20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957.

20021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957.

 

I would like, first of all, to express my deep regret that I may have contributed to the prolongation of the process of the Security Council by my inability to be present here at the last meeting I have done the best I can to meet the convenience of the Council and the necessities of the case by coming to the meeting this morning. I also would like to express my regrets to the Foreign Minister of Pakistan for not having had the privilege of listening to his observations in person, but I have read them with great care.

 

On behalf of my Government I have intervened in this debate on three different occasions and made statements which go into considerable detail, all of which my Government regards as essential and relevant. The fact that the Security Council has given it the attention it has, is proof of its importance. I have read nearly sixty pages of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan's statement and if I were going to take this on the basis of answering it paragraph by paragraph and dealing with accusations and allegations, it would take another lengthy statement. I am sure it would not be the wish of the Security Council that I should do so. And without in any way adopting the tenor of that speech, I would like to say that I have no intention of answering the personal attacks and reflections upon my country contained in it, nor have I any intention of the Council to consider certain expressions used, and the reference to certain fables and so on, which my Punjabi friends would say are not in good taste and therefore I will not touch on them.

 

At the same time, since, so far as the Government of India is concerned, its position has been affected in this matter on several occasions by allowing things to pass without an attempt

 to place them on record, I propose to take only such categories of points that have been raised and refer to the total mis-statements of act, and I have a responsibility to the Government of India and to this Council to correct these mis-statements because then affect the relations between our two countries, the status of this Council and the peace of the world. These mis-statements are an attempt to confuse the issue. It would be wrong for me to say they reflect any confusion in the mind of the author that would be impolite.

 

The first of these is to ridicule the idea that the Government of India has repeatedly referred to the facts of accession, aggression, sovereignty and such other matters; and my distinguished colleague found these words-I will not say offensive rather boring. But they are the basis of the problem. Of course if you get the basis out of the way then you can do what you like with it in your own direction. But that is the basis of the problem. It was the basis of the problem when we came here; it has continued to be the basis of the problem at every meeting of the Commission, at every meeting of the Council, in every assurance that has been given to the Government of India was known to the Government of Pakistan publicly-and there we make no apologies for this, And what is more, the Government of India will not resign from its fundamental position that Kashmir-until something else may happen, as I said before is an integral part of the Union of India by its Constitution, by what it has derived from the British Parliament by the fact of international law and-if I may say so without going into legal argument-I believe the British Government has the greatest experience in this matter in its relations with Portugal. Any municipal law which is generally accepted in other parts of the world attains the status of international law even if it is not incorporated. Here is a situation which is common to great parts of systems of parliamentary government where as a successor State, inherited our status, our functions and our power by parliamentary legislation and by authority conferred by the British Parliament accepted by two sides, That has been the basis of our position from the beginning. I do not want to elaborate this because I have gone into it in great detail.

 

If I correct mis-statements of fact, it is only because the Security Council should be aware that on behalf of the Government of India no statement-and I say this without qualification -has been made before the Council which is not supported by documentary evidence and if any statement is challenged we are prepared. If we are wrong, withdraw it, but there will be no occasion for doing so.

 

Now we did make a point that Pakistan delayed its acceptance of the 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75] resolution; not in order to make a point of chronology but because delay which enabled Pakistan to make the military advances was that that it hoped to make. And in the meantime, between 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, many things happened and it had rejected the resolution, and the Commission says so. The Foreign Minister tells us that this is not the case. He says: "We accepted it a little later; we did the same as the others." Let me read to you what he said:

 

"It is very significant to note here that whereas Pakistan took a little time, a month or two"-a month or two is from August to December-"in asking for clarifications and then accepting, along with India, the resolution in toto, Mr. Krishna Menon tried to create trouble because of this two or three months delay." [770th meeting. para. 9]

 

With great respect, what I do here is not the concern of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. I am not a subject or a citizen of Pakistan; I represent my Government and I wish in the future he would be a more careful in making references to me,

 

What are the facts ? The facts are-and this refers to the 13 August 1948 resolution-that Pakistan took a long time. Pakistan made a reply fairly soon, but this was a reply not of acceptance but a request for clarification. The Commission said the reply had the character of a rejection. This is what the Commission said; "The Commission observes with regret that the Government of Pakistan has been unable to accept the resolution" -that is, the resolution of 13 August 1948; these are not my words-without attaching certain conditions beyond the compass of this resolution, thereby making impossible an immediate cease-fire and the beginning of fruitful negotiations between the two Governments and the Commission to bring about a peaceful and final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir." [S/ 1100, para, 108.]

 

There was no question of Pakistan accepting the 13. August resolution. It rejected it; and it rejected it for the simple reason that it did not want a cease-fire at that time. This is not a question of chronology only. It is a question of the reasons why this was brought about. Therefore, first of all, the facts are not as stated, and it is incorrect for the Foreign Minister of Pakistan to suggest that we have misquoted anything or misrepresented his position. We rely on the Commission's reports.

 

Now, the next point I want to deal with, not in detail, because there is not enough time, is with regard to what I call "assurance". Here I would request the members of the Security Council to study the documents which are before them; they will have the time to do so, I hope. Now the assurances that are given to India are of a categorical character, that is to say, the Prime Minister asked certain questions. "Is this 'a, b, c'? This is our understanding, 'x, y, z'. Do you agree ?" And the Commission said, "Our interpretation corresponds"-whether it be Mr. Korbel or Mr. Lozano; they give a categorical statement. Therefore, three is a query and an answer which makes a complete affirmation. That is the position with regard to the assurances given to India. These assurances are part of the documents of the Security Council. They are the assurances given by the Commission, whether it be given by the Chairman or not. The assurances given to Pakistan were, I believe, with two exceptions, of an entirely different character. The Pakistan Government asked certain. And the Commission did not say : "We agree with this" or make certain interpretations. It did not say: "We agree with this". It said: "We do not agree with this" or "We mean something else."

 

Now the most characteristic example of this is the one to which the distinguished representative, I believe it was the United Kingdom or the United States, I forget which one, referred to the other day, about the synchronization of withdrawal. Now, the Commission told Pakistan that, "What we mean by synchronization is very different from what you mean by synchronization." Now, I do not call that an assurance. In an assurance the two pieces must fit together. In our case, they did. Every one of our assurances are of this character. And my submission is that so far as assurances are given to Pakistan we can only call them so-called assurances.

 

Secondly, the assurances given to us were published; they are not secret. Pakistan accepted the two resolutions after those assurances were known. The Government of India cannot accept the position that one can read these documents separately from the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which were accepted, and the assurances which were endorsed by the Security Council.

 

Then we come to another aspect which is very important. I have no personal feelings about this matter, but Mr. Noon accused me of misinterpreting the paragraph in the resolution which refers to the truce lines [770th meeting, paras 17 ff.). This has reference to part II, section B, paragraph 2, of the resolution, which reads as follows:

 

"Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of cease-fire the minimum. strength of its forces which in agreement with the com mission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order..." [S/1100 para. 75.]

 

We made the point that this was part agreement that was reached, that it was the responsibility of the Government of India for the security of the whole State. It has to go to the assistance of the local authorities. The "local authorities" was the name used exclusively for the entities in the occupied area. Subject to this, in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government had to maintain its forces within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire.

 

Now, the distinguished Foreign Minister tells us that these lines-he used the plural-refer to different cease-fire lines [770th meeting, para. 19]. I refer the Security Council to its own map. This is the map, which unfortunately does not have a page number, but it appears at the end of the third interim report of the Commission. I do not know whether anybody can see it (indicating), that is the cease-fire line. There is only one line. There are not two cease-fire lines. I have behind me the military attached of the delegation of India to the United Nations who spent three years in Kashmir in the campaign. What is more he has spent the whole of his military life in the Punjab-the area we are referring to. The lines that are referred to are the battle lines, the disposition of forces as they were then. There can be no other lines. There was only one cease-fire line. Does the Security Council believe that after all these months of discussion the Commission would have put in here a plural which has no meaning? Would the Commission have repeatedly stated the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, he Government of the whole State as being local authorities? The "local authorities", as I have pointed out, are the words used in relation to the occupied area. Therefore, I do not propose to go into all the dissertations in the Oxford dictionary. The meaning is very clear. At that time we were thinking in terms of a quick cease-fire. So far as we are concerned, there has been no attempt to mislead the Council. We have never misled the Council and we do not intend to do so. If our case is bad at any point, we are prepared to accept that decision. There is only one cease fire line which therefore establishes the position.

 

What is more, clear on, Mr. Korbel, who was Chairman of the Commission, said that the responsibility for law and order, which includes security, is that of the Government of India. This is another part of the assurances which are in your documents, so you cannot get away from that one.

 

We come next to the question of incorporation. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan was surprised that we brought this matter up just now. Though he said that I-presumably the Government of India-make trouble, we do not chase trouble. We know that de facto this territory has been under the authority of Pakistan since the cease-fire and the deterioration of the situation, since it disregarded the injunctions of the Security Council and acted as though to reap the fruits of invasion. But it was only when Pakistan took an overt illegal action that the Indian Parliament sat up and took notice. It was not as though the Government made this difficult. The Indian Parliament naturally turned around and asked how is it that a neighbouring State has a right to part of a territory that, under the Indian Constitution, is Indian? No country represented here would permit that. Pakistan accepted Chitral's accession, which it had no right to do, because Chitral had no right to accede as it was only a feudatory State. There is all this reference to how the people of Chitral will Vote. You know that it is a very dangerous thing for a gentleman to come here and tell us how people are going to vote, because that knocks the bottom out of free elections, if anybody announces how people will vote before the vote is taken. That is why we did not bring up Chitral until the Pakistan Constitution was enacted.

 

Then, the representative of Pakistan informed the Council -I will try to make this as brief as I can that the incorporation of Kashmir is provided for in article 203 of the Constitution of Pakistan [770th meeting, para. 25]. There it says that when the issue is decided, Kashmir shall become part of Pakistan. My submission is that the reference is to that part of Kashmir which it does not have. That incorporation refers to that part of Kashmir. That is what article 203 is for. The present thing is covered by article 1. clause (2), sub-clause (c), of the Constitution to Pakistan. I think I circulated it. I am speaking from memory. I believe it definitely says that every area under Pakistan administration is part of the State of Pakistan. And this area is under Pakistan's administration-so it is de facto and this has been stated by the Commission. What is more, it

is administered by Pakistan. There is a Minister of Kashmir Affairs. There is no question that this is under Pakistan administration,

 

If it is contended, as it is sought to be implied in a later paragraph, that we cannot ask these people to have elections because they are independent, does the Security Council believe that these people are capable of raising forty-five battalions of artillery and infantry with modern equipment, part of which was supplied to Pakistan itself by foreign countries ? Are they capable of bringing these arms to that level? What is more, there is a submission made by their own administration, not ours, which the Pakistan Government regards as the national movement in the "Azad '' area, their memorandum to the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan [S/PV. 762/Add. 1, annex III, sect. 1], complaining about the way they are being treated. The phrase, I believe, is that they cannot even appoint a peon -peon means a porter, a messenger, something of that kind -in "Azad '' Kashmir. This is a position about incorporation.

 

Then there is a reference in three different places which is very vital to us in regard to what we consider as the essential in any kind of election or plebiscite-that is, freedom from religious propaganda. That is to say, no one shall be subjected to the threat or to the fear that he will suffer disabilities in another world if he votes in this way, that way or the other way. This is not only against the character of a secular State, but against the whole conception of the United Nations. It is embodied in our various declarations, and I have quoted them. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said that the Government of India can claim no credit for this, which was done by the British Government in 1920. Well, the British Government did a lot of good things as well as a lot of evil things. They did a lot of good things and when we adopted them they became ours. But in fact, that is not the case. The wording of the election law I read out to you is our own. I am not sure that the British wording was not better phrased, but here it was ours. However, that is not the main point. The main point is that I am surprised and rather worried about the fact that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan made a difference, a distinction and do hope that some of his very trusted friends will listen to this-which either the United States or the United Kingdom has not made in any plebiscite for over thirty years-between an election and a plebiscite [770th meeting, para. 32] He suggests that it is right in an election not to appeal to these things, but that in a plebiscite you can appeal to anything. If that is so, then we know where we are.

 

The next point to which I want to refer is the charge levelled against us in regard to the 5 January 1949 resolution [S/1196, para. 15]. I will state on behalf of my Government that the 5 January 1949 resolution elaborates part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948. It is not a separate document or a separate agreement. After five months of negotiation, the Commission said; "If part I and part II are observed, we will then come to part III. Then the two Governments confer. This is a plan upon which you can work. "I think nobody put it better than the representative of Colombia, whose speech I read: "it is not enough to draw up a contract; it has to be signed by both parties' '. [771st meeting para. 11]. Here, however, it goes farther than that. This is merely a working plan. It is like an architect's blueprint. If all the blueprints made by architects were buildings, then I am afraid the world would be overbuilt. That is the position.

 

I want to go back to the Commission. The Commission talks about the 5 January 1949 resolution. Mr. Lozano, who was Chairman of the Commission, makes a reference to this which is contained in the third interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan :

 

"Mr. Lozano explained that the proposal did not supersede part III of the resolution of 13 August, but was an elaboration of it."-that is exactly what the Government of India said. "They did, however, take priority over the consideration of alternative methods..."

 

That is to say, the Government of India has suggested that while it is true we are discussing plebiscites, if we want a settlement, why do we not consider everything else ? Therefore, Mr. Lozano said in effect. "Let us get through with this plebiscite business and see whether we cannot do it in this way. If we cannot do it in this way, we will do it in some other way". The statement of Mr. Lozano continues as follows:

 

"and every effort had to be made towards putting these proposals into effect. It was in this connexion that Mr. Lozano expressed the view that if the Plebiscite Administrator should find a plebiscite impossible for "technical or practical reasons", he or the Commission would then recommend to the Security Council a solution different from that of a plebiscite and acceptable to the Government of India and Pakistan."

 

This makes it quite clear that the 5 January 1949 resolution has no life. I think that is the only way to put it. It is inanimate without part III of the 13 August 1948 resolution. The 13 August resolution has the character I have mentioned to you. It is an obligation upon us, after parts I and II are performed after law and order is restored, to confer with the other side about the fair means of a plebiscite. Now, how can you get away from that ?

 

My colleagues tell me in private that this is against that, and that is against that. I want them to answer this question. Just because one promises to discuss a plan, does it mean that one agrees to the principles of it? No. We said: "If the plebiscite comes, we shall do it this way, that way or the other way".

 

Great play has been made both by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and by his friends of the fact that the first paragraph of the 5 January 1949 resolution refers to a plebiscite and they say it is on this basis that this programmes rests in order that this may be done, and a certain course may be followed. Therefore I refer you to the quotation I have just read out. I do so because I do not want the Security Council to be left in any doubt. We would sooner lose a point than try to mislead the Council. If our position was the other way, we would not have been in such a situation. With regards to the withholding of information, the Pakistan Government did not convey to the Security Council the information it should have conveyed and the Commission time after time has said that this makes a difference.

 

Let us take the point that the United States and United Kingdom are so obsessed about: demilitarization. I do not use the word 'obsessed' except in a very textual sense. Sir Pierson Dixon is a classical scholar and has an accurate mind, and so he would not mind.

 

It is said that demilitarization is the crux of the matter. Now I invite you to read statement after statement of the Commission where it said that the whole of this demilitarization question has been bedeviled by the fact that, after the acceptance of these documents, i.e., even after 13 August 1948 and even after 5 January 1949, the Commission came to know about the build-up of the "Azad" forces, about the creation of an army, about the annexation of the territory, about the occupation of the northern areas. In fact, Pakistan disregarded all the resolutions from 17 January 1948 onwards. I cannot understand this very un-Anglo-Saxon procedure of taking up a thing at one and forgetting the whole background of it.

 

The whole of this demilitarization procedures have been bedeviled by this, and that has arisen from the fact that the Security Council was not informed. The Security Council was informed, I think, on 15 January 1948 that the Pakistan Government was not concerned with these marauding raids. It denied our charges. The Pakistani said they were not there, but soon afterwards the Commission found them there. The information about the "Azad" forces was also not given. What did the Commission say about it? It said, "This constitutes a material change in the situation". A material change is a change that goes to the root of the matter. When you have a material change, how can you go on playing about with the words that were written down without taking that into account? That is why further assurances were to come.

 

I should like, therefore, to request the Council to read the assurances given by Mr. Lozano to the Government of India in regard to large-scale disarming and disbandment of "Azad'' Kashmir forces and the wording used to the Pakistan Government which unfortunately, if I may say so, for him, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan has quoted Mr. Lozano said, "The disbandment is not contemplated by the resolution". In other words, what he said was, "When the resolution was written, you did not tell us about thirst we did not know; and that is why we had to give the assurances". This habit the Council has been led into of treating the two sides on the same footing is what has bedeviled the whole situation. What is given to us are assurances. They are protocols to a document. So far as Pakistan is concerned the position is different. What the Commission told Pakistan was that the resolution did not contemplate the disbandment of the "Azad" forces. The resolution could not, because the Commission did not know the forces were there. In other words, he is telling them politely, "If you had told us, it would have been there in the resolution".

 

On 19 August 1948, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, in a memorandum attached to a letter of the same date to the Chairman of the Commission, stated:

 

"While the Security Council was still engaged in the consideration of the Kashmir case, India was steadily building up its armed forces in Jammu and Kashmir. This building-up process did not cease on 21 April 1948, but was continued and intensified. The Indian Army mounted a big offensive in the beginning of April, thereby causing a material change in the situation."-(The Commission has not said this.) "This offensive action has continued ever since. The publicly declared intention of the Government of India was to secure a military decision in Jammu and Kashmir, thus presenting the United Nations Commission with a fait accompli. This situation not only put in jeopardy the entire population of the areas under the "Azad" Kashmir Government, and led to a big influx of refugees into Pakistan, but also constituted a direct threat to Pakistan's security. It was this which compelled the Government of Pakistan to move their troops into certain defensive positions." [S/1100, annex. 26, appendix, para. 4]

 

This is the defence for its invasion and the fact that it was hidden from the Security Council. This is the Foreign Minister's statement. What is the Commission's answer ? The Commission said, in the letter of 27 August 1948 from the Chairman of the Commission :

 

"The Security Council resolution of 21 April 1948 which sets forth the terms of reference of the Commission, was adopted with cognizance of the presence of Indian troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The presence of Pakistani troops in Jammu and Kashmir, however, constitutes a material change in the situation inasmuch as the Security Council did not contemplate the presence of such troops in that State, nor was it apprised thereof by the Government of Pakistan. The Commission cannot accept the statement in the memorandum that the Commission's quote'." [Ibid., annex 27, appendix, para. 4.]

 

I ask you whether that is not, in polite language, a statement by the Commission, as regards the Security Council's, resolution and the legitimacy of the Indian troops in Kashmir that the incursion of Pakistani elements was concealed from the Security Council, that this was a misdemeanor, an offence against the Security Council and the Charter and therefore constituted a material change, and that it repudiated the undertaking given to the Council itself. This is part of the Commission's statement, and I do not see how the Security Council can overlook it.

 

There are two references to military aid, in one of which our friends of the United Kingdom come in for a reference. There is a reference to the military aid to Pakistan and the economic aid to India [770th meeting. para. 56 ff.]. I am very sorry to have to go into this, because the arrangements between the United States and ourselves, and in the same category the arrangements with Pakistan, are bilateral. They are published documents, and I hope the representative of the United States will not mind my saying that the greater part of the development expenditure in India is our own money, raised from the banks and by way of loans and in other ways; but when the generous aid from the United States comes, it is for specified purposes and we cannot divert it. What is more, it is part of the policy of the Government of India, from which it does not deviate, that for every dollar that is given as aid the Government of India contributes many times more. Otherwise it would not go into the project, because India does not want any project to become dependent upon foreign aid. Therefore, it is wrong to suggest that the economic aid that comes from anywhere else, whether we build plants through the Germans or the Russians or the Americans or the British by long-term loans or what not, enables us to divert our resources. With a few exceptions, this economic aid is not in reference to the feeding of our people, but is in reference to future projects. Therefore, it is not as though we take it from a till and give it somewhere else. I think that this is a gross perversion of the facts and something that my Government cannot let pass unchallenged. I think that it is a slur on the United States Government, which is extremely careful so far as we are concerned as to the way in which the money is spent. We are anxious that it should know exactly where the money goes, because we have no desire to divert any foreign aid, no matter from what country it comes, whether it be under the Colombo Plan or under a United Nations plan, to any other purpose. To make a statement of that kind I think is a very unfriendly act to a neighbouring country. which is trying its best to live in friendly relations with its neighbour.

 

Military aid to Pakistan, on the other hand, is another matter. There are no published figures on this aid. We have some idea of it, however. No one knows the quality of this aid, and, what is more, it is very difficult to calculate the quantity of this aid in dollar terms because a great part of this equipment is material which was left over from the Second World War and which is good enough for use in fighting against us. All we can say is that the quantum of United States aid, as the Prime Minister of India stated several times last week, is very considerable and is so considerable as to challenge our security.

 

I have stated more than once in the Security Council, and I must repeat it now, that we do not question the assurances of the United States Government that this aid is not given for that purpose. But we deny that the United States is capable of preventing the receiver from using it for whatever purpose it wants. That is our position.

 

Reference has been made to our purchase of bombers in the United Kingdom [770th meeting, para. 571. The purpose of all this is to create an atmosphere to show that we are embarking upon a large-scale invasion. I am very sorry that this reference has been made, because these Canberra bombers from the United Kingdom have been the subject of negotiation for two or two and one half years. In fact, I believe that I started the negotiation myself. The negotiations have been going on for a very long time. The British are very slow in deliveries because of their own commitments and everything else, and we are very particular about getting them on terms that are suitable to us. The bargaining goes on and the arrangements go on, and all this was finalized the other day. The Government of India deeply regrets that from some source in the United Kingdom not connected with the Government, the information leaked out into the Press at the time when this discussion was taking place. It has been synchronized purely from a propaganda point of view. This transaction constitutes a normal replacement. When the British left, there were other bombers which belonged to the period of ten to fifteen years ago. If one has an air force one might as well have it equipped with modern aircraft. That is all there is to it. It constitutes an ordinary replacement for the bomber force of the Indian Air Command.

 

Reference was also made to India's retention of large. quantities of military material that were left in India by the British [770th meeting. para. 59]. I am asked to make an emphatic repudiation of this statement and to express our surprise that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, even though his relations with his Government in an official capacity are recent, should have been guilty of this statement. The moment that partition was decided upon, we set up a Partition Council in which our two sides were represented, and arrangements were made. What was due to Pakistan, we have given to Pakistan. What could not be given, we have paid for. I think, if anything, the balance was the other way round. Therefore, there is no truth whatsoever in that statement, and I am sure that if there was any truth in it, that would have motivated the British to do something about it.

 

Repeated references were made about Indian troop movements. The purpose of all this was to convey the impression not so much to the Security Council but to the world-that India was preparing for aggressive action. It is not a secret that India has an army, and we hope it is a good army if the time should come to test its strength. There is nothing very secret about these troop movements apart from the normal secrecy which the military maintains. It is not usual to refer to troop movements in a public debate of this character, and quite frankly.. I do not know how much of this is what the United States would call classified information. However, since we have been challenged on this, we might as well speak of it.

 

I am authorized by the Prime Minister of India to state that the whole orientation of this in the sense of troop concentrations anywhere is entirely false. I have stated this once before,

 

Reference was made [770th meeting, paras. 66 and 67] to the movement of the 166th Brigade [5th Division], from Dal honsie (Punjab, India) to Pathankot on the Indo-Pakistan border. This is a normal process which has taken place from British times-it has certainly taken place from independence times. That movement had nothing to do with this particular year. It is something which takes place in this season. It is the normal process of moving the troops in this season of the year. We could not keep them at Dalhousie at this time. It is quite a normal practice for a brigade, upon completion of its training. to return to its permanent location.

 

Reference has been made to the 123rd Brigade. All I can say is this there has been no addition whatsoever to the strength on the East Punjab and West Pakistan border. I submit this is a solemn statement on behalf of the Government of India we have not indulged in any troop concentrations; in fact, our normal defence against Pakistan, if there should be any trouble, would be by our armed police. It has not always been satisfactory, but it is far better to take the risks of being hit once or twice rather than to take the risk of a general scuffle.

 

Reference was made to the 27th Division. Here again there has been no change whatsoever-no change in the formation, no change in the units, no change in the strength,

 

Reference has been made to the 2nd Armoured Brigade. My colleague, the Maharaja of Patiala, who sits behind me,

 

knows that this armoured brigade has been in Patiala for the last six years.

 

The Security Council was informed that the First Armoured Division is now in Jhansi, presumably banking on the fact that the Security Council would not be familiar with the map of India without looking at it, for Jhansi is very far from the Pakistan border. In fact, this regiment had been at Jalandhar before it was moved farther away to Jhansi.

 

I note a mark of impatience on the faces of some members, which I can quite well understand. I did not want all these details to be given, but when a Government is charged with the concentration of troops and preparing for war, it is necessary to clarify the position. We have done nothing in that direction, even though we have knowledge through our intelligence service of the preparations on the other side and the danger which we are facing. We do not want to be put in the position before the world that we have gone into mobilization and we do not want our people and this is our greater concern-to get into a war fever. For those reasons there have been no changes whatsoever and I repudiate every one of the insinuations contained in those statements.

 

I come now to the question of censorship of the Press mentioned by the representative of Pakistan [770th meeting, paras. 80 fr.] I hope that the United Kingdom representative will have something to say on this score. I would like to ask him, through the President, the following question: if a United Kingdom national had been manhandled, would not the United Kingdom Government have taken some action in the matter privately, publicity or otherwise ? Perhaps the representative of the United Kingdom would tell us some time whether his Government has any reason to protest.

 

It is significant that the United Kingdom newspapers. which have been quoted by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan are of a particular character-and it is not my intention here to use invectives, because I am polite. The "Daily Mail" and the "Daily Express" have been quoted by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan; The Kashmir Government has looked into this matter. It has denied a report broadcast by the BBC and the Pakistan Radio (there is a relationship between the BBC and the Indian Radio and the Pakistan Radio; and, therefore, when the Pakistan Radio broadcasts something, the BBC picks it up as normal news) to the effect that two British correspondents who visited Kashmir were attacked by hostile crowds and were unable to leave their hotel.

 

The Press Note issued by the Kashmir Government reads as follows:

 

"There is no truth in the report broadcast by BBC and Pakistan Radio that two British correspondents visiting Kashmir had been attacked by hostile crowds and were now unable to leave their hotel.

 

"The two correspondents who arrived in Srinagar last week have been afforded all facilities and treated with the utmost courtesy by all concerned. They have been moving about freely interviewing people. The allegation that the two correspondents were attacked by hostile crowds is presumably based on a minor incident which took place a few days back when there was a demonstration in Srinagar in connexion with the Security Council's latest resolution on Kashmir"-and I suggest that demonstrations take place in this country, too, when there are draft resolutions before the United Nations. Our people are allowed to demonstrate. No one was manhandled. The two correspondents, accompanied by a State Government information officer, were going in a jeep when they were caught up in the midst of a group of demonstrators. It is true that the demonstrators were excited, but at no stage were the correspondents attacked or hurt in any way. All the same they were afforded adequate protection by the police. The allegation made in the BBC report that "they were kicked and punched and red hot charcoal poured from braziers' ' is absolutely baseless.

 

"The two newsmen continue to enjoy the various facilities extended to them and have been visiting places. On Sunday '' that is two days afterwards-"they went to Mughal Gardens and today they went out duck shooting."-I submit that the correspondents could not have been very badly burned if they were able to go out duck shooting. I continue to quote:

 

"The Jammu and Kashmir Government wishes to make it clear that foreign visitors to Kashmir can, as in the past, look forward to all facilities and courtesy due to them as tourists."

 

In fact, the Kashmir Government has a vested interest in this matter. A considerable part of its revenue comes from the tourist trade, and it therefore does not want to make any difficulty for anyone wishing to come to Kashmir.

 

I shall not repudiate everything else that has been said by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan in this respect. I would only say that all the United Kingdom newspapers which have been quoted by him are newspapers which, for more than a generation, have attacked Indian Independence. These newspapers have been against the national movement in India. This does not, of course, mean that the United Kingdom Government or the British people are against that movement. In every country there must be different organs of opinion. But the fact remains that the newspapers quoted by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan have been against Indian independence and have been particularly bad in reporting the news so far as we are concerned. I have no doubt that some of these reporters wrote one story for the newspapers and told a different story to other people. These are the facts.

 

At this stage, I would like to read out to the Council extracts from a syndicated column by Mr. Elmore Philpott, a Canadian Member of Parliament, which appeared in the Canadian Press a few days ago. We have ascertained that Mr. Philpott is a gentleman of high repute, whose opinions are respected. In his weekly column, Mr. Philpott accused the Western Press as a whole of being unfair to Prime Minister Nehru so far his stand on Kashmir is concerned. Mr. Philpott said :

 

"It never was true that the Indian Army 'seized' Kashmir, as many American newspapers are now starting with complete disregard for actual facts."

 

Recounting the sequence of events in which "Kashmir was actually invaded by wild mountaineer tribesmen on 22 October 1947, the orgy of violence and destruction" that went on and the signing of the instrument of accession by the Ruler of Kashmir, Mr. Philpott said:

 

"While it is true that the Ruler of Kashmir was Hindu, it is equally true that the victims of the invasion of Kashmir were mostly Muslims"-I would remind members of the Council that I have already informed them of this fact "and the whole Muslim population of the Valley of Kashmir was frantically appealing for protection from wild invaders... The Indian Army at that time was still under the command of the British officers."-the Commander in-Chief was General Lockhart-"A combat team of 335 men was flown in one of the most timely and clever airborne operations of our times. A small force arrived literally in the nick of time to save Kashmir, not so much for Indian as from violence of the mountaineer invaders, It was considerably later when the Kashmir trouble degenerated into actual war between India and Pakistan. For weeks or even months after the original outbreak, the Pakistan Government tried to convince the world that it had no direct part in the events in Kashmir. Time after time the United Nations arbitrators have found that Pakistan has no 'locus standi' in Kashmir on any basis of legality....

 

"Nehru told me in 1951 that he was completely in earnest about permitting a free vote in Kashmir. But he insisted that Pakistan must meet certain prior conditions including complete withdrawal of her armed forces from all disputed territory before the vote."

 

I have already stated our position with regard to the use of a United Nations force, I shall refer to this question again when we reach the state of discussing the draft resolution

 

I have no desire to go into the anecdotes and fables mentioned by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan. I would only say that I deeply regret the way he has chosen to treat this subject, so far as we are concerned. The Security Council must be the judge as to the manner in which we have presented the facts, as we see them, and have sought to rely on the available documents.

 

At this stage, I would like to make the position of the Government of India clear beyond any possible doubt. Whatever I say in this connexion must be viewed in the background of history-which has been submitted to the Council on many, many occasions-and in the light of all the points that have been outlined to the Council with respect to the position of Kashmir, which is not a no-man's-land.

 

When, on 1 January 1948, we submitted a formal complaint to the Security Council under Chapter VI of the Charter, we were not asking the Council to settle a territorial dispute. I would ask members of the Security Council whether they can show me any evidence anywhere to prove that a suggestion of This kind was made. We came to the Security Council to ask its assistance in obtaining, under Chapter VI of the Charter, the end of an aggression. We informed the Council that, if that were not done, other consequences would follow. Without withdrawing that position, I would say this at the request of the Security Council and of some of Mr. Jarring's predecessors as Presidents of the Council, we expressed our willingness to consider various methods for a pacific settlement. And I would emphasize that we brought this matter to the Council under Chapter VI of the Charter-a fact which seems to have been forgotten. We could have invoked Chapter VII, but we prefer red to invoke Chapter VI. Under the specific methods for a pacific settlement, various plans have been suggested. I would submit to the Council that the essence and basis of all these procedures-whether resolutions of the Security Council, requests we have made, or caveats we have entered and accept ed-is that, whatever may happen in the future, the territory of Kashmir is an integral part of the Union of India, that an aggression has taken place, that the Jammu and Kashmir Government is a sovereign Government, that India is responsible for the security and internal order of Kashmir, that peaceful conditions must be restored before anything else can be done, and that the accession is a continuing accession, capable of termination by the Government of India. Furthermore, we have obtained assurances, which are incorporated in a resolution passed by the Security Council itself, that the only legal authority that can do anything in the State of Jammu and Kashmir is the sovereign authority; this has been emphasized time and time again. Thus, all of the procedures which have been before us have been pacific procedures. In the pursuit of the carrying out of these pacific procedures, two resolutions have been adopted.

 

The Government of India therefore requests the Security Council to consider, after nine years, whether these pacific procedures have been followed or if they have been violated. Of course, these are minor violations in all procedures; there are minor violations by either side. But are they violations that go to the root of them ? That is the first point. The second is whether these procedures are vitiated by the concealment of facts and therefore the whole basis of the approach disappears, Therefore, the Government of India asks compliance with part I, paragraph B of the 13 August 1948 resolution, which is not observed by the Pakistan Government, and is therefore a violation of the cease-fire order.

 

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan said that if there were violations of the cease-fire order, the observers would report the violation [770th meeting, para. 73). In fact, there are violations; sometimes there are violations from our side; somebody goes this way or that way; sometimes they come in. They are reported and matters are settled. But it is definitely laid down in the cease-fire agreement which concerns the observers. that they have nothing to do with political questions. This is a political question. And this is what it says. Part I, paragraph B, reads as follows:

 

"The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control in the State of Jammu and Kashmir." [S/1100, para, 75].

 

The Government of India categorically states that since the adoption of the 5 January 1949 resolution, Pakistan has introduced into the territory of Kashmir occupied by it very large quantities of military equipment; it has trained a considerable army, it has created airfields and has made it a base of attack against us, endangering our security. Therefore, before we proceed any further, before we even talk about part II, the Security Council, I submit, has a duty in regard to this resolution. There has been a tendency to talk about this as though this is what we undertook with Pakistan, and Pakistan undertook it with us. The Security Council told us, "You people settle this on this plan". Therefore, the Security Council took over. Therefore, their moral responsibility is certain and whatever legal responsibilities can be brought to its door under the Charter-it must see that this is carried out. The Government of India is entitled to ask today, after nine years, why the material brought in after the cease-fire order, apart from all questions of demilitarization, is not removed.

 

Secondly, Part B does not require any action. In fact, it does not call for any action from India at all. It is an action the Pakistan Government has to take not only in pursuance of this resolution, but also in pursuance of the resolution of 17 January 1948, which they not only violated but acted in such a way as to conceal the fact from the Security Council. Any Government that is guilty of concealing material facts is out of court before the Security Council. Therefore, the Government of India requests the Security Council to interest itself in its responsibility as one of the parties of this matter and to point out that paragraph B of part I of the 13 August 1948 resolution is being violated.

 

Paragraph E of the agreement states:

 

"The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations." [Ibid.]

 

I have made statements and produced evidence before the Council many times. I did not have too much difficulty because the Foreign Minister of Pakistan himself produced evidence by his statement. His first speech was an ultimatum to the Government of India. Here are reports from the Press in Pakistan which refer to the preparation of tribesmen for the invasion of Kashmir, and these were not non-Pakistan. Balochistan is part of Pakistan. These are persons who are in an official position in relation to all of this.

 

I quote from "Dawn" of 7 February 1957. The "Dawn" correspondent at Quetta wrote as follows under a Quetta date line of 6 February ;

 

"A deputation of Afghan Pawindas of the Tarak tribe today waited upon the Political Agent of the Quetta Pishin area and offered their services of the liberation of their Kashmiri brethren. "They said that the Tarak tribesmen were ready to sacrifice their all to liberate their Kashmiri brethren from the Bharati"-that is us-"tyranny".

 

"The deputation consisted of Malik Khurram Khan Taraki, Malik Akko Khan and Malik Abdullah Khan Hotak".

 

Here is another article from "Dawn" with a Rawalpindi dateline of 8 February 1957. Rawalpindi is in the Punjab. The article states:

 

"In the event of the Security Council's failure to bring Bharat"-that is India-"to reason, we shall not hesitate to revive the liberation war to free our enslaved brethren on the other side of the cease-fire line", says a resolution passed recently at a representative gathering in Skardu... "We are much at seeing our brethren in occupied Kashmir marooned into an unconstitutional accession..."

 

Here is another article from "Dawn" with a Quetta deteline of 9 February 1957:

 

"Mir Habibullah Khan Nausherwani ''-I suppose he is head of the place, the former ruler of the Kharan State "today said that he, along with his tribesmen, was ready to sacrifice them all for liberation of Kashmir. He has requested the Additional Commissioner, Kalat Division, to convey his offer to the Pakistan Government."

 

The duty of any civilized Government today, when a citizen of that kind offers to attack a neighbouring country, is to have him taken under its law. Pakistan owes an obligation to the international community, when any citizen of their makes statements of this kind, to take action against him. But, instead of that, our information is that every considerable concentration is taking place, and, as I have stated before in the Security Council, the pattern is exactly the same as it was in 1947. It is our duty under the Charter-and I say this with all the feelings I personally have and that my Government has about war-if our territory is invaded to resist that invasion. And I am directed by the Government of India to repeat what it has said before that any invasion of any part of India is the invasion of the whole of India. The Government of India would regard an attack on Kashmir as an attack on India and would take action accordingly. That was its position from the very beginning because Kashmir is part of India. Therefore, any attack on Kashmir is an attack on the whole of India. We came here on the last occasion to save ourselves from this position. We said to the Security Council: "This attack means we have to invade Pakistan. We do not want to do that. Please ask them to go away". And this is the result.

 

Therefore, in the first instance, the Government of India seeks from the Security Council some consideration. Instead of concentrating all its attention on matters which are incidental to so many things happening beforehand, and which are not integral to the settlement, it should obtain the observance of these conditions or declare them aggressors. Pakistan has to withdraw and it does not require any action from anyone else. I read out to you the Commission's report that it knew that the Indian forces were there and the responsibility they had for the defence of India. Therefore, with regard to part I, paragraphs B and E of the resolution of 13 August 1948, the Government of India requests that this action be taken. The Government of India requests that note be taken of the fact that according to its constitutional procedures, according to its public opinion and according to constitutional and international law, the attack on any part of any country is an attack on the whole.

 

With regard to the remainder, I have gone into details very many times about the withdrawal of Pakistani troops. Part II, section A, paragraph I of the 13 August 1948 resolution state:

 

"As the presence of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State". [S./1100, para. 75.]

 

I submit that that is not a conditional offer. It is an offer. per se because it is more or less a penance for concealing facts from the Security Council. The Pakistanis have come here and said: "We are not invading; our troops are not there. "When they were found out, the Commission dealt with them politely and merely said that it was a material change.

 

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has quoted Sir Owen (770th meeting, paras, 48 to 52], whose opinions have not been favourable to us, but he is a high judicial luminary, and to suggest that he made an observation in order to get India's agreement that is the phrase that was used-is, I say, a very serious statement to make about the Chief Justice of Australia. But I have quoted the whole of the paragraph-so has the representative of Pakistan. What does it say? In effect it says the following: "I cannot go into this question of aggression. I am not going into it, but, irrespective of that, I say there has been violation of international law when they crossed this territory."

 

That is not to say that this is conditional upon something else. What he was saying was this: whether there were previous factors, as Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan urged in the Council, or whether there were other matters to be considered, first of all, he was not entitled to go into them but, with out all that, he would say: "there has been violation of territory"; there was a broach of international law, which is aggression. And I submit that to suggest that Sir Owen Dixon said this only in order to persuade my Prime Minister to agree to something is, in my view, a reflection on character which, we regret, has been made about the Chief Justice of Australia.

 

Therefore, part II, section A, paragraph I has to be observed, and that observance, I submit to the Security Council, does not require any action from anybody else; and what is more, it is an action that is called for precedent to anything. Therefore, paragraphs B and E of part I and section A of part II are conditions, are actions that have to be taken by the Government of Pakistan out of consideration for the agreements which it has entered into; furthermore, and above all, in pursuance of the resolution of 17 January 1948 and, even further, in pursuance of respect for international law and behaviour, because, assuming for argument's sake that there are flaws in our title, how did Pakistan come into Kashmir? It came in only by invasion.

 

What has the Security Council done about asking Pakistan how it incorporated this territory ? What has the Security Council done about asking these people whether the populations in Gilgit or in the western areas, in so-called "Azad '' Kashmir, or in Baltistan, have a vote ? Can they express themselves? Why do they not have these things? Is there any economic development ? No, they have been prevented by occupation; and the efforts of the Kashmir Government and our Government have been to try to bring political liberty and economic emancipation to the area.

 

So the next point which I wish to make is that part II, section A, paragraph I of the resolution has to be carried out. The same applies to paragraph 2 as well. Then comes paragraph 3, on which the Foreign Minister of Pakistan entered a caveat when he spoke last and which I have explained today. There is no doubt whatever from the wording of this paragraph and the supporting documents in this matter that the administration of this area must be by local authorities: that is to say, there should be no Pakistani interference. It is not Pakistan's sovereign territory, and is the duty of the Government of India, under subsequent paragraphs, to go to the assistance of the people there if there should be danger of invasion.

 

I make a further request to the Security Council. Faced as we are with this present situation, in which there is a campaign of hatred, the Government of India believes-and I hope that the Security Council believes-that, apart from all agreements, it is a basic condition that no pacific procedures are possible except in a pacific atmosphere, and, therefore, observance of part I, paragraph E becomes fundamental to any procedure. How can there be a plebiscite or anything else without pacific procedures? How can there be pacific procedures under threats of war and of "Jehad" (holy war), and the invasion of our country, and name-calling all the time ? Unless there is an alteration in the situation, it is quite impossible to achieve any settlement or any approach towards a pacific settlement. In any dispute that is important, and, therefore, it is more important with us.

 

We are quite or prepared at all times to seek methods of conciliation. The Government of India, therefore, desires me to state that, having regard to the security of India, its north western borders today are threatened by an army which is out of proportion to what it was before-and I repudiate the assertion by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that his country's Army is one-third the size of India's Army, and I am prepared to substantiate it in place. I repudiate the suggestion that its equipment is anything like that and, what is more, we desire to point out that the imbalance that has been created has resulted in insecurity for us and, therefore, the Security Council has the responsibility for implementing the basis on which all these considerations have taken place. The Government of India alone is responsible for the security of this territory. Therefore, when the time comes-if it should ever come-we should be free to protect our frontiers. That would not be aggression. But, at the same time, I repeat the solemn undertaking that I gave in the Security Council: the Government of India will not Imove one soldier nor fire a bullet across the cease-fire line in order to assert its legal, constitutional, moral and political rights. It is still prepared to pursue the path of conciliation, the path of negotiation, the efforts of the Security Council or the influence of time but that does not mean that we shall surrender any of our rights, because if this happened to us, our country would be Balkanized and, strange as it may seem, we have a patriotic fervor about its unity.

 

Therefore, I request that the Security Council would not think that we have not made any specific request in this matter. We believe that the pacific settlement of this difficulty the resolving of this problem-as it was rightly called by the represented of Colombia in his amendment [S/3791/Rev. 1]-is possible in terms of a different outlook cannot be one where the aggressor and the aggressed are treated on equal terms. It is, in our submission, an error to take the view, whoever takes it, that the aggression question has been disposed of. That would be a very dangerous precedent for the Security Council to establish, that, because of the passage of time, somebody can reap the fruits of invasion. The position of my Government-whether it be here, or in the Middle East, or in Central Europe, or anywhere else is that no invading power, no invasion, can be permitted to reap rewards for invasion. That is our position in regard to Kashmir.

 

A great deal has been said about the moral position involved in this, and I submit-and I want to submit this with no reservations whatsoever-that the position which we have taken in regard to Kashmir will stand any test of morality. I would like to look at any Government and ask whether, at a time when. its army was marching victoriously, it would stop it in order to avoid further bloodshed. I do not say that no other Government would have done so; all I am saying is that our Government has done as well as any other.

 

In regard to Kashmir, we have come here to pursue pacific methods, we are now pledging ourselves not use force in order to assert our political, constitutional and moral rights, and we point out that within the territory which we are now administer ing, we have brought the benefits of human rights and civilized existence and, in spite of the fact that Pakistan has territory, we have taken half a million people who have fled from "Azad" Kashmir-Moslems-since Pakistan occupied it, because of a region of terror there. I use these words because they have been used against us. And I ask, do you think that it is possible to have an Iron Curtain in a country where in the holiday season 60,000 visitors, including 5,000 Americans, come in? Can you keep any place private where American visitors go in? Therefore, I submit that we have listened to all this patiently. I submit that it is very wrong-and I particularly look to my friend who is smiling at me-to make use of this forum as a forum for maligning a Government which is trying to follow civilized

standards. Our people have the right to vote, to express themselves. That cannot be said of the other side.

 

Therefore, these are the requests that we make to the Security Council. It cannot be said that the position taken by India was one where it was evading its commitments. In order that there may be no doubt about it, may I say that the Government of India will at no time resile from any international engagement into which it has entered. But it is not sufficient for the daily Press to say what that international engagement is; it is not sufficient even for Member Governments-without getting all the facts of the question. There appears to be a difference of opinion on this. Fortunately for us a Colombian was Chairman of the Commission. So the representative of Colombia has taken some interest in the matter. I ask the members of the Council to read these documents. Let the Security Council say that the assurances that have been given, after very grave discussion, with the Prime Minister, by the Chairman of the Commission, on behalf of the United Nations, have no value. If pacts are not to be observed, why should one pact alone be observed ?

 

There is one further point I desire to make, and since there. is there some possibility, Mr. President, if you go out to what is unfortunately called the subcontinent, I would like to state the following: what is the present position? The present position is that two or three clauses of the cease-fire agreement are observed. That is to say, not desiring to try conclusions or to assert our rights by force, and Pakistan also being apparently satisfied with the territory that it has illegally absorbed, for the time being, there is no fighting at the present time. But what is the exact position ? I would like the representative of the Philippines to think about this because there are some doubts about it. What the Security Council is doing by the draft resolution [S/3787] is trying to hold the ring for aggression, that is to say, it is because of the security that is provided by the cease fire line that all this has taken place on the other side. The Security Council's resolution, our respect for the Observer Group, and our desire not to use force in order to assert our rights, are being used as holding the ring for the invader. It is behind this wall, it is behind this cease-fire line that the annexation has taken place. How do I explain to my people why the members of the Security Council, sitting around this table, had not a word to say about the illegal annexation of some 42,200 square miles of our territory ?

 

As I said before, whatever may be the defects in our title, how do these people come in? They have no right to be there at all. And the Commission said so a hundred times over. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan says that the Plebiscite Administrator was not at the beck and call of Jammu and Kashmir. Government he was not to take orders. But may I say something in this connexion as a parallel. We have an Election Commissioner in India. He is paid out of the Indian revenues, but he does not take orders from the Indian Government. He is appointed by the Indian Government, but he does not take orders from the Indian Government. We have High Court Judges in India who are appointed by the President. They are paid out of Indian revenues, but they do not take orders from the Government of India. But the reason why it has been put down that the only constitutional authority that could appoint the Plebiscite Administrator is the Jammu and Kashmir Government, is the assertion by the Security Council, things being as they are of the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government in this matter.

 

That takes us to the draft resolution. There has been a great deal of our attitude, fortunately not in our area. Here I wish to take the opportunity of expressing our appreciation to the Press in Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia- I have not had the opportunity to read the Manila Press-and increasingly. If I may say so, in Australasia. It takes a long time-there is a lot of water between us-for the appreciation of the position we have taken. We believe today, in spite of any attitudes that may be taken for the time being, that we are subscribing fully to the principles of the United Nations Charter. We are resisting the attempt to capitalize from an invasion. We are begging of the Council not to allow the police force which it has put in there which is what the Observer Group is; it does not matter what its size is, it is respected-to be there as the ring for aggression,

behind which there can be a build-up from the ill-gotten gains of a country that has violated international law, that has concealed facts from the Security Council, that has thrown to the winds all canons of decent behaviour.

 

There is one small matter to which I desire to refer before concluding. There has been an attempt in this unfortunate statement, this very ill-conceived statement, contained in the verbatim record of the 770th meeting, to put every delegation around this table at loggerheads with us. In this connexion, reference has been made to the some discourteous observation that I made in connexion with the representative of Iraq [770th meeting, paras, 99 and 100]. Of course, certain newspapers in some countries will naturally be only glad to say so. But I must say, in defence of my colleague, that he did keep on saying that he did not understand the language which he was using very well. I do not believe in myself. I did not say that; he said that. Incidentally, may I say that I have spoken to the representative of Iraq and it is up to him to say what he thinks. But so far as I can understand, he does not take the same view, and I have no desire to enter into a controversy about it. But since it is written down in the document and will be broadcast in the Arab Press, I want to make this position perfectly clear. What did I say? I will read the whole paragraph, because it refers to Sweden also. I said the following:

 

"Now we come to the draft resolution before the Council. There were two suggestions made by the President in his capacity as representative of Sweden. I have not referred. to the observations made by the representative of Iraq except to say" and these are the important words-"that the presentation he has made does not represent the facts. of the situation." [769th meeting. para. 119).

 

So far as I know, there is nothing unparliamentary in it. It simply says that I do not agree with him. They are not the facts and they do not tally with the facts. But that is not the sentence that the representative of Pakistan quarrels with. The sentence reads: "It ignores the circumstances but, at the same time, I pay tribute and express my appreciation of his desire to be kindly on the side on which he is not neutral and that is all I can say." (Ibid.) I am the side on which he is not neutral, so far as I am concerned. I am entitled to say that. I am entitled to say what is the orientation of his view. He does not quarrel with that. I pay my tribute and express my appreciation of his courtesy, and

then I went on to say:

 

"One must stick to the truth even when one wants to be polite." (Ibid.).

 

That "one" refers to me, to Krishna Menon, and not to him. I have to be truthful even if I want to be polite. I am polite in saying that I pay tribute and express appreciation, but at the same time I must say that this does not represent the facts. Now this is plain ordinary English as I was taught, and I intend to go to the representative of the United Kingdom afterwards and find out if I am wrong about this.

 

If I may say so, if there was any trouble in this matter, this is really a matter between the delegation of Iraq and ourselves, and it is not part of the atmosphere of the Charter to try and make trouble between various members especially in the present conditions in the Middle East and in regard to political alignments in which Iraq is involved and with which we are in disagreement. I have spoken to the representative of Iraq and I would like his countrymen to know that it is far from my mind to be discourteous, and I would be severely reprimanded by my Government if ever I was discourteous to him. Not that would happen. There was no such thing intended, no such meaning is conveyed by these words, and I am prepared to think that the Foreign Minister of Pakistan may have, in his general disposition to find fault with what I have said, been led into error. I do not want to attribute motives to him.

 

Therefore, in so far as the matter has been stated I would, through you. Mr. President, ask the representative of Iraq to accept this explanation-not the explanation saying that it was erroneously meant in the beginning, but the explanation of the facts so that his people may know about them.

 

That brings me to the end of my observations in this regard. With respect to the draft resolution itself. I have spoken at length. Our position remains unchanged. The Government of India cannot be a party to the introduction of foreign troops on the sovereign territory of India and the whole of our case rests, has rested and will rest upon the view that Kashmir is a constituent State of the Indian Union. Any soldier who sets foot on Kashmir soil, whether it be in the illegal occupation by Pakistan or under the administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government as part of the Union, will in our view be violating the sovereignty of the territory unless it is with the permission of the Government of the Union of India, because defence and foreign affairs are the concern of the Government of India.

 

Secondly, I should like the Security Council, apart from these considerations, to take very seriously into account what it is really proposing. Here is a territory where, until now although there are a lot of people who do not like us-there have been no communal disturbances. There are perhaps individuals making trouble, but apart from that there have never been any Hindu-Moslem difficulties in Kashmir. Progress is taking place but very large sections of people are against any unsettling of affairs or interference with them, and it is necessary in the present conditions for the Government to put an enormous amount of effort into reconstruction. Does anyone believe that if the forces of the Kashmir police and militia, and the supporting forces of the Indian Army-who did not go to Kashmir against the Kashmir people, but went there against the invaders who committed plunder and rapine mostly against the Moslems and the Christians but on others too, of course-does anyone believe that when those forces are withdrawn it will be possible for such a modicum of troops as may be produced by the Secretary-General to maintain order in the territory? Would they ever be able to have anything other than the character of an army of occupation ? Would not this mean that those troops would take over the Government of the country under a military administration? What would happen in the Pakistan areas of Kashmir. I am stating my position, which the Pakistan Government denies. We see that the Pakistan side of Kashmir is seething with discount. The effects of opposition are coming out and the territory is split from top to bottom on this issue. There is a considerable demand for union with the rest of India, because on the other side can be seen, if nothing else, prosperity, opportunity and, what is more, the right to elect one's own rulers.

 

It is not a small thing that in a feudal state of that type in five years time they have not only displaced the old Maharaja and done away with the dynasty but have elected the other man who has to seek suffrage every five years. Therefore, any conception that the authors of the resolution may have in their minds that they are undertaking some simple operation, some thing which is practicable, is mistaken and it is my duty as the representative of Member State of the United Nations to remind them that their conception is one which is totally impracticable and is calculated to create trouble in the country, to throw it into civil strife end bring back the memories of foreign occupation.

 

To take foreign troops into any country that has formerly been colonial is to rub wounds which are only just beginning to heal, and there can be no question at any time that this can happen. The Government of India cannot depart from any of the basic positions that I have stated. Equally, it will not depart from its determination to follow the paths of conciliation and that is why we have said that if our distinguished President, under the authority of the Security Council or in his private capacity, were to come to India, our hospitality would be open to him. That hospitality, however, does not extend to the terms you are seeking to impose upon us. They are two different things,

 

Therefore, with certain alterations-if the Security Council found itself a way to follow the line taken by the representative of Colombia, it might be that some other way would be opened. If the Council is still relying on the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, making the reservation that we have no intention of violating the cease-fire line, if it is still relying on those, then start with part 1. Let Sir Pierson Dixon address his mind to part I on the subject of demilitarization. We have no objection to the word demilitarization if it means that to start with. The other day I read out to you a passage from Oppenheim which pointed out that any treaty which a country might enter into was bound by considerations of security, and it is our duty in the present condition not to refrain from in forming the Security Council of the threats, of the ultimatums, of the mobilization of troops, this propaganda of hatred and of the enormous quantity of military material which is being flown. into the area,

 

I wish to make one final point before I conclude, and this largely relates to the moral position which people have spoken about. We do not seek to take up a moral position in the world, but newspapers speak about it. We are only one country among eighty; we have no special position of any kind and we t must ourselves be able to judge the situation. Reference has been made to arbitration-such reference has been made several times, not only by the representative of Pakistan but also by others and it has been stated, with some degree of distress of mind, that at one time we refused to go to arbitration. Again, arbitration is a word, like plebiscite, which can be bandied about. I have never heard of a plebiscite being taken in one of the constituent units of a union. I would like to draw your attention to the fact, which I have set out before, that the arbitration tribunal in this particular case was asked to set down the questions that it was going to arbitrate upon-and that is un usual procedure. But over and above that, certain other things happened. First of all, in making these proposals for arbitration the Commission was acting ultra vires. It had no authority to do that its business was conciliation and there was violent disagreement in the Commission itself on the suggestion, which was only adopted by a small majority.

 

There is another matter to which I have not drawn attention largely out of courtesy to the United States and to the United Kingdom, but if you will push us, then we have to speak. This arbitration was a secret offer of the Commission, but before it was presented to the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan it was placed at the disposal of the United States and the United Kingdom, and President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee, in a synchronized action, publicly intervened. I know both those gentlemen personally, and have had many dealings with Prime Minister Attlee, but the intervention made by the United Kingdom and the United States was of such a character that no self respecting government could have accepted it. However, be that as it may, here was a secret offer made by the Commission, which was not under the orders of the United States, the United Kingdom or any other member of the Security Council, but was independent; why were its terms given to these two Governments and why were they asked to put pressure upon us and why was that pressure put in the terms in which it was put? Why is more, the verbatim text of the secret arbitration memorandum came into the hands of the British High Commissioners in New Delhi and Karachi at the same time as, or even sooner than, it was officially presented to the Government of India. How do we sell this to our people, even if we wanted to ?

 

We have ceased to be a British dominion-to the advantage of both of us. This arbitration offer was published and was known to the High Commissioners, in Karachi and New Delhi, even before we knew anything about it. And though much pressure was put on the Chairmen at the time to make an investigation into the integrity of these proceedings, nothing was done. That is the position about arbitration.

 

Now I say that because our main position with regard to arbitration is normally as provided for under the Charter, if we should avail ourselves of it the procedure must conform to international practice. It is not international practice for the arbitrator to decide what are the terms on which he is going to arbitrate. The parties must decide between themselves, or there must be some terms of reference; otherwise, the whole basis of judicial proceedings disappears. Now this is elementary law. It is ordinary international practice. These were before me when I addressed myself to this matter. I thought it would pass. Indeed, if only the distinguished representative from Pakistan had not referred to it again I would not have brought it back. After all it is his business to do everything he can to present his case. But there were doubts in the minds of other members of the Security Council.

 

Here is India which is pleading for conciliation, and in many cases in these buildings has used its efforts in a moderate way in that direction, when it comes to itself refuses to accept arbitration. Putting it in that way, and that is how it appears elsewhere, it looks very bad. Therefore, we had to review those facts. First, it was not an arbitration as usually understood. Secondly, there was pressure of this kind. The action was ultra vires. What is more, it was done in a way in which no Government could sit back and say: "We are not going to accept orders from anybody else". We regarded the intervention. made at that time as improper, and we said so. We had no quarrel with it because it was done in the best of motives. Both these gentlemen are very good friends of India. And there the matter rested. Why it should be resuscitated at this stage, I do not know.

 

I apologize to the distinguished representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom for referring to this matter, but they will appreciate that it cannot be one way, even this worm turns sometimes. I say once again that I have spoken on behalf of the Government of India not in defence, but as plaintiff in this action. We are plaintiffs in this action, we invoke the provisions of the Charter. We asked Pakistan to come here with us for a joint settlement. They refused; Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan refused. On 22 December 1947 we terminated all that. We came here to take advantage of the provisions of the Charter. We asked this Council to ask Pakistan to withdraw from this aggression and to do what was necessary. It is quite true we did ask you to brand Pakistan as aggressor. But is that a fault on our side ? If it is a fault then we plead guilty to it. It is a fault which we would not be ashamed of being guilty again. But we came here to ask you to prevent the development of events which would lead to war between our two countries-for they had been fighting for several months-soldiers who had belonged to the same divisions and the same companies, were on either side killing each other.

 

So far as we were concerned, that is why we agreed to the 13 August 1948 resolution without any trouble. Pakistan dragged on for five months so it could get military advantages. I want to remind you again that we withdrew from those advanced positions. Does anybody around that table believe it? that in 1947, soon after the British left India, the Indian Army was not in a position to establish a military decision right up to the frontiers of Kashmir ? I do not think anybody believes that.

 

Therefore we came here under Chapter VI for conciliation. I think it is a poor service to the Charter, it is a poor service to the confidence that the vast majority of the peoples of our country share, and I make bold to believe from what I have seen in the newspapers that the vast population in our part of the world share this view, it is poor service to all of them to leave this matter in such a way that the original factors are forgotten. And then the Security Council fixes its mind upon two words, "plebiscite" and "demilitarization"-two disarm bodied ghosts, who must seek sustenance in a large number of the representations.

 

What is more, we ask the Security Council to give us the answer that we can give to our people. What is the value of the assurances given to us by the Commission, on the basis of which alone, and I repeat, on the basis of which alone we accepted these documents? My Government would never have accepted the documents except in the light of those assurances. What would have been the answer of my distinguished colleague of the Philippines, if at that time we said: "Oh, no, your assurance is not good enough for us". Then we would have been told: "You are unreasonable". Were these private assurances ? No, they are in the form of publications in the same way as are the official records of the Security Council.

 

I ask the Security Council to reconsider the submission made by General Romulo the other day [768th meeting, para. 101] that we were not correct in thinking that there was something casual about the way in which this was treated. That is not so. But we are conscious of the multitude of people involved. If there is one thing in our country today, our people, large or small, leaders, big or high or low, they are conscious of the pulse of public opinion. There is this enormous political, civil, social consciousness in our country. We would not by any step we might take, however unpopular we may be at the time, however much we may appear not to be listening to the majority that speaks here, we will not throw our hand in on the side of violence-and this procedure is the promotion of violence. There is a duty laid upon you today: not for injunctions upon us but injunctions upon them to withdraw from the territory, to stop this campaign of hatred, to rescind the provisions of their Constitution, to restore the local authorities, to place them under the United Nations Commission in order to enable the Government of India to protect the frontiers of India and the trade routes as are necessary. These are the obligations that rest on the Security Council. This is my sub mission.