Text of the Speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 770 held on 18 February 1957.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 770 held on 18 February 1957.

This morning I have to answer two speeches of the representative of India, but please do not be afraid that my statement will be inordinately long. I shall try to be as brief as possible.

I am at a loss to decide where to begin my remarks and where to end them. I have listened very carefully to the representative of India. I do not know what the members of the Security Council feel about it, but I have had three lectures too many on the words "accession", "aggression" and "sovereignty". All these matters, as the Council is well aware, have already been considered and decided, and I fail to see why the representative of India has dwelt constantly on these three words. I can find no reason for it except this; that probably he believes, as Hitler in "Mein Kampf", that if one goes on repeating a thing a million times, perhaps people will begin to believe in it. Otherwise, the time of the Security Council has been completely wasted by discussing these three words because such discussion is quite irrelevant. Therefore, I do not wish to waste any more of the Council's time in dwelling on them.

Mr. Krishna Menon picked out these three words from the speeches, but he has forgotten-although he may have mentioned the word "plebiscite" once or twice-that the draft resolution now before the Council [S/3787] was presented mainly for the purpose of holding a plebiscite, and through his speeches he has never diverted either the Council's attention or his own to the question of a plebiscite. He has always talked of irrelevant things and tried to establish confusion with all due respect to Mr. Krishna Menon-so that in that confusion the question of a plebiscite might be forgotten.

I must reiterate at the very beginning that the question which is before the Security Council is how to implement the international agreement that subsists between India and Pakistan for deciding the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan. Council and the parties to this dispute agree that demilitarization of the disputed area is an essential prerequisite to the holding of the plebiscite. It has not so far been possible to bring about demilitarization of the State in accordance with the terms of the international agreement for a plebiscite. It is, therefore, most essential that the Security Council should devote its attention to the problem of demilitarization in order that the agreed objective of a free and impartial plebiscite may be reached quickly. This is also the purpose of the present draft resolution.

Before I proceed to make my submission about the draft resolution which is under consideration. I must say a few. words with regard to some points that the representative of India made in the course of his address to the Security Council on 8 February 1957 [767th meeting]. My sole object in doing so is to keep the record straight. I will limit myself to the main points and will leave aside the rest. That does not mean that we accept either the validity of the other arguments used, or in any way subscribe to them. I am leaving them. aside because in our view those matters are completely irrelevant to the issue that is engaging the attention of the Security Council. I think that such matters as the so-called secularism of India or the propaganda which is carried on in the vernacular Press of India and Pakistan against each other, of who in India or in Pakistan has suffered imprisonment, or what Sheikh Abdullah does or does not want, or the claim of India that, because Kashmir has prospered under its control, Kashmiris should be denied the right of self-determination, are all irrelevant to the issue which is under consideration.

The statement of the representative of India seems to imply that India accepted the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, dated 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75], about a week after it was presented, and accepted the second proposal of the Commission, dated 11 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 3], on 23 December 1948. What happened actually was that the Commission framed a resolution on 13 August 1948 and presented it to the parties. The Government of India signified its acceptance of the resolution. The Government of Pakistan also signified its acceptance of the resolution, subject to certain conditions. The Commission could not at that stage accept those conditions of the Government of Pakistan, chief amongst which was that the resolution should specify the conditions that should govern the final resolution of the dispute by means of a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Thereupon, the negotiations for a cease-fire and a truck fell through and the Commission went back to Geneva and submitted its first report [S/1100] to the Security Council.

After some time, the Commission again took up negotiations with the representatives of India and Pakistan and succeeded in securing their agreement to certain proposals for a plebiscite. These proposals were, as pointed out by the then Foreign Minister of Pakistan in his letter to the Commission dated 25 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 5], in amplification of the resolution of 13 August. The proposals were put to the two Governments on 11 December 1948 and were accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan after certain assurances. and clarifications had been given to them on 23 and 25 December These proposals, after acceptance, were embodied in a resolution by the Commission, which was adopted on 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15].

The entire agreement for a cease-fire, a true and a plebiscite was thus accepted by the Government of India on 23 December 1948 and by the Government of Pakistan on 25 December 1948. The agreement constitutes one entity. Each part of it is linked-up with the other, There was to be a cease fire first, which was to be followed by a truce, which in turn was to be followed by the plebiscite. The entire agreement stands or falls together.

It is very significant to note here that whereas Pakistan took a little time, a month or two, in asking for clarifications and then accepting, along with India, the resolution in toto. Mr. Krishna Menon tried to create trouble because of this two or three months' delay. Then we accepted. On the other hand, his country, for eight or nine years, having accepted those resolutions, has not carried them out and has evaded them, and that waste of time does not concern him at all.

The Indian representative has said that India accepted the two resolutions of the Commission on the basis of certain clarifications that were given to the Government of India by the Commission. I beg to submit that the Government of Pakistan also accepted these resolutions on the basis of certain assurances that were given to it by the Commission. The Indian representative has mentioned only the assurances that were given to the Government of India by the Commission. I am afraid I have not been able to trace the authority for all of these assurances. He has put them in a context which makes them completely different from what they were intended to mean.

For instance, it has been claimed by the Government of India that the Commission had assured it that there would be large-scale disbanding and disarming of the "Azad" Kashmir forces. We accept this as being correct, but the point is, when will such disbanding and disarming take place? I have clearly shown in my opening address [761st meeting] that according to the terms of the resolutions of the Commission as well as the various assurances that were given to us and the qualifications that were given to the Government of India, indeed according to the Government of India's own admission the disbanding of "Azad" Kashmir forces is to take places at the plebiscite stage.

In his letter to the Commission dated 18 February 1949. the Secretary-General of the Ministry of External Affairs and Commonwealth Relations of the Government of India stated:

"The disarming of 'Azad' forces is really a matter of chronology. First, there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce, as envisaged in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding A plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of 'Azad' Kashmir forces. So far as non Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out."

Today, the Government of India says that such disbanding is a prerequisite to the withdrawal of the bulk of their forces from the State, always putting meaning into sentences, which meaning is not there.

I would like to mention only a few of the assurances given to us by the Commission: one that no officer, either civil or military, of the Government of India or of the State Government will be allowed to cross the cease-fire line or allowed to exercise any authority in the "Azad'' Kashmir area; two, that the "Azad" Kashmir forces will not be disbanded or disarmed in the truce stage; three, that synchronization of the withdrawal of the hulk of the Indian Army with the with withdrawal of the Pakistan Army will be arranged by the Commission in consultation with the two High Commands; four that the Commission will be free to hear the views of the Government of Pakistan with regard to the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from the Indian side of the cease fire line; five, that the expression "the Plebiscite Administrator will be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir" does not mean that he will be an employee of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or subject to its control; six, that by the expression "the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary" is meant that the Plebiscite Administrator will be competent to exercise such powers as he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring its freedom and impartiality, and he shall be deemed to have derived those powers from the authorities concerned. The organizing and conducting of the plebiscite shall be the responsibility exclusively of the Plebiscite Administrator. The Plebiscite Administrator could not derive his authority either from India or from Pakistan since there was no accession of the State to either one. Nor did the sovereignty of the State vest in either India or Pakistan. Therefore the imaginary fountainhead of the Plebiscite Administrator's authority was mentioned as the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the dissolution of whose powers to the Plebiscite Administrator was thus presumed. The Commission did not deliberately use the phrase "Government of Jammu and Kashmir" stated in this context.

These and other assurances which are not mentioned, are contained in the three reports of the Commission to the Security Council: document S/110 dated 9 November 1948, document S/1196 dated 10 January 1949 and document S/1430 dated 9 December 1949.

Thus it will be seen that it is not only the Government of India that was given assurances with regard to the provisions of the two resolutions of the Commission. The Government of Pakistan was equally interested in the framing of these resolutions. Although we do not claim to have as much ingenuity of thought as my Indian colleague has, we also took some care to see that our viewpoint was heard by the Commission and the provision for it was made in the resolution.

While dealing with the text of the resolution of 13 August 1948, the distinguished and ingenious representative of India has tried to import into one of its clauses a meaning which it is utterly incapable of bearing. I refer to part II, section B, paragraph 2 of the resolution. I will read it once again:

"Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems. necessary." [S/1100, para. 75.].

The representative of India has argued that because the phrase "local authorities" is used, it is meant to allude to the area which is under the control of the "Azad" Kashmir Government. I would beg of the members of the Security Council to mark the phraseology of the clause which says the Indian Government will be allowed to maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order.

Now, you will want to know why the words "truce lines" and not "truce line" are used. As a matter of fact there are two of these lines, one is in the northern area which runs from south to north-east, and the other runs on the borders of the Punjab-or Punjab-which runs from north-west to south east. Therefore when the word "lines" is used it is two truce lines and not one. Now, with regard to the word "authorities". Mr. Krishna Menon took a great deal of trouble in pointing out to you that the word "authorities" means the authority on the occupied Kashmir side, and the authority on the "Azad" Kashmir side-and therefore the word "authorities" is used [767th meeting, para. 124]. He tried to give us a talk on the English language and the implication of this word. Well, I do not pretend to know the English language because it is a foreign language to me; but I tried to look it up in the Oxford dictionary. I found that since the year 1611 the words "authority" and "authorities" are used in the following sense. When the word is used in the abstract sense, the "authority" of law or "authority" of government, it i. singular -"authority". When it is used in the concrete sense, that is : the municipal "authorities" then it is used in the plural. not in the singular. Therefore, when it is used here, "authorities", it is used in the concrete sense which means "authorities" on the Indian side of the cease-fire line and "authority" on our side of the cease-fire line. Therefore the meaning that Mr. Krishna Menon tried to put into the word "authorities" not what the English language means.

English is a very difficult language, even the English themselves probably do not understand it, and we in the East are particularly in Every difficult situation. So you see, for us to come and lecture you people here who know the English language much better than we do, I will not say it is presumptuous, but it is very daring.

The cease-fire lines were established on 27 July 1949. The Government of India can maintain within the lines at the moment of the cease-fire a certain number of its forces. Could it be claimed that the Government of India is authorized by this clause to cross the cease-fire line and post. its forces in "Azad'' Kashmir territory? No further proof is required for rebutting this novel piece of reasoning. If, how- ever, any further proof of the true import of the clause is required, I would respectfully draw the attention of the Security Council as well as of my distinguished colleague from. India, to the Commission's summary report, dated 21 August 1948, of a meeting held between the United Nations Commission and the Government of India headed by the illustrious Prime Minister of India in person to discuss the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 in New Delhi at 3 p.m. on 17 August 1948. This forms part of the first interim. report of the Commission to the Security Council [S/1100, annex 12].

I shall now read out to the Council extracts from this very interesting document which show what the Commission thought about the proposal of the Government of India to post forces on the "Azad '' Kashmir side of the cease-fire line. (The Commission's view was apparently accepted by the Government of India, as no further mention of this demand appears in either the letter dated 20 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 78], or the letter dated 23 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 4], from the Government of India to the Commission, or in any one of the two aides memoires which formed appendices to the letter of 23 December.)

"Mr. Korbel (Czechoslovakia) replied that the Commission fully recognized the concern of the Government of India for security, but that in all frankness he had to tell the Prime Minister that the Government of Pakistan was equally fearful of invasion by the Indian forces. The Commission. he said, could not assure either country on this question of security. The present document, he said, was a first step in that direction. If the Commission could succeed in obtaining the withdrawal of Pakistan troops, it would have the obligation, while on the sub-continent, of watching over Pakistan. Once the Kashmir problem had been satisfactorily settled, it would then be the duty and right of the Government of India, should the State finally be placed under the sovereignty of that country, to take all necessary measures for the security of that area.

"The Prime Minister reiterated his fears of possible infiltration with or without the knowledge of the Government of Pakistan and mentioned that the strategic points previously enumerated to the Commission which the Government of India considered that its forces must hold in order to ensure the security of Kashmir. Mentioning Domel in particular, he remarked that, if Government of India forces held that point, a natural boundary between the two would be established along the line of the river, and that Pakistan would, in no sense, be threatened through the occupation of that point by the forces of the Government of India inasmuch as Pakistan was from twenty-two twenty-six miles to distant.

"Mr. Korbel commented that such a readjustment of the front line went beyond the cease-fire and said frankly that the Commission, after giving careful consideration to the Indian point of view in that respect, had not been able to accept the view." [S/1100, annex 12, pp. 103 and 104].

And here is a perfectly clear and specific statement by the Commission with regard to the state of fear that will prevail in the area which will be evacuated by the Pakistan Army:

"Part III, section G [of the document entitled "Truce terms transmitted to the Governments of India and Pakistan by the Commission ''], recognizes that the Commission cannot prejudge the sovereignty and integrity of the State as a whole. It should not be construed as envisaging the introduction into the area to be evacuated by Pakistan troops of civil or military officials of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or of the Government of India for the purpose of administration or control."

The representative of India has asserted that the withdrawal of troops as contemplated in this resolution was unconditional. The facts, however, as I showed in my opening speech [761st meeting] are quite otherwise. The Commission assured us that the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army would be synchronized with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army. Besides, the phraseology of the 13 August 1948 resolution itself clearly showed that a certain action has to be taken by the Government of Pakistan on its side, while the corresponding action has to be taken by the Government of India on its side. It is not that the Pakistan Army would withdraw and then nothing would happen on the Indian side of the cease-fire line. When the Pakistan Army is beginning to withdraw from the State, the Government of India is equally bound to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State.

Then it has been alleged that the Government of Pakistan has incorporated certain areas of the Kashmir State into Pakistan. I wish to state categorically that this is entirely incorrect. I would quote to the Security Council article 203 of the Constitution of Pakistan which reads as follows:

"When the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir decide to accede to Pakistan, the relationship between Pakistan and the said State shall be determined in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State."

With the existence of this definite provision in our Constitution, when Mr. Krishna Menon made the remark in my presence that Pakistan had incorporated the Kashmir State already, I was quite a little surprised. What does this show ? Does it show that we have incorporated certain areas of the State into Pakistan, or that the relationship of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan can be determined only after the question of the accession has been solved?

In this connexion I would like to mention the case of Chitral once again. The Indian representative has stated that Chitral is part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We deny it. I do not propose to go into the history of Chitral in order to prove that it was a State which acceded to us lawfully, because the question of Chitral is not before the Security Council. But if Mr. Krishna Menon claims that Chitral is part of Kashmir, would he be willing to count the votes of the people of Chitral in a plebiscite for the determination of the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan? If that were the case I am sure he would speak for another four hours here as to why those votes should not be counted on the Pakistan side.

Allied to this is another matter which I may deal with before passing on to other points. I am amazed that the representative of India should accuse us of not allowing elections. to be held in "Azad" Kashmir. Although we have had elections in all the provinces of Pakistan on an adult franchise basis, why have no elections been held in "Azad" Kashmir ? The reason is not far to seek. We have scrupulously refrained from interfering with the administration of "Azad'' mir; it is the responsibility of the local authorities. If they want to hold elections they are at liberty to do so, but that is a question they have to decide. In adopting this attitude I claim that we have upheld the directive of the Security Council contained in the resolution of 17 January 1948 "to refrain from…doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation". It is unfortunate that the very fact of compliance with the directions of the Security Council is being pleaded against us before that very body.

I think it would be interesting to point out to the Council that Mr. Krishna Menon of course claims the credit that whereas there have been no elections on the "Azad" Kashmir side, there have been elections on the occupied Kashmir side. But I think you will be pleased to notice that in that so-called election not a single vote was cast. All the seventy-five members put up under this dictatorial order of the Indian Government were returned unopposed and that is what Mr. Krishna Menon was pleased to call an election. It is a very strange election in which not a single vote is cast and yet India tries to spread it about in the world that elections have been held in the occupied Kashmir side.

Mr. Krishna Menon has pointed out that according to the electoral laws of his country people are forbidden to appeal to religion when asking for votes. It is clear that it might interfere with the freedom of an election if ecclesiastical condemnation and religious fiats were issued threatening with damnation a particular candidate or those who might support him. Mr. Krishna Menon on this occasion tried to take credit for the fact that in his country there is a law by which religious interference is not permitted and the elections are free. But I think it is ungenerous of him not to admit that this law was framed by the British in the year 1920 and not by the present Congress Government and that the law was framed not only for the Indian side of the people in India but that the same law exists in Pakistan also, where similar rules exist regarding the freedom of elections; and we both inherited that law from the British Therefore, for him to claim credit for something which was done by the British and then come before an international body and try to be so generous was rather surprising to me.

It would be perfectly legitimate in the case of a plebiscite to draw attention to religious, cultural, linguistic, economic, geographic, strategic and other ties, affinities and considerations that might sway the choice. So long as nothing has been done to incite lawlessness or to exercise correction, the exercise of all considerations that might affect the choice would be legitimate.

I think that Mr. Krishna Menon-and I bow before him for his knowledge of the English language-forgot to differentiate between the word "election" and the word "plebiscite". Whereas in an election it is the duty of a Government to see that it is free and no religious arguments are brought in, the matter of a plebiscite, wherever it is held, is held because of religious differences or of ethnic differences or of geographic, linguistic or other differences. Therefore in a plebiscite it is quite legitimate for people to appeal to the electorate for these reasons before they decide whether to accede to one side or the other. In the matter of an election, it is quite different. I am very sorry that Mr. Krishna Menon is not here today to listen to my views personally and that he is not well. I hope he will soon recover. We must realize that we are now dealing with the question of a plebiscite and not an ordinary election, and we must not be confused by the arguments that he advances on this point. In fact, the Prime Minister of India himself emphasized this principle in the telegram of 22 September 1947 to the Government of Pakistan when he characterized the acceptance by that Government of the accession of Juna gadh as being "in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed and effected". These were the words of the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru that Pakistan's action in accepting the accession of Junagadh was against all the accepted principles on which India and Pakistan were agreed. But he forgets all those arguments when he applies the facts to the Kashmir case-that is to say, the principle of separating conti guous Muslim majority areas from non-Muslim majority areas and constituting them respectively into the sovereign States of India and Pakistan.

The word "Junagadh" has reminded me of the fact that in both of my speeches I emphasized the case of Junagadh, which is still on the file of the Security Council and which India was forcibly annexed; and the State of Hyderabad, which was also annexed by invasion. Not a single word has Mr. Krishna Menon said in his speech in defence of the action of his country in invading and annexing these two States.

The representative of India persists in referring to the question of the so-called accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India. I will simply state that this matter has been disposed of. No party to the dispute can now claim that Kashmir was acceded to it so long as the international agreement subsists, and there is nothing that the party can do to break that agreement unilaterally. The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan must be decided by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.

There are other matters in the speech of the representative of India which are important. But I will pass over them to save the time of the Security Council, especially as these points have been made in this forum ad nauseum, and replies to each one of them are already on the record of the Security Council.

There is only one point out of these which I would submit to the Security Council. In trying to impress on the Council the importance of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, the representative of India said quite a lot about the comings and goings and the palavers and conferences that preceded the framing of the resolution and its acceptance by the parties. He said that the resolution was a very carefully drafted document. Immediately thereafter, he ran into some difficulties with regard to the meaning of the resolution of 5 January 1949, especially paragraph 4, which dealt with the question of the demilitarization of the State in the plebiscite stage. Speaking about the paragraph, the representative of India said:

"As members of the Council know, the word 'disposal' has been used with regard to the Government of India forces in the sense of disposition, not in the sense of throwing away." [767th meeting, para. 147]. Here, again, we have had quite a lecture on the English language, on the meaning of the word "disposal". He says that the word "disposal" means locating the troops in various areas and not the dissolution or demobilization of the forces. That is what he is trying to do.

If my memory does not fail me, the members comprising the Commission which drafted the very carefully-worded document of 13 August 1948 also drafted the proposals of 11 December 1948, which were later incorporated in the resolution of 5 January 1949. Surely the representative of India should have thought of some better argument in support of his interpretation of the term "final disposal". The word "disposal" is used in both parts of the paragraph and governs the armed forces both of India and of "Azad" Kashmir If Mr. Krishna Menon reads the meaning in this word regarding his side of the cease-fire line in the sense that the word means location of troops and not demobilization, then the same meaning shall be read into that word used in connexion with the "Azad" troops on their side, which is mentioned in the very next sub-paragraph; and that will mean that Mr. Krishna Menon contemplates the continuance of "Azad" troops on their side of the cease-fire line. I am sure that nothing is farther from his mind than this interpretation which he placed on this word without realizing the consequences. I hope that I have made myself clear.

Paragraph 4 says:

"4. (a) After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite;

"(b) A regards the territory referred to in A. 2 of part II of the resolution of 13 August"-which means the 'Azad' Kashmir territory-"final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities". [S/1196, para. 15).

If Mr. Krishna Menon says that the word "disposal" here means location of troops and not their demobilization, then the argument that he has been putting before the Security Council that the "Azad Kashmir forces must be demobilized is contradicted by the interpretation which is put here, because if the word "disposal" means location, then this clause contemplates the continued location of "Azad" troops also, which I am sure is very far from his mind when he talks in that manner. But when arguments are made in haste and people are carried away by their rhetoric, then the consequences of those arguments are perhaps not realized momentarily.

The representative of India has said a great deal about the provisions of the resolution of the Commission dated January 1949. But the most misleading statement made by him is to the effect that this resolution gives way to part III of the previous resolution of 13 August 1948, in which India and Pakistan reaffirm "their Wish" that the future of the State shall be determined by the will of the people of the State. Much is made of this by Mr. Krishna Menon, and he seeks to characterize India's undertaking regarding a plebiscite as a mere wish-not a resolve, not a commitment, but a wish. Nothing is said by the representative of India about the further and unequivocal undertaking of paragraph 1 of the resolution of 5 January 1949, which reads as follows:

"The question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite." (Ibid.) I am afraid that the copy of the resolution that he has been reading does not contain this very important paragraph:

I do not contest Mr. Krishna Menon's right to talk about the conditions of a plebiscite in the State, but perhaps it is not entirely relevant to the question that is engaging our attention at this stage, which in the problem of demilitarization of the State preparatory to the plebiscite. Whether a certain type of propaganda will or will not be allowed, how and when the refugees will go back to the State, what measures will be taken to ensure to them the right of legitimate political activity, what will happen if local authorities on the two sides of the cease-fire line do not do those things which they are called upon to do under the terms of the resolutions-these are all matters for discussion with the Plebiscite Administrator when he assumes office. He alone has the authority to discuss these matters with those concerned and to take decisions on them. It is not because we have no views on these subjects that I steer clear of them at this stage. It is only because the Pakistan Government does not wish to prejudice these issues beforehand.

The representative of India has pleaded forcefully against any "unsettlement". He said: "Any unsettlement can only be based on the appeal to non-secularity; it can only be based on this appeal to religious prejudice." (767th meeting, para. 232.)

I have searched a lot whether we have made such an appeal and to whom, and I admit that I have not been able to find it. What is it that Pakistan has been demanding about Kashmir ? It is not that Kashmiris should be disposed of like goods and chattels to suit the whims and fancies of either the Government of India or the Government of Pakistan. We have always maintained that Kashmiris and Kashmiris alone can decide their own future in a free and impartial plebiscite and when we say Kashmiris we mean all Kashmiris without distinction of religion. The representative of India has levelled certain charges. of breaches of international agreements against Pakistan. This is indeed a serious matter, and I would be failing in my duty. if I did not refer to them.

The first so-called breach on the part of Pakistan was, and I quote from Mr. Krishna Menon's speech, withholding information from the United Nations that it was a combatant and that it was a party to the invasion" (767th meeting, para. 193)

I submit that this matter has been considered and disposed of by the Security Council. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 17 January 1948 which called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take all measures within their power calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation. Both Governments accepted this resolution of the Security Council. In utter violation of this resolution of the Security Council and of its acceptance of the resolution, the Government of India mounted an offensive in the State of Jammu and Kashmir some time in the spring of 1948. It was to meet this offensive. into a threat to Pakistan, that a certain number of Pakistan. forces were moved into the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the first week of May 1948 in sheer self-defence. When the Government of India mounted their offensive in the State, did it or did it not amount to an aggravation of the situation ? Did they inform the Security Council about their troop movements ?

Again, the representative of India has cited Sir Owen Dixon in support of his contention that Pakistan was an aggressor in Kashmir. I shall, with the permission of the Security Council, read out what Sir Owen Dixon said on the subject in his report: "Upon a number of occasions in the course of the period beginning with the reference on 1 January 1948 of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council, India had advanced not only the contention to which I have already. referred that Pakistan was an aggressor, but the further contention that this should be declared. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting, made the same contention and he referred to it repeatedly during the conference. I took up the positions, first that the Security Council had not made such a declaration : secondly that I had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue; but thirdly that, without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the sub-continent. I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed. on 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with international law.

"I therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day. After a significant number of days from the named day, then other operations on each side of the cease-fire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed as significant was a matter of detail for them to settle.

"The Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed strongly his dissent from the third of the three positions I took up, that is to say the third of the positions stated above. But expressed his readiness to accept, in compliance with my request, the proposition that as a first step in demilitarization the withdrawal of the regular forces of the Pakistan Army should begin on a specified day and that a significant number of days should elapse before the commencement of any operation involving forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line," (S/1791, paras. 21 to 23.) To put this in very plain language, here was this gentleman looking into this case and trying to hold a plebiscite. Each time he mentioned the word "plebiscite", India, instead of getting down to brass tacks and talking about a plebiscite, always said: "Pakistan is an aggressor; please declare that Pakistan is an aggressor", which was quite irrelevant. The Indian team must have repeated this question of aggression so many times that this gentleman must have got sick and tired of it and said: For God's sake stop. Let us take for granted that there was an aggression and let us get on with the plebiscite now." Having mentioned those words which were out of context, the Government of India representative came here and said: "So and so reported that there was aggression." I do dot understand the sense of this logic, when people. try to get rid of a certain gentleman because he is talking too. much by saying: "All right, take it for granted for the sake of argument that what he says is true, and now let us get on to the real point", and goes on to say: "Nov you have admitted there was an aggression."

In the same way, there has been a discussion here about aggression and sovereignty, and so on, for seventeen hours. I do not know what the feeling of the Security Council is. Personally I think you would be prepared to say that we are so sick of hearing this that I would say: "All right, let us take for granted that all these things have happened. What about the agreement for a plebiscite ? Why not get on with the plebiscite ?" Then the Indians will come tomorrow and say that the Security Council decided that there was complete accession, and there was aggression, and there was sovereignty, and therefore there can be no plebiscite. This sort of argument has gone on for so long, for the last eight years, that I am sure we are tired of it, if the Security Council is not.

I have quoted what Sir Owen Dixon said in his report. What does this really mean? According to my understanding of the English language, which I must admit is imperfect, it only means one thing. That is this for the purpose of getting the agreement of the Government of India to a plan of demilitarization, Sir Owen Dixon was prepared to assume, only for the sake of argument, that when the tribesmen entered Kashmir that was a breach of international law and that the entry of Pakistan troops was also a breach of international law It meant nothing more than this. In fact, Sir Owen Dixon himself made it more than clear that the Security Council had not made any declaration on the question of aggression, nor had he been asked by the Security Council to go into that question, nor had he himself made any study or investigation of that matter. and therefore he was not in a position to pronounce upon it.

It is quite clear that Sir Owen Dixon was prepared to make a mere assumption in order to put one side to the question of aggression, so that progress could be made towards the agreed plebiscite. The representative of India has taken the words out of their context in order to twist them to mean what clearly they do not mean. Incidentally, it is rather amusing to note that the distinguished jurist from Australia was such in the estimation of the representative of India only in respect of this single observation, although according to his own admission, he was neither asked to examine the question of aggression nor did he undertake such an examination; but when he formulated his plans of demilitarization and ultimately came to the conclusion that India's agreement would never be obtained. to them, he fell from grace and became quite a different personality in the eyes of India.

The next so-called violation is with regard to the non withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from the State. I repeat that the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army from the State is to be synchronized with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces on the other side of the cease-fire line. The Government. Pakistan is only too anxious to withdraw all its forces from the State. May I ask if the Government of India is equally willing to honour its international agreement with regard to the withdrawal of its Army and forces ?

Then comes an astounding statement which is utterly incomprehensible to me: "Not only has the Pakistan Army not withdrawn, but the changed conditions in view of the imbalance of forces created by rearmament is such that withdrawal has become practically impossible" (767th meeting, para. 194.)

I really do not understand what this means. Even if the Pakistan Army should have become stronger, when it withdraws it will leave the State with all its equipment. I wonder whether he was referring to the Pakistan Army in "Azad '' Kashmir or to the Pakistan Army in our own territory. If he meant the Pakistan Army in "Azad '' Kashmir has become stronger, which is not the case, then why should be worried, because we say that when we withdraw, this whole army will go back? Why weep about it ? Besides, what has the strength of the Pakistan Army within the borders of Pakistan to do with the question of the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir under the terms of an international agreement between India and Pakistan on deciding the question of accession by means of a plebiscite? However, if Mr. Krishna Menon is referring to the fact that our Army has become stronger, let us say in West Pakistan, that has nothing to do with the demilitarization in the Kashmir State. Perhaps only Mr. Krishna Menon himself knows what he was really referring to.

Pakistan has accepted military aid in order to strengthen its defences. It has been repeatedly asserted that this military aid, and for that matter any equipment that we may have, will not be used for aggressive purposes. The Government of India is also strengthening its armed forces. The only difference is that whereas Pakistan is receiving military aid, India is taking economic aid and diverting its funds and resources to the procurement of military supplies. This is a very interesting point. and I should like once and for all to place it before the Security Council. I am referring to the allegation of India that Pakistan is becoming stronger and stronger.

India itself has recently placed an order for the purchase of sixty-five Canberra in the United Kingdom. The Canberra, as members of the Council know, is a long-range bomber which is used only for offensive purposes. Why is India purchasing these bombers and who are they going to be used against ? It is only Pakistan and nobody else. India has also placed an order in the United Kingdom for 300 of the best and the largest tanks. Against which country are these 300 tanks going to be used? It is not against China and Soviet Russia I know that. They will not look towards those countries. Water does not flow up the hill; it always flows down the hill. He dare not look towards Peking or Moscow because they are too big for him. He looks only towards the smaller countries, like the poor Hyderabad State, Junagadh and Kashmir. If we had been equally weak, he probably would have started a war against us by now. All the armaments that India is receiving and preparing are against Pakistan.

Mr. Krishna Menon complained that the British Government was not very kind to his country. But where has India placed these orders? Who has supplied it with all the equipment ? It is the United Kingdom. It takes these things from the United Kingdom and then abuses it. From whom is India buying aircraft carriers? It is buying them. from the United Kingdom, and then it comes here and abuses the United Kingdom for nothing.

I want to point out that at the time of partition, all the gun factories, the tank factories, the armored car factories, airplane repair shop factories, were all inside the territory which is today India. Most of the large underground installations of army stocks and munition dumps were in the territory which is now India. Members will recall that the British left the country within two months. They were the quickest quitters that anybody has ever seen in the whole history of mankind. They left all those armaments in the hands of the Indians. Having withdrawn, they said: "Now, gentlemen, you divide it amongst yourselves." Do you think that India was going to give us a single thing out of those armaments, part of which was our share? It has swallowed all those armaments and they are still in India. It is proceeding to purchase more from Canada, from the United Kingdom and from all over the world. The Americans give the money, bags full of dollars, and say: "Oh, you poor boys; you take this money to help yourselves." By obtaining that money, India makes a reduction in its budget, and with the money saved, purchases things from the United Kingdom and Canada.

The position today with regard to armed forces is the following: Air Force-ours is one-third the size of India's, Navy-ours is one-third the size of India's; Army-ours is one-third the size of India's. The money that India is spending on its defence forces, or offence forces, is four times the amount that we are spending. We are spending 75 percent of our national revenue on defence forces. India, with a budget four or five times larger, is spending 40 to 50 per cent. This is published in its budget. The last time I made this. Mr. Krishna Menon tried to deny it. In the latest budget published by India, 40 percent of the total revenue is going to its defence forces. Why is India trying to build up all these defence forces ? Against whom? They will never be used. against China, I can assure you.

At the time of the partition, the British had their forces. in Tibet: they had their battalions, their political officers, their public works officers to look after the roads, and their post and telegraph officers-that all belonged to the British. That country was looked after by the British. It was almost a part of British India, like any of the other States. But when the Chinese Government paid a little attention to Tibet, my friends there said: "Oh, yes; these people look like you; this is your country, by all means come and take it." Behind that request was the might of China, and not the Prime Minister of a small country like Pakistan.

The Security Council must realize these matters. It is responsible for the security and peace of the world. It is the highest authority today in the International organization and these things must be brought to its notice.

I am told that in order to attack a country one must have at least three times the strength of the other country. If today we have one armoured division and we want to attack India, which has three armoured divisions, in order to win we would need nine armoured divisions. How can we increase our strength from one armoured division to nine armoured divisions overnight in order to fight against India ?

When India comes before the Security Council and pretends that there is a danger of and it fears an attack from Pakistan, I am reminded of a little story of the wolf and the lamb that were drinking water from the same stream. The lamb was downstream from the wolf, and the wolf turned round and said: "Why are you pulling my water?" The lamb replied: "Sir, I am drinking down here below you and you are above me; I cannot be polluting your water" The wolf then said: "You dare to contradict me and call me a liar", whereupon he grabbed the lamb and ran off with him. That is the type of argument which India is now putting forward with regard to the defensive strength of Pakistan, a small country which has practically nothing at all in comparison with what India has, when it claims that we are going to attack it. I think that the world has better sense than to agree to such a flimsy argument.

I assert that the Indian armed might is not there for show. Even as I am speaking before this august body, the Indian war machine is being mobilized and concentrated along the frontiers of Pakistan. We had a press release here concerning the mobilization of the Indian Army on our frontier, and Mr. Krishna Menon said, "There are observers in Kashmir and we have mobilized no army in Kashmir ''. The mobilization of the Ar ny is outside Kashmir on the borders of West Pakistan. I shall give the Council the official details on this matter. If I say that India possesses a knife in its right hand, Mr. Krishna Menon says, "Come and look, my right hand is quite empty, there is no knife in it"; but he has got a big sword on his left hand side. He then says, "But you never said anything about the left hand side." He is trying to hoodwink the Security Council by saying that they have done nothing in Kashmir. They may have done nothing there, that is not our allegation. Our allegation is that they have mobilized troops on our borders in West Pakistan.

Significant troop movements have taken place on the Indian side of West Pakistan since the recent discussion of the Kashmir question in the Security Council began. The information that I am going to give the Council is based on a telegram which I received from my Government, and the telegram is based on army intelligence reports and other reports which our Government possesses about the troop movements of India on our borders. We released this information by way of a press release here, and it was based on this official telegram and not on newspaper information which was conveyed to us. This is official Government information.

The principal moves were as follows:

"(1) 166th Brigade (5th Division) has been moved from Dalhousie (Punjab, India) to Pathankot on the Indo Pakistan border;

"(2) 77th Infantry Brigade (5th Division) from Dharam sala to Amritsar"-which is within thirteen miles of our border-relieving 123rd Brigade (27th Division) which is now being deployed in the Khemkaran-Rajoke area between Ferozpur and Wagah"-That is also on our border.

"The net result of these movements is that India now has two complete divisions, plus one independent brigade, on the East Punjab-West Pakistan border, and, in addition; one division, the 4th Division, at Ambala, and two independent armoured brigades at Patiala.

"Thus the over-all position is that India now has three divisions, plus three detached brigades, on the Jammu and Kashmir border." Now these are the figures in Kashmir State:

"Three divisions, plus three detached brigades, on the Jammu and Kashmir border, three divisions, plus one independent brigade and an armoured brigade on the East Punjab border, making a grand total of six divisions and four brigades, plus an armoured brigade, against West Pakistan.

"There are indications that one armoured division is also moving from its present location at Jhansi Babina."

In view of these developments, my Prime Minister broadcast to the people of Pakistan on 16 February and I quote in part from his statement, as follows:

"Whatever may be the reasons for these movements, the action of India will have dangerous consequences. So many troop movements along the border, digging trenches, taking up strategic positions, may provoke border incidents which may become serious. I have issued instructions to our Army and our people not to be provoked under any circumstances. Clashes on the border will suit India, and may even be engineered by it in an attempt to prevent the United Nations from considering the matter coolly and calmly. We have, therefore, to be all the more careful that we do not get excited and that we do not fall into a trap laid for us."

I should at this stage, like to point out very earnestly to the Security Council that this question is very serious. You do not know, gentlemen, the danger that you are facing, and it is really the duty of the Security Council to take some definite steps to resolve this dangerous situation. Otherwise, the whole of this area will get into a position which we will all regret hereafter. So, something has to be done, and has to be done quickly, and you, gentlemen, have got to stop this progressive deterioration between these two countries. I should not say more. I think you know what the position is, and if you do not take any action, well, it is your responsibility. Mr. Menon again said. "Now there are forty five

battalions of the 'Azad Kashmir forces, officered, trained and equipped by the Pakistan Army" (769th meeting, para. 58), The conclusion which it is sought to draw from this is that demilitarization of the "Azad'' Kashmir area is not possible. I am sorry, but I have not been able to understand that argument. I would, trust and foremost, like to state categorically that the "Azad'' Kashmir forces do not number forty-five battalions. I have said before, and I repeat, that not one soldier has been added to the strength of the "Azad" Kashmir forces since the time the cease-fire became effective.

So, when this area is demilitarized, what will happen? The Pakistan Army will withdraw from the State, taking out all its equipment and personnel. The link between the Pakistan Army and the "Azad" Kashmir forces will thus be broken. What will be left in "Azad" Kashmir will be the people of the area itself. There will be no officer of the Pakistan Army in command of any "Azad" Kashmir forces when the Pakistan Army withdraws from Kashmir. The reason that there are some Pakistan officers in top positions in the "Azad" Kashmir forces is that, in agreement with "Azad" Kashmir Government, the Pakistan High Command is in overall command of all the forces that are now in that area.

Then a reference was made to the alleged violation by Pakistan of the cease-fire agreement. The cease fire agreement was concluded on 27 July 1949. According to the terms of that agreement, all violations of the cease-fire are reported to the two States and to the United Nations Military Observers Group. There is a procedure laid down for that purpose. The Security Council receives periodical reports from the United Nations Military Observers Group. Let it declare after reference to those reports, whether the allegations made in this respect by the representative of India are correct. I assert that those allegations are completely baseless.

The representative of India has more than once quoted. from the third interim report of the Commission words to the effect that, while the situation in the State has changed, the resolutions remain unchanged' That report was submitted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 9 December 1949. All that the Commission said, I submit, was and I quote from paragraph 283;

"The period of investigation has been completed. Within the framework of its terms of reference, following in its endeavours the provisions contained in its resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, the Commission feels that the possibilities of mediation open to it have been exhausted. Over a prolonged period, in a changing and dynamic situation and restricted by long standing related clarifications which proved to be a real impediment to reaching agreement, the framework of the resolution of 13 August has become inadequate in the light of the factual conditions in ihe State. The Commission has been unable, therefore, to mediate much beyond what is today a rather outmoded pattern. The State of Jammu and Kashmir has not been demilitarized, as was envisaged in part II of the resolution of 13 August, and until this is achieved the conditions necessary to the holding of plebiscite cannot begin to be established. As has been seen from those parts of the report entitled 'The "Azad" Kashmir forces, and 'Withdrawal of forces, the Commission believes that the problem of demilitarization must be treated as a whole, and that the distinctions relative to demilitarization which exist in the division of the problem into truce and plebiscite periods. as visualized in the original plan of demilitarization has proven one of the most difficult obstacles in achieving agreement on the problem. It is evident that the presence of a large number of troops in the State is not conducive to the creation of a peaceful atmosphere. The demilitarization of the State is essential to permit the holding of a free and unfettered plebiscite.` The Commission's report continues, in its paragraphs 284 and 285:

"It is imperative that a settlement of the Kashmir issue be reached, and the Commission believes that it can be reached. To this end, conditions should be established at an early date which will make possible the holding of a plebiscite whereby the wishes of the people of the State regarding the future of the State may be freely. ascertained.

"The Commission doubts whether a five-member body is the most flexible and desirable instrument to continue in the task. In the Commission's view, a single person can now more effectively conduct the negotiations which, to be successful, must be carried out in active and constant consultation with the two parties. The designation of a single person with broad authority and undivided responsibility offers a more practical means of finding the balance and compromise necessary to advance the settlement of the dispute."

The context in which this phraseology was used by the Commission is clear. In the light of the changed circumstances, the Commission suggested two things: first that demilitarization should henceforth be brought about not in the two stages, as envisaged in the resolution, but in one stage; second, that the Commission should be dissolved and that its place should be taken by a single individual. Those were the only two changed circumstances; the resolution stood; the circumstances were changed in those two directions. There was nothing more that the Commission meant by the phraseology which the representative of India has quoted more than once.

Let us see whether or not these recommendations by the Commission were accepted by Pakistan. I beg to submit that they were. Despite the fact that demilitarization in a single, continuous process worked against the interests of Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan, in a sincere effort to go forward on any reasonable basis, accepted this proposition. What did the Government of India do? It secured the concession that was offered, and thereafter dug its toes in and refused to agree to any reasonable plan of demilitarization in a single, continu nuous process.

I need not repeat the story. The number of occasions on which the Government of India refused to accept clear cut and specific proposals for the demilitarization of the State have already been enumerated by me in my opening statement; and, despite his efforts, the representative of India has not been able to say that even one of these proposals was found acceptable to the Government of India. Surely, there should be some limit to intransigence.

In his address to the Council on 15 February, to Mr. Krishna Menon read out certain portions of what purported to be the views of a certain Australian correspondent who was recently in Kashmir. It appears from Mr. Krishna Menon's version that this Australian newspaper correspondent was giving his impressions "in an informal meeting with the local newspapermen '' in Srinagar on 7 February 1957 [769th meeting, para. 156).

There is not enough time to recall all that India has been doing by way of the suppression of newspapermen in the part of the State occupied by India. There has been a virtual censorship of press messages going out from Srinagar. Pakistan correspondents and editors have never been allowed to go into the State. Foreign correspondents have been excluded so far as possible. Only a few chosen ones have been taken on conducted tours of the State. Not only have newspapers in the State been suppressed for demanding a plebiscite, but newspapers in Delhi and other important towns which have pleaded for a fair deal for the Kashmiris have either been suppressed or harassed in other ways.

I would mention here what happened as recently as the first week of the current month to two foreign correspondents visiting Srinagar. One was correspondent of the "Daily Mail", Mr. Richard Greenough. This is what he said in a dispatch from Srinagar dated 4 February :

"Two recent demonstrations of mob violence against myself and another British correspondent here were carefully fixed' by a high quarter of the Kashmir Government. I have good grounds for believing. Demonstrations were intended to impress on me the pro-Indian feeling of the people here and also the degree of hatred and bitterness felt against the British, the United Nations and the West generally for favouring the Pakistan request. for a plebiscite They were also intended to try to scare me off talking to those who oppose integration with India. They undoubtedly exist, stifled though they are."

Another correspondent who visited the area was Mr. Stephen Harper of the "Daily Express". This is what he said about his experiences in Srinagar in a dispatch published in the "Daily Express" on 5 February 1957:

"In this capital city of the 'Valley of Fear', I learned today how a plot was laid to set the mob against me. The 'Valley of Fear' is in Kashmir-where India's Premier Nehru keeps a puppet Government in power with the support of 80,000 Indian troops.

"The puppet Premier is Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed, He had declared 'the irrevocable accession' of Kashmir to India without Kashmir's 4 million people having a say in the matter.

"I had scarcely arrived in the Srinagar capital last week when a mob swarmed round my car. They shouted 'Murder him we don't want British reporters here." Car doors and canopy were ripped off. Hands grabbed and tore at my clothes. Little baskets of charcoal-carried around for heat-were poured over me and burned my face.

"Today I discovered that the mob gathered as a result of a telephone call from a Government official to the home of the brother of the puppet Premier Bakhshi.

"The idea was to try to convince me that the people of Srinagar favour integration with India, as Bakhshi has decreed.

"Secondly, the assembling of the mob was an attempt to try to frighten me out of trying to contact opponents of the Bakhshi regime. In both ways the plot failed. "I now have evidence that Sheikh Abdullah-hustled out of premiership and jailed in 1953-is still the darling of Kashmir, and a party called the Kashmir Political Conference carries on secret meetings in mosques.

"Besides my sources for this news, I have heard of two other attempts to contact me. Last night I was warned that I am a target for the mob because my paper is critical of Premier Nehru. News of the 'Daily Express' campaign urging a fair deal for Kashmir has spread to this remote valley."

I am mentioning these recent incidents because Mr. Krishna Menon has chosen to inform the Security Council of what an Australian correspondent was reported to have told Indian newspapermen in Srinagar on 7 February. The fact, however, is that India's policy has consistently been to screen off the area from foreign correspondents. Whenever, under pressure of world opinion, India has allowed foreign correspondents to go to Srinagar, we have had reports on conditions. which would interest this Council.

A correspondent of the London "Economist" made the following report in a dispatch which appeared on 20 August 1955:

"As things are, the average Kashmiri has no desire to be assaulted by the paid bullies of the present Kashmir Government's so-called 'Peace Brigade' or to be arrested on some specious charge and to be locked up without trial. His resentment smoulders, but it seldom bursts into flame. Kashmir is quite a well-run Indian colony... Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed, the present Prime Minister of Kashmir, looks like a moustached Mussolini and often talks like one."

The London "Times" of 14 October 1955 published the following report from its correspondent in India :

"The Government of India is still practicing censorship by refusing to allow British correspondents to visit Kashmir. Representatives of the 'Daily Telegraph' and 'Daily Express' have failed to obtain the necessary permits and have left the country."

The London "Daily Telegraph" of 14 October published a dispatch from its correspondent, Mr. George Evans, which said, in part:

"This morning when I withdrew my application after a vain eighteen-day wait for an entry permit to Kashmir, a New Delhi Government spokesman insisted that my application had not been refused. 'delayed'. It was merely

"This statement was made despite the fact that since my application was first submitted the India Ministry of Defence, which controls the issue of permits, had given one to a Japanese correspondent within two days of his application."

In its issue of 21 October 1955, the London ``Daily Telegraph" published another dispatch from the same correspondent, Mr. George Evans, writing from Muzaffarabad, "Azad '' Kashmir-that is, from the free side of Kashmir. In this dispatch, Mr. Evans said:

"Recent reports of disaffection in 'Azad' Kashmir emanating from India are not in accordance with the actual conditions which I have observed in the course of a two day visit here.

 "The most striking contrast is that, while Mr. Nehru's Government excludes observers from Indian-occupied Kashmir whom it suspects might voice criticism of conditions there, no such discriminatory censorship is applied this side of the cease-fire line...

"Permission to enter 'Azad' Kashmir is necessary, but it seldom takes more than a few hours to get it. The day after applying, I drove across the frontier."

A correspondent of the London "Times" who secured permission to go to Srinagar sent a long dispatch to his newspaper, dealing with the activities of the "Peace Brigade" in Anantnag. This correspondent of the London "Times" said :

"One man had torn nostrils and another claimed that his teeth had been knocked out by members of the 'Peace Brigade'. Two shopkeepers complained that they had been robbed during unofficial searches and others said their shops had been looted. A woman in a highly hysterical state said that she was afraid to go home because of constant harassment. She was the widow of a Muslim killed during the tribal invasion while escorting Hindu refugees, and she alleged that compensation awarded to her had not been paid because she was a supporter of Sheikh Abdullah.

"Mr. Beg said that physical injuries were inflicted on two occasions when his brother, G.M. Beg, was publicly welcomed after his release from prison and when shopkeepers declared hartal last week after one of their number alleged that he had been beaten and robbed by members of the 'Peace Brigade'.

"One of the town's leading traders appeared before this correspondent with bruised and bandaged faces. To top all this, the correspondent himself was approached by a member of the 'Peace Brigade', who demanded information such as his name, address, nationality and purpose of his visit.

"The Indian Government often behaves as if its moral duty is to defend dependent peoples, and it is therefore surprising that so little attention is given to the political welfare of 4 million Kashmiris for whom it is ultimately responsible.

"Generous Indian economic aid and indeed the intelligent development programme of the Kashmir Government tend to conceal the methods of that Government that are totalitarian in concept and occasionally border on outright terrorism in practice."

May I also recall to the Security Council the beating administered to Mr. Ashoka Mehta, a prominent member of the Indian Parliament who, on a visit to the Kashmir State, had the audacity of suggesting a fair deal to the people of Kashmir. This incident was fully reported practically in every important detail. Indian newspaper.

The Council has before it the testimony of such a distinguished Indian social worker as Miss Mridula Sarabhai with regard to the conditions prevalent in Indian held Kashmir. She was an inmate of the Gandhi Ashram for years and later became Assistant Secretary-General of the Indian National Congress. After she had written the letters which had been circulated to the members of the Security Council, the Indian Prime Minister had her thrown out from the New Delhi Constitution House, a Government hostel, where she had stayed for a number of years. It was recently reported in the Indian Press that the Indian Prime Minister had her ejected from a meeting of the Congress, at which she was present and which Mr. Nehru was addressing. I have requested that her letters be released as a United Nations document as well as the letter of Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the veracity of which has been admitted by Bakhshi Ghulam Mohammed, the present Prime Minister of Kashmir. This is what has happened to a lady of very high rank. She is a daughter or sister of one of the biggest textile manufacturers of India, and she has spent her whole life in social service for the benefit of the people. She has been in the forefront of the Congress Party-that is Mr. Nehru's party. The moment she utters a word in favour of the people of Kashmir, Mr. Nehru throws her out of the hostel in New Delhi, which is a Government building, and he ejects her from the meeting in which she is sitting To give that treatment to a woman of status, position, a woman who is a friend, a friend's daughter: it can only happen in India.

Mr. Krishna Menon had been trying to create an impression, here and outside, that it is entirely immaterial what world opinion thinks of Pandit Nehru's attitude in Kashmir, of his intransigence and defiance of this international body created by the Charter, to which India has subscribed.

At this stage I would like to refer to a speech that Mr. Nehru made on 3 February 1957 in connexion with the election campaign. Having seen that his Government was being condemned by the Press of the whole world for not allowing the plebiscite in Kashmir, and being convinced of his position, that he had fallen in the eyes of the whole civilized world in this matter, he made a remarkable speech at this public meeting. He said:

"Gentlemen, I am told"-I suppose he referred to the world Press and world political opinion-"that I have fallen in stature. But what does it matter what the whole world thinks? My stature depends on you, my people."

That is the value that Mr. Nehru attaches to world opinion, to the Security Council, to the United Nations and to the world Press. He says, "Let them say what they like. So long as my people, you people, are with me, I do not care for world opinion". When you are dealing with a man like that, I do not know what method you can employ in order to incline him to honour his pledges given to the United Nations and to the Security Council, when the man does not care for public opinion, the public opinion of the whole world. I think that Mr. Krishna Menon wasted your time when he came here and argued his case for seventeen hours when his Prime Minister has no tions. intention of carrying out his international obliga

I am sure that members of the Security Council have seen some of the comments that have appeared in the Press the world over which have severely taken Pandit Nehru to task for his Kashmir policy. Among these are such distinguished papers as the "Manchester Guardian" and the "New Statesman and Nation" of London, both of which are great admirers of Pandit Nehru. Mr. Kingsley Martin, who is the world-renowned editor of the "New Statesman and Nation" of England, is a fast friend of Pandit Nehru and has been such for the last twenty or thirty years. Mr. Kingsley Martin has brought out a leading article against Mr. Nehru, his friend, condemned him for not allowing a plebiscite in Kashmir and for dishonoring his international agreement. What further proof do you need of world opinion in this direction? In the face of Mr. Nehru's wholly unreasonable attitude in Kashmir, the world Press has been forced to revise its estimate of Mr. Nehru. Such distinguished papers or magazines as "The New York Times'', the "Christian Science Monitor'', the "Washington Post'', the "New York Herald Tribune'', "Life" and "Time" in the United States, the "Times'', "Observer", the "Daily Telegraph''. the "Daily Mail", the "Economist", to mention only a few of the British papers, and leading news papers in Canada, France, Switzerland, Norway, Sweden, Australia, Burma, Indonesia, South America and other countries have expressed views on this matter which are wholly un complimentary to the Indian Prime Minister.

I have with me a very interesting cartoon. I think that if Mr. Krishna Menon were here he would regret having referred to one newspaper correspondent on whom he tried to pin his faith. I have here the latest edition of "Punch", the periodical. Here on this page-I will pass it on-we see a cartoon where Mr. Nehru has one body; he has two heads. On one side of his head, in one hand, he is holding a dove of peace and a little twig. On the other side of his body near his face there is a big sword and underneath is written on the sword side "Kashmir"; on the dove side "Suez Canal".

I would venture to say that on no single issue has world opinion expressed itself so clearly and so vigorously as in the case of Kashmir, and the Council would agree with me that almost the entire volume of this opinion is critical of Pandit Nehru's policy in Kashmir. Mr. Menon advises the Security Council to disregard this expression of public opinion the world over. We have compiled some of these comments and editorials, and although these are only a fraction of what the world Press has said, I would request that the compilation be circulated as a United Nations document.

1, of course, agree with the representative of India that the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 are "the only international engagement that exists". Since then,

are international agreements, and binding international agreements, there is no relevance to Mr. Menon's laboured discussion of the present effect of unaccepted offers by the Government of India to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. These offers, and for that matter the 20 August 1953 agreement between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan that a fair and impartial plebiscite was the most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people, as far as the Security Council is now concerned, are simply demonstrative of India's long-standing announced intention to hold a plebiscite in the State. What is now before the Security Council is the implementation of the international agreement between the Council, India and Pakistan to hold that plebiscite.

No change has taken place as may absolve the Government of India of its international commitment to a plebiscite. Any change that may have taken place is due to unilateral action taken by the Government of India in clear violation of the provisions of the International agreement. Even these changes are such as can be easily undone without causing any harm to either side.

The representative of India has reminded the Council that it is not a legal tribunal. Surely he does not mean by this that the Security council is unable to appreciate the nature of the obligation embodied in the international agreement-an obligation which he says his Government and his people "have no intention and...shall at no time violate" [767th meeting, para. 85]. What is the nature of that obligation ? Mr. Menon points out that the holding of the plebiscite must await the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This is undoubtedly correct. With respect, I would like to point out that Mr. Menon's further argument, that because demilitarization has not been accomplished the obligation to hold a plebiscite falls, is utterly untenable. In fact, it is an attempt by India to take advantage of its own default. The settlement of the Kashmir dispute, according to the international agreement, must proceed step by step. The step that must now be taken is to secure the demilitarization of the State. It was with regard to this next step that my original remarks on 16 January were addressed [761st meeting]. We have tried every method recommended by the Charter, by the Security Council and by the Commission and by the United Nations representatives-and Kashmir is still not demilitarized. There is now before the Council a draft resolution [S/3787] weich addresses itself to the next step..

I do not understand Mr. Krishna Menon's dissatisfaction with the supporters of this draft resolution and the manner in which he has expressed that dissatisfaction. It is interesting to note what Mr. Krishna Menon has said. He has accused Sir Pierson Dixon-or is it the Government of the United Kingdom?-of a "lapse from fortitude and wisdom" [769th meeting, para. 53]. Mr. Krishna Menon has taunted the representative of the United States with having proposed something that is against international law, unethical and inequitable, although he does not impugn Mr. Lodge personally, whom he regards as a man "of great simplicity of mind"-I do not know whether Mr. Lodge will consider that as a compliment "frankness, and odour of expression" [Ibid., para. 991. Mr. Krishna Menon charges the representative of Cuba with not having understood history, political philosophy or the record of the Security Council in respect of Kashmir. The representative of Iraq was chided for having committed the offence of referring to the brotherhood of Islam. Mr. Krishna Menon contrasted it with human brotherhood. If he had read the Koran, from which he is often fond of quoting, he would have known that the concept of the brotherhood of man and of tolerance for all peoples, irrespective of race, creed, colour or caste, is fundamental in Islam. It is one thing to put these things down in a Constitution and quite another thing fully to comprehend them. A little later in his speech Mr. Krishna Meron plainly accused the representative of Iraq of having departed from the truth.

Here, I would like to make a few comments. When Mr. Krishna Menon was commenting on the speech of the representative of Iraq, his last sentence was: "One must stick to the truth even when one wants to be polite." [769th meeting, para. 119.] That means to say that the representative of Iraq had strayed from the truth. And that is a point which I feel that the Security Council cannot pass over lightly.

If an advocate before a High Court Judge, a Supreme Court Judge, or even an ordinary Magistrate, accuses the Judge or the Magistrate of departing from the truth, that is an insult which, when offered to a judicial authority, would bring the confiscation of a lawyer's licence to a practice. If a sentence like that accusation-and a false accusation-were uttered by a Member of Parliament, the Speaker would call upon that Member to withdraw that word. Otherwise, that Member of Parliament would be expelled from the House. I feel that it is commensurate with the dignity and honour of the Security Council that the parties who come before it to argue their cases must control their language and speak in a respectful manner which is in consonance with the high office which the Council holds; and I hope that it is for the Council now to take steps to defend it own honour and prestige so as not to set an example by which, in future, parties who come before it can insult it to its face in the manner in which the representative of Iraq has been insulted. When dealing with other representatives on the Security Council, Mr. Krishna Menon has employed a technique which is well known to us in India and Pakistan, but which may not be well known to the Council. He began to criticize Sir Pierson Dixon very strongly, and when he saw a smile-as I did-on the face of Sir Pierson Dixon, he must have realized that the days when we could accuse the British in India, and they were frightened of us, had gone and we are now a free country, and that Sir Pierson was probably thinking: "Well, my friend, you are a free country; you must now look after yourself." Mr. Krishna Meno must have felt immediately that he had made a mistake in attacking Sir Pierson, and so he softened. He tried to cajole him: "When I was High Commissioner for India in London, the British gave us a lot of supplies and arms, and so on and we have been friends; we are in the Commonwealth, and we are a sister country, and we are brothers." Then he proceeded almost as if he was kissing him on both cheeks. This sort of conduct of a party using strong language against representatives on the Security Council and then changing to another sort of language, thinking that the representative might get angry, a language to cajole him, is an advocacy which I have very seldom come across.

I could have said a good deal about the remarks Mr. Krishna Menon has made about each representative-about the representative of Cuba, the representative of the United States, and so on-simply because if a representative on the Council does not agree with him he resorts to these personal attacks. However, I believe that representatives can defend themselves.

Instead of examining personalities, let us examine what the representatives on the Council have said about the draft resolution. This document has been explained exhaustively by the sponsors. My Government takes note of the following clarifications of the draft resolution that were offered by the sponsors in the course of the debate on 15 February 1957 [768th meeting].

The representative of the United Kingdom said: "As regards other conditions for progress towards the settlement, perhaps I should indicate what we have in mind in including this in the draft. This, then, is one condition for progress which indeed should be examined-the need for a decrease in tension and there are doubtless other matters. I think, for instance, of clarification of the position of the Plebiscite Administrator, which the President may think would repay examination with the two Governments. But all this examination is governed by the phrase. 'Having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan'. That point is fundamental.

" The draft resolution, therefore, provides for a procedure which, we trust, will enable progress to be made, but not through the medium of public debate, during the next few weeks. Yet, the need to make progress is pressing, and for that reason the draft resolution. proposes a definite time-limit within which the President should report to the Security Council; for the Council cannot fail to take up its task again at the earliest possible moment." [768th meeting, para. 16 to 19].

The representative of the United States said: "The draft resolution which has been introduced by the Governments of Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States (S/3787) builds upon these points of agreement. It thus lays considerable stress on the importance of achieving demilitarization. Four of the preambular paragraphs refer to this problem.

"The task which we are suggesting that the Security Council assign to its President also emphasizes the efforts to achieve demilitarization. In this connexion, a proposal has already been put forward as a suggestion by which the present deadlock might be broken. This was the proposal of the representative of Pakistan at the 761st meeting, to the following effect:

""The functions of protecting the State and ensuring internal security should be of interest by the Council to a United Nations force which should be introduced into the area at once." [761st meeting, para, 112].

"We have thought it desirable to note this proposal by the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force in connexion with demilitarization."

"As I indicated earlier, the United States believes that we must build upon the gains which have been made before. The President, in undertaking this mission, is accordingly to do so having regard to the resolutions which have been adopted on Kashmir by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan He is also to bear in mind the statements of the parties and specifically the proposal for a United Nations force. As the President of the Council, he will also no doubt bear in mind the statements of the members of the Council." [768th meeting, paras. 32 to 36].

The representative of Cuba said the following: "The Cuban delegation therefore believes that this draft resolution would lead to the holding of a plebiscite...

... Therefore, For us.... the problem of the plebiscite is something that has been definitely settled and agreed upon by the parties. All that has to be done is to bring about conditions in which the plebiscite can be held.

"From the Indian representative's statement here and also from the statements I have quoted, it seems clear that India has at no time tried to retract its promise to hold the plebiscite, since it laid down conditions under which parts I and II must be complied with before part III can be carried out; and there would be no reason to speak of the fulfilment of conditions for a plebiscite if no plebiscite were to be held. This, in our opinion, is crystal clear. We therefore believe that the draft resolution we have submitted is an attempt, by entrusting the President of the Council with this task, to bring about the conditions which will allow the holding of a plebiscite." [Ibid., paras. 95 to 99].

The representative of Australia stated the following:

"The Council has all along attached great importance to the adoption of appropriate measures of demilitarization in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a necessary step towards the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is well known that negotiations on detailed practical measures to bring about such demilitarization have not in the past been successful. This is the most immediate problem to which, in our view, the Security Council. should bend its present efforts.

"The draft resolution refers to the proposal of the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary. United Nations force to facilitate agreement on effective arrangements for demilitarization. The idea is perhaps not a new one, but it gains in interest and importance from the recent experience of the United Nations in the establishment and operations of the United Nation Emergency Force in Egypt. Without drawing any parallel between the situation that led to the General Assembly's decision to establish that Force and the problem of securing appropriate measures of demilitarization of Kashmir as a preliminary step towards holding a free and impartial plebiscite, it would seem to us very difficult for anybody to deny that the use of such a force, in so far as it might contribute towards demilitarization, would, in the words of the draft resolution 'deserve consideration'. It is the hope of the Australian delegation that this proposal will receive full and sympathetic consideration by the Council and the parties." [Ibid., paras. 52 and 53].

Apart from these clarifications and explanations as to its objective offered by the sponsors, my Government also notes the following from the speeches of the representatives of the Philippines, China and Iraq with regard to their understanding of the contents of the resolution and its objectives.

The representative the Philippines said:

"Although the representative of India has dealt with the question of aggression anew, I do not think that the Council is called upon to make any finding as to whether there has been aggression and by whom it was committed. It should be recalled that the charge and counter charge of aggression ceased to be relevant the moment both sides agreed to the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949." [Ibid., para. 104].

The representative of the Philippines then went on to say:

"The will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, according to the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which have been accepted by both India and Pakistan, is to be ascertained by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The other provisions of the resolutions mentioned are clearly subordinated to that end. The provisions relating to the cease fire and the truce arrangements are aimed simply at the creation of conditions to enable the free and orderly attainment of the prime objective. Whatever changes may have occurred in the situation since the resolutions of the Security Council were passed, it is submitted that the principle underlying those resolutions cannot be changed because it is unchangeable." [Ibid., para. 110]

The representative of the Philippines, further on in his statement, went on to say the following:

"The draft resolution before us meets all the requirements of the situation and. without departing from the sound and practical course heretofore followed by this organ of the United Nations, opens the way realistically to a settlement which, if the parties are minded to coexist in peace, should be final and conclusive.

"The proposal does not deviate from the course we have followed, it recognizes the absolute necessity of demilitarizing the disputed region as a condition precedent to any genuine plebiscite. None of us here will dispute the pro position that no plebiscite is possible in a setting of war like appearances. The first and most important condition to a free election is that the people should be able to go to the polls without a tear in their hearts. Any sign of coercion would make the true expression of the people's will impossible. Those of us who have been used to the democratic way of life will readily admit that any plebiscite worth its name must be conducted under other conditions of absolute peace if it is to be regarded as valid and conclusive.

"We can assume that one of the principal concerns of our President when he goes to the sub-continent is that the ground is properly laid for the untrammelled exercise of popular suffrage when the plan of a plebiscite, which is the Security Council's decision, is actually carried out.

"Finally, the reference in the draft resolution to the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan that a United Nations Force be assigned to Jammu and Kashmir as a temporary means toward the achievement demilitarization is in line with my Government's views that the idea merits full consideration." [Ibid, paras. 118 to 121].

I must apologize for these quotations, but I am going to draw a conclusion from them as regards the draft resolution. That is my only reason for quoting them.

The representative of China said: "Therefore, what this draft resolution tries to do is to further the implementation of the resolutions which the Council or the Commission has already adopted. The co-sponsors have told us and the language of the draft resolution states that all those resolutions stand.

"So we have to devise a scheme to take care of these two requirements: first, the peace and security of the State during the plebiscite; and, second, that the force that maintains peace and security should not coerce or intimidate or give the appearance of intimidating the voters. These are the two requirements that we must always keep in mind in solving this problem of demilitarization.

"I do not know of a better way of meeting those two requirements simultaneously. With the temporary use of a United Nations force in Kashmir, we can contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in that State during the plebiscite. In the second place the stationing of a temporary United Nations force in Kashmir cannot be suspected by anybody of intimidating or coercing the voters to vote in favour of either of the two parties. Therefore, I find that this idea of a temporary United Nations force really deserves consideration," [Ibid., paras, 124 to 130].

The representative of Iraq said the following and this is the last quotation: "The whole issue centres around one major question, namely, that of the establishment of conditions under which a free and impartial plebiscite could be conducted. It will have been realized that all the resolutions, negotiations and reports were endeavours to promote such conditions. It could therefore be said that this problem, which was from its very beginning a clear one, at times had been obscured by the introduction of a number of elements foreign to it and sometimes quite irrelevant." (769th meeting, para, 17.)

The representative of Iraq then said: "The passage of time has neither changed the principles upon which the future of Kashmir was to be decided nor has made the method of plebiscite less applicable now than it was eight years ago." (Ibid, para. 21.)

The representative of Iraq concluded his statement as follows: "We believe that the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States (S/3787) contains all the elements necessary at the moment for taking certain positive steps in the solution of the Kashmir dispute". (Ibid, para. 27.)

The Government of Pakistan is grateful to the members of the Security Council for the clarifications of the draft resolution which they have been kind enough to give publicly. In view of these clarifications, I take great pleasure in informing the Securing Council that my Government would accept the draft resolution that is now before the Security Council and has authorized me to assure the Security Council that the distinguished President of the Council will receive all possible. co-operation from the Government of Pakistan in his difficult and responsible tasks.

My Government has complete confidence in the ability and impartiality of the President of the Security Council, Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring, Ambassador of Sweden. Let us hope that his mission, which is to bring about demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, preparatory to the holding of a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations to deter mine the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan, shall succeed.

My Government is happy that the Security Council has noted the proposal that a United Nations force be sent to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in order to facilitate its demilitarization in accordance with the terms of the international agreement. I would humbly submit, once again, that in our view this is a good way of making progress towards the agreed objective, namely, the plebiscite. Over the course of the last eight years the Government of India has rejected, one after another, eleven proposals to bring about the demilitarization of the State. The various procedures laid down in Chapter VI of the Charter have been tried without success. If the situation is not to erupt into a catastrophe, something positive must be done to demilitarize the State thus making it possible for the plebiscite to be held without further delay.

Mr. Menon has said, and I quote him: "The Government of India will in no circumstances permit foreign troops on its soil." (769th meeting, para.

153.) I submit, Mr. President, that Kashmir is not Indian soil. The question of any foreign troops going on Indian soil does not therefore arise.

Mr. Krishna Menon is a clever lawyer. He has left sufficient scope in these words to argue when he returns, after having agreed to everything. to say, "The meaning of my words were 'our territory', which was Indian territory but not Kashmir territory-which was not our territory". Therefore We should not be dismayed by the use of these words by Mr. Menon because he has left a loop-hole for himself.

The distinguished representative of India has also raised objections with regard to the United Nations force on the score that it may not succeed in demilitarizing the area. We have never suggested that the force will go round the army barracks in Kashmir and force the troops to surrender their arms. The disarming and disbanding of forces is under the terms of the international agreement the responsibility of the representative or the Plebiscite Administrator, as the case may be, The object of the entry-and I specially draw the attention of the honourable member of the Soviet Union of a United Nations force s simply to confidence in the minds of the two sides which should enable them to proceed without fear to the discharge of their obligations under the international agreement. As soon as the United Nations force enters Kashmir both sides must, strictly according to the terms of the international agreement, start withdrawing their forces, which operation would be followed by disbandment of the "Azad'' Kashmir forces and further reduction in the forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

Now, this thing must be clearly understood, that this United Nations force is going into Kashmir with the consent of both parties, in the sense that both parties have agreed to demilitarize, and both parties have agreed to withdraw their forces. It is in pursuance of that agreement which has been made by India and Pakistan before you here, for demilitarization, that this force is going. Therefore, for anyone to think or imagine that this force is going against the wishes of the people of Kashmir, or India, or of Pakistan, would be wrong.

If India said today: "We will not admit the force", then it would be going against its agreement made before the Council that they will demilitarize. This force is now being sent there from the Pakistan side to occupy the frontiers, to prevent war between the two, and to remove fear from the mind of each that the other will invade if they withdraw. Therefore, when this United Nations force has gone to the cease-fire line, then India, having already agreed to withdraw its forces according to the resolution-international treaty, I call it-must withdraw. Therefore if anybody argues, and I want to address this point to Mr. Sobolev, that these troops are going there forced on India-he is wrong. We are agreeing to it, and India has already agreed to demilitarization, therefore its consent is presumed.

Consequently I think the only way of ensuring peace now in that area is that the United Nations troops should go there, and we allow them to go to our area to occupy our cease-fire line. In which case, India already having agreed, and now I am sure It will agree again-when the President goes there that if our troops go, it will be willing to go. If we confirm the original agreement, then India Is agreement can also be presumed, then the troops can go in. But we ourselves do not want to hand over the cease-fire to a few policemen from the United Nations, and then tomorrow India may invade our side and be a danger to Pakistan. The troops are being sent and will be sent only when there is a presumption that both parties are willing to agree to demilitarize and accept these troops. We are giving our acceptance now. India acceptance, the President will secure, I hope, when he goes to New Delhi.

Therefore the question of forcing the troops into that area does not arise, If anybody has been arguing-especially the Russian delegate-I hope he will bear in mind my interpretation of the request for troops: that is the willingness of the parties to receive the troops that will take the troops there. If India is fighting and not in any case allow the United Nations troops to go there, then we may not be willing to allow our troops to move out in order to make room for the United Nations troops unless India has also agreed. Therefore we must help the President in solving this problem. We must give him a chance. We must give him this authority. When he has been to New Delhi, then he will return to report to you and there will be sufficient time for every member of the Security Council to reconsider this matter in connexion with the troops.

At the moment we are only authorizing the President to go and to negotiate with India to find out whether India is willing to receive the troops or not, and if so, on what conditions; and if it is not, how are they going to implement the international. treaty ?

Nothing is going to happen with regard to these troops. until the President returns and reports to you on the opinion of India with respect to this subject. Then the Council will have plenty of time to assess the situation and consider this point. I am saying this because yesterday a certain rumour was spread by a certain quarter-which did not come from the Soviet Union, I know. That is why I felt it necessary to explain the question in this way since I did not have an opportunity of seeing the representative of the Soviet Union to explain this to him before. The troops are not being forced, and after the President returns the Council will have the time to consider this.

The Council also has before it the amendments proposed by the Soviet Union with respect to the draft resolution (S/3789). The decision on these amendments as well as the draft resolution is, of course, one for the Security Council. We have given careful consideration to these amendments and suggest, with due respect, that if adopted, the Soviet Union. amendments would remove from the resolution an authoritative and valuable pronouncement on the present status of the disputes and the lines along which a solution must be sought. The significant area of agreement between India and Pakistan which the Security Council is seeking to build would be overlooked if the Soviet Union amendments were accepted. The usefulness of the purpose of a United Nations force which, though unexplored, has certain distinct possibilities, would be ignored.

Further, these amendments would severely restrict the authority of the President of the Security Council in seeking to develop proposals for the demilitarization of the State. The draft resolution speaks of examining proposals which in the Presidential opinion are likely to contribute to the achievement of demilitarization. The amendments restrict the President to examining the present situation and the progress that can be made. The Soviet Union amendments would unfortunately remove the deadline date for the President's report on demilitarization-a provision which my Government considers vital in view of the present mounting tension over this dispute.

Mr. Krishna Menon, in the course of his last intervention, has tried to differentiate between the case of Algeria and Kashmir (769th meeting, para. 112), but I cannot follow his arguments. Did he mean to convey to the Security Council that because Algeria was conquered by the French some 130 years ago it has earned the right of liberation and self-determination, whereas Kashmir was conquered by Indian troops only nine years ago and therefore the struggle for liberation by these people cannot be rated on a par with the struggle for liberation of the Algerian people ? Or is it that because the people of Kashmir, having placed their faith in the Security Council, have, under great provocation, refrained from reacting violently against the Indian forces of occupation, Mr. Menon does not consider them to be human beings worthy of the name ? Is Mr. Menon waiting for Kashmir to erupt like Algeria before he will concede that the move for liberation by the people of that area is on the march?

The fact is that Kashmir did erupt some nine years ago but failed to engulf India because the Security Council solemnly promised to its people a fair and just solution through peaceful means. If that promise is not kept and if that solution is not allowed to go through, then it is much to be feared that Kashmir may rival or even outrun Algeria in respect of the heart-rending happenings in the latter country.

I am most grateful to the President and the members of the Council for having listened to me patiently, because I fully realize that my speech has been quite a long one this morning which is unusual, and which the Council does not expect from me.