15021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 769 held on 15 February 1957.

15021957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Krishna Menon (India) in the Security Council meeting No. 769 held on 15 February 1957.

 

Mr. President, I believe you reminded the Council this morning that its proceedings would centre around the draft resolution [S/3787], or at least I gathered that impression. Since there have been reasonably long debates on the general issue, I propose to confine myself to the draft resolution initiated by the United Kingdom and the United States and sponsored by Cuba and Australia in addition.

 

The operative part of this draft resolution requests the President of the Security Council, the representative of Sweden, to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan proposals; to visit so far as we are concerned, India for this purpose; and invites the Government of India to cooperate.

 

Before I enter into the substance of this matter and in order that the position of my delegation, my Government and my people should be understood not only in the Security Council but in the outside world, I should like to state here and now that so far as we are concerned, Mr. President, your counsel, your country, the high office you held and your person are held in high respect in India, and you would be welcome at any time. But the question of the functional character of the operations you propose to undertake would be another matter, which we would have to discuss in substance. Therefore, the traditional hospitality of our country would not be disregarded, even in the face of Security. Council resolution with which we may find ourselves in disagreement.

 

Having got that out of the way, I would like now to refer to the subject matter that is before us this afternoon. There have been several speeches The majority of them, if not all of them purport to be based upon the statements made by India and Pakistan and, for the greater part, refer to the statement that I made in this Council. Therefore, it becomes necessary for me to deal with the more relevant parts of them. because it is impracticable to deal with them paragraph by paragraph. First of all, I do not have the script with me and, secondly, it will become interminably long. After that I will try to examine the draft resolution before the Council and deal with its more important aspects as far as the text concerns us.

 

Next I will try to convey to the Security Council what its consequences would be. I do not mean the short-term consequences of how members of the Council vote. What would be its consequences with respect to peace and stability in our part of the world, with respect to public opinion not only in India but in SouthEast Asia, with the exception of parts of Pakistan and with respect to the purported objective of the draft resolution itself? These are obligations I owe to the Council, Some of them may not be welcome to those who are the authors of certain observations. But my duty here is not to reflect the will of other Governments but to reflect, as far as I can, the will of my people and my Government and to convey to you the state of affairs.

 

It was not so long ago that, for the sake of peace and in order not to drive certain issues to differences, we came to an agreement with the then British Government of the day to station a boundary force under a supreme command on the Indo-Pakistan frontier in the West. It was one of the great tragic decisions we took. largely buying that time in the necessities of the situation. I do not think either of our countries had made a more sad decision because as the result of that came the great slaughter of 1947, with respect to which my Prime Minister decided to dissolve the force.

 

The first statement by a Council member was made by the representative of the United Kingdom, for whom we have very great respect. With his country we had relations of one kind, and we have relations of another kind today. Those relations have been strained considerably by the British adventure in the Middle East and now their adventure in regard to Kashmir, but, so far as we are concerned, we would do our best not to allow these individual actions on the part of the United Kingdom Government-not of its people, fortunately-do come in the way of the more substantial relations that should exist between our countries. But I would be doing no service to this Council, or indeed to the United Kingdom or to the very many friends that we have there and with whom we have been in such close relationship if I did not indicate to them the enormous, deep and very vehement feelings in India at the present time in regard to the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom might easily retaliate by saying: "We felt somewhat like that when you took a certain position in another matter." Of course, that is one way of looking at it.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon, after tracing the history of this matter, said that finally, after the failure of various missions, to which I shall come back in a minute, including that of Mr. Graham, whose absence from this table my delegation regrets-even though there is nothing very much in Mr. Graham's report that assists the statement of the position that we made, because he did not examine that the breakdown of the direct negotiations was due to extraneous causes. We had, during the course of this debate, largely because of our concern in regard to Indo-American relations and to avoid introducing issues of the "cold war" outside the Kashmir question and, what is more, in the hope that the present lapse from fortitude and wisdom in this matter is temporary, not referred to them, but the extraneous consideration to which Sir Pierson Dixon refers is the military agreement between the United States and Pakistan.

 

Our views on this matter are very well known, and there is no doubt-and again one must state the facts of the case that the added military strength of Pakistan by the supply of very considerable quantities of war material to that country, of which we have some knowledge, has certainly altered the situation. But it would be equally wrong to say that that was the only changed condition, or indeed the reason for the direct talks between Mr. Mohammed Ali, the former Prime Minister of Pakistan, and afterward someone else, and the Prime Minister of India. It weighed considerably, there is no doubt about it. What is more, we at that time said that the relation to Kashmir we could not consider the United States as being neutral, and for that reason, and with the utmost politeness, we suggested that observers of United States nationality were not the best people to serve on the cease-fire line. They responded with equal politeness, and we resolved that situation as between two countries who have no desire to exaggerate a difficulty. I regret that this matter has come up, because I have been at great pains to avoid it but it was referred to by a close ally of the United States, and it is not my practice to run away from any argument that has been put forward. So that is that. So this extraneous relationship, if it is one of the factors, was not the factor that led to the breakdown of the negotiations.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon made other statements. I picked out that speech because that is the keynote speech, as they call it in this country. The other speeches follow more or less that line with the exception of the speech from Colombia. That is, they lay stress on what is called demilitarization. This word "demilitarization" for this purpose must be interpreted with the connotation that it has derived through the years, by negotiation.

 

In spite of the Security Council having heard my voice for so long, perhaps the members would be so kind, even if they did not read 1 percent of the papers before them, which is impossible because there are so many of them, as to at least refer to the resolutions of the Commission and point out to me any place where there is reference to demilitarization. Demilitarization is a phase and a problem, as it is now pinpointed, which arose as one of the methods for creating the conditions under part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75]. It is very important for us to refer to this in view of the other suggestions in the resolution. The whole of the picture is sought to be covered by demilitarization, but we are prepared to face this in this way.

 

When either the United States or the United Kingdom speaks to us about the importance of demilitarization, they have to take into account certain factors. In Kashmir, which the legitimate Government of Kashmir administers, there are units of the Indian Army. I want to explain this. The Indian. The Army in Kashmir is not a foreign army any more than we have a foreign army in Bombay. The Kashmiris pay for it like everybody else. That is, certain units of the Army of the Indian Union are in the Constituent State of Kashmir. They are easily identifiable. They have no uniforms that are not Army uniforms. Their divisions and their numbers are well known. In addition to this, we have in Kashmir approximately 6,000 men belonging to the Kashmir militia. These are published figures or, if they are not. I shall publish them, and I take the responsibility for doing so. There are 6,000 men who belong to the Kashmir militia, who are a kind of territorial force, a State force, largely of an armed police character, intended for internal security and the like. That is the total strength of our military position in Kashmir, far below what it was at the time of the cease-fire. On the other hand, according to our information, which normally is reliable, in regard to Pakistan military dispositions, there are forty-five battalions of the "Azad" Kashmir forces. There were thirty-five at the time of the cease-fire. Now there are forty-five battalions of the "Azad '' Kashmir forces, officered by men of the Pakistan Army. If the Security Council has any doubt about it, we shall some day be willing to furnish you their names, their ranks and their particulars from available sources. They are officers trained and equipped by the Pakistan Army. They are well-trained soldiers. There are artillery regiments, cavalry, a tank corps, and so on. There were thirty-five, and now there are approximately forty-five battalions of these troops. In addition, as Mr. Firoz Khan Noon admitted the other day by implication, the Pakistan Army itself is there, because he said he would withdraw it, and you cannot withdraw what is not there. Therefore, in addition, there is the Pakistan Army itself. When we speak about demilitarization, we have to think of this military element and what is demilitarized.

 

Add to that two other factors. There are the commandos that are being trained, of which there are 800 in school at all times. When they are finished, they are thrown back into the population. They are another military element in the situation just across our border, mainly in the population. This is not in the whole of the Pakistan-occupied area, because over the whole of the Pakistan-occupied area, in Gilgit, Baltistan and so on, these factors do not apply so much, but in this small area where there are half a million people.

 

In addition to that, as I pointed out the other day, there is today an army in Pakistan which is out of proportion to the relations established at the time of partition. Pakistan has well over 200,000 men equipped not only with the normal equipment that comes from the United Kingdom under the usual purchase arrangements, but with the considerable supply of military material that comes from the United States in pursuance of military agreements, which are not directed against us, so far as the United States is concerned-and we accept that situation so far as the United States is concerned. They are within very short distances of our frontier. I give the Security Council the mileages the other day. [764th meeting, paras. 119 and 162].

 

Therefore, when we speak about demilitarization we must take all these elements into consideration and set them side by side with two other factors. You gentlemen here representing the Member States are not merely concerned about passing resolutions but about their vast social, political and world consequences. Let us set these factors side by side with two others.

 

One of these constitutes the remarks made by the representative of Pakistan outside his printed text when he first spoke here. He stated:

 

"Here I would like to say that it is sometimes argued by India that everything is peaceful, so why bother about Kashmir? But I warn you"-he warns the Security Council-"that is a calm before the storm. Everything is not peaceful. We have just seen a telegram which states that, on 11 January, our Minister for Information, Mr. Amir Azam Khan, made a statement in Karachi that the Indians have massed their troops on our border." [761st meeting, para. 105.]-a statement which I contradicted the other day.

 

The representative of Pakistan then went on to say: "Please do not be misled by the fact that we are peaceful and that we want a peaceful solution." [Ibid., para. 106].

 

This is exactly the pattern, and there may be those who remember this fact, that occurred in 1947. We were told : "Wolf, wolf-"-at that time-"it is coming, it is coming; after all we cannot stop it". And then it came and the Pakistan Army came afterwards.

 

The "Daily Telegraph" of London-a paper which is not friendly to India-carried on 11 February 1957 an interview with Sardar Abdul Quiyum Khan, President of the "Azad" Government. I shall not read the whole of the interview, but this is a part of what he said: "It is coming to a fight in Kashmir"-this is issued not from 'Azad Kashmir, but from the Ministry of Kashmir affairs in Karachi-"whether the people like it or not. We have no alternative left and I have told the Pakistan Government this. I had expected we would fight by December or January but certain factors intervened." The fact of the United States elections, and therefore the Security Council was put off, "I now think it is certain there will be fighting this year, perhaps even in a few weeks."

 

When the correspondent raised the plebiscite issue; the President said:

 

"Recent Security Council notes were encouraging politically" that is also borne out by the testimonial to the United Kingdom Government by the Pakistan Prime Minister, to which I shall refer in a moment-"but Kashmiris want to see some results at last, if not by diplomacy then by war. India will never agree to a free plebiscite. India had occupied most of Kashmir and had poured money into her organization there. She knew that Kashmiris on a free vote would never opt for India, so Nehru would be crazy to agree to a plebiscite. I don't think he is crazy."-That is the only part of it that is true. "It will be a people's war: we know our country. In Kashmir we can give the Indians hell. We are much better equipped"-this is another truthful fact-"now than in the former fighting when we often had not more than five rounds per man."

 

The President went on to point out that "Azad" Kashmir was not a party to the cease-fire agreement-this again is the pattern of 1947-and therefore was not bound by it. He said :

 

"If the United Nations would leave the matter in the hands of 'Azad' Kashmir fighting men for just a few weeks, the question would be solved. Nehru only under stands for that kind of language. He would come running to the United Nations begging them to intervene on his behalf. We can turn both flanks of the Indian."

 

This is only a sample of what is going on. I want to report to the Security Council that this type of wild statement is being made at a time when a vast election campaign is going on in India, where we are addressing, as I stated the other day, an electorate of 200 million people. I state to the Security Council in all conscience that the efforts of our leaders at the present moment are to exercise restraint upon the people so that they should not become inflamed. I could quote to the Council, if there was time, the speeches made by the Prime Minister in this connexion, when he said that if misfortune should befall us by way of attack, we should meet it with fortitude and calm, but there was no need to get excited.

 

Normally this does not very much matter, but we had a dress rehearsal and we had a performance afterwards, so that. This is a repeat performance. When the Security Council passes resolutions which have the effect of unsettling events-unsetting events in Pakistan, in the occupied areas, in Jammu and Kashmir and in the whole of India-then it takes upon itself a responsibility which, fortunately for itself, it will not have to shoulder, while the people of India will have to shoulder it. I hope that my good friend, General Carlos Romulo, the representative of the Philippines will not say that I was admonishing the Council. I shall come to that in a moment.

 

That is the background of what the representative of Pakistan refers to as the decrease in tension. Unless this is measured in reverse terms with the whole thermometer upside down, I do not see how this can mean a decrease in tension. There is a decrease in tension between Pakistan and India in certain other matters, particularly between India and Eastern Pakistan in respect of which we have concluded trade agreements and where the populations are less inflamed by these matters. Therefore, when we speak about demilitarization and a decrease in tension, these matters have to be understood.

 

While I am on this point, I might deal with one other matter, because my Government is very anxious and very concerned that no statement of ours or any errors of omission or commission should afterwards be charged up to us as a commitment. We have suffered by moderation. We have suffered by reasonableness in our proceedings before this Council. Every time we consider a hypothetical proposition and every time we have agreed to embark upon an exploration, it has been charged up against as a commitment. Therefore, I want to say here and now that whatever mathematical calculations were made with regard to 6,000 or 3,000 or 12,000 or 21,000 in the various previous negotiations, these no longer hold true, because no offer that is not accepted is a binding contract, either in the case of individuals or in the case of nations. Otherwise we should have a number of floating commitments, and no country would know where it stood. In the course of long negotiations, all kinds of offers are made. If the Secretary-General were to be committed to the many suggestions which he must have made in the past sixty days. then he would be in an awkward position. The same thing is true with respect to a government.

 

Therefore, I want to say here and now, Mr. President, that if you were to go to India, or if anyone else were to go, it would be no use telling us that we agreed to this and that the time and that "now therefore you are committed to it." We agree to nothing-we discuss all these proposals. They must all be considered, as with any problem, in the context of the time. We agree to things to which we are parties.

 

That brings me to the next propositions put forward by the representative of the United Kingdom. He said, quite rightly, that it is common ground between Pakistan and India that the only obligations appearing in this matter are the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [768th meeting, para. 13]. But Sir Pierson Dixon would feel flattered by the fact that I was educated in a system for which he has very great appreciation and therefore I take care to be precise in language. I said that the only obligations we "had" undertaken-and, although English is rather sparse in grammar, it does have tenses-were these two resolutions. It is quite true that my distinguished colleague put it differently. I do not say that his language is more precise, but he has more friends around this Council than I have, and therefore he does not have to be so much forewarned. And I suppose that General Romulo would say that I am, by nature, suspicious. Of course, he is wrong.

 

At any rate, we say that these resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 are our only engagements and I use the word "engagements' ' very deliberately. I said that they could be elevated to the form of treaties if they were formal. But what we said was that the only international engagements. are the two resolutions of the Commission-and this is recounting history at the present time. I do not object to the statement made by the distinguished representative, but it bears the inference that this thing stands by itself, without any further progress in that matter or any past history. Those engagements have to be understood in the context of all that was said at that time. That becomes necessary because someone is likely to say: "Well, here are these resolutions. It is quite true that you did not get anywhere with them. Why don't we start on them tomorrow morning? Well, tomorrow Saturday, and on Sunday we go to church, so we will start on Monday ''. That would not work because you have to take all the surrounding circumstances into account. And that is why it is necessary to repeat very briefly the fact that the position of the Government of India, as stated the other day by the Prime Minister in a speech at Allahabad, is that Pakistan has violated the cease-fire agreement. That is a far more grievous charge, and we make that deliberately that Pakistan has violated the cease-fire agreement by the introduction of military personnel and materials into the area and by the annexation of territory. And therefore, when the first part of the agreement is violated, the consideration of the second part becomes very, very, very subsequent. That is very bad English-but it becomes very subsequent.

 

Therefore, the observation made by the representative of the United Kingdom must be taken in the context, first of all, of the explanations that I submitted on behalf of my Government and the fact that, since the conclusions of that agreement, there have been violations of part I by the accentuation of the forces on the other side of the cease-fire line and by the assimilation of territory.

 

The President of the Council is what might be called an example of the European neutral. I would ask him, in all conscience, since I am entitled to address a question to the President: How is it that when the Constituent Assembly of Kashmir, under our constitutional procedures and using only the pen and not the sword, working over a period of five or six years and proceeding from a legal instrument about which you all say you are neutral-nobody has challenged it so far-writes a constitution which does not alter any of the physical facts, that is called annexation, whereas the elven members around this table never turned around and asked the Pakistan delegation under what title its Government annexed these territories of 42,000 square miles? The latter was barefaced annexation.

 

Here I propose to cite to you assurances, documents and statements made in the Security Council time after time, that the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government remains inviolate and that neither the Commission nor the Council will do anything to alter it.

 

That leads me to the third point, Sir Pierson Dixon referred to engagements. He is a friend of mine, and I am sure he will forgive me for centering the argument around him (in a sense, it is an expression of great esteem). I said the other day that this engagement bound our two countries. Since this is probably my last main intervention during this episode of the discussion of this item, I should like to say that there are three parties engaged in this whole process.

 

The Security Council is a party to the resolution of 13 August 1948, and we of the Government of India have the privilege and the right to ask the Security Council what it is going to do about the violation of part I. The Council is very quick in passing resolutions about the Constituent Assembly and being misled into acceptance of what was put out in a "crisis atmosphere". How is it that no question had been asked by the eleven nations represented round this table-I ask this question only because my people will ask and because the Security Council does not represent only these eleven countries but, as we understand it, all the Member States of the United Nations about this apparent, gross, obvious, continuous, persistent and flagrant violation of the cease-fire agreement, of international law, of commitments contained in Security Council resolutions and Commission resolutions, and solemn understandings given by representatives of Member States to our Government, which are in writing and which have been made public ?

 

The shoe is on the other foot. That is to say, the annexation is on the other side. The Security Council would be justified in asking us why we have not requested a meeting in order to complain about this annexation. The answer is two fold. My Government proceeds on the basis that this problem -and that is what it is; it is not a dispute-is one of extreme complexity, which involves India-Pakistan relations and various other world factors. The solution of it, which was supposed to be proximate on 1 January 1949, is still far from being at hand. We consider that we have a duty not to re-agitate matters and therefore we have let sleeping dogs lie so far as the actual stage of affairs is concerned, without in any way permitting the Security Council or anyone else to obtain our assent-and it is repeated so many times to any change or alteration in the status of this territory.

 

The representative of Colombia has referred to these matters [J68th meeting]. He probably has first-hand knowledge of the question, because some of these assurances were given by Mr. Lozano. The Secretary-General has an easy way of ascertaining the facts in this connexion, because some of the members of the Commission's staff at that time are still members of the Secretariat here. These assurances are not hanging in the air; they are part of the resolutions. I deal with them more specifically today in view of the observations of the representative of Colombia,

 

To place demilitarization in the centre of the present draft resolution is, in our opinion, a misreading of the entire situation. It is this aspect which has bedevilled the question since the time of General McNaughton. It is a matter of great regret to us that suggestions made, in a spirit of goodwill, by two persons from countries which are members. of our Commonwealth should have been ultra vires of every decision and of the principles of the Security Council. Sir Owen Dixon is a distinguished judge; is now Chief Justice of Australia. With great respect, I must say that Sir Owen Dixon seems to have approached this problem as though. Kashmir were the Australian bush of 200 years ago and, if Mr. Walker objects to that idiom, if it is one, I shall withdraw it-as though Kashmir belonged to no one and, therefore, a United Nations government or some other government could be set up in gross violation of the Security Council's express commitment.

 

My Government is entitled to ask this question: why is it when we have committed no violations whatsoever, that there is all this talk about violations by us? The Security Council itself-a party to this agreement-is remiss in not drawing the other party's attention to violations; the Security Council is remiss in not asking for the withdrawal of the other party from that area; the Security Council's representatives make proposals to us which are in gross violation of the commitments. Why is there no unanimity about these violations ?

 

In fact, we would not have discussed the 13 August 1948 resolution if there had been any suggestion that the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government and India's competence as regards the defence of its frontiers which are on the western and northern side of Kashmir-were in question.

 

I do not know whether the Security Council wishes me to go on citing these documents. The documents are before the Council, as I have said time and time again.

 

Mr. Korbel, the Czechoslovak representative. who was Chairman of the Commission in August 1948, said that the sovereignty of the territory was not to be changed. In a letter which the Prime Minister of India sent to Mr. Korbel on 20 August 1948, the Prime Minister wrote:

 

"If I understood you (Mr. Korbel) correctly, A, 3 of part II of the resolution does not envisage the creation of any of the conditions to which we have objected in paragraph 3 (1) of this letter. In fact, you made it clear that the Commission was not competent to recognize the sovereignty of any authority over the evacuated areas other than that of the Jammu and Kashmir Government." [S/1100, para. 71].

 

Now, there was only one Jammu and Kashmir Government then, and there is only one Jammu and Kashmir Government now. I ask the representative of Cuba, who is so attached to the idea of sovereignty and freedom from intervention in internal affairs, how he reconciles that position with this one in respect of Kashmir.

 

In reply to the above-mentioned letter, Mr. Korbel wrote: to the Prime Minister of India as follows:

 

"The Commission requests me to convey to Your Excellency its view that the interpretation of the resolution as expressed in paragraph 4 of your letter coincides with its own interpretation. [Ibid., para. 79.]

 

In a letter dated 16 April 1949, the Vice-Chairman of the Commission, who, I believe, was a United States citizen, wrote:

 

"It has consistently been the view of the Commission, as well as the Security Council, that pending the determination of the will of the people as regards the accession of the State of India or Pakistan neither body"-and this means neither the Security Council nor the Commission, not India or Pakistan-"will recognize any new sovereignty in the Stale. To do so would constitute a prejudgment of the will of the people." I read out all these documents because they have a relation to the draft resolution sponsored by the United State and the United Kingdom. They have a resolution to the violation of our municipal law and the principles of the law of those two countries and this particularly concerns the representative of the United Kingdom, for it is from the United Kingdom that we claim the heritage of this law. What is more, they have a relation to the violation of international law-and I shall return to this aspect in a moment. I should like now to read out the following excerpt from the Commission's third interim report:

 

"The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities"-and the expression "local authorities" is intended to mean persons who are not a government, who are operating in the area de facto -"under the surveillance of the Commission and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State."

 

Hence, there can be neither a Pakistan nor an "Azad" nor a "Gilgit" government, nor any other government, in this area. The other day. I read out to the Council the Commis sion's agreement that we were entitled to station garrisons there for the protection of the trade routes from the north and the northwest (763rd meeting, para.62).

 

I continue to quote from the Commission's third interim. report:

 

"These provisions are without prejudice to the territorial integrity" and, when part of the country has been annexed, that is certainly a violation of territorial integrity "and the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

I could go on quoting from these. documents-and . There are so many of them.

 

In the Security Council, General McNaughton-who, I believe, was President of the Council at the time of which I am speaking-approached this problem as though this territory really did not belong to anyone, as though two parties were fighting over it; he tried to place us both on an equal status. Sir Benegal Rau, who was then a member of the Security Council, wrote the following to General Mc Naughton in this : connection.

 

"It has been admitted all along that the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State should be accepted over the whole area of the State."-that is a statement of our position. "If Pakistan irregular forces, such as the Gilgit or the Baltistan Scouts, remain in the northern area, the sovereignty of the State will be violated militarily". This, again, is a point which has an immediate bearing on the suggestion made by the United. States and the United Kingdom.-"Further, if, as suggested, the administration of this area is to remain in the hand of the existing local authorities, which have been created by Pakistan and are aided by Pakistan officials, the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State in this area. will be equally violated in the administrative field."

 

That was said in reply to General McNaughton's suggestion for the creation of a new situation, disregarding the basis. of the procedures :

 

Members of the Council will thus be able to understand. why the Government of India has to be extremely wary. A suggestion is put to us, and we are told: "No, you are not asked to accept it, you are only asked to look at it". But the next day we shall be told, "You looked at it, and did not think it was a profanity to do so; if it is not profane, then it must be sacred, and therefore it is binding on you". That is the kind of argument that we have heard.

 

Sir Benegal Kau also said the following with regard to the question of sovereignty, on 7 February 1950:

 

"...accession does not mean dissolution: the acceding State remains intact and fully sovereign in its own field even after accession; it continues as a single unit. If, therefore, the plebiscite is to be held for the State as a whole, it must not be disrupted beforehand." [463rd meeting, p. 12].

 

I turn now to a memorandum which the representative of India transmitted to the United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, on 11 September 1952. I allude to this later period in order to show that this is not old history. In that memorandum, the representative of India said that the Government's position was the following:

 

"The administration of this area would, under paragraph. 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities, under the same resolution, only local administrative functions have been assigned To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their function and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the every nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil armed force." [S/2783 and Corr. 1, annex 5, sect. 1].

 

In a letter to Mr. Graham dated 17 February 1953, we stated:

 

"The Government of India is unable to agree to the retention of any military force in the so-called 'Azad' Kashmir territory. Not only would this be contrary to the assurance given by UNCIP to India"-and I contend that every assurance given by the United Nations commission for India and Pakistan to India is an assurance given by Security Council to the Government of India "that the resolution of 13 August should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of their territory evacuated by Pakistan troops..." [S/2967, annex IV, paaa. 2]. Of course, the evacuation never took place.

 

That is the position with regard to sovereignty.

 

The observation that I shall now make has relation to the whole concept which is now sponsored by the United States and the United Kingdom in regard to United Nations forces. There are also other matters connected with it. My distinguished friend, Mr. Lodge, United States Ambassador, has told us at the 768th meeting that we are only being asked by the Security Council to consider this idea of United Nations forces, but it is not right to ask a sovereign Government to consider something that is against international law, against its own sovereign rights, and in violation of the agreement with the Security Council. It is unethical, inequitable and, what is more, it would not lead to a settlement. I am afraid that Mr. Lodge made a slip when, in explaining the draft resolution, he used the words ``specifically the United Nations force", so that it was not just one of those things that are innocent. He said that the core of this draft resolution was the United Nations force and, Mr. Lodge being a man of, if I may say so with great respect, great simplicity of mind and frankness and candour of expression, let this out. No doubt his speech had been very carefully looked into and the words had been put there. Since in a year from now these words may be quoted against us, I do not want to make any mistake of not having something to show to you about that.

 

The United States representative has addressed a request to the Government of India to receive the President of the Security Council very cordially. We appreciate this request and accept it in the spirit in which it is made, but, as I said a while ago, so far as hospitality is concerned the present President is almost half a native of India. I do not mean this in a disrespectful way; you are always welcome.

 

In the statement of the representative of the United States-perhaps I might make this general-there is no reference whatsoever to the people on the other side. My colleague from Cuba has spoken about rights, about self-determination, about the people and about all those things that we value [768th meeting, paras. 87 to 90], but why is it we have not heard the voice of Cuba in connexion with the freedom of the people who are under the suppression and tyranny of Pakistan authorities on the other side of our cease-fire line? Why is it that we have not heard that in ten years these people have not seen a ballot paper? Why is it that they are streaming into our part of the territory? Why is it they are under conditions of economic degradation? Why is it that when the five-year plan is making vast strides in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, there is no such thing at all, or even a semblance of it, anywhere in the Pakistan-occupied area? Why are there still wild tracts? What is more, why is it that the very men who are the accredited representatives of the organizations of this area make representations to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly and say: "We are but helots, we are but slaves, we have no voice in our own country"? With what voice can either the Security Council, or anyone coming before it, demand a plebiscite for people on our side who exercise their franchise, who have freedom of speech, who function under scores of local bodies, who have freedom of discussion, who have news papers, who have economic development ? With what voice, with what strength of argument can Pakistan come before the Security Council and ask about freedom of choice for those people who have no freedom at all? We say that part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 stands violated and therefore, Pakistan should have no say at all. It is my bounden duty to equest the Security Council-not, my friend from the Philippines, to admonish-to give me an answer to these questions.

 

Our people are dedicated to the Charter. Their emotional reactions, as the Secretary-General will bear witness-I am not making him a party to our dispute-are dedicated to the Charter. They feel that here everything works in terms of justice, equity and fair play. How is it that in all these nine years of discussion no one has asked these questions? All the argument has been about the people who have rights, asking us-and that is putting it at its best-why do they not have more. In other words, if there were a plebiscite when the conditions are satisfied, when it will not create an upset, and when the security of India is not in danger, if we are, by the lack of the conditions that are necessary for a fair settlement, put into the position of handing these unfortunate men who have exercised their freedom into the helotry that prevails on the other side, then it would be a sin against the United Nations Charter.

 

My colleague from Australia later reminded us of very valid examples, as he described them, and very salutary examples. He said that we had recently had a case where we sent out a United Nations force [768th meeting, para. 53]. It is my recollection, although I may be wrong, that the representative of Australia did not support that proposition at the time, but that is by the way. It Is misleading and it is unfair to us, at any rate, whatever you may think of it yourself, to draw an analogy between the United Nations Emergency Force in which we participate and which is in Egypt and any suggestion of the kind that is now being made. In one case, the territory of Egypt was invaded by France, the United Kingdom and Israel, and there was no question of having to find out about the invasion. Nobody ever denied that it was an invasion, and the purposes of this Force were twofold, and my Government has insisted that these purposes should remain twofold. The purposes of this Force are described in paragraph 12 of the route of the Secretary-General on the plan for an emergency international United Nations force. In that paragraph it is stated that the functions of the Force are to supervise the cease fire and to supervise the withdrawal. Is anybody suggesting that a United Nations force should go into the Pakistan-occupied areas in order to supervise their misdoings or to stop their misdoings and to supervise their withdrawal, and then to go away? That is not the idea at all. Therefore, it is not possible to draw an analogy between the two cases. In one case, the United Nations Emergency Force had to go to the defence of those who were aggressed against, and in the other case it would go to stand by the aggressor. As Sir Pierson Dixon, with the candour we expect of him, has pointed out, that is what Pakistan has asked for and that has been espoused. Any The attempt to draw this parallel is, in my humble submission, a challenge to the political intelligence of the Member States of the United Nations, because the analogy bears no relation to facts whatsoever. As the film writers would say, such resemblances as there may be are purely coincidental. Therefore, do not let us draw this analogy, which comes ill from the representative of Australia, who initially refused anything to do with this business of sending a force to Egypt in order to implement the purposes of the Charter. I will come back to this and say where we stand with regard to the Charter. have any

 

We agree in the main with what has been said by the representative of Colombia, who had the advantage of having one of his countrymen on the Commission who spent hours and hours with the Heads of Government and high officials both in Pakistan and in India.

 

We have circulated documents for your information, and we hope that you have read them. We hope that if you have not yet read them, you will read them in the future. If I may say so with respect, I would not feel any sense of umbrage if people did not read them fully, because I myself find it difficult to get from one end of these documents to the other, but a reading of them is necessary.

 

The representative of Cuba started from a basic problem that was worthy of the great philosopher, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, about the sovereign will of the people. He then went into history and, if I may say so, he misunderstood what I said in the Security Council, but that may have been my fault. I said that the capital of Kashmir, Srinagar, was founded 2,300 years ago. I did not say at that time that through the millennia this was a separate State. Actually, the history of Kashmir goes back 5,000 years before the Christian era. It comes into mere modern history, in the Buddhist period. After a short period of Buddhist rule, a succession of Hindu dynasties ruled in Kashmir until the end of the twelfth century. Then it came under Moslem rule and was subsequently reconquered by a Moslem emperor, Akbar, of India, and became part of the Indian Empire. For sixty-three years, on account of the row with the English, the Afghans then occupied it. There were difficulties between the Afghans and the British at various times but not now-they are very good friends, and we are happy they are. There are only a few episodes in the long history of Kashmir when it had been outside of the mainland of India. My colleague from Pakistan the other day refuted the "purchase" of Kashmir and I gave the answer to it.

 

The argument of the representative of Cuba is that the accession by the King is not acceptable. With great respect to his legal knowledge, which is very considerable so far as I am concerned-I mean the respect-no other accession would have been valid, and I call as witness the representative of the United Kingdom or his legal experts. Even if the four and a half million people in Kashmir had signed a memorandum saying: "We accede", on that day in 1947, that accession would not be worth the paper it was written on. It might have political value. It has political value and it has social value. The British Parliament laid down that the accession was to be by the King. This does not mean that we could trick a King into giving an accession against the will of the people. If that is the argument that is in the mind of the representative of Cuba, then I think it is a valid argument and I humbly refer him to the answer I made to the Pakistan 'Foreign Minister in regard to the allegation of fraud. Therefore, there is no question that, over and above that, the first thing we did was to seek, and in the end obtain, the consent of the only national movement there was which for twenty-five years has resisted the Maharaja's rule and the members of the national movement agreed and they head the government today. We agree with the representative of Cuba that we must honour commitments, but we equally submit that the Security Council has an obligation to honour commitments, and commitments are what are in the documents and what is in the spirit of those documents in all the surrounding circumstances.

 

That takes me to the question of the plebiscite which has been referred to constantly. It appears to me to be comparatively simple. The resolution of 13 August 1948 was adopted by the Commission at its 40th meeting. I want to submit to you as responsible members representing Member States that just because a word appears in a document or a resolution and it is repeated a million times over, it does not add to its legal, political, moral or other values. It is quite true that we have talked about the plebiscite, but what is the place of it in this document ? I have read this many times, but I will read it again Part III of the resolution reads:

 

"The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish"-not their resolve, not their commitment, but their wish-"that future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people and to that end, upon, acceptance of the truce agreement"-here my colleague from the Philippines comes in-"upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree". Agree to what? They agree to enter into consultations. with the Commission to determine fair and equitable conditions." [S/1100, para, 75].

 

We did not say that when a plebiscite has been organized we would enter into consultation after it was over. Perhaps it was our mistake that we entered into consultation before because we thought we were going very, very fast. It may be a lesson for the future, but I submit it is not a reason for misunderstanding the position of my Government in regard to international commitments. We agreed "upon acceptance of the truce agreement to enter into consultations with the Commission". What for? To determine "fair and equitable conditions''. Now how about this propaganda which has been going on for the last seven or eight years and which shows no sign of abatement and, what is more-it is not only aided and abetted-which is inspired by responsible leaders and members of the Government of Pakistan, which is part of their national policy. In those circumstances. I submit to you that we had to create the conditions, that is, the first conditions necessary.

 

A plebiscite is a peaceful process, and you cannot force this peaceful process. It is like some people using the machinery of democracy in order to destroy it. So, similarly, the word "plebiscite" embodies the great idea of self-determination and it simply is not to be misinterpreted. We stand by part III of the resolution. Two parts have not been satisfied. Our undertaking is to confer in order to find "fair and equitable conditions''. Are conditions equitable when there is a campaign of hatred? Are conditions equitable when the treaty is in the place of an annex ? Are conditions equitable when the Pakistan Government both privately and openly says the purpose of its military programme with the United States is in order to arm against India ? If I am challenged on this, I will produce the evidence. That is with regard to the plebiscite, so I say with great respect to my friend from Cuba that we are not running away from any conception. But I submit that it is wrong, that it is against international law, that it is against the commitments of the United Nations, that it is against any possibility of the Charter's being respected and that it is a violation of the dignity and work of those people who believe in the United Nations, to say that just because these words appear somewhere that that is therefore a contract. That would be like my colleague the other day who accused some little Moslem boy of quoting the Quran only in one part. Therefore, that is the position of the plebiscite.

 

I have been asked why we take up one position in regard to Algeria and another in regard to Kashmir. First of all, in regard to Kashmir, the conditions have been laid down here, a whole plan has been laid down here. We agreed to the principles. By the way, Sir Pierson Dixon also referred to the resolution of 5 January 1949, I would like to refresh his memory. It refers to the principles on which a plebiscite has to be carried out-it parts I and II of the resolution of 13 August operate. After part I and part II, then part III begins to function by negotiation. When that is all ready, then there is a plan on the chessboard. You cannot start from the other end. That is how things are.

 

With regard to Algeria there has been a conquest, and that is not denied by anybody. I do not want to go outside the realm of this discussion, but I did not raise this question. There was a conquest and there was a national movement to replace that conquest. There is no such thing in Kashmir. I told you the other day that the best evidence and the most convincing argument before the Security Council, irrespective of all legal doctrine, would have been if the marauders that came into Kashmir, and later the Pakistan Army, had been welcomed as liberators by the people. They were not. They committed rapine and plunder and there was no question of religion because the Christians and Moslems were equally sufferers. They were not welcomed as liberators by the local populations So when the representative of Iraq refers to the great brotherhood, he must take this into account, We are also part of a greater brotherhood, namely, the human brotherhood, and therefore it is not as though the two things were on a par. There may be a great deal of argument in favour of not implementing self-determination in Algeria or implementing it. That is another matter. But the two things are not on all fours.

 

In regard to the statement of the representative of Cuba there is one other matter which I want to dispose of, and that is the reference to my Prime Minister. I have, both for reasons of propriety and political reasons, the obligation to put everybody right on this matter.

 

There were two suggestions, one of which I answered at a previous meeting [767th meeting, para. 88], apparently without carrying conviction. One was a telegram sent by the Prime Minister early in October 1947 to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, of whom he was an intimate friend, suggesting that the two countries together should come before the Security Council and that the matter should be settled by plebiscite, by the United Nations and so on. This was long before there was any proof that the Pakistan Army was invading. That was at the time when Pakistan was denying that there was complicity on its part. That was at the time when we had just parted company; and I pointed out that, so far as the political and the documentary parts of the problem were concerned, whatever might have been the commitments, if they had been accepted, they would be binding; if they were not accepted, they were not even escrows; they had lapsed and, therefore, we started from the Security Council because the letter of 22 December 1947 from my Prime Minister to Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan said that nothing had happened and proposed to take our remedy under the Charter of the United Nations. And we came here and said; "We are invaded. In order to protect ourselves we may have to invade Pakistan. We do not want to do so; therefore, please stop them from doing that."

 

The second declaration is the one to which the representative of Cuba has kindly given authority. It comes from an organ called "United Project" which is not run by the Indian Government and we have no responsibility for its policy. It was a massage that came on 6 February 1957 from Allahabad in which, according to tho report. Mr. Nehru listed the following conditions for agreeing to the plebiscite; withdrawal of Pakistan troops from "Occupied Kashmir" the "legal Government" of Kashmir must take over the entire State. I believe that this message came to the United Nations between four and five o'clock. Between five and six o'clock, thanks to the reputable agency Reuter's, we get another version of it, which was published all over the world, and which we have not contradicted, and this was what he Prime Minister said; We have been charged in certain quarters"-that is, over here-"with having backed out of our commitment to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. I would like to draw the attention of those who are making this charge against us to the prerequisite condition of the plebiscite. The condition was that Pakistan would withdraw its forces from that part of Kashmir which it occupies. Has Pakistan fulfilled that condition?" Mr. Nehru said: "A grave injustice has been done to India in regard to Kashmir. The basic point that Pakistan committed aggression in Kashmir has been ignored altogether." And the representatives around this table have done it this morning. The Prime Minister said: "Kashmir has made tremendous progress in the last nine years add no steps should be taken which would disturb the peace of that State." Outside of all controversy. I ask the Council to believe that that is our overwhelming concern about the re-agitation of a situation which can lead to civil war all the way round and conflicts of a character which I shall describe in a moment.

 

In view of the time, I shall try to make the remainder of the observations very brief.

 

Mr. Romulo said that I had "admonished" the Security Council [768th meeting, para. 107]. Normally speaking, I would let this pass, but it is not something which I wish to leave on the record, coming from the distinguished personality who occupied the Chair at that time. I believe this rises from the fact that he was listening to a very long speech, and like everybody else, sometimes he gets tired of it. What did I say? I said that our basic position was aggression. Our basic position is the complaint that we brought forth here in January 1948. From that, we have never moved. From that, we did not move when we came here in those days, not with General Mc Naughton, not with Sir Owen Dixon, not with Mr. Graham, not with you, not with anybody in the world. That position we have never moved from. But I went on to say that, at the same time, representatives of States members of the Security Council, calling me before them, could not just regard themselves as Rip Van Winkles, as though nothing had happened here in nine years. In spite of that basic position, I have the responsibility to address myself to the draft resolution before the Council. That puts a totally different complexion upon my admonition. Do I look like the kind of person who would admonish this august body? I leave it to the Council to judge.

 

We have great confidence, in spite of the present attitude of the Security Council, that when these facts become more and more known-and that is why we keep on bringing the Council's attention to them-representatives will begin to have doubts in that matter.

 

Now we come to the draft resolution before the Council [S/3787]. There were two suggestions made by the President in his capacity as representative of Sweden. I have not referred to the observations made by the representative of Iraq except to say that the presentation he has made does not represent the facts of the situation. It ignores the circumstances but, at the same time, I pay tribute and express my appreciation of his desire to be kindly on the side on which he is not neutral; and that is all I can say. One must stick to the truth even when one wants to be polite. The representative of Sweden, who is the President, speaking here said:

 

"As we see it, there are, in principle, two courses open to us along which programs may be made towards the ultimate goal which, it seems to us, must be an agreement between the parties on a political basis..." [Para, 39 above.]

 

This is a matter which I shall have to deal with when I come to the basic position of the Security Council under the terms of the Charter, and particularly Chapter VI. There is no settlement in this matter that is possible except by agreement between the parties; and, so far as my Government is concerned, we have done everything we can, up till now-but I said "up till now": we have not written the end of history. We have made a solemn declaration, and we repeat it, that we shall at no time, on any issue, however much it may be against us, refuse to negotiate, refuse to seek conciliation, but we cannot be called upon to surrender our sovereignty beforehand; and we cannot be called upon by the Security Council to forgo the charge of aggression upon our sovereignty. We cannot be called upon to ignore a complaint which we have submitted in terms of the provisions of the Charter.

 

Mr. Romulo said-as was said by someone else the other day-that there were counter-charges (768th meeting, para. 104). I submit that there were no counter-charges on Kashmir. There may have been counter-charges on other matters. The Security Council decided not to discuss them for the present, but if it should be decided to discuss them, we would be willing to answer. In regard to Kashmir, so far as I can recollect, it is only paragraph 3 of the document submitted by Pakistan [S/1100, annex 6 document 1] that is relevant, and the answer was a denial. It was not even what the lawyers call a traversing of the facts; it was a denial, saying that we had not invaded. That denial was denied afterwards by the Commission, and, therefore, what remains is invasion, and aggression.

 

When General McNaughton was President of the Council and when Mr. Graham and earlier when members of the Commission, whom we did not invite-in fact we did not invite the Commission, but we said, ours is a hospitable country: you can come-came and talked and talked-and in our part of the world it is very rude not to answer people's questions and asked questions, we answered them. But we also asked some questions ourselves. So, would it have been right for us to come before General McNaughton and to say; no, we will not talk until you decide this question of aggression ? This very Council, with great legitimacy-I may say, with total legitimacy-would have told us that we were being unreasonable. But what could we do? We reserve our position in every document, in every utterance. We reserve our position today; and, by reserve, we mean, do not put it on the shelf.

 

In other words, if the position put forward by General Romulo and, the other day, by Mr, Tsiang is to be accepted, it becomes a crime to negotiate, because once a charge of aggression is decided, what is there left to negotiate? We are prepared to negotiate without prejudice to that, and that is what the Commission said all along. Therefore, Mr. President, it is in your hands; it is your responsibility to address yourself to this position.

 

It is easy for me to be dismissed, as one person; you cannot however dismiss the 400 million people in our country when a question of this kind comes before them. This is a problem which has deeply agitated our people, and it is only the strength of our leadership, which is based in the masses, which is based in trust and confidence, that has been able to restrain the kind of excitement which might lead to a hatred which could not be controlled afterwards. It is only that which has prevented them from developing the wrong kind of feeling in regard to certain other countries, which has prevented them from getting into a kind of war fever. The second course suggested, therefore, so far as that is concerned, is one by which as a general principle or as a universal premise my country always stands-indeed, I submit all countries stand committed by it-under the Articles of the Charter.

 

There are underlying problems of a legal character. Because I have tried to be precise in regard to the position, because if the accession is complete and legal all these problems become comparatively simple. I have never asked the Security Council to pronounce on these legal issues since from the very beginning our position has been that we cannot ask the Council to do so because it is not a court of law. At the same time, the Council is working in the context of international law and justice and cannot depart from that, and that is why I have pointed it out to you.

 

The President, speaking as representative of Sweden, has thrown out the suggestion that it might be useful to have certain underlying problems of a legal character progressively clarified in order to create better conditions for an agreement. I suppose the real meaning is that a look should be taken at the legal claims which we make and which are basic to our position. If it means nothing more, in terms of any provisions of the Charter, I believe the President will agree that I am justified in saying that he would want to see this in greater clarity and would want it to have full consideration by our Government and with our legal advisers-indeed, the United Nations would want to do that-for we cannot at any time turn our face against the law. That is our position, whatever the consequences are; that is our position in regard to these suggestions and there it is.

 

The President went on to say that some legal aspects of the matter might perhaps be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. However, it all depends upon what questions are referred to the Court; we ought to have the opportunity to consider them in order to see whether the problem is referred to the Court in its necessary ambit and scope. Therefore, so far as the Government of India is concerned at the present moment, we simply say that we do not reject any of these ideas, because if we did we would be doing wrong. You would fall foul of us, and even apart from that we should ourselves feel uneasy in our minds. We are therefore prepared to give consideration to these matters, and indeed the Government of India knows the views of the Swedish Government and is prepared to take them into consideration, but we cannot go into any deep consideration of policy until the general elections are over.

 

That deals with the statements. Now I come to the draft resolution [S/3787] and I will not take very long over it.

 

The first paragraph of the preamble recalls previous re solutions. It is one of those habits that we have formed, to recall resolutions, but I would like the draftsmen who assist the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom to have a look at these resolutions. Some of them you can recall as a matter of historical interest, but you cannot implement them. For instance, one of them says that the Commission ought to go to India and Pakistan or something like that; so it is not possible to implement. This is probably a very obvious instance but there are parts of these resolutions that have been worn out by time

 

Therefore, when the representative of the Philippines made a criticism of my Prime Minister's statement-he did not say so, but he implied it-I want to say that we stand by that statement I had a copy of the first draft of this resolution half an hour after started speak and the only alteration which was made in it was to the advantage of Pakistan. Secondly, when I finished speaking that evening I said to the President, who was the representative of the Philippines, that I had then made that part of my statement in order that he need not feel perturbed that some D-Day, some zero hour was approaching, not that I had finished the argument. In fact, I stated expressly that I had still to argue the case. What is more, those who know the facts of this matter know very well that what my Prime Minister says represents the truth. Therefore, recalling these resolutions is merely an exercise, the sort of thing that often happens; and my delegation and my Government would find it difficult to understand why the resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779] has greater significance than the resolution of 17 January 1948, and I would be glad if the representative of the United Kingdom, would tell me. If the Council would insist upon adherence to the resolution of 17 January 1948, we could forget all these other resolutions and I think we would have made a beginning in solving this problem.

 

On 17 January 1948, the Council asked both parties not to aggravate the situation, not to introduce war material and things of that character. That stands violated. This is what was said:

 

"The Security Council,

 

"Having heard statements"-and may I remind the representative of the United Kingdom that in those days they said: "having heard statements"-"on the situation in Kashmir from the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan,

 

"Recognizing the urgency of the situation" and then comes the operative part :

 

"Calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures their power calculated to improve the situation," -and "Jehad" is not an instrument of improving the situation and the calumny and the base words altered about my Prime Minister and the head of my Government and of my country and of our traditions that is going on in West Pakistan at the moment is something not in consonance with this-"and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation; "And further requests each of those Governments to inform the Council immediately “I want to repeat this, if I can have the attention of the Council for one moment-"of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur while the matter is under the consideration of the Council..."

 

The matter has been under the consideration of the Council from that time until now and Pakistan did not inform the Council that it had introduced troops. I say it acted behind the Security Council's back and concealed facts from the Security Council and I think all our sins would be washed out in the face of that. And I ask my colleague Sir Pierson Dixon why the resolution of 17 January 1948 has less sanctity than any other resolutions. Insofar as they are recalled, and if they have any meaning, that is a helpful situation. I say. that if the resolution of 17 January 1948 was adhered to by Pakistan, then we would have had the beginning of a solution.

 

May I preface my next observation by saying that I recognize that I have no part in the draft resolution before the Council [S/3787] either by saying that I support it or that I oppose it because I am not a member of the Security Council, but I believe that I am invited to offer observations.

 

The second paragraph of the preamble reads:

 

"Taking into consideration the statements of the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan".

 

With great respect I would submit that this is a slight overstatement because, although the statements have been heard, the case is so complex and has been argued at such great length, and there are so many documents on the matter and so many cross currents in it, it would be more accurate to say "having heard what we have to say", this would be nearer the truth and more nearly in conformity with previous resolutions. This gives the impression of a great deal of deliberation on this matter before coming to the next conclusion and I submit that I believe that we would like member Governments, not just one individual in the Security Council, but member Governments, to go into this situation, which is one of the most important situations. in the world.

 

The draft resolution continues :

 

"Concerned at the lack of progress in settling the dispute".

 

This word "dispute" was introduced by the Security Council without our assent. The only two resolutions to which we agree are those of 17 January 1948 and 20 January 1948 and the two resolutions of the Commission. You will find that in these resolutions the word "dispute" does not occur. The word is "situation" -and it is not quibbling with words-we have heard the legal arguments and law is the essence of civilized language, so we cannot just ignore it-but we definitely think that the introduction of the word "dispute" means a political change.

 

Sir Gopalaswami Ayyangar, speaking before this Council, said in categorical terms that this is not a dispute over territory-there is no dispute over our territory; the territory is a Constituent State of the Union of India. In the exercise of its sovereignty, for any political reason, it can consent, it can initiate, it can order an act of cession. That is a different question. Therefore, there is no dispute over territory. I submit this frequent reintroduction of the word "dispute" is an attempt on the part of the framers of these resolutions to weight these things against us-because this is a "situation", it is not a territorial dispute, How can it be a territorial dispute when the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir was recognized by the Security Council when you say neither the Security Council nor the Commission can change it, when you say that it is the duty of the Union of India to look after the security of this territory? It can station garrisons on the western and north-western frontiers to guard the passes that come into India.

 

I read the next paragraph:

 

"Considering the importance which it has attached to the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir..."

 

I submit the word "demilitarization" has a particular connotation. It is not only just a plain smite. It means much more. And if you will use the word "demilitarization" in the context where a party who has no legal, ro moral, nor any other title under any semblance of law, is in occupation of the part of a territory, to speak about demilitarization in regard to that area, is a mockery of justice and of international law. And so far as we are concerned, what the Security Council is doing is to expose our vast territory to the insecurity of a neighbour who is not showing from the west the friendly intentions that we expect. Therefore "demilitarization" in terms of counting, in quantum of troops and whether they shoot pistols; or revolvers, or shotguns or machine guns, those problems are not the important problems.

 

The first element in demilitarization is the removal of those people who have no business and no title to be present on the soil of Jammu and Kashmir. That is in the 13 August 1948 resolution, that is in the 5 January 1949 resolution, that is in every resolution of the Council. And what is more, that is in every assurance given by Mr. Korbel, given by Mr. Lozano and given by Mr. Huddle-the United States representative who was also Chairman-that irrespective of personalities, those were the assurances given to us, not in secret, not whispered into our ears, but they are part of the public documents which are in the records of the Security Council. If for any reason the Council on a subsequent date gave an assurance or the Pakistan side, which they can interpret in another way, the responsibility does not lie on the heads of the Government of India. Therefore, we would object to this word if we were parties to the resolution. We insist, because this is throwing the whole thing out of its context; that is to say, you are asking the President of the Security Council to do what Mr. Graham has been trying to do for five years, what Sir Owen Dixon tried to do, and at the end said that this is not the problem, this is something else which he has not been asked to do and so on. The whole reference-that clause-1 submit is misconceived. It is the wrong context, the wrong thing. We are talking about something that has no real relation. I do not say it is irrelevant. The relevance of it is not essential. That is, there is no essentiality about this because that is not the problem.

 

The next paragraph reads ::

 

"Noting that demilitarization preparatory to the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices has not been achieved."

 

Now there, I think it should also have been noted that one of the conditions of holding a free and impartial plebiscite is the cessation of religious propaganda. Under our law, which is copied from the British law, at least the essence of it, it is an unlawful practice (and some other legal phraseology, which I have forgotten) to appeal to religion, to say to voters that they are Catholics, therefore they ought to vote for the Catholic candidate; or that they are Protestants, therefore they ought to vote for the Protestant candidate; or that they are Moslems, that they ought to do this; or that they are Hindus and they ought to do that, or the wrath of God would be visited upon them. In any way, to make use of religion in order to obtain a political end in an election in our law is an unlawful practice which would disqualify the person concerned. The holding of a free and impartial plebiscite therefore is possible only when there is the preparatory condition,

 

Now, I submit to the two representatives who are responsible for the initiating of this draft resolution, is it fair to ask for the adoption of a method, which in its general essence, which in its genesis, which in its purpose is peaceful, but enable it to be surrounded, if not rooted, in hatred? Therefore, until that is cleared away, how can one get anywhere at all; and even with the passing of nine years, it has not been cleared away, and what is more, is being accumulated. I cite the evidence of the statement of the distinguished Foreign Minister who warned the Security Council, who professed in his first speech, in what in effect amounts to an ultimatum. And this campaign of "Jehad" that goes on-we are still in the days of the holy wars.

 

The next paragraph is the crucial part :

 

"Noting the proposal of the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force in connexion with demilitarization."

 

It may be argued that it is right to note anything. There is no crime in stating that something has been said, But when in a resolution something is noted and something is not noted -for example, it has not been noted that the Government of India says that the country has been illegally occupied, that there is an enormous influx, accumulation of arms and forces, that there is hatred propaganda and all the other things I have told you, those things are equal, or even of greater value and they have not been noted. So this selection, this invidious selection, lends a political importance to it. The Security Council, this august body which is seriously minded, notes something in relation to its value. Therefore a greater value is placed on this than on other things. It is this suggestion that has come out of "nothing, the proposal of the representative of Pakistan". I submit that the proposals ought really to come from the Security Council. That, of course, is a matter for you gentlemen and not for me.

 

We come to the next paragraph. "Believing that, insofar as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarization as envisaged in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and towards the pacific settlement of the dispute, the use of such a force would deserve consideration",

 

We would like to offer observations on three parts of this paragraph. First we should like to comment on the words "might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarization". Facts deny this. How would a United Nations force contribute to the achievement of demilitarization when there are forty-five battalions of the "Azad" army on the other side and large numbers of irregulars and commandos who cannot be traced. What would be the practical size of any United Nations force that goes in there? Would a United Nations force in the conditions of the world at the present time be in a position to disarm any soldier of any other country? I can understand their performing police duties. I can understand their going into a place where we are sure they would not be fired at. But would you say that in the conditions that obtain in these areas any United Nations force that you can get to go. would be able to achieve demilitarization ? Would they be able to exercise the degree of supervision that was necessary ? All this is on the basis that some agreement has been reached about it.

 

Furthermore, I would say that it is not necessary to have a United Nations force to achieve demilitarization. All that has to be done is for the Pakistan Army to withdraw and, in order to create conditions of security, for it to give an inter national guaranty that it will not move out of its cantonments beyond the spaces which can be permitted with security; and for the Indian Army in Kashmir, which is in a constituent part of its territory, to be deployed only in conditions of peace. That is what we have done. Therefore, the question of sending somebody to disarm does not arise.

 

With great respect I wish to say we have not in our country attuned our minds to the conception of any foreign forces. United Nations or otherwise, disarming our soldiers or disbanding them. That is a function of our sovereign Government. So far as we are concerned, if we gave an undertaking to withdraw them, as indeed we have done. We have, without any commitment, withdrawn very large numbers of troops from this area.

 

In this connexion, I would like to contradict what was said by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan the other day. It is a statement of the same character as I contradicted the other day, which he has not repeated afterwards, that the Government of India is concentrating troops on the Indo-Pakistan border. This is an entirely untrue statement, and I am authorized by my Government to deny it. There has been no addition of military strength either on the Punjab frontier or any other Indo-Pakistan frontier. The Indian Army moves along according to the normal routine of its maneuvers, of its practice. There has been no accumulation of forces anywhere, and no addition to their strength. This is, I believe, a story somebody picked up somewhere, which was printed in the newspapers and was believed.

 

The second idea in this is "demilitarization as envisaged in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission ''. With great respect to the authors of the draft resolution, I submit that this is a misstatement of fact. What is envisaged in the resolutions is the disbanding and disarming of "Azad'' forces, the total withdrawal of the Pakistan Army and, at a subquentage when that is achieved, the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces. It is quite true that we have discussed at various times a simultaneous synchronized operation. I submit, however, that as this has not been accepted, it ceases to have value. It cannot have. Hereafter, my Government will not agree to any commitment hanging over its head because we find that we have been the sufferers in this. There is no room not to be on one's guard. Therefore, we submit that we have no commitments in this direction apart from what is in the resolution of 13 August 1948. Consequently, the second idea is not strictly accurate. The last part is the most important, it says "deserve consideration". I ask my colleague from the United Kingdom, who is a scholar of great repute, to explain to me what that means, apart from saying that this has merit. This is the Security Council which is composed of Member Governments. of the United Nations, and they make a proposition which not only does not deserve consideration but which is contrary to the Charter, contrary to the interests of peace and contrary to the friendship that exists between my country and the United States on the one hand, and my country and the United Kingdom on the other. It is contrary to all the canons of international behaviour that must be respected. Therefore, it does not deserve consideration.

 

I say the proposal is contrary to the Charter because the United Nations has no authority to place any soldiers in our territory under Chapter VI, and I want to make this perfectly clear. In this connexion, when I say "our territory", any soldier that sets foot in the Pakistan area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is violating the sovereignty of the Indian Union because, according to your decisions, according to the commitments we have with you, it is part of Jammu and Kashmir. So it is not as though you can make an arrangement with Pakistan and feel that you have not violated any law. It is a violation of Charter.

 

The other day the Secretary-General, in another connexion, pointed out that it was only under Chapter VII that troops could be placed anywhere, without consent. Now, someone said that this consent should be forthcoming. I have no desire to sound unco-operative or even worse. The Government of India will in no circumstances permit foreign troops on its soil. That is a categorical statement I am asked by my Government to make to this Council. We will in no circumstances in this context permit the stationing of foreign troops on our soil. The only condition on which we shall have our troops go on foreign soil, as we told the Secretary-General publicly and privately, or on which we shall accept foreign troops ourselves is in pursuance of the Charter, The Security Council is asking us, not deliberately, to accept a situation which in our view, is contrary to the provisions of the Charter, a violation of our sovereignty and calculated to disturb the peace. That is the legal part of it.

 

More than that, I would ask the representative of the United Kingdom, who has much more access to information about India than anyone else because of past connexions with us and many present connexions, to concur on the situation. What volume of troops would be required to keep order in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on both sides when our security troops are withdrawn, considering the vast amount of opposition there is even to the past resolutions of the Security Council, the enormous amount of public demonstrations of disapproval and public anger and the intensity of the feeling in the country with regard to this matter? On our side, how many troops would be required by the United Nations, assuming there were no legal or other difficulties ? Equally, the moment this is published in Pakistan as a great victory for their side, there will be enormous hopes aroused and all these forces, about which I read to you-the man who asserts be will do it by force-will be altered. Therefore, any conception that this is deserving of consideration-I suggest that this is a chimerical proposition, an impractical proposition, a proposition that goes against the purposes of the Charter and the purposes of settlement.

 

There is a statement about the people of Kashmir-that is to say, the part that is not taken over by the enemy. This comes from an authority which will appeal to my colleague from Australia. It is a conservative paper which I believe has had very adverse comments on our policy. It is "The Sydney Morning Herald", and its correspondent Mr. Morrisby is now in Kashmir. This is what he wrote and said to the people on 11 February 1957, that is to say, a fortnight after 26 January. (This report is partly in direct narration and partly in indirect narration):

 

"The people of Kashmir have given their full support to the State's new Constitution, as this Constitution entwinedness the sovereign will and has, therefore, special significance for all of them', said Edwin Morrisby of 'The Sydney Morning Herald' of Australia in Srinagar, 7 February 1957, in an informal meeting with the local newspapermen. Morrisby, who was giving his impressions of four days' tour of Kashmir, added that the State enjoyed semi autonomous status in the Indian Republic, and so the people enjoyed more freedom than in other states of India. The enthusiasm with which the people had rallied to the call for active participation in the implementation of development plans provide irrefutable evidence of the popularity of the Government and their leaders' he said.``

 

Then there is another quotation from Mr. Morrisby:

 

"They have made it clear that they would under no circumstances tolerate any attempt to disturb the peace and stability of the State which has been achieved after great trials and sufferings', he added.

 

"Morrisby who went to some remotest corners of Kashmir on Valley said: 'As I told you the other day, there are no restrictions on foreign travelers to Kashmir, apart from the fact that they must be able to pay their way'. He went on to say: 'There is nothing abnormal in the State. The people are quite content and busy in their business. of life, just like in the rest of India."

 

We did not ask Mr. Morrisby to write that. As we say this is not an Indian newspaperman. I usually do not quote newspapers, because, after all, they are not authoritative in this sense, but this is the latest opinion we have received from an independent source and it deserves consideration.

 

On this point about deserving consideration, I would like to request the representatives who are responsible for this draft resolution to address their minds to the history of this proposition. This is not a new suggestion. This suggestion was first made as early as 1948. If representatives will look at the transactions at that time, I would refer to the statements made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, in a memorandum dated 19 August 1948 which was published in the first interim report of United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. I shall read the relevant part :

 

"In particular, the Pakistan Government would be glad to know whether the Commission intends to secure the services of an international or neutral force for this purpose and, if so, what the strength of such a force would be." [S/1100, annex, 26, appendix, para. 5].

 

So as far as Pakistan is concerned it is an old suggestion which has been reported time after time The Commission's reply was this:

 

"In drawing up the resolution of 13 August 1948, the Commission did not and could not proceed on the assumption that one or the other party would violate the truce. The implementation of the resolution presupposes good faith and co-operation between the two parties." That fact is still true because without that we could not have any implementation.

 

"As the Government of Pakistan is aware, the United Nations does not have at its disposal an international force. The use of a neutral force has not been contemplated by the Commission. However, the Government of Pakistan will have noted that the resolution provides for neutral military observers." (Ibid., annex 27, appendix, para. 5).

 

The United Kingdom and the United States, if I may say so without any disrespect, are not original in this suggestion. They came out with this on 21 February 1951. The joint effort in relation to us is of long standing in this matter. In the United States and United Kingdom draft resolution of 21 February 1951, contained in document S/2017, this is said : "4. Authorizes the United Nations Representative to take into account in these discussions"-the same thing as now -"with the two Governments and in considering the arrangements for demilitarization and for the holding of the plebiscite:...

 

"(ii) The possibility"-it was less at that time-"that any forces required for the purpose"-at that time it did not say that it must be this one. It only said: "If you want someone, we shall send someone."-"to facilitate demilitarization and the holding of the plebiscite might be provided from Member States of the United Nations or raised locally." [S/2917].

 

I remember that the same suggestion was made by the Prime Minister of Australia in informal conversations. Our reply was made by Sir Renegal Rau, a man whose memory is revered and who cannot be accused of any overstatement of any sentiment:

 

"We are wholly unable to accept any entry of foreign troops in the State or in any other part of India."-that. was in 1951, and we repeat that.-"In view of the provision made by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, there is no occasion for the use of foreign troops or of special local levies recruited from outside. agency. Nor, in view of the detailed provisions contained in the resolution of January 1949 to ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite, can we accept a supersession of the lawful government of the State or any interference with its normal functions." [533rd meeting, para. 40].

 

He was asked about it again a few meetings later, and Sir Benegal Rau's answer appears in the report of the 536th meeting held on 9 March 1951 :

 

"My friend has asked whether India agrees to the principle of having United Nations forces in Kashmir. I have already stated India's position in this matter and given our reasons for it: first, we are wholly unable to accept any entry of foreign troops in the State or in any other part of India; secondly, in view of the provision made by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, there is on occasion for the use of foreign troops (...) [536th meeting, para. 26 ]

 

Then something happened which I hope will happen this time also. On 21 March 1951 the United Kingdom and the United States dropped this suggestion in their revised resolution [S/2017/Rev. 1]. The same proposal was revived by Mr. Graham in India, and this was contained in his second report to the Security Council [S/2448], in paragraph 5 (c) of the questionnaire addressed to us. This was one of the questions :

 

"If not, is the Indian Government ready to accept forces to be provided by the United Nations in order to safeguard the security of and to maintain law and order in the whole State of Jammu and Kashmir as long as the United Nations, in consultation with the governments of India and Pakistan, seems necessary?" (S/2448, annex 3, p. 17.]

 

Our answer, given by the Prime Minister at that time, I was this:

 

"As regards the suggestion for the bringing of United Nations forces into the States, it has been made clear more than once on behalf of the Government of India that the replacement of Indian security forces by foreign troops, however constituted, can under no circumstances be accepted. We do not understand why this suggestion is being repeated." [Ibid, annex 9, para. 10.] With very great respect, I repeat that last sentence of the Prime Minister: "We do not understand why this suggestion is being repeated".

 

Then I have a paragraph from my old friend, Sir Gladwyn Jebb's observation was rather nostalgic, in a way of ting the troops back, but I do not share that view, and so I shall leave it.

 

On this draft resolution-and I ask Sir Pierson Dixon not to take this in the wrong way-our minds, not only mine but also those of people sitting around here, go back to those 300 years from Clive to Wellesley, from Wellesley to Dalhousie, from Dalhousie to Canning, from Canning to Minto-referring to the partition of India-from Minto to Linlithgrow. During all that period we have served to liberate our land from the presence of foreign feet on its soil with arms. The Security Council dare not ask us to accept the introduction of foreign troops on our sacred territory. Therefore, the history of our country being what it is, one of the conditions we have always asked was that there should be no foreign troops on our soil. If this brings back these sentiments to us and even to those of us who are comparatively uninstructed-I say this perhaps with lack of modesty-what kind of sentiments will come back to the masses of our people? Therefore, any suggestion of this kind would be unwelcome in India.

 

I wish to add, before I leave that point, that the introduction of United Nations forces, which presumably would be constituted of volunteers of Member States, unless the United Nations proposes to form a foreign legion, would, in my sub mission, not only be a violation of the Charter; it would be a violation by each Member State that contributes troops, because we have bilateral relations with them. If a Member: State were to send its troops to our country in violation of the Charter, then they are not protected by the Charter. Their protection disappears on account of the illegality.

 

I come now to the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. I shall make this very brief. As regards the representative of Sweden, who is the present President of the Security Council, we have already expressed our views. Perhaps we should not say any more, because it might embarrass him. Someone might suggest that the President of the Security The Council is too well liked by India. It is true that he was the Minister of his country in India, but, at the same time, I believe that he was Minister in Pakistan. I note that he is indicating that he was not, so I may be wrong on that. At any rate, so far as we are concerned, whether one has been to India or not, our Government would never refuse hospitality to anyone who comes from the United Nations, or indeed anyone who is satisfied with the kind of modest hospitality that we can offer. But when it comes to discussion of propositions, we have to look at what he has. However, in the general context of never declining conciliation, in that, India will not be found wanting.

 

This draft resolution, in our submission, is totally vitiated by its preamble and by its introduction of United Nations forces. I would ask the United Kingdom and the United States to consider that in the way in which they have presented their proposal, they have established what a lawyer would call a Prima facie case, that is they have already given them a good certificate-it is a laissez-passer for this matter. Of course it could be argued that it deserves consideration by the Government of India. That is a possible explanation. But I have given the answer: we have considered it for many years and we have rejected it. Therefore, so far as that is concerned, that draft resolution will be of no value. Secondly, it will not meet the purposes for which it is required.

 

Sir Pierson Dixon, with characteristic sincerity, has asked us to believe that his country was a common friend of ours and I have forgotten the fact that he forgot us in the numbering the other day, and I accept that in the way it is offered. But I would be failing in my duty if I did not convey to the Security Council and to him that the developments of the last few days and the promotion of the Pakistan proposals, either by or with the assistance of the United Kingdom, have not served to soothe the difficult relations that have arisen as a result of many other matters. My Government will not throw the baby out with the bathwater. We are a conservative people, even though all of us do not belong to the Conservative Party. We are a people who are attached to the peoples of the United Kingdom by many ties. But the basis of all that is mutual respect, and once that disappears other things become difficult.

 

I would be failing in my duty and it would be inaccurate to suggest that the reception of this idea on the other side is in the same way. Here is a report of the view of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. As everyone knows, he has sent his congratulations and his appreciation and gratitude to the representative of the United States. After that he stated-this is a report taken from the newspaper "Dawn", and I do not say that it is an official paper; it was founded by the founder of Pakistan and is considered to be the leading paper-1 hope I am not making invidious distinctions in Karachi:

 

"The Prime Minister of Pakistan Paid a tribute to the role played by the United Kingdom in the Security Council deliberations, and said that the United Kingdom had lent a great deal of assistance in Kashmir. question, which was again responsible for the support 4 received from the United States,"

 

I am afraid that this is not very flattering to the United States, but I am not reading out my opinions; this is the opinion of the Prime Minister of Pakistan. Of course, it may be that he is so pleased with the matter that he attributes reasons in other ways. The United Kingdom is entirely free in this matter to take whatever position it wishes as a sovereign nation and as a permanent member of the Security Council. But so much has been made in this debate of our being two peas in a pod, of our common and equal relations, and so on.

 

I was High Commissioner in London for five years and I had a great deal to do with the relations of the United Kingdom and India. I also had a great deal to do with our military organization, as far as it concerned the United Kingdom, in connexion with supplies and so on. It would take much more than normal circumstances for me to believe that there has been any occasion on which we have been the object of any particularly favourable treatment. We never asked for it and we never got it. But we have always been treated kindly, courteously and with respect, and I am sure that this position will continue.

 

But I would beg of Sir Pierson Dixon not to ask us to convey the view to our people that the attitude of the United Kingdom on this draft resolution is one of impartiality as between Pakistan and India. This does not mean that the United Kingdom is not impartial on the question according to its own lights. As far as we can see it, however, it would not be so regarded by our public opinion.

 

I express my thanks to the Council for the courteous way in which this difficult problem has been presented. This very bitter pill has been coated with a lot of jam, but nevertheless the pill is very bad. It is not only bitter, it is poisonous sheer poison so far as peace is concerned.

 

Concern was expressed in the Security Council by the representative of Cuba for the people of Kashmir. My Prime Minister stated the same thing. The People of Kashmir do not necessarily have to be separated from the people of India for this. It is their future, it is their economic and political stability, their rights of freedom and their hopes of the future. They have waited for a long time to have their difficulties settled and they have taken things into their own hands. Any attempt to interfere in this or not to allow this question to be solved by direct negotiation between our two people in conditions in which Pakistan and India can mutually respect and trust each other, would be wrong. That cannot be done by resolutions of the Security Council or by resolutions of any other organ. That is a matter to which we have to make our contribution; I say with equal respect that Pakistan has to make its contribution in a greater measure to make up for its defaults of the past.

 

The first element would be to call off the dogs of hatred, the campaign of hatred. Our country will not tolerate threats and we shall not sit down under them. My Prime Minister stated yesterday that if it came to that, we would perform our duty under the Charter of the United Nations, that is: defend the soil of our country. We are not cowed down by these threats, nor are we going to fall a victim to them by creating a war atmosphere in our country. We shall reject the attempt to introduce war elements in the way of a United Nations force, following upon the military pacts and other war apparatus on our frontiers, which have expanded the whole realm of the "cold war" right into the heart of our country.

 

Will you say, Mr. President. that a responsible Government like ours does not have the primary duty for the security of our country, which in the last 800 years or so has been time after time invaded through the north-western passes, and which for 300 years has lain at the feet of the conqueror? Are these not the primary duties that we owe to the Council and to ourselves? Or are we to be intimidated by the press propaganda, calling us immoral people? We are the judges of morality. Morality is not a matter of voting. You cannot vote people into morality. If we acted against international morality, that would be on our conscience and the action would show.

 

India pleads not guilty and denies all charges of any attempt at violation. It begs the representative of the United Kingdom not to throw aspersions upon our determination to observe these obligations. It begs the Security Council to take into account that if we have any engagements, those engagements are conditional. They are the foundation upon which the commitment is built. No part I, then no part II; no parts I and II, then no part III-that is how it is. Therefore, those conditions are fundamental.

 

Therefore, if we have addressed ourselves to this matter at length, it is not because we want to win a resolution or to ask you to accept or reject a resolution. This is a time of great political excitement and activity, when we have this barrage of propaganda from the north-west-thank God, not from the north-east-and all these mis-statements of fact about concentrations of the Indian Army. I ask you: how do we concentrate these armies without having to pay for them ? We have a parliament, we have a budget-we have to find the money. Where do we get the extra troops? What is more, there are observers for the cease-fire line: if we concentrated troops, they would know it and they would report to the Secretary-General.

 

Therefore, we cannot proceed in that context. I beg of you not to take a step which will aggravate the situation. There is always room for good men, men of wisdom, to find ways and means. But these are not the ways. It is implied that we are wriggling out of a commitment. Newspapers are led to believe that India is backing out of a commitment that was made, and the world is not told the truth-the simple truth that must be accepted by every Member of the United Nations. How did Pakistan get into Kashmir? There is only one way that she got in, and that was by invasion. And is there anywhere in the Charter any provision for exercising by the use of arms a right over a territory over which a country has no claim-over which it may establish one in the future, but over which it now has no claim?

 

I submit that after nine years there is a bounden duty lying at the door of the Security Council to look back at the resolution of 17 January 1948 and subsequent resolutions and at the concealment of facts, not only when the Commission went there but subsequently, time after time. The accumulation of arms today and the continuous concealment of the increase in armed strength, in the air and on the ground and everywhere-these are not only violations of the Charter, but they are a threat. And those threats do not come from us. We, as a country, have given evidence of our loyalty to the Charter. With our meagre resources, we have contributed to the safeguarding of peace. In the course of doing that, we have incurred hostility from various sides.

 

Without introducing any element of controversy. I would like to conclude on this note: my country has deliberately chosen the path of an independent foreign policy. No pressures will elbow us into an alignment in one direction or another. We serve our people and the cause of international peace as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations.