30011957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 766 held on 30 January 1957.
30011957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 766 held on 30 January 1957.
It is not my intention to enter into a discussion of the various old issues that the representative of India raised in the course of his address. What the Security Council has before it is an agreement which was freely accepted by two Member States for the resolution of a dispute that is likely to endanger international peace and tranquillity. Issues like the question of accession or aggression by Pakistan or by India have already been discussed and disposed of by the Security Council at its 226th to 240th meetings, from 6 January to 4 February 1948, and at the private meetings held on 7, 8 and 9. February 1950. The net result of the efforts of the Security Council and, subsequently, of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, the various United Nations representatives, and the Governments of India and Pakistan themselves is available to the Council. The problem is how to go forward, since any delay in the holding of the plebiscite is fraught with grave dangers. The Government of Pakistan is most anxious to play its part in assisting the Security Council to reach a satisfactory solution.
The Government of India has categorically stated that it has no intention of dishonoring its international obligations -and in this connexion I quote from Mr. Menon's speech :
"I want to say for the purposes of the record that there is nothing that has been said on behalf of the Government of India which in the slightest indicates that the Government of India or the Union of India will dishonor any international obligations it has undertaken." [765th meeting, para. 149].
I do not know what Mr. Menon thinks of this statement after the action recently taken by his Government in Delhi. The only international obligations which the Governments of India and Pakistan have undertaken in regard to the Kashmir dispute are embodied in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission dated 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15]. I submit that it is now the duty of the Security Council to ensure that this international agreement is implemented without any further delay.
Before I proceed further, I would draw the attention of the Council to certain remarks which were made by the representative of India with regard to the necessity of adopting a resolution on 24 January 1957. The representative of India said: "I want to submit, therefore, that the whole of this crisis atmosphere which has been created about 26 January is just unreal" [763rd meeting, para. 141]. "The New York Times'' of 26 January 1957 carried a news item dated from New Delhi, which said in part: "As far as the Indian Government is concerned, the accession of the State of Kashmir to the Indian Union became irrevocable todayIndia will ignore the resolution which was adopted by the Council Thursday." I hardly need to comment on these facts, which speak for themselves.
I would like to turn now to the address of the representative of India. Again and again, he has tried to impress on the Security Council that this dispute is not a dispute, that it was a "situation" which presumably was potentially dangerous enough to disturb international peace and security and, as such, was brought to the notice of the Security Council by the Government of India on 1 January 1948. The argument then runs somewhat like this: the "situation" still exists, but only because Pakistan forces are present in Kashmir.
The situation which developed in the Jammu and Kashmir State consequent upon the partition of the subcontinent is very well known to the Security Council. It was debated at great length in the Security Council in January 1948. Shall I recall the sub-human conditions under which the Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir State have passed their miserable lives since the infamous. Treaty of Amritsar of 1846 sold them for half a million pounds, like goods and I chattels, to the tender mercies of a foreign dynasty of Hindu rulers, whose statues made the killing of a cow a capital offence and the injuring of a cow, even by accident, an offence punishable with seven years rigorous imprisonment? Shall I recall the feeble attempts at securing freedom that they made from time to time, and that evoked considerable sympathy for them, that is, the Kashmiris, in the hearts of all patriotic Indians, that is, of United India? Shall I recall the great movement of 1931 that was spearheaded by thousands of their co-religionists from areas that now constitute West Pakistan, which took a heavy toll of human lives and resulted in untold suffering to the people of the State and extreme repression for those who sympathized with them? Shall I recall the glimmerings of a new hope in the people of the Jammu and Kashmir State when they heard that, consequent upon the partition of the sub-continent, they would get any opportunity to do away with the shackles that had bound them in an iron grip for so long?
Shall I further recall the various steps that were taken by the Hindu Maharaja of the Jammu and Kashmir State to thwart the people's desire and urge for freedom, the comings and goings of the Hindu leaders from Delhi to the State on the eve of the partition, the free distribution of arms to the Hindus by the Maharaja in the Province of Jammu, the invitation to the millitant Hindu gangs of Jan Sangh to esta blish their headquarters in Jammu, the organized massacre of his Muslim subjects which the Maharaja himself launched and which resulted in 237,000 Muslims escapings from the State for fear that they would be butchered?
Shall I recall the heroic resistance of the people of the State, long before any tribesmen or other Pakistani nationals entered Kashmir, to this well organized genocide; the rout of the Maharaja's forces at their hands, his flight from Srinagar and his attempt to secure the military intervention of the Government of India to crush the resistance of the people? Shall I further recall the cloak and Dagger mystery of the fraudulent Instrument of Accession that was dispatched by air on the evening of 26 October 1947, accepted by the Government of India the very next day, on 27 October 1947, which brought in air-borne troops of India into the State on the morning of 27 October, the same day?
It is a very sorry tale. It is not my intention to rake up the past and to parade it before the Security Council, because if I do so, it will only arouse passions and will not lead us anywhere. Suffice it to say that a situation likely to endanger international peace and security did exist. It was brought to the notice of the Security Council by the Government of India on 1 January 1948- It was brought to the notice of the Security Council by the Government of Pakistan on 16 January 1948. The Government of India cannot claim any special consideration on the basis that it was the first to come to the Security Council. Under the Charter, the Secretary General of the United Nations could have himself brought the situation to the notice of the Security Council. What is relevant, however, is the fact. How did the Security Council react to it ?
In this connexion I can do no better than to more very briefly certain extracts from the proceedings of the Security Council.
At the 235th meeting of the Security Council on 24 January 1948, Mr. Warren Austin representative of the United States, said:
"It seems to me that our advice to the two parties should be and that is what they are asking for when they came here-that they proceed with the Kashmir matter, without prejudice to the other question; complete the negotiations that are now pending, and, with respect to the media and methods of creating those conditions in which a fair plebiscite can be held, arrange an interim government that is recognized as free from the smell of brimstone, as nearly impartial and perfect as two great countries like India and Pakistan can make it, in which the rest of the world will have confidence as being fair." [235th meeting p. 561]. At the same meeting Mr. de la Tournelle of France said: "Personally, I would suggest three conditions:
"1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir.
"2. The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race-Hindu or Moslem-to their places of origin in that State.
"3. The establishment of a free administration which would not exert pressure on the population and would give absolute guarantees of a free vote." [Ibid., p. 263].
At the next meeting of the Council held on 28 January 1948, Mr. Noel-Baker, representative of the United Kingdom, stated:
"In my conception, infinitely the best way to stop the fighting is to assure those who are engaged in it that a fair settlement will be arrived at under which their right will be assured. In other words, as I remarked to the re presentative of India in our first talk after his arrival, in my profound conviction, a settlement arrived at quickly in the Security Council is the real way to stop the fighting. The whole thing, from the preliminary measures as to the fighting right up to the conduct of the plebiscite in the end, is all one problem. Only when the combatants know what the future holds for them, will they agree to stop." [236th meeting, p. 283].
Finally, at the 237th meeting on 29 January 1948, Mr. Tsiang, representative of China, observed as follows:
"It is obvious that the key to the problem lies in the plebiscite. If the principle of a free and impartial plebiscite for the deciding the all-important question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be accepted, much of the incentive to violence and the use of force would be removed.
"On the other hand, unless we restore peace in Kashmir, such a plebiscite would not be possible." (237th meeting, p. 288.)
It will be thus be seen that, at a fairly early stage of the debate, the Security Council came to the conclusion first that a situation likely to endanger international peace and security existed in view of the dispute between the Maharaja and his people, and subsequently between India and Pakistan over the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan; and secondly that there was general agreement between the parties that the situation could be resolved only if the dispute was resolved by means of a free and impartial plebiscite. Has the dispute been resolved ?
The representative of India said:
"So long as there are forces of other countries in a place where they have no right to be, irrespective of our rights, I think the Security Council is called upon under the provisions of the Charter to act accordingly." (762nd meeting, para. 15.)
How naive. What is it that he wants the Security Council to do? To serve Kashmir on a platter to him and India ? There is an agreement between dia and Pakistan-a solemn international agreement which lays down quite clearly the stages in which all foreign troops should evacuate the State. Why does not the Government of India implement its part of the bargain and withdraw its forces from the State under the terms of this agreement ? The Government of Pakistan is only too anxious to withdraw its forces from the State. The question that has been engaging the attention of the Security Council for the last eight years is how to persuade the Government of India to do what it had agreed to do. We on our part have accepted eleven proposals for the demilitarization of the State. It is India which has rejected all these proposals Still the Government of India tries to show that Pakistan is remiss, while Indian actions are above-board.
In regard to India's conduct in negotiations with the Commission and Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative. I will cite a few quotations from their reports to the Security Council.
(a) In response to the Commission's truce proposals of 15 April 1949 providing for withdrawal of the entire Pakistan Army, the Government of India agreed to withdraw a very small number of its forces. According to the Commission: "This reduction was considerably less than had been suggested in the Commission's plan for the three-months period and in no case could be considered to constitute the bulk of the Indian forces."
(b) In response to the Commission's truce terms of 28 April 1949, the Government of India presented "its own. scheme for the withdrawal of its forces." The Indian plan was, in the opinion of the Commission, "far from a fulfilment of India's undertaking under the terms of the 13 August resolution" to withdraw the bulk of its forces.
(c) Summing up the position with regard to the withdrawal of the forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Commission stated, "India is not prepared to withdraw such part of her forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as the "bulk, whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the "Azad" forces is reached."
(d) The Prime Minister of India rejected all proposals for the demilitarization of the State that were put forward by Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. In his report to the Security Council dated 15 September 1950, Sir Owen Dixon said:
"In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled." [S/1791, para. 52].
There are two minor points in the address of the representative of India to which I would allude briefly before I take up the next point.
Speaking about the Status of the Princely States on the eve of partition, Mr. Krishna Menon said:
"...It is quite true, as it is said in the Cabinet Mission's Memorandum, that they (the Princely States) were competent to discuss some other political relationship other than accession; that is possible. But they would not have been independent, like Colombia, Cuba, or France or any of the countries around here, because they had no international status." [762nd meeting, para. 26].
I was bewildered when I read along with this the policy statement of the Government of India made in this very forum by the late Mr. Gopalaswamy Ayyangar in January 1948, to which the representative of China drew the attention of the Council the other day. It reads:
"The question of the future status of Kashmir vis-a vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she should withdraw from her accession to India, and either accede to Pakistan or remain independent, with a right to claim admission as a Member of the United Nations-all this we have recognized to be a matter for unfettered decision by the people of Kashmir, after normal life is restored to them." [227th meeting, p. 29].
It was insinuated in the address by the representative of India that the fact that the Security Council considered this matter on 23 December 1952, "which is more than four years ago, a fact which is not without significance", perhaps indicated, Mr. Krishna Menon thought, that there is no crisis. developing in this matter. It is true that the case was last considered by the Security Council towards the end of December 1952. Thereafter followed a round of negotiations with the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan and on his recommendation negotiations began between the Governments of India and Pakistan. It was not that, the case. Having been considered by the Security Council towards the end of 1952, everyone went to sleep over it. It is a pity that the representative of India does not recognize the efforts made by the United Nations Representative and the value of the strenuous efforts made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to resolve this question peacefully in direct parleys with the Prime Minister of India in 1953, 1954 and 1955 in London, Karachi and New Delhi. He tries to brush everything aside by implying that, as the case was last considered in the Security. Council on 23 December 1952 and has not so far been raised here since, it should be taken as settled.
Much has been made by the representative of India of the advice that I have said Lord Mountbatten tendered to the Indian Princes on the question of accession in his address to them on 25 July 1947. A copy of my speech is before me. The relevant portion dealing with this question is included in the ninth paragraph of my statement [761st meeting, para. 13]. The only quotation from Lord Mountbatten's address that I have used is given in that paragraph and was repeated by the representative of India himself. Lord Mountbatten did, how ever, advise the Princes to take into account the communal composition of their States in arriving at a decision regarding accession, as would appear from the same diary of an English man which has been quite copiously quoted by Mr Krishna Menon. I recollect that Mr. Menon denied in his speech the fact that Lord Mountbatten had said that the communal composition of the States should be taken into account when deciding the question of accession. The quotation is from pages 357 to 358 of Mission with Mountbatten :
"On 25 July, after prolonged efforts to achieve some unity of purpose among them, (the Indian princes) Lord Mountbatten spoke to them in the Chamber of Princes for the last time in his capacity as Crown Representative. He took the initiative in advising them all to accede to one or other of the two new Dominions as the effective successor Powers to the British Raj.
"The basic principle of Accession was that it vested in the personal discretion of the Ruler, since he was an autocrat. But it was recognized that this discretion should be qualified by the geographical contiguity of the State to the successor Dominion, the communal composition of the State, and a plebiscite if necessary to ascertain the will of the people".
That this position was also accepted by the Government of India there can hardly be any doubt. In its telegram dated 22 September 1947, more than a month before the acceptance by the Government of India of the spurious offer of accession by the Ruler of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India considered the acceptance of Junagadh's accession by Pakistan as an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory. It characterized it as, and here I quote from the Government of India's communication, "a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by extending influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected". The reason was that Junagadh was a predominantly Hindu majority State with a Muslim ruler. My authority for saying so is the Government of India's communication dated 21 August 1947 to the Government of Pakistan with regard to the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan. The Government of India said at that time :
"This decision has created a very awkward situation for the Dominion of India. Both from the practical and administrative points of view, geographical contiguity is the most important factor, and it was made clear by H.E. the Viceroy that it should be the main criterion to be followed by the State in deciding to which of the two Dominions they accede. Further, of the total population of 671, 719 in the State only 127,814 are Muslims; the State is thus a predominantly Hindu State, and an important decision like this cannot surely be taken by its Ruler without regard to the wishes of its peoples' '.
Again, in a telegram dated 26 September 1947 the Government of India, explaining the position of Junagadh to the Government of Pakistan, said in part: "The State has a population of approximately 671,000 of whom about 543,000 or 81 per cent are non-Muslims".
To say, therefore, at this late stage that the communal composition of the Princely States had no bearing whatsoever on the issue of accession is not at all tenable. Is it that a Muslim Ruler of a predominantly Hindu State had no option but to accede to India because that will of the people could be assumed to be in favour of such an accession, and a Hindu Ruler of a predominantly Muslim State had also no option but to accede to India because the will of the Hindu autocrat could be assumed to be in favour of accession to India, and the will of the people did not matter? In other words, what India says is, "Heads I win, and tails you lose". Mr. Menon, in stating the legal position and policy of his Government with respect to the question of the accession of Princely States, was understandably silent about Junagadh.
The Indian representative took some time of the Security Council in explaining the circumstances in which a standstill agreement between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and India was not concluded. I must admit that the argument was not entirely intelligible to me. What is it that the representative of India wanted to convey to the Security Council? Was it that the State of Jammu and Kashmir approached the Government of India for a standstill agreement on 12 August, three days before the Government of India came into existence as a successor authority to the departing British? If so, what does it show? Does it show that the standstill agreement, which the State concluded with Pakistan, was being used only as a cover to lull the suspicious of the Musli population of the State, while all the time attempts were being made by the Hindu Maharaja in collusion with the Government of India to stage-manage an accession of the State to the Union of India? If everything had been above-board, why didn't the Government of India accept the offer of a standstill agreement? The so-called accession of the State took place on 27 October 1947. Does the Indian representative mean to say that between 12 August and 26 October no one could physically leave the State of Jammu and Kashmir and go to Delhi in order to present his document of a standstill agreement ?
Then, it has been said that the Government of India had a particular form for a standstill agreement, which included subjects like defence, and so forth May I inform the Security Council that the form was common to the two successor authorities, and the telegrams from the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Governments of India and Pakistan offering standstill agreements were couched in identical language They read as follows:
"The Jammu and Kashmir Government would welcome standstill agreements with the Government of Pakistan (or India) on all matters on which these exist at the present moment with the outgoing British Government. It is suggested that existing arrangements should continue pending settlement of details and formal execution of fresh agreement." This offer was accepted by Pakistan but was not accepted by India.
In his letter dated 1 October 1949 to the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, the Minister for Kashmir Affairs of the Government of Pakistan said, in part:
"The Government of India, without making any reference to Pakistan which under the standstill agreement was responsible, inter alia, for the defence and external affairs of the Jammu and Kashmir State, flew in large forces to occupy and subjugate the State, thus entering upon a course of aggression against the people of Jammu and Kashmir, which is still continuing and which can only end with the complete withdrawal of the Indian armed forces from the State."
The purported accession by the Maharaja in 1947 did not, as Mr. Menon now argues, end the matter of Kashmir's accession. By accepting the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 5 January 1949, India. accepted that the status of Kashmir remained to be decided. It remained to be decided not by India alone or by Pakistan alone or by the Government of Kashmir alone-it remained to be decided by the agreed method of a free and impartial plebiscite that should be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. It was also decided, as far bac: as 5 January 1949, that no unilateral act by India or Pakistan would relieve the parties of the solemn international obligation to abide by or take whatever action would be necessary to give effect to the will of the people Kashmir as accepted under the agreed plebiscite.
We are now told that in adopting its Constitution of 1950, India has made itself powerless to honour its commitments. Let us assume that the Constitution of India does make it impossible for one of the Constituent States of India to secede. It does not follow that Kashmir, the accession of which is now in dispute, could not accede to Pakistan. Mr. Menon, if I have re-read his statement correctly, carefully refrained from advertising to this point. Mr. Menon surely cannot contended seriously that a Constituent State, which Kashmir is not. could not change its status with the consent of the Union. India agreed to give any consent necessary for this purpose when it agreed to the plebiscite. But suppose the Constitution of India prohibits the Government of India from honouring its international commitments; can that be pleaded before an international body? Suppose India, under a Constitution framed by itself unilaterally, incorporated the State of Texas into India, what would be the legal implications? Would it be binding on the people of Texas ?
The force of logic has driven the representative of India to the extreme position of now denying that India ever under took to abide by the results of a plebiscite. It is here that I venture to believe that Mr. Krishna Menon has been carried away by his own rhetoric. Mr. Menon stated that the 5 January 1949 resolution uses the verb "will" rather than the verb "shall" in the provision for the plebiscite. [763rd meeting. para. 70] I am advised that these verbs even in private contracts are used interchangeably. As between Governments, the same is the case, the practice being to prefer the verb "will" as sounding more dignified, but certainly never to let one party or another slip out of the commitment it has said it will carry out. Of course, grammarians may remind us that "I will" corresponds to "you shall", just as "I shall" corresponds to "you will". But enough of this. No country, including India, could ever take this battle of "will" or "shall seriously. Here I should like to make this remark. Suppose Mr. Krishna Menon were to say tomorrow that I will destroy the international reputation of India and nobody shall save it. Now we, as friends of India, are not going to be really guided or misled by the use of "shall" or "will". We shall see what is really good for the international reputation of India and not whether Mr. Krishna Menon has used the word "shall" or "will" in that connexion.
The record is against the representative of India's argument that India never undertook to abide by the results of a plebiscite. First, in his letter dated 27 October 1947 to the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, the Governor-General of India promised a reference on this question to the will of the people.
Second, in various telegrams which the Prime Minister of India sent to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and to which I have already referred in my opening address (761st meeting), the Indian Prime Minister categorically promised that the question of accession will be decided by a plebiscite of the people of Kashmir. Let me recall to the Security Council Mr. Nehru's telegram of 31 October 1947 to the Prime Minister of Pakistan:
"Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us"-that is, by India-"at the request of the Maharaja's Govern ment and the most numerously representative popular organization in the State, which is predominantly Muslim. Even then it was accepted on condition that as soon as the invader had been driven from Kashmir soil and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession. It is open to them to accede to either Dominion then. Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding. the future of this State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world."
These are the words of the great Prime Minister of India who, on 26 January 1957, dishonouring all these pledges, annexed the State of Kashmir without consulting the people of the State.
Third, paragraph 1 of the 5 January 1949 resolution [S/ 1196, para. 15], which has been freely accepted by the Government of India and is, therefore, binding on it, lays down that the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted by the United Nations. Fourth, it has been understood all along in the Security Council that there is agreement between the parties that the question of accession of the Jammu and Kashmir State shall be decided by means of a free and impartial plebiscite.
Fifth, the joint communique which the Prime Ministers issued on 20 August 1953, as a result of the direct parleys which took place between them in Delhi, lays down categorically that the question of accession will be decided by means of a free and impartial plebiscite. The Indian representative took exception to my question as to whether his arguments presented the true picture in the mind of the Prime Minister and the people of India. I, in my turn, take exception to the suggestion that the 20 August 1953 communique was signed by the Indian Prime Minister with mental reservations. Yet, what business did any responsible member of the Government of India have in agreeing to appoint a Plebiscite Commissioner if the Constitution of his country forbade his Government from carrying out the terms of the plebiscite? What is it that Mr. Menon wants the Security Country to believe that the Government of India was all along consciously misleading everyone with regard to its true intentions? Surely, as late as 20 August 1953, it was the official view that the Indian Constitution permitted the Government of India to fulfil its international commitments made to the people of Kashmir, to Pakistan and to the world through the Security Council.
The Indian representative states that the resolution of 5 January 1949 is subsidiary to the resolution of 13 August 1948. How it is so has not been explained. The surprising part of it is that while he accepts all the provisions of the 13 August 1948 resolution of the Commission with regard to partial de militarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in addition to paragraph 4(a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution of the Commission, which also deals with the question of demili larization, he does not accept the validity of the other clauses of the 5 January 1949 resolution. We are in complete agreement with him that the plebiscite is not to take place until demilitarization has been carried out. Up to date, the ingenuity of the Indian side has been entirely concentrated on avoiding this demilitarization. Mr. Menon now says that because no truce agreement
has been reached, the obligation to hold a plebiscite failed. There is of course nothing in the agreement to support this position; but in seeking to avoid the obligation to hold a plebiscite, Mr. Menon would have the Council overlook the prior obligation to secure the demilitarization of the state. This prior obligation is still valid, but we hear nothing from Mr. Menon about it other than it has not been fulfilled.
When the direct talks between the two Prime Ministers were called off, long after the joint communique of 20 August 1953, the reason was not that the Prime Minister of India considered a plebiscite impossible. The reason as put forward by India was that the receipt by Pakistan of military aid from the United States of America had changed the situation.
I anticipated this excuse and most of the others mentioned by Mr. Menon and they are discussed in my opening statement. To the usual list, Mr. Menon has added the new excuse that an unreasonable period of time has elapsed since the conclusion of the international agreement. The representative of India now tells us that these excuses are "changed conditions" justifying the release of the Government of India from the obligation to cooperate in holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. Mr. Menon eschewed the Latin phrase he clearly had in mind the doctrine rebus sic stantibus. This doctrine has never been applied by an international tribunal and indeed was emphatically rejected by the Security Council in another case which came before it in 1947. If the doctrine has any application at all, the circumstances that have changed must have been directly related to the obligation undertaken and present in the minds of those who incurred the obligation.
Mr. Menon has not met the burden of the argument and has undertaken to show the necessary factual relation between the preservation of the conditions he says have changed and the obligation he seeks to avoid. To take only one example, he has not shown that the agreement to hold a The plebiscite was made on the condition that a particular balance of force within the borders of India and Pakistan prior to and at the time of the plebiscite had to be maintained. Have the circumstances changed that were in the minds of India, Pakistan and the Security Council? Has the geography of Kashmir changed? Do rivers no longer flow into Pakistan ? Has the contour of the mountains changed making the State more contiguous to India or less to Pakistan than it was? Has the communal composition of the State changed except in the province of Jammu ?
There also, paragraph 6 of the 5 January 1949 resolution of the Commission can restore the status quo ante. What is it that changed? If more schools have been established in the Jammu and Kashmir State, more hospitals built there, more irrigation facilities provided to the people, more roads opened up for communication, do these changes lead one to the conclusion that the people of Jammu and Kashmir State should be denied the right of self-determination? How does the agreement sound to the Security Council, that people should be denied their liberty because economic advantages have accrued to the Jammu and Kashmir State by continuing. illegal association with India? Many more benefits than these had accrued to India itself under the British, but how did India itself react to them? Did they not kill and shoot those benefactors in their effort to gain their freedom? Why did Mr. Nehru prefer imprisonment? He preferred freedom to these improvements.
And remember, the British only deferred freenom. The representative of India argues not for deferment of the plebiscite. The question of freedom for the people of Kashmir is closed, according to him, because of what? Better roads and schools and lower monetary debts? The Hindus were not alone in preferring self-determination. Their Muslim brothers also went to prison in the cause of liberty, as they are now suffering detention in Kashmir in the same cause. Muslims as well as Hindus will not sell their birth-right for a mess of pottage.
I beg to submit that there has been no change that impairs the imperative necessity of holding the plebiscite, The Government of Pakistan maintains that the changes in conditions since 1949 are not such as to relieve either party from the performance of the obligations undertaken in agreeing to the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The same position was accepted by the Security Council when it adopted the resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/37 79], reaffirming those and certain other resolutions. I submit that there was never any difference between India and Pakistan over the objective in Kashmir. The objective has always been a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, as was voluntarily agreed to by the parties under the terms of the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolutions of the Commission. The negotiations broke down on the method and the scope of the demilitarization of the State preparatory to the plebiscite. To begin with, India said that it would not agree to any demilitarization programme that did not include in its purview the large-scale disarming and disbanding of the "Azad'' Kashmir forces. Although the provision for such disbanding and disarming of these forces existed only in the 5 January 1949 resolution of the Commission, the Government of Pakistan, in a genuine effort to go forward, agreed to telescope the two stages of demilitarization into one. After this had been achieved by India, it dug in its toes on the question of the number of forces that would remain on either side of the cease-fire line. Since then, there has been no agreement on the agreed question of the quantum of troops .
I would therefore respectfully request the Security Council to go ahead with the consideration of the specific request of the Government of Pakistan that a programme of demilitarization should now be worked out which should make the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite possible.
There are many assertions in the statement of the representative of India which have, I submit, no relevance to the question of implementation of the resolutions of the Security Council- The Council will, I think, bear with me if I answer certain of these assertions in order that the record may be set straight. The representative of India has sought to make the Security Council believe that an invasion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan had begun long before the tribesmen entered Kashmir. In this connexion he said:
"Even as early as 10 October, long before the Indian forces had been there, Pakistan had invaded the State of Kashmir." [762nd meeting, para, 75].
Irrespective of the fact that Pakistan had a stand-still agreement with the Jammu and Kashmir State and could, therefore, have sent its troops in with perfect justification, I would beg the Security Council to bear with me for a while and listen to the representative of India himself had to say about this matter in the course of his speech :
"On 28 October 1947 it is recorded in a diary written at the time: 'In the middle of today's Defence Committee,
Auchinleck rang up Mountbatten.. from Lahore to say that he had succeeded in persuading Jinnah to cancel orders given the previous night for Pakistani troops to be moved into Kashmir'." [Ibid., para. 85].
Expanding this theme the representative of India said in the course of his speech: "Mr Jinnah gave his order after a conference held on 27 October 1947 at Lahore with Pakistan Army chiefs" (Ibid., para. 89).
Later on, the representative of India got a little involved in his argument and said that the British Commander-in-Chief was able to persuade Mr. Jinnah to cancel his order for entry of Pakistan troops into the State. What is it exactly that the representative of India sought to make out? That Pakistan troops entered Kashmir on 10 October, or that they entered Kashmir on 28 October; that the British Commander-in-Chief obeyed the orders of Mr. Jinnah and did not invade the State ? Why all this attempt to confuse when it is known that the Pakistan Army did not enter the State before May 1948 ?
At this stage I cannot but digress and say that we were probably remiss in our duties and functions in not ordering the Pakistan Army to enter the Jammu and Kashmir State in order to put an end to the reign of terror, the massacre and the wholesale genocide of the Muslim population of the State on which the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir has seemed to be bent long before he succeeded in his design to secure the services of the Indian Army to crush the resistance movement.
There is one other point which arises at this stage to which, I am afraid, I have to allude with deep sorrow. It is a pity that the representative of India has thought fit to ascribe under hand and not entirely honourable motives to the founder of our State, Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who is no more with us, Speaking about the attempt which the Quaid-i Azam made to settle this dispute by direct negotiations, the representative of India said:
"Mr. Jinnah invited the Prime Minister [of India] to go to Lahore, but he was unable to go owing to ill health. However, the Governor-General went, and what happened? At that time discussions took place and it was said that both sides should call off their troops; that is to say, the Indian Army should be withdrawn and the raiders, as they were then called, should also leave... Lord Mountbatten asked the common-sense question of how Mr. Jinnah could be responsible for withdrawing the tribesmen if he had no control over them, to which Mr. Jinnah replied: 'If you do this I will call the whole thing off'." [Ibid., para. 95¹.
I do not know where Mr. Menon got this astounding version of what the Quaid-i-Azam proposed. What actually happened was that the Quaid-i-Azam made a constructive proposal for the solution of the dispute on the basis of complete demilitarization of the State and the holding of a plebiscite under the joint supervision and control of the Governors General of India and Pakistan. Lord Mountbatten inquired as to what steps would be taken if the tribesmen, who apparently obey no one's authority, refused to leave the State, to which the Quaid-i-Azam replied that if, after an agreement had been reached between India and Pakistan and announced to the people of Kashmir, the tribesmen refused to leave the State, the Armies of India and Pakistan would jointly make war against them and force them to vacate the State. These were the words of the Quaid-i-Azam. I would request the Security Council to mark this. Was it or was it not the most honest and sincere approach for a solution of the Kashmir problem?
Mr. Krishna Menon has tried to explain away India's rejection of the proposal of arbitration which was first put forward by the United Nations Commission and later on endorsed by the security Council in its resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev. 1]. The argument is that, to India, arbitration was unacceptable because the Arbitrator was asked to say what he was going to arbitrate upon. I am afraid this was not so. The issues for arbitration were specific and clear. The issues were :
(1) Does the resolution of 13 August 1948 provide for the disbanding and disarming of the "Azad'' Kashmir forces ? The Government of India claimed that it did, or that the matter had already been disposed of and could not be raised again. The Government of Pakistan contended that it did not and the matter had not been disposed of and could therefore be raised again. The Arbitrator was to decide whether this was so or this was not so.
(2) The Government of India claimed that Pakistan would have no say in the matter of the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, contested this claim and maintained that according to the assurances that were given to them and which formed part of the record of the United Nations Com mission, the Commission was at liberty to hear the Government of Pakistan on that issue. The Arbitrator was to decide whether this was so or this was not so.
(3) The Government has a claim to northern areas of State. Government Pakistan contested the claim maintained according to the terms agreement the Government India or the State Government was debarred from sending any civil. ian military officers across the cease-fire line The Arbitrator
In other words, this was a dispute regarding the implications of the assurances of the United Nations Commission in regard to the international agreement on Kashmir. How could this be other than arbitration? India's refusal to agree arbitration clearly manifested its awareness the weakness of position this matter. The conclusion that can be drawn from this attitude the Government of India that it not very of its ground. If is, why it agree arbitration over the points dispute ?
The representative of India denies gravamen our charge with the nature of the Constituent Assembly, so-called elections that were held for it. What does representative India deny? Does denying that the so-called Constituent Assembly was constituted in violation of the Security Council resolution March 1951, does affirm that the Constitution this Assembly was in conformity with the terms of that resolution? Does that Government of itself violate the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951-and now, of January 1957-in accepting the action of the Constituent Assembly, or does he affirm that action is in compliance with the resolutions of this Council? What does he deny? Does deny that the so called Constituent Assembly represents a good part of Jammu Kashmir, which is called (Free) Kashmir, does he affirm that the Assembly represents "Azad" Kashmir as well? What deny? Does deny that no elections were held to Constituent Assembly, or does were Does he deny that in the State of Jammu and Kashmir it is an offence to talk of a free and impartial plebiscite, or does he affirm that it is not so? What does he deny actually ? Does he deny that as of date hundreds of people are suffering imprisonment, are denied civil liberties and government patronage, or does he affirm that it is not so? What is it actually that the representative of India wants to deny ?
I have in my first submission given a picture of the state of affairs in occupied Kashmir. The representative of India has only high-lighted this fact by saying that there are only forty-nine political prisoners suffering imprisonment at this stage. The point is not whether there are forty-nine or 5,000; the point is that in an area which is groaning under the heel of an army of occupation, even according to the Indian admission I do not accept it as correct, my information being that there are many more-there are at least forty-nine leaders, brave souls who had the strength of character to challenge this tyranny and expose the Government of India's game in Kashmir, who are in goal without trial.
Then the representative of India has said quite a number of things about the security of the State. He has said that various cantonments of the Pakistan Army like Jhelum, Abbottabad, Murree and Sialkot are at a stone's throw from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. These cantonments have always been there. The cantonments were located in these places in certain cases as long ago as the time of the Sikh rule in the Punjab, before the British came. What is it that the Government of India wants Pakistan to do about it? Remove these cantonments to other areas and let the flank of Pakistan remain undefended? Factually, the distances of these cantonments from the State of Jammu and Kashmir which Mr. Menon has given in his speech are incorrect. Abbottabad is well over fifty miles from the boundary of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It was founded at the time when a man called Abbott was a General in the Sikh Army, before the British came. Murree is also over forty miles. Rawalpindi is still farther removed. What after all is the argument ? That because Pakistan's cantonments happen to be in Sialkot, Jhelum, Murree and Abbottabad, where they always have been and where they were when the Government of India accepted the resolution of 5 January 1949, the Government of India feels that in 1957 they should not fulfil their international obligation for a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir because these cantonments are there.
The Pakistan Army is a force of which we are legitimately proud. However, its strength is nowhere even near half the strength of the Indian Army. As for the strength of the "Azad'' Kashmir forces, let me say categorically that not one soldier has been added to the strength of the "Azad" Kashmir forces since the day that the cease-fire took place and became effective. The Pakistan Air Force has no bases in either "Azad'' Kashmir or in Gilgit or in the northern areas. We have only two air strips in Gilgit and Skardu, both of which can receive no planes bigger than a DC-3. The air service to the northern areas is meant essentially to carry civil supplies and consumer goods. Mr. Menon has said that the length of these air strips has been increased up to 2,000 yards. Anyone with even the most elementary knowledge of these matters knows that the barest minimum length required for jet aircraft is well over 3,500 yards.
In this context Mr. Menon has also mentioned the air strips we have in Chitral. I am sure the Security Council will be surprised to hear that Chitral, a State which acceded to Pakistan in 1947, has been mentioned as a part of Kashmir. I shall not be surprised if that argument is sought to be enlarged a little further to include in Kashmir all the areas that now constitute Western Pakistan, Chitral was a State which acceded to Pakistan. The status of the State of Chitral has never been in dispute between India and Pakistan. Over the last nine years no mention has ever been made of Chitral in this forum. Only at this late stage has Mr. Menon seen fit to mention Chitral. Why? This is an attempt to confuse the issue, which, I must repeat, is how to secure demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir so that the international obligations of India and Pakistan are implemented without any further delay.
Here I would like to refer to this question of air bases which Mr. Menon mentioned that we had up in the hills, in Gilgit, in Chitral and in Skardu. You can get into those little strips with civilian and medical supplies at great danger to your life, because the hills are very narrow and when there is the slightest cloud you cannot land there. Only a person who knows nothing about air strategy can think that those little air strips are of any military value. We have very large aerodromes in the Punjab and it takes a plane a very short time to cover the distance to these areas. So why should anyone be foolish enough to have these air bases in these dangerous mountains and think that we are keeping these bases in Gilgit and in Skardu in order to maintain bombers there so as to bomb Calcutta, Bombay and Madras. I really do not know where this strategy has come from. It is not necessary for us to keep bases in these mountains. We have these bases in the Punjab, and openly, from where the airplane can take off and go anywhere in India. Therefore, to bring out before this Council the fact that these little strips where we take medicine for our people are dangerous for the security of India is, to say the least, a very strange argument.
Mr. Menon said that his Government could not for a moment accept the principle of communal affiliations. He said that if his Government accepted this principle, it would have unfortunate repercussions; in other words, the Muslim minority in India would be exposed to bitter hatred and violence from the Hindus. In other words, Mr. Menon was conveying a thinly veiled threat, and this has been done before by the Government of India. The threat is that if Kashmir came to Pakistan, 35 million Muslims of India would have to pay for it and risk extermination. This argument, as many others of Mr. Menon, proves on examination to be spurious.
Mr. Krishna Menon himself says that Muslims in India are in a minority, a very sparse minority in most parts. Their total number makes a substantial figure, but 35 million interspersed with nearly 400 million Hindus form a very small minority in the country. Their case is not at all comparable to that of the Muslims of Kashmir, who form a solid contiguous block with Pakistan, and it is only Muslims who were geographically so distributed as to come within the purview of the resolution that established Pakistan. Muslims who are a minority in India, like minorities in any country in the world. must necessarily be merged in the stream of Indian life. What constituted a problem before the partition was that the Mus lims in the sub-continent-the expression that Mr. Krishna Menon does not like, but which, unfortunately, is the only one which correctly describes the area were too large a minority to be absorbed in, or agree to be absorbed in, the body politic of India. Fortunately for them, they were in a majority in two definite areas that could be partitioned off from India; and Kashmir is geographically a part of one of these two areas of absolute Muslim majority.
Mr. Krishna Menon, in trying unnecessarily to tie up the question of the fate of the Kashmir Muslims with the safety of the Muslims in India, is threatening genocide, which has been declared a crime in international law. In saying that national passions will be inflamed in India if Kashmir goes to Pakistan, Mr. Krishna Menon contradicts his oft-repeated and oft-boas ted claim that India is a secular State and that there is no feeling whatever among the Hindus of india against the Mus lims; that they regard the Muslims as Indians and Indians alone, and acknowledge no racial or sectarian difference.
In threatening the Muslims of India, the Government of India is using a very dangerous weapon, and the Government of Pakistan would like to draw the attention of the Security Council to this threat. It is against the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in direct violation of fundamental human rights, of which India is the most vocal champion. It is an unheard of thing in international politics that if a country has a quarrel with another independent country, it should wreak its vengeance on the helpless minorities in its own territory. There are today in the United Kingdom a large number of British subjects of Greek origin. It has never been thought of or contemplated by the British that, as a means of putting pressure on Greece, the safety of the Greek minority in the United Kingdom should be threatened. If any country, Even on a very small scale, resorts to retaliatory measures against a minority in its community, it justifiably earns the opprobrium of the world. Therefore, I wish once again to draw the attention of the Security Council to Mr. Krishna Menon's very thinly veiled threat against the Muslims of India and their possible massacre by the Hindus, of whom Mr. Krishna Menon is a champion.
The representative of India has waxed eloquent over the secularism of India. Although the matter is completely irrelevant to the issue of holding a free and impartial plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, may I also in passing say a few words about this so-called secularism of India.
(a) In "secular" India in 1953, 12,000 Muslims were reported to have been converted forcibly to Hinduism in Khadil Bombay by the Ary Samajists, which is a Hindu militant, religious, fanatical organization;
(b) On 22 September 1956, in secular India, Mr. N.C. Chatterji, President of the All-India Hindu Mahasabha, which is the second largest political organization in that country, and ten others, in a joint statement revealed that 50,000 non-Hindus had been converted to Hinduism during the last three years;
(c) In "secular" India, 386 communal riots took place since 8 April 1950, when the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan signed an agreement giving protection to minorities;
(d) From "secular" India, through only one route, 60,00) Muslim refugees have entered Pakistan since February 1950, the date of the agreement above referred to;
(e) "Secular" India's paper "Sidq" reported on 24 December 1954 that the "result of the National Defence Academy examination held in June 1954 has been announced in this month. The number of successful candidates is 129 which, as usual, does not include a single Muslim! Along with this, another list of successful candi. dates for the Air Force, comprising eighty-eight persons, have been issued. This is also all along "pure"-that is, it also does not include the name of any Muslim";
(f) "Secular" India's newspaper "Sidq" again reported on 26 August 1955 as follows: "Allahabad August 23rd: The result of the examination held by United Provinces Service (Political) and United Provinces Police Service has now been announced. It does not include the name of any Muslim candidate".
Now, the United Provinces is the most highly enlightened part of India where the Muslim minority was always successful in competitive examinations, in very large numbers, during the British days; and today, in West Pakistan, and even in East Pakistan, one will see a large number of Muslims who had, through competition, succeeded in getting into the highest level of the civil service during the United India days, but who sud denly seem to have left it, and not a single one can get into the civil service now.
At least Mr. Krishna Menon cannot claim that no leader in Pakistan cares for the welfare of the minorities. It was as well that the representative of India himself referred to the concern of our Prime Minister for the minorities of Pakistan. The Constitution of Pakistan guarantees the same treatment to all its citizens exactly in the same manner as the Constitution of India. There is no difference between the two. That is, however, completely irrelevant to the issue which is before us.
Turning now to that portion of the representative of India's speech which tried to rebut the allegations of non performance of India's obligations, which I cited in my opening address to the Council. I would refer very briefly to certain statements which Mr. Krishna Menon made. He said:
"It is true that India rejected the proposal for arbitration that was made by the Commission at that time." [764th meeting, para. 20].
Out of the charges which I made-and he seemed to give the impression that India has never rejected anything-I am quoting from his speech to show that he himself has admitted that India rejected those suggestions. The reasons which he gives, of course, are not worth the paper they are written on.
Mr. Krishna Menon said:
"For similar reasons, India objected to the Security. Council resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev. 11, which gave Pakistan the right to be consulted, even in vital matters affecting the security of Jammu and Kashmir." [Ibid., para. 28].
Here, again, he admits my allegation.
He said further :
"These proposals of General McNaughton failed to take account of our respective positions in this dispute and did not preserve the agreements of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949." [Ibid., para. 32].
Here, again, he agrees that India did not accept.
Mr. Krishna Menon then said:
"Sir Owen Dixon, now Chief Justice of Australia, went to India and to Kashmir and to Pakistan and he tried to establish, in the same way as General McNaughton did, a parity between India and Pakistan. What is more, he also brought in 'Azad' Kashmir as though it were a de jure Government, and he also tried to establish parity between the State forces and militia on the one hand, and 'Azad' forces on the other." [Ibid., para. 35].
Sir Owen Dixon's proposals were consequently rejected by the Government of India. Mr. Menon admits it.
Mr. Krishna Menon has done us a service by reading out the account of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meeting as recorded by the Prime Minister of India. I hardly need to comment on it except to show my gratitude to him for bringing it out.
Speaking about the Security Council resolution of December 1952 [S/2883], the representative of India said:
"Our answer to this is that while the Government of India could not accept a resolution which suggested a number of forces which in India's view was insufficient for security, the Government of India did enter into further negotiations with Mr. Graham." [764th meeting, para. 75].
Then the representative of India went on to assert :
"Therefore, the charges of non-performance, in my sub mission, are wrongly laid at our door." [Ibid., para, 77].
Need anyone to comment on this ?
The representative of India has sought to claim credit for certain so-called concessions which the Indian experts committee is supposed to have made in the direct parleys that took place between the experts committees of India and Pakistan towards the end of December 1953. The record of these parleys from which he has taken out the figures which he quoted was prepared by the Pakistan delegation and approved by the Indian delegation. I have a copy of the record with me, and I would be only too happy to give it to the Security Council for its perusal.
The reasons why no progress was possible on the basis of what the Indian delegation had suggested in the course of those meetings was that the experts committees were not allowed to meet again. It was said by the Prime Minister of India that the receipt of military aid by Pakistan had changed the entire context of the negotiations and, therefore there was no further point in permitting those committees to reconvene. It is not that the committees having met, the Indian delegation made a concession and the Pakistan delegation refused to accept it.
The record has so far been treated by the Pakistan Government as informal, on the request of the Indian Government, but since the Indian representative has seen fit to quote from it in his speech I think we are permitted to circulate it as an official document.
The representative of India has more than once alluded. to the responsibilities and obligations of Member States under the Charter of the United Nations. May I, with due respect to him, quote for his information two Articles from the Character. Article 2 paragraph 2 of the Charter requires that :
"All Members, in order to ensure to all of them the rights and benefits resulting from membership, shall fulfil in good faith the obligations assumed by them in accordance with the present Charter."
Article 25 of the Character reads:
"The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter."
Against these quotations from the Charter, may I set two questions from Mr. Menon's statement: "It is the Council's resolution. Again : It does not bind us" (75th meeting, para. 120.)
"...I have the responsibility to let the people and Government of India know that I have said in this Council that this resolution only takes care to remind us of those resolutions of the Security Council which we have, in express terms, declined to accept, that is, the resolutions of 21 April 1948 on word." [Ibid., para. 127]. It is not my intention to weary the Security Council by rebutting all the irrelevant arguments that the representative of India chose to make in the course of an eight-hour speech. This does not, however, mean that I cannot meet all his arguments or that I accept the validity of those that I have not commented upon today, I propose to stop now and reserve my right to speak further should the occasion so demand or should the Security Council want me to clarify any point arising out of Mr. Krishna Menon's speech.
Pakistan brought two matters to the notice of the Jammu and Security Council. One was that steps were being taken by the Government of India to integrate the State of Kashmir into the Indian Union in defiance of various Security Council resolutions on the subject of this dispute, and in utter violation of the freely accepted international commitments of the Government of India. My Government is most grateful to the Security Council for giving prompt attention to the first part of our submission The resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779] takes care of India's action in this regard.
My second point was that direct negotiations between the Government of India and Pakistan on the resolution of the deadlock over the question of the demilitarization of the State had failed to bear any fruit. It is surprising that the representative of India had hardly anything constructive to say with regard to the second point of our submission. He has completely ignored these direct negotiations and the result of their failure. I submit, therefore, that the Security Council should now take upon itself the task of resolving this deadlock. I submit that much the best way to do this is to introduce a United Nations Force in Jammu and Kashmir and call upon all forces of India and Pakistan to withdraw from the State, demobilize the local militia on both sides of the cease-fire line, and enable the people of Kashmir to decide in a free and impartial United Nations plebiscite whether they wish to accede to India or Pakistan.
Before I close my remarks I should like to refer very briefly to the incident which occurred at the 763rd meeting when I interrupted Mr. Krishna Menon's speech, for which I am very sorry. I was not aware of the practice of the Security Council. But the Council will recall Mr. Menon said that I had said in my statement that Pakistan was not bound by any international obligations-and there he stopped. I interrupted and said that was not the whole of my remark and that he had quoted only half the sentence. I am grateful to Mr. Menon for the fact that, upon that interruption, he read the whole remark which was to the effect that Pakistan is not bound by any international obligations regarding this case, except by the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Thus he had omitted to read the second part of the sentence: "except by the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan ''. That reminded me of the story of a young Mussulman who was one day chided by his priest in the mosque that he did not say his prayers regularly. The young man said, "But. Sir, it is written in the Holy Koran that one should not go near prayer". The priest was astounded, and said, "Bring me the Holy Koran ''. The young man quickly brought the Holy Koran to the priest, and showed him where it is said "Thou shalt not go near prayer". But the priest said: "Why don't you read the other half of the sentence, which says, 'when thou art in a condition of drunkenness"?"