16011957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 761 held on 16 January 1957.

16011957 Text of the speech made by Mr. Noon (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 761 held on 16 January 1957.

It is my duty to report to the Security Council that the direct negotiations initiated by the Government of Pakistan with the Government of India in 1953, on the sugges­tion of Mr. Frank P. Graham, United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, for resolving the deadlock over the implementation of the international agreement for a plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, have failed in their objective.

The failure of the direct negotiations is due solely to the intransigent attitude adopted by the Government of India and its unwillingness to honour its international obligations freely assumed by it towards the end of 1948.

The Government of India is taking steps to integrate the State of Jammu and Kashmir into the Indian Union, reportedly on 26 January 1957, in defiance of the Security Council's clear directives and of its own freely accepted international obligation that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan shall be decided by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted by the United Nations.

The Security Council will recall that the international agreement to which I have alluded is contained in the two re­solutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, Para 15]. These resolutions were accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan and have time and again been endorsed by the Security Council. According to this international agreement the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan is to be decided by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the supervision and control of the United Nations.

I shall not labour the Security Council with the history of the dispute. That is well known and is recorded with a wealth of detail in the verbatim records of the proceedings of this august body. At this stage I shall only allude to certain salient features of the problem necessary for the understanding of the case.

India before August 1947 was composed of British India and the Princely States. British India was governed directly by the British.

The Princely States enjoyed varying degrees of internal autonomy which was regulated by a number of treaties and agreements that the British Power had entered into with them. They, however, had no international status, inasmuch as their foreign relations, defence and communications were invariably the responsibility of the suzerain power, the United Kingdom. The Governor-General of British India acted as Viceroy in his capacity as the representative of the British Crown in its relations with the Princely States, The Princely States had no power to make peace or war to negotiate or communicate with any foreign State. Even their internal sovereignty was restricted by the right of the Crown representative to intervene in their affairs, for example, for the benefit of the State administration, the welfare of the ruler or the people or of India as a whole, and also for giving effect to international commitments. In short, the Princely States, including Jammu and Kashmir, were more or less protectorates under the British Crown.

Let us now recall the change which took place in the status of the Princely States when British rule in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent came to an end.

When partition of the sub-continent into the two sovereign States of India and Pakistan was agreed upon, the United Kingdom Government declared that the paramountcy of the Crown over the Princely States would lapse on the day the sub­continent became independent. The States would then be free to accede either to India or to Pakistan. The Viceroy and Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten, who represented the suzerain—the King of the United Kingdom and Emperor of India—however, advised the Princes of India on 25 July 1947 that in deciding the question of accession, they must pay due regard to the communal composition, the wishes of their peoples and the geographical location of their States. He warned : "You cannot run away from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible."

The basis of partition of the British Empire in India, as set forth in the statement of the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 3 June 1947 was that Pakistan would be constituted by the contiguous Muslim-majority areas in the north-west and the north-east of the sub-continent, and India would comprise contiguous non-Muslim-majority areas.

It was thus universally assumed that, following the basis adopted for partition, Princely States with a Muslim majority in population contiguous Pakistan would accede to Pakistan.

Thus in the case of Jammu and Kashmir the position was crystal clear. Here, although the ruler was a Hindu, 77 percent of the population was Muslim. The State territory was contiguous to Pakistan. Political, economic, strategic, cultural geographical and other considerations all made accession to Pakistan the natural course.

The Government of India and the Indian National Congress were in full agreement with the advice that Lord Mountbatten had given to the Indian rulers on the subject of accession. Had this advice, which was based on the principle underlying partition, been honoured by India, or had India consistent even in its own conduct on the issue of accession, there would have been no dispute regarding the three States of Jammu and Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad.

The Nawab of Junagadh, a Muslim ruler, acceded to Pakistan, although the State had a majority of Hindu popula­tion. The Government of India protested in the strongest terms. Its view was that, on the lapse of British paramountcy, sovereign rights in an Indian State reverted to its people. A Muslim ruler could not speak for his non-Muslim population. In its telegram dated 22 September 1947, the Government of India considered the acceptance by Pakistan of Junagadh's accession as an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and terri-tary. The Government of India characterized it as "a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by expan­ding the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected". Subsequently, the Indian Army invaded Junagadh and the States was occupied by Indian by force.

In the matter of Hyderabad, a Hindu majority State of the size of France and having a population of 15 million with a Muslim ruler, the conduct of the Government of India was also inspired by similar considerations. The Nizam, a Muslim ruler, did not wish to accede either to India or Pakistan. He wanted instead to enter into special treaty relations with the Government of India in order to preserve a measure of inde­pendence for his State and was prepared to hold a plebiscite on this issue. That the Nizam a Muslim ruler of a Hindu-majority State should refuse to accede to India, even though He was prepared to let his people decide this question by means of a plebiscite, which was intolerable to the Indian Government. In September 1948, the Indian Army invaded Hyderabad and, after defeating the Nizam's army, occupied his State and subject it to military rule.

The Indian stand, therefore, was that a State with a majority of Hindu population had no choice but to accede to India, even if its Muslim ruler did not wish to do so. In such a case, the Government of India was not prepared to entertain the very conception of a plebiscite. It followed, therefore, from the Indian thesis that a State whose majority was Muslim had no choice other than to accede to, and must be deemed to have acceded to, Pakistan, even though its Hindu ruler might decide otherwise.

When it came to Kashmir, however, India abandoned this thesis. Here was a case of a Hindu ruler offering to accede to India, in spite of the fact that 77 per cent of the State's population was Muslim. Thus, when the opportunity offered itself, the Government of India accepted, against the known wishes of the people of the State, a spurious offer of accession from the Maharaja, who had already been driven out from his seat of Government by his people and lost whatever semblance of authority he exercised over his subjects. Indian armed forces were flown to Kashmir to subjugate the Muslim population. Since then, India has remained in the forcible occupation of Kashmir that contains the major part of the population of the State.

This is how the dispute arose. Had India honoured the basis on which the Indian States were to accede to Pakistan or to India, or had India's conduct with regard to Kashmir been consistent with its own conduct in respect of Junagadh and Hyderabad, no such dispute would have arisen.

While accepting the Maharaja's offer of accession, how­ever, the Indian Government gave a solemn pledge that this accession was to be conditional. In its reply to the Maharaja on 27 October 1947, it categorically said :"In consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people."

Four days later, on 31 October 1947, the Prime Minister of India telegraphed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan :

"Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us"—is, by India—"at the request of the Maharaja's government and the most numerously representative popoular organi­zation in the State which is predominantly Muslim. Even then, it was accepted on condition that, as soon as the invader had been driven from Kashmir soil and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of accession. It is open to them to accede to either Dominion then. Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world."

This was the promise of Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

Again, on 8 November, 1947, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, in a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, declared :

"It will thus be seen that our proposals which we have repeatedly stated are : (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir ; (2) that the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored : (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date.

"The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential, in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions, that there should be acceptance of principle that, where the ruler of a State does not belong to a community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or other Dominion should be ascertained by re­ference to the will of the people."

These are, again, the words of Mr. Nehru, Prime Minister of India.

Ever since then, for these last eight years, this "reference to the people" has remained a mirage, Law and order was established in the State several years ago. But that Indian undertaking subsequently reinforced by an inter­national agreement, that the people of Kashmir shall be allowed to decide the question of accession by means of a free and fair plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, remains unfulfilled.

On 1 November 1947, the Governor-General of Pakistan, Quaid-i-Azam Jinnah, suggested that the Indian forces and the tribesmen should withdraw from the State at once and then the Governors-General of Pakistan and India should arrange for a plebiscite under the joint supervision. These proposals were not accepted by India. This was the first attempt at a settlement of the dispute by direct negotiation in November 1947.

Eventually, on 1 January 1948, the Government of India took this dispute to the United Nations. On 16 January, Pakistan also filed a complaint with the Security Council. The Security Council is seized of both complaints. While the Council was endeavouring to bring about a settlement, the Government of India, disregarding the under­taking it had already given to this organ to do nothing that might aggravate the situation, launched a major offensive in the State in April 1948. The Indian intention obviously was to crush the forces of liberation and resistance within the State and to occupy it by force, thus presenting the world with a fait accompli as it had done in the case of Junagadh and as it sub­sequently did in the case of Hyderabad.

As the Indian offensive mounted, over 500,000 Muslims were driven out of Jammu and Kashmir to seek refuge in Pakistan. Pakistan's security being thus seriously threatened by advancing Indian forces, the Government of Pakistan, in May 1948, was therefore compelled to move a limited number of troops into the State in order to hold certain defensive posi­tions against the advancing Indian Army.

After hearing both Indian and Pakistan representatives, the Security Council came to the conclusion in April 1948 that the only just, peaceful and democratic solution to this dispute was to determine the accession of the State in accordance with the freely expressed will of the people. The Council appointed a Commission which was able eventually to bring about an agreement between Pakistan and India on the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This interna­tional agreement is embodied in two of the Commission's re­solutions dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

The main provisions of this international agreement for a plebiscite are :

1.  

Cease fire and demarcation of a cease-fire line ;

1.  

Truce agreement providing, inter alia, for : (a) with­drawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of resisting the Indian advances; (b) withdrawal of Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian Army in a "synchronized" movement from Jammu and Kashmir on account of the difficulties created by India, this demilitarization has not taken place and the truce agreement has not been signed ; (c) a plebiscite to be conducted, under the supervision and control of Plebiscite Administrator, empowered to deter­mine the final disposal of the remaining forces in the State and vested will all the powers he considers necessary to ensure the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.

It will be noticed that under the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 demilitarization was to be carried out in two stages. The first is the truce stage when the Pakistan forces and the bulk of the Indian Army are to be withdrawn from the State in a synchronized movement. This would leave a small Indian force and the State armed forces included the State Army and Militia on the one side and the "Azad"—that is to say, free and not yet occupied by India—Kashmir forces on the other. The final disposal of these remaining forces is to be determined by the Plebiscite Administrator, having regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. The phrase "final disposal" has been correctly paraphrased by the Commission as removal, disbandment and location of forces.

The whole object of this international agreement is to create conditions which the people of Jammu and Kashmir would decide freely whether the State is to accede to India or to Pakistan.

The Security Council has throughout recognized that it is impossible to conduct a free poll in the presence of troops of interest parties. Similarly, it is regarded as essential that the Plebiscite Administrator, who is responsible for the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite, should have adequate powers to prevent the local authorities from coercing or influencing the vote in one direction or the other. These basic principles have been embodied in the international agreement.

Turning to the implementation of the agreement, the Provision for a cease-fire and the demarcation of a ceasefire line has been carried out. Although the provision relating to the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers was to be implemented only after the truce agreement had been signed, the Pakistan Government had secured the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals from Kashmir already.

A deadlock has ensued owing to the refusal of the Government of India to conclude a truce agreement in accordance with the terms which that Government itself had accepted.

1. this is the central problem facing the Security Council, it is necessary to deal with it at some length. The Indian technique has been to pay lip service to India's obligations but to refuse to carry them out by insisting on some new condition or ra.smg irrelevant issues, or by putting impossible construc­tions on the words of the agreement. It will suffice to give one example of this technique. As already mentioned, the disposal of the "Azad" Kashmir-that is, the Free Kashmir—forces, along with the remaining Indian forces and State Army and Militia, is the responsibility of the Plebiscite Administrator. During the truce stage, the "Azad" Kashmir forces were to be left intact. This was fully known to the Government of India.

In the course of its discussions with the Government of India in August 1948, the Commission pointed out that, according to the provisions of the Commission's resolution :

" . . .limited Government of India forces would remain and that on the other side only the "Azad" forces would remain in their present positions". [S/1100, annex 12, p. 103]

In its discussions with the Pakistan Government, also, the Commission took the same line, and in its letter of 19 Septem­ber 1948 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan explicitly stated that : "the resolution does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of "Azad" Kashmir forces" [S/l 100 paragraph 108, sub-paragraph 2, C].

Again, in the discussion which the Prime Minister of India had with the Commission in December 1948, before accepting the January 1949 resolution, he referred to the fact that the "Azad" Kashmir forces "ran into tens of thousands" [S/l 196, annex 4, p. 38]. Thus, the Government of India was fully aware of the existence of the "Azad" Kashmir forces in such large numbers before it accepted the international agree­ment.

That the "Azad'' Kashmir forces were not to be disbanded during the truce period, when the bulk of Indian forces had to be withdrawn, was explicitly recognized by the Government of India in the letter dated 18 February 1949 written to the Com­mission by the then Secretary-General of India, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai . I quote the following passage from the letter :

1. disarming of 'Azad' forces is really a matter of chronology. First, there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce, as envisaged in parts I and II of the Com­mission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of 'Azad' Kashmir forces. So far as non-Muslims are con­cerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out. We tried to make this clear to the Commission through Mr. Lozano in the course of our discussions last December, and I have         emphasized this point  in our recent meetings.'

The position is also set out very clearly in a letter which the Commission wrote to the Government of India on 14 March 1949. I quote from that letter as follows :

"In the course of the conversations last August, the Commission explained to the Government of Pakistan that in its view a 'military balance' would exist in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period in the sense and to the extent that the resolution of 13 August [1948] did not call for disarming or disbanding of the 'Azad' Kashmir forces, which the Commission understood to number approximately thirty-five battalions."

Notwithstanding this clear and explicit understanding of the position, the Government of India went back on its pledged word and, in contravention of the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions, accepted by India, made the withdrawal of the "bulk" of other forces conditional upon the disbandment and disarming of the "Azad" Kashmir forces. The Commission, after repeated efforts, came to the conclusion that :

"India is not prepared to withdraw such part of her forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as the 'bulk', whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the 'Azad' forces is reached."

These Indian tactics of playing fast and loose with the international agreement and of interpreting that agreement arbitrarily in India's own interest, contrary to what the Commis­sion itself held to have been agreed to by the parties, finally compelled the Commission to suggest arbitration of the points of difference by Admiral Nimitz, who had been accepted as the Plebiscite Administrator by both India and Pakistan. This pro­posal was endorsed by President Truman and Mr. Attlee. Pakistan accepted it; India rejected it.

With a view to meeting this unreasonable demand of the Government of India, it was proposed—first by General Mc-Naughton and later by Sir Owen Dixon and Mr. Graham—that the two stages of demilitarization be telescoped into one. Although the proposal was against the clear provisions of the international agreement, the Government of Pakistan, in its anxiety to go forward, accepted it. Since then, a number of proposals have been formulated to effect the demilitarization of the State. All of these proposals, without exception, have been accepted by the Government of Pakistan, and all of them— again without exception—have been rejected by the Government of India. What has held up the plebiscite has been the refusal of the Government of India to demilitarize the State of Jammu and Kashmir as envisaged by the international agree­ment. Even a cursory appraisal of the facts will show who is responsible.

Eleven proposals for settling the differences were next put forward. Pakistan accepted each; India rejected every one. I shall refer to these proposals briefly.

(1)

In March 1949, the United Nations Commission con­vened a joint Committee of the Indian and Pakistan representatives, at which it was agreed that both India and Pakistan would submit their plans for the withdrawal of forces to that Committee. Pakistan did so; India first asked for more time and later refused to honour this agreement.

(2)

1. many months of effort, the United Nations Commission came to the conclusion that India was not prepared to withdraw the bulk of its forces from Kashmir and was seek­ing to cover this refusal by misinterpreting the Commission's resolutions on the subject. The Commission, therefore, proposed that the differences arising from the interpretation of the two resolutions—which constitute the international agreement on Kashmir—should be submitted to the arbitration of Admiral Nimitz, the designated Plebiscite Administrator. This proposal was endorsed by a personal appeal from President Truman of the United States and Mr. Attlee, the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, in August 1949.  Pakistan accepted this proposal; India rejected it.

(3)

In December 1949, the President of the Security Council, General McNaughton, acting as the Council's mediator in this dispute, formulated certain proposals for the demili­tarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Pakistan accep­ted these proposals: India rejected them.

(4)

1. Security Council then appointed Sir Owen Dixon and authorized him, in March 1950, to bring about the demili­tarization of the State within five months. He formulated his demilitarization proposals in July 1950 and discussed them with the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Pakistan accepted those proposals; India rejected them.

(5)

In January 1951, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers lent their good offices to bring about agreements for the removal or disbandment of troops necessary for the plebiscite to be free and impartial. They first proposed that the troops of both interested parties should be replaced by troops from New Zealand and Australia. Pakistan accepted this proposal; India rejected it.

(6)

1. Commonwealth Prime Ministers proposed in the alternative that the problem be resolved by the substitution of a joint force of Indian and Pakistan troops. Pakistan accepted this proposal; India rejected it.

(7)

1. proposal put forward by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers was to substitute troops raised  locally by the Plebiscite Administrator. Pakistan accepted this; India once more rejected it.

1.  

In March 1951, Administrator Muniz of Brazil suggested that in order to resolve the deadlock, both India and Pakistan should agree to arbitration on all points of difference arising from the interpretation of the two United Nations Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1945 and 5 January 1949, which provide for the plebiscite. Pakistan accepted this proposal: India rejected it.

1.  

In March 1951, the Security Council in a resolution made a similar proposal; Pakistan accepted this resolution; India again rejected it.

(10)

Subsequently, between March 1951 and December 1952, Mr. Frank P. Graham, the United Nations Representa­tive, put forward a number of proposals on the subject of the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and each one of these was accepted by Pakistan, but rejected by India.

(11)

Finally, at its 611th meeting on 23 December 1952,

the Security Council adopted a resolution urging :

" . . .the Government of India and Pakistan to enter into immediate negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in order to reach agreement on the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization, this number to be between 3,000 and 5,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease fire line." [S/2883.]

The Government of Pakistan accepted this resolution; the Government of India rejected it.

Nevertheless, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan persisted in his efforts to secure the agreement of the Government of India to a reasonable plan of demilitariza­tion of the State preparatory to the plebiscite. It was only when he failed to obtain an agreement in February 1953 that he recommended that the two Governments might try to resolve the points in dispute by means of direct negotiations.

The Government of Pakistan, consistent with its policy to uphold the prestige of the United Nations, accepted this suggestion of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan and initiated direct negotiations with the Government of India at the Prime Ministers' level.

These negotiations took place in a series of meetings between the two Prime Ministers. The first was held in London in May 1953, and was followed by a meeting in Karachi in July. The third meeting took place in Delhi from 17 to 20 August 1953.

At the end of this meeting, a joint communique was issued by the Prime Ministers which, inter alia, contained the following with regard to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute :

(a) It was their—the Prime Ministers'—firm opinion that this dispute should be settled "in accordance with the wishes of the people of that State"—the State of Jammu and Kashmir—"with a view to promoting their well-being and causing the least disturbance to the life of the people of the State. The most feasible method of ascertaining the wishes of the people was by fair and impartial plebiscite".

(b)

"The Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed by the end of April 1954."

(c)

"Previous to that date the preliminary issues" that had held up progress towards a plebiscite "should be decided and action in implementation thereof should be taken", and with this object in view, "Committees of military and other experts should be appointed to advise the Prime Ministers".

(d)

The Prime Ministers also felt that "progress can only be made in this direction if there is an atmosphere of peace and cooperation between the two countries". The Prime Ministers, therefore, "deprecated any propaganda or attack on one country by the other in the Press, by radio, or by speeches or statements made by responsible men and women of either country. The Prime Ministers attached the greatest importance to this friendly approach and to the avoidance of words and actions which promote discord between the two countries."

The joint communique of 20 August had envisaged the setting up of committees of experts of India and Pakistan to resolve certain preliminary issues, of which the main one was the question of the demilitarization of the State.

While negotiations were going on to pave the way for meetings of the committees of experts, wild rumours began to circulate in the Indian Press with regard to an impending mili­tary pact between Pakistan and the United States of America and the establishment of American bases in Pakistan. The Prime Minister of India seized upon these rumours to write to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, on 9 December 1953, that such a pact between Pakistan and the United States of America would be undesirable from the point of view of peace in Asia—it might even lead to the extension of the sphere of war—and it was highly likely to limit progressively the independence of the country receiving aid. He warned that such an expansion of Pakistan's war resources with the help of the United States of America could only be looked upon "as an unfriendly act in India". He further expressed the view that such a pact would inevitably affect the Kashmir issue and especially the question of demilitarization.

The committees of experts eventually met in Delhi from 21 December to 22 December 1953. The committees were able to cover considerable ground and also made some progress in the resolution of the main problems of the demilitarization of the State that had held up all progress so far.

Although the committees of experts had made some progress, they were not allowed to meet again. In spite of his best efforts to persuade the Prime Minister of India to go for­ward, the Prime Minister of Pakistan failed to move Pandit Nehru. Pakistan went to the extent of making a major con­cession in deference to Mr. Nehru's wishes in the matter of the selection of a new Plebiscite Administrator, in the hope that this would lead to a resumption of negotiations and the imple­mentation of the joint communique, but Mr. Nehru later declined to carry out even his own proposal. Again and again he was reminded that the deadline for the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator was fast approaching and that nego­tiations should be resumed to settle the preliminary issues, but to no effect.

The Government of India has put forward one pretext after another in an effort to justify its intransigent attitude. As the hollowness of one becomes apparent, another is thought up. I will refer now only to the lastest. The latest pretext is that the acceptance by Pakistan of American military aid absolves India from its obligation to Pakistan, to the people of Kashmir and to the Security Council to honour its agreement to cooperate in a free and impartial plebiscite. India has not publicly withdrawn this contention, notwithstanding repeated assurances that any military aid may be and will be used exclusively for the purpose of self-defence.

A further pseudo-argument trotted out by India in its bid to stave off the plebiscite in Kashmir is that the plebiscite can» not be held because Pakistan has joined regional defence pacts. Both these matters—the receiving of foreign aid and the entering into defensive pacts—have no relevance whatsoever to the inter­national agreement for a plebiscite in Kashmir.

Here I should like to say that if the objection of India to these pacts is genuine and India fears that Pakistan may attack India, then we make this offer to India to hold a plebiscite, and we will enter into a no war pact with India as soon as the plebiscite is held. I will go further. The moment Mr. Nehru agrees to honour the pledges he has given to the Security Council, to the world and to the people of Kashmir, and holds a plebiscite, we are willing to enter into a pact which will say that an attack on India will be an attack on Pakistan. What more does India want by way of an assurance from us that our intentions are friendly ? We want to be friendly with the people of India, Mr. Nehru who has stood in the way of our two people being friends during the past eight year.

The relative strength of India and Pakistan within their own borders has nothing to do with the question of the demili­tarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to the holding of the agreed plebiscite. India's position has no proper legal basis. It is a political weapon. In essence, India has been saying. "If you want us to fulfil our obligations under the international agreement, you must follow our policy as to defensive pacts."

The Indian Prime Minister and other Indian spokesmen have recently added a further argument based on recent developments brought about by India. Under the Indian Constitution, they say no decision concerning the disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir could be taken without the con­sent of the Government of that State—that is, Jammu and Kashmir. The argument assumes that the puppet regime set up by India is the Government of Kashmir and concludes that Kashmir has already consented to accede only to India.

The developments on which this argument is based are nothing but action taken unilaterally by India itself. They cannot alter the basic fact that India is committed under an international agreement to the proposition that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir will be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite. Nor can they possibly take away from the people of Kashmir their right to self-determination. It must be remember­ed that there are three parties to this agreement : Pakistan, the Security Council and India. Any unilateral action taken by India or by any subordinate body, like this puppet assembly in Kashmir, set up under Indian authority, cannot in the least alter the commitment India has freely made under an interna­tional agreement in regard to Kashmir.

So far as the accession to India by the puppet Constituent Assembly of the State is concerned, it is wholly devoid of any legal effect.

Further, any attempt to bring about accession except through the agreed plebiscite is a violation of India's commit­ment to the Security Council and contrary to the assurances given to this Council. When the idea of convening this Assembly was suggested, the Indian representative categorically assured the Security Council that it was not meant—I now quote the undertaking he gave to this body—"to come in the way" of the Security Council and that while "the assembly"—that is, the Srinagar Assembly—"might express an opinion" on the question of accession, "it can take no decision on it" [533rd meeting].

The Security Council adopted a resolution on 30 March 1951, which, after reiterating that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, affirmed—and I quote the Security Council resolution :

"That the convening of a constituent Assembly as re­commended by the General Council of the 'All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference', and any action that the Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliations of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle." [S/2017/Rev. 1.]

Paragraph 8 of the same resolution called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan "to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement". India's conduct constitutes a flagrant defiance of the United Nations Charter and of the Security Council. It is a relapse into the law of the jungle where force is the sole arbiter of all disputes.

Even if that Assembly were democratically elected, that election could not serve as a substitute for the agreed plebiscite. Let us, nevertheless, take a look at the character of that Assembly.

To start with, it obviously does not represent a large part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, namely, the substantial State territory which is not under Indian occupation. But let that pass. What is the nature of the so-called constitution-making body ? It was to consist of seventy-five members repre­senting Indian-occupied Kashmir. The polls were held while Indian troops were still in full control of the State. Under these circumstances, there was no question of any freedom of vote, and in fact there was no vote. All sections of the Kashmir population boycotted this election. The result was that no election at all took place. All the seventy five members nominated at India's behest were declared elected unopposed. To call such an Assembly representative of the people of Kashmir would be a mockery of democracy. To claim that it is competent to speak for the people of Kashmir and to decide the fate of that State is nothing short of being absurd.

However, even with an Assembly which consisted wholly of men nominated by India's agents, things did not proceed entirely according to plan. As time passed and the Indian designs with regard to the future of the State became clear, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, the State's Prime Minister, elected Prime Minister and leader of the House, began to get progressively disillusioned about the intentions of India.

As the Security Council is likely to hear a little more of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, I may as well inform it about his background.

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, popularly known as the "Lion of Kashmir'', which honorific was awarded to him by on less a person than the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, and his own party, the Indian National Congress, was—I do not know of the state of Sheikh Abdullah's present relations with the Indian Prime Minister—a fast friend of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and a loyal disciple of Mahatma Gandhi. In the course of a colourfull career, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah led a powerful freedom movement in the State of Jammu and Kashmir against the ruler of Kashmir and was, together with other partriots, sent to jail on a number of occasions. So there was no doubt about his being the leader of his people.

When the sub continent was in the grip of the turmoil of partition, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was in jail. He was released from jail by the Maharaja, at the instance of Pandit Nehru, his great friend, some time on 29 September 1947.

Soon thereafter, we find him being mentioned in the letter offering the accession of the State to India which the Maharaja sent to the Governor-General of India, Lord Mount-batten, from Jammu, on 26 October 1947. The Governor-General of India, accepting the accession, wrote to the Maharaja of Kashmir :

"My Government and I"—his Government means Mr. Nehru's Government—"note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an Interim Government to work with your Prime Minister."

At that time Sheikh Abdullah was very popular with Mr. Nehru.

In a broadcast from the All-India Radio on 2 November 1947, the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru said :

"We received urgent messages for aid not only from the Maharaja's Government but from the representative of the people, notably that great leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah, President of the National Conference".

Pandit Nehru continued : "Under inspiration of this great leader, Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, people of the Valley, Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, were together for the defence of their country against the invaders."

Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah was a full-fledged member of the first Indian delegation to the Security Council in January 1948, and made a fiery speech in support of India. He again appeared as a member of the Indian delegation in 1949.

As I was saying, this self-same Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah, the darling of the Indian National Congress, the friend of Pandit Nehru, the epitome, according to the Indian leaders and especially according to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, of all that was good and honest and decent in Kashmir, started condemning the attempts to force the State to accede wholly to India. In a public speech, he described, unfortunately for him­self, the Indian argument for the full application of the Indian Constitution to Kashmir as "unrealistic, childish and savouring of lunacy". This was in April 1252.

By August 1953, the gulf between his and the Indian points of view on the question of accession had widened so much that it became dangerous to India's plans to let him stay at large. The Indian Press began vigorously to attack Sheikh Abdullah and openly to suggest that he needed rest. Accordingly, on 9 August 1953, the man whom India had held up to the world as the true spokesman of the people of Kashmir was denounced, dismissed and clamped in jail.

In his place, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad was installed as Prime Minister with the help of the Indian Army of occupa­tion. In due course Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad fulfilled his part of the bargin. The so-called Constituent Assembly passed a resolution in favour of accession to India. This is the true nature of the alleged accession decision which that Assembly adopted at India's dictation.

Before proceeding to the next point I should make men­tion of the fate of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah. He is still resting in jail, without trial. This is what happens to Muslim friends of Mr. Nehru if they do not agree with him.

India has loudly maintained that things have settled down in Kashmir, that the people are reconciled to everything and that law and order prevail in the Indian-occupied areas of the State. The facts, however, are otherwise. If it is really satisfied with conditions in Kashmir, why does it hesitate to hold a plebiscite? The fact that it does not want a plebiscite shows a great weakness and the oppression under which these people are suffering today.

Since the arrest of Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah on 9 August 1953 and the assumption office by Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad, a reign of terror has prevailed in Indian-occupied Kashmir. Whoever tries openly to ask for a plebiscite to decide the question of accession, is accused of "treason and imprisoned. A large number of prominent Kashmir leaders have been arrested on this ground. Among them are Mirza Muhammad Afzal Beg, Mr. Ghulam Mohiuddin Karra, Pandit Prem Nath Bazar (a Hindu), Pir Maqbool Shah Gilani, Mr. Ghalam Ahmad Ashai, Mr. Sadruddin Mujahid, Pandit Raghunath Vishnavi (another Hindu), Soofi Mohammad Akbar, Abdui Ghani Goni and Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Dar. They have been detained without any trial.

Indian-occupied Kashmir today is virtually an armed camp. There are some 82,000 Indian soldiers in the territory. In other words, there is an Indian soldier for every thirty-six persons in Indian-occupied territory. But if we leave women and children out of account it would appear that India has one soldier for every twelve unarmed, poverty-stricken and down­trodden adult males in Kashmir. There is, besides, the State Militia.

In this connexion I can do no better than to refer to extracts from letters addressed by Miss Mridula  Sarabhi, a Hindu lady, to all members of the Indian Parliament. Miss Sarabhai is a well-known social worker in India, and is a per­sonal friend of both Pandit Nehru and Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah as she was of the Late Mahatma Gandhi. I hope that the Security Council will take those letters as read and allow them to be printed along with the record; but if the President wishes I can read those letters.

The PRESIDENT : I suppose, to save time, the members of the Council have no objection to having those letters printed as part of the speech of the representative of Pakistan.

Since there is no objection, this will be done.

1. NOON (Pakistan) : There are also other documents published as annexes to my speech; perhaps they could be dealt with in the same way. There are letters from Sheikh Muham­mad Abdullah and other documents. If members of the Council would kindly take them as read and have them printed, I will not take the time to read them here.    

The PRESIDENT : If there is no objection on the part of the Council, the annexes will be printed as part of the speech of the representative of Pakistan.

Mr. NOON (Pakistan) : Despite this ruthless repression of civil liberties, the popular demand for a free and impartial plebiscite has intensified. In June 1955 an organization came into existence known as the Plebiscite Front. Its demand is that a free and impartial plebiscite should be held in the State. In less than a year, the organization has gained great popularity and gathered widespread support.

The Kashmir Political Conference and the Kashmir Democratic Union together with the Kisan Mazdoor Conference have also been working cease-lessly on the same lines as the Plebiscite Front. Besides these organizations in the State, the End Kashmir Dispute Committee with its headquarters in Delhi is agitating for an early plebiscite.

1. meet this challenge to his authority Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad, at the behest of his Indian masters, has resorted to cajolery, bribery, blandishments and severe repressive mea­sures. He has drafted large numbers of the Central Reserve Police from India into his service and has raised a body euphe­mistically called the "Peace Brigade" but which in reality con­sists of hired hooligans. 11 ey are stationed in every town and village of the Indian occupied part of Kashmir. Their job is to harass and oppress those who challenge the finality of the so-called accession of the State to India. The methods used for such repressions are arrests, detentions and even torture of political workers, ban on their processions and meetings, house searches, denial of government employment and government contracts and business facilities. The order of the day is censor­ship of their mail, denial of radio facilities, imposition of various restrictions on their movements, and in extreme cases, even expulsion from the State. The result is that civil liberties are extinct and corruption and nepotism are rampant.

In spite of this repression, the urge for freedom is growing apace and the torch of liberty burns brighter every day. From all accounts, the people are ripe for a revolution, if the United Nations does not deliver them from the colonial domination of India.

This recital of events would show that all the processes for a peaceful settlement of the dispute laid down in Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, that is, direct parleys between the parties, mediation, conciliation and negotiations, have been exhausted without yielding any results and the Government of India has not been willing to resort to arbitration over the points in dispute.

The effect of Indian intransigence on the public opinion throughout Pakistan and particularly in "Azad" Kashmir and the tribal belt on the north-western frontier of Pakistan has been sharp and outspoken. The Kashmiri refugees in Pakistan— over half a million—went to launch a movement aimed at crossing the cease-fire line and a mass movement inside the State with a view to winning for Kashmiris their right to self-deter­mination. The tribesmen are impatient to know what has happened to the assurances given by the Security Council for a plebiscite in Kashmir on the basis of which they withdrew from the State.

Lastly the people of Pakistan itself who have common religious, family and economic ties with the people of Kashmir cannot remain indifferent to the miserable plight of those who are groaning under an oppressive regime or of those who have been driven from their homes and have found refuge in Pakistan. Pakistan has no intention of being the aggressor; but that is no reason why India should take advantage of our patience and peaceful intentions and provoke us continuously and attempt progressively to absorb the State of Jammu and Kashmir and repudiate its international obligations and defy the United Nations. It is for this reason, in the interest of peace and in the hope of a just, peaceful and honourable settlement of all disputes once and for all that we have come to the United Nations.

Here I would like to say that it is sometimes argued by India that everything is peaceful, so why bother about Kashmir ? But I warn you, that is a calm before the storm. Everything is not peaceful. We have just seen a telegram which states that, on 11 January, our Minister for Information, Mr. Amir Azam Khan, made a statement in Karachi that the Indians have massed their troops on our border. The excuse that Mr. Nehru gives is that he fears an attack from Pakistan, whereas we have not sent one soldier to our border. The fact that he is afraid of a war breaking out because of the Kashmir problem should assure the Security Council and the world that it is peaceful on the surface, but if the Security Council closes the door on a peaceful settlement we cannot say what will happen. If the Indian troops are there because India fears war between India and Pakistan, that should be a sufficient answer to those people who say that "all is quiet in the Kingdom of Kashmir and India and Pakistan'' and the Security Council need not take any action.

Please do not be misled by the fact that we are peaceful and that we want a peaceful solution. We are looking to the Security Council to do justice to these poor and poverty-stricken people of Kashmir to whom it has promised a free and fair plebiscite under the auspices of the Security Council, which plebiscite has been denied to them for the last eight years.

In view of this grave situation the Government of Pakistan requests the Security Council to take action on the following lines :

First, call upon India to refrain from accepting the change envisaged by the new constitution adopted by the so-called Constituent Assembly of Srinagar. If India gets away with this relaxation in spite of its agreement with and repeated assurances to the Council, I cannot say what future there will be in the world for the peaceful settlement of this dispute at the hands of the Security Council of the United Nations. You cannot allow one nation to defy and dishonour their own pledges given to the Security Council.

Secondly, under Article 37, paragraph 2 of the United Nations Charter, spell out the obligations of the parties, under the terms of the international agreement for a plebiscite as embodied in the United Nations resolutions.

The main problems in the way of the agreed plebiscite are : (a) withdrawal of forces from the State; and (6) the induc­tion into office of a Plebiscite Administrator.

As the Government of India has repeatedly and consis­tently flouted all reasonable proposals formulated by the Security Council or by its mediators, there does not seem to be any particular need to go on temporizing with the question of demilitarization. It has already been accepted by the Security Council that the objective in Kashmir is the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the control of the United Nations. It has also been agreed by the parties and by the Security Council that demilitarization is an essential pre­requisite of a free and impartial plebiscite.

In view of this, the Security Council should call upon the parties to withdraw all their troops from the State and should also ensure that the local forces which should be placed under the representative of the Security Council and left behind, are suitably reduced, if not disbanded altogether. The functions of protecting the State and ensuring internal security should be entrusted by the Council to a United Nations Force which should be introduced into the area at once. Let all other forces— Indian, Pakistani and local—be disbanded and non-Kashmiri nationals even in the police forces be removed from the State of Kashmir. It is further requested that an early and firm date be fixed for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.

The situation may be saved even at this late stage-but only by these means. The most important of all is to take immediate steps to prevent India from taking the bite into its mouth and defying this august body.

I am most grateful to the Security Council for giving a patient hearing. Before I close, however, I would like to make a few submissions in regard generally to Pakistan's posi­tions vis a vis this dispute.

Pakistan stands firmly by the international agreement for a plebiscite and is most willing and indeed anxious to imple­ment all its obligations under the terms of that agreement. I want it to be clearly understood that the affiliation of the geographical entity known as the State of Jammu and Kashmir has not so far been determined. The question of drawing any demarcation line within the State dividing Pakistan from India does not, therefore, arise.

Pakistan is equally convinced that the international agreement for a plebiscite is one indivisible whole. No party to the dispute has the right to accept it in part. If India, a party to the dispute, makes an attempt to freeze the situation as it exists, Pakistan would consider it as a repudiation of the international agreement, and I hope that the Security Council would also. 1 want to make it clear that Pakistan recognizes no international obligations with regard to the state of Jammu and Kashmir except those it has voluntarily accepted together with the Government of India in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

There can be no true peace in the sub-continent until the Kashmir dispute is resolved by the free choice of the people of Kashmir. A solution imposed by India could not bring even the appearance of peace. Such a solution would be the exact opposite of the peace with justice to which the United Nations and you, gentlemen, are dedicated.

The world has had brought forcibly and tragically before it the consequences of past temporizing when Members of the The United Nations has failed to comply with the decisions of the Security Council of the General Assembly. The world has also had a recent encouraging example of the respect that the Member States have won for themselves and for the United Nations by insisting that the decisions of the United Nations be complied with by great nations as well as by small ones.

The world has had the further example of great nations bringing honour to themselves by complying with the decisions of the United Nations, an example which we sincerely hope that India, as a civilized country, will also follow.

With these examples fresh in our minds, Pakistan is encouraged to believe that the Security Council will now deal resolutely with the Kashmir dispute and will see to it that its decisions are carried out promptly and in good spirit. Pakistan believes further that the parties to the dispute, aware as they are of the importance of setting a good example, will comply with these decisions.