23121952 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafarulla Khan {Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 610 held on 23 Decem­ber 1952.

 

 

23121952 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafarulla Khan {Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 610 held on 23 Decem­ber 1952.

 

I have been distressed to notice that the representative of India is not feeling very well this morning and that she has been under a strain while she has been addressing the Security Council. I hope and pray that her effort this morning will not result in any serious discomfort to her and that she will soon get over her temporary indisposition.

I shall now have to make some submissions to the Security Council on the matters that have been placed before the Council on behalf of India this morning. A very large portion of them are really only academic and, if I may say so with all respect, irrelevant to the matters with which the Security Council is now faced. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the record, some observations are due from me, lest it should be thought, if I made no comment on those matters, that I accepted the allegations and statements made on behalf of India.

On certain points there has been some confusion, as was Apparent from the statement which the Council has just heard. For instance it is said to start that one of the points I sought to make the other day [609th meeting] was that it was the Maharaja's decision to accede to India that started the whole trouble in Kashmir. Then it was said that the Maharajah s decision to accede was not made until 26 October 1947 whereas the revolt in the State had started sometime in August and the tribal incursion had taken place on 22 October. To the best of my recollection, when dealing with that period between August and 26 October, I did not in my previous submission anywhere use the words "the Maharajah's inclination to accede to India" which was well known to the people of his State.

It was then argued that the Maharajah was the legal head of the State and was entitled to offer accession to India or to Pakistan, and when he had offered accession to India, India was entitled to accept it, and the acceptance by India of the acces­sion offered by the Maharajah made the accession complete. I was at pains to make it clear during my previous submission that it was India's own stand, irrespective of Kashmir or Junagadh, which I sought to support by quotations from the speeches of Mr. Ayyangar, that when a State gained indepen­dence the paramountcy of the British suzerain lapsed, that sovereignty rested in the people of the Indian States, that the ruler was no doubt the instrument through which the decision to accede to one Dominion or the other—as they then were— was to be expressed, but that where there was a dispute between the ruler and his people, or a difference with regard to accession, the ruler was to ascertain the wishes of the people and then accede in accordance therewith. My point was that long before this alleged accession was offered by Kashmir, not only was there a difference between the ruler and the majority of his people but that difference had taken the shape of a revolt against the authority of the Maharajah and that revolt had gone so far that the Maharajah's troops had been defeated and had had to retreat, and the Maharajah had had to leave the capital before the offered accession to India.

It was said that this revolt within the State was just a part of the disturbances, the killings, the persecutions which were going on the borders of East and West Punjab immediately after partition. But that, with all respect, was not so at all. These killings, these persecutions, these expulsions of people from one side to the other—most regrettable and very deplorable were between the communities, they were communal, they were a species of genocide. The movement in Kashmir had not that character at all. It was a popular movement against the tyranny of the Maharajah. It was not directed against any community and I cited in support of this position the statement of Sheikh Abdullah himself, made in a Press statement on 21 October 1947, before any tribal incursion from outside had taken place. Sheikh Abdullah was then dealing with this popular movement inside the State.

It was also said—it was admitted—that the fact is that a popular movement against the tyranny of the Maharajah had started in the State many years earlier. I think the representa­tive of India said thirty years earlier, but actually the active movement had manifested itself during the early thirties. That, however, is not the material point. At that time it was not the National Conference that was leading the movement, it was the Muslim Conference, though it is true that Sheikh Abdullah was then also one of the principal leaders of this movement. He headed the Muslim Conference; the National Conference did not come into being until height years later. That again, as I have said, is for the purpose of correcting the record.

It was further said, and it is true, that India offered uni­laterally that when law and order were restored and the soil of Kashmir was cleared of the invader the United Nations would be asked to hold a plebiscite in order to ascertain the wishes of the people, India having withdrawn its military forces from the State, and it was observed that the soil of Kashmir has not been cleared of the invader and that is why the reference to the People cannot take place.

Let me for a moment examine the position. The invaders at that time referred to in the telegram and in Lord Mount-batten's letter were the tribesmen. The tribesmen have since !! withdrawn. That is Point number one. Point number two is : the term is said to include the regular Pakistan army, The regular Pakistan army has always been ready to withdraw according to the terms of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. It cannot be argued that the people of this State, who took up arms in August 1947, are invaders who have to withdraw anywhere to enable the reference to the people to take place on the question of accession. They are people of the State, they cannot withdraw anywhere else, there has been no demand and there could be no demand that they should withdraw anywhere else. With regard to them, the demand is a large-scale disband­ing and disarming. Therefore on that point again my submis­sion is that the invader then contemplated has withdrawn and that, so far as the Pakistan army, which was compelled to go in at the beginning of May 1948, is concerned, it hat at all times been ready to withdraw in accordance with the terms of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

What is delaying progress in organizing and holding the plebiscite is the refusal of the Government of India to withdraw its forces from the part of Kashmir occupied by India, in accordance with the two resolutions accepted by India.

As regards what happened in May of 1948, there are one or two observations which are necessary in order again to set the picture right.

The representative of India represented my submission to the Security Council as if I had argued that the responsibility for the movement of the Pakistan forces into the Azad Kashmir area lay upon the then Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan. That is by no means the case. I did not urge that; I do not urge that; I have at no time urged that. I submitted the appreciation of the Commander-in-Chief in order to give the Security Council a resume of the situation as it existed. The responsibi­lity for the decision lies where it should, that is to say, with the Pakistan Government. The decision was not the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. I have never taken any other position.

It was then asked—I do not know why—whether His Majesty's Government had been consulted before action was taken. I do not know how that obligation arose or is alleged to have arisen. Was his Majesty's Government consulted before Indian forces moved into Kashmir ? Was His Majesty's Govern­ment consulted, before the offensive of March-April 1948 was mounted, despite the fact that the offensive contained all those elements—a threat to the Mangla head works, a threat even to the security of Pakistan, a sister Dominion—which I detailed when I last addressed the Security Council ?

Then, the statement was made : "It was alleged that the Pakistan forces went in to hold the line. They did much more than that. They consolidated Pakistan's position in the northern areas." I repeat, with full responsibility, that the Pakistan* forces, even in the northern areas to which reference has been made, did not take over any area which had been occupied by or was under the control of the Indian armed forces at any time.

Reference was also made to the controversy over the no-war declaration. It was not denied that the position, in brief, was this ; the Prime Minister of India was anxious that a declaration should be made by the two Prime Ministers stating only that India and Pakistan would not go to war with each other over their disputes. The Prime Minister of Pakistan said that since the disputes were going on and were even, in fact, being intensified, a bare declaration, as suggested by the Prime Minister of India, would serve no purpose. The two States had already undertaken such an obligation in the United Nations Charter. The disputes, however, had arisen; no way of resolv­ing them had as yet been found; they were in the course of being intensified. What would reassure the people would be a declaration in the following form : "We have decided that these disputes, which threaten a breach of the peace, should be resolved in the following peaceful manner : by negotiation and, if negotiation should fail, by arbitration, judicial determination through the agency of the United Nations, or any other method desired. We agree that neither of us shall take any action against the other which would amount to a threat to the peace or would disturb the peace between the two countries." That was the difference.

I made the submission during my last statement to the Security Council that it was not fair to put the matter as if Pakistan had been invited to declare that it would not go to war over these matters and had refused to do so. Our position remains the same as it has always been : these disputes should be peacefully resolved. We continue our attempts to persuade India to agree to methods and procedures which would succeed in resolving these disputes peacefully. I must say, with regret and sorrow, that we have not had the response we desired.

Then, the following complaint was made : "In the mean­time, the Pakistan Press goes on publishing articles or state­ments made by people which threaten the peace between the countries; it goes on saying that, if these matters are not peace­fully resolved, they may have to be resolved by force." So far as the Press and speeches in my country are concerned, I would say this : India is far ahead of us in almost every field—I make this statement deliberately and with responsibility—and even so far as the licence of the Press and the platform is concerned, India does not yield its place to Pakistan. That, however, is not the point.

The point is this : if disputes of this magnitude and character are not peacefully resolved, what is the alternative ? How are they to be resolved ? The matter might get out of hand. Someone, out of a spirit of pure mischief, might do something which might lead to a chain of circumstances which might become irrevocable. It is therefore necessary that every effort should be bent towards an early, peaceful resolution of these disputes.

To take up the position : "We shall not move from our own stand except on our own terms and on our own interpre­tations of our agreements, resolutions or obligations", and then to say, "The other party has no business to show impa­tience or frustration or to talk of anything but remaining peaceful", reminds one of an Urdu proverb—which is as familiar to the representative of India as it is to me—to the effect that the tyrant strikes and does not permit the victim even to protest.

Then a reference was made to Junagadh State. In the First, the reference to the Junagadh State is not as irrele­vant as the representative of India sought to make out : it is one of the matters pending before the Security Council. There is a direction, in one of the resolutions of the Security Council, to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan concer­ning the report on Junagadh, and the United Nations represen­tative had the same responsibility as UNCIP had. But that is, not the matter which I desire to stress. The reason why I cited Junagadh had regard to India's interpretation of the basis of partition and the factors upon which accession is to be based : in one case, in one manner; in the other case, in another manner. The only distinguishing feature that has been mention­ed is that Junagadh is not continuous to Pakistan by land. But is that a matter which would take the case out of the category of an independent State, the ruler of which belongs to one community and the majority of the people to another ?

What are the principles that are to apply to this question of accession ? The Indian Prime Minister has, in this case, laid down very clearly what, according to India, should be the principles.

Then we come to the two resolutions. In regard to the resolutions, it was pointed out by the representative of India that the resolution of 13 August 1948 was accepted by India on 20 August 1948, and was not accepted by Pakistan until the last week of December 1948. That is correct. What has not been mentioned—and it is a fact to which attention should be drawn—is that the resolution of 13 August, as is quite clear from the records, although it concerns itself with a cease-fire and a truce agreement thereafter, stops short there and does not go on, apart from a general expression in part III to the effect that the future of the State shall be decided in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people, to formulate any pro­posals with regard to the organizing and the holding of the Plebiscite, which was the main matter upon which the Security Council had been agreed, namely, that that was the one factor reassurance with regard to which could alone bring about a cessation of the fighting. When the Commission went on to formulate proposals with regard to the organizing and the holding of the plebiscite according to the second resolution, Pakistan was able to accept both. But that really makes no difference to the position. The two resolutions—the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which now form one whole—were accepted by both India and Pakistan in the last week of December 1948 and consequently, a cease-fire was arranged effective from 1 January 1949. Everybody was hoping that, the cease-fire having been arranged, a truce agreement would also be arranged and, thereafter, the plebiscite held in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

The representative of India went on to refer to certain matters which are not in accordance with the resolutions. In the first place, attention was drawn to the problem of the security of the State. With regard to the security of the state, the two resolutions have nowhere made the security of the State the sole responsibility of India. That is a matter that must be cleared up. We—India and Pakistan—are, I conceive, agreed upon this, that we both accept the two resolutions. It has been stress­ed on behalf of India, in the first submission that was made to the Security Council during these discussions by the represen­tative of India, that India will not permit anybody to go beyond those resolutions, that India insists upon strict adherence to the resolutions. We agree. We are willing to proceed on that basis. Then, what provision do the two resolutions make with regard to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir pending the organizing and the holding of the plebiscite ? The resolutions are quite clear on these matters. The resolutions of 13 August, part II, section B, paragraphs I and 2, read as follows :

"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Govern­ment of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, there­by terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. "2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Com­mission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary."

Those are the obligations undertaken by India in accept­ing that resolution, up to a certain stage. This was followed by the other resolution, to which I shall refer later. These are the two obligations undertaken : one, when the Commission is satisfied with certain things and has so notified the Government of India, then the Government of India will begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. And then what was to happen, pending the acceptance of con­ditions for a final settlement? "...the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease­fire"—that is to say, on its own side of the cease-fire line—"the minimum strength of its force", not determined solely by itself, but "which in agreement with the Commission are consi­dered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order". Where, either in this resolution or in the other, is authority given to the Government of India, or reserved by the Government of India, to determine, by itself, the strength of forces necessary to be retained in the portion of the State occupied by India after the bulk has been withdrawn ? There is no such authority, no such resolution.

The obligation of India is quite clear to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces on receipt of a certain notification from the Commission, in the first place ; and in the second place, to maintain within the cease-fire line the minimum strength of its forces which, in agreement with the Commission, are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. That is number one.

Now, what does the second resolution provide ? The second resolution—that is, that is the resolution of 5 January 1949—provides, in paragraph 4 (a)

"After implementation of parts I and II of the Commis­sion's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Com­mission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State"—when the Commission is satisfied, and now, in place of the Commission, when the United Nations Representative is satisfied—"the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine"—not the Government of India—"in consultation with the Govern­ment of India, the final disposal"—not "disposition"— "of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the free­dom of the plebiscite."

It is obvious here that the responsibility for the determina­tion—after consultation with the Government of India, no doubt—of the forces that are to remain rests upon the Com­mission and the plebiscite Administrator, and they are to deter­mine and to make the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces. But, in determining this final disposal—the numbers and locations, etc.—they shall have "due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite". No doubt, they must take into account all that the Government of India may have to say on the security of the State, because this deter­mination will take place "in consultation with the Government of India". They must also take into account all that may be urged with regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. Having carried out the consultation with the Government of India and taken into account the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite, they shall determine the final disposal.

On the other side, the situation would be as follows under the resolution of 13 August 1948, part II, A, 1 and 2 : the tribesmen having withdrawn, the Pakistan nationals who may have entered the State for the purpose of fighting having with­drawn, the Pakistan regular forces having been simultaneously withdrawn—beginning the withdrawal, but thereafter being simultaneously withdrawn with the bulk of the Indian forces— there would be let on the Pakistan side, in Azad Kashmir, the Azad Kashmir, forces. That is how the full implementation of the resolution of 13 August 1948 would leave the situa­tion. On the Azad Kashmir side, there would be no tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers who may have entered for the purpose of fighting, no Pakistan regular forces ; there would be only Azad Kashmir forces, which, according to the clear declarations of the Commission to the Government of India and to the Government of Pakistan while these resolutions were under discussion, were not to be touched during that period. They would be there. On the other side of the cease-fire line, there would be the limited number of Indian forces and the State armed forces.

The Plebiscite Administrator took over at the end of the 13 August 1948 resolution. Then he along with the Commis­sion, shall determine, on the one side—on the side occupied by Indian—the final disposal of the Indian forces and the State armed forces ; and, under paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, "as regards the territory referred to in paragraph A, 2 of part II of the resolution of 13 August"— that is to say, the Azad Kashmir territory—"final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities".

The language is identical : on the one side, "in consulta­tion with the Government of India", the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine "the final disposal" of the forces on that side ; on the other side, "in consultation with the local authorities", the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine "the final disposal" of the forces on that side.

We know what the forces will be :one side, Azad Kashmir forces : on the other side, the limited number left-after the bulk has been withdrawn—of the Indian armed and State armed forces.

The position under the resolutions is quite clear. The representative of India has insisted that the resolutions must be strictly adhered to. We agree. We have in the past agreed to either course— and I shall reiterate—we are prepared that the two resolutions should be strictly enforced, as I have just sub­mitted, in two parts. Under the first part, the tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers who may have entered the State for the purpose of fighting shall withdraw as soon as the truce agree­ment has been signed—as a matter of fact, I have said that they have actually withdrawn, but I am now reiterating the obligation—and the Pakistan regular army shall begin to with­draw. When the Commission is satisfied that the tribesmen have withdrawn, that the Pakistan volunteers have withdrawn and that the Pakistan army has begun its withdrawal the Govern­ment of India shall begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces. On completion of the implementation of the 13 August 1948 resolution, then, the Pakistan volunteers and tribesmen shall be withdrawn, the Pakistan regular army shall have withdrawn and, on the other side, the bulk of Indian forces shall have withdrawn. There shall left, on the Azad Kashmir side, only the Azad Kashmir forces ; there shall be left, on the territory occupied by India, limited forces of the Government of India "necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order"—that is in accordance with part II, paragraph B, 2 of the resolution of 13 August 1948—and the State armed forces.

Then the Plebiscite Administrator takes over. He then carries out the final disposal of the forces on both sides : on the side of the Government of India, "in consultation with the Government of India"' and "with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite", and on the Azad Kashmir side "in consultation with local authorities".

The whole thing is perfectly clear. We are willing to proceed on that basis. Before I go on to deal with the intervening submission that was made by the representative of India, I shall here deal —so that I do not have to revert to these matters later—with her criticism of what she has been pleased to term my offer. I want the Council to have before it these clauses of the two resolutions dealing with demilitarization; this would be the appropriate moment to dispose of that matter.

I have said—and I shall now try to clarify the matter again—with regard to the obligation undertaken by India under the 13 August 1948 resolution to withdraw the bulk of their forces, difficulty has arisen because the bulk could not be deter­mined. I shall not go over again the meetings of 9 March and India's refusal to place its proposal on the table, as it is already on the record and it is not necessary to repeat it. The difficulty was that the bulk could not be determined. I said that India had itself now determined the bulk. In addressing the Security Council on the first occasion, 8 December 1952 (608th meeting), the representative of India said this :

"In view of the considerations which I have mentioned, and after careful examination and assessment by its experts, the Government of India had come to the con­clusion that a minimum force of 28,000 was required to carry out its responsibilities. However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces, and as a further contribution towards a settlement, the Government of India is prepared to effect a further reduc­tion of 7,000, to a figure of 21,000, which, is the absolute and irreducible minimum. I should like to emphasize that this figure, which includes the former State armed forces, represents less than one-sixth of the Indian forces at the time of the cease-fire. It should further be emphasized that this force will have no supporting arms such as armour or artillery. In addition to its other duties, this small force would also be responsible for policing the cease-fire line on the other side of which is the aggressor. This line is several hundred miles long and runs through difficult and mountainous terrain. This force has also to guard the extensive borders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. A glance at the map will be sufficient to indicate the magnitude of the task with which the proposed force will be entrusted."

1. submission was this. Here India had put forward its own determination of what it needed to carry out its responsibilities, which include, as expressly set out, the maintenance of the cease-fire line, the security of the State, assisting local authori­ties in the maintenance of law and order. It needs a force of 28,000, which includes State armed forces, and it can carry without armour or artillery.    

The determination of the bulk has to be made not by the Commission under part II, paragraph B, 2. After the bulk is withdrawn, India can maintain, within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire, the minimum strength of its forces which, in agreement with the Commission, are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order.

What I said was this : "We do not insist that the deter­mination of this number should be in agreement with the Commission. We are prepared to accept India's own estimate of the minimum number that is required for the purpose of the 13 August resolution—that is to say, that in order to comply with paragraphs B, I and 2 of the resolution of 13 August 1948, we shall accept that number as representing the minimum that the Government of India considers necessary for the mainten­ance of law and order and for the purpose of safe-guarding the security and the maintenance of cease-fire line—that is to say, the 28,000".

1. case goes further. They say : "When you have completely disbanded and disarmed the Azad Kashmir forces, we will make a further reduction". That is a matter of controversy, of interpretation. I submitted : "Let us proceed at least as far as we can in the implementation of these resolutions on the basis of agreement before the controversy arises. The contro­versy would arise when you start on the disbanding and the disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces and final disposal of the remaining Indian State armed forces. We shall leave that aside for the moment.``

Are we or are we not agreed that India can discharge all its responsibilities under the resolution of 13 August with a minimum of 28,000 troops, including the State armed forces without armour and artillery ? We consider that it is a high figure. We are certain that if the Commission had to make the determination it would be able to place the figure at a much lower one. But in order to make a move and to show that both sides are prepared to go on with the implementation of these resolutions, we are prepared to accept that figure as representing the minimum that the Government of India is permitted to maintain within the cease-fire lines of its forces for the purpose of assisting the local authorities in the maintenance of law and order. Incidentally, India is satisfied that the minimum is enough for it to discharge other duties, which India mistakenly thinks that under the resolution it is solely for it to determine. It is not. Nevertheless, for the moment they are satisfied that 28,000 will be sufficient for all those purposes and we have accepted that. Let us go forward.

So far as the resolution of 13 August is concerned, it is before the Commission and there are no secret clauses in it. There is nothing here, not one word, that is any indication that during that stage—I want to emphasize that because to some extent the position as it has been represented in the Press has been misunderstood—that does not finish the demilitariza­tion. During that stage of the demilitarization, as laid down in this resolution and as accepted by both sides, we shall do whatever the resolution lays down for us to do under section A, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. India has to do whatever the resolution lays down under section B, paragraphs 1 and 2. Under section B, paragraphs 1 and 2, India itself has determined the number to be 28,000. We accepted that. Let us go forward with the implementation of section A, paragraphs 1 and 2—paragraph 3 of section A does not relate to demilitarization—and section B, paragraphs 1 and 2.

As I submitted on the last occasion [609th meeting], the question of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, arises only under paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949. Now, when you are done with the resolution of 13 August 1948, then the Plebiscite Administrator takes over. The resolution of 5 January 1949 so provides. Then the Commission, now represented by the United Nations Repre­sentative and the Plebiscite Administrator, under paragraph 4 (a), "will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces".

Then we have the words ``such disposal to be with due regard to security of the State and the freedom of the plebi­scite." We agree. We do not want any addition to that. Then on the other side, we have the words ``final disposal of the armed forces in the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in con­sultation with the local authorities." We are not asking for anything more. We are not putting any additional clauses in the resolution. We are prepared to go forward.

The point reiterated throughout has been that India will not depart from the two resolutions, that we must strictly adhere to them. We agree. We do not seek to depart from the two resolutions and we are prepared to adhere to them. The puzzling position that arises is the fact that India goes on saying—as if it were in two parallel lines—that on the one side we must adhere to the resolutions and that it cannot accept anything else. But when India is called upon to adhere to the resolutions, it starts asking for a great deal more, which is not provided for at all in the resolutions or which is provided for during the stages in which India requires it.

Let us take this question of the disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. It is absolutely clear from the extracts which I read out at the last meeting from the reports of the Commis­sion, that the following was made clear by the Commission to Prime Minister of India—the proposals of 13 August had not yet become a resolution—when discussing the resolution of 13 August 1948 : we are aware of the dangers in the situation. We have tried to strike a military balance. Under our proposals —which were then the proposals of 13 August 1948—there will be left on the Indian side the limited number of forces, designed to assist the local authorities in the maintenance of law and order, and the State armed forces. There will be left on the Azad Kashmir side only the Azad Kashmir people in their present positions. The Pakistan army will have been withdrawn, the tribesmen and volunteers will have been withdrawn.

This was explained to the Prime Minister of India and he understood the meaning of the proposals of 13 August 1948 in that sense. The Commission later explained to the Pakistan Government that it was seeking to establish a military balance during that period. There will be limited Indian forces on the other side, and the Azad Kashmir forces will not be disarmed or disbanded during that period.

There is nothing in the resolution of 13 August to require that. There is nothing in the explanations given by the Com­mission to require that. We admit that a large-scale disbandment and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, at a sub­sequent stage, was contemplated by the Commission. That is the meaning of paragraph 4 (b) of the second resolution, that is, that the "final disposal of the armed forces in that territory" —Azad Kashmir—"will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities". We accept that. We do not go back on it.

When the stage is reached, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine the final disposal of the forces left on both sides. We shall accept what they decide, in consultation with the local authorities on the one hand, and in consultation with the Government of India on the other hand.

The curious complication that is again sought to be raised by India is the following : it insists that during the stage of the demilitarization contemplated under the resolution of 13 August 1948, there should be a disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces. Where is that provided for in that resolution ? When did the Commission say, either to the Government of India or to the Government of Pakistan that was contemplated under any of the clauses of that resolution 7 On the other hand, I have cited quite clear explanations of the Commission to both sides, to the effect that during that stage the Azad Kashmir forces will not be disbanded or disarmed : they will remain in their positions. There are provisions to that effect in paragraph 4 (a) and (b).

India has sought to put its own interpretation on the words "final disposal". I shall not detain the Council by sub­mitting a detailed argument on the meaning of the words "final disposal" as it appears in paragraphs 4 (a) and (6) of the resolution. All I will do at this moment is to say the following : here are the words "final disposal of Indian and State-armed forces", contained paragraph 4 {a), and the words "final disposal of the armed forces in that territory"—meaning the Azad Kashmir Territory—contained in paragraph 4 (b).

Mutatis mutandis, the language is identical in the two sub-paragraphs. Whatever the words "final disposal" mean in paragraph 4 (a), they mean the same in paragraph 4 (b). Whatever they mean in paragraph 4 (b), they mean the same in paragraph 4 (a).

I shall not carry the argument further now. I am not seeking to place any restrictive interpretation upon it or any extensive interpretation upon it. I am willing that we should go forward with the implementation of the 13 August resolution. When the Commission is satisfied that Pakistan volunteers who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting have with­drawn, and when they are satisfied that the Pakistan army has begun its withdrawal, then India will begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces in stages to be agreed upon with the Com­mission. Let that operation be carried out. It was held up by the difficulty of ascertaining the bulk of the Indian forces and the minimum number of its forces to be retained. The Govern­ment of India has given the figure of 28,000, including the State armed forces, with no armour or artillery.

This is not a determination by the Commission but by the United Nations Representative ; we are prepared to accept it and to go forward on this basis.

One or two matters have been raised incidentally. It is said that we have offered to withdraw our armour or artillery, but there is no mention of it on the other side. Will armour and artillery remain on the other side ? Again, whatever the meaning of the resolutions may be, I admit it is a relevant consideration. Whatever armour and artillery are withdrawn from the other side shall be withdrawn from the Azad Kashmir Territory also, if any of the Azad Kashmir forces are equipped. If they are, they shall be withdrawn, as part of that operation, but before we pass on to the disbanding stage. I accept that position.

But then it is said : the Azad Kashmir people are in the operational control of the Pakistan army and they are practi­cally a part of the Pakistan army. They are under the opera­tional control of the Pakistan army, it is true. The Pakistan army will withdraw in the stage of demilitarization contemplated in the resolution of 13 August 1948. When the Pakistan army withdraws from that territory, it will cease to exercise opera­tional control over the Azad Kashmir forces. They will be under the operational control of their own officers. The Pakistan army will not continue to exercise any operational control over them. Therefore, the argument based upon continuing exercise of operational control is met and should be considered to be completely satisfied. All that will remain will be the Azad Kashmir forces under their own officers, under the local author­ity, that authority being under the surveillance of the Commis­sion as provided by part II, paragraph A, 3 of the resolution of 13 August 1948. There is no confusion. We shall not try to say on the one hand that we are willing to carry out the resolution, and then to put forward conditions which subtract from the resolution or nullify the resolution.

We mean what we say and we shall be prepared to carry out what we say, namely, to implement the terms of the resolu­tion as now determined with regard to numbers by the figure offered by India.

It was then said that the Azad Kashmir forces would remain, and that was not contemplated. But that I accept; they are to be dealt with under paragraph 4 (a) and (b). If the Plebiscite Administrator, in dealing with that question in con­sultation with the local authorities, comes to the conclusion that there shall remain only 500 of them, we shall not object; we shall agree. It is for the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the local authorities, to determine their final disposal. Equally, if the Plebiscite Adminis­trator and the Commission, in consultation with the Government of India, come to the conclusion that on the other side there shall remain, let us say, a force of 15,000 out of the 28,000 that are left, while there should be only 1,000 on the Azad Kashmir side, we shall accept that too. That is for them to determine in consultation. They will hear each side and will then arrive at their determination. Where under these two resolutions is there any provision or implication that it is solely for the Government of India to decide what their irreducible minimum is or that it is solely for the Pakistan Government to decide whether they shall or shall not withdraw Pakistan forces ? Or where is it stated that it is for the Pakistan Government or the Azad Kashmir authorities to decide how much they shall retain? Both sides agreed to place this matter in the hands of impartial authorities of international standing who will hear both sides and make a determination. We adhere to that and have no desire to depart from it. Is India prepared to adhere to it and does India have any desire to depart from it ? Where did they get this idea that it is for them to decide the forces necessary for the security of the State, how many must remain or what the irreducible minimum is ? That is by no means the case; they know what they agreed to and if language means anything they have already agreed that after the bulk of the forces is with­drawn the final disposal of the Indian and State armed forces, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of  the plebiscite, shall be carried out by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the Govern­ment of India, We are not seeking to minimize the fact that it is equally agreed by the Government of India that as regards the Azad Kashmir territory, the final disposal of the armed forces in that territory—that is to say the Azad Kashmir forces—will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administra­tor in consultation with the local authorities. We shall accept both determinations; we shall not withdraw from that. If they are satisfied that a number much in excess of what we think is needed on the other side is needed, and they so determine, we shall accept that determination. If they decide that a number far below that which we consider to be necessary on the Azad Kashmir side will satisfy the requirements of the situation, we shall accept what they say and we shall not withdraw—from our agreement. Is India prepared to do the same ?

My offer therefore was this. India itself has put forward a number which we consider too high, but it has said that a force of 28,000 is necessary, including the State armed forces, without armour and artillery, for the discharge of all their responsibilities. We say that is all right; this has not been determined by the Commission, but in order to make some progress we agree to it.

It is then stated with reference to the Azad Kashmir forces that although they are to be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 4 (b) no one has made an effort to meet India's wish that a substantial number of Azad Kashmir forces should be disbanded and disarmed at the very first stage of demilitariza­tion. India says that it will not do what is required under paragraph 4 (a), it wants paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January to be carried out. It is not willing to accept the carrying out of paragraph 4 (a) and that has been the trouble all the time.

When India raised this question of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan tried to meet its wishes and tried to frame some scheme under which those wishes could be met. India said that we were including State armed forces on the Indian side and that that was not provided for. However, it is clearly provided for in paragraph 4 (a). Therefore, strict adherence is refused because the Azad Kashmir forces are not included in the first stage and, when the Azad forces are sought to be included— which would necessitate a further reduction on the Indian side—India will not agree to this and says it cannot be done.

I want to make our position on that point quite clear. Although armour and artillery are not specifically mentioned anywhere, they were referred to by the representative of India, who said that those forces will have no armour or artillery and it was therefore only fair to ask what the position on the other side would be. The position will be that, when there is no armour or artillery on their side, there will be none on our side, though the Azad Kashmir forces may still be in possession of some.

There are one or two intermediate matters to which r should like to refer. The dispute about water has been mention­ed. The bulk of the irrigation system water before partition went into the West Punjab while a small part went into the East Punjab. That is true, but what has not been mentioned is this : East Punjab, after the province was divided, pointed out that the whole of this irrigation system was developed by the joint resources of the province before it was partitioned. The greater part had gone into West Punjab for geographical reasons and East Punjab wanted credit for the extra share of the irriga­tion system which had gone to West Punjab. That share was determined and the question then arose of the amount of compensation which East Punjab should receive. We said that they should receive their proportionate share of the capital cost of the project, but they said that as the project had turned out to be a very profitable one it would be unfair to determine its present value on the basis of the original cost of construction. A tribunal was set up to determine the matter and it agreed that India, in respect of the excess for which it was entitled to receive compensation, should receive twice the amount of the original capital cost. That was the compensation awarded to India, and that settled the question of the fifteen main canals, twelve on one side and three on the other. India next asked the Com­mission to determine who should have the water.

India stated that West Punjab was an area of food surplus and that East Punjab was an area of deficit. That was true at the time of partition and no doubt it meant that such water resources as were available so each side must be fully develop­ed, but in order to improve matters on one side you cannot take away what the other was entitled to. That would be con­trary to the basis of partition, contrary to international law and contrary to the principles determined by Sir Benegal Rau himself when he presided over the Commission. However, I will leave that aside because it is not the question which the Security Council is dealing with today. But I do wish to put before the Council that in consequence of the action taken by the Govern­ment of India, West Punjab today is a deficit area and East Punjab is beginning to be a surplus area as a result of this diversion of water. In the meantime, the representative of India has said that officers of the International Bank are now investi­gating the possibility of using more and more water for this purpose, and in spite of repeated requests, in spite of India's agreement that supplies will not be interfered with, India is going on with the construction of its works in consequence of which it can at any moment divert every drop of water from West Punjab and Pakistan. Those works are proceeding and some of the new canals have been opened, as a result of which we are getting much less water. But, as I have said, this is not the question now before the Security Council and I merely mention it in connexion with the apprehensions raised in the minds of the people of West Punjab and of the Government in connexion with the threat to the Mangla Headworks in conse­quence of the offensive mounted by India in April 1948.

We are told : "If a threat arises and Pakistan moves its troops, that would be the law of the jungle." But who started applying the law of the jungle ? I have described to the Security Council what took place in Junagadh. The Council is aware of the situation in Hyderabad, because that matter is also on the agenda and statements on it have been made to the Council on several occasions. India moved its troops into Junagadh and took possession of it. India moved its troops into Kashmir and took possession of the greater part of it. Who has been practis­ing the law of the jungle ? India turned off the waters, because it was the upper riparian owner and could control the waters. Who has been practising the law of the jungle ? But the Pakistan Press and the Pakistan people speaking from the platform must not say these things : that is what annoys India, that reminds me of a verse, the English translation of which runs as follows : "I am denounced if I breathe a sigh of protest. Nobody protests against his killing." It has been said that India is prepared to go forward on the basis of the two resolutions, but will not accept anything which is inconsistent with those basic resolutions. We are not asking India to do anything inconsistent with those resolutions. As I have already explained, all that we desire is that India should move forward with them. One could match all this talk of aggression, of the law of the jungle, of the sufferings, and soon. Not only could one match it : one could draw pictures of actual occurrences that were more lurid than could be drawn on the other side. From the very first moment when I addressed the Security Council, I have said that deplorable things were happe­ning on both sides. It would be unprofitable to attempt to strike a balance in that regard.           

The question is : Are we prepared to go forward on the basis of the agreement which we have made—an agreement which has been approved by the Security Council and is before the whole world in the form of two resolutions ? We are and have at all times been prepared to go forward. If India is also prepared to do so, we can do any of the following things : we can strictly apply the terms of the resolutions and allow the United Nations Commission to determine the minimum number of Indian troops which should remain on the side of the State occupied by India during the first part of demilitarization. The bulk of the Indian troops would then be withdrawn. We should accept that determination. Would India ? The determination would be made in consultation with India. Once it had been made, we should begin to withdraw our regular troops and India would begin to withdraw the bulk of its troops. There­after, the Plebiscite Administrator would take over. The final disposition of the forces remaining on both sides would be made by the Plebiscite Administrator. We are prepared to accept that course ; it is a strict interpretation of the two resolutions.

If, as I have said previously, India is for some reason apprehensive that that situation, though agreed upon, involves some kind of danger or threat to it, and if India desires that, as part of the first stage of demilitarization, a large-scale disband­ing and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces should also take place, we are equally willing to accept that—in other words, the implementation of paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949—provided paragraph 4 (a) is implemented simultaneously.

We have no objection to either course; we are prepared to go forward on the basis of either. We have accepted all previous plans which have been put forward to carry out these ideas.

I have already explained Pakistan's position on the draft resolution [SI2839] now before the Security Council. I would only add this : if, in the further stage contemplated in the draft resolution, agreement should, unfortunately, not result, a report by the parties would be either a summary or an expansion of the parties' submissions which the Security Council has already heard.

I should like to state, once again, that we are prepared to go forward on the basis of the draft resolution now before the Security Council, subject to the suggestions which I made when I last spoke and which might improve the situation, as well as the possibilities of reaching an agreement between the two sides.