23121952 Text of the speech made by Mrs. Pandit {India) in the Security Council meeting No. 610 held on 23 December 1952.

23121952 Text of the speech made by Mrs. Pandit {India) in the Security Council meeting No. 610 held on 23 December 1952.

I do not wish to tax the patience of the Security Council. I shall therefore endeavour to be brief, and confine myself to dealing with some of the more basic points raised by the repre­sentative of Pakistan and to restating our position where necessary.

The representative of Pakistan has sought to persuade the Council that the invasion of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir by tribesmen and Pakistan nationals, across Pakistan territory, which was engineered, aided and abetted by Pakistan, was a spontaneous act of revolt against the Maharajah's Government by those who had a right to feel concern. It was even suggested that the revolt was by way of protest against the Maharajah's decision to accede to India.

The Council will recall that the instrument of accession was executed by the Maharajah on 26 October 1947, and ac­cepted by the Government of India on 27 October 1947. The invasion, however, had started on 22 October 1947.

The question of the validity of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India has been raised again. I should like to remind the Council that neither the Council nor the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan nor any other authority set up by the Council has ever disputed the validity of the accession. An Indian State, as Kashmir was at that time, was deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General had signified his acceptance of an instru­ment of accession executed by the ruler : that was laid down in the Government of India Act of 1933 (section 6) enacted by the British Parliament.

The ruler was the legal head of the State. The legal 'requisites of accession were fully completed and the Maharajah of Jammu and Kashmir signed the instrument of acces­sion on 26 October 1947, and the Governor-General, Lord Mountbatten of Burma, accepted it. But the Governor-Gene­ral, on behalf of the Government of India, expressed the wish,unilaterally, that as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir, and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.

1. soil of Kashmir has unfortunately not yet been cleared of the invaders, and subversive forces and elements continue to function in the territory occupied by them. This is the real reason why reference to the people of Kashmir is being delayed. The representative of Pakistan has again asked how it was possible to fly troops to Srinagar on 27 October 1947, the day on which the Governor-General accepted the accession.

Regarding this point the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, in its first interim report, dated 22 November 1948, states as follows [S/1100, para 121 (IV)]:

"The accession of Jammu and Kashmir, the legality of which is disputed by Pakistan, was accepted by India on 27 October 1947. Immediately thereafter"—and I emphasize this word "thereafter—"the Indian Army advanced into the State with the purpose of expelling the tribesmen and restoring law and order."

In the course of his letter of acceptance to the Maha­rajah dated 27 October 1947, the Governor-General observed :

"Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness's appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people."

I shall quote an extract from a diary of the events of the time, which appears in Campbell-Johnson's Mission with Mountbatten :

"As for the military outlook, V.P."—this refers to Mr. V.P. Menon, Secretary of the Ministry of States at that time—"advised that the troops left in Srinagar had no prospect whatever of holding the invaders, for they con­sisted merely of one squadron of cavalry. In the light of these depressing data, the Cabinet decided that the Maha­rajah's accession should be accepted and that a battalion of infantry should be flown in at dawn the next day."

Another quotation from the same diary will help cor­rectly to appraise the policy of the Government of India :

"It should be noted that, when Mountbatten visited Kashmir in June, he did everything possible to impress upon the Maharajah the urgent necessity of acceding to one or other of the successor Dominions before 15 August and of basing his decision upon some expression of the popular will.

"Moreover, Mountbatten was empowered to advise him, on the authority of Patel"—that is, the late Deputy Prime Minister of India—"that if his decision was to throw in his lot with Pakistan and join their Constituent Assembly in advance of the transfer of power, it would not be regarded as an unfriendly act by India."

Campbell-Johnson further says :

"Three days before the transfer of power and the acces­sion time limit, the Kashmir Government announced its intention of signing stand-still agreements with both India and Pakistan. Subsequently, the Indian Govern­ment's policy has been to refrain from inducing Kashmir to accede. Indeed, the States Ministry, under Patel's direction, went out of its way to take no action which could be interpreted as forcing Kashmir's hand and to give assurances that accession to Pakistan would not be taken amiss by India."

Here we have factual testimony which rebuffs the fiction which has often been presented to the Council that the accession of the State to India was brought about by some pre. arranged a plan or manoeuvre, to which, presumably Lord Mountbatten was a party.

The following extract from a broadcast made at that time by the Prime Minister of India affords proof in the same direction . He said :

"Had we desired a pretext either for Kashmir's accession or for sending out troops there, we should not have waited to accomplish our purpose until half of the Valley of Kashmir and parts of Jammu Province had been given to fire and sword and Srinagar itself was in April of cap­ture by the raiders, with all its horrors.

"We decided to send troops on the afternoon of 26 Octo­ber. Srinagar was in peril, and the situation was urgent and critical. Our staff worked that day and night, and at daybreak on the 27th our troops went by air. They were small in numbers to begin with—no one at that time knew how few they were—but immediately on ar­rival they rushed into action to stop the invader. Their gallant Commander, a brave officer of our Army, was killed the next day."

The sequence of events during those difficult days and the motives which inspired the sending of troops into Kashmir was, in the words of Lord Mountbatten, "to protect the lives, property and honour" of the people of Kashmir, and will be evident from the above quotations.

To describe the fury inspired and directed by Pakistan which was unleashed on Kashmir as a "popular revolt" against the Maharajah's rule is a cynical distortion of facts.

I need not recall the gruesome details of the events which followed the unprovoked invasion, since they have already been described in this Council more than once. It is enough to say that raiders, who were armed and equipped with modern and automatic weapons supplied by the Pakistan Army and were transferred in Pakistan military and civil vehicles, spread" death and destruction, sparing neither men, women nor children. The convent at Baramulla was raided and nuns and other innocent inmates who were not even people of the country were murdered. I am sure that Mr. Zafrulla Khan would not suggest that the victims of the Baramulla atrocities were the agents of the Maharajah, upon whom the righteous wrath of a people seeking their liberty was vented.

Mr. Zafrulla Khan mentions that disturbances in Kashmir had commenced some two months earlier than October 1947, that is, about the month of August. The Council may be reminded that, about the time of the transfer of power, vast disturbances and upheavals rocked the great Province of the Punjab and spread to the southern fringe of Jammu and Kashmir State. It has been alleged that these disturbances were really a revolt against the Maharajah's authority. Is it suggested that the upheavals which took place at the time in the Western Punjab and North-West Frontier Province and elsewhere in Pakistan were also popular revolts against the authority of the Government of Pakistan ?

The fact is that there had been a popular movement, started twenty years earlier, against autocracy in the State ; it was organized and developed by the Kashmir National Con­ference, the leading popular party in Kashmir, which today has in its hands the reins of government. The movement against autocracy always had the fullest support of the Indian National Congress, and in 1946 the present Prime Minister of India, who had gone to Kashmir in connexion with the popular movement, was actually arrested by the State authorities.

But that people's movement was an entirely non-violent one, and it is an undeserved insult to the people of Kashmir to seek to place the responsibility on them for the plunder, rapine and massacres which characterized the first invasion of Kashmir.

It has been argued that that invasion of the State cannot be regarded as aggression, as it was preceded by four days of accession to India. Does Pakistan admit, then, that it ! and committed aggression against the territory of because the latter had not yet acceded? Kashmir, it may be remembered, had then a stand-still agreement with Pakistan. The invasion by a State of a neighbouring State is in itself an act of aggression. It becomes even more flagrant when that State happens to be a small and peaceful neighbour. It became an aggression against India as well after the Jammu and Kashmir State's accession to India.

The Foreign Minister of Pakistan has tried again to justify the second aggression against India by Pakistan on 8 May 1948. Mr. Zafrulla Khan, who is himself a jurist, seeks to justify this aggression by telling the Council that it took place on the advice of the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakis­tan army, a British General. Let me quote what !Sir Benegal N. Rau said to this Council in regard to this on a previous occasion [466th meeting]

'I now come to that part of the Commander-in-Chief's appraisal which recommended that regular units of the Pakistan army must, if necessary, be sent into Kashmir. I must confess that I have been gravely disturbed by this disclosure. Here is a British Commander-in-Chief of a Dominion of the Commonwealth, recommending that a military expedition should be sent, if necessary, against a sister Dominion.

“ I should like at this stage to ask the representative of Pakistan two questions. The first is : Before the Pakis­tan army was actually sent into Kashmir, was His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consulted or even informed ? I ask this question because I believe that the recommendation involved a serious offence against the British Foreign Enlistment Act .."

"The second question which I should like to ask him is whether, at any point of his appraisal, the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief cautioned the Pakistan Govern­ment that the step which he was recommending, however justifiable in his view, might constitute a breach of international law. I feel that, in order to protect himself, he would have taken this precaution, having regard to his conduct on an earlier occasion which I shall mention immediately-"

"••Whatever the answers to these questions may be, one thing is clear : that the justification pleaded by Pakistan is that the sending of troops was necessitated by conside­rations of self-defence. Such a plea might have passed muster in the old days, but now, fortunately, we have the United Nations and its Charter. Article 51 of the Charter reads:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations until the Security Council has taken the measures neces­sary to maintain international peace and security Mea­sures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.'

This Article imposes two limitations upon the right of self-defence : first, there must be an armed attack upon the Member that exercises the right ; and, secondly, measures taken in the exercise of the right of self-defence must be immediately reported to the Security Council. In the present instance there was no armed attack on Pakistan, and admittedly the sending of the army into Kashmir was not reported to the Security Council.

I am not making a small legal point. I am pointing this out because, if the matter had been reported at that stage to the Security Council, we should not have been in the difficult position in which we find ourselves today. I feel sure that the Pakistan army would not have been allowed to go in, and the subsequent mischief to which the invasion led would have been avoided. I have contended in my original speech [463rdmeeting' that because of this initial wrong, certain other wrongs followed, namely, the building up of the so-called Azad forces and the so-called Azad administrations. I then asked, as I still ask, that all these wrongs should be completely undone before a plebiscite can be held. Any other course would involve the recognition of an act which was not only against the plain provisions of the Charter but was also, as I see it, a crime according to British municipal law. We should be creating a dangerous precedent if we took any other view or adopted any other course.

"ft is said that the dispatch of Pakistan troops was neces­sitated by India's mounting and offensive against the raiders.      But surely this was nothing new. The Security Council knew that the Indian army had gone to Kashmir to repel the invaders, but it is curious to learn that, although Pakistan, according to its defence before this-Council, was rendering no assistance whatever to the raiders, nevertheless when it found that India was on the point of expelling the raiders, Pakistan found it necessary to send its army into Kashmir in order to hold the line. But we are told that Pakistan did not do anything more, whereas we have it both from the majority [S/ 1430] and from the minority [S/ 1430/ Add. 3] reports of the Com­mission, that Pakistan not merely held the line but exten­ded its military control over the northern areas between August 1948 and January 1949. This was not a case of merely holding the line but of occupying as large a part of the State as Pakistan's military strength permitted-"

I need hardly add anything to the above. To this day, Pakistan forces continue to occupy the territory forcibly seized by them. India does not occupy an inch of Pakistan territory* nor does it seek to do so. It relies on peaceful methods for the settlement of disputes and does not threaten war or have recourse to warlike acts. India has repeatedly asked Pakistan to join it in a mutual no-war declaration. Mr. Zafrulla Khan referred to this at some length the other day [609th meeting]. He dismissed such a declaration by asserting that it had no meaning unless agreement was first reached on methods and procedures for the settlement of pending issues. If such an agreement cannot immediately be reached, is that a reason for not declaring that forest is to stand outlawed ? Instead, however, of any such no-war declaration, we are faced with incessant threats of force and jihad—holy war.

Mr. Zafrulla Khan quoted his late Prime Minister's reply to our Prime Minister's invitation to him to join in a no-war declaration. I can do no better than follow Mr. Zafrulla Khan's example in this instance and quote our Prime Minis­ter's reply :

"I should like to discuss the raison deter of our sugges­tion for a no-war declaration. We thought, and subsequent events have proved it, that any complicated declaration would lead to an interminable correspondence. We were anxious for an immediate step forward even though it might only be a first step. We were convinced that this would have given Indo-Pakistan problems a new orientation. Hence we suggested the simplest possible no-war declaration. It is easy to criticize that, but can anyone doubt that such a declaration coming from our respective Governments would have made a tremen­dous difference in the relations between India and Pakistan and would have lightened the dark and heavy atmosphere that surrounds us ?

We are fully aware of the obligations that our two countries, in common with many others, have accepted by be­coming Members of the United Nations. But you know as well as I do that, in spite of the brave and eloquent words of e Charter of the United Nations, fierce disputes and impassioned arguments are in progress at Lake Success even as I write. Member nations look at each other with tears and suspicion and the world stands on the verge of catastrophe. It is even possible that the United Nations may change its original shape and character. All this is not the fault of the Charter, but of fear, which envelopes the nations of the world and drives them continuously in a wrong direction.

"Suppose that the leaders of the great Powers met, or otherwise agreed, to issue a simple no-war declaration such as I have suggested to you. Would rot make a startling difference ? There would be a great sigh of relief from hun­dreds of millions of people, and the imminent threat of war would, for the moment at least, fade away. A chance would be given to the nations to think calmly and dispassionately of their problems and possibly find a way out. And yet, that simple declaration would contain nothing new. It would only be a reiteration of a part of the Charter.

"We have had to contend also, in India and Pakistan, with this pervasive sense of fear and apprehension and the possibility of war between our two countries. This has been created by a variety of circumstances and by the persistence of certain disputes between Pakistan and India which remain unsolved. I have drawn your atten­tion to the type of propaganda that has been going on in Pakistan and the belligerent character of certain speeches and writings in the Pakistan Press about India. The Charter of the United Nations has not helped in stopping these speeches and writings or even in improving our relations. Nearly eight months  ago, you and I met, under a happy inspiration, at a moment of deep crisis for our countries. After some discussion, we arrived at certain simple conclusions There was nothing novel about them. But they were the result of an earnest approach by both sides, and immediately there was a re­markable change in the atmosphere of both countries. There was a cooling of temper, and understanding repla­ced passion and prejudice. This psychological change did not solve any problem, but it went a long way to produce conditions favourable for a solution. After eight months, I think both of us can say with confidence that we did well and the results have justified our action.

"This encouraged me to think that another move by us such as the one that I had suggested in the shape of a simple no-war declaration, would transform the minds of Indians and Pakistanis alike. To encumber that declara­tion with details of procedure and programme would be to weaken the effect, which was the main purpose of the declaration proposed by us. This 'does not mean, of course, that practical steps, including agreement on pro­cedure and timing, would not be necessary for resolving specific disputes. In my previous letters to you, I have attempted to deal as fully as I could with the mode of settling individual issues outstanding between our two countries.

"You say that the crux of the difficulty in our reaching an agreement has been our reluctance to substitute, on any issue, impartial arbitration for threatened or actual use of force. I am greatly surprised at your reference to force and must categorically deny any suggestion that at any time we have threatened to resort to force to settle a dispute with Pakistan. Force has been used by Pakistan and by India against each other in Kashmir. I do not wish to repeat the sad story of Kashmir here. But you know well that we sent our troops to Kashmir under stress of grave emergency and when an invasion of Kashmir had already begun. I am convinced that we would have failed in our duty if we had not met this aggression and rescued Kashmir from it. After a long denial that Pakistan forces had gone to Kashmir, this fact had to be admitted, and there they are still—with what justification, I have completely failed to understand. Even so, after the failure of Sir Owen Dixon's mission I stated unequivocally that India would not attack Pakistan unless it was attacked first. I asked you to make a similar declaration on behalf of Pakistan, but to this you did not respond. I do not claim that my declaration should convince all reasonable persons of the genuineness of our pacific intentions. As regards impartial arbitra­tion, I have never stated that we would not resort to it on any issue. But there are some issues, for example the future of Kashmir, which cannot be settled by arbitra­tion. If I am not mistaken, your Minister for Kashmir Affairs , Mr. Gurmani, has expressed the same view publicly. In international affairs all kinds of issues arise. Some lend themselves to adjudication, some to arbitra­tion and some to settlement only by agreement among the parties. To recognize this is not to refuse arbitration on matters which lend themselves to a settlement by this method".

There is no need to read the rest of the letter, but we shall be glad to place it before the members of the Council along with other correspondence which took place between the two Prime Ministers on this occasion.

The representative of Pakistan has again raised the ques­tion of Junagadh—that seems to have become his habit—and he seeks to set it up as some kind of parallel. Although any discussion about Junagadh is entirely irrelevant. I shall deal with it briefly to show how much of it is irrelevant. Junagadh was a principality situated hundreds of miles from the land frontiers of Pakistan. Its small port of Veraval, like any other port, no doubt has access by sea to Karachi, but so also has the great Indian ports of Bombay, Madras and Calcutta. The principle of geographical contiguity, which is an essential feature of the policy of accession with respect to all former Indian States, to one or the other of the States of Pakistan and India, does not apply in the case of Junagadh. What are the facts in regard to Junagadh and its accession? Mr. Campbell-Johnson outlines the picture in his diary, Mission with Mount-batten, and I shall give some extracts therefore :

"inside Junagadh are islands of territory from these States, and inside these States are islands of Junagadh territory. Her railways, ports and telegraphs are an integral part of the Indian system.

1. first move was V.P.'s visit"—that refers to V.P. Menon, Secretary, Ministry of States of the Government of India—"to the State ten days ago, which produced only limited results. He met the Dewan, who told him that the Nawab was indisposed, and therefore could not see him. However, the Sheikh of the small State of Mongrel, which up to the transfer of power had been under the suzerainty of Junagadh, used the occasion of V P.'s presence in the neighbourhood to get away from his own State and voluntarily to accede to India, thus following Babariawad, which had already acceded. But the Sheikh, on his return to Mongrol, which coincided with V.P. 's visit to Delhi, found himself obliged to reno­unce his accession. On the 22nd, the Government of India decided that the circumstances in which the letter of renunciation was written were such as to justify them ignoring it. Junagadh followed up this bloodless victory over Mongrel by sending troops into Babariawad".

The diary continues :

"Ismay (General Lord Ismay, now Secretary-General of NATO) spoke with great cogency about Jinnah's proba­ble tactics and strategy over Junagadh. Clearly on its face value the state is worthless to him. It is an impossi­ble military liability. By no stretch of imagination as it is his policy to incorporate isolated pockets of Moslems, for there are already some 40 million of them outside the Pakistan homeland.

"ismay, from the conversations he had with Liaquat during his last visit to Delhi, is quite convinced that Pakistan's strategy is to use the whole Junagadh contest as a bargaining counter for Kashmir. This interpretation is borne out by a significant remark Liaquat made to Mountbatten on the same visit. 'All right', he told him, let India go ahead and commit an act of war, and see what happens.' The consistency of Pakistan's case against the Kashmir accession is ill-served by the Junagadh precedent. The 'fraud and violence'of acces­sion when it involves India and Kashmir is strict legality when Junagadh accedes to Pakistan."

The representative of Pakistan has sought to claim merit for having accepted proposals made in and outside this Council from time to time; equally, he has tried to discredit India for its inability to concur. The enumeration of the acceptances and rejections is incomplete and misleading. Pakistan accepted and India rejected the Council's resolution [S/726] of 21 April 1948 [26th meeting]. Pakistan followed up the "acceptance" by invading Kashmir thereby augmenting its initial act of aggres­sion. India's "rejection" was followed by continued cooperation and negotiation with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan despite the grave provocation offered by Pakistan's acts. India and Pakistan have both accepted the resolution of 13 August 1948. India's acceptance was communicated to UNCIP on 20 August 1948. Pakistan's acceptance came on 25 December, and Pakistan made use of those months to alter the military situation to its advantage and to the detriment of India. Again Mr. Zafrulla Khan states that Pakistan accepted and India rejected Mr. Graham's pro­posals of 16 July 1952. But Pakistan's acceptance was subject to the condition that the character of the forces should be the same on either side of the cease-fire line. Mr. Graham's proposals envisaged a different character for the forces on either side and Pakistan's conditions really nullified its so-called acceptance. Finally, on 4 September 1952, Mr. Graham made a proposal of which Mr. Zafrulla Khan significantly makes n > mention. India considered that these proposals were "conceived in the right spirit" and "contained the germs of a settlement". Pakistan accepted the proposal subject to the deletion of all references to India's responsibility for the security of the State. It will be clear to anyone who reads Mr. Graham's proposals that Pakistan's conditions nullified its so-called acceptance. The record shows that Pakistan is not will­ing to accept any proposal which takes into account the difference in status between the parties as clearly set forth in the UNCIP resolutions. India has given and is prepared to give sympathetic consideration to any reasonable proposal which is based on the recognition of the basic difference in the status of the parties to the dispute.

Mr. Zafrulla Khan has once again raised the question of canal waters. What are the facts ? There were sixteen canal systems in the undivided Punjab; after partition, as many as twelve belong to Pakistan and only three to India, while the remaining one is divided between the two countries. Eleven million acres on the Pakistan side are canal-irrigated as against only 3 million on the Indian side. West Punjab is a highly developed surplus food area while East Punjab is dry and parched and liable to famine. In December 1947, a standstill agreement for the continuance of the supply of water to Pakis­tan canals was signed by the Chief Engineers of East and West Punjab, which was to continue until 31 March 1948. But despite reminders, the Pakistan authorities took no steps whatsoever to enter into a fresh agreement. In consequence, with the termination of the agreement, through no fault of the Indian irrigation authorities, the supply of water to the Pakis­tan canals became also automatically terminated. As soon as this became known, the Prime Minister of India intervened and a fresh agreement was executed and the supply of water resumed on 4 May 1948. The water resources of the entire Indus basin were developed as a single unit prior to the parti­tion. Since the partition of India, the position is that out of the 45 percent of the waters of the basin which are utilized for irrigation purposes, Pakistan received 40 per cent while India received 5 per cent. The rest of the waters of the basin, that is about 55 per cent, flows into the sea. To avoid the wastage and to utilize more of the water supply, talks are in progress to see if some arrangement cannot be worked out to the mutual benefit of both countries and the millions of agricultu­rists by a greater utilization of the waters of the Indus and its tributaries.

The Council, I feel, will agree with us that Mr. Zafrulla Khan's fear regarding an interruption in Pakistan's water supply, particularly when it is unfounded as in the present case, cannot be a legitimate excuse for, or justify, awarding it the territory of a neighbour. This would be the law of the jungle and not of civilized nations.

The representative of Pakistan referred to certain troop movements in the summer of 1951. These India was forced to make and they were a purely defensive and precautionary measure. The Council will remember that Mr. Graham, when he went to the sub-continent last year, reported that he found a tense situation there. Widespread and fierce propaganda for jihad for the conquest of India had been unleashed in Pakistan. Threats, insults and provocative statements were made by people in high authority. Feverish preparations for launching such a "holy war" against India were going on. The jihad was being proclaimed as the only effective means of solving the Kashmir and even other problems. No government could be obvious of its responsibilities in such a situation. ( could not neglect the necessary protective measures in defence of its own security. Certain defensive movements of Indian forces were carried out. But with the subsequent lessening of tension, the Indian forces moved back as much as from 70 to 450 miles from the border, and it is quite incorrect to say that they are still there now. As I said the other day, propaganda for war against India is again very much in the air in Pakistan. India, however, continues to show forbearance in the face of this provocation, and adheres to its unequivocal assurance that it wishes to live in peace and friendship with Pakistan.

At the end of his statement, the representative of Pakistan made what he described as an "offer"; I do not know if he meant it to be taken seriously. He was willing, he said, to withdraw the Pakistan army from the territory occupied by it in Kashmir. As for the tribesmen and so-called Pakistan volunteers, they have, according to him, already been with­drawn. India, he said, could keep 28,000 men, which it con­sidered necessary for the security of the State, but they should be without any armour or artillery. Mr. Zafrulla Khan, how­ever, forgot to mention what is to happen to the so-called Azad Kashmir forces, whose strength is some 30,000 and who are fully armed, equipped and trained by Pakistan. Presumably, this force is to be regarded as a normality. This formidable force is part and parcel of the regular Pakistan army and is as well equipped as any unit in that army. Apparently the restrictions in regard to armour and artillery are to apply only to the Indian and not to the so-called Azad Kashmir forces.

It will be recalled that Mr Zafrulla Khan observed as long ago as 4 August 1948 that the Pakistan army was respon­sible for the overall command of the Azad Kashmir forces. The High Command of the Pakistan army had also stated that the so-called Azad Kashmir forces were operationally control­led by the Pakistan army. That position continues unchanged and the so-called Azad Kashmir forces are distinguished in name only from the regular Pakistan Army.

While Mr. Graham's proposals of 16 July 1952, and in­deed, the draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States [S/2839] as well, contemplate a reduc­tion of the Pakistan forces to a figure between 3,000 and 6 000, Mr. Zafrulla Khan's so-called proposal would actually mean a substantial preponderance of Pakistan forces over the Indian security troops. The proposal is ingenious enough. However, it reverses Mr. Graham's approach and cannot lead to a solu­tion. It is also basically inconsistent with the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and assurances given to us by the Commission. It could not have been seriously thought that such a proposal would be enter­tained.

In this connexion, I would like to draw the attention of the Council to a particularly outspoken editorial which appea­red in the Pakistan newspaper Dawn of 19 December 1952. That newspaper, as members of the Council may be aware, is generally believed to be the official mouthpiece of the ruling party in Pakistan. I shall read a particularly virulent extract from this editorial :

Bharat's—that is India's—formal rejection of the offer, when it comes, will immediately raise the issue of the next step. If the Security Council does not act even after Bharat's rejection of our offer to hold a plebiscite, practically on Bharat's own terms, then Pakistan must turn to history for an alternative. With a full knowledge of the importance and implications of what we next day, we do say in the name of Pakistan's 76 million people that Bharat will have to be offered something which she can­not refuse. In other words, failure of the Security Coun­cil to act this time can only drive this country to war."

There is little attempt at concealment here. This is not only a threat of war but leaves little in the way of disguise for Mr. Zafrulla Khan's "proposals" which are for maintain­ing a large equipped army of the Azad forces in menacingly large numbers on the other side of the cease fire line. It throws into relief the grave threat to the security of Kashmir, which we are pledged to ensure.

India's position is fully in conformity with the two reso­lutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakis­tan. It is that all proposals must be based on a recognition of the integrity of the entire territory of the Jammu and Kashmir State and of the responsibility which India has assumed and has for its defence. It follows from the resolution of August 1948 that all Pakistan troops must be withdrawn and all armed formations, including the Azad Kashmir forces, Gilgit scouts, etc., which are under Pakistan's control, fully disarmed and disbanded. The administration of the areas evacuated by Pakistan troops will be entrusted to local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission. The local authorities cannot permit any military formations, they will, however, have a police force partly armed and partly unarranged.

Under the resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator was only responsible for the disposition, that is the location, of the Indian forces. He cannot by himself bring about any reduction in their number. There can be no reduc­tion of Indian forces below the minimum necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the security of the State. This is the legitimate criterion, and it is consistent with our responsibilities and the facts of the case.

It will be seen that the so-called "offer" made by Mr. Zafiulla Khan, instead -of being a proposal which points to any solution, actually retards a solution, as it is basically inconsistent with the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and assurances given to us by the Commis­sion. As far as the draft resolution is concerned, I have already fully explained my Government's attitude towards it. I should like to repeat that we reject the proposal contained in it and we are not prepared to enter into any talks on the basis suggest­ed in the seventh paragraph of the resolution.

I would reiterate, without reserve, that we are always, as hitherto willing to extend our cooperation and indeed to ex­plore ourselves every avenue which may lead to a peaceful solution of the problem, which does not ignore or violate the basic principles which are vital to a correct appreciation of the problem and which have been accepted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and by the parties them­selves.

147. Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafarulla Khan {Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 610 held on 23 Decem­ber 1952.

I have been distressed to notice that the representative of India is not feeling very well this morning and that she has been under a strain while she has been addressing the Security Council. I hope and pray that her effort this morning will not result in any serious discomfort to her and that she will soon get over her temporary indisposition.

I shall now have to make some submissions to the Security Council on the matters that have been placed before the Council on behalf of India this morning. A very large portion of them are really only academic and, if I may say so with all respect, irrelevant to the matters with which the Security Council is now faced. Nevertheless, for the purpose of the record, some observations are due from me, lest it should be thought, if I made no comment on those matters, that I accepted the allegations and statements made on behalf of India.

On certain points there has been some confusion, as was Apparent from the statement which the Council has just heard. For instance it is said to start that one of the points I sought to make the other day [609th meeting] was that it was the Maharaja's decision to accede to India that started the whole trouble in Kashmir. Then it was said that the Maharajah s decision to accede was not made until 26 October 1947 whereas the revolt in the State had started sometime in August and the tribal incursion had taken place on 22 October. To the best of my recollection, when dealing with that period between August and 26 October, I did not in my previous submission anywhere use the words "the Maharajah's inclination to accede to India" which was well known to the people of his State.

It was then argued that the Maharajah was the legal head of the State and was entitled to offer accession to India or to Pakistan, and when he had offered accession to India, India was entitled to accept it, and the acceptance by India of the acces­sion offered by the Maharajah made the accession complete. I was at pains to make it clear during my previous submission that it was India's own stand, irrespective of Kashmir or Junagadh, which I sought to support by quotations from the speeches of Mr. Ayyangar, that when a State gained indepen­dence the paramountcy of the British suzerain lapsed, that sovereignty rested in the people of the Indian States, that the ruler was no doubt the instrument through which the decision to accede to one Dominion or the other—as they then were— was to be expressed, but that where there was a dispute between the ruler and his people, or a difference with regard to accession, the ruler was to ascertain the wishes of the people and then accede in accordance therewith. My point was that long before this alleged accession was offered by Kashmir, not only was there a difference between the ruler and the majority of his people but that difference had taken the shape of a revolt against the authority of the Maharajah and that revolt had gone so far that the Maharajah's troops had been defeated and had had to retreat, and the Maharajah had had to leave the capital before the offered accession to India.

It was said that this revolt within the State was just a part of the disturbances, the killings, the persecutions which were going on the borders of East and West Punjab immediately after partition. But that, with all respect, was not so at all. These killings, these persecutions, these expulsions of people from one side to the other—most regrettable and very deplorable were between the communities, they were communal, they were a species of genocide. The movement in Kashmir had not that character at all. It was a popular movement against the tyranny of the Maharajah. It was not directed against any community and I cited in support of this position the statement of Sheikh Abdullah himself, made in a Press statement on 21 October 1947, before any tribal incursion from outside had taken place. Sheikh Abdullah was then dealing with this popular movement inside the State.

It was also said—it was admitted—that the fact is that a popular movement against the tyranny of the Maharajah had started in the State many years earlier. I think the representa­tive of India said thirty years earlier, but actually the active movement had manifested itself during the early thirties. That, however, is not the material point. At that time it was not the National Conference that was leading the movement, it was the Muslim Conference, though it is true that Sheikh Abdullah was then also one of the principal leaders of this movement. He headed the Muslim Conference; the National Conference did not come into being until height years later. That again, as I have said, is for the purpose of correcting the record.

It was further said, and it is true, that India offered uni­laterally that when law and order were restored and the soil of Kashmir was cleared of the invader the United Nations would be asked to hold a plebiscite in order to ascertain the wishes of the people, India having withdrawn its military forces from the State, and it was observed that the soil of Kashmir has not been cleared of the invader and that is why the reference to the People cannot take place.

Let me for a moment examine the position. The invaders at that time referred to in the telegram and in Lord Mount-batten's letter were the tribesmen. The tribesmen have since !! withdrawn. That is Point number one. Point number two is : the term is said to include the regular Pakistan army, The regular Pakistan army has always been ready to withdraw according to the terms of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. It cannot be argued that the people of this State, who took up arms in August 1947, are invaders who have to withdraw anywhere to enable the reference to the people to take place on the question of accession. They are people of the State, they cannot withdraw anywhere else, there has been no demand and there could be no demand that they should withdraw anywhere else. With regard to them, the demand is a large-scale disband­ing and disarming. Therefore on that point again my submis­sion is that the invader then contemplated has withdrawn and that, so far as the Pakistan army, which was compelled to go in at the beginning of May 1948, is concerned, it hat at all times been ready to withdraw in accordance with the terms of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

What is delaying progress in organizing and holding the plebiscite is the refusal of the Government of India to withdraw its forces from the part of Kashmir occupied by India, in accordance with the two resolutions accepted by India.

As regards what happened in May of 1948, there are one or two observations which are necessary in order again to set the picture right.

The representative of India represented my submission to the Security Council as if I had argued that the responsibility for the movement of the Pakistan forces into the Azad Kashmir area lay upon the then Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan. That is by no means the case. I did not urge that; I do not urge that; I have at no time urged that. I submitted the appreciation of the Commander-in-Chief in order to give the Security Council a resume of the situation as it existed. The responsibi­lity for the decision lies where it should, that is to say, with the Pakistan Government. The decision was not the responsibility of the Commander-in-Chief. I have never taken any other position.

It was then asked—I do not know why—whether His Majesty's Government had been consulted before action was taken. I do not know how that obligation arose or is alleged to have arisen. Was his Majesty's Government consulted before Indian forces moved into Kashmir ? Was His Majesty's Govern­ment consulted, before the offensive of March-April 1948 was mounted, despite the fact that the offensive contained all those elements—a threat to the Mangla head works, a threat even to the security of Pakistan, a sister Dominion—which I detailed when I last addressed the Security Council ?

Then, the statement was made : "It was alleged that the Pakistan forces went in to hold the line. They did much more than that. They consolidated Pakistan's position in the northern areas." I repeat, with full responsibility, that the Pakistan* forces, even in the northern areas to which reference has been made, did not take over any area which had been occupied by or was under the control of the Indian armed forces at any time.

Reference was also made to the controversy over the no-war declaration. It was not denied that the position, in brief, was this ; the Prime Minister of India was anxious that a declaration should be made by the two Prime Ministers stating only that India and Pakistan would not go to war with each other over their disputes. The Prime Minister of Pakistan said that since the disputes were going on and were even, in fact, being intensified, a bare declaration, as suggested by the Prime Minister of India, would serve no purpose. The two States had already undertaken such an obligation in the United Nations Charter. The disputes, however, had arisen; no way of resolv­ing them had as yet been found; they were in the course of being intensified. What would reassure the people would be a declaration in the following form : "We have decided that these disputes, which threaten a breach of the peace, should be resolved in the following peaceful manner : by negotiation and, if negotiation should fail, by arbitration, judicial determination through the agency of the United Nations, or any other method desired. We agree that neither of us shall take any action against the other which would amount to a threat to the peace or would disturb the peace between the two countries." That was the difference.

I made the submission during my last statement to the Security Council that it was not fair to put the matter as if Pakistan had been invited to declare that it would not go to war over these matters and had refused to do so. Our position remains the same as it has always been : these disputes should be peacefully resolved. We continue our attempts to persuade India to agree to methods and procedures which would succeed in resolving these disputes peacefully. I must say, with regret and sorrow, that we have not had the response we desired.

Then, the following complaint was made : "In the mean­time, the Pakistan Press goes on publishing articles or state­ments made by people which threaten the peace between the countries; it goes on saying that, if these matters are not peace­fully resolved, they may have to be resolved by force." So far as the Press and speeches in my country are concerned, I would say this : India is far ahead of us in almost every field—I make this statement deliberately and with responsibility—and even so far as the licence of the Press and the platform is concerned, India does not yield its place to Pakistan. That, however, is not the point.

The point is this : if disputes of this magnitude and character are not peacefully resolved, what is the alternative ? How are they to be resolved ? The matter might get out of hand. Someone, out of a spirit of pure mischief, might do something which might lead to a chain of circumstances which might become irrevocable. It is therefore necessary that every effort should be bent towards an early, peaceful resolution of these disputes.

To take up the position : "We shall not move from our own stand except on our own terms and on our own interpre­tations of our agreements, resolutions or obligations", and then to say, "The other party has no business to show impa­tience or frustration or to talk of anything but remaining peaceful", reminds one of an Urdu proverb—which is as familiar to the representative of India as it is to me—to the effect that the tyrant strikes and does not permit the victim even to protest.

Then a reference was made to Junagadh State. In the First, the reference to the Junagadh State is not as irrele­vant as the representative of India sought to make out : it is one of the matters pending before the Security Council. There is a direction, in one of the resolutions of the Security Council, to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan concer­ning the report on Junagadh, and the United Nations represen­tative had the same responsibility as UNCIP had. But that is, not the matter which I desire to stress. The reason why I cited Junagadh had regard to India's interpretation of the basis of partition and the factors upon which accession is to be based : in one case, in one manner; in the other case, in another manner. The only distinguishing feature that has been mention­ed is that Junagadh is not continuous to Pakistan by land. But is that a matter which would take the case out of the category of an independent State, the ruler of which belongs to one community and the majority of the people to another ?

What are the principles that are to apply to this question of accession ? The Indian Prime Minister has, in this case, laid down very clearly what, according to India, should be the principles.

Then we come to the two resolutions. In regard to the resolutions, it was pointed out by the representative of India that the resolution of 13 August 1948 was accepted by India on 20 August 1948, and was not accepted by Pakistan until the last week of December 1948. That is correct. What has not been mentioned—and it is a fact to which attention should be drawn—is that the resolution of 13 August, as is quite clear from the records, although it concerns itself with a cease-fire and a truce agreement thereafter, stops short there and does not go on, apart from a general expression in part III to the effect that the future of the State shall be decided in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people, to formulate any pro­posals with regard to the organizing and the holding of the Plebiscite, which was the main matter upon which the Security Council had been agreed, namely, that that was the one factor reassurance with regard to which could alone bring about a cessation of the fighting.

When the Commission went on to formulate proposals with regard to the organizing and the holding of the plebiscite according to the second resolution, Pakistan was able to accept both. But that really makes no difference to the position. The two resolutions—the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which now form one whole—were accepted by both India and Pakistan in the last week of December 1948 and consequently, a cease-fire was arranged effective from 1 January 1949. Everybody was hoping that, the cease-fire having been arranged, a truce agreement would also be arranged and, thereafter, the plebiscite held in accordance with the provisions of the resolution.

The representative of India went on to refer to certain matters which are not in accordance with the resolutions. In the first place, attention was drawn to the problem of the security of the State. With regard to the security of the state, the two resolutions have nowhere made the security of the State the sole responsibility of India. That is a matter that must be cleared up. We—India and Pakistan—are, I conceive, agreed upon this, that we both accept the two resolutions. It has been stress­ed on behalf of India, in the first submission that was made to the Security Council during these discussions by the represen­tative of India, that India will not permit anybody to go beyond those resolutions, that India insists upon strict adherence to the resolutions. We agree. We are willing to proceed on that basis. Then, what provision do the two resolutions make with regard to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir pending the organizing and the holding of the plebiscite ? The resolutions are quite clear on these matters. The resolutions of 13 August, part II, section B, paragraphs I and 2, read as follows :

"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Govern­ment of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, there­by terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. "2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Com­mission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary."

Those are the obligations undertaken by India in accept­ing that resolution, up to a certain stage. This was followed by the other resolution, to which I shall refer later. These are the two obligations undertaken : one, when the Commission is satisfied with certain things and has so notified the Government of India, then the Government of India will begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. And then what was to happen, pending the acceptance of con­ditions for a final settlement? "...the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease­fire"—that is to say, on its own side of the cease-fire line—"the minimum strength of its force", not determined solely by itself, but "which in agreement with the Commission are consi­dered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order". Where, either in this resolution or in the other, is authority given to the Government of India, or reserved by the Government of India, to determine, by itself, the strength of forces necessary to be retained in the portion of the State occupied by India after the bulk has been withdrawn ? There is no such authority, no such resolution.

The obligation of India is quite clear to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces on receipt of a certain notification from the Commission, in the first place ; and in the second place, to maintain within the cease-fire line the minimum strength of its forces which, in agreement with the Commission, are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. That is number one.

Now, what does the second resolution provide ? The second resolution—that is, that is the resolution of 5 January 1949—provides, in paragraph 4 (a)

"After implementation of parts I and II of the Commis­sion's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Com­mission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State"—when the Commission is satisfied, and now, in place of the Commission, when the United Nations Representative is satisfied—"the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine"—not the Government of India—"in consultation with the Govern­ment of India, the final disposal"—not "disposition"— "of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the free­dom of the plebiscite."

It is obvious here that the responsibility for the determina­tion—after consultation with the Government of India, no doubt—of the forces that are to remain rests upon the Com­mission and the plebiscite Administrator, and they are to deter­mine and to make the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces. But, in determining this final disposal—the numbers and locations, etc.—they shall have "due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite". No doubt, they must take into account all that the Government of India may have to say on the security of the State, because this deter­mination will take place "in consultation with the Government of India". They must also take into account all that may be urged with regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. Having carried out the consultation with the Government of India and taken into account the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite, they shall determine the final disposal.

On the other side, the situation would be as follows under the resolution of 13 August 1948, part II, A, 1 and 2 : the tribesmen having withdrawn, the Pakistan nationals who may have entered the State for the purpose of fighting having with­drawn, the Pakistan regular forces having been simultaneously withdrawn—beginning the withdrawal, but thereafter being simultaneously withdrawn with the bulk of the Indian forces— there would be let on the Pakistan side, in Azad Kashmir, the Azad Kashmir, forces. That is how the full implementation of the resolution of 13 August 1948 would leave the situa­tion. On the Azad Kashmir side, there would be no tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers who may have entered for the purpose of fighting, no Pakistan regular forces ; there would be only Azad Kashmir forces, which, according to the clear declarations of the Commission to the Government of India and to the Government of Pakistan while these resolutions were under discussion, were not to be touched during that period. They would be there. On the other side of the cease-fire line, there would be the limited number of Indian forces and the State armed forces.

The Plebiscite Administrator took over at the end of the 13 August 1948 resolution. Then he along with the Commis­sion, shall determine, on the one side—on the side occupied by Indian—the final disposal of the Indian forces and the State armed forces ; and, under paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, "as regards the territory referred to in paragraph A, 2 of part II of the resolution of 13 August"— that is to say, the Azad Kashmir territory—"final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities".

The language is identical : on the one side, "in consulta­tion with the Government of India", the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine "the final disposal" of the forces on that side ; on the other side, "in consultation with the local authorities", the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine "the final disposal" of the forces on that side.

We know what the forces will be :one side, Azad Kashmir forces : on the other side, the limited number left-after the bulk has been withdrawn—of the Indian armed and State armed forces.

The position under the resolutions is quite clear. The representative of India has insisted that the resolutions must be strictly adhered to. We agree. We have in the past agreed to either course— and I shall reiterate—we are prepared that the two resolutions should be strictly enforced, as I have just sub­mitted, in two parts. Under the first part, the tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers who may have entered the State for the purpose of fighting shall withdraw as soon as the truce agree­ment has been signed—as a matter of fact, I have said that they have actually withdrawn, but I am now reiterating the obligation—and the Pakistan regular army shall begin to with­draw. When the Commission is satisfied that the tribesmen have withdrawn, that the Pakistan volunteers have withdrawn and that the Pakistan army has begun its withdrawal the Govern­ment of India shall begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces. On completion of the implementation of the 13 August 1948 resolution, then, the Pakistan volunteers and tribesmen shall be withdrawn, the Pakistan regular army shall have withdrawn and, on the other side, the bulk of Indian forces shall have withdrawn. There shall left, on the Azad Kashmir side, only the Azad Kashmir forces ; there shall be left, on the territory occupied by India, limited forces of the Government of India "necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order"—that is in accordance with part II, paragraph B, 2 of the resolution of 13 August 1948—and the State armed forces.

Then the Plebiscite Administrator takes over. He then carries out the final disposal of the forces on both sides : on the side of the Government of India, "in consultation with the Government of India"' and "with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite", and on the Azad Kashmir side "in consultation with local authorities".

The whole thing is perfectly clear. We are willing to proceed on that basis. Before I go on to deal with the intervening submission that was made by the representative of India, I shall here deal —so that I do not have to revert to these matters later—with her criticism of what she has been pleased to term my offer. I want the Council to have before it these clauses of the two resolutions dealing with demilitarization; this would be the appropriate moment to dispose of that matter.

I have said—and I shall now try to clarify the matter again—with regard to the obligation undertaken by India under the 13 August 1948 resolution to withdraw the bulk of their forces, difficulty has arisen because the bulk could not be deter­mined. I shall not go over again the meetings of 9 March and India's refusal to place its proposal on the table, as it is already on the record and it is not necessary to repeat it. The difficulty was that the bulk could not be determined. I said that India had itself now determined the bulk. In addressing the Security Council on the first occasion, 8 December 1952 (608th meeting), the representative of India said this :

"In view of the considerations which I have mentioned, and after careful examination and assessment by its experts, the Government of India had come to the con­clusion that a minimum force of 28,000 was required to carry out its responsibilities. However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces, and as a further contribution towards a settlement, the Government of India is prepared to effect a further reduc­tion of 7,000, to a figure of 21,000, which, is the absolute and irreducible minimum. I should like to emphasize that this figure, which includes the former State armed forces, represents less than one-sixth of the Indian forces at the time of the cease-fire. It should further be emphasized that this force will have no supporting arms such as armour or artillery. In addition to its other duties, this small force would also be responsible for policing the cease-fire line on the other side of which is the aggressor. This line is several hundred miles long and runs through difficult and mountainous terrain. This force has also to guard the extensive borders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. A glance at the map will be sufficient to indicate the magnitude of the task with which the proposed force will be entrusted."

1. submission was this. Here India had put forward its own determination of what it needed to carry out its responsibilities, which include, as expressly set out, the maintenance of the cease-fire line, the security of the State, assisting local authori­ties in the maintenance of law and order. It needs a force of 28,000, which includes State armed forces, and it can carry without armour or artillery.    

The determination of the bulk has to be made not by the Commission under part II, paragraph B, 2. After the bulk is withdrawn, India can maintain, within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire, the minimum strength of its forces which, in agreement with the Commission, are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order.

What I said was this : "We do not insist that the deter­mination of this number should be in agreement with the Commission. We are prepared to accept India's own estimate of the minimum number that is required for the purpose of the 13 August resolution—that is to say, that in order to comply with paragraphs B, I and 2 of the resolution of 13 August 1948, we shall accept that number as representing the minimum that the Government of India considers necessary for the mainten­ance of law and order and for the purpose of safe-guarding the security and the maintenance of cease-fire line—that is to say, the 28,000".

1. case goes further. They say : "When you have completely disbanded and disarmed the Azad Kashmir forces, we will make a further reduction". That is a matter of controversy, of interpretation. I submitted : "Let us proceed at least as far as we can in the implementation of these resolutions on the basis of agreement before the controversy arises. The contro­versy would arise when you start on the disbanding and the disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces and final disposal of the remaining Indian State armed forces. We shall leave that aside for the moment.``

Are we or are we not agreed that India can discharge all its responsibilities under the resolution of 13 August with a minimum of 28,000 troops, including the State armed forces without armour and artillery ? We consider that it is a high figure. We are certain that if the Commission had to make the determination it would be able to place the figure at a much lower one. But in order to make a move and to show that both sides are prepared to go on with the implementation of these resolutions, we are prepared to accept that figure as representing the minimum that the Government of India is permitted to maintain within the cease-fire lines of its forces for the purpose of assisting the local authorities in the maintenance of law and order. Incidentally, India is satisfied that the minimum is enough for it to discharge other duties, which India mistakenly thinks that under the resolution it is solely for it to determine. It is not. Nevertheless, for the moment they are satisfied that 28,000 will be sufficient for all those purposes and we have accepted that. Let us go forward.

So far as the resolution of 13 August is concerned, it is before the Commission and there are no secret clauses in it. There is nothing here, not one word, that is any indication that during that stage—I want to emphasize that because to some extent the position as it has been represented in the Press has been misunderstood—that does not finish the demilitariza­tion. During that stage of the demilitarization, as laid down in this resolution and as accepted by both sides, we shall do whatever the resolution lays down for us to do under section A, paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. India has to do whatever the resolution lays down under section B, paragraphs 1 and 2. Under section B, paragraphs 1 and 2, India itself has determined the number to be 28,000. We accepted that. Let us go forward with the implementation of section A, paragraphs 1 and 2—paragraph 3 of section A does not relate to demilitarization—and section B, paragraphs 1 and 2.

As I submitted on the last occasion [609th meeting], the question of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, arises only under paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949. Now, when you are done with the resolution of 13 August 1948, then the Plebiscite Administrator takes over. The resolution of 5 January 1949 so provides. Then the Commission, now represented by the United Nations Repre­sentative and the Plebiscite Administrator, under paragraph 4 (a), "will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces".

Then we have the words ``such disposal to be with due regard to security of the State and the freedom of the plebi­scite." We agree. We do not want any addition to that. Then on the other side, we have the words ``final disposal of the armed forces in the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in con­sultation with the local authorities." We are not asking for anything more. We are not putting any additional clauses in the resolution. We are prepared to go forward.

The point reiterated throughout has been that India will not depart from the two resolutions, that we must strictly adhere to them. We agree. We do not seek to depart from the two resolutions and we are prepared to adhere to them. The puzzling position that arises is the fact that India goes on saying—as if it were in two parallel lines—that on the one side we must adhere to the resolutions and that it cannot accept anything else. But when India is called upon to adhere to the resolutions, it starts asking for a great deal more, which is not provided for at all in the resolutions or which is provided for during the stages in which India requires it.

Let us take this question of the disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. It is absolutely clear from the extracts which I read out at the last meeting from the reports of the Commis­sion, that the following was made clear by the Commission to Prime Minister of India—the proposals of 13 August had not yet become a resolution—when discussing the resolution of 13 August 1948 : we are aware of the dangers in the situation. We have tried to strike a military balance. Under our proposals —which were then the proposals of 13 August 1948—there will be left on the Indian side the limited number of forces, designed to assist the local authorities in the maintenance of law and order, and the State armed forces. There will be left on the Azad Kashmir side only the Azad Kashmir people in their present positions. The Pakistan army will have been withdrawn, the tribesmen and volunteers will have been withdrawn.

This was explained to the Prime Minister of India and he understood the meaning of the proposals of 13 August 1948 in that sense. The Commission later explained to the Pakistan Government that it was seeking to establish a military balance during that period. There will be limited Indian forces on the other side, and the Azad Kashmir forces will not be disarmed or disbanded during that period.

There is nothing in the resolution of 13 August to require that. There is nothing in the explanations given by the Com­mission to require that. We admit that a large-scale disbandment and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, at a sub­sequent stage, was contemplated by the Commission. That is the meaning of paragraph 4 (b) of the second resolution, that is, that the "final disposal of the armed forces in that territory" —Azad Kashmir—"will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities". We accept that. We do not go back on it.

When the stage is reached, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine the final disposal of the forces left on both sides. We shall accept what they decide, in consultation with the local authorities on the one hand, and in consultation with the Government of India on the other hand.

The curious complication that is again sought to be raised by India is the following : it insists that during the stage of the demilitarization contemplated under the resolution of 13 August 1948, there should be a disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces. Where is that provided for in that resolution ? When did the Commission say, either to the Government of India or to the Government of Pakistan that was contemplated under any of the clauses of that resolution 7 On the other hand, I have cited quite clear explanations of the Commission to both sides, to the effect that during that stage the Azad Kashmir forces will not be disbanded or disarmed : they will remain in their positions. There are provisions to that effect in paragraph 4 (a) and (b).

India has sought to put its own interpretation on the words "final disposal". I shall not detain the Council by sub­mitting a detailed argument on the meaning of the words "final disposal" as it appears in paragraphs 4 (a) and (6) of the resolution. All I will do at this moment is to say the following : here are the words "final disposal of Indian and State-armed forces", contained paragraph 4 {a), and the words "final disposal of the armed forces in that territory"—meaning the Azad Kashmir Territory—contained in paragraph 4 (b).

Mutatis mutandis, the language is identical in the two sub-paragraphs. Whatever the words "final disposal" mean in paragraph 4 (a), they mean the same in paragraph 4 (b). Whatever they mean in paragraph 4 (b), they mean the same in paragraph 4 (a).

I shall not carry the argument further now. I am not seeking to place any restrictive interpretation upon it or any extensive interpretation upon it. I am willing that we should go forward with the implementation of the 13 August resolution. When the Commission is satisfied that Pakistan volunteers who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting have with­drawn, and when they are satisfied that the Pakistan army has begun its withdrawal, then India will begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces in stages to be agreed upon with the Com­mission. Let that operation be carried out. It was held up by the difficulty of ascertaining the bulk of the Indian forces and the minimum number of its forces to be retained. The Govern­ment of India has given the figure of 28,000, including the State armed forces, with no armour or artillery.

This is not a determination by the Commission but by the United Nations Representative ; we are prepared to accept it and to go forward on this basis.

One or two matters have been raised incidentally. It is said that we have offered to withdraw our armour or artillery, but there is no mention of it on the other side. Will armour and artillery remain on the other side ? Again, whatever the meaning of the resolutions may be, I admit it is a relevant consideration. Whatever armour and artillery are withdrawn from the other side shall be withdrawn from the Azad Kashmir Territory also, if any of the Azad Kashmir forces are equipped. If they are, they shall be withdrawn, as part of that operation, but before we pass on to the disbanding stage. I accept that position.

But then it is said : the Azad Kashmir people are in the operational control of the Pakistan army and they are practi­cally a part of the Pakistan army. They are under the opera­tional control of the Pakistan army, it is true. The Pakistan army will withdraw in the stage of demilitarization contemplated in the resolution of 13 August 1948. When the Pakistan army withdraws from that territory, it will cease to exercise opera­tional control over the Azad Kashmir forces. They will be under the operational control of their own officers. The Pakistan army will not continue to exercise any operational control over them. Therefore, the argument based upon continuing exercise of operational control is met and should be considered to be completely satisfied. All that will remain will be the Azad Kashmir forces under their own officers, under the local author­ity, that authority being under the surveillance of the Commis­sion as provided by part II, paragraph A, 3 of the resolution of 13 August 1948. There is no confusion. We shall not try to say on the one hand that we are willing to carry out the resolution, and then to put forward conditions which subtract from the resolution or nullify the resolution.

We mean what we say and we shall be prepared to carry out what we say, namely, to implement the terms of the resolu­tion as now determined with regard to numbers by the figure offered by India.

It was then said that the Azad Kashmir forces would remain, and that was not contemplated. But that I accept; they are to be dealt with under paragraph 4 (a) and (b). If the Plebiscite Administrator, in dealing with that question in con­sultation with the local authorities, comes to the conclusion that there shall remain only 500 of them, we shall not object; we shall agree. It is for the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the local authorities, to determine their final disposal. Equally, if the Plebiscite Adminis­trator and the Commission, in consultation with the Government of India, come to the conclusion that on the other side there shall remain, let us say, a force of 15,000 out of the 28,000 that are left, while there should be only 1,000 on the Azad Kashmir side, we shall accept that too. That is for them to determine in consultation. They will hear each side and will then arrive at their determination. Where under these two resolutions is there any provision or implication that it is solely for the Government of India to decide what their irreducible minimum is or that it is solely for the Pakistan Government to decide whether they shall or shall not withdraw Pakistan forces ? Or where is it stated that it is for the Pakistan Government or the Azad Kashmir authorities to decide how much they shall retain? Both sides agreed to place this matter in the hands of impartial authorities of international standing who will hear both sides and make a determination. We adhere to that and have no desire to depart from it. Is India prepared to adhere to it and does India have any desire to depart from it ? Where did they get this idea that it is for them to decide the forces necessary for the security of the State, how many must remain or what the irreducible minimum is ? That is by no means the case; they know what they agreed to and if language means anything they have already agreed that after the bulk of the forces is with­drawn the final disposal of the Indian and State armed forces, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of  the plebiscite, shall be carried out by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the Govern­ment of India, We are not seeking to minimize the fact that it is equally agreed by the Government of India that as regards the Azad Kashmir territory, the final disposal of the armed forces in that territory—that is to say the Azad Kashmir forces—will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administra­tor in consultation with the local authorities. We shall accept both determinations; we shall not withdraw from that. If they are satisfied that a number much in excess of what we think is needed on the other side is needed, and they so determine, we shall accept that determination. If they decide that a number far below that which we consider to be necessary on the Azad Kashmir side will satisfy the requirements of the situation, we shall accept what they say and we shall not withdraw—from our agreement. Is India prepared to do the same ?

My offer therefore was this. India itself has put forward a number which we consider too high, but it has said that a force of 28,000 is necessary, including the State armed forces, without armour and artillery, for the discharge of all their responsibilities. We say that is all right; this has not been determined by the Commission, but in order to make some progress we agree to it.

It is then stated with reference to the Azad Kashmir forces that although they are to be dealt with in accordance with paragraph 4 (b) no one has made an effort to meet India's wish that a substantial number of Azad Kashmir forces should be disbanded and disarmed at the very first stage of demilitariza­tion. India says that it will not do what is required under paragraph 4 (a), it wants paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January to be carried out. It is not willing to accept the carrying out of paragraph 4 (a) and that has been the trouble all the time.

When India raised this question of Azad Kashmir, Pakistan tried to meet its wishes and tried to frame some scheme under which those wishes could be met. India said that we were including State armed forces on the Indian side and that that was not provided for. However, it is clearly provided for in paragraph 4 (a). Therefore, strict adherence is refused because the Azad Kashmir forces are not included in the first stage and, when the Azad forces are sought to be included— which would necessitate a further reduction on the Indian side—India will not agree to this and says it cannot be done.

I want to make our position on that point quite clear. Although armour and artillery are not specifically mentioned anywhere, they were referred to by the representative of India, who said that those forces will have no armour or artillery and it was therefore only fair to ask what the position on the other side would be. The position will be that, when there is no armour or artillery on their side, there will be none on our side, though the Azad Kashmir forces may still be in possession of some.

There are one or two intermediate matters to which r should like to refer. The dispute about water has been mention­ed. The bulk of the irrigation system water before partition went into the West Punjab while a small part went into the East Punjab. That is true, but what has not been mentioned is this : East Punjab, after the province was divided, pointed out that the whole of this irrigation system was developed by the joint resources of the province before it was partitioned. The greater part had gone into West Punjab for geographical reasons and East Punjab wanted credit for the extra share of the irriga­tion system which had gone to West Punjab. That share was determined and the question then arose of the amount of compensation which East Punjab should receive. We said that they should receive their proportionate share of the capital cost of the project, but they said that as the project had turned out to be a very profitable one it would be unfair to determine its present value on the basis of the original cost of construction. A tribunal was set up to determine the matter and it agreed that India, in respect of the excess for which it was entitled to receive compensation, should receive twice the amount of the original capital cost. That was the compensation awarded to India, and that settled the question of the fifteen main canals, twelve on one side and three on the other. India next asked the Com­mission to determine who should have the water.

India stated that West Punjab was an area of food surplus and that East Punjab was an area of deficit. That was true at the time of partition and no doubt it meant that such water resources as were available so each side must be fully develop­ed, but in order to improve matters on one side you cannot take away what the other was entitled to. That would be con­trary to the basis of partition, contrary to international law and contrary to the principles determined by Sir Benegal Rau himself when he presided over the Commission. However, I will leave that aside because it is not the question which the Security Council is dealing with today. But I do wish to put before the Council that in consequence of the action taken by the Govern­ment of India, West Punjab today is a deficit area and East Punjab is beginning to be a surplus area as a result of this diversion of water. In the meantime, the representative of India has said that officers of the International Bank are now investi­gating the possibility of using more and more water for this purpose, and in spite of repeated requests, in spite of India's agreement that supplies will not be interfered with, India is going on with the construction of its works in consequence of which it can at any moment divert every drop of water from West Punjab and Pakistan. Those works are proceeding and some of the new canals have been opened, as a result of which we are getting much less water. But, as I have said, this is not the question now before the Security Council and I merely mention it in connexion with the apprehensions raised in the minds of the people of West Punjab and of the Government in connexion with the threat to the Mangla Headworks in conse­quence of the offensive mounted by India in April 1948.

We are told : "If a threat arises and Pakistan moves its troops, that would be the law of the jungle." But who started applying the law of the jungle ? I have described to the Security Council what took place in Junagadh. The Council is aware of the situation in Hyderabad, because that matter is also on the agenda and statements on it have been made to the Council on several occasions. India moved its troops into Junagadh and took possession of it. India moved its troops into Kashmir and took possession of the greater part of it. Who has been practis­ing the law of the jungle ? India turned off the waters, because it was the upper riparian owner and could control the waters. Who has been practising the law of the jungle ? But the Pakistan Press and the Pakistan people speaking from the platform must not say these things : that is what annoys India, that reminds me of a verse, the English translation of which runs as follows : "I am denounced if I breathe a sigh of protest. Nobody protests against his killing."

It has been said that India is prepared to go forward on the basis of the two resolutions, but will not accept anything which is inconsistent with those basic resolutions. We are not asking India to do anything inconsistent with those resolutions. As I have already explained, all that we desire is that India should move forward with them. One could match all this talk of aggression, of the law of the jungle, of the sufferings, and soon. Not only could one match it : one could draw pictures of actual occurrences that were more lurid than could be drawn on the other side. From the very first moment when I addressed the Security Council, I have said that deplorable things were happe­ning on both sides. It would be unprofitable to attempt to strike a balance in that regard.           

The question is : Are we prepared to go forward on the basis of the agreement which we have made—an agreement which has been approved by the Security Council and is before the whole world in the form of two resolutions ? We are and have at all times been prepared to go forward. If India is also prepared to do so, we can do any of the following things : we can strictly apply the terms of the resolutions and allow the United Nations Commission to determine the minimum number of Indian troops which should remain on the side of the State occupied by India during the first part of demilitarization. The bulk of the Indian troops would then be withdrawn. We should accept that determination. Would India ? The determination would be made in consultation with India. Once it had been made, we should begin to withdraw our regular troops and India would begin to withdraw the bulk of its troops. There­after, the Plebiscite Administrator would take over. The final disposition of the forces remaining on both sides would be made by the Plebiscite Administrator. We are prepared to accept that course ; it is a strict interpretation of the two resolutions.

If, as I have said previously, India is for some reason apprehensive that that situation, though agreed upon, involves some kind of danger or threat to it, and if India desires that, as part of the first stage of demilitarization, a large-scale disband­ing and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces should also take place, we are equally willing to accept that—in other words, the implementation of paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949—provided paragraph 4 (a) is implemented simultaneously.

We have no objection to either course; we are prepared to go forward on the basis of either. We have accepted all previous plans which have been put forward to carry out these ideas.

I have already explained Pakistan's position on the draft resolution [SI2839] now before the Security Council. I would only add this : if, in the further stage contemplated in the draft resolution, agreement should, unfortunately, not result, a report by the parties would be either a summary or an expansion of the parties' submissions which the Security Council has already heard.

I should like to state, once again, that we are prepared to go forward on the basis of the draft resolution now before the Security Council, subject to the suggestions which I made when I last spoke and which might improve the situation, as well as the possibilities of reaching an agreement between the two sides.