16121952 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 609 held on 16 December 1952.

16121952 Text of the speech made by Mr. Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 609 held on 16 December 1952.

I find myself this afternoon in a position of some embar­rassment in having to attempt a reply to the statement which the representative of India made at the last meeting of the Security Council. The statement contained charges against Pakistan which no country could let pass without challenge. On the other hand, I have always had so much esteem for the representative who spoke on behalf of India and continue to entertain such respect, esteem and—if I may say so without impertinence—affection for her that I am afraid lest anything I might say should in the slightest degree jar on her feelings. I shall try to avoid that. 1 can fully appreciate that she had to put her Government's case as her Government saw it. I am not making any complaint whatso­ever: I am sure the Security Council and the representative of India will appreciate that I, also, have to put my side of the case—first, with reference to the allegations which were made against Pakistan and, secondly, with reference to the merits of the dispute as it stands today and the draft resolution now under discussion.

In the forefront of the submission made on behalf of India was the charge that Pakistan had been guilty of aggres­sion—not once, but twice—against a neighbouring; friendly State, a fellow Member of the United Nations. That is a very grave and serious charge. When it was said that Pakistan had been guilty of aggression against a neighbouring, friendly State, a Member of the United Nations, obviously, the allega­tion was based, to start with, on the assumption—altogether apart from the facts—that Kashmir was part of the territory of India.

I shall proceed to explain to the Security Council— although the greater part of my submission will not be new to the permanent members—that both the above-mentioned allegations are without foundation.

It was said that Pakistan had been guilty of aggression, first, by aiding the tribesmen who invaded Kashmir in the autumn of 1947 and, secondly, by sending its own forces into the territory of Kashmir on 8 May 1948. In order to appreciate-the situation, it is necessary to go into the background of the partition of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan, although it will not be necessary to go into it in any detail.

The basis of partition, asset out in the statement of 3 June 1947 of the then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, was that Pakistan would comprise contiguous Muslim-majority areas in the north-west and the north-east of the sub-continent, and India would be constituted an independent sovereign State and would comprise contiguous non-Muslim-majority areas. That was the basis of partition. I shall read it out. the relevant sentences from paragraph 9 of the statement of 3 June 1947 to which I have referred. Before I do that, however, I might explain that a boundary commission was to be set up to determine what were the Muslim-majority areas and the non-Muslim-majority areas, and the sentence that I am about to quote relates to the terms of reference and the functions of this boundary commission. The statement reads :

It will be instructed to demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of the Punjab on the basis of ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims".

The statement goes on to say "Similar instructions will be given to the Bengal boundary commission", but we are not concerned with what happened on the eastern side.

That is the point, then, from which we start: that British India was to be partitioned on the basis of contiguous majo­rity areas of Muslims and contiguous majority areas of non-Muslims. But that did not solve the whole question. On the sub-continent, there were large areas governed by Indian rulers, which were known as the Indian States. With regard to the Indian States, it was decided that each State would have. the choice of acceding to Pakistan or to India, as it might| desire. That was the constitutional position: each State would have a choice—although, of course, as explained by Lord  Mountbatten, the then Governor-General, each State, in[ making its choice, would no doubt have regard in many! factors—geographical position and other factors—that might! affect the situation.

In actual practice, it was quite clear what would happen in the case of the majority of them. With regard to the majority of the Indian States, no problem would arise, as the geographical position itself would determine to which Dominion the State should accede.

It was apprehended, however, that problems might arise which would lead to trouble with regard to States in which the ruler was a Muslim, say, and the majority of the people of the State were non-Muslims, or vice versa. There were several such States. One might cite as examples Kashmir, Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kapurthala. In Kashmir and Kapurthala, the ruler was a Hindu and the majority of the population was Muslim; in Junagadh and Hyderabad, the ruler was a Muslim and the majority of the population was Hindu.

So far as Kapurthala is concerned, unfortunately the question did not arise or, rather, was not permitted to arise. I say "unfortunately" in view of the circumstances which rendered it unnecessary for a ? decision on accession to be taken: Kapurthala had a population that was 61 percent Muslim. During the tragedy that over-took that part of the Punjab at the time of the partition, the whole of this Muslim population was either murdered or driven out of the State, so that no Muslim was left to raise any question with regard to the accession. But the way in which this question was solved in Kapurthala had become well known. In fact, the same sort of thing happened in other States also—in Patiala, Jind, Nabah, Faridkot, Bharatpur—but there the Muslims were in a minority. The misfortunes that attended the actual carrying out of the partition as regards certain sections of the population Both East Punjab and West Punjab overtook these people also . But the question became acute with regard to Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad.

Before we go on to see what actually happened in Kashmir, what was the principle to be applied in determining whether a State of that kind, in which the ruler belonged to one community and the majority of the population belonged to the other, should accede to Pakistan or should accede to India ?

As the Council is probably aware, the authority that the British exercised in respect of these Indian States was desig­nated by the term "suzerainty". As part of the changes that took place in consequence of independence, suzerainty lapsed. It is the Indian case that, on the lapse of suzerainty, sover­eignty in the Indian States was vested in the people, and that therefore any decision with regard to accession had to be taken by the people of the State.

How it would work out in practice was explained by Mr. Ayyangar, representative of India, when he spoke on this matter in the Security Council in 1948. But there is also an official pronouncement of the Government of India on the subject. It is contained in the White Paper issued by the Government of India on Hyderabad, dated 10 August 1948, from which I quote

The Government of India is firmly of the view that whatever sovereign rights reverted to these States on the lapse of paramountcy. they vest in the people, and conditions must be created in every State for a free and unfettered exercise of these rights".

Mr. Ayyangar, speaking in the Security Council on behalf of India on 15 January 1948 [227th meeting], said :

On the question of accession, the Government of India has always enunciated the policy that in all cases of dispute the people of the State concerned should make the decision".

On 8 March 1948, speaking before the Security Council [264th meeting]—this time, on the subject of the Junagadh— Mr. Ayyangar said :

"No doubt the Ruler, as the head of the State, has to take action in respect of accession. When he and his people are in agreement as to the Dominion to which they should accede, he applies for accession to that Dominion. However, when he takes one view and his people take another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people. That is our position."

Therefore, we have this position clearly set out: that, where there is a difference of opinion between the ruler and the people with regard to accession, although the ruler is the instrument through whom the choice is to be expressed, the choice must be that of the people.

What happened in Kashmir ? In Kashmir, as early as August 1947, people in certain parts of the State revolted against the authority of the Maharajah, the root of the trouble being their suspicion, or their fear, that the Maharajah was inclined to accede to India. As the Council is aware, the overwhelming majority of the people of Kashmir are Muslims; and Maharajah is a Hindu. That revolt started in August. A Press note was issued by the Government of the Maharajah on 12 September 1947 from Srinagar, giving an account of the origin of these disturbances which developed into the revolt. It starts with setting out the beginnings of the trouble in Bagh, Sidhnutti and Poonch Tehsils early in August. It then goes on to describe incidents that occurred during the month of August—on the 24th, 25th and 26th—and describes how the troops came into conflict with the people, and thus the movement spread.

Later on, the Times of London also summarized the origin of this trouble in the following words :

"In the remaining Dogra area 237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated, unless they escaped to Pakistan along the border, by the Dogra State forces, headed by the Maharajah in person and aided by Hindus and Sikhs. This elimination of two-thirds of the Muslim population of Jammu province has entirely changed the present composition of the Eastern Jammu province."

Helen Kirkpatrick, an American journalist, wrote in the New York Post of 13 May 1948 to the following effect—I quote from her dispatch :

"Can India deny that the Kashmiris rebelled against the despotic rule of their Hindu Maharajah in August, two months before the so-called raiders entered Kashmir ?"

This proves beyond a shadow of doubt that, as early as August, the people of Kashmir had revolted against the autho­rity of the Maharajah in respect of this question of accession. No further proof is needed that there was a dispute—and an active dispute, resulting in the revolt, in the defeat of the Maharajah's troops, and in the Maharajah having to leave his capital, Srinagar—regarding this question of accession.

But here is further proof, if any further proof is needed. On 21 October 1947, Sheikh Abdulla, at present Prime Minis­ter of Kashmir, gave a Press statement in Delhi, from which I quote :

"The happenings in certain States, such as Patiala and Bharatpur and elsewhere have, naturally, caused apprehension in the minds of the Muslims in Kashmir, who form the majority of the population. They were afraid that the State's accession to India posed a danger to them. The present troubles in Poonch were because of the unwise policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch, who suffered under their local ruler and, again, under the Kashmir Durbar, who was the overlord of Poonch, had started a people's movement for re­dress of their grievances. It was not communal. The Kashmir State sent their troops and there was panic in Poonch, but most of the adult population of Poonch were ex-servicemen in the Indian Army who had close connexions with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, closed the frontier, and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas."

All this had happened before a single tribesman ever entered the territory of Kashmir.

Was this aggression by Pakistan, or was this tyranny by the Maharajah of Kashmir ? The fact is that there did exist this freedom movement in Kashmir, which swelled into a re­volt. As I have said, the Maharajah's forces were defeated in that area and the Maharajah was forced to flee from the capital. He asked for military aid from India. In these circumstances, the people objected to his inclination or desire to accede to India. Not only was there a difference between them; a revolt had started. He appealed to India, asking for military aid to deal with the situation. India made it clear that it could not give him military aid unless he offered to accede. He wrote a letter of accession, as dictated by Mr. Menon, the Secretary of the Government of India, dealing with the Indian States. The letter itself is proof of his meaning. That was on 26 October 1947.

Lord Mountbatten, then Governor-General of India, signified his acceptance of the accession on 27 October. Already, on the morning of 27 October, Indian troops had occupied Kashmir.

Was this aggression by Pakistan ? Or was this aggression by India against the people of Kashmir, in support of the tyranny. of the Maharajah ?

The acceptance by India of this letter of the Maharajah's created no legal relationship between Kashmir and India. The Maharajah was not prepared to submit the issue of accession to a referendum in order to ascertain the will of the people, and the Dominion of India, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people and principles governing the matter, purported to enter into an arrangement by which Kashmir should become a part of the Union of India. The Government of Pakistan could not be expected to acquiesce in such an arrangement.

The acceptance by India of the so-called accession of Kashmir could not but be regarded by the Government of Pakistan as an encroachment on the sovereignty and territory of Pakistan and inconsistent with the friendly relations that should have existed between the two dominions. This action on the part of India was considered by the Government of Pakistan to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of Pakistan by extending the influence and the boundaries of the Dominion of India in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected. The responsibility for the consequences that ensued from this action rests squarely on the shoulders of the Indian Govern­ment. I do not know whether the representative of India would agree with me in this view of the matter, but I assure the Security Council that the Prime Minister of India agrees with me.

Let me explain. Shortly after partition, Junagadh, a State in a position the reverse of that of Kashmir in people were Hindus, acceded to Pakistan. Up to then, people were Hindus, acceded to Pakistan. Up to them, no incident of any kind had happened in Junagadh to mark any difference in this matter between the people of Junagadh and the ruler. I am not saying that they supported this action but I do say that there was no trouble of any kind in Junagadh over the ques­tion at that time. Thereupon the Prime Minister of India made the following statement to the Prime Minister of Pakis­tan on 12 September 1947 in his telegram on this subject :

"The Dominion of India would be prepared to accept any democratic test in respect of the accession of the Junagadh State to either of the two Dominions. They would, accordingly, be willing to abide by the verdict of its people in this matter ascertained under the joint supervision of the Dominion of India and Junagadh.

"if, however, the ruler of Junagadh is not prepared to submit this issue to a referendum and if the Dominion of Pakistan, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people and the principles governing the matter, enter into an arrangement by which Junagadh is to become a part of the Federation of Pakistan, the Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce in such an arrangement."

He therefore agreed with me that the action of his Government in respect of Kashmir in accepting or purporting to accept an offer of accession in circumstances where not only was there a difference between the wishes of the people and the wishes of the ruler but people had made that difference manifest most emphatically, was, in the words of the Prime Minister of India cannot be expected to acquiesce in." Simi­larly, the Government of Pakistan cannot be expected to acquiesce in such an arrangement. And here an attempt is made to persuade the Security Council that the entry of tribes­man into Kashmir territory in support of the movement to which I have referred, on 22 October 1947, four days before this letter of the Maharajah's was even written, was an act of aggression on the part of Pakistan against India.

On 22 September 1947, there was a further telegram from the Prime Minister of India on the same subject, from which I quote :

"The Pakistan Government has unilaterally proceeded to action in which it was made plain the Government of India could never and does not acquiesce. Such accep­tance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by the Government of India as an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions.

"This action of Pakistanis considered by the Govern­ment of India to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of the principles on which the partition was agreed upon and effected. In these circumstances, I hope that it will be possible for you to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to reconsider their attitude on accession of Junagadh.   But if the  matter  is not reconsidered red, the responsibility for the consequences must, I am compelled to inform you, rest squarely on the shoulders of the Pakistan Government.

"The Government of India is, however, still prepared to accept the verdict of the people of Junagadh in the matter of accession, the plebiscite being carried out under the joint supervision of the Indian and Junagadh Government."

Apart from the character of the attempt of accession, the way in which the Government of India regarded it and the principles that it insisted must be applied to such cases, it is also interesting to note, in view of further developments in respect of Kashmir, that in the view of the Government of India the fairest way of ascertaining the wishes of the people of the Junagadh State on this matter was to hold a plebiscite under the joint supervision of the Junagadh Government, that is to say the Government of the State, and of the Government of India, that is to say the Government of the Dominion to whom on the basis of the majority principle accession should have taken place. The Government of Pakistan was not to have any share in the arrangements under which these wishes were to be ascertained.

Those were the principles applicable to the question of accession. Sovereignty rests in the people. Though the ins­trument for intimating the decision on accession was to be the ruler, where there was a difference between the ruler and his people, their wishes were to be ascertained and the verdict of the people were to be communicated by the ruler for the pur­poses of accession. Nothing else would be accepted. Nothing else could be valid. Apply these tests to Kashmir. In those circumstances, in the words of the Prime Minister of India himself, the aggression was by India and not by Pakistan, though it is also worth remembering that the tribesmen had entered Kashmir, as I have said, four days before this letter of the Maharajah's was even written. So much for the first alleged aggression by Pakistan against a neighbouring, friendly State, a Member of the United Nations.

Now we come to the second alleged aggression. This matter was brought before the Security Council in a letter of 1 January 1948 from India [226th meeting]. I do submit that throughout, before the Security Council, the effort of India was to secure the withdrawal of the tribesmen so that Indian armed forces could then crush the freedom movement by military action. That was all that they asked for, insisted upon and continued to work for when the matter was being debated before the Security Council during the winter of 1948. Sheikh Abdullah said as much to the then President of the Security. Council, Mr. van Langenhove of Belgium, who, at the suggestion of the Security Council, was trying to arrange a settlement by conversations between the parties. Sheikh Abdullah's words were: "Get the tribesmen out and we shall do the rest."

 

The Security Council persistently refused to endorse that position. To start with, its first resolution [S/651] of 17 January 1948 [229th meeting] made this appeal to the two parties :

 

"The Security Council,

 

"Having heard statements on the situation in Kashmir from representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan,

 

"Recognizing the urgency of the situation,

 

"Taking note of the telegram addressed on 6 January by its President to each of the parties and of their replies thereto in which they affirmed their intention to conform to the Charter,

 

"Calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation..."

Then I must draw attention to just one or two extracts from the statements of members of the Security Council indi­cating the attitude that the Council adopted on this matter of trying to bring about a decision by military action, which was the desire and the effort of India.

Addressing the Security Council on 28 January 1948 [236th meeting], Mr. Noel Baker said the following :

"The cause which is now in dispute here, the cause of the fighting in Kashmir, is the question : To which of the two Governments. India or Pakistan, shall Kashmir accede ? In my conception, infinitely the best way to stop the fighting is to assure those who are engaged in it that a fair settlement will be arrived at under which their rights will be assured. In other words, as I remarked to the representative of India in our first talk after his arrival, in my profound conviction, a settlement arrived at quickly in the Security Council is the real way to stop the fighting. The whole thing, from the preliminary measures as to the fighting, right up to the conduct of the plebiscite in the end, is all one problem. Only when the combatants know what the future holds for them, will they agree to stop."

That is how the Security Council wanted the fighting to be stopped.

Senator Warren Austin, speaking on 29 January 1948 [237th meeting], said the following :

"No one wants to see a superior force sent into the Kashmir area to drive out the invaders of that area. Everyone, we assume, wants to see this situation so settled by an agreement that it will not be necessary to use any force to carry it into effect."

Later, in the same speech, he said :

Of course, we can see that a superior military force could be employed to drive out the trespassers in Kashmir and Jammu and to force the battle line off this ground, but that might not and the military character of this problem, that might not settle the matter. On principle and on the impracticality of such a method. I think we have to discard the idea of using force and thus separating this question of the military problem from the other question of a fair plebiscite."

What action did the Security Council take in respect of this problem? First, a draft resolution [S/667] was proposed on 6 February 1948. The Security Council proceeded with its discussion. The six sponsors of the draft resolution spoke in favour of it and explained it, and this is what it sought to provide. I shall not quote the whole resolution, but paragraph 4(c) said the following :

"Regular armed forces in aid of the establishment and maintenance of order must be made available. In this connexion the Governments should seek to ensure cooperation between their military forces to establish order and security until the question of accession shall be determined by the plebiscite."

This was not only a clear exhortation but a direction that the military forces of the two Governments, the Govern­ment of India and the Government of Pakistan, should seek to ensure cooperation so as to establish order and security. We all! know that when the Security Council was about to vote on this draft resolution the delegation of India, under instruction from their Government, withdrew from the Council. Ultimately, a resolution was adopted by the Council in 21 April 1948 [286th meeting]. I shall draw attention to two of the provisions of that resolution [S/726].

Paragraph 2(a) reads as follows :

"When it is established to the satisfaction of the Com­mission-that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective", the Government of India "shall put into operation in consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the mini­mum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order."

Paragraph 5 reads as follows :

"If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Domi­nion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification."

I have quoted these paragraphs to show the attitude of the Security Council towards this problem. But as I have said on the other hand. India was bent upon securing a military decision. The representative of India said the other day [608 meeting] that this second alleged aggression by Pakistan took place at a time when the matter was pending before the Security Council. It would therefore be helpful to see what it is that the Security Council is seeking to do.

It is true, as I have already said, that the resolution of 6 February 1948 was not adopted because India withdrew, and the resolution of 21 April 1948 was adopted, but India rejected it. However, that does not affect the attitude of the Security Council as exhibited by the draft resolution of 6 February and the resolution of 21 April 1948. That being the attitude of the Security Council, and having itself brought the case before the Council, India was making on-the-spot preparations to launch an offensive so as to bring about a military decision.

Who was the aggressor? During the latter part of March and the whole of April 1948, when these preparations were Going forward, a limited offensive had already been mounted. certain areas had already been taken from the other side. who was the aggressor ? Was Pakistan the aggressor?

I have said that preparations for a military offensive were being made- On 15 March 1948, in the middle of the discussions before the Security Council, the Indian Defence Minister announced in the Indian Constituent Assembly that the Indian Army would clear out all resistance from Kashmir's soil in the next two or three months.

This is a public declaration. No further proof is needed But here is more. On 13 April 1948. The Times of London published a dispatch from its special correspondent in Srina-gar, in Kashmir, in which it stated the following :

"The Indian Army has worked extremely hard during the winter months and its position has been much impro­ved-"

Further on, the dispatch says :

"To improve communications a daily air service has been organized, although weather conditions will make flying unsafe for at least two or three weeks. But the force has been considerably strengthened and it should soon be ready for a limited offensive. Already some units have advanced from Rajouri in Jammu and from Uri, and some small successes have been reported. Fighting is bloody. Few prisoners are taken and acts of barbarism have been committed by both sides. Many Pathans have been decapitated" by Sikh troops.``

Here was a public declaration by a responsible Indian1 Minister, by the Minister responsible for this matter, in the middle of March. Here are reports of these preparations in the middle of April. On 20 April, the Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army submitted to the Pakistan Government an appreciation of the military situation. It is a long appreciation, but I shall quote only certain portions. It reads as follows :

"General military situation : (a) The build-up of the Indian Army for an all-out offensive in Kashmir started towards the end of February 1948, at a very rapid rate. Eight brigade troops, complete with supporting arms, artillery, armour, engineers etc., backed by a considerable air force of fighters, bombers and transport aircraft are at present deployed in Jammu and Kashmir and the process of building up continues, but appears to be almost complete now. On 15 March 1948 the Indian Defence Minister announced in the Indian Constituent Assembly that the Indian Army would clear out the so-called raiders from Kashmir within the next two or three months. So far the main concentrations are in the south, that is, in the area of Jammu-Naushera at least one additional brigade is already reported to have moved into the Valley. There are also indications of two sepa­rate commands being organized, one in the Valley and one in the Jammu area. The offensive on a limited scale appears to have started already and Rajouri was captu­red by Indian troops on 12 April. This was followed by a reign of terror which included the burning of villages, and the massacre of civilians population, and other atrocities. Four thousand men are reported to have been victimized in this manner and great panic and confusion prevailed in the area.

' (b) Deduction : It is obvious that a general offensive is about to start very soon now. The present dispositions suggest that it will first start in the south with Bhimber and Mirpur as the most likely objectives with a view to coming right up to the Pakistan border".

Then I will quote the summary of his deductions :

summary of deductions (a) : That a general offensive is being planned by the Indian Army in the north and the south is a certainty. Their objectives are likely to be as follows : south : (i) Bhimber-Mirpur, (ii) Poonch; north: Muzaffarabad-Kohala.

(b) Judging from what has happened in Rajouri, an advance by the and an Army in one of the above areas is almost certain to create a big refugee problem for Pakistan, which is already saturated. Refugees will be an extremely serious strain on the civil administration and a heavy drain on the country's economic and financial resources. From this point of view alone, it is imperative that the Indian Army be prevented from gaining any Of the above objectives.

"(c) Occupation of Bhimber and Mirpur will give India the strategic advantage of having crossed two major obstacles, i.e., the rivers Ravi and Chenab, and of coming right up to the Pakistan border, thereby sitting on our doorsteps, threatening the Jhelum bridge which is so vital for us, and getting further Opportunities for intrigue. It will also give them the control of the Mangla Headworks, thus placing irrigation in Jhelum and other districts at their mercy.

"(d) Occupation of Poonch by the Indian Army is certain to have a most serious effect on the morale of many Punches in the Pakistan Army and this in turn will adversely affect the morale of other troops. Deser­tions will undoubtedly increase and discipline will receive a big set-back.

"(e) The loss of Muzaaffarabad or Kohala will, broadly speaking, have the most far-reaching effects on the security of Pakistan. It would enable the Indian Army to secure the rear gateway to Pakistan through which they can march in at any time they wish to do so, with­out any major obstacle such as the river Jhelum to stand in its way..."

"Recommendations : If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan, to the rear and on the flank, at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not to be effected to dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself,

it is imperative that the Indian Army should not be allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naushera."

That was the appreciation made by the Commander-in-Chief, a distinguished British soldier, on 20 April 1948. On this side, the Security Council had for the moment concluded its hearing of the Kashmir case. The Commission set up by the Security Council to go to the sub-continent in order to bring about a settlement of the Kashmir question had not yet arrived on the sub-continent.

The offensive was launched. Among other objectives, as detailed by the Commander-in-Chief, was the capture of the Mangla Head works. If I were to leave the matter there, it could be said: "The capture of a head works" is only a phrase. What does it matter when compared with other factors which have been outlined? But, here, another diversion is necessary.

The partition of the Punjab cut across the river system of the Province. The Province is so identified with its river system that its very name means "The Laud of the Five Rivers" (Punj : five; Ab : water, or river). Before partition, in both East and West Punjab—but mainly in the west—a splendid irrigation system had been built up, upon which 90 per cent of the prosperity of the Province depended. The partition line was so drawn that two of these rivers—Sutlej together with its tributaries, Bias, and Ravi—while originating in India, later flowed into Pakistan. To other rivers, on the western side—Indus and Chenab—while originating in India, flow through Kashmir and then into Pakistan. One of the middle rivers, Jhelum, originates in Kashmir and flows into Pakistan. That is the only river the upper reaches of which do not lie within Indian territory.

In the assessment of the value of the assets that were to go to each portion of the Punjab after partition, India was awarded by the tribunal set up for the purpose, not its propor­tionate share of the original cost of the irrigation system, but twice the original cost. India contended that, in the meantime, the value of the whole of the irrigation system had considerably increased. The tribunal accepted that contention and awarded India, as I have said, an amount equal to twice the original cost of the system.

The tribunal was dissolved on 31 March 1948. On 1 April 1948, having received this compensation, India turned off the waters of these rivers which used to flow into Pakistan. India did this in spite of the principles of international law applying to such a situation. I ask the Security Council to set that date—1 April 1948—against the dates which I have already given.

Again, it is correct to say that the greater part of the flow of these waters was restored six weeks later under a tempo­rary agreement imposing most onerous conditions upon Pakistan. But that is beside the point. India exercised this control upon the waters of these rivers flowing through its territory : the day after the tribunal was dissolved, India turned off every drop of water which Pakistan had formerly received and in respect of which India had already received compensation from the tribunal.

In countries where there is already an abundance of water, and especially in countries where the problem is always one of drainage rather than of irrigation, the seriousness of the consequences following upon India's action in turning off the waters may not be fully appreciated. But for a country where every drop of water means reviving the dead, parched earth, where in many areas every drop of water means drink­ing water for cattle and for men's food and sustenance—in fact . the maintenance of human life itself—India's action was most callous.

As a result of India's action, the Mangla Headworks were again in danger. The Mangla Headworks—and I now revert to Kashmir—controlled the flow of the Jhelum River with regard to the irrigation system based upon the river in West Punjab. The Headworks are inside Kashmir territory. The military offensive launched by India in the spring of 1948 had as one of its objectives the capture of those Headworks.

1. was the situation with which Pakistan was faced through the month of April 1948. In that situation,The Pakistan Government decided to send in its own troops to stop the further advance of the Indian army towards the Pakis­tan borders and to prevent the Headworks from being captu­red. Pakistan had no international obligation of any kind towards India in respect of this territory. The claim made by India in respect of the territory was based entirely on the Maharajah's letter of 26 October and Lord Mountatten's reply. But Lord Mountbatten's reply itself has said that the question of accession would be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people. In any case, there was, according to the Prime Minister of India himself, an attempt to disrupt a neighbour­ing, friendly State Pakistan took the minimum action which it was obliged to take. The authorities in Pakistan would have been traitors to their trust had they not taken that action. We attempted no occupation of Indian territory. We attempted no fresh occupation by anybody—least of all by our troops—of any portion of Kashmir territory. All that we did was to ward off the dangers to which the Commander-in-Chief referred.

Dealing with this aspect of the matter on 8 February 1950 [464 meeting}, I made this submission to the Security Council—and I would beg the Council's indulgence to quote from my statement :

"I put it to the representatives on the Security Council that if they, in their respective spheres, were charged with the responsibility of the defence and the security of their own countries, and they received this report from their Commander-in-Chief—and in this case it was not a Pakistan national who had made the report : the Com­mander-in-Chief was and is General Sir Douglas E. Gracey, a distinguished British officer—if they had recei­ved this report which every-thing else reinforced and supported : the reports of foreign observers to their newspapers, the speeches of Indian statesmen and their Defence Minister both in public and in the Constituent Assembly, and if they were convinced that this was the situation, what is the very least that they would have done in the circumstances ? Pakistan did that very least and no more. It sent in its troops to hold that line.

"Yesterday, the representative of India said that was an act of aggression. Did the representative of India expect that the Indian Army should march victoriously forward, crush this freedom movement of which I have now given some slight, inadequate picture to the Security Council, and occupy the whole of the State militarily ? India had rejected the Security Council's resolution of 6 Feb­ruary [S/667] ; it had rejected the Security Council's resolution of 21 April [S/726] ; it was not willing to hold a plebiscite under any conditions that would approximate to conditions which would ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. India's avowed object was to occupy the whole State militarily and that action, in addition to what it would have done to Kashmir and the Kashmiris, would have put the whole situation of Pakistan in jeopardy and would have put out of action one of the principal irrigation projects. 1 say again to the Security Council, what is the minimum that any one responsible for the defence of Pakistan would have done ? That is the minimum that we did."

I repeat: had the Government of Pakistan done less in the circumstances than it actually did, it would have been a traitor to the trust which it had undertaken. It was not aggres­sion. It could not possibly have been aggression because the territory in respect of which this action was taken had at no time, in any circumstances, been under the control or the military occupation of India, even as the result of that acces­sion to which reference has been made. Not one inch of that territory was ever occupied by the Pakistan forces. So much for the second alleged aggression.

I regret I have had to take so much of the Security Council's time in going over this ground—for the second, or almost the third, time, The Council will, however, appreciate that, as I have said earlier, it is not possible to sit silent when before this international forum the responsible representative of a great Government of a great country levels charges of that description against a neighbour.

As I have said, India's whole argument in this respect is based on the assumption that there was a valid accession of Kashmir to India. This assumption is entirely erroneous. It is utterly unfounded. It has never been accepted by Pakistan or by the Security Council. As I have said, in his reply of 27 October 1947 to the Maharajah's letter of 2.6 October, Lord Mountbatten made the following statement :

"Consistently with their policy in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people..."

That is the very question to be decided : whether the State shall accede to India or to Pakistan. There has at no time been any accession which would give rise to any legal relationship or to any legal rights—certainly not any which Pakistan could possibly accept. The telegram of 8 November 1947 sent by the Prime Minister of India himself makes that quite clear.

As a matter of fact, during the last five years, approxi­mately, it has been the effort of the Security Council, it has been the effort of Pakistan, it has been the effort of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which was set up by the Security Council, it has been the effort of the various United Nations representatives appointed by the Security Council, to try to persuade India to do what the Prime Minister of India in his telegram of 8 November said should be done. The telegram is long; it sets out various proposals. I shall quote only paragraph 10 :

"it will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated, are : (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir: (2) that the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as the raiders have with-drawnland law and order are restored; (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

Then, so far as the Security Council is concerned, if I may^ draw attention again to those resolutions [S/667 and SI726]— although to different provisions from those I have already quoted—this was the Council's position :     

Paragraph 2 of the draft proposals of 6 February 1948 [SI667] reads :

"Considers that it is urgent and important to stop acts of violence and hostility in Jammu and Kashmir : and to decide the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to Pakistan or to India by the democratic method of a plebiscite to be held, as recogni­zed by the parties, under the auspices of the United Nations to ensure complete impartiality."

There, very clearly, the question is set out: that the question of accession shall, as agreed to by the parties, be decided in this manner.

Paragraph 4(f) of the same draft proposals reads : "The conditions necessary for a free and fair plebiscite on the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan, including an interim administration which will command confi­dence and respect of the people of the State at Jammu Kashmir, must be established."

The fourth paragraph of the preamble of the resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] reads :

"Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite.' And then, in the operative part of that same resolution, we find this paragraph :

"Recommends to the Governments of India and Pakistan the following measures as those which in the opinion of the Council are appropriate to bring about a cessation of the fighting and to create proper conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan". Then, in Section B, paragraph 7, this is stated :

"The Government of India should undertake that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a Plebiscite Administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State in India or Pakistan."

So far as the position of the Security Council and of Pakistan is concerned, it is perfectly clear. Up to a point, the position of India was also perfectly clear. But then gradually it began to be insinuated, in speeches and in documents, that the question to be decided was whether the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir desired to continue the accession or not. That the Security Council will see later, I am constrai­ned to observe, is on a par with the other efforts made on behalf of the Government of India to evade its obligations undertaken by way of acceptance of resolutions or agreements, or expressed through official documents.

On 21 March 1951 [537th meeting], the representative of the United Kingdom expressed himself before the Security Council on this aspect of the matter in the following words :

"The assumption made by the representative of India that the accession has been settled and that no more remains except to give the inhabitants of the State an opportunity to decide whether they should remain in India or not, in the view of my Government cuts right across the very principles on which the Council and, we have always understood, the two parties also, have been striving to effect a settlement."

At the same meeting, the representative of the United States stated before the Security Council :

'The parties, moreover, are committed to permit the people of Kashmir to decide the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan. That commitment is not, as the distinguished representa­tive of India has said, and I quote the words he, used in the Security Council, 'To give the people the right to decide whether they would remain in India or not'. To phrase the plebiscite question in this form would be to disregard the binding agreement accepted by both parties. The Security Council has from the beginning held that the issue of accession is one which is to be settled by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices, and both parties, in the language of their own commitments, have accepted this view."

As the Security Council will recall, the representative of India, when she spoke the other day [608th meeting], insisted —and quite rightly insisted, and I endorse what she said in this respect—that there should be strict adherence to the agree­ment between the two Governments contained in the two reso­lutions of the Commission which both Governments accepted. There are two resolutions of the Commission which together form the agreement between the two Governments : the resolu­tion of 13 August 1948 and the resolution of 5 January 1949.

The resolution of 13 August 1948 says, in part III :

"The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan reaffirm their wish that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the «ill of the people and to that end, upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both Governments agree to enter into consultations with the Commis­sion to determine fair and equitable conditions whereby such free expression will be assured."

1. was put merely as an objective. It was this part III that was subsequently elaborated in the resolution of 5 January 1949. Paragraph 1 of that resolution says this :

"The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite."

There is no question here of continuing accession, of choosing whether to remain or not to remain with India.

The question is today really academic. This question of the validity of the accession, of the alleged aggressions by one side or the other—these matters have long been left behind. The crux of the matter, as the representative of India put in the other day, is the implementation of the two resolutions which constitute the agreement between the two Governments on this matter. Since those resolutions were accepted by the two Governments during the last week of December 1948, long after all these matters had happened and had been debated and had been clarified between the Commission and the two Governments, these questions, as I have said, have long been academic. The events in Kashmir in August, September, October, November and December of 1947, the action taken by the Government of Pakistan on 8 May 1948—these all hap­pened long before these two resolutions were even propounded by the Commission, let alone before they were accepted by the two parties. I would therefore beg the Security Council to remember that, although they are repeatedly raised, they have really now become a form of abuse in which the Government of India chooses to indulge against the Government of Pakistan.

Normally, it would be most unjustifiable on my part to take so much of the time of the Security Council to go over the same ground again. `But the representative of India has solemnly adjourned the Security Council to decide this question of accession if it wants this matter to be dealt with rightly, t submit that, at the time when the Government of India agreed to the resolutions, all these events had occurred, had been de­bated, had been mentioned to the Commission, had been con­sidered by the Commission, had been taken into account by it; clarifications had been sought from the Commission on various aspects of its resolutions touching upon those matters, and the result had been an agreement which is embodied in these two resolutions.

With regard to these two resolutions, the representative of India of said the other day [608th meeting]-%and, as I have already said, I fully endorse what she stated on this matter so far as it relates to the implementation of these two resolutions:

"We wish to make it clear that we cannot accept any decisions which violate the two UNCIP resolutions on which the parties have agreed. But we are always, as hitherto, willing to extend our cooperation in the explo­ration of, and indeed to explore ourselves, every avenue which may lead to a peaceful solution of the problem that does not ignore or violate the basic principles which are vital to a correct appreciation of the problem and which have been accepted by UNCIP and by the parties themselves."

The representative of India then went on to say :

"We do not seek to go behind the UNCIP resolutions, or to ignore the vital elements of principle contained in them. The draft resolution before us appears to do so. We have always adhered to the UNCIP resolutions. Our difficulty has been that repeated attempts have been and are being made to by-pass them, both in the letter and in the spirit. We cannot be a party to the reversal of previous decisions taken by the United Nations Com­mission with the agreement of the parties."

As I have said, I generally agree—I do not agree with every word of it, with the condemnation of the Security Coun­cil or of its mediators or of the Pakistan Government—but I agree that we, on our part, are as willing and eager as the Government of India has, through its representative, professed itself to be to carry out to the fullest the implementation of these two resolutions which the parties have accepted. The only difference is this : as I shall show presently, we have a record of being willing to translate our agreement into actual fact—and equally there is a sad record of evasion on the other side.

On this point, let us see what it is that the resolutions say. The first part of the resolution of 13 August 1948 deals with a ceasefire. I need not advertise that. A cease-fire was reached between the parties, with effect from I January 1949, and a cease-fire line was even drawn up on the maps and on the ground on 27 July 1949. That cease-fire continues and has been reaffirmed several times.

Part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 goes on to say :

"Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in part I, both Governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission."

The first principle is set forth as follows :

'1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represen­ted by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from the State."

We have throughout adhered to that. We have at no "me tried in any way to whittle down this obligation.

2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting."

Although no truce agreement has yet been drawn up, we have carried into effect this obligation.

"3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission."

We adhere to that. We do not seek to exercise our authority over that territory after our troops have been with­drawn.

So far as the question of demilitarization is concerned; or the withdrawal of troops, these are the only obligations laid upon the Pakistan Government. The Pakistan Government fully accepted them. It has throughout accepted them; it has throughout been willing to carry them into effect. I quote now from section B :

"l. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and, further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

"2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary."

1. were the two obligations undertaken by the Government of India. What happened? As I have said, these resolutions—one of 13 August 1948 and the other of 5 January 1949—were accepted. On 9 March 1949 the Commission called a meeting of the military representatives of India and Pakistan in Delhi in order to settle the terms of the truce agree­ment in accordance with part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Our representatives were asked whether we had ready a scheme of demilitarization in accordance with the resolution. We said we could produce one, and we were asked to produce it. We said we could produce one, and we were asked to produce it. We said we could produce one provided India agreed to produce one of its own. On the faith of that assurance we put our scheme before the Commission on the day which had been fixed. When India was called upon to do the same, its repre­sentatives asked for more time because, they said, the Commander-in-Chief was out of Delhi. After the Commander-in-Chief returned they were asked to put in their scheme, and they said they wanted a little more time because the Prime Minister was out of Delhi. After the Prime Minister returned they were asked again, but they still hesitated, and the Com­mission began to feel that India was not willing at that stage to put a scheme on the table. Later, India submitted a scheme to the Commission, but laid this condition upon the Commis­sion, namely, that the scheme was not to be disclosed to the Pakistan Government, the Pakistan military representatives, or even to the Security Council; so that up to this date, neither we nor the Security Council know what is in the Indian Proposal for carrying out the  obligations which it had undertaken under part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. This is what the Commission said in respect of it, in Paragraph 245 of its third interim report of 9 december 1949 s/1430] :"•••India is not prepared to withdraw such part of her forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as the 'bulk', whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces is reached--"

Now, I invite the Security Council—representatives have before them these resolutions, or can easily obtain them—to determine where the resolution of 13 August 1948 requires the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces before the bulk of Indian forces are withdrawn. The language is perfectly clear : "A.I. -the Government of Pakistan-agrees to withdraw its troops from that State. 2. ••• withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals-". As I have said, clause A.2 has already been carried out. We have never repudiated clause A.I nor had any doubt about it, nor about our willingness to carry it out fully.

According to clause B. 1, "When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in part II, A.2 hereof have with­drawn—the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission." Now they make a condition : they will not do it unless the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces have begun. And yet, it has been argued here time after time—at least three or four times—in the course of the address to the Council by the representative of India the other day : We will not submit to any violation; we will not submit to any breach; we will not submit to any alteration of the resolutions.

Who is trying to commit a breach ? Who is trying to introduce new factors ? Who is trying to commit a violation? There is a clear obligation, and here is the report of the Com­mission. We do not know what happened between the Com­mission and the Government of India. The Security Council does not know. But this is their conclusion, that India was not willing to agree to withdraw, quantitatively or qualita­tively, the bulk of its forces and to discharge this obligation unless there was large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces. Which part of the resolution is that? Who is trying to add to or subtract from the resolutions ?

With regard to the Azad Kashmir forces, what was the actual situation ? What is involved there ? When, if at all, were they to be disbanded or disarmed ? Is there anything in the Commission's report or the resolutions that clarify this; or is there not ? So far as the resolutions are concerned, that matter is dealt with in paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949, paragraph 4(b) of which reads as follows :

"(b) As regards the territory referred to in A, 2 of part of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consul­tation with the local authorities."

I shall come to that point later. So far as the resolu­tions are concerned, whatever is to be done is to be done by the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities and determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities. Is there anywhere anything which might cause misunderstanding in the mind of the Government of India to the effect that this was to be done simultaneously with, even in advance of, the withdrawal of the bulk of their forces ? Let us look into that.

Before these resolutions were agreed upon, there were numerous discussions between the Commission and the two Governments. In the course of its discussion with the Govern­ment of India, in August 1948, the Commission pointed out that, according to the provisions of its resolutions, limited Indian forces would remain after the evacuation; and, on the other side, only the Azad people would remain in their present position. I shall later draw attention to the other portions of the paragraph and, therefore, in order to save time, I shall quote the whole of it here. (Summary of the meeting of representatives of the Government of India with the members 0 the Commission to discuss the Commission's resolution of ^August 1948 (S/AC.12/46) Held at New Delhi on Tuesday, 17 August 1948, at 3 p.m.).

A second consideration which bothered the Govern­ment of India with reference to the fixing of a cease-fire line along the present lines was that those lines ran very near to the Pakistan frontier and that, in a short time, varying from one-half to two hours, the tribesmen or the Pakistan Army itself could over-run the positions held by garrisons left by the Indian Army, and that a situation might be created worse than that of last October. He contended that India needed to have certain strategic points for defence against sudden attacks. Mr. Korbel replied that the Commission had been quite aware of that danger, but that it had tried to strike a military balance. The Commission felt that if the two Governments could be brought together, the danger of sudden incursion would be removed. Moreover, he pointed out that limited Government of India forces would remain and that, on the other side, only the Azad forces would remain in their present positions. Should the eventuality envisaged by the Prime Minister occur, the whole weight of the United Nations would be turned against Pakistan'' [S/1100, annex 12].

In its discussion with the Pakistan Government the Com­mission took the same line and, in its letter of 19 September 3948, addressed to me, it stated :' "The resolution does not contemplate the disarming or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces." This appears in the first interim report of UNCIP [S/1100] dated 22 November 1948, paragraph 108.

Nothing could be clearer than that. It was explained to-India that, after the bulk of the Indian forces was withdrawn, limited forces would still remain and that, on the other side, there would be no Pakistan forces; they would be withdrawn, and there would be only the Azad Kashmir forces remaining-Explaining the same provision to the Government of Pakistan, it was stated that the resolution did not contemplate the dis­armament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces.

Again, in the discussions with the Prime Minister of India in December 1948, the Prime Minister of India referred to the Azad Kashmir forces, and he said that the Azad Kashmir forces ran into tens of thousands. This is seen from the second interim report of UNCIP [Si 1196], dated 10 January 1949, annex 4.

Then, Sir Girja S. Bajpai, who was then Secretary-Gene­ral of the Government of India, wrote a letter dated 18 Febru­ary 1949 to the Commission—it will be remembered that this was after the resolution of 5 January 1949, which does provide for final disposal on both sides, had been accepted. This is his own interpretation and that of the Government of-India :

"The disarming of Azad forces is really a matter of chro­nology. First, there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce, as envisaged in parts I and II of the Com­mission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of Azad Kashmir forces. So far as non-Muslims are con­cerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out---"

We tried to make this clear to the Commission through Dr. Lozano in the course of our discussions last September, and I emphasized this point in our recent meetings. So again they knew that the 13 August resolution did not provide for the disarming of Azad Kashmir forces. They asked for a large-scale disarming and they put down the chronology themselves. It is quite clear that they understood the two resolutions quite correctly.

On 14 March 1949, the Commission wrote a letter to the Government of India, in the course of which it observed :

In the course of the conversations last August, the Com­mission explained to the Government of Pakistan, that, in its view, a 'military balance' would exist in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period in the sense and to the extent that the resolution of 13 August did not call for the disarming or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces, which the Commission understood to number approximately thirty-five battalions . . ." (Third interim report of UNCIP, 9 December 1949).

Is there a doubt with regard to what the position was as to the Azad Kashmir forces ? And then the Commission had to report finally that India was not willing to carry out its obligation unless something that was not provided in the reso­lution was done, something against which the Commission had given assurances to the Pakistan Government, assurances which it had repeated to the Government of India. Who is trying to evade his obligations ? Where is the evasion On which side is the misrepresentation ? Who is seeking to get out of the obligations undertaken under the resolution ?

It is now quite obvious that the position taken is that— and I believe those are the words used in the submission of the representative of India at the last meeting—we cannot permit any Azad Kashmir forces as such to remain. What should remain is only a civil armed force on the other side. But here is a clear undertaking to withdraw the bulk of the Indian forces with Azad forces intact, and then, when the plebiscite stage arrives, the final disposal of these forces is to be carried out by large-scale disbanding and disarming. There is no question of the Azad Kashmir forces being done away with altogether.

It also stands to reason that the obligation under the cease-fire agreement is that, till the question can be finally settled, neither side is to violate the line at all in any sense. India demands that it should have substantial military forces on its side of the cease-fire line, but no military forces at all as such on the other side.

And yet, even anticipating a little bit what should come later under paragraph 8 of Dr, Graham's proposals, the two sides have agreed "that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above."

Would there not be a serious threat to the cease-fire line if, on the one side, there was a military force and, on the on the other side, there was nothing of that kind ? How is that situa­tion going to be met ? What is the solution offered by India ?

It is obvious that a certain number of forces are to remain on the Azad Kashmir side. We are not saying that Pakistan forces shall remain. That I have made quite clear. They shall withdraw. But a certain number of forces must remain. They must be adequate for the maintenance of law and order in that territory and for the maintenance of the cease-fire line.

1. the Commission came to the conclusion that India was not willing to carry out its obligation under the resolutions because it put forward questions upon which obviously the Commission did not want to pronounce itself. The Commis­sion had brought about this agreement on these resolutions and I should have thought that it was eminently the one which should pronounce itself upon them. But naturally, I may have felt some reluctance. This being so, it suggested the following: Here is an agreement between the parties which is enshrined in these two resolutions. Part I of the first resolu­tion has been implemented. A difficulty has arisen with regard to settling the truce agreement. Let us call it a difficulty of interpretation, though, with all respect, I cannot see any difficulty in this regard. All the parties have already agreed that Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be the Plebiscite Administrator; that is to say, he shall be the person who, under paragraph 4 of the 5 January 1949 resolution, will have the power of final disposal of the forces on both sides. Therefore, the Commission suggested that the parties should agree to accept his arbitration on what the resolution of 13 August 1948 meant and required. This proposal by the Commission was reinforced by a very earnest appeal from President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee.

Pakistan accepted, India said No; they would not accept arbitration. They enter into an agreement and there is a difference as to the interpretation, let us say, of some pro­visions of that agreement. They do not accept what the Commission says. How is the difference to be resolved? The Commission says "Accept the arbitration of the man who, in any case, has to make the final disposal." We say Yes; India says No: Well, then, how is this difference to be resolved ?

The matter came back to the Security Council. The Council requested its then President, General McNaughton of Canada, to get in touch with the parties and to try to bring about a settlement. He worked hard morning and night. He gave up his Christmas holiday and produced a set of proposals, The parties were asked whether they were willing to accept them. Pakistan said Yes; India said No. Apparently the ground on which India was not willing to accept those pro­posals was this: General McNaughton had tried to meet India's demand with regard to the disbanding and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces in the very first stage of the demili­tarization, but he said that could only be done under paragraph 4(3) of the resolution of 5 January 1949. That necessarily involves the implementation of paragraph 4{a) at the same time, India objected to that. In his proposals relat­ing to the implementation of paragraph 4(a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, General McNaughton had also included the State armed forces. As India believed that was in contradiction to the resolution, it would not accept his proposals.

let me invite the Security Council's attention to the language of paragraph 4(a) to see if this was in contravention of the resolution :

"After implementation of parts I and II of the Commis­sion's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

Whatever the reason, India rejected the proposal. Here is the difficult situation which has arisen. India insists that this is something that is provided for under paragraph 4(b) of the 5.

The January 1949 resolution must be carried out in the very first part of the demilitarization. India asks Pakistan whether it is prepared to go forward on that basis. When its demand is met, India says that is very good. But India's demand will also involve the implementation of paragraph 4(a) which deals with the other side. India then begins to object and states that we are going against the resolutions.

The Pakistan Government has been prepared at all times —it is prepared today—to take either of two courses that may be agreeable to India. One is to adhere to the strict arrange­ment visualized in the resolutions; that is to say, first the implementation of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and then the implementation of the resolution of 5 January 1949, if that is agreeable to India.

If, on further consideration, the Government of India has come to the view that it would be better to take the two together so that the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces could also be done at the same time, Pakistan is equally willing to proceed on that basis. Let us take part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and as much of paragraphs 4(a) and 4(6) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 as is needed for this purpose and go ahead with regard to the two together.

Then, what is left ? The final disposition can be made by the Plebiscite Administrator. Put it either way, we do not insist that the resolution of 13 August 1948 must be completely implemented before we start on the resolution of 5 January 1949. Our object is not so much to comply with the strict letter of the resolutions as to go forward on the basis of the agreement that exists.

General McNaughton's proposals were rejected. The Commission's suggestions were rejected. The Commission's proposals to resort to arbitration were rejected. Then the matter came back again to the Security Council. The Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon of the High Court of Australia as United Nations Representative to go out and, within a certain Period, to bring about a settlement with regard to the demilitarization of the State. This is what he reported on demilitarization. I quote from paragraph 52 of his report [S/179J and Add. 1] :

"In the end, I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to the provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character as would, in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperiled."

So he came to that conclusion regarding demilitarization. That was rejection number four.

The next stage was that the matter was raised among some of the Prime Ministers of the Commonwealth who had gathered together in London in January of 1951 to consult with respect to certain matters common to the Commonwealth.

Some of these Prime Ministers, being very worried over the position in Kashmir and seeking very anxiously and earnestly to bring about some settlement, or to move the matter forward, brought the two Prime Ministers together, heard their points of view on demilitarization, and then suggested that Commonwealth troops might hold the cease-fire line and be available for the purpose of assisting the Plebiscite Administrator to carry out his duties. This suggestion was accepted by Pakistan, but it was rejected by India.

'As a matter of fact, Australia and New Zealand had gone so far as to say that they would supply the troops and that they would bear the cost of the troops to be supplied. After receiving this reply from the Prime Minister of India, they made another effort and they suggested that Pakistan and Indian troops together, under a feasible arrangement, might be available to the Plebiscite Administrator to assist him in the discharge of his duties. Pakistan accepted it and India rejected it. That makes six rejections.

They then considered the matter further and they came up with a third proposal that local troops might be raised from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, from both sides, for that purpose. Pakistan accepted it; India rejected it. That made seven rejections.

We were evading our obligation all the time. India, according to its representative, was ready all the time to go forward. The matter came to the Security Council after Sir Owen Dixon's report, and the representative of a great country is now sitting at this table. Ambassador Muniz, pro­posed to the representative of India and to the representative of Pakistan that on these matters on which differences now existed—and on these matters only, and I am emphasizing that for a purpose which I shall mention presently—the parties might accept arbitration. We were ready and India rejected it. That made eight rejections.

Then in the resolution [Sl2017lRev.l] adopted on 30 March 1951 [539th meeting], it is provided that if the United Nations representative then to be appointed—and Dr. Graham was later appointed in pursuance of that resolution— failed to bring about agreement on demilitarization, he would report the points of difference again—that is, I emphasize, the points of difference with regard to demilitarization—to the Security Council and the parties were invited to have those point? determined by arbitration by an arbitrator, or by a panel of arbitrators to be appointed by it in consultation with the parties, by the President of the International Court of Justice.            We accepted that resolution and India rejected it.

Again I ask, What is to happen? Here is an agreement contained in these two resolutions accepted by both parties. Both parties still adhere to it. Differences have arisen with regard to the implementation of a portion. How are those differences to be resolved? The Commission, which was the author, made suggestions and they were not accepted. The Security Council, under whose authority the Commission went . made various suggestions or appointed various people to try to settle these differences. Whatever proposals have been put forward Pakistan has accepted but India has rejected India has particularly objected to arbitration. It has been said repeatedly : we cannot commit the fate of four million people to arbitration. Nobody has at any time sugges­ted that the fate of four million people be committed to arbitration. Whether it would be right or wrong to do so, I am not for the moment expressing an opinion. But nobody has ever suggested it. To say that you cannot do what nobody has asked you to do constitutes an evasion. What has been suggested is the settlement of the differences that have arisen with regard to the interpretation of the agreement existing between the parties. In other words, what is it that the parties agreed to in this respect? The determination of that alone, it is suggested, should go to arbitration. India says No. It is sometimes said that, somehow, it would be a reflection upon the sovereignty of India if it accepted arbitration on any such question.

Article 51 of the Indian Constitution says the following :

"The State shall endeavour to (a) promote international peace and security; (b) maintain just and honourable relations between nations; (c) foster respect for interna­tional law and treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one another; and (d) encourage settlement of international disputes by arbitration."

It is an obligation laid upon the Government of India, and accepted by the present Government of India in as much as they were the people under whose auspices this Constitution was settled, to encourage settlement of international disputes by .arbitration. If they are to encourage settlement of inter­national disputes by arbitration, would they not be asking those involved in the dispute—the dispute in which they might seek to encourage international arbitration—that they should surrender their sovereignty equally?

The truth of the matter is —and one has to say it with sorrow—that the declarations of India are, when they are declarations of policy or when they are advice tendered to other States, most unexceptionable. But India has so far, in its own disputes, failed to illustrate how those declarations are to be applied in practice.

I have before me a very valuable book called The Dis­covery of India by the present Prime Minister of India. Dealing •with 'he question of the Muslim demand for partition of the sub-continent, and the opposition of the Indian National Congress to it, he says the following, and I shall quote from pages 387 and 388 of his book :

"The Congress went further and declared that if there was any disagreement between the majority and a religi­ous minority, it should not be decided by a majority vote"—that is to say, in the new Indian Parliament to be elected under the Constitution—"but should be referred to an impartial judicial tribunal, or even an international tribunal, whose decision should be final."

In other words, their position was that if any such question arose in the working out of the daily relations of the two communities or nations inside India (if India had remained united) the party which has the honour of having the Prime Minister of India as its leader—and he is both a great states­man and a great leader—would be willing to have such questions referred to in impartial tribunal or even an inter­national tribunal whose decision should be final. Not only that, but when the question of Indonesia was before the Security Council, the representative of India, making his submission to the Security Council on 7 August 1947, at the 178th meeting, said the following :

"In the course of this statement of the facts of the case I have indicated that there are many points which will have to be joined as between the two parties. Unfortu­nately, in the course of the debate, certain members have expressed opinions, probably unintentionally, which may have aroused suspicion of lack of confidence in the minds of the people of Indonesia. However, I shall not approach the question from that point of view. I shall only suggest that it would be in the fitness of things for the Security Council to follow up the decision which it took at its 173rd meeting, by the establishment of an international arbitration commission to settle the dispute."

1. Constitution lays that down as an obligation upon them According to the Prime Minister of India that would have been quite a fair means of settling disputes between the minorities and the majority in India itself, had the Constitution taken a different course. The Indian representative, sitting here before the Security Council in a dispute between two other States, proposes the setting up of an international arbitration commission. When the suggestion is made by the Commission then by a distinguished member of the Security Council and later on in a resolution of the Security Council, on this narrow question of the meaning of the obligation undertaken by the parties m respect of demilitarization in these resolutions, what did they agree to do when arbitration was suggested ?India said No. We are charged, and the Security Council is charged, with evasion ? That resolution being rejected-paragraph 6 being rejected in any case—that made nine rejections.

Dr. Graham was appointed and he went out there. General Jacob Devers, who was his military advisor, formula­ted a plan of demilitarization. I need not go into the details of it, but we accepted it and India rejected it, and that was the tenth rejection.

Then Dr. Graham put forward his proposals, and on demilitarization he put forward this principle : that the forces on both sides should be reduced to the lowest possible number in proportion to the numbers that obtained on the cease-fire day We accepted it; India rejected it. That made eleven rejec­tions.

He then put forward his proposals of 16 July 1952, and he eventually asked for a meeting at the minister's level in Geneva, on the basis of those proposals. The invitation was accepted. Both sides sent ministers, which could only mean that the basis proposed by Dr. Graham was accepted. The very first meeting was purely formal, and when at that meeting the Indian minister began to explain his point of view, Dr. Graham discovered at a fairly early stage that India was not willing to proceed on the basis of the proposals of 16 July. Pakistan was willing to proceed on that basis. That made twelve rejections.

Thereafter, Dr. Graham revised his proposals, and those revised proposals are known as the proposals of 2 September 1952. Pakistan accepted them : India rejected them. That made thirteen rejections. I am merely enumerating all the acceptances and rejections.

The proposals of 2 September are before the Security Council. We are willing to proceed on the basis of those pro­posals without any modification or amendment. Is India willing ? Then we have the present draft resolution [S/2839], I shall explain in a moment our attitude on that. India says that they reject it. That is the fourteenth rejection.

Before I go on to explain our attitude to the draft resolu­tion, which I shall do in the course of a few minutes, I should like to deal with one or two miscellaneous matters which were raised by the representative of India and which bear on this question of demilitarization.

In the attempt to justify the stand of the Government of India in respect of this question, it was urged that one of the factors in the situation which made it necessary for India to maintain large forces in the portions of the State of Kashmir occupied by India was the fact that Pakistan had cantonments near the Kashmir border. But those cantonments are there as the result of a pre-partition geographical distribution. Pakistan has built no new cantonments. The ones in question were there before the subcontinent was partitioned, before any of these disputes arose.

There is the consideration, however. If by the statement to which I have referred it is meant that Pakistan would be in a favourable position to embark upon an invasion of the State and commit aggression, I would say this : if the course of this -drawn-out dispute proves anything, it proves that Pakistan anxious to proceed to the holding of a plebiscite; India is not In that case could anybody imagine that, as soon as India had withdrawn the bulk of its forces, or all of its forces,from the portion of Kashmir occupied by India, Pakistan would march its troops into Kashmir, thus, first, discarding any possibility of a plebiscite being held, and, secondly, inviting India to attack Pakistan from the rear and occupy it. Is that what India fears ?

This consideration, also, is academic. The situation was fully considered. The very first extract from the Commission's proceedings which I read out related to this. It will be remem­bered that I said that, in order to save time, I would read out the whole of the report of the Commission's proceedings and merely refer to relevant parts afterwards. This very matter was put by the Prime Minister of India to the Commission, and the Commission said : We have taken it into account. There will be a limited number of Indian forces still in Kashmir, and, on the other side, during the truce period there will be only the Azad Kashmir forces. Later on, of course, the Plebiscite Ad­ministrator was to make the final disposal on both sides. That, too, was taken into account. It is not a new fact.

But, again, let us see what has happened during this time when all these efforts have been made to bring about the truce agreement, which has not materialized.

In the summer of 1950, India moved a very large portion of its troops on to the Pakistan border in West Punjab. Sub­sequently some of these troops went back. In the summer of 1951, India moved the whole of its armour and a much larger number of troops right up to within a few miles of our borders. Those troops are there now. Pakistan was compelled, out of considerations of defence, to move forward its own troops to the border also. These troops have gone back to their peace­time stations. Not only have the greater part of the Indian troops not gone back to their peacetime stations, but the present stations are now becoming their permanent stations; loca­tions are being permanently formed for the stationing of these troops.

The situation, therefore, is this: though Pakistan has cantonments along the Kashmir border, India now has its troops massed in the rear of Pakistan. What has India to fear from the fact that the cantonments are near the Kashmir border ? India, on its side, has taken steps threatening Pakistan's security. India's troops are massed on our borders.

But is this the main consideration ? Law and order are to be maintained on both sides of the cease-fire line. The cease-fire line itself is to be maintained. If the cease-fire line is maintained, if the cease-fire agreement is kept by both sides, and if law and order are maintained, there is no need for troops for any other purpose within the State territory. Those are the only considerations that apply. Therefore, troops have to be reduced. That is common ground. It has been said repeatedly at this table. There cannot be a free and impartial plebiscite with large bodies of troops of either side stationed in the area in which the plebiscite is to be held.

This is a plain, straightforward case. It has been bedeviled by evasions and misrepresentations. The Security Council should now be in a position to determine from where the evasions and misrepresentations have come.

Then, again, it is said: paragraph 8 of Mr. Graham's proposals has been pressed into service in order to justify certain proposals that have been submitted with regard to Azad Kashmir forces and the question how many of them should remain, whereas that proposal has nothing to do with this aspect of the case. I have already read out proposal 8. It has been agreed to by both parties. It states :

' Agree that the demilitarization shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above."

In other words, there must be military forces on both sides. If there is military force on one side and not/on the other, is that not a direct threat to the cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire line ?

The other day, it was said that the cease-fire agreement was between the Governments of Pakistan and India, and the Azad Kashmir people had nothing to do with it. I do not know exactly what it was sought to establish by this contention Did this mean that the Pakistan Government might be permitted to keep troops along the cease-fire line, but that the Azad Kashmir people would not be ? If that is desired, and if it is suggested as a modification of the proposals in the resolution of 13 August 1948, we shall accept it. We are not, however, asking for it because it is not in accordance with the resolution. The resolution contemplates-and the explanations and clarifications given establish-that there will be a military balance in both stages of demilitarization: limited Indian forces and State armed forces on one side, and Azad Kashmir forces on the other, in the first stage; then there would be final disposal of both in the second stage. It has been quite clear from the very beginning that is the desired balance, for two purposes: maintenance of law and order on both sides and maintenance of the cease-fire line.

 

There is one other matter to which I must refer before I come to the draft resolution. In her submission the other day [608th meeting], the representative of India attempted to show how peaceful India was, how peaceful its intentions were, how peaceful its efforts were to bring about a solution of the dispute by peaceful means and to exclude every possibility of a military conflict. In this connexion, she observed :

 

"We have also repeatedly declared that on no account would we initiate military operations and that we would continue to seek a peaceful settlement. Pakistan, though invited by us to do so, has refused to make this declaration".

 

I submit that was a very unfair statement to make. It caused me good deal of sorrow that a statement which does not directly bear upon the questions under discussion should have been made in that fashion, in an attempt to create the impression that India had said, "Let us declare that we shall settle these issues peacefully", and Pakistan had said, "No, we shall not declare that".

 

In this connexion, all that I shall do is to invite attention to the letter of the Prime Minister of Pakistan dated 21 November 1950 to the Prime Minister of India, on this subject. I shall read out certain paragraphs, not the whole of it. It will make the whole subject-matter clear.

"For almost a year we have discussed ways of resolving our disputes by peaceful means. You have proposed that our Governments declare jointly that they will not resort to war. I have endeavoured to persuade you that such a declaration by itself is not enough and that the way to resolve our disputes without resort to force is to adopt the procedures for resolving them peacefully. I have proposed specific, concrete procedures that provide for automatic arbitration on all issues where negotiation fails. I suggested a substantive no-war declaration to this effect. This you have not accepted.

"It seems to me that if we are to move forward we must face squarely what it is that has prevented India from accepting my no-war declaration.

Reviewing our correspondence it becomes quite clear that the crux of the difficulty is the reluctance of your Government to substitute on any issue impartial arbitration for threatened and actual use of force. India has been unwilling to accept the decision of an impartial arbiter on any issue now outstanding. Pakistan is and has been willing to accept the decision of an impartial arbiter on every issue outstanding between us.

By joining the United Nations our countries have already renounced the use or threatened use of non-pacific means of every kind. We have subscribed to the Statute of the International Court of Justice. We have agreed in the Charter of the United Nations that our legal disputes as a rule should be referred by us to that Court. A bare announcement that we will not declare war unless attacked adds nothing to these commitments. If anything. it detracts from them. Against the back-ground of the past two and one-half years, an announce­ment that fails to substitute arbitration for compulsion whether war is declared or not, will fail to carry conviction that there will be no resort to force.

"'During the past two years, our joint undertaking to accept the decision of a free and impartial plebiscite of the inhabitants of Kashmir has remained a hollow declaration, owing to the refusal of your Government to implement this agreement and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission and the Security Council. Your Government has rejected every recommendation that their armed forces be withdrawn, as Pakistan has agreed that its armed forces be withdrawn, in order that the plebiscite may take place without undue influence or compulsion by either side .

"When it was proposed to each of our Governments that we accept an impartial arbiter to settle the difference over interpretation of the agreement brought about by the United Nations, Pakistan agreed; India did not. You say that the matter is not justiciable. Certainly it would seem to me that the interpretation of an interna­tional agreement is eminently justiciable. But, even if the matter were not justiciable, this would only mean that the impartial arbiter should be other than a court of law. The fact that a dispute is not justiciable is not a valid reason for refusing to accept the impartial decision of experienced and understanding statesmen. Your willing­ness to accept arbitration of the interpretation of our Kashmir agreement will demonstrate more than any mere declaration the determination of your Government to resolve this issue by peaceful means.

"At the time of partition, Indian representatives joined in declaring that there was no question of varying the shares of the two new countries in our common waters required for irrigation. Since then, India sought to compel acceptance of greatly increased supplies for India. at the expense of irrigation vital to Pakistan. Taking advantage of its position as the upstream riparian, India arbitrarily cut off during the critical sowing season in the spring of 1948 the supplies into every Pakistan canal that crossed the boundary. Contrary to the information you have received and no doubt contrary to your personal wishes and orders, the flows were not resumed until after your Government sought to exact certain conditions inimical to Pakistan. Not until certain of these condi­tions were met was the flow restored in the Central Bari Doab canals and it has not yet been resorted in the Bahawalpur State distributory. Even your recent assur­ance that the partition supplies will not again be cut off has since been qualified by conditions which your Government knows Pakistan cannot accept. Our repeated requests to submit the canal waters dispute to the Inter­national Court of Justice have not been accepted".

Further on in this letter, we read :

"Without qualifying in any way what I have just said, I must in full frankness confess to you that the more we have studied your counter-proposal the more clearly does it appear to us that the International Court would best serve your proper purposes as well as ours. It has the great advantage of independence, impartiality and unquestioned competence, without being in any sense a foreign court. It is our Court. India and Pakistan by accepting the Statute of the Court and agreeing to its jurisdiction, far from impairing their sovereignty, exer­cised it in aligning themselves with those nations that have freely chosen to live under the rule of law. By submitting our water dispute to that Court and abiding by its decision, we again demonstrate that the highest act of sovereignty is to act in conformity with international law. The International Court stands for the very same high principles of international conduct with which you have always identified yourself. There are so many prac­tical considerations weighing in favour of the international Court. The Court is already functioning success­fully. No detailed agreement need be worked out to fix its composition, its jurisdiction, its rules of procedure. As you and your advisers consider the actual terms of the draft agreement governing the tribunal you propose, I believe you will come to appreciate the full merit of the International Court. I therefore again request that, rather than postpone settlement while seeking to create a new tribunal as good as the International Court, we accept now the jurisdiction of that Court to settle the canal waters dispute."

Finally, the Prime Minister said :

"My Government is prepared to reaffirm with you the solemn engagements undertaken when we became Members of the United Nations. We are willing to do more, but we are not willing to do less. The path of construc­tive statesmanship is for us to eschew declarations with­out deeds and to avoid assuming to decide by unilateral act or by veto the merits of our own contentions. The solution of our problems will come, I am earnestly con­vinced, when each side accepts adjudication of all issues that are justiciable and arbitration of all other issues. My Government are prepared to do this now on every issue. I most earnestly hope that your Government will see fit to do the same."

Was this a refusal to say that we shall settle our disputes through peaceful means and shall not go to war ?

The whole trouble was this : India is in possession of the greater part of Kashmir, it refuses to move towards a plebis­cite—that is to say, towards a decision. India, as the upper riparian owner, has the power which it has exercised once, to cut off our waters and to convert the whole of Pakistan into a desert. It is in that sense in possession of those waters. In fact, it claims ownership of every drop of those waters. And it says : "Let us say that we shall never fight with each other over anything." Pakistan's reply is : "Let us settle the procedure through which our disputes can be settled and we can reach a final solution. Having done that, let us proclaim to our people 'This is the way we are going to settle the matter-through peaceful means. We are not going to war with each other'."

That is all that happened. Again, the Security Council can judge whether it was a fair presentation of that aspect of the matter to say : "We have invited the Government of Pakis­tan to say that we shall never fight over these matters, but the Government of Pakistan refuses to say it."

[ now come to the draft resolution [Si2839]. So far as the numbers suggested in the draft resolution are concerned— that is to say, 12,000 to 18,000 and 3,000 to 6,000—I would beg to submit that, having regard to the agreements that exis­ted, their background, the needs on both sides, the numbers are not fair to the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line.

Not to go too much into detail at this late stage, con­sider paragraph 8 of the proposals of Dr. Graham, which I have already read out twice : that demilitarization shall take place in such a manner that it shall cause no fears or danger to the cease-fire line on either side. Would not 18,000 on one side and 6,000 on the other, or 12,000 on one side and 3,000 on the other, set up such an imbalance—whereas the Commission was seeking to establish a military balance—that it would cause apprehension on one side that the cease-fire might not be adhered to ?

The position is, a I have been at pains to demonstrate* that India goes on announcing its peaceful intentions but rejects everything that is proposed so that these intentions might be translated into action, and refuses to make a move, e have on every occasion given a practical demonstration of °ur peaceful intentions by accepting proposal after proposal, a though each proposal sought to push us in some respect or another, so that a peaceful settlement might eventually be reached.

We are again prepared, in spite of these considerations, to go forward on the basis of this resolution also—in spite, I say, of the considerations that I have suggested. These will be taken into account.

But I would submit that there are two matters with regard to which this resolution—with all respect—does not appear to us to aim at the making of progress. One is that it contemplates that the parties seek out each other and go into con­ference with each other; the other is that the parties, at the end of their conversations with each other, should report the result to the Security Council. With all respect, as I have said, we consider that this is not a practical way of approaching the problem.

The United Nations Representative is there? true; the re­solution says he will be available. We owe it to him, we owe it to the powers that your resolutions have vested in him, we owe it to the parties, we owe it to the dispute, we owe it to the people of Kashmir, irrespective of what the situation between India and Pakistan is, that the representative of the Security Council should retain the initiative in this matter, that the conversations should take place under his auspices and that he should report to the Security Council. As an impartial repre­sentative of the United Nations, knowing the whole background of the dispute—he has already made four reports—he would know to what his report should confine itself, what it should contain and what its presentation should be.

I very much fear that, if the parties are left to themselves the matter may not move at all; and, if it does move—let us say that conversations take place but that no arrangement is reached—the report that each party will make to the Security Council will probably contain the greater part of all these volumes from which I have put extracts before you. It will not be of much use to the Security Council. The obligation to report should also be placed where it properly belongs: on the United Nations Representative.

I shall now conclude with one concrete offer. May I, in that connexion, draw the attention of the Security Council once more to part II of the resolution of 13 August .948 and refresh the memory of the members of the Council. On the one side, under that resolution, the obligation is that the Pakistan troops should begin to withdraw, that we should agree that they should be withdrawn—I leave out the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals, who have already gone out—and, on the other side, when our troops begin to withdraw, the bulk of the Indian troops should be withdrawn.

Paragraph 2 of section B of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 states :

"Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement—the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire" the minimum strength of its forces "which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order-"

That is to be withdrawn; this is to be left.

I now draw the attention of the Security Council to what the representative of India said to our last meeting :

1. view of the considerations which I have mentioned, and after careful examination and assessment by the experts, the Government of India had come to the con­clusion that a minimum force of 28,000 was required to carry out its responsibilities. However,    on complete disbandment and disarmament of the 'Azad Kashmir forces', and as a further contribution towards a settle­ment, the Government of India is prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000 to a figure of 21,000 which is the absolute and irreducible minimum.      I should like to emphasize that this figure, which includes the former State armed forces, represents less than one-sixth of the Indian forces at the time of the cease-fire. It should further be emphasized that this force will have no supporting arms such as armour or artillery. In addition to its other duties, this small force would also be respon­sible for policing the cease-fire line on the other side of which is the aggressor. This line is several hundred miles long and runs through difficult and mountainous terrain. This force has also to guard the extensive borders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. A glance at the map will be sufficient to indicate the magnitude of the task with which the proposed force will be entrusted".

Leave aside for the moment the disarming and disband­ing of the Azad Kashmir forces, which is part of the 5 January 1949 resolution, and the offer that, when that is done, the Indian forces will be further reduced by 7,000. That is a matter which has been committed to the Plebiscite Administrator. The Commission—let us say the United Nations Representative, who now has the powers of the Commission—and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the Government of India, have to see to the final disposal of the forces on that side and, in consultation with the local authorities, the final disposal on this side. We should leave that aside. But, so far as the withdrawal of the bulk is concerned and the limited forces that are to remain, the representative of India said that her Government's military advisers think that a minimum force of 28,000 is required to carry out its responsibilities.

I purpose—and I am willing that on this basis, if it is agreeable to India, we should proceed—that the resolution of 13 August 1948 be implemented immediately on this basis :

India shall remain on the side of Kashmir occupied by its 28,000 men, all told, including State armed forces, without armour or artillery. On our side, we will carry out the full obligations undertaken by us under that resolution: The tribesmen and Pakistan volunteers are already out, and the Pakistan army will move out on that basis.

If it is agreeable to India, Jet us agree on that, and then let the resolution of 5 January 1949 take care of the rest-provided that then the Plebiscite Administrator takes over and carries out all the duties and responsibilities which the resolution of 5 January 1949 entrusts to him.

If the representative of India will signify her assent to this, now or later, we can proceed, under the auspices of the United Nations Representative, on this basis immediately.