08121952 Text of the speech made by Mrs. Pandit {India) in the Security Council meeting No. 608 held on 8 December 1952.

08121952 Text of the speech made by Mrs. Pandit {India) in the Security Council meeting No. 608 held on 8 December 1952.

Five years have passed since India brought this complaint before the Security Council, following the invasion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by tribesmen and nationals of Pakistan, who were armed, equipped and directed by the Pakistan authori­ties. The Government of India requested the Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to this aid and assistance and to its participation in this act of aggression against India. In particular, the Government of India requested the Council to call upon the Government of Pakistan : first, to prevent Pakistan Government personnel, military and civil, from participating or assisting in the invasion of the Jammu and Kashmir State; secondly to call upon other Pakistan nationals to desist from taking by part in the fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State, thirdly, to deny to the invaders access to and state of its territory for operations against Kashmir, military and other supplies, and all other kinds of aid that might tend to prolong the struggle.

Pakistan emphatically denied the charge of aggression, but the complaint was later fully proved to be correct. Indeed, in subsequent months it was proved true in an aggravated form. Despite Pakistan's denials and protestations of innocence, the regular Pakistan army also invaded the State on 8 May 1948, according to the later admission of the Pakistan authorities themselves. This unprovoked aggression and invasion of the territory of a neighbour and a Member State is a gross viola­tion of the Charter of the United Nations as well as of inter­national law. Thus Pakistan, not content with aiding and encouraging aggression, itself directly became an aggressor. It should be observed that the Pakistan army invaded the State despite the fact that the Council was already seized of the question and was engaged in searching for peaceful solutions.

1. army to this day continues its forcible and illegal occupation of a large part of Kashmir State, thus committing a continuing breach of international law. No solution has yet been found because the root cause of the conflict, namely the unlawful occupation by Pakistan of the territory of the Jammu and Kashmir State, and the creation of subversive forces and authorities therein, continues. Until the Council is prepared, firmly and courageously, to face this central issue, no just and lasting solution can be found.

The relative position and status of the parties in this dispute, and therefore the issue itself, will not be set in the proper context unless they are related to these basic facts. India derives its status in the Jammu and Kashmir State by virtue of the accession of the State to India on 26 October 1947, by an instrument which was accepted by the then Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten of Burma. The validity of the accession has at no time been questioned —as indeed it cannot be — by the Council or by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan or by any other authority set up or appointed by this Council.

But what is Pakistan's status in Kashmir ? The Council must face up to the stark fact that Pakistan entered the State by an act of aggression, and that it continues in possession of a large part of State territory in the capacity of an invader who is in forcible and illegal possession of the territory of a neigh­bouring State. This is the central issue in this problem, and no proposals or attempted solutions which ignore this basic position can be realistic or effective.

1. was in recognition of this position that the two UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 drew a distinction between the commitments of the two sides in furthe­rance of an armistice agreement. In the former resolution it was stated that as the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State". The Government of India, for its part, was requir­ed to withdraw only the bulk of its forces in stages to be agreed upon as part of the general arrangements for a peaceful settlement.

The United Nations Commission's resolution of 1948 was based on the recognition of the "new situation" which had arisen through the invasion of Kashmir State territory by regular Pakistan forces. The sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the entire State, including the areas invaded and occupied by the Pakistan forces, was recognized, and the first step agreed upon was the total withdrawal of Pakistan forces from all parts of State territory. The Govern­ment of India's constitutional responsibility for protecting the State from external aggression was admitted and duly recogni­zed. The Government of India was to withdraw the bulk of its forces, but was always to keep enough armed forces in the State to give it protection.

I need not enter into a discussion of the various attempts at mediation, or the earlier reports of the United Nation Representative, Mr. Graham, as the Council has already fully discussed them. I shall, however, pursue my examination of the difference in the status of the parties implicit in some of Mr. Graham's proposals. It will be Recalled that in his proposals of 16 July 1952, [SI2783. annex 6), Mr. Graham had proposed certain figures in regard to the quantum of forces remaining on the other side of the cease-fire line, but it was at the same time laid down that these forces would be separated from the admi­nistrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Com­mand and that they would be of officered by neutral, and local, officers under the surveillance of the United Nations. On the Indian side of the cease fire line, however, there would be an Indian army force.

The same concept of the sole responsibility of India for the security of the State is found in Mr. Graham's seventh proposal of 4 September 1952, [SI2783, annex 8], where it is clearly laid down that in considering the final number of forces required on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, due regard shall be paid to the security of the State. This is not merely an empty phrase, but is the recognition of India's normal and constitutional responsibility for the protection and security of the State, which has twice suffered invasion at the hands of Pakistan. This responsibility India is determined fully to dis­charge. It rests with the Government of India. The Govern­ment of India is not prepared to abdicate it, or to share with others, least of all with the aggressor.

This brings me to the consideration of the proposals and recommendations now made by Mr. Graham in his fourth report [SJ2783], following his discussions with the parties at Geneva. I should like to pause here to pay a sincere tribute on my own behalf and on behalf of my Government, to the patience, skill and diligence which Mr. Graham brought to bear on his task. In the discussions which took place at Geneva, agreement was reached on a number of points, but there is still no agreement on some basic issues, which represent the hard core of the problem of demilitarization.

The most important of the pending issues are the questions of first, the quantum and secondly, the character of the forces remaining on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. The Government of India has fully explained its position on this matter on more than one occasion, and our memorandum to the United Nations Representa­tive, presented to him at Geneva, which appears as annex 5 to his fourth report, reaffirms our basic views. These views remain unaltered.

1. Government of India has consistently maintained that the requirements of the forces on either side of the cease-fire line should be determined on the basis of the principles embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Paragraph B. 2 of part II of the resolution of 13 August recognizes that the Government of India is responsible for providing the local Authorities on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, that is, the government of Jammu and Kashmir, with the forces necessary for maintaining law and order. Paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 further recognizes that the disposal of Indian and State armed forces has to be made with due regard to the security of the State. It is clear that, in the view of the Com­mission as expressed in the above resolutions, the requirements of law and order as well as the overall security of the State, which includes adequate defence, have to be taken into account in assessing the requirements of the forces to be maintained on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

This view is fully in keeping with the legal and constitu­tional position of the Government of India with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Having regard to the above responsibilities of the Government of India as well as the integrity of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, both of which have been recognized by the United Nations Commission, the strength of the forces on the Indian side must be assessed in the light of the following governing considerations : first, aid to the civil authorities in maintaining law and order; secondly, mini­mum defence against external aggression; thirdly, prevention of incursions or infiltration across the cease-fire line.

It should be borne in mind that Pakistan would be free to locate its force as it likes within its own borders, which for a considerable length are conterminous with the borders of Jammu and Kashmir State, and for a still greater length within practically striking distance of the cease-fire line and important and vital areas of Jammu and Kashmir State.

1. view of the considerations which I have mentioned, and after careful examination and assessment by its experts, the Government of India had come to the conclusion that a mini­mum force of 28,000 was required to carry out its responsibili­ties. However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces, and as a further contribution towards a settlement, the Government of India is prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000 to a figure of 21,000, which is the absolute and irreducible minimum. I should like to emphasize that this figure, which includes the former State armed forces, represents less than one-sixth of the Indian forces at the time of the cease-fire. It should further be emphasized that this the force will have no supporting arms such as armour or artillery. addition to its other duties, this small force would also be responsible for policing the cease-fire line on the other side of which is the aggressor. This line is several hundred miles long and runs through difficult and mountainous terrain. This force also has to guard the extensive borders of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. A glance at the map will be sufficient to indicate the magnitude of the task with which the proposed force will be entrusted.

So far as the other side of the cease-fire line is concerned, the position is that although the Government of India is cons­titutionally responsible for the defence of the entire State, including the so-called Azad Kashmir area, it is prepared to agree to the retention in this area by the Azad authorities of a civil armed force. The administrative authorities to be establish­ed on the other side of the cease-fire line before the end of the period of demilitarization can only be local authorities. The Government of India has agreed to United Nations surveiliance over the local authorities in the area evacuated by the Pakistan army until the plebiscite has been carried out. Such authorities will be in charge of local law and order, whether in evacuated territory or with reference to the cease-fire line. They cannot be entrusted with any responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement. That agreement is between the Governments of India and Pakistan, while the local authorities can have no international status. To concede to them any armed forces equivalent to troops would be wholly inconsistent with their status and functions and would constitute a violation of the sovereignty of the Indian Union and the integrity of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It should be noted that the so-called Azad Kashmir Government has never at any time been recog­nized by any authority, not even by the Pakistan Government itself. In the very nature of things therefore, the local authori­ties of the so-called Azad Kashmir can at best be entrusted only with a civil armed force. The Government of India considers that, having regard to all these circumstances, a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side, considering the pre-aggression strength of similar forces policing that area. How-ever, it would be prepared to consider some increase in these forces, which will be operating under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative, provided the latter can make out a case that the proposed strength is inadequate.

As for the argument advanced by the United Kingdom representative that the presence of troops on the Indian side of the cease-fire line with only a civil armed force on the other side would be inconsistent with a really free plebiscite, the statement ignores not only the UNCIP resolutions which them­selves provide for the stationing of such troops, but it also ignores the actual facts of the situation. It should* not be forgotten that in Pakistan, within a few miles of the State frontier, there already is, and there would continue to be, a much heavier concentration of troops. Logically, the same argument could be used to justify the demand for the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from their cantonments—and the number of such cantonments is very large—in the neighbourhood of the State frontier.

In his attempt to resolve the dead-lock on this question, Dr. Graham made the alternative proposal that agreement should first be reached between the parties on the principles or criteria for determining both the character and the quantum of the forces. The Government of India considers that this approach has been conceived in the right spirit having regard to the two UNCIP resolutions and that it contains the possibility of a settlement on this fundamental issue. Unless there is an initial agreement on the principles or criteria on the basis of which the character and quantum of the forces on both sides are to be determined, the deadlock is likely to continue. It is obvious that these positions are recognized by the two UNCIP resolutions. Any departure from this position aimed at establi­shing parity of any kind, either of character or of quantum, between India on the one hand and Pakistan or the local authorities on the other, is unacceptable to the Government of India. Indeed, Dr. Graham's proposal referred to earlier re­cognizes this basic difference in the relative status and responsi­bilities of India and of the other parties involved.

Against this background, I shall now deal with the draft resolution [S/2839 and Corr. 1] and with the statement of Sir Gladwyn Jebb in introducing it [606th meeting]. The operative part of this draft resolution is contained in the seventh para­graph. The parties are urged to enter into negotiations in order to reach agreement on the number of forces. Mo mention is made of their character, which as I have indicated, has been a vital issue in the negotiations all along. This omission is signi­ficant. The figures to be arrived at must be within certain prescribed margins. In considering these numbers, the resolu­tion requires that the principles and criteria contained in paragraph 7 of Dr. Graham's proposals of 4 September 1952 [S/2183, annex 8] should be borne in mind. Lest it be assumed that these proposals of the sponsors are derived from the conclusions reached by Dr. Graham, let me quote paragraph 38 of his fourth report [SI2183] :

The United Nations Representative holds the view that for reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarization it is necessary either

"(a) To establish the character and number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization ; or

"(b) To declare that the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area, and, accordingly, principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the Provisional Clause of the revised proposals".

1. will be easy to see that in the seventh paragraph of the draft resolution, the sponsors have inadvertently or unjustifia­bly combined what are essentially independent and alternative approaches envisaged by the United Nations Representative. In the draft resolution the word "or", which is the essence of Dr. Graham ‘s Proposal has been "Placed in effect by the word and , leading to the result contained in the seventh paragraph in this, our view, is not in line with Dr. Graham's recommendation, on Further, Dr. Graham has posed his alternatives in general terms leaving the details to be negotiated between the parties The draft resolution, in combining these alternatives has subjected them to specific limitations which do not appear' in Dr. Graham's conclusions and which Dr. Graham, it appears, to us, had deliberately left for further consideration and negotiation. Paragraph 38 of his fourth report suggests that agreement should be reached both on the number and character of the forces on each side the draft resolution refers to numbers alone, and further lays down the limits within which the numbers must lie. thus leaves out the essential and important consideration of the character of the forces paragraph 38 then suggests that agreement may alternatively be reached on the principles which should govern both the number and character of the forces on each side ; the draft resolution seeks to specify these principles and further to lay down in advance the conclusions which are to be extracted from them. Dr. Graham envisages two alternative and flexible procedures ; the draft resolution proposes one procedure only, restricted in advance, and leading to a predetermined result.
2. effect, the draft resolution makes Dr. Graham's proposals of 16 July 1952 [S/2783, annex 3] a consequence of his proposals of 4 September 1952 [S/2783, annex 8], instead of being independent of them. Moreover, the proposals of 16 July appear to be incorrectly cited. They do not simply refer to the limits within which that quantum of forces on each side is to be Danced. They also stipulate a radically different character for the forces on either side. The forces on the Indian side are to remain under the complete control of the Government of India whereas those on the other side are to be separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command and are to be offered by control and local, officer., the numbers have been put forward in relation to this deference of character-a difference which incidentally Pakistan has rejected. To take into account one half of Dr. Graham's proposal while ignoring the other half, to which It is integrally related not merely to mutilate his recommend- actions but to permit their purpose to suffer distortion and to render them unsuitable for consideration as a basis for resolving the dead-lock. To this extent, the draft resolution has deprived the patient labourers of the United Nations Representative of their purpose.

We have therefore found ourselves forced to refer to the basic issues of the origin of the complaint made by us before the Security Council in order to indicate the essential difference in the status of the parties and to show how this is totally disregarded in the draft resolution.

Sir Gladwyn Jebb has referred nostalgically in his speech [606th meeting] to the idea of introducing a so-called : "neutral" force in the State. In fairness to the representative of Pakistan. Sir Gladwyn Jebb cannot claim originality for this idea, as it was Sir Zafrulla Khan himself who first propounded it as long ago as 19 April 1948 [285th meeting] in this very Council. In its memorandum to the United Nations Com­mission's resolution of 13 August 1948 Pakistan pursued the idea. The idea was echoed in the United Kingdom-United States draft resolution of February 1951 [S/2017], which openly recommended a neutral or an international force. Sir Gladwyn Jebb should know that we long ago rejected this idea of the imposition of a foreign force on Indian territory as being derogatory to the dignity and territorial integrity of an independent nation. It is surprising that anyone should think of suggesting to us that we should admit, or receive back on our soil, foreign troops whose withdrawal was an essential feature of our independence. It does not matter in what guise they are sought to be introduced or by whom. We shall not permit this to happen.

1. other remarks made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb in the course of his speech cannot be allowed to pass unchallenged. He has stated that paragraph 8 of Dr. Graham's proposals ai2783 annex 3] may be taken as "a criterion in deciding the stages by which, and the extent to which, the military forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be reduced". He goes on to say :

"We believe that Dr. Graham, in suggesting the limits within which the final number of armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be fixed, was guided by this principle".

Sir Gladwyn Jebb's interpretation of this paragraph appears to us misleading and incorrect. Paragraph 8 has no bearing at all on the principles for determining the character and quantum of forces. These principles or criteria are stated in paragraph 7 of Dr. Graham's proposals of 4 September 1952 [SI2183 annex 8], These provisions are based on the two UNCIP resolutions. Paragraph 8 merely states that demilitariza­tion—according to plan to be framed under other paragraphs— shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to cease-fire agreement. It appears that when speaking of principles or criteria, Sir Gladwyn Jebb has forgotten paragraph 7 of the proposals of 4 September 1952, which is the only paragraph which deals with them, and has relied instead on another para­graph entirely unrelated to the question.

1. would like to hear the figures of the forces mentioned in the seventh paragraph of the draft resolution. As I have already said, no agreement was reached between the parties in regard to these figures. Yet these figures are now proposed for acceptance. The figures of 12,000 to 18,000 troops for the Indian side, suggested in the proposal of 16 July 1952, are entirely arbitrary. The United Nations Representative has never explained satisfactorily how these figures were arrived at. They are unrelated to the normal considerations determining the minimum need for security. Our security requirements have been fully stated in our memorandum annexed to Dr. Graham's fourth report [S/2783, annex 5], and have been mentioned by me already. The representative of the Union States of America has suggested [607th meeting] that the United Nations Repre­sentative must have arrived at these figures on the basis of the advice of military advisers. But it will be admitted that the security of the State being the responsibility of the Government of ndia, my Government must, in the discharge of that responsibility be guided by the advice of its own military advisers. No outside advice can supersede that of those who are them­selves responsible for carrying out the obligations of the security and protection of the State. It will be recalled that the United Nations Representative at one time suggested that the figures of the forces to be retained on both sides should be in proportion to the respective forces at the time of the cease-fire. That proposal also was not based on any principle but on a randum formula, wholly inapplicable to the fact of the case. We have already stated that 21,000 troops is the absolute mini­mum which our military advisers consider necessary to discharge their commitments for the security of the State. Any alternative figures must be justified on realistic considerations of security, and not be put forward merely as a matter of political bargain­ing or appeasement.

The representative of the United States has said that the quantum of forces within certain ranges suggested by Mr. Graham in some earlier proposals represents his "considered judgment" based on "his own study of the principles or criteria which he later put to the parties". This statement is, in our-view, incorrect. It also appears to show a misunderstanding of Mr. Graham's functions as defined by himself. Mr. Graham said in his statement of 29 May 1952 [S/2783, annex 1] that his position was that of mediator, and that if any approach sugges­ted by him was not acceptable to one or both Governments, he considered it his duty as mediator to find another approach. His definition of his functions was accepted by both parties. It is on this basis that we have given Mr. Graham our cooperation. Nor can we agree with the argument that Mr. Graham has accepted the view that the remaining forces on the other side of the cease-fire line should be the so-called Azad Kashmir force*. Irrespective of Mr. Graham's views, however, we have made our position clear in this respect. These so-called Azad forces are no other than regular Pakistan army forces under a different name. We cannot agree to any so-called Azad or any other military formations remaining on the other side.

I now come to the question of the character of the forces, which, as the Council is well aware, is basic to our position. Yet the draft resolution ignores this point and thereby makes the proposal unrelated to the issue to be resolved. Indeed, in Sir Gladwyn Jebb's speech, there is only one, and a somewhat oblique reference to this essential principle. Sir Gladwyn Jebb observes [606th meeting] in regard to the question of character of forces :

"I would simply say that we would hope that agreement could quickly be reached, based on the principle I have mentioned earlier that at no stage should1 demilitarization involve a threat to the cease-fire agreement".

And the conclusion which he draws from this statement is : "This would mean that the forces on each side of the cease­fire line should be, broadly speaking, of the same kind." Sir Gladwyn Jebb again appears to overlook paragraph 7 of the proposals of 4 September 1952 and to concentrate his attention on paragraph 8, which bears little relation to this issue. An issue so basic to the problem of demilitarization, or to any agreement in relation to it, cannot be so overlooked or ignored. To do so is to go behind the terms of the UNCIP resolutions which have been agreed on and adopt a position unfavourable to India. It can rest only on the totally inadmissible basis of equating the aggressor with the victim of the aggression.

In another place Sir Gladwyn Jebb refers to the require­ments of security on each side—I repeat the words "each side" —of the cease-fire line. It is difficult to understand what preci­sely this means. It has no basis in the UNCIP resolutions or in any of Dr. Graham's proposals. The United Nations Com­mission for India and Pakistan has clearly laid down, and the United Nations Representative has endorsed the principle, that the security of the State is the sole responsibility of the Govern­ment of India. Any attempt to revise this basic principle is a violation of the fundamental principles on which mediation has been carried on and, further, to which the parties themselves have subscribed.

The general approach which the United Kingdom representative has put forward in explanation of his draft resolution is completely inconsistent with and contrary to the principles underlined in the UNCIP resolutions We have not accepted this approach at any time and can never accept it. To do so is to recognize the right of an aggressor to keep armed forces in, and to exercise authority over, our territory.

My Government was unable to accept [539th meeting] the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017lRev. 1] as we did not agree to the terms of reference contained in it, and because it sought to impose a decision upon us. But because of our earnest desire to arrive at a peaceful settlement, we gave our full cooperation to the United Nations Represen­tative. We wish to make it clear that we cannot accept any decisions which violate the two UNCIP resolutions on which the parties have agreed. But we are always, as hitherto, willing to extend our cooperation in the exploration of, and indeed to explore ourselves, every avenue which may lead to a peaceful solution of the problem that does not ignore or violate the basic principles which are vital to a correct appreciation of the problem and which have been accepted by UNCIP and the parties themselves.

1. feel I ought to say that in all the long and protracted proceedings and procedures in respect of this matter, the Security Council has failed to address itself to the central issue before it, that is, the complaint which we laid before the Council. That complaint is one of aggression on our territory by Pakistan. The United Nations Commission has admitted the fact of this aggression, although in a brief and indirect reference to it. We have, however, repeatedly drawn attention to it, and although the Security Council has till now failed to pronounce 1 se" On this central issue, we have, in our earnest desire for a peaceful settlement, co-operated in the many plans and attempts to find a solution of this problem It will be remembered that

1. was at our instance that a cease-fire was agreed to at the end of 1948 . We have also repeatedly declared that on no account would we "initiate military operations and that we could continue to seek a peaceful settlement. Pakistan, though invited by us to do so, has refused to make this declaration. On the contrary, constant threats of whole war (jihad) have been, and continue to be, hurled at us from across the border.

The Council has heard from Dr. Graham that the parties have accepted the first of his proposals, and thereby reaffirmed their determination to adhere to peaceful procedures with regard to the Kashmir question. Similarly, the parties have agreed to paragraph 2 of the proposals, and thereby undertaken to discourage warlike propaganda in relation to this question. Yet, only a few weeks ago, when Dr. Graham was reporting to the Council [695th meeting] that the two sides ha*l so agreed and that they would not resort to force or war to seek a settlement of this question, the conference of the ruling party in Pakistan, the Muslim League, at its session at Lyallpur under the chair­manship of no less a person than the Prime Minister of Pakistan, passed resolutions and made statements threatening aggression and war against us. After the denouncement in a resolution of what was described as an attitude of "inordinate delay and malicious inaction" on the part of the United Nations, which Organisation was stigmatized as moving "only in the imperial interests of the United States of America and its allies" the Government of Pakistan was called upon to "take direct action for the liberation of Kashmir".

Sir Gladwyn had rightly expressed the sentiments, shared by us all, of "deep satisfaction" about the agreements referred to by Dr. Graham. We venture to hope that he feels and will express his sense of disappointment at the disregard and disavo­wal by one of the parties of this peaceful undertaking and at its resort to threats of war.

As I have already said, the Security Council has failed to address the central and basic issue of the aggression against us. Evasion and misrepresentation has served to cloud this plain and straightforward issue and to bar the way to a solution. We cannot permit ourselves to act in disregard of principles or to abandon agreements which already exist. The origins of the dispute and the principles on which the UNCIP resolutions are based are among these.        Any consideration of the problem must proceed on the clear and unequivocal recognition of the authority of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the entire territory of the State, of the fact that the State, by virtue of its accession to India, became a part of the territory of the Indian Union, and of the Government of India's responsibility for the security of the State against exter­nal aggression. This leads inevitably to the conclusion that all armed forces must be removed from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, and that Pakistan should exercise no authority whatsoever over the area which it has invaded.

We do not seek to go behind the UNCIP resolutions, or to ignore the vital elements of principle contained in them. The draft resolution before us appears to do so. We have always adhered to the UNCIP resolutions. Our difficulty has been that repeated attempts have been and are being made to by-pass them, both in the letter and in the spirit. We cannot be a party to the reversal of previous decisions taken by the United Nations Commission with the agreement of the parties.

So far as the draft resolution before us is concerned, we must reject the proposals contained in it. As I have already said, the Government of India is prepared, as always, to co­operate in and to persevere in the exploration of all peaceful procedures for the settlement of this problem, so long as they are not consistent with the basic principles to which I have referred. From these we cannot deviate.

1. ZAFRULLA KHAN (Pakistan) : There is at least one sentence in the statement made just now by the fair and distinguished representative of India with which I can express the entire agreement. It is the sentence : "Evasion and misrepresentation has served to cloud this plain and straightforward issue and to bar the way to a solution." But it would take a little time to try to explain to the Council where the evasion and misrepresentation lie. I shall, therefore, beg for a little time to prepare and submit a reply to the allegations and the criticisms that have been offered on behalf of India both with respect to Pakistan and with respect to the resolutions to which both India and Pakistan have already agreed, and the implementation of which is the only subject-matter of consideration before the Council and the subject-matter of controversy between the two parties.