06111952 Text of the speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (UK.) in the Security Council meeting No. 606 held on 6 November 1952.

06111952 Text of the speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (UK.) in the Security Council meeting No. 606 held on 6 November 1952.

The object of my intervention this afternoon will be to explain as best I can the draft resolution which has now been distributed to all members of the Council in document S/2839, dated 5 November 1952. In what I say I shall not, of course, be speaking on behalf of my United States colleague, who has associated himself with this draft resolution, but I hope that what I say will be agreeable to him.

Now that we are about to resume our deliberations on the India-Pakistan question, I am sure of one thing : that I shall be giving expression to the views of most of the governments represented round this table when I say how deeply we regret 1 at no solution has yet been found to the differences between e Government of India and the Government of Pakistan with regard to the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

For its part, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has always recognized the great delicacy of the issues involved in this question. At the same time, however, it has always been encouraged by the firm agreement of the two governments concerned on the principles to be followed in order to achieve a settlement. It has therefore always hoped, and it continues most strongly to hope, that agreement can be reached on how these principles can be put into effect—in other words, on how the inhabitants of the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be enabled most fairly and effectively to express their wishes on the question whether their State should accede to the Indian Union or to Pakistan.

In a world beset by so many intractable and seemingly insoluble problems, this particular one has always seemed to be eminently susceptible of settlement by reasoned negotiations and compromise. I am sure that my colleagues on the Security Council will agree with me on one thing : that it is the plain duty of the Council to use its best endeavours to promote such a settlement.

We last discussed the various issues involved in the India-Pakistan question in detail in February and March 1951. As the result of our debates at that time, Dr. Graham was appoint­ed as the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, with a mandate to resolve, in negotiation with the parties, the differences between them which were preventing the fulfilment of the demilitarization provisions of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The four reports which we have received from Dr. Graham [S/2375, S/2448, S/2661 and S/2783] are a monument, if I may say so, to his thoroughness, patience and perseverance in carrying out this mandate, and I am sure we are all agreed on this one thing, the tribute that I have paid to Dr. Graham. As represen­tatives will have observed, the fourth report of Dr. Graham, which deals with the latest negotiations, contains certain detailed suggestions for the determination of the number of armed forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization. I believe that Dr. Graham made a valuable contribution to the long negotiations on this point by putting forward these specific suggestions. It will be seen that in the draft resolution which the United States and United Kingdom delegations have now placed before the Council, and to which I have referred, we have based the action which we think the Security Council might urge the parties to take on certain of these detailed suggestions by Dr. Graham, to which I have just referred. I will come back to this point, however, a little later when I discuss the draft resolution in detail.

Before I do this I should like, if I may, to explain to the members of the Council the general considerations which have guided the United Kingdom as co-sponsor of this draft resolution.

In the first place, we do not believe that this dispute over the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be left simply to settle itself, or that the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement can in any way be relaxed. It may be that there are some problems which can with advantage be placed on the side and just allowed to develop and, perhaps, -come to a head in their own way. I do not know, but that may be so. But I do not believe, personally, that representatives will consider that such a proceeding would be wise or proper in dealing with this question of India and Pakistan.

1. I have already said, the dispute over the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is of a kind in which the Security Council ought to be able to be of great assistance. The parties have agreed—and they have many times reaffirmed their agreement—to decide the future accession of the State by means of a free and impartial plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. And I repeat that : Under the auspices of the United Nations". Can the United nations, therefore, do anything other than continue to strive to create the conditions in which this plebiscite may be held ? Indeed the danger which we all have reason to fear might use to the peaceful relations of the peoples of India and Pakistan if this question were to be shelved by the United Nations is enough to persuade us that there can be—or there should be—no relaxation of effort on our part to bring about a settlement.

Of course, the United Kingdom Government has in no sense closed its mind to the possibility of a settlement of the problem on lines different from those which we have considered in the Security Council up to now. We have always insisted that the solution to this problem can come only as a result of an agreement by the two governments concerned, and it would follow from this, we should have thought, that if these govern­ments choose to reach a settlement in accordance with principles different from those continued in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, on which all our recent action in the Security Council has been based, that settlement would be none the less welcome. I am sure that I speak for other representatives in the Security Council in say­ing that we do not regard ourselves as having any monopoly of wisdom in regard to this problem and that any agreement between the parties to settle the dispute in any whatever should be most welcome to all of us. Nevertheless, the only agreement which has been placed on record so far between the Governments of India and Pakistan on this question is that contained in the two resolutions of the- United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It is because the original agreement between the governments has, therefore, been to decide the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations that the United Kingdom Government has always lent its support for a settle­ment on such lines. This we shall continue to do unless there 1S1 and until there is, some indication from both governments  they prefer to work for a settlement in some other form, drawing up a draft resolution to place before the Security Council, therefore, the Government I represent has, for this very reason, concentrated attention on resolving the main difference standing in the way of agreement between the two parties the demilitarization of the State and the holding of plebiscite. I should now like to examine for a moment, if I may, the extent to which Dr. Graham has been able to obtain acceptance by two governments of the points contained in his twelve proposals which, of course, are all familiar to us. He originally put these proposals forward on 7 September 1951, and he has Presented them in various slightly modified forms since then, ding with his proposals of 4 September 1952. In the first place, as we understand it, it has been agreed by the two governments that demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single continuous process. We, for our part, have always felt that this would be more logical and, indeed, more suitable than for the demilitarization to be done in two separate operations, as provided for in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. We therefore welcome the acceptance by the parties of Dr. Graham's proposal on this point.

It has also been agreed that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State will have been withdrawn by the end of the period of demilitarization. In fact, we understand that this has long been the case. Nevertheless, we welcome also this restatement of agreement by the two parties.

We understand that they are further agreed that the Pakistan regular army units should be withdrawn from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk of the Indian and State armed forces should likewise be withdrawn. These are the steps which the two governments concerned have agreed on as the method of reducing the military forces in the State to whatever final figures they may determine between them.

Dr. Graham has also reported that they have accepted "his proposal that demilitarization should be conducted in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the demilitarization period. This seems to us at any rate to be of great significance. If it is taken as a criterion in deciding the stages by which, and the extent to which, the military forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be reduced, it should provide a way of resolving at least the major differences of view that may exist between the two governments. We believe that Dr. Graham, in suggesting the limits within which the final number of armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be fixed, was guided by this principle.

If the two governments could now decide on a final figure for the strength of their armed forces within the limits suggested by Dr. Graham and, indeed, within the limits which we have incorporated into our draft resolution, they can, we think, assure themselves that, in spite of a considerable reduc­tion in the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease fire line, this reduction will, at any rate, involve no threat to the integrity or to the security of the*territory on either side.

Therefore, it is our view that, within these limits, final figures for the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line can and should be determined ; that within these limits figures could be agreed upon which would enable a free and impartial plebiscite to be arranged—and this must, in our view, be the first and principal consideration—and which would at the same time take into account the need to safeguard law and order, the integrity of the cease-fire line and the security of the territory on each side of that line.

The Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit Scouts, which occupy a special position, need not, in the view of the sponsors of this draft resolution—I think I am speaking for the representative of the United States to—be included in the total of the forces to be determined in accordance with the draft resolution which we have now jointly put before the Council.

1. am sure that representatives have noticed with deep satisfaction the agreement recorded in the first of Dr. Graham s twelve proposals, namely, that neither government will resort to the use of armed force to settle this dispute. I believe that once some evident progress towards the organization of a plebiscite is achieved, the efforts of the people of Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line and, indeed, of the peoples of India and Pakistan also, would be concentrated on the task of organizing the methods and procedures to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to express freely their wishes on the question of the accession, and that, once this stage was reached, the talk of war and threats of war, which we have all so much regretted in the past would, as it were, become a thing of the past. Of course, should there still be doubts on this score, should hope that the parties would remember the proposal which my Government and the Government of the United States put forward in the draft resolution of 21 February 1951 [S/2017]. It may be remembered that at that time we suggested that a neutral force might be used to facilitate demilitarization. If demilitarization is on the lines suggested by Dr. Graham and if our own draft resolution can be brought about, I do not believe that the device of a neutral force would in any sense be necessary. Of course not. But, should the fear that demilitarization may lead to a renewal of conflict in Kashmir still exist, 'perhaps' we might, with respect, urge whichever of the parties feels this fear to reconsider the proposal that a neutral force might then be made available.

In this way, therefore, we would hope that an agreement might at last be reached by the two governments on the extent of demilitarization ; on the number of armed forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the time when the plebiscite is to take place. Dr. Graham, in paragraph 38 of his last report [S/2783], observes that not only the number of armed forces but also their character remains to be settled, which of course is true. On this question of the character of the forces, I would simply say that we would hope that agreement could quickly be reached, based on the principle I have mentioned earlier that at no stage should demilitarization involve a threat to the cease­fire agreement. This would mean that the forces of each side of the cease-fire line should be, broadly speaking, of the same kind. I should make it clear that the United Kingdom Government has never thought that the proposal to limit the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line to an armed civil police force while leaving a military force on the other side of the cease-fire line was consistent with a really free plebiscite. I hope that representatives will join me in urging that the parties should resolve any differences they may still have on this point in the way which I have suggested.

1. the draft resolution [S/2839] which the United King­dom and the United States have placed before the Council, it is sought to concentrate attention on this one question, namely, of determining finally the figures to which the armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line are to be reduced. It will be seen that the suggestion contained in the draft resolution is that the two governments should negotiate directly with each other to his end. We should hope that Dr. Graham will be ready to assist the two parties in any way they indicate, and we have framed the draft resolution so as to provide for this possibility. We would hope, however, that the Council will agree that at this moment the primary responsibility for working out an agreement should lie with the two governments themselves. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, would earnestly hope that the Governments of India and Pakistan would each appoint representatives with adequate powers to enable them to nego­tiate a final agreement on demilitarization. In the draft resolu­tion we have suggested that these negotiations should take place in New York. This seems likely to be the most convenient arrangement since, after all, while the General Assembly is in session, the ministers and representatives of the two govern­ments who will be concerned with the negotiations are in addition likely to be engaged with the work of the General Assembly.

It will also be seen that the draft resolution requests the two governments to inform the Security Council of the results of their negotiations within a period of thirty days. In view of the urgency of a solution and the narrow gap, as we think, to which the differences between the two parties seem to have been brought, the sponsors of the draft resolution believe that members of the Council will think it desirable that a further report should be placed before them within the period which we have indicated in the draft resolution.

Once agreement is reached on the level of the armed forces at the end of the demilitarization, surely it will be but a short step for representatives of the two governments, sitting in joint session with military experts, of course, to draw up a Detailed programme of disbandment and withdrawal.

The two governments have already agreed that such a programme should be carried through within ninety days from the date of its signature by them. Within a matter of months, therefore, we might hope to see the forces in Kashmir reduced to the level at which a fair and impartial plebiscite could take place. Within a matter of months we might hope to see the plebiscite Administrator formally appointed and established inside Kashmir to begin the final task of preparing for the voting to take place.

So near are we to a solution—or so it seems to us—of this difficult and dangerous problem which has so long exercised our minds and unsettled and and weakened an extensive and vitally important region of the world; so near are we to a solu­tion if only the spirit of compromise and the determination of both parties to achieve a settlement can be brought to grapple with the outstanding differences between them.

The sponsors of this draft resolution hope that there will be tendency on the part of either of the two governments to go behind the agreements enshrined in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which have been agreed on. These resolutions, as we think, contain all the elements of a settlement. Reinforced and amplified as they are by the agreements of the two governments to all but two of Dr. Graham's twelve proposals, they provide the Security Council and the parties with a framework on which to build, and they also provide certain agreed principles according to which that building should be done.

The ultimate objective of a fair and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations has, after all, been written into solemn agreements by the two governments and endorsed by this Security Council. These agreements have been affirmed and reaffirmed by the two governments many times during the last three and a half years. The transformation of this agreement into the reality of the actual voting ought not to Present insuperable difficulties. We have recently seen the tremendous achievement—if I may say so, with respect—of the Government of India in organizing and carrying through a' fully democratic election throughout its vast territory. From this great example it is clear that the will of the people of Kashmir and Jammu in this question of accession could be ascertained without any insuperable difficulty.

Is it therefore too much to hope that the two governments can now resolve their differences and show by example how ,he precepts which the United Nations frequently affirms can be put into practical effect and made the instrument of a political settlement which would not only satisfy the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir but would also add greatly, as we all know, to the happiness, prosperity and security of peoples throughout the free world.