30011952 Text of the speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1952

30011952 Text of the speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1952

The Kashmir question has been before the Security Council since 1 January 1948. During these four years every aspect of the question has been examined. On-the-spot in­quiries have been made by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) by Sir Owen Dixon and now by Mr. Frank P. Graham. The fullest information has therefore already been made available to the Security Council on this question. The representatives of India and Pakistan have also stated their views at great length before the United Nations Commission, the United Nations representatives and the Secu­rity Council itself. The official correspondence on the subject runs into hundreds of pages, while the verbatim records of the Security Council are even more voluminous. It is thus not for want of factual information with regard to the various aspects of the problem, nor for lack of knowledge of the views of the Parties, that the dispute has not so far been settled. The dead-lock that has unfortunately been reached with regard to the matter is also not due to the absence of an agreement.

After hearing both sides at length and ascertaining their views in detail and taking all relevant factors into account, the United Nations Commission obtained the agreement of India and Pakistan to which the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 12 January 1949 apply. These two resolutions to­gether constitute the international agreement with regard to Kashmir and cover all the stages from the cease-fire to the holding of the plebiscite. It has been the concern of those who have been called upon since to deal with the matter— General McNaughton, Sir Owen Dixon and Mr. Frank P. Graham—to preserve and build upon the measures of agree­ment already reached between India and Pakistan. In pursu­ance of this international agreement the cease-fire came into effect on 1 January 1949 and an agreement on the demarcation of the cease-fire line was reached on 27 July 1949.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz of the United States Navy was designated as Plebiscite Administrator, with the agreement of India and Pakistan, on 22 March 1949. Since January 1949 Pakistan has been striving to secure the implementation of the remaining terms of the agreement. There has at no time been any question of anything being imposed from outside on either party. The efforts of the Security Council have been directed solely towards securing an implementation of the agreement existing between the parties. The deadlock that is now almost three years old is related to the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to the holding of the plebis­cite and the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.

When the cease-fire was agreed, the armed forces engaged in Jammu and Kashmir fell into the following categories. On the "Pakistan'' side there were the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and also regular troops of the Pakistan Army and the Azad Kashmir forces. On the Indian side of the cease-fire line the forces consisted of regular Indian armed forces and State armed forces, which include the State army and State militia.

The resolution of the Commission envisaged demilitariza­tion in two stages. The first stage provided for withdrawal of tribesmen, of Pakistan volunteers and Pakistan troops, on the one side, and of the bulk of the Indian forces on the other side, (Vide part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948.) The second stage provided for the final disposal of the remaining forces in the State, namely, the Azad Kashmir forces on the one side and the Indian forces remaining after the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces and the State forces and militia on the other side. (Vide paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949.) The obligation on Pakistan to persuade the tribesmen and volunteers to withdraw, in the language of the resolution, arises only after the signing of the truce agreement which has not yet been reached or signed, but as proof of good intentions and of its anxiety to proceed with the implementation of the resolu­tion, Pakistan discharged its obligation without waiting for the conclusions of the truce agreement. Pakistan has also been prepared to withdraw the Pakistan forces of the regular army and to agree to large-scale disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces, provided that India would carry out its commitment regarding withdrawal of Indian forces and the large-scale dis­bandment of the State army and militia.

1. is not necessary to go over the history of the Kashmir dispute. The Pakistan case has been stated at length before the Security Council on several occasions. The attention of such members of the Council as may be anxious to discover where to find the case stated in detail is drawn to the records of the Security Council meetings of 8, 9 and 10 February 1950 and 6, 7 and 9 March 1951 [464th-466th, 534-536th meetings}. The terms of reference of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan are contained in the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 [5/2077/Rev. 1]. Paragraph 3 of this resolution instructs the United Nations Representative to effect, in consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.If Mr. Graham was not successful in carrying out this task, he was instructed to report to the Purity Council those points of difference between the parties ' in regard to the interpretation and execution of the two resolutions which he considered must be resolved to enable such militarization to be implemented. After visiting Jammu and Kashmir and holding a num­ber of meetings with representatives of India and Pakistan, Mr. Graham put forward, on 7 September 1951, twelve proposals for a comprehensive programme of demilitarization prepara­tory to the holding of a plebiscite. [Vide annex 2 of document S/2375). Mr. Graham informed the Security Council in this report that he had been able to secure agreement only on the first four of his twelve proposals, namely, those relating to the observance of the cease-fire agreement and the cessation of war­like propaganda and the reaffirmation of the undertaking that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided in a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

The Security Council considered Mr. Graham's report of 15 October 1951 and his personal statement of 18 October 1951 ["64th meeting], and adopted a resolution [SJ2392] on 10 November 1951 [566th meeting] noting the basis for a pro­gramme of demilitarization which could be carried out in con­formity with the previous undertakings of the parties, put forward by the United Nations Representative in his communi­cation of 7 September 195 1 to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan [S/2375, annex 2]. The Council instructed the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain agreement on the demilitarization plan, and requested him to report concerning his efforts and his views on the problems confided in him.

The second report of the United Nations Representative was submitted to the Security Council on i 8 December 1951 [Sjf2448]. On 17 January 1952 Mr. Graham made a personal statement before the Security Council (570th meeting). Since then the United Nations Representative has released the tenta­tive plan on demilitarization proposed by his Military Adviser, General Devers [S/2485]. Mr. Graham has pointed out that, as a result of his second effort, he had obtained agreement on points 8, 9, 11 and 12 of his truce proposals of 7 September 1951. These related to the procedure for working out the details of a demilitarization plan, and the powers of the Plebiscite Administrator to determine the final disposal of all the remaining forces in consultation with the United Nations Representative and the authorities concerned. Mr. Graham • formed the Security Council that agreement had not been reached on the four basic proposals 5, 6, 7 and 10. "Agree­ment on these four proposals", wrote Mr. Graham, "is most essential for carrying out the plan of demilitarization envisa­ged as an integrated whole in the twelve proposals" [S/2248,para 29].

These four proposals relate to the scope and extent of demilitarization, the period within which the demilitarization programme should be carried out, the quantum of forces which should  remain at the end of demilitarization, and the date on which the Plebiscite Administrator should be formally appoin­ted to office. After taking into account the views of both parties, Mr. Graham came to the following conclusions on the four basic proposals concerning which he had not succeeded in obtaining the agreement of India and Pakistan [SJ2448, para. 32]

First, he pointed out that the proposals for a demilitariza­tion programme in a single continuous process implied, in his opinion, the implementation as a whole of part 11 of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b), of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949. The demilitarization programme should, therefore, be in accord with paragraph 7 of his proposals. In other words, the de­militarization programme should embrace all the fighting forces within the State, namely, tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and troops and Azad Kashmir forces, on the one hand, and the Indian forces, the State army and militia, on the other.

1. Mr. Graham recommended that the demilitarization less Programme should be completed by 15 July 1952 un-less another date is agreed upon by the representatives of India and Pakistan.

Thirdly Mr.- Graham recommended that at the end of the programme of demilitarization there should remain "on each side of  the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease fire line on 1 january 1949. Mr. Graham explained to the Security Council on 17 January, in his address, that he did not have the expert knowledge to suggest what the exact figures should be, had suggested the store mentioned principles as a basis for an approach to the problem he said at the 570th meeting .

Concerning the first point, the reasons are obvious both parties have agreed to the demilitarization of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Security Council has recom­mended that the demilitarization should be effaced.

Concerning the second point, it is the view of the United Nations Representative that the way to Demilitarize is to withdraw, or reduce, or disarm and disband, armed forces, and that the simplest and clearest and one of the most workable principles may be co-ordination in the continuous process so as to have at the end of the period of demilitarization the smallest number possible based in proportion on the number existing at the beginning of the cease-fire on 1 January 1949."

Fourthly, Mr. Graham recommended that the Govern­ment of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator  to be formally appointed to office not later than the last day of the demilitarization period", that is, 15 July 1952.

Mr. Graham attaches importance to this part of his truce proposals. He told the Security Council on 17 January 1952 :

"It is the view of the United Nations Representative that an agreement for a specified time for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator would contribute to the? further development of a more friendly atmosphere. One of the main keys to the complex problems of demili­tarization, the possible linchpin which would integrate the twelve-point programme, the clearest symbol both of the necessary and ultimate demilitarization in the promi­sed plebiscite, would be the fixing of a definite day for the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.

The United Nations Representative holds the view that the best day for the induction info office of the Plebiscite Administrator is not at the beginning or midway but the last day of the contemplated period, which is not later than 15 July 1952."

I may recall to the memory of the members of the Council that the two UNCIP resolutions contemplate that the Plebis­cite Administrator would be formally appointed to office at the beginning of the second stage of the demilitarization, the stage that is set out in sub paragraph 4 (a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949; that is to say, very much earlier than con­templated by Mr. Graham. Pakistan's views regarding Mr. Graham's truce proposals of 7 September 1951 are set out in the late Prime Minister's letter dated 12 September 1951 [S/2375, annex 4] and in my letter dated 11 December 1951 [Si2448, annex 5]. Pakistan is equally ready to carry out a programme of demilitarization in two stages as envisaged in the UNCIP resolutions, or a demilitarization programme in one single continuous process, as proposed by Mr. Graham. But Pakistan could not possibly be expected to agree to any one-sided demilitarization arrangement. For us, demilitariza­tion is not on end in itself; it is an essential preliminary to the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.

We also agree to Mr. Graham's proposal that the Plebis­cite Administrator should be inducted into office not later than the last day of the demilitarization programme, namely, 15 July 1952, although, as I have said, that would postpone his formal appointment to a later period than that contemplated in the UNCIP resolutions.

In short, we accept in principle the truce proposals for­mulated in Mr. Graham's second report to the Security Council. We consider, however, that for the sake of clarity, and in order to avoid future "controversies; some of the important terms used in Mr. Graham's proposals should be defined and tier necessary details should be filled in. In this connexion, .spade work done by General Devers, and the demilitarization- the plan drawn up by him, after much thought and prolonged study, should prove very helpful.

At the 570th meetings of the Security Council held on 17 january 1952, the representative of the USSR referred to certain Press reports relating to the granting of military bases in Kashmir to the United States. I wish to state clearly and with authority that these reports upon which he relied for his statement are utterly false and without any foundation what­soever. We have neither been asked for, nor have we offered, any military or other bases to the United States or any other Power. I trust that any misapprehension that might have been raised in the mind of the representative of the USSR on the basis of the reports to which he refers will now be set at rest.

The USSR representative has also observed that the settlement of the Kashmir dispute should be "inspired by the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples proclaimed in the United Nations Charter", and that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should determine their future through a democratically elected representative constituent assembly. .1 have since understood that his reference was not to the cons­tituent assembly convened in Indian-occupied Kashmir, but to a new constituent assembly for the whole of Jammu and Kashmir elected under conditions of absolute freedom and impartiality and free from all pressure and interference

The difference between what the USSR representative suggested and what the Security Council has sought to achieve with the agreement of India and Pakistan is one of method, not of principle. Throughout this controversy, India, Pakis­tan and the Security Council have agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This fundamental principle is embo­died in the preamble to the Security Council resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] and in paragraph 1 of the UNOP resolu­tion of 5 January 1949. Pakistan fully subscribes to this principle, and not only agrees, but is insistent and eager, that conditions should be created as speedily as possible to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir freely to record their view on this question. Every measure that the Security Council can devise to achieve this end will have the fullest and unqualified support of Pakistan.

Mr. Graham described the Kashmir dispute as a turning sore which is poisoning the relations between India and Pakis­tan and draining away the resources and energies of both countries. The dispute has been before the United Nations for over four years. All efforts at negotiation, mediation and conciliation have failed. The time has come for the Security Council to face the issue and bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute. The welfare and prosperity of over 400 million human beings and the peace and stability of South Asia are at stake. The situation brooks no further delay. It calls for prompt, firm and decisive action. We earnestly hope that the yearnings and prayers of the millions of people of Jammu and Kashmir and the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent will not remain unanswered, and that the Security Council will now take defi­nite steps to resolve the points in dispute submitted by Mr. Graham, so that the implementation of the two UNC1P resolu­tions may be resumed and pushed vigorously forward.

Sir Gladwyn JEBB (United Kingdom) : I have listened with great attention to the speech made by my friend, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan. We are all, I am sure, very grateful to him for the resume which he has given us of the negotiations conducted by Mr. Graham since the Secu­rity Council resolution of 30 March i951, and we shall all doubtless wish to study the conclusions which he has drawn.

Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan has also, if I may say so, dealt most effectively with the allegations made by the repre­sentative of the Soviet Union in his intervention on 17 January with which, as the Council will recollect, I also dealt at the time. T do most sincerely hope that these extraordinary red herrings will not continue to be drawn across the trail and that the Council will return to the atmosphere of objectivity which, until the USSR representative made his last intervention, had always, I think I am right in saying, characterized its conside­ration of the Kashmir problem.

The representative of India will presumably, at some stage in our discussion, wish to comment on the views expres­sed by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and to put forward the views of the Government of India on the points immedi­ately at issue In the belief that both parties will seek so far as possible to avoid controversy—which I know is the inten­tion—I have asked the President's permission to speak before the representative of India, in the hope that, by putting before the Council certain proposals—constructive as we believe—we may be able to confine our discussion to a quite brief examina­tion of the steps likely to carry this problem further forward towards a solution. In our long and painful consideration of the Kashmir question, we have—as it were—inched our way slowly forward, one step at a time. Now, however, seems to be the time to take one final step.

We have now had time to give proper study to Mr. Graham's second report and the text of the important and helpful oral statement which he made to the Council on 17 January 1952. The United Kingdom Government had hoped, of course, that Mr. Graham, during the further period of six weeks in which he continued his negotiations with the two parties here in Paris, would succeed in resolving the outstand­ing points of difference between them. We had hoped that, with the points of difference so clearly defined, the way would be found to reach agreement on them. I shall not, therefore, conceal the fact that the United Kingdom Government was deeply disappointed when Mr. Graham's second report showed that on the two basic points—the points which go to the very root of this problem of arranging a plebiscite in Kashmir—the differences between the Government of India and Pakistan seem to be almost as wide as ever. As we know, Mr. Graham defined these two points in his oral statement as follows : first, the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarization; and, secondly, the fixing of the definite time when the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted into office.

Agreement between the parties must clearly be reached under these two heads before we can hope to go forward to the plebiscite and to the final goal to which both the parties have pledged themselves : namely, a decision by the people of Kashmir whether the accession of their State should be to India or to Pakistan. How such agreement can best be brought about is, I submit, the matter which requires our immediate attention.

I do not wish to suggest to the Council that because these basic differences continue no progress has been made during Mr. Graham's tenure of office as United Nations Representa­tive On the contrary, I believe that there has been significant progress and that we are all greatly indebted to Mr. Graham for clearing a good deal of the ground towards a final settle­ment of the dispute. In the first place, it has been a consider­able gain, in our view, for Mr. Graham to focus on the main points on which agreement between the two Governments is required, in the form of his twelve-point proposal. This has introduced clarity into the consideration of the dispute and has disposed of a number of uncertainties and ambiguities which tended to cloud the earlier negotiations. Also, we must by no means overlook the importance of the eight points in Mr. Graham's proposals to which the two Governments have ex­pressed their agreement.

It is because of the success which Mr. Graham has had in carrying his negotiators forward that the Government of the United Kingdom now believes that he should pay a further visit to the sub-continent to make one final attempt to bring about a solution of the two outstanding points of difference which I mentioned earlier. After all, we must admit that the circumstances for Mr. Graham's last round of negotiations were perhaps not entirely propitious: The Government of India was already preoccupied with the arrangements for its general election, which, as we all know, on account of both the size of the country and the great extension of the franchise, has Presented many difficult problems. The United Kingdom Government therefore hopes that, now that the Indian elec­tions are, as I believe, virtually over, and now that both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are ready—and we believe indeed anxious —to give their full a mention to the task of working out an agreement on out­standing points, continued negotiations by Mr. Graham will be fully justified.

Another reason which has moved us to suggest continued negotiations by the United Nations Representative is that, by going to the sub-continent, he might be able to arrange for re­presentatives from both sides, able to speak for their Govern­ments, to meet together under his chairmanship to discuss how best to resolve the differences at present preventing demilitari­zation, the plebiscite and the final settlement of the dispute. Indeed, he might find the situation such that it would be pos­sible for the two Prime Ministers themselves to meet under his chairmanship. That might happen. I express this hope, because we think that such joint discussions offer the best hope of speedy progress. Of course, Mr. Graham would have to decide himself when the moment was appropriate for them, and we would not wish in any way to limit his discretion. But, should he decide that joint discussions were desirable, we trust that he would find the two parties ready to fall in with his pro­posals for bringing them about.

It is scarcely necessary, I suppose, for me to say that the United Kingdom Government is fully aware of the urgent need for a settlement of this dispute and for some early and tangible proof that the Security Council and its representative, Mr. Graham, are carrying matters forward towards a settlement. I would therefore suggest that, if the procedure which I have just put before the Council is adopted. Mr. Graham should report back to the Council on the results of his further negotia­tions by the end of March. I think it is most important—and I am sure that Mr. Graham himself would agree—to set some time limit in this way for any further round of negotiations.

There is no need to speak of terms of reference, I think, for the negotiations which I have suggested. In a long series of resolutions, the Council has already clearly defined the path along which a settlement has to be approached. The two parties, by their acceptance of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, are them­selves pledged to a programme for achieving a settlement. Mr. Graham himself, by the twelve-point proposals which he has submitted to the parties in furtherance of the principles con­tained in the resolution of 30 March 1951, has already set the course which he will follow.

Throughout his negotiations, Mr. Graham has clearly been guided by two main principles, with which the United The Kingdom Government—and, I have no doubt, the governments of most other members of the Security Council—is in complete agreement. The first is that, in order that the plebiscite shall be demonstrably fair and free from any external pressure, the number of troops on both sides of the cease-fire line should be reduced to the absolute minimum compatible with the need to preserve law and order and internal security, and that both parties should cooperate to this end in a spirit of mutual trust and goodwill. The second is that once the process of demili­tarization and preparation for a plebiscite has started, the momentum should be maintained until the whole operation is completed.

The twelve proposals which Mr. Graham put to the two parties last September, and has since been discussing with them, are firmly based on these two principles and we feel satisfied that they are on the right lin.s. As I have already said, agreement has been secured on eight of them and there has been progress in defining the other four. In our view the object of the new discussions between the parties should be to build on these proposals of Mr. Graham's to consolidate the progress already made, and to tackle the outstanding points of difference on the basis of the two principles to which I have referred in a resolute effort to reach agreement on them.

In paragraph 32 of his second report, Mr. Graham has expressed views on the four outstanding points of difference. We have no doubt that these views, coming from such a source, will be taken fully into account by the two parties. We also greatly hope that, with the object of setting themselves a target, the parties will, as suggested by Mr. Graham, aim at 15 July 1952 as the date by which the process of demilitarization should be completed and the Plebiscite Administrator inducted.

1. I see the position, Mr. Graham can now return to the sub-continent in pursuance of the existing mandate, no new resolution being necessary. May I refresh the memory of the council by reading paragraph 2 of the Council's resolution cf 14 March ]950 [S11461]. That part reads as follows :"The Security Council..

"2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate :

"(a) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarization referred to above and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarization;

"(b) To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before those Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solu­tion of the dispute which has arisen between the two Govern­ments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

"(c) To exercise all of the powers and responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission by reason of existing resolutions of the Security Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949;

"(d) To arrange at the appropriate stage of demilitariza­tion for the assumption by the Plebiscite. Administrator of the functions assigned to the latter under agreements made between the parties;

"(e) To report to the Security Council as he may consi­der necessary submitting his conclusions and any recommenda­tions which he may desire to make."

Mr. Graham, of course, in succeeding Sir Owen Dixon to this appointment under the resolution of 30 March 1951, has also inherited all the powers and responsibilities of the office of United Nations Representative and, as we see it, he is therefore fully entitled to return to the sub-continent if he believes it desirable and if the Council does not disagree.

To sum up, I earnestly hope that my colleagues in the Council will feel able to concur in our view that Mr. Graham should, as part of his continuing function as United Nations The Representative for India and Pakistan, made a further visit to the sub-continent to continue his negotiations with the two Governments and that he should report the result of these negotiations to the Council by the end of March 1952.

If this is the general sense of the Council, I hope that the representatives of India and Pakistan will agree that these fur­ther negotiations should be undertaken and that they will be able to offer the full cooperation of their Governments to Mr. Graham in bringing them to a successful conclusion. Clearly the less controversy between the parties in the Council at this stage, the greater will be Mr. Graham's chances of finding a readiness in the sub-continent to conclude the settlement which we have all so long and earnestly awaited. May 1 therefore appeals to our colleagues from India and Pakistan to hammer out their differences round the conference table with Mr. Graham rather than at the Security Council table.

This time we must all hope that the hammering-out pro­cess will produce agreement rather than new lacerations. We must all try to show the world that the United Nations way, long and arduous though it be, is the right way to solve our mutual conflicts. We must all, by our help and our encourage­ment, do our best to preserve faith in our democratic institu­tions. T think that it is the privilege of India and Pakistan to be able to point the way to the happier world community of the future.