09031951 Text of the speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No 536 held on 9 March, 1951

09031951 Text of the speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council meeting No 536 held on 9 March, 1951

Some of the points raised by the representative of India call for a reply, not so much from the point of view that they are in controversy and a reply could in itself settle the controversy— the controversy is there, and that is why the Security Council is engaged in the discussion of this problem—but because, if further explanation of them were not submitted, the issue might be con­fused. On some points I shall be quite brief, because my main object is not merely to make debating points but to clarify the issues with which the Council has to deal and which it is called upon to decide and dispose of. On one or two points I shall be compelled to draw the Council's attention to the relevant docu­ments so that it may have a full view of the situation.

With regard to the first point raised by the representative of India as to whether the Maharaja's letter of 26 October addressed to Lord Mountbatten offering accession to India was or was not the culmination of a conspiracy, the representative of India has submitted two main points for consideration. One is the official account given by the Prime Minister of India of what happened after the night of 24 October 1947, when the first request from the Maharaja for armed assistance was receiv­ed. I have no means of controverting that account, and I do not desire to controvert it; but it is what had gone on before,and had brought about that request, which would show whether there was or was not a conspiracy.

I have cited the visits of Congress Leaders to the Maharaja,, including the visit of Mahatma Gandhi, during the crucial period. What were they discussing ?

1. regard to Sheikh Abdullah's position, it was said, in the extract I read out from Mr. Bazaz' statement that the alleg­ed writing of the letter by Sheikh Abdullah to a friend in Jammu, which Mr. Bazaz has stated that, published in the Congress papers, is sought to be made out to be improbable, owing to what Sheikh Abdullah had stated on one or two occasions in New Delhi after his release from jail. Sheikh Abdullah was released from jail on 29 September. He went straight to New Delhi. He remained in New Delhi either throughout the period intervening between his release and the Maharaja's letter of 26 October 1947 intimating to Lord Mountbatten that the Maharaja was willing to associate Sheikh Abdullah with the administration at the stage, or at least during the crucial period. He was in New Delhi on 21 October, because a reception was given to him. On that date there was another reception, but at any rate a Press statement was made by him from which I have quoted on previous occasions. He certainly was there on 27 October because the representative of India has himself referred to his being in New Delhi on 27 October.

1. was he doing there ? The representative of India says, and he has put it in quotations, that Sheikh Abdullah was at that time pleading for time to consider which Dominion the State should join. He is in New Delhi, on 9 October—and he is a great friend of the Prime Minister of India—pleading for time to consider which Dominion the State should join.           With whom was he pleading ? He was pleading with the authorities in New Delhi. Why was he pleading ? Because they were exerting pressure to make Kashmir accede to India. Otherwise, what is the explanation ? He was not pleading with Pakistan in New Delhi. He was in New Delhi pleading for time to consider which Dominated the State should join, because time was not being granted, because pressure was being exerted to cause Kashmir to accede to India.

Very well. He remains in New Delhi. Here is a man who had been in jail, as I have said. It was an honourable incarcera­tion ; I am not objecting to his having been in jail. He was honourably there on account of his struggle on behalf of the people of Kashmir. Whatever his views were, he was certainly not persona grata with the Maharaja. He is released and he goes straight to New Delhi. The Maharaja, when asking for armed assistance, mentions—obviously as a factor which would be welcome to the Government of India in New Delhi—that he has decided to associate Sheikh Abdullah with the administra­tion. Where has the suggestion come from ? Where was Sheikh Abdullah ? The Maharaja had not talked with Sheikh Abdullah after his incarceration and he had no means of gauging, through Sheikh Abdullah or anyone else, whether Sheikh Abdullah would be able to bring to bear a steadying influence on the people in Kashmir,

Sheikh Abdullah was in New Delhi pleading for time, and the Maharaja states in his letter that he is willing to associate Sheikh Abdullah with the administration and Lord Mountbatten says "we note it with satisfaction". The situation is obvious. Sheikh Abdullah was the go-between, and the go-between was mentioned in the document when it was ultimately presented to Lord Mountbatten. Sheikh Abdullah's price, or his prize, was also mentioned in the document.

Then, with regard to the troops it was said "we did not come to any decision to send the troops until sometime on the 26th", and the troops were there on the 27th. But, it was said, the number was small, fortunately it was not known how small. Yet their number was large enough to enable them to go into action immediately and to stop the further advance of this serious threat thit was endangering, according to them, the security of the State. How could an airborne operation of that kind have been carried out if, as has been alleged by the repre­sentative of India, the directions to the military authorities did not emanate from the civilian government until sometime during the night of the 26th, and the troops were there in the State the early muffling of the 27th, unless all the preparations had already been made ? The facts speak for themselves.

However, as I have said, if we were to spend our time merely trying to determine whether that was or was not possible, it would not take us any further forward. The facts are too strong for the representative of India to get over.

Sheikh Abdullah was acting as a go-between ; he was persona grata with the Prime Minister of India. He was not persona grata with the Maharaja. He was pleading with India for time on the question of accession; India was putting pressure. He had been selected to act between the two, and he emerged as being associated with the Prime Minister of Kashmir in the administration of the State, and subsequently became Prime Minister. I have said, facts speak for themselves.

The representative of India went on to the merits of the question, and I am glad he did so. Look at the resolution, he said. India is being blamed for not doing its part under the resolution. Has Pakistan carried out its part ? He then chose to read out certain portions of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948. He left out the governing paragraph ; he may not have done so deliberately, but he did leave it out, and that would make all the difference. I venture to invite the attention of the Council to the whole of part II so that representatives may have fresh in their minds the obligations of the two parties. The heading is "Truce agreement". It reads as follows :

"Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in part I, both governments accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between the representatives and the Commission."

1. emphasize this. This part relates to the formulation of a true agreement. An agreement will be formulated on the basis of the following principles ; the details will then be work­ed out between representatives of the two governments and the Commission ; and then the implementation of that agreement will start. Obviously, that is what it means. What were the obligations ? When drawing up a document, things have to be put in some sort of order, but as a whole the document will show what were the obligations to be undertaken as a matter of principle, and once the truce agreement was drawn up and the details settled, implementation must start in accordance with the agreement. continue with the quotation, as follows :

"A. 1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the terri­tory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State."

When we accepted this resolution we agreed to do that. We have never repudiated this agreement. We have at all times been ready to carry it out. It is not correct to state that we have at any time put in doubt either our acceptance or our readiness to carry out the agreement that we have undertaken. But the representative of India asks whether we have withdrawn our troops. I shall first deal with the resolution and answer that later.

The resolution continues :

"2. The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting.

"3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

"B. 1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have with­drawn, thereby terminating the situation which was, represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

I shall stop here because these are the only paragraphs that relate to the withdrawal of troops. They lay down that after the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities, there shall be a truce agreement based upon these principles, the details of which will be settled between the representatives of the two governments and the Commission. The two govern­ments having accepted this, and the cease-fire having become effective as of 1 January 1949, the Commission, after its arrival on the sub-continent on that occasion, called the representatives of the parties together to formulate the truce agreement. This meeting took place on 7 March 1949 in New Delhi. The Commission said, now we must proceed to formulate the truce agreement. The main thing for the truce agreement is to settle this question of the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and of the Pakistan Arm ', on the Azad Kashmir side, and of the bulk of the Indian Army, on the other side. Have the parties got any scheme, the Commission asked, for the withdrawal of what they have undertaken to withdraw ? Pakistan's representatives were asked whether they had any scheme. They said : Yes, we can formulate one and on the understanding mentioned by the Commission that, after Pakistan had put its scheme on the table, India would put its scheme on the table for the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces, the Pakistan representatives produced their scheme and put it on the table on 9 March. This happened in New Delhi. This was the beginning of the process of the formulation of the truce agreement.

The representatives of India were then asked when they could produce their scheme in accordance with the understand­ing that they would do so once Pakistan had done it. I believe, although I have not checked the dates, that they said they would do it the next day. They did not produce it the next day on the ground—it may have been valid or only a pretext;

it is not necessary to go into that here—that either the Prime Minister was not in New Delhi or that the Commander-in-Chief was not in New Delhi. These excuses were put forward, but in what order I have not been able to check. Time was taken first on one ground, then on another. Days passed. The Commission found India not willing to produce a scheme for withdrawal, and therefore no progress could be made on the formulation of the truce agreement. And that is where the matter remained.

We understand from the report of the Commission that later on, at some stage, the Government of India submitted to the Commission some scheme of withdrawal but with the condition that it was not to be communicated to Pakistan; and, as a matter of fact, up to now, in spite of the fact that the Commission submitted reports to the Security Council, I believe I am correct in stating that India's scheme has not been com­municated even to the Security Council.

How could the Truce Agreement be formulated ? Who held up the formulation ? Was it Pakistan who refused to go forward ? The following is what the Commission has said, as I read it out to the Security Council when I had the honour of addressing it the other day.

According to paragraph 245 of the third interim report, "...India is not prepared to withdraw such part of its forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as the 'bulk', whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces is reached". Where is the mention of Azad forces in any of the paragraphs of part II of the agreement ? The Azad forces do not come in until the plebiscite, when the plebiscite Administration would have the power of final disposal of the remaining forces on both sides. In any case, that is a point which I went into the other day when trying to elucidate the situation. That is where the matter got struck. Once the truce agreement had been formulated and the details agreed upon, our undertaking was, first of all, to persuade the tribesmen to withdraw and to arrange for the withdrawal of the Pakistan nationals who had gone in for the purpose of fighting as volunteers. Then, in accordance with the scheme that might be agreed upon, we were to begin the withdrawal of our forces, and the withdrawal was then to proceed in synchronized fashion on both sides until the whole was achieved. All this was to be done once the agreement was formulated; and India did not agree to formulate it. What were we to do ? What is it that India suggests Pakistan should have done and has not done ? That it had to be a synchronized withdrawal was perfectly clear to the Commission. In its clarification of the resolution of 13 August 1948, set forth in the appendix to annex 27 of document S/1100, the Commission said in paragraph 10 :

"In accordance with part II, B, 1, of the resolution, the Indian Government, when apprised that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. Synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission."

How can you start with withdrawal, particularly a Synchronized withdrawal, until the arrangement has been settled between the parties with the assistance of the Commission ? The representative of India asked : What has Pakistan done ? Pakistan, in spite of the fact that India refused to go forward with the Commission for the purpose of the formulation of a truce agreement, succeeded in persuading the tribesmen to withdraw and withdrew the Pakistan volunteers who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting. It has, in spite of India's refusal to proceed with the formulation of the agreement, performed a part of its obligations. The withdrawal of regular forces cannot be begun until the formulation of the agreement has been agreed upon. The latest attempt in this regard was made by Sir Owen Dixon. Sir Owen Dixon suggested a method of withdrawal of forces, that is to say, he suggested that Pakistan should begin to withdraw its troops on a specified date : after the lapse of a significant number of days. India should start, and thereafter, a synchronized process of withdrawal should continue until the agreement was actually implemented.

We said that we were willing to do so. The Prime Minister of Pakistan's willingness to do that, in spite of her objection to the assumption that Sir Owen Dixon was prepared to make with regard to the entry of tribesmen and of Pakistan forces, and our unqualified acceptance of the scheme is there in black and white in Sir Owen Dixon's report, and has been read out.

The principal reason which the representative of India gave as to why India did not accept Sir Owen Dixon's proposal — and I am not trying to say here that we have at any time been in default, the default having been on India's side—was that Sir Owen insisted on the complete withdrawal of the whole of the Indian forces. Even this in itself is not correct, since Sir Owen had made provision or was prepared to make provi­sion for small forces to remain at strategic points in certain places. That is neither here nor there. The question is this : What was our obligation ? Our obligation was first to accept these principles. We accepted them. Secondly, it was our obligation to cooperate in the formulation of a truce agree­ment. We were invited to put our proposals on the table, and we did so. But the next step could not be taken because India refused to do so. Where have we failed ?

Again, the representative of India has said that the Govern­ment of India has already taken steps to reduce the number of its troops, and he asked. "Has Pakistan reduced the number of its troops ? " In fact Pakistan has, but again the question is not whether or not India, on its own has, carried out a reduc­tion in the number of its troops, or whether or not Pakistan, on its own, has carried out a reduction in the number of its troops. That is not part of the obligation. Here the reduction must take place in pursuance of a truce agreement which has first to be settled, and must amount to a complete implementation of that agreement.

How has India reduced the number of its troops ? As I said the other day, in spite of whatever reduction may have taken place, India still has in the State of Kashmir many times the number of troops that Pakistan has in the Azad Kashmir area. So what actual difference has it made to the situation ? The sole point is this : Why has the deadlock occurred ? Because, at each step and at every stage, India has obstructed and has refused to carry out the obligation it had undertaken, and that is where the difficulty arose. India would not permit the formulation of the truce agreement to go forward.

Then the representative of India asked : Is Pakistan willing to start the withdrawal and to continue it ?" Pakistan has at all times been ready to go forward with the complete implementa­tion of what it had undertaken to do. As soon as the truce agreement has been formulated, Pakistan will at once start doing whatever that agreement requires it to do. Once the truce agreement has been formulated, Pakistan will of course, as it has undertaken to do, start the withdrawal. We have never raised any objection to it. We have repeatedly affirmed our willingness our readiness and our eagerness to go forward with the formulation of the truce agreement so that the withdrawal could begin; and, of course, the obligation is, as the agreement will no doubt state, that we should begin the withdrawal which, in its later stages, will be synchronized.

The representative of India quoted today from paragraph 74 of Sir Owen Dixon's report. He said that Pakistan did not emerge "unscathed"—I believe that was his expression—from that report. Whether we did or did not is a different matter, but the passage which the representative of India quoted to the Security Council in that connexion has nothing whatsoever to do with the demilitarization of the State or the obligations undertaken by the parties, or with the question of going forward with the organizing and holding of the plebiscite. The passage he quoted appears, as I say, in paragraph 74 of the report. However, paragraph 52 of the report concludes the matter of the efforts of Sir Owen Dixon to go forward with the implementation of the agreement, and this is the conclusion he reached : "In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit of the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled."

Sir Owen then said, in paragraph 53 :

"Having come to this conclusion I thought that I must either abandon all attempts to settle the dispute or turn from the plebiscite by which the destination of the whole State would be decided to some different solution."

The rest of the report is concerned with the efforts which Sir Owen made in that direction and in that connexion, and his observations with regard thereto. Even there, what he refers to is the fact that he first proposed one thing to one side and then the same thing to the other side, and that on one occasion the Pakistan reaction was against it and on another occasion the Indian reaction was against it. Ultimately, however, he obtained Pakistan's acceptance of his suggestion—and that was, again, the end of that stage—:that both Pakistan and India should go into conference with him, Sir Owen, to discuss and consider an alternative scheme that he would elaborate, provided the parties accepted certain basic outstanding con­siderations. Pakistan accepted, India refused, and that is where the whole thing came to a stop.

Even if, in the process of trying to persuade India and Pakistan that they should be prepared to go into conference to discuss and consider some alternative proposal once he found that the overall plebiscite could not be undertaken owing to India's intransigence and obstruction, Sir Owen found that one side expressed its willingness to go forward while the other did not, the Council cannot be invited to draw the conclusion from that one side was not discharging or prepared to discharge its obligation.

The representative of India went on to say that I had referred to Junagadh and Hyderabad, and he said that those matters were irrelevant to the issue before us. How are those two matters irrelevant to the issue before us ? In the first place, merely from the point of view of technical relevancy, both these problems are before the Security Council. The Junagadh pro­blem is before the Council as part of this Indo-Pakistan dispute which is on the agenda even today, although we are at the moment only discussing Kashmir. Hyderabad is before the Security Council although it is on the agenda on a different basis. But apart from the question of technical relevancy, I have cited those two instances in order—If I may, with all respect, employ a common saying—to show that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.

There, too, the question of accession was involved ; there, too, the question of a Ruler belonging to one community and the majority of the population belonging to another community was involved ; there, too, the parties desired accession to India or to Pakistan. Those two cases are illustrations showing how India interprets the application of certain principles where a Ruler belongs to one community and the majority of the population to the other and the question of accession is in dispute.

1. does India say ? India says, with regard to Junagadh, that the issue must be decided according to the will of the people. Very well. How is the will of the people to be-ascertained? When the majority of the population of a State are non-Muslims and the Ruler is a Muslim, how is the question of accession to be decided ? By plebiscite. Very well. "But", says India, "a plebiscite must be held under the joint control of the Government of India and the government of that State". Reverse the case. Take a State where the majority of the population are Muslim, where the Ruler is a non-Muslim and where the issue of accession is in dispute. How is the issue to be decided ? Through a plebiscite. How is the plebiscite organized ? Under the control of the Government of India and the government of that State. Thus, each time, it must be the Government of India. Whether the Ruler is a Muslim or a non-Muslim, whether the majority of the population are Muslims or non-Muslims, the plebiscite must be- held under the auspices of the Government of India and of the government of the State concerned. Pakistan does not come into the issue at all. How is this irrelevant ?

The representative of India said that there was a distinction. The distinction is this. Large sections of the Muslims in Kashmir are in favour of accession to India. There is, I believe, an expression, "begging the question." But that, in itself, is the question—whether they are or whether they are not in favour of ac:ession to India. I suppose the Security Council is invited to determine even these pending matters on the assumption that a large part of the Muslims in Kashmir are in favour of accession to India. Then why go on with the question ? It is that which has to be ascertained.

But, assuming that India is of that view, how does it affect the main question so as to permit India not to withdraw its military forces when the plebiscite is being held? If large sections of the people of Junagadh, who are non-Muslims, are not first shown to be in favour of accession to Pakistan then, in Junagadh, the plebiscite must be held with the Indian Army present. But if large sections of the population of Kashmir are assumed by India to be in favour of accession to India, the plebiscite must still be held in the presence of Indian troops. Is that the argument ? But the presence of troops is the very negation of fairness and impartiality of a plebiscite. They must go out; Pakistan troops must go out from wherever they are in the Azad Kashmir area. Indian troops must go out from where- er they are in occupation in Kashmir. That is necessary in order to enable the people freely to express their wishes on this question of accession.

How is that principle modified each time in favour of India, whether the majority of the population is Muslim or non-Muslim ? By begging the question through the assertion that large sections of the population of Kashmir are in favour of accession to India. Why did not India put it to the test ? What is India afraid of if that is so ? Then it is said, "Oh, but the forces of India are lawfully there. The forces of Pakistan are unlawfully in the Azad Kashmir area". That, again, is begging the question. They are lawfully there if Kashmir has lawfully acceded to India. India itself has repeatedly preached and tried to convert Pakistan to the view that where the question of accession is in dispute, it is only the will of the people that can determine the question one way or another. As a matter of fact, India's stand has been— it has been quoted before, but it can be quoted now, and the reference can be given—that once the suzerainty of the British over these princely States had been withdrawn or had come to an end, sovereignty passed not to the Rulers but to the people. All right, its sovereignty did not pass to the Maharaja, then who acceded and where is the question of legality and law-fulness ? But assume, for the sake of argument, that it was lawful. In his telegram of 8 November, Pandit Nehru says :

1. will thus be seen that our proposals which we have repeatedly stated are : 2. That the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as the raiders are withdrawn and law and order are restored."

Did he think that Indian troops were there unlawfully ? He claims that his forces are lawfully there, and yet he says that once the raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored "we shall withdraw our forces". Why ? Because he is replying to the point that you cannot hold a fair and impartial plebiscite so long as troops are there. He says : "You persuade the tribesmen to get out, and we shall withdraw our troops once the tribesmen have left." It is said, then, that Pakistan troops are also in the Azad Kashmir area. All right, let them and the tribesmen withdraw and let the Indian troops withdraw.

The representative of India says that this—the removal of Indian troops—would have a psychological effect. He says that it would not make the plebiscite fair and impartial because it would have a psychological effect. Of course it would have a psychological effect. It would have the psychological effect of assuring the people that, whichever way they voted, they would not subsequently be persecuted. If you do not want to produce that psychological effect, why do you go on claiming that you want to hold a fair and impartial plebiscite ? That psychological effect must be produced : that no person in what­ever position, however humble, however weak, however unpro­tected, will be subjected to any hardship or disadvantage, or will made to suffer any kind of harm by voting for one side or the other on the question of accession. The complete withdrawal of troops is a necessary preliminary for that purpose.

My learned friend again has contended throughout that the resolution did not contemplate complete withdrawal of Indian troops. I took a certain amount of the Security Council's time the other afternoon to show that the resolution left that matter to be determined by the Plebiscite Administrator. Under subparagraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, he has the power of the final disposal of the troops that remain : the Azad Kashmir troops on one side, and the remnants of the Indian troops and the State forces and militia on the other. If he feels that he needs any portion of these troops in any area, he can retain those troops and get rid of the rest. He may ask the Indian forces, the States forces and militia, or the Azad Kashmir forces to disarm and disband. He reduces the forces to what­ever he considers to be necessary, having due regard to the security of the State and the fairness of an impartial plebiscite. But that is his business and his responsibility. He may insist upon the complete withdrawal of the Indian forces ; he may insist upon the complete disbandment and disarmament of the State militia. He may do whatever he likes in the same manner with regard to the Azad Kashmir forces. But, according to the resolution, it is his duty.

However, assume that India is unwilling to agree to that interpretation, and we do not accept their interpretation. That is exactly the kind of thing that has to be determined by some­one. As there is a difference of opinion over these interpreta­tions, the correct one must be determined. The Commission has given explanations and clarifications. The representative of India insists that his interpretations must be taken into account. Of course they must be taken into account. The interpretation both of the language of the resolution and of the clarifications given to it by both sides must be determined as to what the parties did agree to do, and then the parties must be ealled upon to do it. That is the only way to proceed with the matter.

My learned friend said. "But Pakistan says that India's object in carrying out this aggression in Kashmir is to encircle Pakistan strategically and to destroy Pakistan's economy". He posed this question : "Supposing, as a result of the plebiscite, it was found that a majority of the people wanted to accede to India. What then? Will Pakistan still claim that Kashmir should accede to Pakistan for strategic and economic reasons ?

I went to some pains the other day to explain that although these factors are there—cultural, religious, geographic, economic, strategic ; communications, trade, commerce—and they all indicate that the natural relationship of Kashmir is with Pakistan, nevertheless, we have accepted and we abide by the agreement that the question of accession should be determined upon the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite, and whatever the result, we shall accept it.

The representative of India might argue, "In that case you will be encircled and your economy may be affected". That is true, and we take the risk. After all, disputes must somehow or other be settled on some fair and just basis. What we object to is the determination being made by force. India attempts to make that determination by force.

Kashmir is not, in any sense whatever, necessary either to the security of India or to the economy of India. It could help India only to encircle Pakistan and to destroy its economy. When India proceeds by force to occupy Kashmir and refuses to go forward with the implementation of the agreement which alone can make a fair and just solution possible, then it is obvious that India is in Kashmir for the one purpose which Kashmir could serve if India continued in occupation.

The representative of India says, "Why have fears regarding your economy ? An agreement can be arrived at with regard to the use of the waters of these rivers on the basis of inter­national principles." I submit that the issue is wholly irrelevant. Assuming that it can be arrived at, is my friend suggesting that we should give up the question of Kashmir and that he will give us a portion of the rivers that flow through Kashmir ? Even there our experience is bitter. As I have stated to the Security Council previously, on 1 April 1948 India turned off the supply of waters that flow through India, and then later on through West Pakistan down into the Indus, which action threatened the ruin of the harvests, and ultimately the ruin of the greater part of West Punjab and the Sind. This action continued for about six weeks, and the supply of water was resumed only after Pakistan, and I am compelled to use the expression, was forced to sign an agreement which was extre­mely onerous to Pakistan. Even then the issue was not settled. Certain payments which India claimed, and to which we did not believe it was entitled, had to be deposited while the supply continued .

Since that time certain developments have taken place. We have not continued with the arrangement that was then forced upon us. We stand on our rights, which were reserved under that agreement. The representative of India is a very eminent authority on this subject, having presided with great ability over a commission which was set up to deal with this question between two Indian provinces. As the representative of India has said, there are international principles for sharing these waters. We have repeatedly submitted to India that there are these principles. We have said : Let us take this dispute to the International Court of Justice and have it settled there. India has persistently refused to do so. It is one thing to go on saying that there are these international principles and that these matters can be settled through the judicial organs in which a determination can take place, but the whole record shows that whenever any suggestion of that kind is made, India turns it down.

The other day I read—and I need not repeat it in detail—an extract from a letter from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of India which stated that all the trouble bet­ween India and Pakistan continues because on no single issue will India agree to submit the matter to either arbitration or judicial determination, whereas Pakistan is prepared to do that with regard to every single issue in dispute between India and Pakistan.

With regard to proposals for arbitration of these matters, the representative of India has said, "We cannot accept arbitra­tion because closed issues cannot be reopened". Who has suggested that they should be reopened ? We have not suggested it. The Commission did not suggest it. It was not suggested that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to India should be submitted to arbitration. The suggestion is : as there is an international agreement embodied in the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and as the implementation of these resolutions has come to a standstill, the issues arising there from should be submitted to arbitration so that the arbitrators can determine what is to be done, and should call upon the parties to do it, or should at least proclaim to the Security Council what is to be done, and then the Council should call upon them to do it.

1. would that lead to the reopening of issues that have been closed ? India might fear that Pakistan may attempt to reopen an issue that is closed. In such a case, the arbitrator will say: "This issue is closed : I will not arbitrate on that. I will arbitrate only on matters arising out of the agreement on which there is a difference". What is this excuse : "We shall not go to arbitration because closed issues might be reopened" ? The arbitrator will be there to exclude everything that has been settled, and to give his decision on the matters of difference which are holding up the implementation of the agreement.

The representative of India also put the point that there was no case for the use of foreign troops and that he could not agree to that, as the international agreement of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 did not contemplate the use of foreign troops. Very well : let that agreement be implemented. Let us go forward on the basis of that. We are not refusing to do so ; it is India that is refusing to do so.

The representative of India says that I referred to Indian aggression in South Asia, and he took exception to that. However, that is not really an issue which is before the Council, and if it hurts the susceptibilities of the representative of India, and naturally it does, I am prepared to apologize to him for having used the expression. But he goes on to cite illustrations trying to show that what Pakistan did was aggression, while what India did was peaceful and non-violent. India took military possession of Junagadh, which had acceded to Pakistan. India took military possession of Hyderabad. India took military possession of Kashmir. From Indian soil, though I will not bring the Government of India into it, attempts have recently been made to undo the freedom and independence of a neighbouring independent State. That is peaceful, that is non-violent. If that is peace, if that is non­violence, the only area in the world today that is peaceful and non-violent is Korea.

The representative of India said that India had desired a peaceful settlement, but there was a partition, which was carried into effect in a period of ten weeks, creating a host of problems and disputes. He said that the separation of Burma took five years, but this was done in ten weeks. So it was, but that is neither his fault nor Pakistan's. As a matter of fact, Pakistan actually pleaded for a little more time. As the result of parti­tion, India was to carry on with a machine already in existence and in operation, and in many respects it was an extremely efficient machine. Pakistan was to start from scratch, and though India also may have desired more time and Pakistan certainly did, we were not given more time. I do not say it was India's fault. India may have suffered seriously as well. However, the partition was carried through and it has created problems and disputes, but what is the remedy that the representative of India suggests ?

1. suggests that we should let things be and they will settle down. On the one hand, he goes on citing, as part of Pakistan's alleged aggression, all the agitation in Pakistan and all the talk—according to him—of jihad or holy war. Is that part of settling down ? Are things settling down ? It should be borne in mind that all the trouble centres upon Kashmir. As I said the other day, Kashmir is both the key to and the barometer of relations between Pakistan and India. Until that problem is settled, the atmosphere will not only continue to be explosive but, as time progresses, the maintenance of peace between the two, the maintenance of peace in Asia, and ultimately the maintenance of international peace, will be in serious jeopardy.

People have waited far too long. Here is a test whether this august international Organization, which the civilized con­science of the world has charged with the maintenance of inter­national peace and with averting any threat to it, will find a speedy and effective way of resolving this extremely explosive situation, which might lead to anything almost at any time. The Prime Minister of Australia has recently referred to three big areas where danger threatens the peace of the world. He says that one is Europe, another is the Middle East, and the third is Kashmir. He puts it very mildly. The remedy, if it is to be effective, if it is to avert the dangers of which the situation is daily becoming fuller, if it is to be applied, must be adequate ; it must be effective and it must be speedy.