09031951 Text of the speech made by Sir Benegal N. Rau {India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 536 held on 9 March 1951.

09031951 Text of the speech made by Sir Benegal N. Rau {India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 536 held on 9 March 1951.

The distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan has covered a good deal of ground in his speech [534th and 535th meetings]} much of it is ancient history, hardly calling for any new reply. I shall only deal with the more important points.

The first point I should like to deal with is the allegation that the accession of Kashmir to India was the result of a conspiracy between the Hindu leaders of India and the Maharaja of Kashmir, in which Sheikh Abdullah, the present Prime Minister of Kashmir, was a tool. "How else", it is asked, "could the Indian Army have been flown to Srinagar on the very day Lord Mountbatten accepted the accession, namely 27 October 1947 ?" The Prime Minister of India broadcast or otherwise published the full facts of the case at the time. Let me read out the salient portions of what was said ;

"It was on the 24th night"—that is, on 24 October— "that for the first time a request was made to us on behalf of the Kashmir State for accession and military help. On the 25th morning we considered this in the Defence Committee but no decision was taken about sending troops in view of the obvious difficulties of the under­taking. On the 26th morning we again considered this matter. The situation was even more critical than. The raiders had sacked several towns and had destroyed the great power house at Mahoora which supplies electricity to the whole of Kashmir. They were on the point of entering the Valley. The fate of Srinagar and the whole of Kashmir hung in the balance.

1. received urgent messages for aid not only from the Maharaja's Government but from representatives of the people, notably that great leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the President of the National Conference. Both the Kashmir Government and the National Conference pressed us to accept the accession, of Kashmir to the Indian Union. We decided to accept this accession and to send troops by air, but we made a condition that the accession would have to be considered by the people of Kashmir later when peace and order were established. It was for them ultimately to decide."

The following is a very important part of this quotation : "Had we desired a pretext either for Kashmir's accession or for sending our troops there, we should not have waited to accomplish our purpose until half of the Valley of Kashmir and parts of Jammu# Province had been given to fire and sword and Srinagar itself was in peril of capture by the raiders, with all its horrors.

"We decided to send troops on the afternoon of 26 October. Srinagar was in peril and the situation was urgent and critical. Our staff worked hard that day and night, and at daybreak on the 27th our troops went by air. They were small in numbers to begin with"—no one at the time knew how few they were—"but immediately on arrival they rushed into action to stop the invader. Their gallant commander, a brave officer of our Army, was killed the next day."

The Security Council will thus see that there was no actual despatch of troops until after the accession, although we had been receiving S.O.S. messages for two or three days. Even as it was, the Indian Army was just too late to prevent the terrible outrage by the raiders on 26 October upon St. Joseph's Convent and the attached hospital at Baramulla. The members of the Council will find all the details in my two speeches of last year. I need not repeat them. One of the most distinguished and gallant officers in the Kashmir cam­paign on the Indian side was the Muslim Brigadier Osman, who was unfortunately killed in action. This is the Hindu conspiracy which the Council, thousands of miles away from the facts, is asked to believe.

About Sheikh Abdullah's being a tool in this conspiracy, let me give a few more facts. Sheikh Abdullah was released from prison on 29 September 1947. He had been fighting the Maharaja's Government until then. The representative of Pakistan has said that Sheikh Abdullah wrote from prison a letter praying to the Maharaja that he should declare his accession to India forthwith. The letter is said to have been written to a friend; that friend apparently communicated it to one Prem Nath Bazaz who, it is said, has disclosed the fact in a book on Kashmir. Instead of this double hearsay, let us have more direct evidence. On 10 October, 1947 there appeared in The Statesman, a British-conducted paper, an account of a reception given in New Delhi to Sheikh Abdullah about a week after his release. I shall read the account of the proceedings :

"New Delhi, Tuesday—Speaking at a reception today Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the Kashmir nationalist leader, pleaded for time to consider which Dominion the State should join, 'In the meantime,' he said, 'our friends could help us to attain our freedom from autocracy.' The Kashmir leader stated that despite the opposition of the League"—that is the Moslem League—"to the popular demand for self-government implicit in the 'Quit Kashmir campaign, the attitude of his party would not be governed by passion. He believed in facing issues emotionally and unsentimental and in weighing conse­quences before taking a decision. Only the good of the people of the State would count".

Now comes an important sentence :

"He asserted that he would not bring dictation from Pakistan or coercion from India. Their first concern, he repeated, was attainment of self-government so that the people, armed with authority and responsibility, could decide for themselves where their interests lay."

This was shortly before 10 October 1947—that is to say, nearly a fortnight before the invasion of Kashmir by the tribes­men. On 27 October 1947, shortly after the invasion, Sheik Abdullah made another statement published in the Times of India on 28 October 1947. This is what he then said.

"New Delhi, October 27th —Kashmir is in dire peril, and the first duty of every Kashmiri is to defend his mother­land against the intruder', declared Sheikh Abdullah, the Kashmir leader.

"The "invasion" of Kashmir is meant to coerce and compel the people of Kashmir to act in a particular way, namely, to accede to Pakistan', Sheikh Abdullah says. 'Every Kashmiri resents this compassion in his will'."

I will not wear the Council with further quotations from the Press of that time. It is clear from what I have already quoted that what happened was that, while the Kashmir Govern­ment and Sheikh Abdullah were considering the question of accession, the invasion was planned for the purpose of com­pelling them by force to accede to Pakistan once and for all, without any reference to the people at any stage. That effort failed —in fact it had the reverse effect—and it is only since then that Pakistan has been speaking of the will of the people.

Why was Sheikh Abdullah chosen by the Maharaja to form an interim government to work "with the Prime Minister during this crisis ? Let me quote from The Times of London of 7 November 1947 :

"London, November 7th — In spite of the proximity of the raiders and comparatively heavy lighting four and a half miles west of Srinagar, Srinagar remained calm and business continued as usual. The situation is quite unreal and can be explained only by the fact that the head of the administration, Sheikh Abdullah, and his National Conference followers have contrived to instil confidence into the citizens."

It was because Sheikh Abdullah was able to command the confidence of the citizens that he was chosen. All these facts are well known in India and Kashmir; it is only at Lake Success that fantastic theories are put forward for the consump­tion of members of the Council far away both in time and space from the relevant events.

Let me turn to another point. India has been repeatedly accused of not fulfilling or wishing to fulfil its obligations under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [S./1100 S/1196]. I should like to invite the attention of the Council to the first step towards a truce agreement contained in the first of these resolutions.

I am reading from part II of the resolution dealing with the truce agreement. Part II opens with a paragraph running thus :

"Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in part I, both governments"—that is to say, the Governments of India and Pakistan—"accept the following principles as a basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission."

Then follows the first step :

"A. 1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State."

I ask what the Government of Pakistan has done towards the fulfilment of this first and primary obligation. Why are Pakistan troops still kept within the State ? The representative of Pakistan has tried to make out that the Pakistan Army went into Kashmir on 8 May to defend the vital interests of the Pakistan, that is to say in self defence, and incidentally, to turn away the wrath of the invading tribesmen in case Pakistan did not give them assistance in a more direct from against the Indian Army. I drew attention last year to Article 51 of the Charter. Let me draw attention to once again. Under that Article, the right of self-defence begins only when there is an armed attack against a Member. In the present case there was never an armed attack against Pakistan by the Indian Army. Secondly under that Article, measures taken by Members in the exercise of self-defence must be immediately reported to the Security Council. Pakistan did not inform the Security Council; indeed, it was only after the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan arrived on the sub-continent, nearly two months later, and the facts could no longer be concealed, that the Commission was informed of the presence in the State of regular Pakistan troops. Thirdly, and this is very important, under the Charter the right of self-defence continues only until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.

In the present case the Security Council, through the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, took the necessary measures, and in fact the Commission succeeded in getting the parties to agree to the two resolutions which I have already mentioned. Under these resolutions a cease-fire has been achieved, a cease fire line has been demarcated, and there are military observers to supervise the observance of the cease-fire order. None of the alleged grounds on which the Pakistan Army marched into Kashmir in May 1948 have any longer any validity. The line which that army was meant to hold, and more than that line, is now secured under the cease-fire arrange­ments already imposed.

What, then, is the need or the justification for the continued presence of the Pakistan Army in the State ? Why is it not withdrawn ? Why is not even a beginning made towards its withdrawal ? Let us contrast this action with the step which the Government of India has already taken towards reducing its forces in the State. Members of the Council will notice that this is the third step in part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, the first two steps being the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army and the withdrawal of tribesmen and the Pakistan nationals that entered the State for the purpose of fighting. Let me refresh the memory of members of this Council by reading paragraph 1 of Section B of part II of the resolution of 13 August.

This paragraph runs:

"When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals referr­ed to in part II, A, 2, hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

It will thus be seen that the Government of India has already started the implementation of the third step. United Nations observers are well aware of this fact. But has there been any reduction on the Pakistan side ? Is Pakistan willing to begin and to continue the withdrawal of its forces from the State ? The representative of Pakistan has avoided saying anything on these points. Nevertheless, as usual, it is India that is accused of refusing to fulfil its obligations.

My esteemed friend from Pakistan has tried to play down Sir Owen Dixon's observations regarding violation of inter­national law, first by the raiders and then by the Pakistan Army, and has emphasized Sir Owen Dixon's criticism that India was not likely to agree to any form of demilitarization or any plebi­scite plan which in his—that is, in Sir Owen Dixon's—view was necessary for a free and impartial plebiscite.

I have already, in my first intervention [533rd meeting], pointed out that India agreed to all the provisions for ensuring a free plebiscite contained in the resolution of 5 January 1949. Pakistan also agreed to them; presumably therefore they were sufficient even in Pakistan's view at that time to ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. If India is now asked for further con-cessions, such as the complete removal of the Indian Army regardless of considerations of security and the supplanting of the lawful Government of Jammu and Kashmir, India must necessarily demur. The effect of this would be not to ensure a fair plebiscite but the reverse. With all due respect to Sir Owen Dixon—and I may say at this stage that my government fully acknowledges the spirit in which he worked—he appears not to have appreciated India's point of view. At no time was it suggested on behalf of India that members of the Indian Army or the State forces or the State militia should roam about the State armed during the plebiscite period. India's objection was not to a reduction of forces nor to their disposal within the State during the plebiscite period in such a way as to prevent their interference with the freedom of the vote, but to their reduction on a scale that would endanger the security of the State, as also to measures which would unnecessarily infringe the sovereignty of the State. While striving to eliminate undue influence, Sir Owen Dixon forgot to take into account the subtle but potent psychological effect which is bound to result from the removal of the lawful forces and authorities in the State, guaranteed by previous agreements and assurances, and from the recognition, directly or indirectly, of the unlawful forces and the unlawful local authorities in various parts of the State.

But apart from all this, Pakistan does not emerge quite so unscathed from Sir Owen Dixon's report as my esteemed friend tries to make out. He has attempted to explain away Sir Owen's view about Pakistan's violation of international law as intended merely to justify the proposal that the first stage in demilitariza­tion should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces. This, however, did not require any new justification; the proposal—with a reason for it—is part of the resolution of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948, which I have already read out. Sir Owen's view cannot therefore be dismis­sed in so cavalier a fashion. There is, however, something more. I quote from his report [S/1791, para 74] :

"The stand adopted by the Prime Minister of Pakistan had led me to the conclusion that there no longer existed any possibility of my bringing the parties to any composi­tion of the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

My friend from Pakistan has again referred to Junagadh and Hyderabad. We are at present concerned only with the Kashmir case, I shall therefore only repeat what I said last year on these other issues, although they are obviously irrelevant to the pre­sent discussion [466th meeting] :

"One thing has emerged clearly even from the extracts which my distinguished friend has quoted from various statements made by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of India, which is that in every disputed case there should be a reference to the will of the people. That is the criterion which, subject to certain conditions as to the restoration of normal conditions, India has offered to apply in Kashmir. There is, however, one fundamental difference between the cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh, on the one hand, and Kashmir, on the other. In Kashmir, as I have already stated in my original speech, a large section of the Muslims—that is to say, a large section of the majority community—are themselves in favour of remaining in India. This is not India's fault; it is a plain fact, for which I have already tried to give several reasons. In Hyderabad and Junagadn, on the other hand, so far as I am aware, no section of the population that forms the majority has even been in favour of acceding to Pakistan. This is a fundamental difference which is apt to be for­gotten in these facile analogies."

1. shall now turn to a matter which appears to have caused some concern to certain members of the Council, namely the proposal to convene a constituent assembly for Kashmir. As I have already said, Kashmir is at present a unit of the Indian Federation and has to be governed accordingly. When we were drafting a constitution for India, we had to consider what provision should be made for the con­stitutions of the various units of the Indian Federation. It was decided that the framing of these constitutions should be entrust­ed to a constituent assembly for the unit concerned. Accor-dingly, several units convoked constituent assemblies for the purpose, for example,  Saurashtra, Travancore-Cochin and Mysore. Others lagged behind for one reason or another; Kashmir is one of the units where a constituent assembly has not yet been convened, so that the constitution of the State is still to be made. Members will please note that the machinery of a constituent assembly was not devised only for Kashmir, but for other similar units of the ndian Federation as well. Indeed, it is a recognized machinery for the framing of the constitution in most parts of the world. Accordingly, provision was made in the Indian Constitution for a constituent assembly for setting the details of the Kashmir constitution. Will that assembly decide the question of accession ? My government's view is that, while the constituent assembly may, if it so desires, express an opinion on this question, it can take no decision on it.

The representative of Pakistan has said at one point of his speech that the occupation of Kashmir by India is a threat to the existence of Pakistan, since India thereby aims not only to encircle Pakistan strategically but also to have its economy at its mercy by control over the rivers which are the life-blood of Pakistan. I confess I do not quite understand this point. If, as the result of a plebiscite, Kashmir goes to Pakistan, the question does not arise; the question can only arise if Kashmir decides to remain in India. Does my esteemed friend mean that even if the plebiscite should result in favour of India, Kashmir should be allocated to Pakistan on the grounds he has mentioned ?

If Pakistan has any apprehensions regarding the supply of water from the river-system of the State, my government will have no difficulty in giving suitable assurances. After all, there are rivers in other parts of the world flowing through more than one State, and there are well-established ways of regulating the use of these waters.

My friend has asked whether India agrees to the principle of having United Nations forces in Kashmir. I have already stat­ed India's position in this matter and given our reasons for it: first, we are wholly unable to accept any entry of foreign troops in the State or in any other part of India; secondly, in view of The provisions made by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, there are occasions for the use of foreign troops or of special local levies recruited by an outside agency.

My friend has also referred to the principle of arbitration. Here again India has already explained its position on more than one occasion, namely that under the guise of arbitration issues which have already been closed by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 and by the assurances given to India by the United Nations Commissions cannot be reopened.

The representative of Pakistan has spoken of what he des­cribes as India's aggression in Asia. I do not know if this statement is intended to be taken seriously by this Council. Strange, indeed, are the mutations of language as we have heard it used here. It is aggression if one goes to repel an invader; it is not aggression to give full help and succour to the invader. It is aggression if, after halting the invasion, the protecting forces are voluntarily reduced by from 20 per cent to 25 per cent; it is not aggression if the forces joining in the invasion, in breach of international law, continue to remain on the soil which they have violated and to consolidate their unlawful hold. It is aggression if it is proposed to set up a constituent assembly of the people; it is not a threat of aggression if there is a constant preaching of jehad, or holy war, and the systematic incitement of feelings of religious frenzy and hatred.

I find no pleasure in participating in these annual contests. We all desire a peaceful solution to this problem, but a peaceful solution needs a proper atmosphere. When a subcontinent which had grown up as a single economic and political entity for centuries, as India had, is suddenly split into two separate States, a host of complex problems is bound to arise. What was previously a domestic question is suddenly thrust into the inter­national arena and discussed in a world forum.

I remember the time when Burma was a part of India; it was separated in 1936. But experts sat from, I believe, 1931 and worked at the problems that were likely to arise from the sepa­ration, and only after solutions had been found for most, if not all of them, was the separation effected. In the case of Pakistan, the partition was affected in about ten weeks. Necessarily, a number of complex questions remained unsolved. And then, owing to outbreaks of communal feeling and other causes, the atmosphere for their peaceful and successful solution was destroyed.

I mention these facts so that members of the Council may realize that, if there are still unsolved disputes between India and Pakistan, the reason is to be found largely in the circums­tances of the partition. Time and patent efforts are required for their solution, and I trust I have said nothing to retard that solution.