07031951 Text of the speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 535 held on 7 March 1951.
When the Council adjourned yesterday afternoon [534th meeting], I was about to proceed to deal with the suggestion made by the representative of India [53?rd meeting] that, in agreement with a similar suggestion made by Sir Owen Dixon in his report, the Security Council might agree that the initiative in this matter should now pass to the parties themselves, and that the parties should be left to settle this dispute by direct negotiations.
The Council is aware that, ever since this dispute arose, repeated efforts have been made by the Government of Pakistan, in direct negotiation with the Government of India, to arrive at a just solution to the Kashmir question. The earliest effort was made immediately after the tribal incursion into Kashmir. The Council will recall that it was then suggested to the Government of India, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan, that the matter should be committed to the authority of their respective Governors-General, and that the two Governors-General should issue an appeal for restoration of law and order. Pakistan undertook that, if this appeal did not succeed in securing the withdrawal of the tribesmen from the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Pakistan would be prepared to take military action jointly with India to expel the tribesmen from the territory of the State; and that, once that had been secured, whether as a result of the joint appeal of the two Governors-General or as a result of military action that might become necessary, the administration of the State should become the responsibility of the two Governors-General, who should then proceed to organize and hold a free and impartial plebiscite in the State to determine whether the people of the State desired to accede to India or to Pakistan.
I maintain that was the fairest possible solution of the situation which had arisen and the fairest settlement of the dispute over accession. Nobody can suggest that it would have given any kind of advantage to Pakistan or, indeed, to India, and that is the reason why I maintain that it was a very fair solution.
The trouble which had arisen was still in its initial stages. That solution did not commend itself to the Government of India, and the principal reason it advanced against it was that, for constitutional reasons, it was not willing to invest its Governor-General with the needed authority to act on its behalf. Pakistan, on the other hand, was ready to invest in its Governor-General with the needed authority. It was in reply to that suggestion that the Prime Minister of India made the offer, part of which I read out from his telegram of 8 November yesterday afternoon, when I drew attention to paragraphs 10 and 11 of that telegram.
That was our first attempt to come to a settlement with the Government of India of the problem that had arisen. Since then, over the course of the years 1948, 1949, 1950 and even 1951, efforts have been made to reach a settlement by negotiation if possible, but those efforts have been unavailing. I need not dilate upon them nor draw the Council's attention to them. The conversations which have taken place and the correspondence which has gone on have not led to anything concrete. I therefore submit that it is wholly unrealistic to suggest that the parties ought to settle this matter by negotiation between themselves.
As I set out before the Council yesterday afternoon, an international agreement exists between India and Pakistan with reference to the Kashmir dispute. The whole difficulty is to get India to implement it. Effort after effort has been made by the Security Council, by its representatives, and by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, but they have been unable to secure a resolution of the deadlock. To suggest now that the deadlock could most easily be resolved by negotiations between the parties is tantamount to saying that the Security Council should now abdicate its functions in respect of this dispute and that international peace should be subjected to the further perils that arise from a continuation of this dispute between India and Pakistan.
In this connexion, when making this suggestion the representative of India called the attention of the Security Council to a Press report, according to him dated 20 February from Karachi, to the effect that Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan, former head of the Azad Kashmir Government, had expressed the view that all Indo-Pakistan disputes, including the dispute relating to Kashmir could be settled by India and Pakistan between themselves by mutual discussion. Even if that were so, even if Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan had said this, that would be the opinion or the hope of one individual who might well make a mistake in assessing the possibilities of a settlement by mutual negotiation. It is not as if Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan were speaking on a question of fact. It so happens, however, that Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan did not say that some Press agency has attributed this to him.
Apparently, on noticing in the Press what was attributed to him, Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan, dispatched a telegram to the President of the Security Council which reads as follows;
"My statement as reported by the Press Trust of India and quoted by the Indian representative is wholly incorrect. The correct text of the statement made by me, representing my views and published in the Pakistan Times of 23 February 1951, is as follows--"
It will be recalled that the draft resolution now before the Security Council [S/2017] was presented to the Council on 21 February in the afternoon, when it was already 22 February in the Indian subcontinent. This statement of Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan was published on 23 February. He has quoted his statement, which is as follows :
The draft resolution as presented to the Security Council by the Anglo-American delegations is a definite deviation from the stand taken by the Council in its earlier resolution and amounts to appeasement of intransigence of India.
It is comforting to note that the proposal made by Sir
Owen Dixon in his report to leave the parties concerned to settle the dispute among themselves has been rejected. I Suggest that the Security Council should be asked to issue an injunction order to the Government of India and Dogra Government restraining them from holding elections to the proposed State 'constituent assembly' as nothing short of an over-all plebiscite will satisfy the Kashmiris.
"As regards arbitration, I am of the view that it would be desirable to have ready arbitration machinery evolved beforehand and incorporated in the resolution so that during negotiations with the two Governments, if any point of difference arose, it could immediately be referred to arbitration on the spot.
"The State of Jammu and Kashmir should remain one single unit, and no government or party should be allowed to function during the plebiscite.
"It is comforting to note that the proposal made by Sir Owen Dixon in his report to leave the parties concerned to settle the dispute among themselves has been rejected."
Therefore, as I have submitted, even if Sardar Mahammad Ibrahim Khan had said what was attributed to him, that really would have no relevance to the issue. It would be the opinion or the appraisal of one individual. But actually he has not said that to which the representative of India drew the Security Council's attention.
What would be the result if any such counsel were to be followed ? It would enable India to consolidate its hold on Kashmir and to continue systematically to alter the composition of the population by forcing or driving out more and more Muslims as refugees into Pakistan, and settling non-Muslims in their place.
The representative of India said the other day, in the course of his speech; that conditions in Kashmir were now settling down and that it would be a pity to disturb them— presumably through further efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute. One of the aspects of the settling down of conditions that is taking place is a constant stream of Muslim refugees out of Kashmir into Pakistan, And our information—of course, it is not based on the personal knowledge of any of us, inasmuch as we have no access to the Valley itself—is that a good deal of the substitution of the population has gone on and is still going on; that is, that refugees from India—refugees who had to go to India as such, non-Muslims—are being settled in the territory of Kashmir.
The truth is that nothing is settling down in Kashmir. The vast majority of the population is being held down by military force. If that can be called settling down, it is true that it is settling down in the sense that this vast majority of the people of Kashmir have, during the last three and a half years, been stretched on the rack. They are, fortunately, still breathing. Possibly it is felt that their breathing is gradually subsiding and, therefore, perhaps that process is being described as a settling down of conditions.
There can be no settling down of conditions until the people of Kashmir are given the fullest right to determine, absolutely and freely, without any kind of hindrance or influence or pressure, the question of accession of the State to India or to Pakistan. On behalf of India, any suggestion that India should relax its hold over Kashmir is resented.
India resents any suggestion that it should relax its hold on Kashmir. Because the Government and people of Pakistan demand this, they appear to Indian eyes as disturbers of peace and as inciters to war. India desires to be left alone to complete the strangulation of Kashmir, and every voice raised in protest against its broken pledges and its tyranny in Kashmir jars on its ears. One can appreciate that kind of sensitiveness, though of course one cannot be expected to sympathize with it.
Again, Sir Benegal Rau has made a reference to propaganda in Pakistan threatening war over Kashmir. I suppose the insinuation is that India stands only for peace and nonviolence while Pakistan is a warmonger. True, in Pakistan there has been, there still is, a great deal of agitation in the minds of the people over this problem of Kashmir. It would be futile to deny that the situation has often boiled up to bursting point. That shows the degree of intensity of feeling in Pakistan over this question, but that war or warlike policies are threatened from the Indian side cannot be denied. Apart from certain military movements that took place some time ago in India towards the borders of Pakistan, the only objective of which could be to overawe Pakistan, there is the statement of Mr. Khare, the President of the Hindu Mahasabha, an important political body to which the President of the Indian Union recently sent his good wishes. Incidentally, the Hindu Mahasabha is a purely communal Hindu organization. This statement appeared in the Press on 22 February 1951. Mr. Khare's solution is short and sharp. Referring to Kashmir, he said the solution was "to attack and attach it".
It would be unprofitable to go on multiplying references to that which, if it proves anything at all, proves that certainly in Pakistan, possibly all throughout India, there is great agitation and disturbance of the public mind over the continuation of this dispute, The only conclusion that can be drawn there from is that speedy, vigorous and effective action is needed to bring about a peaceful settlement of the dispute, if worse is not to happen and if worse is not to be faced.
Sir Benegal Rau also drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that India had already reduced its forces in Kashmir by 20 to 25 percent without waiting for any corresponding reduction by Pakistan. That, again, is a matter on which, in the nature of things, we have no direct information. I have no reason to question this statement made by my distinguished friend. I accept it as correct, but, on the other hand, our information is that, even after this reduction, India maintains at the present moment something like four divisions in Kashmir. This is many times the strength of Pakistan forces in the Azad Kashmir area. The total strength of the Indian armed forces, we have been informed, in Indian-occupied Kashmir is roughly 65,000 men. This, again roughly, means one Indian soldier for every forty Kashmiris. In addition, there are the State armed forces, including the State army and militia, totaling twenty-one battalions and a cavalry regiment. That is, we believe—and it is based on such information as is available to us—a fair estimate of the armed forces maintained in the Indian-occupied portion of Kashmir.
I have said that the proportion of the Indian armed forces alone, leaving out the State army and the State militia, is one to forty Kashmiris, men, women and children. What is the significance of that ? As has been observed by Sir Owen Dixon, the people of the Valley, of whom we are talking at the moment, are not high-spirited and independent people. They are extremely timid. They have been rendered timid, and some of the stories of their timidity, if related, would raise both laughter and pity. They have been rendered timid by a hundred years of the most grinding tyranny under the Dogra rulers. They are a highly artistic people, even in their present state. Specimen's of their artistic work fetch high prices and are highly appreciated in Pakistan, India and elsewhere. Given the chance, they are also an extremely cultured people, although that kind of chance comes to a very small percentage of the people of the Valley of Kashmir, and only when they have left the Valley. Those who have gone outside Kashmir and settled down in Pakistan and India not only have given an extremely good account of themselves, but they have always risen to the highest positions, both in public life and in the field of letters and culture, in much larger numbers in proportion to their size in Pakistan and India than any other section of the population.
He prayed for something that might inspire the lowly people of Kashmir with a spark of dignity. Here is a Kashmiri of the present generation—Sir Mohammad Iqbal died only a few years ago—describing the degradation, the misery, the wretchedness of his own people. In another verse, he said : "The Kashmiri, the bondsman who himself goes about in rags, while his master adorns himself in the beautiful silks woven by his slaves''. This is an almost literal description of the conditions in Kashmir.
That was Sir Mohammad Iqbal. The present Governor-General of Pakistan is a Kashmiri. The Minister of the Interior in the Pakistan Central Government is a Kashmiri. The Governor of Sindh, one of the provinces of Pakistan, is a Kashmiri. The Prime Minister of the Northwest Frontier Province is a Kashmiri, and a host of others, as I have said, occupy very honourable positions in the cultural life of Pakistan, and indeed, even of India. That is the kind of people who have been reduced to the conditions 1 have described in the words of Sir Mohammad Iqbal and which has been described in very moderate language by Sir Owen Dixon. There is one armed Indian soldier to forty Kashmiris. As a matter of fact, one soldier armed with no more than a bayonet could drive 4,000 Kashmiris today in whatever direction he desired. The Security Council can judge to what extent the presence of any troops among people of that kind, who have suffered to that degree and to that extent, would interfere with the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite. As a matter of fact, it would not be a question of interference. The mere sight of somebody whom the Kashmiris supposed was posted there by Sheikh Abdullah's Government and who desired the accession of Kashmir to India would persuade 99 Kashmiris out of 100 to vote for the accession, although every one of those 99, left to himself, would vote for accession to Pakistan. In those circumstances, India's continued occupation of Kashmir by force and its insistence upon retaining its armed forces in Kashmir, is a most flagrant act of aggression and a most potent threat to the maintenance of international peace.
It is an aggression not only against the people of Kashmir, but also against Pakistan. It is a threat to the very existence of Pakistan, since India aims thereby not only to encircle Pakistan strategically, but also to have its economy at its mercy by control of all the rivers which are the life-blood of West Pakistan. That the reference to strategic encirclement is not a figure of speech is borne out by Sheikh Abdullah himself. A Press report of a statement which he gave in Delhi on 21 October 1947 reads, in part, as follows :
"Due to the strategic position that the State held; if this State joins the Indian Dominion, he thought, Pakistan would be completely encircled."
Owing to India's persistent refusal to withdraw its forces and permit a fair and impartial plebiscite to be held. Kashmir is today an explosive spot and is a cause of the most acute anxiety to the whole world, but more particularly to Pakistan to our neighbours both in the Middle East and in the Far East It may be within the knowledge of the Security Council-' inasmuch as some of these communications have been addressed to the Secretary-General and may have been passed on to the Council-that the Iranian Parliament, a number of Syrian Deputies and a number of Iraqi Deputies have expressed their anxiety over the continuation of this dispute and have requested that, having regard to the peace of that region of the earth and ultimately to international peace, this dispute should be quickly and fairly and justly resolved through peaceful methods.
More recently, expression has been given to similar sentiments on behalf of the non-official representatives of the whole of that region in the sessions of the Motamar, or the Conference of Islamic Countries, which took place in Karachi.
It would be enough to quote in this connexion the view of one who took part in the discussion on Kashmir in the recent Prime Ministers' Conference in London. I refer to Mr. Menzies, the Prime Minister of Australia, one of our Far Eastern neighbours. I take this quotation from The Times of London of 16 January 1951 :
"I want to say to my friend, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, as I would say to the Prime Minister of India if he were here tonight, that there is nothing we are not prepared to do to get rid of a matter which, so long as it continues, is not only a threat to the peace and good government of the Indian subcontinent, but is a grave threat to the security of the entire free world."
The problem before the Security Council can be very briefly stated. It is to insist upon India's carrying out the obligations that it has undertaken. The disparity between India's professions, both in connexion with Kashmir and in connexion with other problems, and its action, is so wide that the world stands puzzled by it. Most people imagine that a great country, as India undoubtedly is, claiming to be a peaceful Member of the United Nations and professing to base its conduct on the loftiest moral principles—and in fact, preaching to the world from a high moral pedestal—could hardly be so inconsistent where its own obligations are concerned. Yet, no fact in recent history is so indisputably established as this : that India has, over a long period, through various excuses, persistently refused to carry out what it had undertaken to do.
The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was compelled to recognize this and, indeed, to record it. General MacNaughton, in his turn, was faced with the same intransigence. Sir Owen Dixon made a most determined effort and ultimately became convinced that India could not be persuaded to honour its obligations. But, not deterred by this record, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers made a determined effort to persuade India to honour its commitments. However, like all those who made that effort before them, they also failed.
India realizes that no impartial person would regard its excuses or interpretations as valid, and therefore it refuses to face arbitration. It turned down the proposal for arbitration put forward by the Commission. Throughout the year 1950, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in personal discussion and in correspondence with the Prime Minister of India, tried his utmost to get the Prime Minister of India to accept arbitration for settling all outstanding disputes between India and Pakistan if negotiations and mediation should fail. The Prime Minister of India would not agree.
I venture to submit that no party to a dispute, let alone a great country like India, which knows its stand in a dispute to be just, would refuse impartial arbitration. India's refusal is a clear indication of India's own estimation of where it stands. It knows it is wrong, and therefore it has turned down every suggestion that some impartial authority should determine those points with regard to which the two parties are at variance, relating to the international agreement embodied in the resolutions of the Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [S/1100, S/1196].
But even where the stand of a party is deemed not to be fair or just, at least by the opposing party, in the ultimate resort what is the method of resolving a deadlock of that description ? There is an agreement affirmed by both, accepted by both-still affirmed and accepted by both; differences arise with regard to its interpretation or method of implementation; one side insists that its interpretation of the agreement should be accepted and given effect to; the other party does not accept that interpretation as valid. How in the world can you decide a dispute of that kind except through arbitration, if mediation or conciliation or other attempts at adjustment should fail, as they have all failed in this case ?
Let us assume for one moment that the fault is wholly Pakistan's. After all, that is the utmost that my learned friend could contend with. Let us assume that, in respect of every matter that is holding up the progress of a settlement, Pakistan is to blame and is in the wrong. Well, Pakistan says: "Let an impartial authority look into the matter and tell both sides what their obligations are. Let both sides say, 'We were and now agree that, when we are told what our obligations are, we shall carry them out fully"."
What more is required of us, assuming we are in the wrong? After all, India can only contend that it is in the right and that we are in the wrong. Very good. Then let us get somebody to tell us what our obligations are and to tell India what its obligations are-and let us both agree that we shall do whatever he tells us to do.
On numerous occasions, Pakistan has expressed its willingness to have its pending disputes with India settled through arbitration. I shall draw attention to only one statement of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, made in the course of what has now come to be known as the "No War Declaration" correspondence. I believe the correspondence has been made public. In paragraph 3 of his letter dated 21 November 1950, to the Prime Minister of India, the Prime Minister of Pakistan wrote:
"It seems to me that, if we are to move forward, we must face squarely what it is that has prevented India from accepting my No War Declaration. Reviewing our correspondence, it becomes quite clear that the crux of the difficulty is the reluctance of your Government to substitute, on any issue, impartial arbitration for threatened and actual use of force. India has been unwilling to accept the decision of an impartial arbiter or any issue now outstanding. Pakistan is and has been willing to accept the decision of an impartial arbiter on every issue outstanding between us."
Can Pakistan be called upon or expected to make any greater contribution toward the settlement of international disputes through peaceful methods? As I have already said, let us assume for one moment that every charge that my learned and distinguished friend from India makes against Pakistan has substance. Well, then, we will go to arbitration and we will be turned down. We are prepared to take that risk. Why does not India eagerly embrace this fair opportunity offered to it of having every one of these matters in which it considers itself in the right decided in its favour?
This then, is the situation which the Security Council has to resolve that India, while professing to adhere to the international agreement contained in those two resolutions, and repeating its acceptance and affirmation of it, refuses in actual fact to carry it out.
The rejection by the representative of India of the United Kingdom United States draft resolution which is now before the Security Council is the latest instance of this intransigence. The main ground that he has put forward for rejecting the resolution is that it endorses Sir Owen Dixon's proposals for demilitarization, which, according to the representative of India, go beyond the terms of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
As I tried to explain to the Security Council earlier, the resolutions divided the demilitarization process into two stages, the truce stage and the plebiscite stage. I will not repeat that; I submitted it as late as yesterday to the Council. India took objection with regard to something that was to be attempted and carried out in the second stage on the ground that it should be carried out in the first stage. Being impressed by the consideration that the solution of the difficulty proposed and put forward by India might help to move matters forward, Sir Owen Dixon produced a scheme of demilitarization proposing that demilitarization should be carried out in one stage. It was obvious therefore that the whole of the demilitarization problem could be dealt with in that stage. India objected to that on the ground that it attempted to deal with the State armed forces also. But if the whole of the problem of demilitarization had to be dealt with in one stage, it had to deal with all that the two resolutions had attempted to deal with : the whole of the Pakistan forces, the Azad Kashmir forces, the Indian forces, and the State forces and militia. The State armed forces are expressly mentioned in sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949, as I pointed out yesterday.
Then Sir Owen Dixon took up the same idea and attacked the whole demilitarization problem together. Naturally, when you depart from the method of implementation laid down in an instrument, some changes do creep in, but the objective remains the same, namely the demilitarization of the State to the extent which will enable a fair and impartial plebiscite to be held. He put forward his scheme, but objection was taken to that on the ground that it departed from the two resolutions. India will not do what the two resolutions say : it says they mean something else. India will not agree to have the point in dispute arbitrated upon, it will not do what it has already agreed to do, taking into account the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, and it will not do what Sir Owen Dixon suggests.
If at this stage all that is attempted is another mediation, the whole history of the dispute shows that it will meet with the same result as previous mediation efforts. Those who are waiting in agony and impatience upon the action to be taken by the Security Council to resolve this most explosive problem will be compelled to come to the conclusion that the Security Council is not prepared to deal with it, as its duties as the principal organ of the United Nations make it imperative that it should.
What is it that we suggest might help to move matters forward ? We submit that the Security Council should depute an outstanding personality of high repute and standing to bring about the implementation of the international agreement and to carry out its implementation, and should give him full powers for the discharge of his responsibility, including the power to effect demilitarization by removing or disbanding the military forces of all interested parties—to use the words used by Sir Gladwyn Jebb on 21 February [532nd meeting]—to exercise effective supervision over the functions of government in the State and to decide finally any points of difference which might arise between the parties in the carrying out of those duties, including the interpretation of any clauses of the international agreement embodied in the two resolutions of the Commission which were accepted by the parties and which both parties continue to accept. At the same time, the Security Council should call upon both India and Pakistan to withdraw their forces and to extend full cooperation to the United Nations representative in the discharge of his duties.
In view of the information now before the Security Council relating to the proposal to call a State constituent assembly in Kashmir, India should be asked not to proceed with the convocation of the constituent assembly in Kashmir and not to make any attempt to determine unilaterally the future of the State. By taking this action the Security Council would be putting to a final and conclusive test the professions of the Government of India that it is ready to honour its obligations under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.
The draft resolution now before the Council should therefore be modified in the sense that I have indicated. There are some clauses in that draft resolution which should be omitted and there are others which need to be amended. For example, sub-paragraph (4) (iii) relates to the possibility of boundary adjustments, which in fact would mean a partial partition of the State. This sub-paragraph is in contravention of the international agreements embodied in the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, and should be omitted. This is something which has not been asked for either by India or by Pakistan, neither has either of the two main political parties in Kashmir, the National Conference and the Muslim Conference, asked for anything of the kind, in fact, all parties are opposed to this suggestion. Here is the latest pronouncement of Sheikh Abdullah on this point, reported from New Delhi on 24 February. I am quoting from the Pakistan Times of 25 February, and in the course of his statement on the resolution, Sheikh Abdullah is reported as having stated :
"The latest resolution has again insinuated the suggestion for the partition of the State in its final disposition, so as to secure parts of it for both the States of India and Pakistan. This holds out dangerous possibilities of the dissolution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as an organic unit and is bound to result in the people being deprived of their nation's existence and identity."
I need not at this stage go into further details on the draft resolution, but I shall do so if the necessity should arise. At the present moment we are, as I conceive, occupied with the main question of principle, which is that the two resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 have been accepted and reaffirmed by both sides and the effort of the Security Council must be directed towards the implementation of those two resolutions. The whole object of those two resolutions is to move forward, towards, and to organize and hold, a free and impartial plebiscite, and it is that object which must be kept in view all the time. Every step that is necessary must be taken towards the achievement of that objective, and no step must in the slightest degree take away from the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.
The representative of India referred to the interests of the people of Kashmir, and this is what the interests of the people of Kashmir demand. He said :
"The people of Kashmir are not mere chattels to be disposed of according to a rigid formula; their future must be decided in their own interests and in accordance with their own desires."
Nobody is suggesting that the people of Kashmir should be disposed of in accordance with any formula, rigid or otherwise. There has been constant insistence upon this : that every factors likely to compel anybody in Kashmir to express a view on this problem which he does not freely hold should be excluded. Is that a rigid formula ? It is the only principle which can enable the people of Kashmir, in the words of the representative of India, to decide their future "in their own interests and in accordance with their own desires."
The vast majority of these people have, as I have said, suffered for over a century under the most despotic tyranny. They are today living under constant threat and dread of bayonets. Undoubtedly their future must be decided in their own interests and in accordance with their own desires, but it is only the people of Kashmir, voting in a free plebiscite, who can decide their own future in accordance with their own interests and desires. We do not ask for more, but we shall not be content with less.
The representative of India has talked of concessions to Pakistan, and has said that India can make no more concessions. We ask for no concessions. Is it a concession that this problem should be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite ? And if it is a concession, to whom is it a concession ? The representative of India painted a very attractive picture the other day of conditions in India and conditions in Kashmir. If a free and impartial plebiscite is held, and that picture represents the actual state of affairs, everyone in Kashmir will vote for accession to India should be eager to push forward to that consummation.
I have stated on previous occasions before the Security Council and I repeat that if any proposal made by me will, in the opinion of the Council, have the effect of swaying the vote of even a single voter against his free wishes, in respect of this matter, that proposal should be rejected. But the same criterion must be applied to every Indian proposal.
Am I asking for concessions ? Am I seeking to apply a rigid formula ? The duty of the Security Council is clear. I am asking for no more. It is only thus that we can secure for the people of Kashmir the right of self determination. It is in this spirit that Sir Gladwyn Jebb made the following remarks in his speech of 21 February [532nd meeting] :
"Whatever difficulties may have been felt by either of the parties in the past, I hope that there will now be a ready acceptance of the principle that the best guarantee of a fair expression of the wishes of the people of Kashmir is the removal or disbandment of the military forces of all interested parties and their replacement by United Nations forces which can have no interest to sway the vote either way. As a principle this seems to us at least to be so axiomatic that we can hardly believe that it will not be accepted by the Council and by those immediately concerned. For if it is not accepted, it can only mean that the contestant denies the whole conception of settlement by plebiscite which after all has already been accepted without reservation."
The Prime Minister of Pakistan, in a letter dated 14 February 1950, urging the Prime Minister of India to accept arbitration about standing disputes between India and Pakistan, said the following :
"In all disputes there is a danger that the party which is in possession of and wishes to withhold the rightful due of the other may so conduct itself as either to prevent a fair settlement or to cause such delay in settlement as to produce the same result. Either cause engenders a sense of injustice, frustration and despair of securing a remedy by peaceful means, which is one of the most frequent causes of conflict."
On the question of Kashmir, which is both the key to and the barometer of India-Pakistan relations, the sense of frustration and despair has already mounted to a dangerous pitch. The task before the Security Council is of the utmost importance and urgency. I solemnly appeal to the Council to approach that task in that sense of urgency.
It has been said, on behalf of India, that India is a secular State, that it is democratic, that it is progressive, and that it is non-violent. It is not my purpose to question India's greatness on the basis of these claims or, indeed, of many others which readily suggest themselves. It has been either alleged or insinuated that Pakistan has been guilty of aggression, that Pakistan is retrogressive, that Pakistan is a theocratic State. I do not know what that might mean, but somehow it is employed as a term of derogation.
This is what I had to submit at this stage, and I shall wait to hear what the Security Council will say is the choice offered to Pakistan and the people of Kashmir. What should they do to bring about a peaceful settlement of this problem, consistent with their honour and dignity and the principles of fairness and justice ?