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चैत्र कृष्ण पक्ष, शुक्रवार, चर्तुथी

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06031951 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 534 held on 6 March 1951


06031951 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 534 held on 6 March 1951

 

As the representative of India observed in the opening part of his statement to the Council on 1 March [533rd meeting), the question of Kashmir has been before the Security Council on several occasions already. Unfortunately, very little progress has been made towards its peaceful settlement.

 

On this occasion, the task that Sir Benegal Rau set himself was comparatively easy. The conclusion that he sought to press upon the attention of the Council was that the Council need do no more than accept Sir Owen Dixon's suggestion that the matter now be left to discussion and settlement between the parties themselves. In other words, the objective he set himself -a part of it, at least-was that the Security Council should be persuaded that the best thing to do now with regard to Kashmir is to do nothing.

 

As I have said, his task was easy. All that was necessary for him to do was to put forward certain considerations which would show that a peaceful settlement was difficult, at least through the efforts of the Security Council, and that therefore the problem should be left to look after itself.

 

Of course, the danger there is that a problem left to look after itself may run wild, and when it runs wild no one can predict where it might run and what it might bring in its wake.

 

My task is a little more difficult. My task is to try to convince the Security Council that the situation is of such gravity that it requires earnest, vigorous and speedy action if it is to be prevented from breaking out in a manner that might rule out peaceful settlement. My task further is to indicate to what extent the efforts hitherto made have been successful, where they have got stuck, and what is needed to speed the matter toward a peaceful settlement.

 

The whole argument of my esteemed friend, the representative of India, rested on the absolutely untenable assumption that India is in lawful occupation of Kashmir. His argument, such as it was, and all its implications and insinuations, revolved around that assumption. The stark fact is that India's occupation of Kashmir was brought about as the result of a conspiracy between the Hindu Ruler of Kashmir and the Hindu leaders of India, the victims of that conspiracy being the people of Kashmir. This conspiracy was hatched during the spring and summer of 1947 when some of the most prominent Hindu leaders visited Kashmir and persuaded the Maharaja to accept their point of view. I shall reinforce this part of my submission to the Council by quoting a statement by Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, a Kashmiri leader who, because he could not see eye to eye with a good many of the policies of the Maharaja, and later with the view of the Maharaja over accession, had to spend a fairly long period in gaol. He has since been released. The quotations that I propose to make at this stage and later have been published in a pamphlet called The Truth about Kashmir by the Kashmir Democratic Union of Delhi. He states:

 

"From the outside Congress leaders approached the Maharaja and, in the name of Hinduism and ancient Indian culture, appealed to him to decide to accede to India. One after the other many Congress stalwarts, including Acharya Kripalani, the then Rashtrapati, visited Kashmir with that mission. The highest among them, Mahatma Gandhi, also visited Kashmir.

 

"The Mahatma stayed in Srinagar for a few days, when he had long interviews with the Maharaja, as well as with nationalist leaders and officials. Immediately after the Mahatma left the State, drastic changes came over the Maharaja's policy, particularly regarding the issue of accession. Ramchandra Kak, the then Premier, who was for his own reasons a supporter of Kashmir's independence, was thrown out and was replaced by a well known communalist and reactionary, Dogra Rajput septuagenarian Major General Janak Singh. All papers advocating Kashmir's accession to Pakistan or its independence were either stopped or put under a pre-censorship ban. Leaders and political workers who were preaching pro-Pakistan views or were opposing accession to India began to be gagged or arrested, This was in August 1947, long before the tribesmen entered Kashmir.``

 

That is a Hindu leader speaking, and he is speaking from India.

 

The Maharaja entered upon that course because he well knew that the vast majority of his people-and it is well known that the Muslims constitute an overall majority of some 78 percent of the population of the State of Jammu and Kashmir -were anxious that the State should accede to Pakistan, and were bitterly opposed to accession to India.

 

Shortly after the terrible slaughters in India, which accompanied partition, the Maharaja set upon a course of action whereby, in the words of the special correspondent of The Times of London published in its issue of 10 October 1948, "in the remaining Dogra area, 237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated, unless they escaped to Pakistan along the border, by all the forces of the Dogra State headed by the Maharaja in person and aided by Hindus and Sikhs". The Maharaja was encouraged to do that by what had already happened in another State which, so far as the composition of its population was concerned, was in similar straits.

 

In the case of Kapurthala, one of the Punjab States contiguous to Muslim majority areas in the Punjab, where the population was 63 per cent Muslim, not one Muslim was left in the course of a few weeks. They were all either massacred or driven out of the State by force. That is how the population composition of the State was converted from a majority of Muslims into a total of non-Muslims. There was no reason why if the Maharaja of Kashmir was similarly minded, he could not achieve the same end, and thus clear the way for accession to India.

 

When this became clear, agitation started in the State and large-scale repression was undertaken. I shall quote again from Prem Nath Bazaz, who says:

 

"Restlessness was universal. In Punch, where thousands of demobilized Muslim veterans live, an open armed rebellion broke out against the Maharaja and his administration. The rebellion spread rapidly to the adjoining area of Mirpur, where war veterans also lived in large numbers. Instead of realizing what he had done, the Maharaja, egged on by Congress leaders and his new counsellors, dispatched the whole of the Dogra Army to quell the disturbances, or, as one colonel put it, to reconquer the area. The army perpetrated unheard of atrocities on the people of Punch. Whole villages were burned down and innocent people were massacred. Reports reaching Srinagar were not allowed to be published in the Press. No official reports were issued to allay the fears of the public. This happened in September and the tribesmen did not enter the State before 23 October 1947."

 

That is the testimony of a Kashmiri, a Hindu Kashmiri. He then proceeds a little later with the following statement:

 

"With the consultation of Congress leaders''-and this means leaders of the Indian National Congress-"the Maharaja now appointed a notorious anti-Pakistani as his Prime Minister. Only four hours after he took charge, Mr. Meher Chand Mahajan, the new Prime Minister, made, in a press conference, injudicious and irresponsible statements, in utter disregard of public opinion, condemning Pakistan and all those who supported Kashmir's accession to that dominion. The result was more disturbances in the valley and chaos in Punch and the adjoining areas. While widespread disturbances were taking place inside the State, Muslims outside could not keep silent. Many responsible Pakistani leaders warned the Maharaja not to take the contemplated ruinous step which it was quite evident he was determined to take. The Premier of the Northwest Frontier Province, who is a Kashmiri by descent, implored and advised the Maharaja to be farsighted. Even the rulers of the frontier district, such as the Rajahs of Hunza and Nagar, warned him of the disastrous consequences that his action would bring about. Hundreds of telegrams poured into the Royal Palace from all over the State, from leaders great and small, from organizations big and little, from institutions important and unimportant, unanimously praying for him to look ahead before jumping. But all this fell on deaf ears."

 

That being the state of affairs in Kashmir where the Ruler at the head of his Dogra forces undertook in person to quell and crush this movement for liberation, which had sponta neously started in the State, was it to be wondered at that the sympathy and the sentiments of the Muslim population of Pakistan should be deeply stirred and aroused?

 

On previous occasions the same thing had happened. During the 1930's, when a liberation movement, or a movement for constitutional freedom, had been undertaken in Kashmir, as many as 30,000 Muslims from the Punjab had gone to gaol in their effort to assist their Muslim brethren in their struggle to obtain elementary human rights.

 

I need not, here and at this stage, go over again the kind of tyranny that the Muslims of the State had suffered for an exact hundred years under the domination of the dynasty of this particular Maharaja.

 

The people of Punch, having started this liberation movement, were able, within a very few days, to rout the Maharaja's forces. With his forces being scattered, the Maharaja was compelled to leave his capital of Srinagar. It was in that state of affairs, when his authority over the greater part of the State of Kashmir had been set aside and his armed forces had been scattered, and he himself had been forced to flee from the capital of Kashmir to Jammu, the capital of Jammu Province, that he wrote that letter to Lord Mountbatten, then Viceroy of India, which is claimed as the legal title of India to the occupation of Kashmir.

 

I have said that the whole of this business was a conspiracy. I have drawn attention to what happened between prominent Congress leaders and the Maharaja. The sequel of events speaks eloquently as to what must have happened behind the scenes between the Maharaja and the Government of India. Here are two significant facts. The first is that this letter was written from Jammu on 26 October. The reply is dated 27 October, from Lord Mountbatten. There is nothing very surprising in that. But what is surprising is that a large number of airborne troops had already occupied portions of the State on the morning of 27 October. Those members of the Council who may claim experience in these matters, will be able to judge how much preparation must have preceded an operation of that kind. The Maharaja asked for military assistance on 26 October. The next morning, as a result of airborne operations over high ranges of mountains, portions of the State had been occupied by Indian armed forces. And it is pretended-and the Security Council is sought to be persuaded to believe that all this had happened as a result of the Maharaja's appeal for armed assistance in order to quell what are described as disturbances in the State. There could be no more eloquent proof of the fact that the whole thing was engineered as the result of a conspiracy.

 

The second significant factor, in this connexion, is the position of Sheikh Abdulla. Sheikh Abdulla was a political leader in Kashmir whose political views were in sympathy with and supported by the Indian National Congress. He had long acted as the agent of the Indian National Congress in Kashmir. At the time when agitation in the State started against the Maharaja's design to accede to India, Sheikh Abdulla was in gaol under a long sentence of imprisonment on a charge of treason against the Maharaja. I have on previous occasions conceded that it was an honourable kind of incarceration that he was suffering. But here is the significance. At the height of this agitation against the Maharaja, Sheikh Abdulla was released. His release was not part of a general gaol delivery of political offenders, because the Maharaja suddenly bethought himself that he had better have the support of the political leaders of the State in his contemplated action. Other leaders, particularly those who did not see eye to eye with the Maharaja over this matter, continued to remain in gaol. Sheikh Abdulla was selected for release. Again, in the words of Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, here is what preceded this release:

 

"Sheikh Abdulla was then in gaol as a result of his unsuccessful 'Quit Kashmir' adventure. The trend of public opinion outside made him worried and restless. He wrote a letter to a friend in Jammu, which was published in the Congress press, praying to the Maharaja that he should. neither remain independent nor join Pakistan, but should declare the State's accession to India forthwith. Sheikh Abdulla offered the unequivocal support of his National Conference to such a declaration."

 

The release was followed by liberty to Sheikh Abdulla to carry on his efforts in support of the State's accession to India. I shall quote again from Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz:

 

"Sheikh Abdulla was not only released, he was also encouraged and subsidized by the Maharaja's Government to hold public meetings and processions. Orders banning processions and meetings were, however, strictly applied in the case of all other political parties which refused to support the Maharaja's new policy."

 

There is a significant aspect of this matter. Here is this man; he is not persona grata with the Maharaja. In fact, having been sentenced to a long term of imprisonment because he had demanded that the Maharaja quit Kashmir, he is not only released but he becomes a particular favourite. In the letter that the Maharaja wrote to Lord Mountbatten asking for assistance, there occurs this very significant sentence as an inducement to the Government of India to offer military aid: "I may also inform Your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdulla to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister."

 

How did the Maharaja know this would come as a welcome gesture to Lord Mountbatten and to his government unless the matter had already been arranged between the two, that is, between the Government of India and the Maharaja, that military aid would be forthcoming to Sheikh Abdulla, whose politics, as I have said, had for long been in accord with those of the Indian National Congress, who was a personal friend of the Prime Minister of India, and who, when he was being tried for treason against the Maharaja, before the partition, sought to be defended by the Prime Minister of India to be? Pandit Nehru then rushed to Srinagar on the plea that he wanted to defend his friend against the charge of treason brought against him. Under the Maharaja's orders, he was put into a motor car, taken out of the State and put back into the Punjab. That man was not only selected to be associated with the administration, but his contemplated selection was put forward to the Government of India as an inducement to obtain military aid from them. And not only that. In the reply of Lord Mountbatten, this matter is noted with satisfaction. Lord Mountbatten, often stating that, consistent with the policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession had been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, went on to say:

 

"I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdulla to form an interim government to work with your Prime Minister."

 

I submit that these are significant facts, that the whole thing had been settled as part of a scheme to suppress the liberation movement in Kashmir and to over-rule those who might wish to raise their voice in favour of the State's accession to Pakistan. By this promise which the Maharaja conveyed to Lore Mountbatten, Sheikh Abdulla obtained his quid pro quo. While this was going on, Indian troops had arrived and the movement continued. In the meantime, three days before the Maharaja wrote his letter, the tribal incursion had taken place and the struggle, reinforced by this, went on. Eventually the Azad Kashmir Government was organized. The Azad Kashmir forces. were organized and withstood successfully the onslaught of the Indian Army. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the representative of India has chosen to malign these brave fighters for the freedom of Kashmir and their government as subversive forces and authorities. But subversive of whom? Of the Maharajas? Of a century-long oppression? This, from the representative of a State which after a long and honourable life. The struggle had only a few months previously succeeded in winning and establishing its own independence, which is somewhat ironic. What was Sheikh Abdulla doing in the meantime after he had died? come into power?

 

Prem Nath Bazaz, in the course of that statement to which I have already drawn attention, comments on the fact that Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, had said that Abdulla and his party were not put in power in Kashmir from the air. He analyses that statement in detail and gives cogent reasons to show that they were put in power from the air. He concludes this aspect of the matter thus:

 

"In view of these solid facts, it is clearly wrong to state that the Nationalists were given power because they were the most representative political body of the State's people. The truth is that they were put there from the air."

 

To use Pandit Nehru's phrase, "They"-that is the National Government-"represented the popular organization and remained there because of their own strength and not because of legal sanctions alone".

 

He conveniently forgot the one factor which is solely responsible for the existence of the Abdulla Government. That factor is the occupation of the State by a huge Indian Army.

 

"But so long as tens of thousands of Indian soldiers are stationed in every nook and corner of Kashmir to back the Abdulla Government, the unarmed people of Kashmir can not do anything to push out that government." That is to say, his government is being maintained in power by India's military forces, and it cannot be maintained that it is a government based upon popular assent.

 

As early as October, 1947, the Pakistan Government made repeated efforts to reach a settlement with the Government of India wherein the people of Kashmir could settle their future through a plebiscite. Various suggestions were made which have been detailed before the Security Council at previous meetings and to which I need not here revert. They were not acceptable to India. India put forward counter-proposals on which I shall comment presently. They were acceptable to Pakistan and, during the last three years and a half, Pakistan, the Security Council and the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan-and lately some of the prime Ministers of the Commonwealth countries-have been engaged in the effort to persuade India to carry out what it had offered to do and what it had subsequently, through the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [S/1100, S/1196]. agreed to do. All these efforts have so far been without any appreciable result.

 

India goes on affirming over and over again its readiness indeed, its anxiety-to honour all its commitments, to carry into effect all that it has agreed to do. But, when it comes to the doing of it, nobody who has so far had to deal with the matter can achieve any success. Failure after failure has been reported.

 

The latest of these declarations of willingness and readiness to carry out all that India has undertaken was made by Sir Benegal Rau in a speech before the Security Council on the first of this month [533rd meeting]. The earliest was contained in the telegram of the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, dated 8 November 1947. It has been quoted in extenso and can be found in the records of the Security Council. I shall therefore not read out the whole of it but shall draw attention to paragraphs 10 and 11. One of the points that the Prime Minister of India was trying to meet in this telegram was the objection raised on behalf of Pakistan that a plebiscite carried out while a good portion of the State was in the occupation of Indian military forces, and while an Indian nominee was at the head of the Kashmir administrators could give no confidence to anybody at all. This is how the telegram concludes-and I shall read first paragraph 10:

 

It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated, are:

 

"1. That the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir.

 

"2. That the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as the raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored.

 

"3. That the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

 

Stopping here for a moment, I might draw the attention of the Council to the fact that the raiders have withdrawn from Kashmir; that they withdrew long ago, after agreement was reached between the two governments on the resolutions of the Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Indian troops are still in occupation of Kashmir, and no practical prospect has yet appeared of a plebiscite being undertaken by the United Nations in order to determine the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan.

 

Paragraph 11 of that telegram runs as follows:

 

"The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential, in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions, that there should be acceptance of the principle that, where the Ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or the other Dominion should be ascertained by reference to the will of the people."

 

I stress this in order to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that, as early as 8 November 1947, India's position was that, in the circumstances set out in paragraph 11, no accession can take place-at any rate, it cannot be recognized-until the will of the people has been ascertained.

 

That was the principle on the basis of which Pakistan was willing that the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan might be decided. As I have said, every effort that has since been made from any quarter to carry out what was explicitly undertaken has so far brought no result. India, instead of coming to the United Nations with a joint

 

request that the plebiscite be held under the authority of the United Nations, lodged a complaint that Pakistan was assisting those who were challenging India's military occupation of Kashmir. The Security Council heard India's complaint and Pakistan's reply and came to the conclusion that the only just and democratic solution in Kashmir was a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations, to deter mine whether Kashmir should accede to India or to Pakistan.

 

As to the conditions of the plebiscite, everyone who spoke in the Security Council gave expression to what, in his opinion, would constitute the minimum conditions which alone could guarantee a fair and impartial plebiscite. But the matter was set out in the fewest possible words in the statement of the representative of France [235th meeting], to which I draw attention:

 

"Personally, I would suggest three conditions"-in connexion with the plebiscite-: "1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir,

 

The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race -Hindu or Moslem-to their places of origin in that State; "3. The establishment of a free administration which would not exert pressure on the population and would give absolute guarantees of a free vote."

 

Similar views were expressed by the majority of the members. of the Security Council. These views were crystallized in a draft resolution which was brought before the Council by its President on 6 February 1948 [S/667]. This draft resolution was accepted by Pakistan and was rejected by India-thus, at that very early date, setting the pattern for the many subsequent occasions on which proposals for carrying out a free and impartial plebiscite, proposals made by eminent and impartial authorities, have been accepted by Pakistan and rejected by India.

 

While the Security Council was continuing its efforts to bring about a solution by means of a free and impartial plebiscite, India was making a determined bid to conquer the rest of the State, in spite of the Security Council resolution [S/651] of 17 January 1948 [229th meeting] which

 

"Calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from making any statement and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggregate the situation."

 

In spite of this appeal, India was going forward rapidly in order to achieve not a peaceful settlement of the problem, but a military settlement through its armed forces. It poured troops into Kashmir in an effort to crush the liberation movement and to encircle Pakistan. At the same time-that is to say, during April 1948, which synchronizes with these events-India tried, in another field, to do mortal injury to Pakistan by withholding the waters of common rivers from Pakistan and thus putting the whole agricultural economy of West Pakistan into jeopardy.

 

On 21 April 1948, the Security Council eventually adopted a resolution [S/726]-no longer the resolution which was presented on 6 February 1948, but a resolution in several respects watered down as compared with the resolution of 6 February, in the hope and expectation that it might become acceptable to India. India rejected that resolution of 21 April 1948 and went on with its military campaign in Kashmir.

 

The representative of India has referred to a recommendation of the Commander-in-Chief of Pakistan made about this time, and he has quoted an extract from it, which is torn out of its context, in an attempt to show that the object of the entry of Pakistan troops into Azad Kashmir areas which had already been liberated from the Maharajah's authority was to render more effective assistance to the tribesmen, I should like to read the whole passage from which that extract was taken, so that the Council may see the whole picture, as it then emerged, of the military situation in its proper setting. This is from an appraisal submitted by Sir Douglas Gracey, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan forces, to the Pakistan Government. I quote the summary of his deductions:

 

"(a) That a general offensive is being planned by the Indian Army in the north and the south is a certainty. Their objectives are likely to be as follows: south: (i) Bhimber Mirpur, (ii) Punch; north: Muzaffarabad-Kobala.

 

"(b) Judging from what has happened in Rajouri, an advance by the Indian Army in any of the above areas is almost certain to create a big refugee problem for Pakistan, which is already saturated. Refugees will be an extremely serious strain on the civil administration and a heavy drain on the country's economic and financial resources. From this point of view alone it is imperative that the Indian Army is prevented from gaining any of the above objectives.

 

"(c) Occupation of Bhimber and Mirpur will give India the strategic advantage of having crossed two major obstacles, i.e., the Rivers Ravi and Chenab, and of coming right up to the Pakistan border, thereby sitting on our doorsteps, threatening the Jhelum Bridge which is so vital for us, and getting further opportunities for intrigue, etc. It would also give him the control of the Mangla beadworks, thus placing the irrigation in Jhelum and other districts at their mercy." (Those headworks are situated inside the boundary of the Kashmir State but belong to Pakistan.)

 

(d") Occupation of Punch by the Indian Army is certain to have a most serious effect on the morale of the many Punches in the Pakistan Army, and this in turn will adversely affect the morale of other troops. Desertions will undoubtedly increase and discipline will receive a big setback

 

(e)"The loss of Muzaffarabad or Kohala will, broadly speaking, have the most far-reaching effect on the security of Pakistan. It would enable the Indian Army to secure the rear gateway to Pakistan through which it can march at any time it wishes to do so, without any major obstacle such as the River Jhelum to stand in its way. It will encourage subversive elements such as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his party, Ipi, and Afghanistan, and it will certainly cause extreme panic and alarm in some of the adjoining districts of the North West Frontier Province and Punjab resulting in the mass exodus of population which will create an insoluble refugee problem within Pakistan itself.

 

(f)" An easy victory of the Indian Army in any of the above-mentioned sectors, particularly in the Muzaffara bad area, is almost certain to arouse the anger of the tribesmen against Pakistan for its failure to render them more direct assistance, and might well cause them to turn against Pakistan."

 

That was the paragraph from which the representative of India quoted. This is the setting from which his quotation was taken. The appraisal continued:

 

"Recommendations. 7. If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Punch-Naushera" [464th meeting].

 

The situation was this. As I have said, in spite of the appeal of the Security Council conveyed to both sides in the resolution of 17 January, in spite of the continuing efforts of the Security Council to find the basis of a peaceful settlement and for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite, India persisted in its efforts to bring about a military solution, not only by occupation of the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but by the encirclement of Pakistan. In those circumstances, Pakistan decided to send its troops in to hold certain defensive lines, and more than that at no stage did those troops attempt. As I said on the last occasion when I had the honour to address the Security Council [464th meeting], anybody responsible for the security of Pakistan who did not do at least that should have been impeached and executed.

 

This is what India has throughout described as Pakistan's aggression. Another aspect of Pakistan's aggression to which attention is sometimes drawn is that the tribesmen succeeded in proceeding through Pakistan to Kashmir and took a hand in the struggle that was going on there. In that connexion I would beg permission again to quote from Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, and as I have said before, the significant thing is that Pandit Bazaz is a Hindu leader of Kashmir who has suffered for his political views and who is now speaking from India:

 

"When India complains that the tribesmen were aggressors, it is the proverbial kettle calling the pot black. To pronounce a judgment with regard to aggression, one must weigh everything in the balance. To Pandit Nehru and his supporters, aggression begins from the moment the tribesmen entered Kashmir; whatever happened before that was, according to them, affection and friendship for the State and its people. But if aggression means encroachment upon the rights of the people, it is evident that aggression began in Kashmir as early as the end of July, when the Congress leaders were successful in influencing the Maharaja to change his policy of neutrality in the matter of accession and adopt a course in total disregard of the clear will of the overwhelming majority of the State's population. After noting all these facts, an impartial judge cannot but ask what moral or legal right had the Congress leaders and Congress Government of India to interfere with the affairs of the Muslim majority State of Kashmir, after they had accepted the division of India on a religious basis. What right had the Maharaja to go against the manifest and declared will of the people of the State? And when the Maharaja was virtually deposed, not by the tribesmen but by his own subjects, what right had India to send its armies into the State to restore the Dogra rule and to foist an unwanted regime on the people?"

 

As a result of the resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726], the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan, appointed by the Security Council, went out to the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and afterwards was successful in having its two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 accepted by India and Pakistan and endorsed by the Security Council. The main provisions of those two resolutions, which by their acceptance by the parties and their approval by the Security Council became an international agreement, may be summarized as follows. Firstly, that there should be a cease-fire, and a cease- fire line should be demarcated. Secondly, that there should be a truce agreement providing for the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had gone to the State for the purpose of fighting, and for the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops and the bulk of the Indian troops from the State. Thirdly, that a plebiscite should be conducted under the supervision and control of a Plebiscite Administrator, who was empowered to determine the final disposal of the remaining forces in the State, and who was vested with all the powers he considered necessary to ensure the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.

 

Pausing here for a moment, it will be appreciated that the demilitarization of the State which has come to be the main crux of the whole matter and the principal obstacle in the way of progress being made towards the organizing and holding of the plebiscite, was, under the scheme of those two resolutions, to be carried out in two stages. After the cease-fire had been achieved and the cease-fire line had been demarcated, a truce agreement was to be entered into. The principal features of that truce agreement were to be, firstly, the withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had gone into the State for the purpose of fighting, and secondly, the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops, on the one side, and the bulk of the Indian troops, on the other side, from the State.

 

This was the measure of the degree of demilitarization to take place at the truce stage, but the rest was to be achieved during what is known as the plebiscite stage. In the plebiscite stage, the Plebiscite Administrator would have the power of the final disposal of the remaining forces of both sides, having due regard to the security of the State and the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite,

 

There has been a tendency on occasion to stress the fact that the only demilitarization visualized in those resolutions was the withdrawal of the Pakistan armed forces and the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian army. But that was to be during the truce stage; the rest was to be achieved during the plebiscite stage, I shall refer to that later. What would be left after the truce stage? On the Azad Kashmir side, the Azad Kashmir forces-the Pakistan forces would be withdrawn; in the Indian-occupied portion of Kashmir, the remnants of the Indian forces after the bulk had been withdrawn, the Kashmir State forces and the Kashmir State militia. Those three on the one side, and the Azad Kashmir forces on the other side, would be finally disposed of under the directions of the Plebiscite Administrator.

 

The representative of India has argued and has often implied that the disposal here mentioned in sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 is not a disposal but a Mere disposition. But that it was to be a disposal in the sense that the Plebiscite Administrator would have full authority to disband, disarm and also settle dispositions with regard to the remainder, is clear from India's own insistence that the bulk of the Azad Kashmir forces must be disarmed and disbanded in the truce stage.

 

Those were to remain intact during the truce stage. Their disposal, that is to say their disbandment and the disarming of the greater part of them, could only be achieved by the Plebiscite Administrator under this power. According to the Indian view, when disposal applies to the Azad Kashmir forces, it means disbanding and disarming at least of the greater part, but when it applies to the remnants of the Indian forces and to the State forces and the State militia, it is to mean merely disposition in barracks. That is obviously inequitable. No where was it contemplated that disposal would mean only disposition. The Plebiscite Administrator has full authority so to dispose, that is to say, disband or disarm, to station, to impose restrictions upon and to subject to discipline those forces of either side-the Azad Kashmir forces or the remaining Indian forces, State forces and State militia-as he considers necessary and desirable, having regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

 

This international agreement was designed to bring about one thing-a free and impartial plebiscite-so that the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan could be determined. All efforts that have been made since then by the Commission itself, by the Security Council or by other authorities at the request of the Security Council, have been directed towards achieving this end. Everybody has recognized that nobody could pretend that the poll could be free if any portion of the areas concerned were occupied by the military forces of either side. Such experience as exists of plebiscites having been taken under international joint supervision reinforces this natural consideration. India is the one sole exception in that it continues to contend that a plebiscite could be held which could be claimed to be free and impartial while its forces occupy portions of the State the most heavily populated portions of the State-and while those portions are being administered by a nominee of the Government of India who has repeatedly stated that he is completely wedded to bringing about accession of the State to India.

 

Two things are essential in order to secure freedom of the poll. One necessity is complete demilitarization of the State. The second is that the Administration must in some manner or other be completely neutralized so that, if it is left in power, it is left in no position to exercise any undue influence, to utter any threat, to persuade in any manner anybody to vote in favour of accession to India when they would wish to vote for Pakistan or to persuade them to vote for accession to Pakistan when they would wish to vote for accession to India. That was the agreement.

 

What has been the implementation? As I stated, the cease fire became effective 1 January 1949, and subsequently a cease fire line was demarcated in July 1949. The withdrawal of the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had gone into the State for the purpose of fighting was to be part of the truce stage. No truce agreement has yet been arrived at. Nevertheless, the tribesmen have been persuaded to withdraw and the Pakistan volunteers also have withdrawn from the Azad Kashmir areas; so that part of the second part of the resolution has already been carried into effect.

 

But a deadlock has ensued over the second part of the second provision, that is, the provision relating to the withdrawal of Pakistan troops and the bulk of Indian forces. It is this deadlock that has not allowed any progress to be made towards a peaceful settlement during the last two years. This deadlock is due to the repeated refusal of the Government of India to withdraw the bulk of its troops from Kashmir, as required by the resolution and the agreement.

 

It is true that repeatedly India goes on declaring its acceptance and affirmation of this obligation. But beyond that it will not go away. The latest affirmation was in the speech by the representative of India on 1 March before the Security Council. But India will take no steps towards fulfilling the obligation which it repeatedly affirms it accepts. All efforts to persuade the Government of India to carry out its obligations have proved futile.

 

This is the central problem which faces the Security Council. I would beg the indulgence of the Council to deal with it at some length. The Indian technique has been to go on affirming the acceptance of these obligations. Indeed, it can do little else. They are there in black and white, endorsed by the Security Council. India refuses to carry them out. It either insists on some new condition which does not apply and has not been accepted by the parties, raises irrelevant issues or impossible constructions upon which the language puts the agreement, and in one manner or another it continues to evade its obligations.

 

It would suffice to give one example of this technique in some detail. As I have already attempted to make clear, the disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces along with the State forces and the State militia is the responsibility of the Plebiscite Administrator to be carried into effect during the plebiscite stage. During the truce stage the Azad Kashmir forces were to be left intact. That is the agreement. This was fully known to the Government of India and, to start with, was fully accepted by it.

 

In the course of its discussions with the Government of India in August 1948, the Commission pointed out that, according to the provisions of the Commission's resolution which was not accepted until December-at that time it was only in the stage of clarification-"limited Government of India forces would remain and, on the other side, only the Azad people would remain in their present positions". I refer to the first interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, document S/1100, dated 22 November 1948, annex 12.

 

This was the discussion between the Prime Minister of India and his advisers and the members of the Commission in an attempt to get a clarification of the resolution of 13 August 1948. In answer to the apprehension expressed by the Prime Minister of India that Pakistan, being much nearer to the cease fire line once it was established, could commit aggression against Kashmir more easily than India could contravene the cease-fire, one of the members of the Commission representing Czechoslovakia "replied that the Commission had been quite aware of this danger, but it had tried to strike a military balance."

 

"The Commission felt that if the two governments could be brought together, this danger of a sudden incursion would be removed. Moreover, he pointed out that limited Government of India forces would remain and that, on the other side, only the Azad forces would remain in their present positions. Should the eventuality envisaged by the Prime Minister occur, the whole weight of the United Nations would be turned against Pakistan."

 

Here was a very clear understanding at the very outset that the Azad Kashmir forces would remain intact during the truce stage and that during that stage-or as a result of the truce agreement what would happen would be that a small portion of the Indian forces would remain on the Indian-occupied side plus, of course, the State forces and the State militia and, on the other side, there would be only the Azad forces.

 

In its discussions with the Pakistan Government also, the Commission took the same line, and in its letter of 19 September 1948 addressed to me as Foreign Minister of Pakistan, it stated the following, and I quote from paragraph 108 of the first interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [S/1100]:

 

"Moreover, the Commission agrees that it will be anxious to reduce the truce period to a minimum and that the resolution does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces."

 

At that time what subsequently became the resolution of 5 January 1949 had not yet been drafted. That is why this writer states that this resolution-that is to say, the resolution of 13 August 1948 which deals with the truce stage-"does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces".

 

In the discussions which the Prime Minister of India had with the Commission in December 1948, before accepting the January 1949 resolution he himself referred to the fact that the Azad Kashmir forces "ran into tens of thousands". I refer to the second interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, document S/1196, dated 10 January 1949, annex 4, aide-memoire 1:

 

"The Prime Minister"-that is to say, the Prime Minister of India "drew attention to the fact that the Azad Kashmir forces which had been armed and equipped by Pakistan and were under the operational command of Pakistan ran into tens of thousands."

 

Thus the Government of India was fully aware of the position regarding the Azad Kashmir forces before it accepted the international agreement, and the agreement itself is clear beyond any suspicion or doubt with regard to what was intended. This position was not only within the knowledge of India and accepted by it when it accepted the resolution, but its representatives themselves stated subsequently in explanation of the resolution that these forces were not to be disbanded during the truce period when the bulk of the Indian forces had to be withdrawn.

 

This was explicitly recognized by the Government of India in the letter of Sir Girja Shanker Bajpai, dated 18 February 1949 and addressed to the Commission. I refer to the third interim report of the Commission dated 9 December 1949, the text of which is contained in document S/1430, annex 7. Paragraph 3 of this letter states:

 

"The disarming of Azad forces is really a matter of chronology. First, there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce as envisaged in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of Azad Kashmir forces. So far as non-Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out."

 

India itself clearly accepted the position that it was after the truce stage that large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad forces was to take place. The position is again set out very clearly in a letter which the Commission wrote to the Government of India on 14 March 1949. I refer to the Commission's third interim report, annex 12. In paragraph 2 the Commission states:

 

"In the course of the conversations last August the Commission explained to the Government of Pakistan that in its view a 'military balance' would exist in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period in the sense and to the extent that the resolution of 13 August did not call for the disarming or disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces which the Commission understood to number approximately thirty five battalions."

 

Nothing could be clearer than that. Notwithstanding these clear and explicit understandings of the position and the acceptance of it, the Government of India went back on its pledged word, and in contravention of the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, made the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces conditional. It said that the withdrawal of its forces in the truce stage would depend upon the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces which was not to take place in the truce stage at all, but only in a subsequent plebiscite stage. The Commission, after repeated efforts, came to the conclusion, as set forth in paragraph 245 of its third interim report, that:

 

"...India is not prepared to withdraw such part of its forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as the 'bulk', whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces is reached." Here there was no question of interpretation. The wording of the resolution was perfectly clear. It had been clearly interpreted both to the Government of India and to the Government of Pakistan by the Commission itself. As the language was clear, no question of interpretation arose and the interpretation had been accepted by both parties. Yet, the disbanding and disarming of the bulk of the Azad Kashmir forces, which was not to take place until the plebiscite stage, was made by India a prior condition to carrying out its obligation in the truce stage and to entering into a truce agreement.

 

The Commission did not know how to resolve this difficulty. Its position eventually was that both sides had accepted the agreement, and that question had arisen as to its meaning. According to us, there certainly was no such question, but India said that there was. Therefore, the Commission said that a question had arisen with regard to the meaning of what the parties had agreed to do. The Commission's own interpretation. was clear, but India would not accept that. In this circumstance, the Commission said that the only way to resolve the difference. was to invite someone in whom the parties had confidence and who would be completely impartial, to arbitrate this point.

 

Inasmuch as the parties had already accepted Admiral Nimitz as the Plebiscite Administrator, and as he in any event had the power of the final disposal of the remaining forces on both sides, the Commission suggested that the parties should accept Admiral Nimitz to arbitrate on this difference which was blocking further progress in the settlement. This suggestion of the Commission was reinforced by earnest appeals by President Truman and Prime Minister Atlee. Pakistan accepted it, India rejected it. Its representatives said: "No, we will not go to arbitration." Here was an impasse. What would anyone suggest should happen in those circumstances? Two sides to a dispute enter into a solemn international agreement as to how the dispute is to be resolved. In the course of attempted progress toward the settlement of the dispute, a question arises, flimsy and unfounded according to us, but, nevertheless, let us say, according to India, a serious question of the interpretation of the document. The Commission, which was the author of the agreement and the body which persuaded the parties to accept the agreement, gave its interpretation. India would not accept it. The Commission then proposed asking an impartial and trustworthy person to resolve the difference. India said: "No, we shall not go to arbitration." What is the position? Pakistan must accept what India says the agreement means, although clearly the agreement does not mean that. That is the spirit in which India goes on claiming that it has never disclaimed its obligations, it is always ready, willing and eager to give the fullest effect to whatever it has agreed to. This device was simply to say: "We have not agreed to do this." The Commission says that it has agreed to do this; it says no. Pakistan says that it has agreed to do this; it says no. All right, let us ask a third person to consider everything and to say what India did agree to do. India answers: "No".

 

The Commission could do no more, and it reported the matter back to the Security Council. The Security Council requested its President, General McNaughton, to get in touch with the parties to try to resolve the deadlock that had arisen. General McNaughton, impressed with the fact that India's refusal to withdraw the bulk of its forces had been made in connexion with the Azad Kashmir forces, tried to meet the Indian objection by suggesting the withdrawal and disbandment of forces on both sides, including the Azad Kashmir forces and the State army and militia. That is to say, instead of the scheme in the resolutions that disarmament should take place in two stages, during the truce stage and then during the plebiscite stage, General McNaughton tried to erect a scheme under which the whole thing would take place as part of one operation, including the Pakistan Army and the Azad Kashmir forces on one side, and all of the Indian Army and the State forces and the State militia on the other. The Government of India flatly rejected General McNaughton's proposals mainly on the ground that he had suggested the disbandment of State armed forces. Pakistan accepted.

 

Now was this objection valid? The disbandment of the State armed forces was clearly again part of the resolution accepted by India and Pakistan. Sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 reads:

 

"After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions had been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

 

It was first argued that India could not accept any scheme of demilitarization which did not deal with the Azad Kashmir forces. Here is a scheme put forward which deals with everything. India then says it will not accept that scheme mainly on the ground that it deals with everything.

 

Another favourite device to which the Government of India often has recourse is to accuse Pakistan of aggression. I have to a large extent already dealt with this contention. The Pakistan Army moved in defence of Pakistan's own vital interest to hold certain defensive positions, this movement having taken place in May 1948. As a matter of fact, my learned and distinguished friend even supplied the date in his speech: 8 May 1948. This was known to the Government of India. I shall not again revert to the question of whether or not it constituted aggression. It was the plain duty of the Government of Pakistan. It was more: It was carrying out the object of the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 [S/651). But apart from that, this was known to the Government of India, it had been argued before the Security Council and the United Nations Commission, and this fact had been taken into account in formulating the two resolutions of 13 August and 5 January. Whatever had happened, whether it was aggression or not, was clearly within the knowledge of both sides. It was within the knowledge of the Security Council before the resolutions were accepted, and it was within the knowledge of the Commission. In the situation as it was then that is to say in December 1948, India accepted the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, A slight confusion might arise from the fact that it is said the resolution of 5 January 1949 was accepted in December 1948. The actual formulation of the proposals by the Commission and its acceptance by the two governments was in December. The date of the incorporation of these proposals in a formal resolution is 5 January 1949. No new fact had entered into the situation. It was with full knowledge of the situation that the Government of India accepted the international agreement. Nevertheless, the Government of India has continually put this forward as an excuse for not fulfilling its obligations under the agreement. India says that the tribal incursions took place in October 1947 and continued for some weeks. India says that the Pakistan movement of forces into the Azad Kashmir area took place on 8 May 1948. India says that it will not carry out its obligations under the resolution of 5 January 1949, which it accepted in December 1948, because an aggression had been committed in May 1948. India accepted all these obligations after what it chose to call aggression had taken place. Can that be made an excuse today for not carrying out its obligations?

 

After India refused to accept General McNaughton's proposals [S/1453], the Security Council appointed Sir Owen Dixon as United Nations representative [471st meeting] to try to bring about an agreement with regard to demilitarization on the basis of General McNaughton's proposals. Sir Owen Dixon arranged a meeting of the two Prime Ministers with himself in Delhi in July 1950. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting, again advanced the contention that Pakistan was an aggressor and should be declared as such. Finding that no progress was possible unless he could do something to put this red herring out of the way, Sir Owen Dixon made certain observations, as will presently be seen from the language applied by him, as it were, for argument's sake. I shall draw the attention of the Security Council to the statement of Sir Owen Dixon in this connexion, as it continues to be contended throughout that he branded Pakistan an aggressor in this controversy. In paragraphs 21-23 of his report, Sir Owen Dixon said:

 

"Upon a number of occasions in the course of the period beginning with the reference on 1 January 1948 of the Kashmir dispute to the Security Council, India had advanced not only the contention to which I have already referred that Pakistan was an aggressor, but the further contention that this should be declared. The Prime Minister of India, at an early stage of the meeting made the same contention and he referred to it repeatedly during the conference. I took up the positions, first, that the Security Council had not made such a declaration; secondly, that I had neither been commissioned to make nor had I made any judicial investigation of the issue; but, thirdly, that without going into the causes or reasons why it happened, which presumably formed part of the history of the sub continent, I was prepared to adopt the view that when the frontier of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was crossed on, I believe 20 October 1947, by hostile elements, it was contrary to international law, and that when, in May 1948, as I believe, units of the regular Pakistan forces moved into the territory of the State, that too was inconsistent with international law.

 

"I therefore proposed that the first step in demilitarization should consist in the withdrawal of the Pakistan regular forces commencing on a named day. After a significant number of days from the named day, then other operations on each side of the cease-fire line should take place and as far as practicable, concurrently. What number of days should be fixed as significant was a matter of detail for them. to settle.

 

"The Prime Minister of Pakistan expressed strongly his dissent from the third of the three positions I took up, that is to say, the third of the positions stated above. But he expressed his readiness to accept, in compliance with my request, the proposition that as a first step in demilitarization the withdrawal of the regular forces of the Pakistan Army should begin on a specified day and that a significant number of days should elapse before the commencement of

any operation involving forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line."

 

The whole matter is perfectly clear. Sir Owen Dixon found that this matter of aggression was being brought up time and again before the Security Council and before other authorities, and was now being insisted upon being raised before him. He said that the Council had not decided on this. Obviously he meant that he had no authority to decide here either. He said: "I have not been commissioned to carry out a judicial investigation of this matter." In fact he said: "I have not carried out any such investigation, but for purposes of getting on to demilitarization, I am prepared to make this assumption, and on the basis of that assumption I proposed that Pakistan. Army should start moving first, and that after a significant number of days had passed after the first movement had started, then later on the demilitarization should be synchronized." There is no finding of aggression here. It was a position which Sir Owen Dixon was prepared to adopt in order to proceed with demilitarization.

 

The Prime Minister of Pakistan took serious objection to this third position that he should make any such assumption, but he said: "For the purpose of facilitating the demilitarization, we are prepared to accept what you propose."

 

I have quoted this extract to show the Security Council how unfounded the deduction which my learned and distinguished friend has tried to draw from these observations of Sir Owen. Dixon. Still another excuse which India constantly put forward for its failure to carry out its obligations, is its professed fear for the security of the State. Its apprehensions are alleged to arise from fear of an attack by Pakistan or by tribesmen. Pakistan has repeatedly given assurance It has expressed its readiness I believe at least before General McNaughton-to give a guarantee that Pakistan would be prepared to take necessary and adequate action, even military action, if needed, to stop any incursion of tribesmen into the State. But India says: "What about an attack by Pakistan forces?"

 

In the first place, a guarantee and an assurance of that kind to the United Nations should be enough. But in the second place, look at the problem. Pakistan is eager to obtain a settlement of this question through a fair and impartial plebiscite. Would it be the first to destroy every chance of that settlement being arrived at by mounting an invasion of the State after the cease-fire had taken place and the truce had been settled? Would it not completely put itself out of consideration forever in this dispute if it took action of that kind? Would any reasonable government lend itself to an action or a policy of that kind? Nevertheless, India continues to express apprehensions on that score,

 

But apart from disregarding the assurances of the Pakistan Government, and apart from disregarding what is perfectly patent in the situation itself, India forgets that the matter of the security of the State has been dealt with in the resolution itself.

 

Even in his speech of 1 March, my learned friend stated that what has been described or continuously described by other people as India's intransigence is "no more than an insistence on pledges already given to India, particularly on questions relating to the security of Kashmir".

 

He went on to argue later that it was not necessary to go. into the conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite since the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan took care of that. But he conveniently overlooked the fact that the security of the State is also taken care of by those very resolutions I have read out, and sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 invests the Plebiscite Administrator with power to carry out the final disposal of all the forces remaining in the State, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite. But the difference is this. India insists that it alone is the judge of what is needed for the security of the State. However, it has already agreed, in the resolutions which it has accepted and which have become an international agreement, that that matter is to be kept in mind by the Plebiscite Administrator when he carries out the final disposal of the military forces on both sides. Responsibility rests on him and not on India.

 

When the Commonwealth Ministers met in London in January of this year-and they also discussed the Kashmir question-the Prime Minister of India again put forward the security of the State as his excuse for its refusal to withdraw Indian forces from the State. Since the Commonwealth Prime Ministers recognized that no free plebiscite could be held in the presence of Indian troops, they tried to meet the Indian Prime Minister's apprehensions, however groundless they themselves thought them to be, by offering, at their own expense, Commonwealth forces for purposes of the plebiscite.

 

This generous offer was again accepted by Pakistan, but was rejected by India. Again, they made an alternative proposal. They said: "All right, let the small force needed be provided jointly by India and Pakistan." Pakistan accepted it and India accepted it. rejected it. They then made a third proposal. They said: "Let the Plebiscite Administrator raise a local force from all elements of the population of Kashmir for that purpose." Pakistan accepted; India rejected.

 

Everybody who has tried to deal with this situation comes. up against that difficulty, India goes on raising excuse after excuse for not doing what is set forth perfectly clearly in its language and in its implications, and what was clearly accepted by India as binding, and which we continue to affirm is binding upon it.

 

This is the manner in which Sir Owen Dixon sums up the situation [S/1791, para. 52]:

 

"In the end I became convinced that India's agreement would never be obtained to demilitarization in any such form, or to provisions governing the period of the plebiscite of any such character, as would in my opinion permit the plebiscite being conducted in conditions sufficiently guarding against intimidation and other forms of influence and abuse by which the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite might be imperilled."

 

Why does India go on insisting on these things which make demilitarization and, therefore, the holding of the plebiscite impossible? For the obvious reason that India's hold over Kashmir is only through its military forces, India does not want to let go and India knows that if a fair and impartial plebiscite were held, the plebiscite would go heavily against India. Therefore, it is determined to keep its forces in the State and to prevent a free vote. That is the situation. It has been repeatedly tried. People started with the hope that India's apprehensions with regard to various matters may have been genuine. They thought they were flimsy, but that, supposing they were genuine so far as the Indians are concerned, they should be met. Every possible effort has been made to meet those apprehensions, but India would have none of it. Why? Because India does not desire to go through with the plebiscite.

 

My learned and distinguished friend has painted an idyllic picture of conditions in India, of India's secularism, its regard for minorities, and the manner in which administration in Kashmir is carried on by a Cabinet of seven in which five are Muslims. But these are wholly irrelevant considerations to the question the Security Council has under consideration, namely, the holding of a free plebiscite. If we assume that all this is true and that conditions in India are ideal, then what follows? Either Kashmir must accede to India-and is that the conclusion to be drawn?-or if a plebiscite is to be held, it must be held while the greater part of Kashmir or the most densely populated portions of Kashmir are held by the Indian military. forces and the administration it carried on by a nomince and creature of India. Does that follow from these conditions in India, even if such conditions exist? And does my learned friend, by implication, mean that they do not exist in Pakistan? Are we now to embark on an investigation of these factors in order to determine whether or not the plebiscite is to be held or, if it is to be held, under what conditions it is to be held? These are wholly irrelevant considerations. I will not therefore refer to the numerous disabilities, political, economic, cultural and social, from which Muslims in India continue to suffer. Nor need I deal with the wholly unfounded insinuations about conditions in Pakistan, which the representative of India has sought to make through the mouth of the Kashmir National Conference. I will also not dwell on the abject misery and terror in which the people in Indian-occupied Kashmir are living, except perhaps again to quote an eminent Hindu Kashmiri, Prem Nath Bazaz. He said:

 

"Pandit Nehru said the present government in Kashmir stands because of its own strength. What are the signs of their strength? All papers and periodicals which do not agree with Sheikh Abdulla, particularly in the matter of accession, and are critical of the views and doings of the Nationalists, have been suppressed. All parties other than the National Conference, be they communal or non-communal, which oppose the present regime even peacefully and constitutionally, are not allowed to hold meetings.

 

"There is no free platform-in fact, no institution to vindicate the people's rights or ventilate the public's grievances.

 

"Never before, even in the reign of the hated Dogras, were Kashmiris victimized and ruled so despotically as is done now under Sheikh Abdulla as the Chief Minister of the Maharaja. All vestiges of freedom gained by manifold sacrifices during the last hundred years have disappeared. Nationalist rule stands on the strength of Indian bayonets, and not on its own strength or efficiency. That is the naked truth and the tragic story of Kashmir."

 

In fact, the truth is that every State that imposes its rule by force upon another is able to find some Quislings and parade it's support by these Quislings as proof that it rules by popular consent.

 

Sir Benegal Rau has invited the testimony of tourists to conditions in the beautiful Kashmir Valley. I might perhaps be permitted to quote the opinion of one who went to the Valley of Kashmir not as a tourist but as a United Nations representative. I quote from Sir Owen Dixon's report [S/1791, para. 88]:

 

"I had formed the opinion that it was not easy to exclude the danger that the inhabitants of the Valley of Kashmir would vote under fear or apprehension of consequences and other improper influences. They are not high-spirited people of an independent or resolute temper. For the most part they are illiterate. There were large numbers of regular soldiers of the Indian Army as well as of the State Militia and police, and more often than not they were under arms. The State Government was exercising wide powers of arbitrary arrest. These are not matters that the Kashmiris inhabiting the Valley could be expected to disregard in choosing between voting as the Government of Kashmir asked them and voting for accession to Pakistan."

 

Lest there be any misunderstanding with regard to the character and qualities of the people inhabiting the different. parts of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, I might explain that this refers to the Valley, as Sir Owen Dixon has made clear, and not to Punch, where the liberation movement started and the greater part of which is under the administration of the Azad Kashmir Government.

 

The Kashmir Democratic Union, which is presided over by Pandit Prem Nath Bazaz, to whom I have already referred several times, stressed the fact, in its resolution adopted on 26 February of this year, that the people of Jammu and Kashmir had during three and a half years suffered incredible hardships in every sphere of life under the "authoritarian, unrepresentative and unwanted Abdulla Government," and urged the Security Council to ensure the speedy holding of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices.

 

Another topic which has lately become a favourite with the Government of India and its representatives is that the Kashmir question should not be represented as a Hindu-Muslim question; and it challenges the argument that, since Kashmir is predominantly Muslim, it should rightfully acceed to Pakistan.

 

I think that first I might clear the ground. It is well known that, although every factor on the basis of which the question of accession should be determined-population, cultural and religious bonds, the flow of trade, the economic situation, communications, the geographical position, strategic considerations -points insistently in the direction of the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, nevertheless we have not asked for the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan on those grounds. We have agreed, and we have been insistent, that the question should be settled through the freely expressed wishes of the people of the State. But that these matters do come into the picture is admitted by everybody who is concerned with the conditions. It was the basic fact underlying the partition of India itself, and, whenever a question has arisen with regard to the accession of a State with a majority of non-Muslim population, India itself has always stressed that fact. India takes objection to it and demurs against it only when the same principle is sought to be applied to Kashmir.

 

As the Security Council is well aware, there were two States, Junagadh and Hyderabad, which had a majority of non Muslim people and a Mulism Ruler. Junagadh acceded to Pakistan. Hyderabad-a country with 17 million people, vast territories, flourishing economic conditions-desired to remain independent. We shall see what happened with regard to each of these States.

 

When the Government of India came to know that the Ruler of Junagadh contemplated accession to Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, dated 12 September 1947, in the course of which he said, in paragraph 4:

 

"The population of Junagadh, according to the 1941 census, is 671,000, of which no less than 543,000, or 80 per cent, are Hindus. This large majority of the population of the State has made it clear to the Ruler of Junagadh in no uncertain terms that they are opposed to Junagadh acceding to the Dominion of Pakistan and that they wish that the State should accede to the Dominion of India."

 

He went on, in paragraph 5, as follows:

 

"The Dominion of India would be prepared to accept any democratic test in respect of the accession of the Junagadh State to either of the two Dominions. It would accordingly be willing to abide by a verdict of its people in this matter, ascertained under joint supervision"-and this is important -"of the Dominion of India and Junagadh."

 

The telegram continued:

 

"If, however, the Ruler of Junagadh is not prepared to submit this issue to a referendum, and if the Dominion of Pakistan, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people and the principles governing the matter, enters into an arrangement by which Junagadh is to become a part of the Federation of Pakistan, the Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce in such an arrangement."

 

This was followed, on 22 September, by a telegram from the Governor-General of India to the Governor-General of Pakistan, which stated:

 

"The Pakistan Government has unilaterally proceeded to an action in which, it was made plain, the Government of India could never and does not acquiesce. Acceptance of accession to Pakistan cannot but be regarded by the Government of India as an encroachment of Indian sovereignty and inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between. the two Dominions."

 

That is worthy of note. This was long before the events in Kashmir, which took place in October, more than a month after the date of the second telegram and nearly six weeks after the date of the first telegram. And here is the principle: that the acceptance of accession, by a Dominion, of a State the majority of whose people are opposed to that accession is "an encroachment on the sovereignty and territory" of the other Dominion and is "inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions". Substitute Kashmir for Junagadh and read mutatis mutandis, the principle which the Government of India itself is urging should be accepted.

 

The telegram goes on:

 

"This action of Pakistan is considered by the Government of India to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of the principles on which partition was agreed upon and effected."

 

What were those principles? The partition of India was agreed upon and effected on the principle that contiguous majority Muslim areas would constitute Pakistan, and conti guous majority non-Muslim areas would constitute India. That was the principle. And that is what the Governor-General of India was stressing: "You have accepted the accession of Junagadh, the majority of whose population is non-Muslim. This is contrary to the principle upon which the partition of India took place. Therefore, your action is in utter violation of the principles of the partition and is a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India."

 

Why does not India's action in respect of Kashmir amount to a disruption of the integrity of Pakistan? Why is it not in utter violation of the principles upon which the partition was accepted? The Indian army marched into Junagadh and occupied it with its military forces. That occupation still continues; that aggression is in operation. In fact, the matter is before the Security Council, and that problem also has to be resolved by the Council. India also marched into Kashmir, occupying the greater part of populated Kashmir-and it does not suit India to apply to Kashmir those principles which it insisted should be applied to Junagadh.

 

It has been said, on one occasion: "But, you see, in the case of Junagadh, the Diwan''-the Prime Minister-"invited the Government of India to take over the administration." Under what circumstances did the Diwan extend that invitation, if any such invitation was extended? The Government of India set up within its own boundaries, or at least permitted to be set up, with its connivance, the Government of Junagadh. That Government of Junagadh, at the very least with the connivance of the Government of India, from outside Junagadh, that is to say, from Indian territory, continued to create disorder and disruption inside Junagadh, until it brought about a state of complete chaos within Junagadh. The Indian Army then marched in-as the Government of India says, on the invitation of the Prime Minister-to maintain law and order. It is a point worthy of note that in Kashmir the Maharaja had a standstill agreement with Pakistan.

 

He had no standstill agreement with India, India had no business with Kashmir, and no kind of invitation could have been extended to India. In the circumstances that I have related, an offer by the Maharaja to accede to India was, in terms used by India itself, an attempt to disrupt the integrity of Pakistan by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of India in utter violation of the principles upon which partition. was agreed upon in the first place.

 

The telegram goes on to say:

 

"In the circumstances I hope it will be possible to prevail. upon the Government of Pakistan to reconsider its position, otherwise the responsibility and the consequences must, I am compelled to inform you, rest squarely on the shoulders of the Pakistan Government."

 

Then this curious offer is again repeated:

 

"The Government of India is, however, prepared to accept the verdict of the people of Junagadh in the matter of accession, the plebiscite being carried out under the joint supervision of the Indian and Junagadh Governments."

 

When it is a question of the accession of a State with a majority of Hindus in its population, a plebiscite must be carried out under the joint auspices of the Government of that. State and the Government of India. That is the principle, so that the people may be in a position freely to express their wishes. When the majority of the population is Muslim and a plebiscite is to be organized and held to ascertain their wishes, that plebiscite should be carried out under Indian military occupation and under the administration in the State by government nominated by India. That is what the Security Council is. asked to accept. What happened in Hyderabad? Hyderabad wanted to remain independent; it was prepared to do anything by treaty that India wanted it to do by accession. Eventually, it was even prepared to hold a plebiscite in order to determine whether the people of Hyderabad wanted to accede to India or remain in treaty relations with it. India refused to accept any of the offers, marched its troops in and occupied the State-it is still in occupation of the State-and that problem is also before the Security Council.

 

Junagadh's accession to Pakistan is challenged by India. The Hyderabad Ruler is denied the right to remain independent, but the Maharaja of Kashmir, in circumstances when under his rule. had been repudiated in the rarest possible manner by the majority of his subjects and when he had, by his own ruthless persecution of his own people, forfeited the right to continue to rule, signed an instrument of accession in a conspiracy which, as I have already briefly indicated, is regarded by India as completing the legal requirements and converting Kashmir into a unit of the Indian Federation. It is this wholly invalid transaction which is used as the cloak for Indian aggression in Kashmir.

 

There are other areas also in which Indian aggression has been at work, but I do not refer to them here. The stark truth of the situation, in brief, is that in South Asia today Indian. aggression is on the march. It has used various devices to camouflage itself. Sometimes, as in Junagadh, it operates in the name of Indian integrity. It was hard to find any excuse for what is called "police action" in Hyderabad, when in truth as everyone knows it was nothing less than military. Invasion on a large scale. In Kashmir it takes on the labour of a spurious legality, and in other areas it has been used and continues to use the sacred name of democracy.

 

The elephant is an animal which is very useful and which. is also revered in India. As a matter of fact the forward half is even regarded in Indian mythology as a god, but there is a very significant proverb with regard to the elephant which completely illustrates the position that India continues to adopt with regard to the obligation to carry out what it undertook to do. The proverb says: "The elephant has one set of teeth for show and another set for eating." The resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 of the Commission are ivory tusks for show. India has accepted those resolutions. The real business of masticating and digesting Kashmir is being carried on in another manner. For what purpose the Government of India has another device which it is carrying out step by step. The device was first put forward by the Indian representative to the President of the Security Council in January 1948, more than three years ago, when the Security Council to bring the case for the first time, asked its then President, Mr. van Langenhove) [229th meeting], to hold discussions with the two parties. The Indian representative, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, proposed that the Maharaja's interim government in Kashmir, as soon as the restoration of normal conditions had been completed, should take steps to convoke a national assembly. A national government based upon the national assembly was to have a plebiscite taken on the question of accession. The national assembly was also to frame a new constitution. Since all of those steps were to be taken in the presence of Indian troops and by the Indian-controlled interim government, the result was a foregone conclusion. The President of the Security Council was not prepared to look upon the scheme as providing a fair means for ascertaining the wishes of the people of the State. That, however, did not deter the Government of India from putting the scheme into effect. It will not carry into effect its obligations under the international agreement; it is going forward with its own scheme step by step.

 

In presenting the scheme to Mr. van Langenhove, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar maintained the elaborate pretence that the decision whether or not to give effect to it rested with the autonomous Maharaja's Government, and that the Government of India could not impose any decision on that government. The manner in which the Government of India during the last three years has liquidated those autonomous princely states is by now well-known to the world.

 

The representative of India, in repeating his predecessor's observations about the autonomy of the Maharaja's Government in Kashmir and the limitations of the Government of India in dealing with it, is presuming a little too much upon the credulity of the world.

 

In pursuance of the scheme, the Government of India has included the State of Jammu and Kashmir in part B of the first schedule of the Constitution of India as one of the units of the Indian Union, and has provided in article 370 of the Constitution for a constituent assembly to be elected in Kashmir. The constituent assembly which is now being elected in Kashmir is thus the result of a long thought out scheme, and is a clear indication that the Government of India had never any intention of proceeding with a free plebiscite under United Nations auspices, for if such a plebiscite is to be held at an early date to decide whether Kashmir should accede to India or to Pakistan, there should be no necessity for holding elections to a constituent assembly to determine Kashmir's constitution, there should be no necessity even to determine Kashmir's constitution.

 

The real intention of the Government of India in these matters has already been given out by the Prime Minister of India as reported in The Statesman of 30 October 1950. The representative of India assured the Security Council the other day that it was not intended that the constituent assembly should deter mine the question of the accession of the State and that in any case it would not stand in the way of the Security Council. Let us see what the illustrious Prime Minister of India has said on that point, as recently as the end of October last. I am quoting from The Statesman of 30 October, when Prime Minister Nehru is quoted as having spoken in Shimla on 28 October, and these are the extracts to which I desire to draw attention:

 

"Addressing the National Conference workers here today, Pandit Nehru reaffirmed India's policy on Kashmir and said ultimately it was the people of Kashmir who had to decide their future. Pandit Nehru thought, however, that if Kashmir went to Pakistan, it would be completely ruined.

 

'I want Kashmir to be part of India. I wish Kashmir and India to have cordial relations. I do not want Kashmir to be ruined'."

 

I have no doubt the people of Kashmir are duly grateful to him for those sentiments. The report went on:

 

"He expressed amazement at the United Nations delay in coming to a decision regarding Kashmir."

 

This is a sentiment of which I have no doubt the Security Council will take due note:

 

"Referring to the resolution passed yesterday by the All Jammu-Kashmir National Conference proposing the setting up of a constituent assembly based on adult franchise for determining the future shape and evolution of the State, Pandit Nehru welcomed the proposal and said it would further strengthen the National Conference in the elections and would also enable it to know the people's wishes. It was possible, he said, that some countries might object to the holding of elections on the plea that the Kashmir question was before the United Nations and still remained undecided, but that would be a wrong approach, as the people in Kashmir could not stop all their activity and just adopt an unhelpful attitude of wait and see."

 

That makes it quite clear what the object of the assembly is. It is that the assembly should be able to determine the future shape and evolution of the State. But the matter is not left. there; later on the Prime Minister is reported as having said:

 

"India never accepted the two-nation theory even when the country was partitioned. Today I will never agree to it. Moreover, India and Kashmir have developed closer ties. Kashmir is part of our heart. Naturally these sentiments will affect the attitude of the people of Kashmir towards India, although ultimately the people of Kashmir, through an elected constituent assembly, will ratify the formal accession of the State to India."

 

It will be for the Security Council to determine on which statement to place reliance, that of the Prime Minister who says that is the object of the assembly, or that of the representative of India, who says that is not the object of the assembly.

 

Replying to a question in the Indian Parliament, whether it would be competent for the constituent assembly in Kashmir to decide whether to accede or not, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar said:

 

"There is nothing which can prevent the constituent assembly from pronouncing its opinion on that question."

 

This is what Sheikh Abdulla says, and I am quoting from the New York Times of 25 February 1951:

 

"Sheikh Abdulla announced today his Kashmir National Conference party would go ahead with plans for electing a constituent assembly in September. This body will then decide whether Kashmir will accede to India or Pakistan on the basis that the assembly consists of elected representatives of a majority of the people. In the view of Sheikh Abdulla's firm control-which Sir Owen Dixon, former United Nations mediator, in his report likened to that of a police State-there is little doubt of the outcome."

 

Nevertheless, the representative of India stated to the Security Council that, "so far as the Government of India is concerned, the constituent assembly is not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in its way". I have no doubt, after what I have quoted from the speeches of the Prime Minister of India and from the Prime Minister of the State of Kashmir appointed by the Government of India though nominally by the Maharaja-some clarification of the position becomes necessary as to what the basis is on which one is to deal with this question. It is obvious, however, that those on the spot know best what they intend to do because they are doing it. Both of them, Sheikh Abdulla and the Prime Minister of India, declared that the constituent assembly will determine the question of accession of the State to India or to Pakistan.