08031950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 469 held on 8 March 1950

08031950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 469 held on 8 March 1950

 

While the Security Council has before it the text of the draft resolution, as explained both in the speeches which were made at previous meetings and in the clarifications which have been offered today on behalf of the sponsors, one is left in considerable doubt, and also in some puzzlement, with regard to the attitude of the Government of India on the specific proposals contained in the draft resolution.

 

I have noted, and I value, the expression of opinion which the representative of India has just given, and of course I am not at all inclined to think that he was under any obligation to do more if he did not find it convenient to do so, or if he was not ready to do so today. All that I desire to point out is that, on this score, one is left in a state of considerable uncertainty. So far Pakistan is concerned, it would perhaps be useful to draw the attention of the Security Council to some of the clarifications that have been offered this afternoon before seeking to appraise, if I might be permitted to use that expression, the draft resolution as a whole.

 

There is a good deal in this statement of clarification which we note with satisfaction. It meets some of the points that we had ourselves raised in discussions with the sponsors of the draft resolution. One notes, for instance, the belief of the sponsors that the draft resolution provides a practical procedure for moving forward towards the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute by building on the essentials of agreement. already reached between India and Pakistan. The outstanding agreement between India and Pakistan with regard to the settlement of this dispute, reached at a very early stage and to which both Governments have throughout adhered without casting any doubt upon the validity of that agreement, is that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or India will be settled through the ascertainment of the freely expressed wishes of the people of Kashmir. As soon as the matter was brought before the Security Council early in January 1948, that agreement was noted with great satisfaction by the Security Council itself. All that has been attempted since is to bring about agreement between the parties as to the conditions which would ensure the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite,

 

Doubt has never been cast on the main agreement from either side. As a matter of fact, in the letter that Lord Mountbatten, who was the Governor-General of India, wrote to the Maharaja on 27 October 1947 [227th meeting], he clearly told the Maharaja that the question of accession would be decided by the clearly expressed will of the people of Kashmir itself. Every resolution, whether merely drafted and discussed or whether adopted, and every suggestion since made by the Security Council, has been based upon that agreement. The resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 75] and of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15], repeat this agreement and proceed to build upon it. As I have said, doubt has never been cast upon it, and one notes with satisfaction that the draft resolution now under consideration by the Security Council proceeds upon the same basis.

 

The whole effort has been, and is today, that the actual settlement to be built up between the parties should be such as to ensure that objective: the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. I venture to submit that any proposal, whether advanced on behalf of either of the parties or suggested by the Security Council or by any other organ of the United Nations, must be subjected to that acid test. We have been willing throughout, and we are quite willing today, to have anything that has ever been suggested on behalf of Pakistan submitted to that test. If any suggestion put forward by us, any proposal made by us, any condition upon which we may insist, has had, in the opinion of the Security Council, or should have, in the opinion of the United Nations representative to appointed under the draft resolution, or in the opinion of the Plebiscite Administrator, the character of forcing or coercing or putting pressure upon a single voter in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to vote on this question contrary to his free inclination, or of putting him in fear that, if he votes according to his free inclination, some undesirable consequences may follow as far as he is concerned, then that suggestion, that proposal, that condition may either be rejected altogether or modified as may be desired. We wish that the same test should be applied throughout.

 

During the debates in the Security Council, both in 1942 and now, following the remission of the matter to the Council by the Commission, an attempt has been made to import into the discussion of that aspect of the problem considerations of a kind which have no relation to the establishment of conditions which would ensure a free expression of opinion on this question of accession to Pakistan or to India. One has perforce been compelled, when those considerations have been put forward, to make a reply with regard to them, lest it should be assumed that they had some force or that there was no adequate reply. But one recognizes the justice of the comments made by the representative of Norway on 24 February 1950 [467th meeting] to the effect that those matters are really irrelevant to the main problem before the Security Council. For instance, if an argument for the extension of the military control of India to certain areas in the State of Jammu and Kashmir now under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government is based on legalistic conceptions of sovereignty, then, apart from the inherent weakness of the argument itself in view of what has taken place, the test is: Would such an extension help the people of Kashmir to record their views on this question freely, or would it retard such a development or make it more difficult?

 

This is the aspect of the problem that requires the real attention of the Security Council, and again, we note with satisfaction that the main features of the draft resolution before the Security Council are directed toward that aspect. We have already submitted to the Council that, at various

 

stages in the consideration of this problem, the sum and substance of these safeguards that would ensure the free expression of the will of the people of Kashmir has been steadily whittled down. The Security Council started by placing on record its view that the main considerations were to exclude all outside military forces and to bring about the setting up of a neutral and impartial administration in the State of Kashmir, and that these two factors alone could ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. In the course of negotiations and the efforts of the United Nations Commission to bring about agreement between the two sides as to the conditions of a free and impartial plebiscite, this second main safeguard has had, to a large degree, to be abandoned, as agreement could not be brought about between the parties with regard to it. It is true that there are safeguards embodied in the resolution of the Commission itself which are calculated to improve the situation in that respect, but nobody will pretend that they amount in effect to the same thing as a neutral and impartial administration. The other main safeguard is the demilitarization of the State, and that is where the main trouble arose between the parties after the acceptance of the resolutions of the Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

 

Those are the aspects that ended in a deadlock: certain contentions advanced on behalf of India and contested on behalf of Pakistan on which agreement could not be reached. Nor could an agreement be reached with regard to the method of procedure for resolving those differences. The Council itself had to take cognizance of the matter again, and while noting the main features of the resolution, one does want to stress this factor: that this resolution should go out from the Security Council to the parties in a form and with a commendation which would make quite clear what was the line that the United Nations representative was to take with regard to the matters in dispute. The Security Council might not consider it desirable to pronounce upon every aspect of these disputed matters, but it should at least make the main things clear. Then there should be some person, the representative of the United Nations or some authority, with the power to resolve the remaining portion of the dispute if it should be agitated again. Otherwise the whole thing will become a series of references back to the Security Council and of attempts by the Security Council again to have the parties resolve these difficulties between themselves.

 

It is from that point of view that I desire to comment on the following paragraph of the statement read out a short time ago by Sir Terence Shone:

 

"It has been asked whether the provision in sub-paragraph 2(a) of the joint draft resolution that the United Nations representative should interpret demilitarization agreements, is intended to refer only to future agreements. We confirm that this is the intention."

 

Of course, we obviously note that this is the intention of the sponsors, but if that is so, a lacuna still remains. What do the sponsors and the Council as a whole visualize would happen, or should happen, in the event that the dispute with regard to the agreements already reached should be again revived and presented, almost as a preliminary matter, to the United Nations representative as soon as he took over the discharge of his duties under this draft resolution? To the extent to which the Security Council would have expressed its views in the draft resolution, he would have guidance. But would not or could not this paragraph be taken advantage of in support of the attempt to press upon the United Nations representative that he still has to resolve the disputes which necessitated the reference back to the Security Council? Some clarification at a later stage with regard to this would be very welcome.

 

With regard to the main demilitarization problem, we note particularly the contents of two paragraphs of the statement that has been read out today. While we have no comments on the contents of the first of these paragraphs, we are somewhat perturbed by the conclusion reached at the end of the second, which begins by saying: "As to the question of the temporary administration of the northern area, the co-sponsors believe it to be a corollary of the maintenance of the cease-fire line that the military and civilian authorities on their respective sides of the cease-fire line must be able to cooperate with each other". As this sentence reads it appears to us to mean that there is no intention that the cease-fire line should, with regard to the military arrangements, be disturbed in any respect at all, that is to say, that the armed forces on either side must confine themselves to their side of the cease-fire line. That being so, it is a corollary of the maintenance of the cease-fire line that the military and civilian authorities --the military authorities being what they are today in the northern area-on their respective. sides of the cease-fire line must be able to co-operate and that, therefore, no disturbance of the civilian administration should take place.

 

If that had been all we should have no comment nor cavil against it. But the paragraph goes on to say: "The sponsors have therefore assumed, as General McNaughton appeared to assume in paragraph 2 of his proposals, that there could be no question of making any change in the civil administration in the northern area". I do not know exactly what the ultimate effect of this assumption is. Although it is put in the form of an assumption, it does say that there could be no question of making any change in the civil administration in the northern area, which, again, is completely satisfactory to us.

 

I may point out in passing, however, that General McNaughton does not appear merely to assume. General McNaughton's proposal in sub-paragraph 2 (b) is: "The 'northern area' should also be included in the above programme of demilitarization, and its administration should, subject to United Nations supervision, be continued by the existing local authorities". There is neither any assumption here nor merely an appearance. There is as clear-cut a statement as could possibly be made by anybody on this matter. That is in passing.

 

The sponsors go on to say that they "are fortified in this view"-that is, their substantive view that there should be no inference with the civil administration-and that they have an additional reason or an additional cause for satisfaction in taking this view in the "apparent belief of the Commission that any such change would involve the risk of an extension of military activity". Now comes the sentence which is the cause of our perturbation: "If the United Nations representative should find the assumption I have mentioned unwarranted"-I should like to know exactly what is meant by "should find the assumption I have mentioned unwarranted" "this draft resolution would not preclude him from suggesting other appropriate and equitable arrangements''. Would the corollary that the military and civilian authorities on either side must cooperate with each other cease to hold good? Or, assuming again for one moment that there was no serious danger that if the Maharaja's civil authority were reorganized in these areas, there would be disturbances, would the United Nations representative be at liberty then to say the Maharaja would assume civil authority there? What is meant? We should like to know exactly what it is. in the minds of the sponsors. After all, a clarification should clarify, not obscure, a matter.

 

Again, with regard to these areas, the fundamental thing is not that the entry of the Indian armed forces into them would bring about a resumption of fighting, although that is a very important consideration. The fundamental thing is-as I respectfully indicated to the Security Council during my first submission that at no time since 20 August 1948, when this question was first raised with the Commission by the Prime Minister of India [S/1100, paragraph 78]. has the military control of the forces of India been exercised or the Maharaja's authority in respect of civil administration been recognized with respect to a single inch of territory within these areas. There is the fundamental thing. If that has been so, then, whether the assumptions made here are found by the United Nations representative to be correct or not, what would be the basis for making any change? As a matter of fact, that is one of the principal questions which the Commission referred back to the Security Council. One had hoped and expected that the clear proposal made by General McNaughton in respect of the matter would put an end to any further doubt on it, but if the Council does entertain any other possibility of a solution with regard to these areas, it would be only fair to my Government to insist that we should know it quite clearly before we could say whether or not it would be acceptable to us.

 

As regards the paragraphs of the statement which relate to sub-paragraph 2 (b) of the draft resolution now before the Council, the first of these paragraphs and the first sentence of the second make it quite clear that "the Council would expect any suggestions which the representative might make to be compatible with the agreed objective".

 

As I have been at pains to reiterate to the Council a few months ago, the agreed objective is the determination of the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan or to India through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. Regarding that, there has been no doubt whatsoever at any stage. That is the agreement between the parties and that is the agreed objective, so this sentence sums up the position quite correctly. But again, there is something in this paragraph, namely, the second sentence, which perturbs and disturbs us even more than the matter to which I have already referred. It says: "Only if he should find, after an investigation on the spot, that the agreed objective was impracticable, would he be expected to make suggestions at variance with this objective". We should like to know exactly what that means. I am sure that after this statement is communicated to my Government, it will ask me to let it know the exact import of that sentence. I shall try to put to the Council the concrete difficulties that may arise.

 

The matter on which we wish to be clear is whether it would or would not be open to either party, if it were so inclined, to say to the United Nations representative: "Why go through all the travail of trying to bring about an agreement in pursuance of these objectives and principles laid down here and to obtain settlement of the details of the demilitarization and the various other questions that arise later on with regard to the control over the administration and so on, in order to ensure a free and impartial plebiscite? You are first expected to carry out an investigation on the spot. At any rate, you are expected to carry out an investigation on the spot whether or not the agreed objective is practicable. That is why that sentence is there. Why do you defer that investigation? Why not undertake that investigation now? If that investigation should prove that the agreed objective is impracticable, then why go through all the difficulties which would be involved in progress toward that objective?"

 

Having raised that, possibly a question of the interpretation of that sentence in the statement would arise and the United Nations representative himself would not be competent to interpret it. This is not an agreement reached between the parties through him afterwards. This question itself might occupy him for some weeks: whether he must start the investigation, or whether he is to carry through his duties with regard to the agreed objective.

 

Now supposing that difficulty is overcome in some manner or other, would it be open for either party, irrespective of the United Nations representative's willingness or unwillingness to undertake this investigation on the spot, to say: "We undertake to convince you that the agreed objective is impracticable without your investigation on the spot"? The other side might then be under the necessity of having to convince him that it was practicable. Again, the parties and the United Nations representative might get involved in an absolutely fruitless and futile discussion having no reference whatsoever to the agreed objective and to what we have no doubt the Security Council itself desires should be accomplished.

 

A third concrete question is this. Assume that one of the parties, not desiring to have the question decided by a free and impartial plebiscite, should create conditions which would make the organizing and holding of a free and impartial plebiscite impracticable, would the United Nations representative then be justified in saying: "Well, I am now faced with these conditions, and the agreed objective has become impracticable"? In his report he would probably not say that one party had made it impracticable, but it might well appear that such had been the case. Would he then be within his rights to proceed to make suggestions at variance with the agreed objective? There are possibilities of all those kinds of mischief in the interpretation of this one sentence, and we shall be very happy, whenever it is convenient to the Security Council, to know, first, what is meant exactly by this sentence and what contingency it provides for and, secondly, in respect of each of the three concrete difficulties I have mentioned, what is the solution that the Security Council visualizes?

 

The attitude of my Government throughout this controversy has been to cooperate with the United Nations to the fullest extent in bringing about the establishing conditions that would ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite, conditions that would give no advantage to either side in the matter of the plebiscite, and, at all stages, the Pakistan Government has been willing to accept proposals and suggestions and resolutions which were designed to bring about this result. If at any stage a proposal has seemed to us either not to lead to that result expressly or to leave factors in operation which would amount to imposing any coercion or fear upon the voters, then the Government either declined to accept the proposal or suggested alternatives.

 

Look, for instance, at the Commission's resolution of 13. August 1948. It dealt with the cease-fire and it dealt with the truce agreements, but it did not go on to deal with the establishment of conditions to ensure a free and impartial plebiscite, and the objection of the Pakistan Government to the resolution was that part III thereof should have been extended so as to deal with that matter also. There was not much objection, apart from discussion of the question of details and clarifications with regard to the resolution as far as it went, but when it stopped short of dealing with that aspect, the Pakistan Government obviously found itself unable to accept it as it stood. But when the resolution of 5 January 1949 removed that lack and made the resolution complete-cease-fire, truce terms, conditions for the plebiscite-the Government of Pakistan was not only willing, but ready, to accept the resolution and to do its own part to the fullest to put it into execution. That, by and large, continues to be the attitude of the Government of Pakistan, but in the determination of those conditions the Pakistan Government, as I have said, has been pushed back from stage to stage to the last ditch. It feels that any further modification of what has been agreed upon and what it has already accepted would put in serious jeopardy the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.

 

We are not convinced that the conditions which already have been agreed upon to completely guarantee a free and impartial plebiscite. But to the extent that a risk is involved in the acceptance of those conditions, we have reconciled ourselves to that risk, relying mainly-indeed most entirely-on the fact that a Plebiscite Administrator of the distinction, calibre, experience and integrity of that gallant and distinguished gentleman, Admiral Nimitz, will see to it that, having engaged himself to guarantee that the plebiscite held under his organization and supervision is free and impartial, it will be as free and impartial as human effort can make it. But as I have said, we have arrived at a stage in which any further modification or relaxation of any of these conditions would not be acceptable to the Government of Pakistan.

 

I have already indicated that the main features of the draft resolution now before the Security Council are satisfactory from the point of view of the Pakistan Government, but its categorical reply to the question whether it is able or not able to accept the draft resolution would depend very largely upon. the clarifications that I have sought.

 

That is all that I have to submit at this stage.