10021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security-Council Meeting No 466 held on 10 February 1950

10021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security-Council Meeting No 466 held on 10 February 1950

 

Today's statement of the representative of India to the Security Council does not call for a lengthy reply, but inasmuch as it is charged with a great deal of skill that he undoubtedly possesses, clarification of some of the points is necessary.

 

My learned friend's main point is that it is the presence of Pakistan forces in the State which has become the main obstacle in the way of a settlement. I was happy to note, however, that his very opening sentences are in full accord with the situation as we view it. He stated that the two sides agreed upon the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and the task before the Council was to settle the procedure according to which they could be implemented. As I have said, I am happy that, at least to that extent, as regards principle the two sides are agreed.

 

With regard to the point of the presence of Pakistan forces in the State, though I shall comment presently upon the arguments made by him, the fact is, as it is now quite clear to the Security Council, that the entry of those forces took place early in May 1948. The very first of the two resolutions subsequently accepted by both Governments, that is to say the resolution of August 1948, was framed and presented to the parties more than three months after the entry of the Pakistan forces into the State, and several weeks after full details with regard to such entry had been supplied to the Commission. By the time the parties agreed to accept the two resolutions, everyone was fully aware of the situation, including the situation, whatever it might have been, created by the entry of these forces into the State. The resolutions deal with that matter. Part II of the resolution of 13 August begins by dealing with that situation. It is not a situation which was created after the two Governments accepted the two resolutions. Whatever the rights or wrongs of it may be, it is a situation that has already happened. in existence and was known to the Commission in every detail. before it proceeded even to formulate its earliest proposals specifically dealing with the matter. The Commission mentions that situation and then proceeds to deal with it. The resolutions were then accepted by the two Governments.

 

Surely that situation cannot today be put forward as something that obstructs the further progress of the implementation of those resolutions. That is reversing the chronology altogether.

 

My learned friend then entered into the question of the justification or non-justification of the step taken by the Pakistan Government in this respect. Again, the main reply to that contention is that all of that must have been discussed with the Commission, and was certainly taken into account by the Commission before it made its proposals. To bring up that matter today is to go back to a period before the presentation by the Commission of its first resolution. It is an attempt to throw aside the agreement with which the submission of the representative of India to the Security Council started today. He said that we have agreed upon those two resolutions, and that the task before the Security Council is to find the means to lay down the procedure for their implementation. Those resolutions, as I have said, deal with the whole situation and take note of it in every respect.

The representative of India then put two specific questions, stating that that was an action against a sister Dominion. Why was it an action against a sister Dominion? His contention is that it was so because the Ruler had offered accession to India and India had accepted that accession.

 

My reply to my learned friend is that Junagadh had offered accession to Pakistan on 15 September 1947, which was accepted. India marched its forces into the State of Junagadh on 9 November 1947. Was that or was that not aggression against a sister Dominion? According to the representative of India, by virtue of its accession Junagadh had become part of Pakistan. That being so, the marching of Indian forces into Junagadh on 9 November 1947 either was or was not an aggression against a sister Dominion. If it was an aggression against a sister Dominion, then the marching of Pakistan forces early in May of 1948 into a portion of another State which had gone through the form of accession, no doubt, with India, but where a freedom movement had already started, and those forces confining themselves to the area already liberated, was much less of an aggression than India's aggression against Pakistan in the preceding November, six months before. If the marching of India's troops on 9 November 1947 into the State of Junagadh, which was in accession to Pakistan, was not an aggression according to my learned friend, then how is it that the marching of Pakistan forces into the liberated areas of Kashmir six months later was an aggression?

 

If the reply is that aggression was committed by India, then it is not for India now, six months later, to raise the complaint of aggression against Pakistan. And if India was not guilty of aggression, how can it charge us with aggression? If it was not aggression in either case, then the questions posed by the representative of India do not arise. If it was aggression in India's case, I shall answer Sir Benegal N. Rau's two questions if he will be pleased to answer my question. Before India marched its troops into Junagadh, was His Majesty's Government consulted or informed? In the words of my learned friend, India was "committing aggression against a sister

 

Dominion." I wish to ask whether or not its Commander-in Chief, when sanctioning this movement, cautioned its Government that by moving these troops into Junagadh it would be guilty of aggression against a sister Dominion? When these questions are answered by my learned friend, I shall attempt to answer his questions.

 

Then the representative of India read out Douglas Brown's dispatch about certain things of which even I am unaware up to this day. I am unaware what exactly took place because I have not studied that problem and I was not then in the Government. But is he prepared to accept the account of a newspaper correspondent with regard to confidential consultations which took place between different organs of the Government? Does anyone know to what extent they are true or whether they are false or garbled? And if so, would he be prepared to answer similar questions put by me to him with regard to Kashmir? The truth of the matter is that these matters are irrelevant today, apart from the question of the rights or wrongs of it. There is no wrong committed by Pakistan whatsoever in this respect, because apart from all other justifications, India had itself furnished the fullest justification by interpreting these matters in regard to Junagadh in the way which I have described to the Council.

 

Again, the representative of India said that if Pakistan had taken the precaution of informing His Majesty's Government before taking this action or if Pakistan had taken the precaution of informing the Security Council, the subsequent mischief that has arisen would have been avoided. What is the mischief that has arisen? The mischief that has arisen is that the line between the two fighting sides in Kashmir is now less favourable to Azad Kashmir, in spite of the entry of Pakistan troops, than it was before Pakistan troops entered Kashmir. That is all that happened in the actual situation. And the mischief would not have risen-but that is a euphemistic expression; the representative of India obviously means that India would then have been in complete possession of the whole of the State of Jammu in the military sense, and could then have disposed of it in whatever way it chose, as it disposed of Junagadh and.

 

Hyderabad. That is all that would have happened, apart from the danger to Pakistan itself so far as Kashmir is concerned.

 

The representative of India has said that Pakistan extended its military control over the northern areas. I dealt with this matter in detail yesterday and I stated categorically to the Security Council that on 20 August 1948, when the Prime Minister of India first raised this matter with the Commission, the Maharaja's administrative authority did not extend to one inch of those territories which are now in dispute. The Indian military forces have at no time been in control of any part of those areas, but certainly on 20 August 1948 they were not in control of a single inch of the territory. If that was so, how is it alleged today that it was after that date that the Pakistan forces or the Azad Kashmir forces had somehow consolidated their positions? That statement of mine is not controverted, and nothing else is alleged in answer to it, yet the theory is being developed that the Pakistan forces consolidated their control over the northern areas because somehow the Commission has fallen into the error of assuming that that had happened. As a matter of fact I said that after that date the Indian military forces, as a result of their November offensive, had taken possession of the Zojila Pass, of Dras and Kargil and had been able to relieve them. All those towns, and the whole of that line, is now on their side of the cease-fire line.

 

Discussing the Azad Kashmir forces, the representative of India said that his Government's view had consistently been that the Azad Kashmir forces should be disbanded before the bulk of the Indian Army was withdrawn. He said that he was not concerned whether that happened in the second stage or in the third stage, but that the Indian view had consistently been that they must be disbanded before the bulk of the Indian Army was withdrawn. The actual fact is that the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army was provided for in the second part of the resolution of 13 August. The Commission clearly explained that the whole of the resolution of 13 August did not touch the Azad Kashmir forces, the disbandment of which-an arrangement to which the Government of India agreed-is provided for in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the resolution of 5 ary 1949, Sub-paragraph 4 (a) of that resolution deals with the final disposal of the remaining Indian forces after the bulk had been withdrawn in the truce stage and after the disbandment and disarmament of Azad Kashmir forces. That is what India had agreed to. The plain answer to the Indian contention that this has been its consistent position is that all the Security Council need do is to read the two resolutions which India accepted, and which we accepted.

 

The representative of India again reverted to his argument based on the phraseology of sub-paragraph 3 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 to the effect that the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive his authority from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. I went into that matter in detail yesterday and I will not repeat my arguments, but the representative of India said that while India has been given certain explanations and we had been given certain explanations, neither side knew at the time what explanations had been given to the other side, though those explanations have subsequently been published. If the explanations and clarifications given to India are to be binding, though they do not amount to what the representative of India contended, and those which were given to us are not to be binding, is that not applying one rule to one side and another rule to the other? That is why it was suggested that if any conflict arose over those clarifications given to either side, the arbitrator should decide. Anybody who arbitrates will obviously look both to the language of the resolutions and to the clarifications and assurances given to both sides; he will endeavour to find out what was understood by each side and to what each side agreed. As a matter of fact, the Government of Pakistan was itself so conscious of this-that any agreement arrived at must be an agreement upon the same things and in the same sense-that, in replying to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, one of the main points made by the Pakistan Government was that any clarifications given to the Government of India must be communicated to and accepted by the Government of Pakistan, and any clarifications given to the Government of Pakistan must be communicated to and accepted by the Government of India before it could be said that an agreement had been reached. That has been our point and that was one of the conditions on our side which has been described as amounting to a rejection of the resolution. But we are not responsible for that situation.

 

In my letter dated 6 September 1948 (S/1100, paragraph 97), addressed to the Chairman of the Commission, which contained the reply of the Government of Pakistan to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, paragraph 10 states:

 

"The Government of Pakistan has not been informed of any clarifications and elucidations of the proposals contained in the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 that the Commission may have furnished to the Government of India. If no clarifications or elucidations have been furnished, no point on that behalf arises. If any clarifications or elucidations have been furnished by the Commission to the Government of India, it is necessary that they should be communicated to the Government of Pakistan and the latter's agreement to them secured. It is equally necessary that the clarifications and elucidations furnished by the Commission to the Government of Pakistan should be communicated to the Government of India and their acceptance of them secured. The Commission will recognize that it is of the utmost importance that any agreement between the two Governments should be arrived at on the clearest possible basis so that there is left no possibility of any misunderstanding of any of the matters agreed upon. In other words, it is essential that the two Governments should agree simultaneously to the same thing and in the same sense."

 

That is what we were pleading for.

The second plea that we made on that occasion was that part III of the resolution of 13 August should be elaborated so as to build up a scheme for the holding of the plebiscite in order that the whole thing should become complete up to that final stage.

 

In paragraph 11 of my same letter I added:

 

"Subject to the clarifications and elucidations furnished by the Commission to the Government of Pakistan being accepted by the Government of India, and the elucidations and clarifications, if any, furnished by the Commission to the Government of India being acceptable to the Government of Pakistan, and provided the Government of India accept the conditions laid down in part II (paragraphs 6 to 15, both inclusive) of the Security Council's resolution of 21st April, 1948 [S/726], as explained by the sponsors of the resolution in the Security Council, for a free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to accede to India or Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan accepts the proposals contained in the Commission's. resolution...".

 

That was our attitude then. Our attitude clearly was that each side must know the clarifications and elucidations given to the other, but in any case, whether they knew or not, they have accepted the resolution. If a question arises that the language of the clarifications or elucidations is in conflict or has to be reconciled to the situation or to the language of the resolution then, surely, it would be the business of the arbitrator who proposed-or of any other arbitrator who might be accepted-to study the matter, hear both parties, and say, "Here is what was intended by the Commission and accepted by both parties." For that matter, after that stage the points which are completely taken care of by the resolution are concluded, and the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army and the questions of the authority of the State, of sovereignty and of integrity, are dealt with and taken care of in the resolution.

 

Then the representative of India said that, although he would not go into the question of Junagadh and Hyderabad because they were irrelevant, he would say that large sections of Muslims in Kashmir favoured India and that therefore the two cases were distinguishable. In the first place, the two cases are not irrelevant. I do not explain the outlines of these two cases in an attempt to invite the Security Council to pronounce upon them. I am quite conscious of the fact that they are not before the Council at this stage. However, I invite the attention of the Security Council to those cases to illustrate what was the Government of India's own interpretation of certain matters. applying to the Kashmir case, and I think it will be a useful guide to the Commission in determining these matters of accession and so on. What is it that was meant and what is it that was intended, and how is it that the Government of India itself interpreted these matters as illustrations?

 

When the representative of India says that a large section of the Muslims in Kashmir favour India that is begging the question. That is the whole point at issue. How many? But even if they do, the obvious course to take is for us to proceed to the stage of a free and impartial plebiscite in which neither side has any advantage, in which neither side is able to exercise any influence or coercion, and in which the people are left entirely free to decide for themselves to which side they wish to accede. If they find that their interests, their desires and their ambitions impel them to accede to India, they will be free to accede to India. Where is the difficulty? Where is the problem?

 

Then the representative of India referred to a sentence of mine. He said that I had stated that the possession of Kashmir was vital to Pakistan. He will, however, do me the justice of recalling that at that stage all that I was arguing was that if one was to take the prima facie grounds which Lord Mount batten had pointed out to the Rulers themselves, all those factors went in favour of accession to Pakistan. If the matter had to be decided on the basis of those considerations, the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan should have taken place on those grounds. If, in arguing that point, I on one occasion used the word "possession" instead of "accession" the representative of India cannot argue. "There it is. They want to eat up Kashmir. It is a case of the wolf and the lamb." Those who have followed the course of events in India with regard to the Indian States and the situation of the Indian States which have acceded to Pakistan, are well able to decide for themselves which is the case of the wolf and the lamb-whether it is that of India or of Pakistan.

 

I would complete this portion of my remarks by saying that, while I did present that argument, I went on to say that, in spite of all these factors, we had accepted the position that the decision should be by means of a free and impartial plebiscite to be held in Kashmir so that the people could decide to which side they wanted to go. What is wrong with that? On the basis of all the factors which apply to the situation, Kashmir should have acceded to Pakistan, but in spite of that, Pakistan is willing that the democratic method of the people freely expressing their wishes should be followed and that the decision should take place in accordance therewith.

 

The representative of India cited certain trade figures, although he himself added that India was at that time unpartitioned and that his figures, therefore, were not exact. I would say that they were not even approximate. What is the means of checking how these figures have been arrived at? I gave to the Council one incontrovertible factor to which there can be no reply. The timber from Kashmir, which is Kashmir's main export, can, I believe, be transported economically and practicably only through its rivers, and all Kashmir's rivers flow into Pakistan. That is a factor that never can change. Other things can be diverted, but this cannot be. And geography itself indicates the means of communication-roads, the short rail length, the rivers-which all show with which side Kashmir was integrated before the trouble arose.

 

The representative of India made certain observations with regard to the dispute concerning the canal waters, and I was again amused by his saying that, in spite of reminders to us before the expiry of the interim agreement, we took no action. As a matter of fact, the history of that dispute, if it were before the Security Council, would disclose that during the month of March every effort of our engineers to get into touch with the Indian engineers in order to settle the further working of these head works was frustrated by their evasion. They would not agree to meet our engineers on one excuse or another, and then, on 1 April, they cut off the waters.

 

The waters remained cut off for about six weeks. True, the representative of India had stated that on 4 May 1948 an interim agreement was reached. But that ad interim agreement, as I have said, was arrived at at the point of the pistol and, as I have already stated, seeks to base India's point of view, at any rate, on the ground that India is entitled to the whole of the water and would sell it to us only on payment of seigniorage. Were we not entitled to assume, in spite of that agreement and in spite of the restoration of the water on those terms-that we deposit the price of the water in the form of seigniorage-that if India once secured possession of the Mangla Head Works of the Jhelum irrigation system, it would insist upon the same view being accepted, and that unless we agreed to pay seigniorage, we would not be given any water? Was that apprehension not justified? I think that it was fully justified. The representative of India said yesterday that I had not mentioned that an agreement had been arrived at. I did. mention the agreement. As a matter of fact I even used the expression-though it may not be acceptable to the representative of India-that it was arrived at the point of the pistol.

 

Then my learned friend referred to my criticism of Margaret Bourke-White's remarks. He said some sort of Constitution had been drawn or was proposed. But what that lady said was; "While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital was completing these things..." Where was the People's Government at that date? Even Sheikh Abdullah, though he had been released from prison toward the end of September, was not associated with the Government in any form at all. He became Prime Minister much later. He was associated with the then Prime Minister after 26 October. The Maharaja, in his letter of 26 October, spoke of his intention of inviting Sheikh Abdullah to participate in the Government in that capacity. Up to that point, then, there was not even a vestige of any intention to associate any of the people with the administration. All through, the Prime Ministers of Kashmir had been taken from outside. Mr. Ayyangar, who had the honour to address the Security Council on the first occasion and who belongs to Madras, had been for several years-for seven or eight or ten years, I forget the exact period-Prime Minister in Kashmir. And at that time the Prime Minister in Kashmir was Mr. Mehar Chand Mahajan, a gentleman from East Punjab, not Kashmiri. Certainly, no Kashmiri Muslim belonging to the majority community of Kashmir had ever been associated with the Government, let alone that Government being the people's Government. That was the point of my criticism. With regard to the Baramulla Convent, I must say that my learned friend was not at all fair when he said that perhaps I was not content with what he had quoted previously. I myself said that there had been regrettable incidents in Baramulla. My learned friend himself had conceded, quite fairly and justly, that we were not responsible for those incidents. We have not denied that the tribesmen were guilty of that kind of thing. Equally with the Government of India, we have deplored those incidents. But I did take up my learned friend's point, or the point he sought to make, to the effect that we had done nothing to prevent those incidents. I showed what we had done to prevent them, and I said that I pleaded guilty to this: that the Government of Pakistan at that time did not take the only appropriate action that it should have taken, more particularly in view of the fact that there was a standstill agreement with the Government of the Maharaja. We should have moved Pakistan troops into the State both to stop the disorders that were taking place on account of the tribesmen and also to stop the persecution of the Muslim section of the population by the Maharaja's troops. We did not do that, and therein we committed a serious default. If my learned friend's point is that we were guilty of neglect in that respect, then, as I have said, I plead guilty.

 

Then I quoted something from Mr. M. N Roy. I certainly was guilty of saying that Mr. M. N. Roy, whatever his ideology and his political views, whether one agrees with them or not, was a non-Muslim Indian patriot; I am quite certain I said something to that effect. If that is such praise from me of Mr. M. N. Roy that my learned friend cannot tolerate it, will, I cannot help it. But Mr. M. N. Roy is a non-Muslim, that is to say, he is not a Muslim. He is Indian: I do not know whether or not that is denied. Whether his patriotism takes the same shape or form, so far as his political views are concerned, is a different matter. But if he has been an exile from India for many years, as my learned friend pointed out, he was an axle from India because he protested against the British domination of India at that stage. If that is not the definition of patriotism-or one of the definitions of patriotism-then what is? And was I guilty in introducing his views, for whatever they may be worth? They may not be binding upon anybody. But he gave expression to his opinions, and, in introducing those views, I had to say something about who he was. If I had merely said "Mr. M N. Roy says this", the Council certainly would have been entitled to wonder, "Who is this man that he is talking about?" I had to give some description of him. What could I have said less than I did? And of what was I guilty in saying it?

 

I shall not try to make a reply in regard to the remarks of Brigadier-General Haight, the ex-G.I. who became a Brigadier General under the Azad Kashmir Government. I did not quote those remarks during the previous debates, although they were then available. And there were very harsh things said by him about both sides, in order to get a price settled, I have no doubt, for the communications that he was prepared to make for the Press in the United States. I shall not quote them today. Mr. Ayyangar quoted them even two years ago, and, while quoting them, he suddenly came upon this expression: Both sides are lying extensively"-or some such adverb-"over this issue.'' Mr. Ayyangar stopped at that point and said: "Well, I hope he is not lying"-and then he went on to comment upon his further remarks.

 

It is not necessary to advert to that matter. If that is the kind of evidence on which my learned friend bases his case, he is welcome to it.

 

He then furnished an analogy. He said it was as if we had offered, as trustee, to sell a house to a friend or neighbour for 10,000 dollars. The friend or neighbour says "I am willing to take the house." Both have agreed that the house shall pass to the friend. The whole question is: what is the consideration? We have asked for 10,000 dollars. We are first offered 5,000 dollars, then we are offered 3,000 dollars, then we are offered 2,000 dollars.

 

Again I say with all due respect that, if any learned friend's case rests on analogies of that kind, it is a hopeless case. Here it is not a question of what the price is or is not for anything that has been offered. Here is an agreement, as he himself says, embodied in these two resolutions: the resolution of 13 August 1948 and that of 5 January 1949. The question is: What had the parties agreed upon? The question is not what they should agree upon-although that again, in these matters, is a legitimate way to talk in order to resolve this deadlock-but what they had agreed upon. And they should be called upon to do what they had agreed to do. If the neighbour or the friend had agreed to pay 10,000 dollars-to continue the analogy-then he must pay the 10,000 dollars, and he should get the house. If there was no agreement to pay anything, while the other side was demanding 10,000 dollars, then no agreement had yet been arrived at. How does it profit one to indulge in analogies of that kind?

 

My learned friend then said that they are willing to accept mediation, though they would not accept arbitration. But what has been going on during the past two years if not. mediation? Mediation was undertaken and carried through, and it resulted in an agreement just over a year ago. The issue is now the implementation of that agreement. The mediation has, to the extent to which agreement was reached, successfully achieved its task. An agreement having been arrived at, the mediation having brought about agreement, the question now is: How is that agreement to be implemented?

 

There are various ways of implementing it, and I have indicated some of them to the Security Council. But mediation. cannot start afresh with the whole thing. Are we going to spend year after year merely in attempts to mediate, reopening everything that may already have been agreed upon and starting afresh?

 

The crux of the matter is what my learned friend stated in his first two or three sentences. The efforts of the Commission resulted in the reaching of agreements on the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. If either party raises a question with regard to the interpretation of any portion of those agreements, it is not a question of mediation. The problem is to determine, by some fair and impartial method, what those agreements mean, what the parties had agreed to, and to give effect to it.

My learned friend says that the prestige of the United Nations is involved. I also say that the prestige of the United Nations is involved. But, if that is the case, let us accept what the United Nations says. How is the prestige of the United Nations to be upheld? By declining, time after time, to do what the United Nations suggests or recommends? The prestige of the United Nations can only be upheld in this way: if the parties have a difference and it is resolved either by the arbitration of a single person or by the arbitration of the Security Council itself-if these gentlemen who represent the whole civilized world, or at least the greatest part of it, consider the whole matter and tell the parties that this is what they had agreed upon then the parties should be prepared to carry out that decision.

 

My concluding remarks are these. As the Council now has to proceed, after the parties have placed their cases in detail before it, the main trouble is with regard to the demilitarization of this State before the preparations for the plebiscite can start. I mean that, by and large, that is the situation. India has given certain versions of some incidents it complains of, or of some developments. We have given our reply. Before the Security Council is able to appraise the whole thing and to make up its mind with regard to what ought to be done, it will either feel that it has had enough information with regard even to the military situation from both rules and from the documents, to be able to determine the matter quite clearly; or it may feel. that on some aspects put forward by India and some on behalf of Pakistan, it is not quite clear as to the extent to which they differ and what the actual situation is or has been.

 

I venture to make a suggestion which could very easily resolve any doubt that might arise in the minds of the representatives to the Security Council. The Commission's military adviser, General Delvoie, has been supervising all these things practically from the date of the second resolution of the Commission, that of 5 January 1949, and he has spent almost the whole of the year 1949 in the affected areas. He must have complete and detailed knowledge of the actual facts and of the situation. He is a distinguished soldier, completely fair and impartial, belonging neither to one side nor the other. He has devoted one whole year to this service of the United Nations. He is available to the Council. On any points on which the Council feels in doubt, or on the whole military picture, the Council can ask him for his views and can supplement what it receives from him with regard to knowledge of the facts by such information as the parties have given, and can correct to any extent to which a correction may be necessary the views the parties hold with regard to each of these matters.

 

It has been said that India's position is that it desires an amicable settlement, a settlement through the United Nations. All true. India's insistence is that, although that settlement should be with the United Nations and the United Nations should take the responsibility for it, that settlement must be what India says. It is not willing to move from its point of view, and in proof of its desire to settle amicably, and repeated attention being drawn to the fact that we have said we do not want to go to war over these things, I made my situation clear on the last occasion when I spoke in connexion with this matter.

 

I have now received, since I spoke yesterday, the last reply of the Pakistan Government to the Government of India on this matter. The reply is somewhat lengthy and I shall not read it, but after putting forward the kind of considerations I had already mentioned to the Security Council, it says this:

 

"In the light of these considerations the Pakistan Government suggests the following joint declaration:

 

""The Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, being desirous of promoting friendship and good will between their peoples, hereby declare that they condemn resort to war for settlement of any existing or future disputes between them. They further agree that the settlement of such disputes shall always be sought through peaceful methods of negotiation and mediation and, if these should fail to bring settlement, by resort to arbitration of all points of difference, including those relating to the procedure for arbitration.

 

"They undertake that they will abide by the award of the arbitrator. Mediation or arbitration may be undertaken by a specialized agency set up by mutual agreement for the purpose or by an agreed reference to some appropriate international body recognized by both of them.

 

"In pursuance of this declaration, both Governments hereby agree to refer to arbitration differences that have arisen or may arise in the implementation of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which both Governments have accepted for settlement of the Kashmir dispute. "Both Governments also agree that the canal water dispute shall, if no agreement is reached by negotiation or mediation, be referred to the International Court of Justice for decision. In other disputes outstanding between them, such as Junagadh, evacuee property, boundary disputes and claims relating to assets, both Governments agree that if no settlement is reached by negotiation and mediation, the matter shall be referred to arbitration.

 

""It is their earnest hope, as well as their firm conviction, that the implementation of this declaration and the spirit which lies behind it will serve to promote friendly relations between the two countries and advance the cause of international peace." "

 

The situation in this respect is that while the Government of India invites us to subscribe to such declarations, it will not make any move towards the peaceful settlement of these disputes, whereas our attitude is set out in the declaration that we are willing to subscribe to and to issue and to act upon. I do not see that we are in any way behind India. As a matter of fact, we are miles in advance of the Government of India in suggesting a practical way of settling the disputes in a friendly manner.

 

To conclude, our position is this. We are prepared to accept the 6 February 1948 draft resolution of the Security Council [S/667] which was under discussion and supported by the six representatives on the Security Council who had already spoken before the Indian delegation withdrew to Delhi for consultation. are prepared to accept, we do accept, the 21 April 1948

resolution of the Security Council [S/726], the whole of it as it stands. We have accepted, and India has accepted the 13 August 1948 resolution and the 5 January 1949 resolution of the Commission. That is the only point where agreement has been reached. Differences have arisen even, as Sir Benegal N. Rau said, with regard to the implementation of the resolution; that is to say, the second part of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

 

The Commission suggested arbitration. We are prepared to go to arbitration to have those differences resolved. General McNaughton dealt with those proposals and made his suggestions [S/1453]. We are prepared to accept them. Would this show that we are anxious to settle the dispute in a friendly manner? manner through the United Nations, upholding and enhancing the prestige of the United Nations? Is this India's attitude, when at each stage it insists that its point of view must be accepted and carried through?

 

Briefly, again I shall repeat Sir Benegal N. Rau's words with which he started this afternoon, namely, that the whole problem before the Security Council is how to resolve the differences of interpretation that have arisen between the two Governments with regard to the truce stage of these two resolutions and to go forward with regard to them. It is a serious enough problem. It is in some respects even a complicated problem. But the task is clear before the Security Council, and that is the responsibility that lies on its shoulders. I trust, indeed I am confident, that having now so clear a picture of the whole matter before it, the Security Council will undertake to discharge, adequately and effectively, this responsibility towards the two Dominions and, indeed, towards the whole civilized world and to the cause of international peace.