10021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Benegal N. Rau (India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 466 held on 10 February 1950
10021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Benegal N. Rau (India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 466 held on 10 February 1950
We are here concerned with the Kashmir issue, and I therefore propose at the outset to confine myself strictly to that issue. Let us see exactly where we stand. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan adopted two resolutions, one on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 75] and the other on 5 January 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15]. These resolutions have been accepted by both sides, but difficulties have arisen with regard to the implementation of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Our task now is to consider how those difficulties can best be resolved.
In my first speech [463rd meeting] I indicated that all our present difficulties have arisen because of the invasion of Kashmir, by which I mean the State of Jammu and Kashmir, by Pakistan troops and their unlawful activities in the State in the way of building up disruptive forces and administrations. L have listened to the representative of Pakistan patiently and with the utmost attention, but I have been unable to see how he justifies the invasion of the State or the subsequent activities of the Pakistan Army. He read out to us [464th meeting] an appraisal of the Kashmir situation by General Gracey. Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, dated 20 April 1948. The representative of Pakistan stated that it was upon the recommendations of the Commander-in-Chief that Pakistan. felt it necessary to send its army into Kashmir. Let us briefly consider what those recommendations were. I shall first quote from the Commander-in-Chief's summary of deductions. paragraph (f):
"An easy victory of the Indian Army in any of the above mentioned sectors, particularly in the Muzaffarabad area, is almost certain to arouse the anger of the tribesmen against Pakistan for its failure to render them more direct assistance, and might well cause them to turn against Pakistan."
I invite special attention to the words "more direct assistance". This is a most damaging admission, proving that, in spite of the protestations of the representative of Pakistan here, Pakistan was in fact rendering the tribesmen, even before 20 April 1948, some kind of assistance, direct or indirect. The Commander-in-Chief was recommending that the assistance should take a more direct form. This is conclusive proof that India's complaint to the Security Council in January 1948 [S/628] was completely true.
The representative of Pakistan tweeted me upon my use of the quaint phrase that the complaint had "become true". In view of the proof which he has now himself furnished, I am able to dispense with that quaint phrase and say that "the complaint has been proved to be true".
I now come to that part of the Commander-in-Chief's appraisal which recommended that regular units of the Pakistan Army must, if necessary, be sent into Kashmir. I must confess that I have been gravely disturbed by this enclosure. Here is a British Commander-in-Chief of a Dominion of the Commonwealth recommending that a military expedition should be sent, if necessary, against the army of a sister Dominion. I should like at this stage to ask the representative of Pakistan two questions. The first is: Before the Pakistan Army was actually sent into Kashmir, was His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consulted or even informed? I ask this question because I believe that the recommendation involved a serious offence against the British Foreign Enlistment Act. do not know whether the representative of Pakistan would like to answer this question immediately or at a later stage.
Representatives will doubtless remember the Jameson Raid. in South Africa, where the expedition was against the South African Republic. The case is stronger here because the expedition was against a sister Dominion and a member of the Commonwealth. It seems almost incredible to me that a step of this kind should have been taken without consulting His Majesty's Government. Indeed, I feel sure that if there had been any such consultation, this step would never have been taken and we should have been spared all the difficulties that it has created and that now impede our progress.
The second question which I should like to ask him is whether, at any point of his appraisal, the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief cautioned the Pakistan Government that the step which he was recommending, however justifiable in his view, might constitute a breach of international law. I feel that, in order to protect himself, he would have taken this precaution, having regard to his conduct on an earlier occasion which I shall mention immediately. I quote from a dispatch sent by Douglas Brown from Pakistan on Tuesday, 28 October 1947, which appeared in the Daily Telegraph of London on 29 October 1947:
"Mr. Jinnah commanded General Gracey to reply to the Indian Government's move into Kashmir by sending troops immediately up the Murree Road to recapture Baramulla, occupy Srinagar and hold its airfield and cut off the Banihal Pass into India.
"General Gracey replied that news had just reached him that Kashmir had joined the Indian Union, so that to send troops there would be an act of war against Hindustan. He begged that the matter be referred first to Field-Marshal Auchinleck. To this Mr. Jinnah with some reluctance agreed.
"Such was the reason for the conference held today around the sick-bed of the Pakistan Prime Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, for which Field Marshal Auchinleck from Delhi, General Gracey from Rawalpindi and Sir George Cunningham, Governor of the North West Frontier Province from Peshawar, all set out by air at dawn.
"I am told that the first point made by the Supreme Commander at the conference was that if the armies of the two Dominions came to blows, all British officers on both sides would immediately resign. This would include the respective Commanders-in-Chief of India and Pakistan, Lieutenant General Sir Rob Lockhart and Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Messervy. General Messervy is expected to return immediately from England, arriving on Thursday."
Whatever the answers to these questions may be, one thing is clear: that the justification pleaded by Pakistan is that the sending of the troops was necessitated by considerations of self defence. Such a plea might have passed muster in the old days, but now, fortunately, we have the United Nations and its Charter.
Article 51 of the Charter reads:
"Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary. to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council, and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."
This Article imposes two limitations upon the right of self defence: first, there must be an armed attack upon the Member that exercises the right; and secondly, measures taken in the exercise of the right of self-defence must immediately be reported to the Security Council. In the present instance there was no armed attack on Pakistan, and admittedly the sending of the army into Kashmir was not reported to the Security Council.
I am not making a small legal point. I am pointing this out because, if the matter had been reported at that stage to the Security Council, we should not have been in the difficult position in which we find ourselves today. I feel sure that the Pakistan Army would not have been allowed to go in, and the subsequent mischief to which the invasion led would have been avoided. I have contended in my original speech [463rd meeting] that because of this initial wrong, certain other wrongs followed, namely, the building up of the so-called Azad forces and the so-called Azad administrations. I then asked, as I still ask, that all these wrongs should be completely undone before a plebiscite can be held. Any other course would involve the recognition of an act which was not only against the plain provisions of the Charter but was also, as I see it, a crime according to British municipal law. We should be creating a dangerous precedent if we took any other view or adopted any other course.
It is said that the dispatch of Pakistan troops was necessitated by India's mounting an offensive against the raiders. But surely this was nothing new. The Security Council knew that the Indian Army had gone to Kashmir to repel the invaders, but it is curious to learn that, although Pakistan, according to its defence before this Council, was rendering no assistance whatever to the raiders, nevertheless when it found that India was on the point of expelling the raiders. Pakistan found it necessary to send its army into Kashmir in order to hold the line. But we are told that Pakistan did not do anything more, whereas we have it, both from the majority [S/1430] and from the minority [S/1430/Add. 3] reports of the Commission, that Pakistan not merely held the line but extended its military control over the northern areas between August 1948 and January 1949. This was not a case of merely holding the line, but of occupying as large a part of the State as Pakistan's military strength permitted.
I shall now proceed to deal with two other points raised by the representative of Pakistan in connexion with the implementation of the resolution of 13 August. His first point was that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces belonged to what is called the plebiscite period, which is to commence after the implementation of parts I and II of the resolution. The real point, so far as India is concerned, is not whether the disbanding and disarming of these forces should fall in this period or that period, but whether it should not take place before the bulk of the Indian Army is withdrawn from the State. Our view has consistently been that these forces should be disbanded and disarmed before India is called upon to withdraw the bulk of its army. The Commission itself has said that if it could have foreseen that Pakistan would build up such a formidable force as the Azad forces have now become, it would have dealt with the question in part II of the resolution. Therefore, if we follow the spirit of the resolution-that is to say, what the Commission really would have done if it could have foreseen the facts -the disbanding and disarming of the Azad forces should be put on the same footing as the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, of which these forces are merely a limb or adjunct. To this the representative of Pakistan answers that the Azad forces are not mentioned in the resolution of 13 August. In the words of a famous precedent, the representative of Pakistan's objection is, "It is not so nominated in the bond." If so, if the representative of Pakistan wishes to stand upon the letter of the resolution of 13 August, let us go by the letter. The wording of part II, section B, paragraph 1 of the resolution is to the effect that when the Pakistan forces are notified as being withdrawn, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.
In other words, what India is required to do by the letter of the resolution is to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces, but the withdrawal need not be completed. Indeed, the stages of the withdrawal are left to be determined by agreement between the Commission and the Government of India. Only the initial stages constitute the beginning, and that is all for which the strict words of the resolution provide. India's view is that it cannot afford to complete the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces until the Azad Kashmir forces have been disbanded and disarmed. The real question, as I have already pointed out, is which is to come first: the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces or the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army. We say the former, and the Commission supports this contention when it says that if it had been able to fore what Pakistan was going to do, it would have made express provision for the disbanding and disarming of these forces in the resolution of 13 August.
I now come to the point regarding the northern areas. So far as concerns the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops in the south, part II, section A, paragraph 3 of the resolution of 13 August provides that the territory shall be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission, this, of course, subject to the assurance given to India by the Commission that this part of the revolution will not be interpreted or applied in practice so as to bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of its territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops.
Let me draw attention to the words ``or applied in practice". The meaning is obviously that neither in theory nor in practice was the sovereignty of the State to be questioned in that territory. If the contention of the representative of Pakistan is that the territory referred to includes the northern areas as well as the southern areas, then the assurance will apply to both. But if, as held by the Commission, the reference was only to the territory to the south-west and did not include the northern areas, then there was a separate assurance in respect of the northern areas given in the Commission's reply of 25 August [S/1100, paragraph 79] to the second letter of the Prime Minister of India of 20 August (S/1100, paragraph 78] to which I have already referred in my speech.
Therefore, on whatever interpretation, an assurance of the unquestioned sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State was given to India; and, in our view, that assurance was repeated in sub-paragraph 3 (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949. I have quoted that particular sub-paragraph once before, but I shall quote it again because we attach great importance to it. The sub-paragraph, as I have already said, was inserted at India's instance. It runs as follows:
"The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite."
My learned friend, the representative of Pakistan, tweeted me at one point of his speech with claiming credit for India for accepting the proposals contained in this resolution on 23 December [S/1196, annex 4] whereas Pakistan accepted them two days later [S/1196, annex 5]. What I was commenting upon in that part of my speech was the delay in Pakistan's acceptance of the resolution of 13 August. But, apart from that, the difference of two days between 23 December and 25 December is of very great significance, as I shall presently explain. India asked for the insertion of sub-paragraph 3 (b) in the resolution of 5 January 1949 because it attached the greatest importance to the unquestioned sovereignty of the State throughout its territory, and the words of the sub-paragraph necessarily implied that the powers of the State, whether in the northern areas or in the southern areas or anywhere else, would remain with the State before the holding of a plebiscite. However, my distinguished friend stated yesterday [465th meeting] that in a memorandum of 25 December the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan gave him an explanation of the sub-paragraph which stated that it meant practically nothing, that it was a mere formality, and so on. If any such explanation was given to the Pakistan Government on 25 December, that is to say, two days after the proposals had been accepted by the Government of India, clearly that explanation is not binding upon the Government of India.
The holding of the plebiscite for the entire State and the unquestioned sovereignty of the State over its entire territory are inseparably connected. The southern areas may be administered, under the surveillance of the United Nations, by local authorities appointed from among the local inhabitants by the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This would be in accordance with the resolution of 13 August, as interpreted by India. I may mention that Sheikh Abdullah's Government at present includes a member of the rival organi zation, the Muslim Conference.
I shall now proceed to deal with some of the specific points raised by the representative of Pakistan. He covered a great deal of ground, and I do not propose to follow him into every detail; I shall confine myself to the more salient points in his argument. He opened with a longish discourse on Junagadh, Hyderabad and various other matters. We are at present. concerned only with the Kashmir issue. I do not know what the other members of the Council feel, but, speaking for myself, I have found it difficult enough to master the facts of the Kashmir issue. If we are to be asked at the same time to go. into all the other matters which are alleged to be in dispute between India and Pakistan, the burden will be intolerable. I shall therefore make only a few general observations on these issues, although to my mind they are, strictly speaking, irrelevant to the present discussion.
One thing has emerged clearly even from the extracts which my distinguished friend has quoted from various statements made by the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister of India, which is that in every disputed case there should be a reference to the will of the people. That is the criterion which, subject to certain conditions as to the restoration of normal conditions, India has offered to apply in Kashmir. There is, however, one fundamental difference between the cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh, on the one hand, and Kashmir, on the other. In Kashmir, as I have already stated in my original speech, a large section of the Muslims-that is to say, a large section of the majority community-are themselves in favour of remaining in India. This is not India's fault; it is a plain fact, for which I have already tried to give several reasons. In Hyderabad and Junagadh, on the other hand, so far as I am aware, no section of the population that forms the majority has ever been in favour of acceding to Pakistan. This is a fundamental difference which is apt to be forgotten in these facile analogies.
My distinguished friend has often referred to the "so-called accession" of Kashmir to India, as if there were some legal defect therein. Members will find this aspect of the case fully discussed in annex 43 to the majority report of the Commission (S/1430/Add. 11. I do not wish to weary the members of the Council with a long legal disquisition on the subject of accession. I would only mention that, under the Constitution which was in force in India after 15 August 1947 and until 26 January 1950, specific provisions had been made as to the exact mode of accession of Indian States. In passing, I may observe that that Constitution was practically an enactment of the British Parliament. Under section 6 of that Constitution, often referred to as the Government of India Act, 1935, an Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of an instrument of accession executed by the Ruler, etc. The rest of the section merely deals with the contents of the instrument. This is all that was required for accession: an instrument executed by the Ruler and accepted by the Governor-General.
On 26 October 1947, the Ruler actually executed such an instrument of accession; and, on 27 October 1947, the Governor General, Lord Mountbatten, signified his acceptance of that instrument. Constitutionally, therefore, all the requirements of accession were complete. In accepting the instrument, Lord Mountbatten said to the Ruler:
"Consistently with its policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.
"Meanwhile, in response to Your Highness's appeal for military aid, action has been taken today to send troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own sources to defend your territory, and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people. My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has devoted to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim Government to work with your Prime Minister.
" As I have repeatedly said, India still stands by the offer contained in that letter, to submit the question to the will of the people as soon as normal conditions are restored. But this does not in any way affect the position that for the time being accession is legally and constitutionally complete.
Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan devoted a good deal of his speech towards proving why it was essential, from Pakistan's point of view, that Kashmir must accede to Pakistan. Let me quote his exact words [464th meeting]: "The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India or to the strategic security of India. On the other hand, it is vital for Pakistan." That is to say, the possession of Kashmir is vital for Pakistan. Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan is apparently no longer content with accession; he desires possession. At this point of his argument he seems to have forgotten that the matter is to be decided not by the comparative needs of Pakistan and of India, but by the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Indeed, as I heard him developing this part of his argument, I began to understand more and more clearly why a large section of the Kashmir Muslims are nervous of acceding to Pakistan. If I may say so without any offence, the wolf may need the lamb desperately, but the lamb may have different wishes in the matter. It is because India has no need to exploit Kashmir and can give it the fullest political and economic freedom that a large section, even of the Muslims in Kashmir, wish to remain in India. This part of his argument sounded very much like the Lebensraum doctrine.
The representative of Pakistan joined the issue with me over my statement that the bulk of the trade of Kashmir was in the areas now included in India. I shall therefore give the exact figures of the three years immediately preceding partition. These figures were compiled from official records for the information of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In the year 1944-1945 Kashmir imported 46 million rupees worth of goods from the areas now included in India and 12 million rupees worth of goods from the areas now included in Pakistan, in percentages, 79 per cent from India and 21 percent from Pakistan. In 1945-1946, 47 million rupees worth of goods were imported from India and 9 million rupees worth from Pakistan; in percentages, 84 per cent from India and 16 per cent from Pakistan. In 1946-1947, 59 million rupees worth of goods were imported from India and 12 million rupees worth from Pakistan; in percentages, 82 percent and 18 percent respectively. The figures for exports from Kashmir during the same years were 80 per cent to India and 20 per cent to Pakistan in each of the three years.
With reference to timber, on which Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan dwelt at some length, the official records show that eleven eighteenths of the timber exports, including fir logs, were for consumption in India, and seven-eighteenths for consumption in Pakistan. It must, of course, be admitted that during the years in question India was a single country, an undivided country, and the figures I have quoted are to some extent based upon the best estimate that could be made of the proportions of certain goods consumed in the areas now included in India and in Pakistan, respectively. To that extent the figures are a matter of opinion. I shall concede that. The main consumer of Kashmir timber was and continues to be the Indian railways.
The representative of Pakistan repeatedly referred to the stoppage of water from certain irrigation canals. I shall therefore mention a few salient facts. Previous to the partition of India there were sixteen canal systems in the undivided Punjab. As a result of partition, twelve of these systems have fallen exclusively into West Punjab, that is, into Pakistan. Only three are in East Punjab, which is in India. One, the Bari-Doab Canal, is divided between the two. The total discharges of the five rivers of the Punjab in the winter season is 47,500 cusecs, of which West Punjab and Bahawalpur in Pakistan get 39,500 cusecs, and East Punjab, with its States, only about 8,000 cusecs. In other words, five-sixths of the supply has been given to Pakistan and about one-sixth to India. West Punjab is a highly developed surplus food area, whereas East Punjab is under-developed and a deficit food area liable to severe and frequent famine.
In December 1947 a standstill agreement was signed by the Chief Engineers of the East and West Punjab for the continuance of the supply to Pakistan canals from head waters in India, subject, of course, to payment. This standstill agreement was to last only up to 31 March 1948, but in spite of reminders from the East Punjab Engineers, Pakistan took no step to enter into a fresh agreement before the existing one expired. In the absence of any such agreement, East Punjab had to close the canals on 1 April 1948. About the middle of that month the Chief Engineers of the two provinces, with the authority of their respective Governments, signed an agreement under which the supplies were to be continued for a limited period. This agreement was, however, not ratified by the Government of West Punjab, Pakistan, with the result that the flow of water in the canals could not be resumed and there might have been severe loss of crops. At this stage-and I invite special attention to this point-the Prime Minister of India intervened personally, and as a result of his efforts an agreement was executed between the two Governments on 4 May 1948, according to which the supplies to these canals were resumed.
Members of the Council will remember that among the reasons given for the marching of the Pakistan Army into Kashmir, one was that Pakistan feared that India would stop the water from the Mangla Head Works. The representative of Pakistan might at least have mentioned that, two days earlier, as a result of the Prime Minister of India's personal intervention, India had resumed the supplies which, owing to the continued negligence of the Pakistan Government of West Punjab, had been suspended.
The representative of Pakistan repeatedly charged me with having said that there was no trouble within the State before 22 October 1947. He made a partial correction of that error yesterday, but I should like to correct it completely, so far as I am concerned. His exact words were [464th meeting]: "The representative of India yesterday said that he denied the assertion by Pakistan that anything had happened before 22 October." I have been unable to find any such statement in my speech. What in fact I did say was that the trouble in the State had caused the Maharaja's accession on 26 October, and not that the Maharaja's accession had caused the trouble as is often represented or misrepresented. In other words, what I said was that the trouble occurred before 26 October. I did not say that there was no trouble before 22 October.
The representative of Pakistan has tried to make out that the trouble was a battle for freedom in which tribesmen from across the border joined as volunteers. In this connexion, I should like to invite the attention of the members of this Council to certain remarkable disclosures made in the Press in this country in February 1948. The writer was an American ex G.I. who was for some months a Brigadier-General in what was called the Azad Kashmir International Brigade. I have photostatic copies here of what he wrote, and these photostatic copies. copies are here for anyone to look at. I shall quote only a few extracts. Speaking of himself, he says: "I never cared about the issues involved. For me it was a job and exciting." Speaking of the circumstances and terms of his employment, he goes on to say:
"And so I was introduced to Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, President of the Azad Kashmir Provisional Government. He gestured my two companions away and motioned me to a seat on the bed beside him. Bluntly, he asked, "Why do you want to join Azad?" I said frankly that I had come out of curiosity more than anything else. Then Ibrahim launched into a long explanation of the Muslim revolt against India and Kashmir. He justified his cause with the same arguments he is using today before the United Nations at Lake Success.``
Incidentally, I am quoting from an account bearing the date of 12 February 1948. To resume:
"I did not get particularly excited, although he did. I was more interested when he asked me what I wanted for serving Azad. Behind me someone suggested 1,000 dollars a month. 'You can have anything you want,' said Ibrahim."
Speaking of the tribesmen he was commanding, the Brigadier-General says:
"But there were always more tribes leaving the barren hills for raids on the fertile valleys. Although they were Muslims themselves, they did not care about the issues of the Kashmir Muslim revolt against India. They wanted excitement and loot. When the Indian Government charged that we encouraged the savage tribesmen in wanton looting and raping, our publicity men countered with the statement that the Pathans were volunteers for our cause, fighting in a special international brigade. The fact that the brigade was headed by me, an American, lent colour to this story. Now, 8,000 Pathans have come down from Dir State in Pakistan's north-west province to get their share of the booty. We rushed them to the front as fast as we could get trucks. The Pakistan Government co-operated gladly, lending us trucks and gas. This was done, I think, because they wanted to get the Pathans out of Rawalpindi before they started to loot there. I returned to the front ten days later to take over my international brigade,"
Such was the nature of the "battle for freedom" in which the tribesmen are said to have taken such a prominent and honourable a part. Let me add, for the information of members of the Council, that the fight for freedom in Kashmir started not in October 1947, or even in September 1947, but twenty years ago, and it has been continually waged during this period by the man who is now heading the People's Government, Sheikh Abdullah. As I have already said, he has suffered imprisonment for nine years in the people's cause.
At the head of the Indian Government another man who has spent nearly thirteen years in prison in the fight for freedom, and one of his last acts before he became the Prime Minister of India was to participate in the struggle that was going on in Kashmir. That battle has now ended in complete success for the people because autocracy is now dead in Kashmir, as it is dead in the other States of India.
The representative of Pakistan referred to the large number of refugees that had come over into Pakistan from the Indian side of the cease-fire line, and he pointed to this fact as proof of aggression, tyranny and what-not by India. It is unfortunately true that there has been a stream of refugees across the frontier on both sides, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere. This is not a feature peculiar to Kashmir. It was the result of the partition and the communal frenzy that unfortunately accompanied it. There are large numbers of Hindu refugees and even Muslim refugees who have come over to the Indian side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir because they felt unsafe on the other side, and their number also runs into hundreds of thousands.
The resolution of 5 January makes provision for the repatriation of all these refugees on either side, and indeed this will be one of the most difficult tasks to be completed before the holding of the plebiscite. I have already drawn the attention of the members of the Security Council to the fact that, even as late as August 1949 in the presence of certain United Nations observers, the Muslim inhabitants of certain villages which were on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line insisted on moving across to the Indian side. As the representative of Pakistan said, "Facts are worth more than arguments," and here are facts which can be confirmed by the United Nations observer, Lieutenant Wayne. I can furnish the fullest details of these happenings if they are required for purposes of verification They are contained in a report made by the Administrative Officer of Gurais. According to the representative of Pakistan himself, two-thirds of the population of the entire State is still on the Indian side of the cease-fire line and, needless to say, the vast majority of that population consists of Muslims.
I now come to the extract which I quoted from Margaret Bourke-White's book. The representative of Pakistan seems to be doubtful of the facts mentioned in the extracts, and he asked me, "Where was the Constitution referred to in the first sentence of that extract?" I have it here in my hand. It is entitled New Kashmir, and is described as a draft constitution and outline -economic plan for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It opens with the words:
"We the people of Jammu and Kashmir, Ladakh and the frontier regions including Poonch and Chinani, comprising whole of Jammu and Kashmir State, in order to perfect our union in the fullest equality and self-determination, to raise ourselves and our children do propose and propound the following constitution of our State."
Article 2 of part I of that draft constitution reads: "Freedom of conscience and of worship shall be guaranteed for all citizens."
As to the facts actually stated in the extract from Margaret Bourke-White's book, there can hardly be any doubt, because they are corroborated by the account of another eye-witness, Father Shanks. When I made my original speech, I did not wish to read out the details given by Father Shanks, because they do not make pleasant reading. Since the representative of Pakistan is not content with what I have already stated, however, I am compelled to read out the further details now for the information of the Council. The account was reproduced in the Daily Express of London, dated 11 November 1947. He describes the attack on St. Joseph's Convent in the following words:
"The tribesmen came shooting their way down from the hills on both sides of the town. They climbed over the hospital walls from all sides. The first group burst into a ward, firing at the patients. A twenty-year-old Indian nurse tried to protect a Muslim patient whose baby had just been born.. She was shot dead first; the patient was next. Mother Superior Aldetrude rushed into the ward, knelt over the Indian nurse and was at once attacked and robbed. Assistant Mother Teresa Lina saw a tribesman point a rifle at Mother Aldetrude and jumped in front of her. A bullet went through Teresalina's heart.
"At that moment, Colonel Dykes, who had assured us we would not be attacked, raced from his room a few yards. along the terrace to get the Mother Superior out of danger, shouting at the tribesmen as he ran. But the Mother Superior fell, shot, and Colonel Dykes collapsed beside her with a bullet in his stomach. Mrs. Dykes ran from her husband's room to help him. She, too, was shot dead" and so on and so on; I shall not read out the full details.
While the representative of Pakistan seems to doubt the veracity of Margaret Bourke- White, he seems to accept without reservation the statements made by Mr. M.N. Roy, whom he now describes as a "non-Muslim patriotic political leader of India". This particular gentleman has been a patriot in many countries to mention them in order: Russia, China, now India, and tomorrow, in view of the admiration he appears to have evoked, perhaps Pakistan.
Whenever there is a hitch or delay with respect to the Kashmir problem, there is a tendency to blame India and to intransigence. Let me give a rough analogy, though not an exact parallel. Suppose I am a trustee of a certain house which my neighbour covets and upon the assurances of a house agent, I offer to sell it for the benefit of the trust for 10,000 dollars. My neighbour is good enough to be prepared to take it, but as a free gift. Accordingly, he sends his men to take possession. I go to court and complain about trespassing. The Court then says to me: "You have agreed to part with the house. Your neighbour has agreed to take it. Therefore, so much is agreed upon: the house is to change hands. Now, let me try to reduce the area of disagreement. You want 10,000 dollars. Your neighbour wants to pay nothing. Let us split the difference and make it 5,000 dollars" I naturally reject these terms. Thereupon, the Court says to me: "You are very unreasonable. Let me make you another offer. Let there be arbitration as to the price." Once again, I say: "No, I was assured of getting 10,000 dollars: there is nothing for arbitration." The Court then makes me an offer of 3,000 dollars, to which, of course, I reply: "I have already refused an offer of 5,000 dollars. How do you expect me to take 3,000 dollars?" Whereupon, I am told that I am intransigent for having refused three successive offers. In reality, there is no intransigence at all. India's position has been consistent throughout, except that, for the sake of peace, it has made certain concessions which, unfortunately, I have not brought peace.
In conclusion, I should like to quote what the Prime Minister said about the Kashmir issue at a Press conference in Delhi soon after his return to India. He was asked what statements he had made on this subject, and his reply was:
"What I said was that the Kashmir issue, or any such issue, would be resolved in three ways. The first was one of war, whatever the result; the other was continuation of the stalemate as it is now; and the third was some kind of settlement by mediation, if it could be brought about directly.
"I definitely said that resolution of an issue of this kind by arbitration was not possible. Mediation means other people. helping the parties themselves in coming to a settlement. There cannot be any compulsion about mediation.
"And I said further that we wanted to do everything to increase the prestige of the United Nations by its being associated with that mediation as it had been in the past." Then, referring to the activities of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, the Prime Minister replied:
"I am not prepared to say that there have been no results at all. There have been many results: One major result which we aimed at when we went to the United Nations was to prevent the spreading of this conflict, which is a very big thing. We did succeed in that, but, as I said, if you rule out mediation, then the only two things remaining are either continuation of the present deadlock or war. So far as we are concerned, and I have said this repeatedly, we want to rule out war or resumption of hostilities for the settlement of this, or any dispute. In fact, at least on half a dozen occasions, I precisely put forward this proposal: that, whatever way might be found of resolving the Kashmir dispute, war should be ruled out. I have put it to Pakistan, and I have put this publicly in other ways. If we rule it out, that fact alone reduces a great deal of tension, psychological and other, and one proceeds to consider the matter in a different context.
"Maybe it is a difficult question, in the sense that passions have been roused. I am not going into the merits at this moment. It takes time. Maybe one has to go step by step."
Asked about the next step to solve the deadlock, the Prime Minister said that, whatever may be the next step, it should be under the auspices of the United Nations; what form it should take, could be considered later.
I have tried to deal with the more important parts of the speech of the representative of Pakistan, but it must not be assumed that, because I have not had time to deal with every detail, anything that I have not controverted is admitted. I should like to comment upon these other matters, if I think necessary, at a subsequent stage.