09021948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 465 held on 9 February 1950

09021948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 465 held on 9 February 1950

I regret that my submission to the Council has become so lengthy; it might even begin to appear to be wearisome. But I have no doubt it will be realized that the problem before the Council is of great magnitude and of vital importance-not only to the parties, but, as I said in my opening remarks [463rd meeting], to the maintenance of international peace-and has an extensive background and many ramifications. I do wish to assure the Council that, though I am conscious of making large claims upon its valuable time, it is necessary that, before the Council proceeds to determine what is the course that should be adopted at this stage in order to resolve this problem, it should be in possession of every aspect of it.

Before I resume my submission to the Council I wish to say that yesterday afternoon [464th meeting] I was very naturally disturbed and somewhat distressed at hearing Sir Benegal N. Rau say that I had attributed to him, in the course of the first part of my submission to the Council at that meeting, certain things that he had not said.

The Council will recall what I said at the conclusion of my submission yesterday afternoon, but apart from that, I have looked into the matter myself and have taken pains to study afresh what Sir Benegal N. Rau said in that connexion and what Mr. Setalvad had said earlier to which I also had made reference. I desire, with the permission of the President, in the course of the next three or four minutes to make a submission. in that respect.

Sir Benegal N. Rau had said [463rd meeting] "Another misconception which dies hard is that the whole trouble in Kashmir was the result of the Maharaja's accession to India. It cannot be repeated too often that the very reverse was the case. Invaders from outside Kashmir began to pour into the Valley of Kashmir on 22 October 1947. This is a historical fact which can be easily proved from the records, and which no one, to my knowledge, has controverted. The Maharaja's letter containing the Instrument of Accession was written on 26 October 1947...."

Sir Benegal N. Rau then quoted certain passages of the Maharaja's letter which made reference to this tribal incursion. And even that letter went on to say the following-the picture that was then sought to be presented to Lord Mountbatten was that the whole trouble started with the tribal incursion-in a section which was not contained in the quotation made by Sir Benegal N. Rau, and I quote just one sentence: "The people of my State, both the Muslims and non-Muslims, generally have taken no part at all". That was written on 26 October.

In the same connexion, when Mr. Setalvad was addressing the Security Council on behalf of India on 23 January 1948 [234th meeting] he stated the following:

"Thus came the invasion of Kashmir on 22 October 1947. It commenced with an attack at a place called Muzaffarabad in Kashmir. What is most important to remember is the fact that, until that raid commenced on 22 October 1947 that is, the raid by the tribesmen-there had not been any killing by the Dogras. A point which has been repeatedly mentioned to the members is that Muslims were killed by the Dogras and it was because of the killing of the Muslims that the tribesmen, their brethren, returned from the frontier. That is a totally untrue picture."

Although Sir Benegal N. Rau did not actually use the words used by Mr. Setalvad, he was referring to the same thing, that is, that it was a totally untrue picture of the actual events to say that there had been any trouble inside the State worth the name, let us say, which could have incited the tribesmen or Pakistan nationals to go into the State to help their co religionists. It is true that Sir Benegal N. Rau did not use the expression "nothing had happened" which I repeated on two or three occasions yesterday afternoon. But that is my own epitome of the argument put forward by Mr. Setalvad and sought to be repeated so far as I could understand it, by Sir Benegal N. Rau, that is, that what led to the whole trouble in Kashmir were these incidents of 22 October, and that the trouble started with them.

Our case has been this and I put it to the Security Council, as follows, in reply to Mr. Setalvad in the next meeting of the Security Council on 24 January 1948 [235th meeting]:

 

"The real picture is that it is a movement of the people in Kashmir to get rid of Dogra tyranny brought about by the massacres to which I shall presently come, the existence of which has been altogether and categorically denied by the representative of India before 22 October when the first raid took place. This movement is spreading. No doubt, there is sympathy among the tribesmen, and I have not denied the fact that there is sympathy all through Pakistan with the struggle. But the spearhead of the movement, the people upon whom the brunt of it has fallen and who are mainly fighting, are the people of Kashmir themselves. If that were not so, the movement would have collapsed within three days. How is it continuing?"

Thus, the real difference between the presentation made by the representative of India and the presentation that I have sought to make is this: that weeks before 22 October, the persecution, massacre and extermination-to use the expression employed by the correspondent of The Times in his contribution of 10 October 1948-had commenced: "Many of them had been killed and many of them had been compelled to leave their homes." In the words of Sheikh Abdullah himself, which I quoted yesterday, as reported in his Press statement in New Delhi on 21 October, the panic was created by the dispatch of the troops of the State to quell this movement, and thereupon the people of Poonch-those who had taken up arms-took their women and children across the border, across the River Jhelum to Pakistan, obtained arms, returned to the State, began their military campaign, and dispensed the Maharaja's forces, and this freedom movement started.

All that had happened before 21 October. That was the point I was making. If I used any expression in describing the gist of this argument which actually was not employed by the representative of India, I would both apologize in respect of it, if he has any objection to it, and I would also explain that that was the presentation of my argument which I have now put before the Security Council in the very words of Sir Benegal N. Rau himself and in those of Mr. Setalvad.

I shall now go on to deal with the problem of the disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces. The Azad Kashmir forces, it must be realized, consist of nationals of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. They are not people who have come from outside; they are the people who started this freedom movement towards the end of August or some time early in September of 1947, But these people were not just mere rabble or just ordinary citizens who had had no military experience. The vast majority of them were ex-servicemen who had fought in the Indian armies, as they were called up during the Second World War, and there were others who were at one time serving in the Kashmir State forces, and when this disturbance and clash started, they deserted over to the freedom movement, instead of continuing to support the Maharaja's rule.

The next thing to remember with regard to them is that they are entirely an infantry force with no artillery, no armour and no air force. Their strength was, at the time when the Commission arrived on the sub-continent, thirty-two battalions, although it might be remembered that a battalion of the Azad Kashmir force consists of 650 men as against the 840, of which an Indian or Pakistan battalion is composed. Even in respect of the military equipment that they do possess, an Azad battalion is much inferior in armament and equipment to a regular Indian or Pakistan battalion. Nevertheless, it must be remembered that even in 1947 and the early part of 1948, these Azad Kashmir forces had first routed the Maharaja's forces and had driven them away, and had next put up a more or less equal struggle against the Indian forces that had gone into Kashmir, and had for many months held on to their positions with very little loss in their fight against the Indian forces. This was the strength, the armament and the character of the Azad Kashmir forces.

It is alleged, and the point sought to be made, is that during the period from August 1948 onwards, these forces have been augmented and strengthened and that, as the representative of India said "This was contrary to the understanding that Pakistan would not use the period for consolidating its position or increasing its military potential". It becomes necessary, therefore, first to see whether there has been any change, and if so of what description, in respect of the Azad Kashmir forces. If there has been any change, when did it take place, and was it, if it took place, contrary to any understanding or undertaking? From the phraseology the representative of India employed in regard to this understanding, it appears that he was referring to the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 75] in which, in part I which deals with the cease fire order, the following words occur in paragraph B: "The High Commands of the Indian and Pakistan forces agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment the military potential of the forces under their control of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

The first thing to realize in respect of this is that these were the proposals which formed the resolution. This was what was proposed by the Commission to each side. The understanding or the undertaking would arise only on acceptance of these proposals.

The next thing to note, which is of great importance, is that this is paragraph B under the cease-fire order. That is to say, there is first to be a cease-fire: fighting must stop. After the fighting had ceased, each side would be bound not to augment the military potential of the forces under its control. It is obvious that this was to apply once fighting had stopped. It would not be possible, when fighting was going on, to lay down, as it were, the conditions under which the fighting should take place, as if it were a game being conducted which must be played according to certain limitations that the Council had laid down. The Commission was building up a structure, step by step, for the cease-fire, for the truce, and in order to get to the plebiscite. Obviously, the first step was the cease-fire. That is dealt with in paragraph A, which is anterior to paragraph B and says:

"The Governments of India and Pakistan agree that their respective High Commands will issue separately and simultaneously a cease-fire order..." and so on.

Once the cease-fire has taken place both sides are bound not to augment the military potential, which is logical and perfectly understandable.

The third thing to understand is that it was not only Pakistan that was bound but India also. The representative of India argues on the basis that, after 13 August, Pakistan was guilty of the contravention of this direction or agreement or understanding laid down in paragraph B by doing something to the Azad forces. We shall come to what it was and to whether anything did or did not occur. What was the position? What was the understanding or obligation? Fighting was going on. Fighting did not stop until 1 January the following year, and I fail to understand what is the understanding to which Pakistan or for that matter, India, could have adhered during that period when the cease-fire had not yet been brought about. I am sure that it was not the contention of the representative of India that, while the Indian forces went on attacking, the other side-Azad Kashmir or Pakistan, whoever was fighting on the other side-should take no step to withstand the attacks of these military forces. The fighting was actually going on. Not only was it actually going on at that time, but during the November Indian offensive, India pushed these forces back and deprived them of quite substantial territory. This was during the period in November 1948. Now the complaint is made that from 13 August onwards until the spring of 1949 these forces were being augmented.

That there was an Indian offensive in November 1948 can not be denied. We made a complaint through the Commission to the Security Council that while the Commission was engaged upon setting the terms of an agreement, India had mounted an offensive in these areas, which it was pushing forward. We asked the Commission to bring this matter to the notice of the Security Council-which it did-and to take effective steps to see that the position did not deteriorate any further. The letter is dated 19 November, and on 22 November it was forwarded by the Chairman of the Commission to the Security Council [S/1196, annex 1]. The text is as follows:

"The Pakistan Government wishes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the developments in Kashmir which constitute definite violations by India of the undertaking given by both Governments in response to UNCIP's resolution"-which was accepted by both sides"-"of 19 September 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 109]. This resolution appealed to both Governments to use their best endeavours during the absence of the Commission to lessen the existing tension in this dispute so as to further prepare the ground for its peaceful final settlement.

"The Government of Pakistan has scrupulously observed. the undertaking given by it. On the other hand, India now appears determined to force a military decision in Kashmir. The Indian Army has recently been reinforced in the Jammu area by three infantry brigades, four militia battalions, one field artillery regiment, one medium artillery regiment. A Corps H.Q. has been established in Naushera, controlling three divisions of the army and one air-borne division operating in the Riasi and Poonch Districts. In the Srinagar area, reinforcements of two additional infantry brigades plus three battalions and one regiment of field artillery have arrived. The Indian Air Force operating in Kashmir has also been. considerably reinforced.

"Last September the Indian Army made an attack in brigade strength on Zojila Pass which was repulsed. In October an attack in brigade strength north from Jammu towards Uri was also held, while an attack by one brigade from Jhangar towards Kotli was held, fifteen miles northwest of Jhangar. The Indian Army has now started a major offensive by at least one division supported by armoured cars from Rajouri towards Kotli and Mendhar and is continually moving up reinforcements to Naushera. The Objective undoubtedly is an all-out offensive to obtain possession of Western Kashmir including Mirpur, Mangla headworks and the whole of Poonch.

"Heavy fighting is now in progress on this front and a renewed flow of refugees into West Pakistan has already begun as a result of this Indian Army offensive. The Indian Army has also renewed attack by at least one brigade over Zojila Pass and has penetrated the defences of Dras."-These are the northern areas to which references are presently to be made. -"These attacks on both fronts are being supported by maximum air action. It is quite clear that India's object is to secure a decision by military means immediately and so face the United Nations with a fait accompli.

"Hitherto Azad forces, with minimum support by the Pakistan Army acting in a purely defensive role, have managed to hold off Indian aggression. The Pakistan Air Force has so far not been employed in a combat role. The Pakistan Government cannot emphasize too strongly to the Security Council that unless immediate steps are taken by it to halt the Indian Army offensive, the Pakistan Government will have no option but to change its policy of using minimum regular forces in Kashmir and will have to undertake a counter-offensive with all available resources in an endeavour to prevent the overrunning by the Indian Army of Poonch and Mirpur districts. This must inevitably lead to more bloody fighting between regular Pakistan and regular Indian forces which up till now the Pakistan Government has sincerely endeavoured to avoid. The situation is therefore fraught with possibilities of wide extension of armed conflict."

It was requested that this letter should be transmitted to the Security Council. The Commission did so.

Pausing here for a moment, I wish to draw attention to this. The undertaking which was required by the Commission from both sides, and to which the representative of India referred, would come into operation only after the cease-fire. That is

obvious. The parties could not be asked not to augment their military potential until fighting had stopped.

In the meantime, the Commission, when leaving the sub continent for Geneva and later for Paris, made an appeal to the two Governments that they should put forth their best endeavours during the absence of the Commission to lessen the existing tension in this dispute so as further to prepare the ground for its peaceful final settlement. This was accepted by both Governments but, in spite of that, India mounted this offensive.

What was the reply of India with regard to this matter? In a letter dated 28 November 1948 Sir Girja S. Bajpai replied to the letter of the Pakistan Government in a fairly long communication [S/1196, annex 2] from which I quote from paragraph (3): "The operations over the Zojila Pass were intended to relieve the Kashmir Valley of a threat from the north-east and the pressure by hostiles on Leh. The operation in the Poonch area, which resulted in the capture of Mendhar, was also undertaken to clear the road to Poonch, where, as the Commission is aware, a garrison of Indian troops has been besieged for some months and is still under siege."

It was not denied that military operations were undertaken-and, indeed, that was a fact. What was denied was that there was any intention to undertake any major offensive; it was held that these were minor operations, and that this was their object. But whatever their objective, and whatever the magnitude of the operations, the starting of military operations in that manner was a contravention of the resolution of 19 September, which the Commission had asked both sides to accept and to which both sides had agreed.

Nevertheless, the point is that while the Indian Army was doing that, while it was attacking both in the northern areas and in the western sector, a complaint was made that during that period the Azad Kashmir forces were being built up. Well, what were the Azad Kashmir forces supposed to do? Were they supposed to just go on retreating? If you are attacked, you not only have to build up, you have to take every military action that may be necessitated in order to hold the attack and, if possible, even to push back those who are attacking.

The concrete result was that, on the western sector, as the result of this offensive, the Indian armed forces not only had already occupied Riasi, to which reference has been made in the letter, but they further occupied Mendhar, and in the northern areas they took the Zojila Pass, and later on they took Dras and Kargil and they were able to relieve Leh. A reference to the map will show that those places are all now inside the cease-fire line on the Indian side; but at that time, when the Commission had left India and had made that appeal which the two Governments had accepted, those places were in the possession of the Azad forces. Those areas were taken away; they were taken away in the period of August, September, October and November.

And yet, the Indian Government complains today that the Azad Kashmir forces were being built up, and it makes a grievance of that. What did the Indian Government expect? Assuming that there was an undertaking not to augment, it applied to both sides. The Indian forces augmented, and they attacked, and they expected that the other side would do nothing. Well, is that what the undertaking amounted to, or is that what was expected? They attacked, and both in the western sector and in the northern sector they took away areas and towns from the Azad Kashmir forces.

What was the strength of these forces? Some point was made by my learned friend from India, and there appears to be support for it on the basis of his quotations from the reports of the Commission, that the Commission somehow did not have a complete picture of the strength of the Azad forces before it when it formulated its proposals of 13 August 1948. But it is not correct to say that the strength of the Azad Kashmir forces was not completely known to the Commission.

On 31 August 1948, there was a meeting between the Commission and myself in Karachi when we were exploring and clarifying the different implications of the provisions in the resolution of 13 August 1948. I shall quote from the official minutes of that meeting, from the beginning of paragraph 9:

"Mr. Korbel continued that the Commission had taken great pains to assure the military balance on both sides and the element of balance had been continually at the back of the Commission's mind while drafting the resolution. He asked the Foreign Minister to take note of the fact that, even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, the Azad forces would still muster thirty-five battalions of armed people who were not asked to disarm or to withdraw.

That is the explanation; that is the assurance which the then Chairman of the Commission conveyed to me in explaining the Commission's proposals. The Pakistan Army would be asked to withdraw during the truce stage; and, on the other side, only the bulk of the Indian Army would be withdrawn. To meet the apprehension that under those circumstances the Azad Kashmir areas would be placed in danger, the Chairman asked me to take note of the fact that, even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army, the Azad forces would still muster thirty five battalions of armed people who were not asked to disarm or to withdraw.

I am not for the moment stressing at what stage they were to be disarmed or disbanded, but I do draw attention to the fact that the Commission's proposals were based upon an assumption, and as a matter of fact were urged upon us for our acceptance on that basis, to the effect that the Azad Kashmir battalions were thirty-five in number and were properly armed battalions. To contend now that the Commission was not aware of the strength of the Azad Kashmir forces does not hold water. That was their strength; at any rate, it was the strength upon the basis of which the Commission proceeded. Actually, the strength was thirty-two, and if the Commission did make a mistake in proceeding upon the basis of thirty-five because of some error of calculation, it was a mistake which goes against the contention now sought to be made by the representative of India that they had minimized the strength of the Azad Kashmir forces. It is not that the strength has subsequently been discovered to be greater; the estimated strength was thirty-five, but the actual tsrengthwas thirty-two.

The question now is, to turn to another part of the case, what happened in the spring, but before I deal with that I wish to add one word: it was on the above-mentioned basis that agreement was reached on the clarifications of 23 and 25 December [S/1196, annexes 4 and 5]. Surely the Indian Government was fully aware of the strength of the Azad Kashmir battalions at that time. It knew, and had had experience of, their fighting qualities. They were not a disorganized rebel population or just a rebellious rabble; they were a fighting force, a competent fighting force which had put up an almost equal struggle against the fully equipped Indian armed forces, and they had held their positions more or less successfully against the Indian Army for several months. It was that type of force which the Azad Kashmir forces were. What happened was this. The Prime Minister of India had himself expressed to the Commission some apprehension that once a cease-fire came into operation, such a large force, if not completely controlled and under discipline, might constitute a danger. Therefore it was necessary that discipline and control should be stricter and that the organization of these forces should be on a regular military basis. Our proposals in that respect were made on 9 March 1949 to the Commission, and are reproduced in annex 10 to the third report of the Commission [S/1430/ Add. 1]. I quote from paragraph 11 of that annex:

"The Pakistan Government has considered the recommendations of this meeting and it informed the Commission on 8 February at a meeting in Karachi that it considered the

following arrangements essential to enable it to effectively discharge its obligations under the resolutions of the Commission:

"1. The relief of the Azad Kashmir forces is now in the forward areas by Pakistan regular troops."

This is the reorganization that was contemplated at that time. The second proposal was:

"2. The temporary withdrawal from the forward area and concentration in the rear areas of Azad Kashmir territory, of all Azad Kashmir forces to enable them to be reorganized and trained, under the supervision of G.H.Q. Pakistan, into a disciplined force of infantry units with the necessary administrative and ancillary units."

This was to bring them on to some regular basis as a controlled and disciplined force. The third proposal was:

"3. The relief, on completion of this reorganization and training, of the Pakistan regular forces in the forward areas by the Azad Kashmir forces."

Paragraph 12 goes on to say: "The Commission has also been informed that it is estimated that a period of some three months would be needed for the reorganization and training of the Azad Kashmir forces..."

That was in March 1949. That is all that was contemplated and suggested in order to facilitate the carrying into effect of the relevant provisions of the resolutions of the Commission. There was nothing underhand going on at all; there was a meeting with the Commission in February in Karachi, there was a meeting with the Commission in Delhi, and the Commission was then discussing measures which would be necessary now that a cease-fire had been arranged and would be put into effect to prepare those forces for their ultimate disposal. That was the method that was suggested. The representative of India has argued that this constituted an obstruction in the way of holding a plebiscite or making progress towards a plebiscite. Where was the obstruction? The obstruction has arisen because, contrary to its undertaking in the resolution, the Government of India now insists that the disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces such disbandment as has to be carried out, subject to the minimum that may be required for the maintenance of law and order-should take place during the truce stage, whereas the Commission had laid down clearly, and obviously contemplated, that that reduction should take place during the plebiscite stage. That, therefore, is the next question to which I shall address myself.

Is India right in contending that the resolution required that the Azad Kashmir forces should be disbanded and disarmed during the truce stage, or is Pakistan correct in contending that it has to take place during the plebiscite stage? On that, of course, the very last evidence is the language of the resolutions themselves. In that respect, I would first submit that the resolution of 13 August 1948, which deals with the cease-fire and the truce, makes no reference to the Azad forces whatsoever, and that in itself is conclusive evidence that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, such as was later contemplated, was not to take place under that resolution, that is to say, not during the truce stage. It was repeatedly explained to the Pakistan Government that that was not intended.

I have just drawn the attention of the Security Council to an assurance which was conveyed to me and which I was asked to note by Mr. Korbel, the then Chairman of the Commission, that even after the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army-and the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army would take place during the trace stage, of course-there would still be available, in the Azad Kashmir areas, thirty-five armed battalions of Azad Kashmir forces.

In the Commission's letter of 19 September 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 108] sub-paragraph 2 (c) reads as follows:

"Moreover, the Commission agrees that it will be anxious to reduce the truce period to a minimum and that the resolution does not contemplate the disarmament or disbanding of Azad Kashmir forces."

The reference in that paragraph is to the resolution of 13 August 1948.

I now quote from the summary record of the meeting of 17 August 1948, four days after the date of the resolution, between the Commission and the Government of India. In annex 12 of the Commission's report states:

"Moreover, he [the Chairman] pointed out the limits. Government of India forces would remain and that on the other side only the Azad forces would remain in their

positions."

On 17 August this was clearly conveyed to the Government of India as the meaning of the Commission with regard to its truce proposals: that after the bulk of the Indian Army had withdrawn, there would still remain on the Indian side limited Government of India forces, and that on the other side tribesmen would have withdrawn, Pakistan volunteers would have withdrawn, and the Pakistan Army would have withdrawn, and there would remain only the Azad people in their present positions. It cannot be pretended that that was not the clear

meaning of the resolution when the Commission itself was at pains to explain that to the Government of India. But let us go on to the resolution of 15 January 1949 (S/1976, paragraph 15]. I shall have to come back to the interval to show how the whole of this question arose and was dealt with, but let us see what the resolutions themselves provide. The resolution of 5 January 1949 was a resolution which extended part III of the resolution of 13 August, part III having dealt with the plebiscite. Sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the resolution of

5 January 1949 reads as follows:

"(a) After implementation of parts I and II of the Com mission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces; such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

That is the first part of paragraph 4. I am not saying that because it is mentioned first it must be completed before anything is done, but paragraph 4 has two parts and this is the first part. In this connexion I would draw Security Council's attention particularly to the fact that the representative of India, on 7 February [463rd meeting], made a grievance of the fact that although the Commission had not proposed to touch these State armed forces on the Indian side, General McNaugh ton's proposal [S/1453) had brought the State armed forces also into the scheme. But these are clearly mentioned here, that after parts I and II have been implemented, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces shall be carried out by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator as determined by them, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

The second part of that paragraph, sub-paragraph 4 (b). deals with the situation after the implementation of parts 1 and II of the 13 August resolution and after it has dealt with the final disposal of the remaining armed forces of India and the State armed forces. This second part of the paragraph reads as follows:

"As regards the territory referred to in part II, section A. paragraph 2 of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities."

It is as clear as anything could be that in the whole scheme of demilitarization, the disbanding and disarmament, or call it the final disposal, of the Azad Kashmir forces is to be undertaken at this stage, and that is the balance. In the truce stage, the bulk of the Indian armed forces are to withdraw from Kashmir and, on the other side, the tribesmen are to withdraw, the Pakistan volunteers are to withdraw, and the Pakistan regular army is to withdraw. That is the truce stage. When that is completed, then the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, on the Indian side, the final disposal of the remaining Indian forces and of the other armed forces in the State; and on this side, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, with the local authorities, the final disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces. Could any doubt be left as to what was intended by the resolutions? This was clearly communicated to the Government of India.

The Government of India had raised, it is true, the question of a large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces. But there was no question at that stage that they would be disbanded any earlier than the plebiscite stage. As late as 18 February 1949, after the acceptance of both these resolutions with that meaning and with those explanations, the correct position with regard to the Azad Kashmir forces was known to and accepted by the Government of India. There was no question.

I would draw the attention of the Security Council to Sir Girja S. Bajpai's letter dated 18 February 1949 to the Commission, reproduced in annex 7 of the Commission's third report [S/1430/Add. 1]. I draw particular attention to paragraph 3 of that letter:

The disarming of Azad forces is really a matter of chronology. First there must be a cease-fire and, after that, a truce, as envisaged in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. After that, the condition precedent to arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite is the creation of conditions in which Kashmir nationals can return to the area now in the occupation of Azad Kashmir forces. So far as non-Muslims are concerned, such a movement will not take place until large-scale disarming of these forces has been carried out."

That is again quite clear. Sir Girja S. Bajpai himself interprets these provisions as meaning that it is a matter of chronology First, there must be a cease-fire. Then, there must be a truce agreement. Then, during the truce, whatever withdrawals have to take place should take place. Then, he says, ancillary to the plebiscite arrangements, you have to create conditions under which people who have migrated from certain areas should be able to return to them and, he says, so far as the non-Muslim people who have migrated from the areas under the control of Azad Kashmir are concerned, it cannot be expected that they will be able to return to those areas unless a large-scale disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces has taken place. That, clearly again, is as provided for in sub-paragraph 4 (b), which is a part of the resolution of 5 January, and the resolution of 5 January addresses itself to create the conditions under which the plebiscite could be organized and held. Nothing could be clearer than that.

But, later on, the Government of India began to change its position. In his letter of 10 March 1949 to the Commission, which is annex 11 to the Commission's third interim report, Sir Girja S. Bajpai states the following:

"Pakistan forces must be withdrawn entirely from Jammu and Kashmir State territory and the disposal of the so-called Azad Kashmir forces during the period of the truce must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate collapse .

disbanding and disarming of these forces." Here, again, although the position has been shifted, all that was asked for at that stage was that preparations must be made for the disbanding and disarming of those forces at a later stage.

The Commission perceived what was intended and replied to Sir Girja S. Bajpai on 14 March 1949. This reply appears as annex 12 to the report, and I quote the second sentence of paragraph 2:

"In the course of the conversations last August the Commission explained to the Government of Pakistan that in its view a 'military balance' would exist in the State of Jammu and Kashmir during the truce period in the sense and to the extent that the resolution of 13 August did not call for the disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces, which the Commission understood to number approximately thirty-five battalions."

Now, when this question was raised with the Commission, that was the reply of the Commission to the Government of India. It said, "We have already explained to the Government of Pakistan that, during the truce stage, after the other withdrawals had taken place, Azad Kashmir forces would remain, and their strength is approximately thirty-five battalions."

The Council will note the progressive shifting of the position of the Government of India. On 18 February, it is a matter of chronology: "We realize that stages 1 and 2 of the resolution of 13 August have to be completed, and, then, in order to enable the population to return for the plebiscite stage, this has to be undertaken." On 10 March, "Preparations during the period of the truce must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate disbanding and disarming of these forces." To this the Commission replies that this is not contemplated.

Then, there is a letter from the Government of India to the Commission dated 28 March, which is set forth in annex 16, part 2 of the same report, in which it says that it adheres to the position that nothing should be done after the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces which would "enable the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops to be consolidated in any way during the period of the truce to the disadvantage of the State. The Government of India adheres to this view and

reaffirms its request that action should be taken to disband and disarm the so-called Azad Kashmir forces."

Well, the position has shifted from "the disposal of these forces must be so arranged as to prepare the way for the ultimate disbanding and disarming of these forces," which was what was asked for on 10 March-and to which the Commission declined to accede-to the position now taken, which is: "the Government of India adheres to this view and reaffirms its request that action should be taken to disband and disarm the so-called Azad Kashmir forces."

When this was encountered, we wrote a letter on 14 April. This letter is not, I believe, to be found among the documents which have been presented to the Council by the Commission, but it is in the Commission's records. It is dated 14 April 1949, and is from Mr. M. A. Gurmani, Minister for Kashmir Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, to the Chairman of the Commission. I quote from sub-paragraph 3 of paragraph 7, where we made this offer:

"After the publication of the truce agreement, and as soon as the regular forces on both sides have begun to withdraw, discussions under clause 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 regarding the final disposal of the Indian and State forces, on the one hand, and of the Azad forces, on the other, may be initiated. Any agreement reached as a result of these deliberations would not preclude the Plebiscite Administrator from taking any further action with regard to the Indian and State forces and the Azad Kashmir forces at a later date."

We practically met the request of the Government of India. made on 10 March 1948, that is to say, that after the publication of the truce agreement and as soon as the regular forces on both sides had begun to withdraw, then discussions might take place regarding the final disposal of the Indian and State forces on the one hand, and of the Azad Kashmir forces on the other. This is a fact which the documents would not disclose, but it is relevant in this connexion, and that is why I have drawn the attention of the Council to it. In its letter of 28 April forwarding its truce terms to the Government of India, the Commission stated, as set forth in annex 22, sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the Commission's third report:

"The Government of India will understand that the Commission cannot deal at this stage with the question of disbanding and disarming the Azad Kashmir forces, since it does not fall within the purview of part II of the resolution of 13 August. Nevertheless the Commission appreciates the significance of the question and is anxious to consider it without delay. While the Commission cannot share the view of the Government of India that a reduction of its forces beyond the strength mentioned in your letter of 17 April 1949 must depend upon the actual disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces, it is convinced that an early study of the matter would hasten the preparations for the plebiscite."

We had already offered early study of the matter.

Pausing here, the position was that the resolution of 13 August did not in any manner whatsoever refer to the Azad Kashmir forces. The resolution of 5 January completes the whole picture with regard to the third stage, which was the plebiscite stage. The resolution of 13 August dealt with the cease-fire stage and the truce stage. The Government of India understood, it appears both from the language of the resolution and from the explanations given to the Government of India and also from the Government of India's own understanding of the communications to the Commission, that the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces was not contemplated in the truce stage.

Then the resolution of 5 January 1949 was framed, based upon the agreement of the parties, and paragraph 4 therein deals with this matter, that is, with the final disposal of the remaining Indian forces and the armed forces of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on one side, and the Azad Kashmir forces, on the other.

The whole thing is perfectly clear. As I have said, it is true that up to 18 February the Government of India had understood the position to be as I have explained it. From 10 March, it began to shift its position and progressively to increase its demands until the demands became that the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces should take place during the truce stage.

Now who has been responsible for obstructing the future? progress of the plebiscite, based on the recital of these facts? That is for the Security Council to determine. Has the Pakistan Government in any manner gone back upon what it has agreed to do? Or is the Government of India seeking to go back upon what it had agreed to do with regard to that stage?

The next question that deserves the attention of the Council is that of the administration and defence of the northern areas. The northern areas were defined by the Commission in sub paragraph (1) (a) of its letter dated 16 April 1949 to the Government of Pakistan [S/1430/ Add. 1, appendix 19] as "the area of the State north of the positions presently occupied by the Indian Army, with the exception of Gilgit Sub-division and Agency."

The question of these areas was first raised with the Commission by the Prime Minister of India in his letter of 20 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 80]. With regard to this there appears to be some misconception in the minds of the Commission members themselves, though in their final report they presented the situation as it stands. However, they appear to have been under the impression that the position with regard to the northern areas was somehow consolidated on our side of the cease-fire line between 13 August, the date of the first resolution and 5 January, the date of the second resolution. That, in fact, is not so.

Actually, on 20 August, the day on which the Prime Minister of India wrote his letter to the Commission, the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not responsible for the administration of one inch of the territory comprised within what is now known as the northern areas, and the armed forces of the Government of India or of the State were not in occupation of one inch of this territory on that date. The actual position was that a considerable amount of the territory which was included within these areas and which I was in the occupation of the other side's armed forces was subsequently taken away by the Government of India in its offensive in November of 1948, as I have explained earlier this afternoon to the Council. Zojila was attacked and occupied, Dras was taken; Kargil was taken, and Leh was relieved. All along that line beginning with the Zojila Pass right up to Leh, the whole of that territory, which on 20 August was in the occupation of the Azad forces or local forces that were operating with them, was in the possession of those people and not in the military occupation of the Government of India. All that happened between 20 August, the date of Pandit Nehru's letter to the Commission, or 13 August, the date of the resolution, and 5 January, was that in the meantime the Indian Forces had, as the result of their offensive, occupied Zojila, Dras and Kargil, and had gone on to relieve Leh. Therefore, the boot is really on the other leg. There is no challenging of these facts. That is what happened.

As a matter of fact, the reply of Sir Girja S. Bajpai [S/1196, annex 2] in answer to my letter of 19 November (S/1196, annex 1) drawing attention to this offensive, admits that, in both the western sector and in the northern sector, military operations he does not admit that it was an offensive-were undertaken for this purpose and that that purpose was achieved. In his letter of 20 August 1948 (S/1100, paragraph 80) Pandit. Nehru mentions that they were "roving bands''. There is no question of "roving bands''. The population, as the Commission has stated, is 100 per cent Muslim in those areas. They had risen in revolt against the authority of the Maharaja in the beginning. They excluded everyone who had any connexion with the Maharaja in that area, and ever since then no one has ever returned, except in those areas taken as a result of military action and in the areas on their side of the cease-fire line. There is no question of the situation having undergone any change at all. No doubt there is the question that, for purposes of security, there are to be permitted to place garrisons on the extreme northern frontier of the northern areas. The Commission said that that is a matter which can be taken into consideration at the time of the implementation of the resolution. At any rate, that is a matter that was never brought to our attention until the documents released by the Commission. were published.

In any case, from the point of view of security, which is being stressed by India-security against whom?-the cease-fire line had been drawn and both sides were under obligation not to violate it. The cease-fire line now has been in operation in actual fact after the firing had stopped for over thirteen months, and with the exception of a few minor incidents, nothing has happened to interfere with the cease-fire line. What is it that the Government of India wants to provide against by putting military garrisons in places which have never been under its military occupation at any time during the history of this dispute, and which are on the other side of the cease-fire line? Security against whom? Well, it may be said, security against the incursions of tribesmen. In that connexion, the other day the representative of India, when he was addressing the Council, raised this point. He said, in effect, "Well, it is said that the Government of Pakistan has offered an assurance that it would deal with any contingency of that description that might arise within its own areas and its own frontiers, even if it necessitated military action." He said, in effect, "Well, that would not work for the reason that if the Government of Pakistan were not able to stop the incursion of tribesmen in 1947, how is it possible that they would be able to stop the incursion of tribesmen now in 1950 or 1951, until the plebiscite has been held, organized and completed?"

Now, there is a fundamental misconception at the basis of that apprehension or argument. In the first place, let me call attention to the assurance which we did convey, and that in itself will show why such an assurance can become effective. I have here a letter which I think has not been distributed. It is a letter dated 28 November 1948 from me to the Chairman of the Commission. It is not included in the documents released by the Commission, but it is available to the Council, it is with the Commission's documents. I shall now quote from the middle of paragraph 4:

"The Government of India has, however, pressed for the retention of Indian forces in Kashmir for purposes of defence as well as of internal security. The Pakistan Government believes that once a settlement has been reached with regard to the organization and conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite, there will be no further risk of a threat to the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In any case, should such a threat unfortunately arise, the Pakistan Government will undertake to deal effectively with it within its own borders, even if this should necessitate use of its armed forces. This should dispel any fears that the Government of India might entertain this count."

That also gives the reason why such an assurance can now be made effective. What led to the incursion of the tribesmen originally? In spite of the contrary assertions and allegations of the representative of India, I urge that what led to the original. tribal incursions was the massacres that were taking place and the apprehensions that the Muslim population of the State would be dragooned into declaring its acceptance of the accession of the State to the Indian Dominion. That was the crux of the matter. That is why fighting was taking place. That is the view expressed by almost every member of the Security Council who spoke on this aspect of the matter during the discussions from January to April 1948 before the Security Council.

Why is the fighting taking place? The fighting is taking place because this freedom movement started against the Maharaja, the immediate cause having been the suspicion that the Maharaja wanted to accede to India, and the tribesmen went in, as a result of the incident that had taken place. How could it be stopped? It was repeatedly asserted that it could be stopped only when the people were effectively assured that, while they were fighting to obtain what they wanted, they could obtain this by means of the exercise of their franchise. That is very good. Once that agreement had been arrived at and conditions agreed to under which the plebiscite would take place, the main objective would have been achieved and assurances could be given to the people. It is of no use to create trouble; you need not be impatient over it; hold your souls in peace. Both Dominions have now agreed on what should be done, and it is being done under the authority of the United Nations. The people of Kashmir will have the right and the freedom to decide their own future. That is the main reason why an assurance can become effective today.

Also, fighting has stopped; the tribesmen are out. At that time there was a sudden movement all through the tribal areas before anybody was aware of it, and that led to these incursions. Now the situation is quiet. If an agreement can be reached and if the various stages can begin to be put into operation, there is every reason to believe that no further trouble need be feared. But, as I have said, if further trouble should arise, it cannot be of a nature which cannot be dealt with within the frontiers of the Pakistan Government, and as the Government of Pakistan has said, "We are willing for them to take that step; even if it should necessitate the use of our armed forces, we should be willing to use them."

At that time, with all those factors, even with regard to our armed forces, what was our position? As I then said and as I repeat again, we could not have afforded to undertake, in those circumstances, first-class military operations against the tribal areas; they were all up in arms; the whole area was afire. But even then, what was our military situation? The partition had just taken place. The holocaust between East and West Punjab was going on. Attention was drawn to this in the discussion which took place in 1948. The greater parts of such armed forces as were available were occupied with the duty of maintaining law and order, and from the point of view of equipment, as the Security Council is aware because that was one our complaints before the Security Council at that time, out of 165,000 tons of armaments and material which the Government of India was bound to deliver to us as the equipment of our armed forces, I believe that not more than 20,000 tons have yet been delivered; the greater part has not yet been delivered. But that is beside the point. The point I am making now is that up to that time only 13,000 tons had been delivered, and now about 23,000 or 25,000 tons so far have been delivered. That was the state of our equipment. In the meantime, of course, we have had to equip our armed forces as best we could ourselves, 50 that, from the point of view of the likelihood of an emergency arising, there was every hope that it would not arise. If it did arise at all, it would be on a very, very small scale.

We do not believe it will. If it did arise on that very, very small scale, we could adequately deal with it through our political arrangements, and if it could not be dealt with through political arrangements, then military action might become necessary. That should be enough to dispel any doubts in the minds of the Government of India on that score. As a matter of fact, the McNaughton proposals lay down that the arrangements made by the Government of Pakistan in this respect should be communicated to the military adviser; he should be advised of them so that he is satisfied that they are adequate. That should more than satisfy the Government of India on that score. That refers to the tribal incursions. As a matter of fact, if any tribal incursion took place at all, it would not take place in the northern areas. The northern areas have very high valleys, are very sparsely populated, and populated to the extent of 100 per cent by the Muslim population. What would the tribesmen wish to do there, even, if they could easily get over those high passes? If the object was to get into the Valley, they could not come through the northern areas.

The second question may be, although it has not been raised and we do not know what the point is, that India is anxious with regard to security against some major Power invading those areas. That has only to be mentioned for the Security Council to realize that if that contingency should again unfortunately arise, and Heaven forbid, it would not be a question of a few battalions here and there in those areas. In the first place, in any case, no sane commander would wish to bring his troops to those areas over those high ranges, some of them rising to over 25,000 feet and where even in the passes through the ranges, which rise to between 15,000 and 19,000 feet, not more than one mule or, at the widest places, two mules at the most, can pass. But if the contingency did arise, it would not be these few battalions of the Indian armed forces which would be able to do anything, and in that event the defence of the whole area starting from the Persian Gulf and extending right up to the Karakoram would be the business of the Pakistan Government. That is a contingency for which it is idle to provide, and in any case it cannot be provided for by placing a few armed camps along these high ranges in the northern areas. The whole attempt is to obtain military occupation of an area of which the armed forces of India have never been in military occupation, to the extent of even one inch, at any time since this dispute began.

Another argument sometimes put forward has been that the northern areas control the trade routes into Sinkiang. Broadly stated, the proposition is correct, Sinkiang being farther to the north. After all, the trade routes pass somewhere. But actual study of the geography and of these routes will show that there are only two routes from Sinking into those areas over the passes. One runs through Hunza and Gilgit, and those places are outside the northern areas, which means that there is no dispute with regard to them. That route does not pass through or anywhere touch what had been defined as the northern areas with regard to which this controversy is being carried on. The other route, which is less frequented because it is not so easily negotiable, particularly in winter, passes through Leh and Zojila Pass. That is entirely in control of the Indian side already, and no part of it passes through or touches the northern areas, so that trade is not affected in these northern areas through which neither of these two routes passes. Thus we cannot conceive of any contingency which necessitates the Government of India's insistence that it must have forces in these areas. In any case, the resolutions are again clear on that matter. There is nothing with regard to it in the resolutions, and, so far as concerns the Government of India, although it did at one time bring this question forward, it stated that this was not a condition to its acceptance of the resolution of the Commission.

In paragraph 80 of the Commission's first report (S/1100) it is stated:

 

"The Prime Minister of India submitted another letter dated 20 August"-to which I have already referred "the contents of which, according to the statement of Sir Girja S. Bajpai, were not to be considered as a condition to the acceptance of the Commission's resolution by the Government of India."

 

That is the letter which raises the question of the northern areas. The Government of India raised the question but said, "We do not make it a condition". It merely brought it to the notice of the Commission. With regard to the argument that the Commission had gone so far as to say that under certain contingencies, when the Plebiscite Administrator of the Commission might determine that conditions so necessitated, certain Government of India forces might be stationed in those areas, General McNaughton had excluded even that altogether.

 

To begin with, it was, after all, dealing only with a contingency, and it is obvious that, in order to be rid of this matter over which the Government of India was raising difficulties, the Commission chose to reserve it within its own hands. But the proper comparison of General McNaughton's proposal is not what was being said during the truce conference between the Government of India and the Commission: the proper comparison is between the two resolutions of 13 August and 5 January, and the proposals of General McNaughton. But even apart from that, in its third report [S/1430) the Commission has clearly stated that any attempt to post Indian armed forces in these areas would restart the fighting. I repeat, "would restart the fighting". Is it the object of the Government of India to have the fighting restarted, or, would the Security Council be willing to lend its support to any proposal which could, in the view of the Commission-and the Commission was fully justified in taking that view-restart fighting in those areas?

 

In paragraph 274 of its third report, the Commission has said:

"The spirit of the 13 August resolution had to be observed. Its underlying principle was the withdrawal of forces from the State, the reduction, not the extension of military activities. It contemplated, and expressly stated, that the Indian Government would maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease-fire those forces of its army which, in agreement with the Commission, are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order."

That is to say, the observance of law and order on its side to the cease-fire line. Paragraph 275 continues:

"The situation in the northern area today is such that the posting of garrisons by the Indian Army at any point beyond those which are now held by it would result in an extension of military activities by the Government of India, although it need not necessarily imply an increase in the military potential which both Governments have agreed is not to take place on either side."

 

That is the position. It is absolutely incorrect, as a matter of fact, to suggest that anything had been done or had happened with regard to the northern areas between 13 August and 5 January to the prejudice of the Government of India or of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. All that had happened was that, to the prejudice of the Azad Kashmir side, certain territories had been taken away from it within these areas. In the remaining territories the Maharaja's authority had never been acknowledged since the first eruption of the population in revolt against him, and not an inch of ground had ever been occupied by the military forces of India. The whole problem is demilitarization. Actually, this would not be demilitarization: it would not even be remilitarization: it would be new militarization in areas where there had been no militarization by the Government of India's forces. The cease-fire line having been drawn, its whole object is that neither side is to be permitted to cross it-neither its forces nor its officers-and

This was clearly understood in those same minutes of the meeting held on 31 August 1948 between the Commission and myself in Karachi.

The then Chairman of the Commission made this clear, as can be seen in the following quotation:

 

"The Commission, continued Mr. Korbel, would assure the Pakistan Government that no Indian soldiers would tread on the evacuated territory." Then how is it possible for the Government of India to contend that there was contemplated, or now to demand, that its forces should be placed on the other side of the cease-fire line areas which they had never occupied, had never been permitted to enter, and never succeeded in entering in spite of their offensives, of their fighting and of everything they could do?

 

With regard to the cease-fire line, I shall quote from paragraph 276 of the Commission's third interim report:

 

"The Karachi Military Conference of July has settled the question of the cease-fire line. The line is now demarcated and agreed to by India and Pakistan. Until such time as the conditions envisaged in the resolution of 5 January have been created and normal life begins to return to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the line which is today a guarantee against a resumption of hostilities should be scrupulously observed by the Governments of India and Pakistan, and the opposing forces should remain behind it."

 

That, I submit, settles that matter.

 

Certain questions were raised by my learned friend which have not so far been covered by the submission that I have made. They are rather miscellaneous-of course, he was perfectly justified in raising them-but I must make my submissions on them apart from what I have already said.

 

My learned friend raised the question of the sovereignty and integrity of the State. He said that so long as those have not been secured, or were in jeopardy, or so long as conditions existed which were inconsistent with them, progress could not be made toward holding the plebiscite; I suppose that would be the argument.

 

In that connexion, he drew attention to the fact that the Indian Government's reaction to the resolution of the Commission of 13 August 1948 was that it was prepared to accept certain parts of it only, subject to certain conditions. Those considerations were set out in Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's letter of 20 August 1948 to the Commission. I shall read the relevant portion of that letter, which is set out in paragraph 78 of the Commission's first interim report:

 

"That paragraph, part II, section A, paragraph 3 of the resolution, should not be interpreted, or applied in practice, so as:

 

"(a) To bring into question the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government over the portion of its territory evacuated by Pakistan troops; "

(b) To afford any recognition of the so-called Azad Kashmir Government; or

"(c) To enable this territory to be consolidated in any way during the period of truce to the disadvantage of the State."

 

In connexion with the same paragraph, the clarifications given to the Pakistan Government by the Commission included the following, which I quote from the Commission's letter of 3 September 1948, which appears in paragraph 90 of the Commission's first interim report:

 

"In connexion with part II, section A, paragraph 3 of the resolution, the term 'evacuated territory' refers to those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command, it being understood that the population of these territories will have freedom of legitimate political activity."

 

The whole trouble was that the Commission was faced with this actual position that an impartial administration, a neutral administration, for the whole of the State, comprising both sides or even a coalition administration-was not acceptable to the Government of India. That being so, although that was contemplated and laid down in the resolution of 21 April 1948 (S/726) of the Security Council, the actual fact was that the authority boing exercised on both sides was being exercised on the one side by what was known as the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, on the other side, by the Azad Kashmir Government. But India insisted that the Azad Kashmir Government should not be designated as such in any of these documents, so that the Commission should not by any implication be construed as having given recognition to the Azad Kashmir Government. That is why the Commission, while talking of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on the one side, talks throughout of the "local authorities", on the other, although it is clearly understood that by the "local authorities" it means the Azad Kashmir Government.

 

In that connexion, the Commission explained, in sub-para graph 2 (a) of its letter of 19 September 1948, which is set forth in paragraph 10%-of the Commission's first interim report: "the existence of the Azad Kashmir movement has not been ignored by the Commission, consideration thereof appearing in part II, section A, paragraph 3, of its resolution of 13 August."

 

The Commission was at pains to explain that it recognized the existence of this movement and these authorities, except that it referred to them as "local authorities". As a matter of fact, it was repeatedly explained to us. We were anxious not to create difficulties on technical points, and we said: "All right, as long as it is recognized in actual fact, it does not matter by what name the movement is called."

 

Sir Benegal N. Rau, my learned friend on the other side, drew the attention of the Council to the true proposals, where he said this principle had been recognized. He quoted from paragraph 3 of section A of the first proposals, which are set forth at the end of annex 17 of the Commission's third interim report, and in which the Commission said: "The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State."

 

I might draw the attention of the Council to the fact that in annex 21, where the final draft of the true terms appears, its matter is dealt with under the heading "General Provisions". What is stated there runs as follows: "The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission." The words that follow in annex 17-"without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State"-do not appear in the corresponding provision in the final draft. But it is a fact that at another place in their proposals, in part III, section G of annex 21, the Commission says: "These terms are without prejudice to the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

 

What did that mean? In annex 23, which contains the text of a letter dated 28 April from the Chairman of the Commission to the Pakistan Government, sub-paragraph 4 (d) says:

 

"Part III, section G recognizes that the Commission cannot prejudge the sovereignty and integrity of the State as a whole. It should not be construed as envisaging the introduction into the area to be evacuated by Pakistan troops of civil or military officials of the Government of Jammu and Kashmir or of the Government of India for the purpose of administration or control. The Commission does not feel that the presence of this clause in the enclosed terms introduces a controversial subject, nor does it in any way affect the agreement already reached by both Governments in their acceptance of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948,"

 

It is therefore quite clear that the Commission was not giving countenance to any fresh doctrine. All that it was laying down was that the disposal of this question would be for the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole, and that the Commission itself was taking up no position with regard to sovereignty or such cognate matters one way or the other. It was not prejudicing or prejudging the question in any way. It is in this connexion that the representative of India drew the attention of the Commission also to the resolution of 5 January, sub paragraph 3 (b) of which lays down: "The Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite." He asked: How could the Plebiscite Administrator derive his powers from the State of Jammu and Kashmir if the State of Jammu and Kashmir had no authority over the northern areas? I shall presently explain to the Security Council what was meant by this clause, what was its genesis, and what was meant by the Commission, but if that argument were pressed to its logical conclusion, it would mean that the administration and military control of the Government of India should be restored not only in the northern areas, but throughout the whole of the territories occupied by Azad Kashmir. Otherwise, how was the Plebiscite Administrator going to derive authority in respect of those areas if the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not administering them and had no military control over them?

 

That argument cannot stand at all. As a matter of fact, what happened was this. When the Commission adumbrated this, it was pointed out to its members that this clause might be misconstrued as meaning that the State of Jammu and Kashmir should mean the Government of Sheikh Abdullah, or whatever might take its place and that unless they invested the Plebiscite Administrator with specific powers, he would not have those powers at all. The Commission said that that was not what was contemplated; all that was contemplated was that he should be deemed to have derived his powers, as a matter of legal technicality, from the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Not even the Government was mentioned; it was the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as a legal doctrine.

 

It was again pointed out that there were areas which were not under the military control or administrative control of either the Jammu and Kashmir or of the Government of India. Would any attempt be made to argue that authority should be derived from that State also? The reply was that the words "the State of Jammu and Kashmir" meant that he was deriving authority from whosoever had authority in respect of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It was only a formality which was being complied with. To some extent, no doubt, it would soothe the feelings of the Government of India to know that the Azad Kashmir Government was not being brought into the matter. I shall now proceed to substantiate that explanation of the Commission.

 

In the summary record of the minutes of the meeting held on Thursday 2 December 1948 in Paris between the Commission and myself, a discussion on these points is reported. We said, in the first place, that if the Plebiscite Administrator were to derive his authority from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, he would have to submit his proposals to it, and it might say that the powers he sought were not necessary and might accordingly withhold them

 

The summary record states:

 

"Mr. Ayub explained that as the Plebiscite Administrator was empowered by the Government of the State to take certain measures, he might have to submit his proposals for approval by the Government. Mr. Huddle (United States) felt that this question was a mere formality because the Plebiscite Administrator might be obliged to resort to certain powers which would be beyond the authority of the Government of the State."

 

He might not be able to exercise even those powers. Again, there is the memorandum dated 25 December 1948 embodying the clarifications given by M. Lozano to the Government of Pakistan when he visited Karachi before these proposals were accepted. This is contained in annex 5 of the Commission's second interim report [S/1196]:

 

"Clause B. 3 (b): By the expression 'the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers he considers necessary', is meant that the Plebiscite Administrator will be competent to exercise such powers as he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring its freedom and impartiality, and he shall be deemed to have derived those powers from the authorities concerned. The organizing and conducting of the plebiscite will be the responsibility exclusively of the Plebiscite Administrator."

 

That was the clarification. The Administrator was to be competent to exercise all the powers he considered necessary and he was to be deemed to have derived those powers from the authorities concerned. That is to say, whoever is exercising authority in whatever area, he will be deemed to be acting on the authority given him by them. If it was a question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the sense of the Government, of Jammu and Kashmir, by virtue of what authority would the Plebiscite Administrator call upon, say, the Azad Kashmir authorities to do anything to carry out any of his directions in the western areas? How would he exercise his authority? What provision has been made? This was the provision made in order. to take over this difficulty. The Commission chose this phraseology, and said he would he free to exercise any powers that he considered necessary to ensure the fairness and impartiality of the plebiscite but, technically, his authority would be deemed to be derived from the authorities concerned, whether the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or the Azad Kashmir Government. The Azad Kashmir Government was not specifically mentioned because of the difficulty which had arisen in regard to the sensitiveness of the Government of India. The argument that unless the Government of India or the State Government has authority over the northern areas the plan cannot be effectively carried out, cannot hold water at all. If there were anything in that argument, how would the Plebiscite Administrator exercise authority in Muzaffarabad and Mirpur? They do not claim to have authority over those areas, and if the argument is not valid in that case, how can it apply elsewhere?

 

This whole question of sovereignty and integrity is a purely technical question which the Security Council, from the very beginning, has set to one side. It will not go into it; it is not here to decide these technicalities. It is a human problem, and the Security Council as the representative-or, I must say, in these matters, the custodian-of the conscience of the civilized world, must approach it in that spirit and see how it can resolve the question. In 1948 the Council did make certain recommendations. The Commission went out. After a good deal of difficulty, and after the Pakistan Government had to yield a great deal of ground in respect of what it considered necessary for the fairness of the plebiscite, these two resolutions were eventually agreed upon. Today the only question is, what do they mean?

 

The parties have agreed to these things. As a matter of fact, neither side has said that it wants to back out. The Pakistan Government is prepared to carry out the obligations of the resolution of 13 August. The Government of India has not said it is not ready to carry them out. The question is, what do certain portions mean? It should be easy to resolve that. But the problem has to be approached from the proper standpoint. That opinion is reinforced by the very respected, charming Ambassador of India to Washington. She uttered this charge to the General Assembly of the United Nations in Paris. She said and I shall presently give the reference:

 

"We are by our own acts gradually undermining the prestige of our Organization and taking away from the peoples of the world their only hope. This resolution recommended by the Fourth Committee for adoption by the General Assembly has already been hailed as a tacit acceptance of the position taken by the Union of South Africa and as indirect approval of its policy by this General Assembly, My delegation has often been charged with trying to influence the emotions of the General Assembly. Perhaps a slight emphasis on the emotions is necessary to prevent us from becoming completely enslaved by legalities. We are rapidly reducing the General Assembly and its Committees to the status of law courts where lawyers discuss proposals and conditions of issues exclusively from the legal angle. In such an atmosphere there seems no place for any other consideration, though it should hardly be necessary for me to remind representatives that human problems have been solved only by a human approach and never through courts of law. The pursuit of such a policy spells disaster for the United Nations as an Organization that could implement the hopes and aspirations of mankind. I am content to leave this thought with this Assembly.``

 

Substitute Kashmir for South Africa in this passage, and I address the same appeal through Mrs. Pandit to the Security Council.

 

But there is no foundation for these legal and technical considerations. They have been taken care of, and, to the extent to which they have not been taken care of, they have been given up for the purposes of holding a plebiscite. The two resolutions are absolutely clear on these points. They are complete in themselves as setting up a scheme. Now the question is the implementation of that scheme.

 

Then we come to the final stages. With regard to integrity, I might draw the attention of the Security Council to one matter which I have already to some extent stressed. If by "integrity" what is meant is that the whole of the State should be under one authority, then the Government of India has its choice. The Security Council contemplated that kind of integrity. It suggests an impartial, neutral administration for the whole of the State, as free from the appearance of partiality as human ingenuity could make it. Very good, India has that choice.

 

In the resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] a coalition Government of the two sides of the political parties was suggested. That would also bring about that kind of integrity. The Government of India has its choice. If it is prepared, then we are prepared also. But if by "integrity", the Government of India means the military control of the whole of the State obviously, Sheikh Abdullab's administrative control of the whole State that is nothing to which the Pakistan Government could agree, and is not what was meant by the Security Council or by the Commission or by any State.

Let me make this clear. What does the Government of India mean by "integrity"? If it is as the Commission understood it to mean-that nothing shall prejudice the integrity of the State, that the plebiscite shall be held and the decision shall be binding with regard to the whole of the State-then nobody has gone back from that position. We insist on that position being maintained. When the Commission found itself at the end of its efforts to make progress with regard to the truce, as the Security Council is well aware, it made a proposal that the two sides should agree to submit to arbitration such differences as had arisen between them over the truce arrangements. That was reinforced by a very earnest appeal by President Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. We accepted; India declined. One does not know the exact grounds of India's refusal to go to arbitration over these matters. After all, it seems obvious to us that if I enter into an agreement with somebody else, and differences arise over the interpretation of the agreement, the only method of settling those differences is either by judicial determination of the meaning of the agreement, or by arbitration.

 

But there have been indications, once or twice, that the Government of India could not accept arbitration, because the terms of the arbitration were indefinite. If that was so, surely those terms could have been settled by the mediation of the Commission; they could be settled through the means of the Security Council. In any case, it appears that it is not difficult to state the points of difference, because they were stated the other day by the representative of India in his submission to the Council, and they have been replied to by me. It should be quite possible to determine what the differences are. This is the main difference; the demilitarization of northern areas, within which problems arise the questions of the stage of the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces- if the Government of India thinks that question arises-and of the synchronization of the withdrawal of the military forces. In any case, the significant point is that, with regard to demilitarization, which is the main question, the final disposal of the forces remaining on either side during the truce stage has to be carried out by the Plebiscite Administrator in any event, under paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January. If he is to do that what risk is there for anybody in the suggestion that, at an anterior stage, he should arbitrate between the parties as to how far, in the truce period, demilitarization is to go? The Plebiscite Administrator, a man of the standing, of the experience, of the reputation which he possesses-an Administrator agreed to between the parties-has to make the final disposal, so why can we not entrust him to determine what should happen in between, or to determine what the parties had agreed to in between?

That is all that had to be determined. But that was declined. It has also been said: "We cannot go to arbitration over. matters which have already been settled by the Commission." Well, suppose that we say a matter is settled. After all, we say, and we think we have made it clear to the Security Council here, that the question of the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces arises at the plebiscite stage, and not during the truce stage. That is clear to everybody; it certainly is very clear to us. But we do not say: "This cannot go to arbitration." We are prepared for it to go to arbitration in this sense: let the arbitrator determine whether we did agree to that disbanding in the truce stage. If we did, let it be carried on. After all, whenever a dispute arises, one party alleges that this has been determined in this sense; the other party says, no, this has been determined in the other sense. That is what a dispute over an agreement means. How else does a dispute over an agreement arise?

 

Then, it has been said: "We cannot put the question of security under arbitration.'' But nobody suggests putting the question of security under arbitration. The question is: What was agreed upon? The Commission had gone into all these questions-security, law and order, withdrawals, cease-fire, truce, everything and built up that structure. The only question is: What does that mean? No one says that the question of security should be put to arbitration. As a matter of fact, the final disposal of the armed forces of India and of the State armed forces has to be determined, under subparagraph 4 (a) of the 5 January resolution with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite. In any case, however, any considerations of security which are dealt with by these resolutions can be raised before the arbitrator.

 

But the position of the Government of India is: "This is what we say... These words ought to mean... Therefore, everybody must accept that that is what they do mean, and we cannot ask anybody else to determine this.

 

" Then, as I have said, the Commission found itself at the end of its resources and reported the matter back to the Security Council. The Security Council requested General McNaughton to get in touch with the parties and to see whether he could bring about a settlement. Well, General McNaughton has himself made a report on that matter to the Security Council [S/1453]. It is unnecessary for me to reiterate something of which the Council is fully aware. The General carried out his task. He has made two reports: one interim report, and one presented to the Security Council on 3 February. The proposals are before the Council. They are based on certain fundamentals: that is true. But those fundamentals have been agreed upon between the parties: that the future of the State, the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan, should be determined through a free and impartial plebiscite. Very good. Then, as General McNaughton has explained, he proceeds on the basis that the agreement already arrived at must be preserved, and that the difficulties that have arisen since that agreement, and with reference to it, should be resolved. But he says that he leaves aside legal technicalities and even the question of who is right or who is wrong in the argument; he takes the problem of demilitarization as a whole, and he does make certain changes with regard to the scheme that was visualized by the Commission. He says, "In my opinion, this is fair and this should be done."

 

The representative of India has submitted these proposals to meticulous examination and comparison. He chooses whatever he thinks goes in his favour anywhere in the resolutions, and correspondence and the clarifications with the Commission, or in the truce proposals of the Commission, and, if that has been in any manner changed or modified in the McNaughton proposes, he says: "Well, this prejudices me." But he does not look at the other side of the question. After all, either the McNaughton proposals could be identical with what the Commission had done, in which case, his grievance, I presume, would be: "Not having agreed to the Commission's proposals, how can we agree to these; they are merely an attempt to repeat them", or the McNaughton proposals could be different, in which case, in order to have a complete scheme of his own with regard to the questions that were in dispute, the General's proposals would have to go beyond the Commission's recommendations in some respects and fall short of those recommendations in some other respects.

 

That is obvious, it is inescapable. Who could make any grievance out of that? What is the real prejudice that the representative of India complains of with regard to those proposals? His only prejudice is that his point of view, which was unacceptable to the Commission, has, by and large, been equally unacceptable to General McNaughton. But General McNaughton has made an effort with regard to the demilitarization in the Azad Kashmir territories, by bringing about demilitarization with respect to the Azad Kashmir forces, not in one stage-the plebiscite stage-but divided between the truce stage. and the plebiscite stage. In that respect, the proposals are different in one or two minor respects, too.

 

The McNaughton proposals which were accepted by us were rejected by India. The matter has now come before the Security Council again, and it has been debated. The Security Council. is now in full possession of what has happened so far. The question is, what is to be done? As I said in the opening part of my submission to the Council, on the basis of all the criteria, or at least on that of the major portion of the criteria that the Government of India has to date suggested with regard to accession, Kashmir ought to accede to Pakistan if the choice was to be made by Kashmir itself. The Ruler should have acceded to Pakistan. As a matter of fact, the interest of the majority of the inhabitants of Kashmir indisputably points in that direction. Here is a significant fact. In the Indian-occupied area of Kashmir there were roughly 2 million Muslims before this trouble started. Of those 2 million Muslims, 600,000 to 700,000 are already refugees in Pakistan. What does that indicate? That is not an argument; it is a hard, poignant fact, and it is the strongest piece of evidence to show in which direction the inhabitants consider safety for themselves, security for themselves, and opportunities for the development of their intellect and for their progress in life, to lie.

 

As recently as January 1950 the following has happened. I quote from the Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, dated 30 January 1950. It is a piece of news originating from Rawalpindi on 29 January, which reads:

 

"Apprehensive of revolt in the State forces, the Indian Army is following a steady policy of eliminating Muslim elements from the State forces in Indian-held Kashmir, said Lieutenant-Colonel Manavar Khan, the officer com manding the Pioneer Company of Jammu and Kashmir State forces which crossed over into Pakistan territory on 22 January with a contingent of 500 men composed of officers, other ranks and their families."

 

Then there is a long piece giving the whole history relating how it was brought about. Five hundred of them-and at as late a date as this. If those people were free to decide, is there any doubt as to which way they would decide? It is not merely a matter of which way they are going to decide, but it is a matter of where they know lie their safety, their security, their integrity, their honour, their development, and their intellectual and economic prosperity.

 

Well then, that should have happened and it did not happen. We do not make a claim that, on that ground, Kashmir should accede to Pakistan. But it has been agreed that the whole matter shall be settled on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. Well, then, let the free and impartial plebiscite take place. At the 463rd meeting the representative of India said, in effect, "Oh, it is assumed that we have agreed to a free and impartial plebiscite," and then it is said, "Ob, let us try to narrow the difference as far as we can." He says that this is the wrong approach. He says, "I have said that this is an argument which at first sight seems good, but it is fundamentally unsound. India offered a plebiscite upon certain conditions. which amounts to this, that the State might be restored to its normal conditions before the plebiscite is held. India stands by that offer subject to those conditions. Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to desire a plebiscite with the State in its present disrupted and abnormal condition. The two positions are fundamentally irreconcilable."

 

That could have been argued here two years ago; that argument is not admissible today. Today it is a fact that the parties have solemnly agreed and accepted the resolution of 13 August and 5 January. They are international documents. The Security Council first laboured over the whole problem; the Commission Laboured over the whole problem, and then that agreement was achieved on 23 and 25 December 1948, after a whole year's trouble over the matter. The question today is not of any fresh conditions, of any new conditions. The whole question is to implement the resolutions to which the two parties have agreed. Has India agreed to them or not? Do they apply to a state of affairs? If they apply to a state of affairs which can be regarded as integrated in the State, then they apply to the integrated State. And if they do apply to a state of affairs which can be described as disrupted, then let us apply them to the disrupted state of affairs.

 

But those are the conditions laid down there. As a matter of fact, before agreement was reached on the resolution of 5 January 1949, Pakistan had itself put forward its own view of the matter which I will read to the Council, and which would show what our attitude has been with regard to these matters. It is a letter from me to the Chairman of the Commission dated 28 November 1948, and I have already drawn attention to one paragraph of that letter. However, it is worthwhile reading it out to the Security Council because it puts in a nutshell the whole position of the Pakistan Government:

 

"At our meeting on 27 November 1948, you asked me to submit in writing the preliminary reactions of Pakistan.

Government to the Commission's draft plebiscite proposals of 20 November." After certain modifications these proposals became the resolution.

 

"1. As I explained to the Commission, the Pakistan Government has authorized me to explore the ground with the Commission in order to obtain a fuller outline of its plan for a free and impartial plebiscite. My Government appreciates that the draft proposals are at this stage tentative in character, and are intended to furnish a basis for discussion. It wishes, however, important principles which should find a place in any plan designed to secure a free and impartial plebiscite.

 

"2. The Commission will agree that in order to achieve a Amin free and impartial plebiscite to decide whether the State should accede to India or to Pakistan, all sections of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be able to cast their vote without being subjected to any pressure or interference, and that neither of the two Dominions should enjoy any special advantage over the other in respect of the plebiscite.

 

"3. Pressure may be exercised through the Army, the police or the civil administration. In order to eliminate or neutralize these sources of pressure, the following measures are necessary:

 

"(i) Withdrawal of all outside troops;

 

"(ii) Neutralization of the civil administration;

 

"(ii) Provision of the fullest and widest powers for the Plebiscite Administrator; and "

(iv) Ensuring complete freedom for legitimate political activity.

 

"4. With regard to the necessity for the complete withdrawal of outside troops, it may be observed that when parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August have been complied with, Azad Kashmir forces would have ceased fighting, tribesmen would have left the State, and the Pakistan Army and the bulk of Indian forces would have withdrawn from the State in accordance with an agreed programme. At the end of the truce period, by which time law and order would have been restored in the State, the only outside troops in the State would be the Indian forces retained for internal security. The Government of India has, however, pressed for the retention of Indian forces in Kashmir for purposes of defence as well as of internal security."

 

I have already read the rest of this paragraph so I shall omit that portion and continue:

 

"The mere presence of Indian troops, even if they do nothing directly to influence the people of Kashmir in the matter of the plebiscite, would constitute intimidation and is further likely to be exploited by the party interested in securing the accession of the State to India. The freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite would thus be seriously jeopardized by the presence of Indian troops in the State during the plebiscite.

 

"Secondly, it is essential that the civil administration should be impartial, or should be neutralized on the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan."-That is to say, on the question of accession.-"It is recognized that it would not be practicable to achieve this at all levels of the administration. What is, however, necessary is that this should be carried out at least at the ministerial level, so that, in the words of Senator Austin, the administration would command the confidence and respect of all people of the State, and would be a symbol to the people of both sides that the Government of the State was officially neutral on the issue of accession. The Security Council was convinced that this could best be realized through a coalition Government in which the major political parties shared equitably and fully. Pakistan The Government is also of the same view, but would be prepared to entertain any equally effective alternative which the Commission may wish to suggest."

 

At that time, of course, the alternative had not yet been suggested. The quotation continues:

 

"Thirdly, it is obvious that the Plebiscite Administrator should have the fullest powers to enable him to discharge his responsibility to ensure that the plebiscite is completely free and impartial. Having regard to his duties and responsibilities, the Plebiscite Administrator must be a man of international standing, in whose judgment, integrity and capacity everyone would have implicit confidence."

 

There are two great achievements to the credit of the Commission after it was able to obtain the agreement of the two Governments to its resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. One is the implementation of the cease-fire, for which, of course, it deserves every credit, and the other is that, fortunately for everyone concerned, the Commission was able to secure, with the agreement of the parties, the appointment, in the person of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, of a Plebiscite Administrator who fulfilled in every respect the qualities that were laid down as being essential in his case. The quotation goes on:

 

"It would not be possible to persuade such a man to undertake this high responsibility unless he is assured that he would have adequate powers to discharge it successfully.

 

"Fourthly, it is necessary to ensure complete freedom of legitimate political activity. Articles 11 to 14 of the Security Council resolution of 21 April 1948, were designed to secure this objective, and were accepted by the representatives of India and Pakistan. As explained by Senator Austin, the Plebiscite Administrator would have full authority to make these safeguards effective."

 

That is our position. To the extent to which this position has been modified by the two resolutions which have been accepted, we stand by the modification. The whole trouble at the moment is that there are differences between the parties, to put it minimally, with regard to the interpretation of certain matters to which they have agreed. The Security Council at this stage is faced with the task of finding a means of resolving those differences. It can, if it so chooses, pronounce upon them itself and can recommend its decision to the (wo Governments, saying, "This is what you have agreed upon and we invite you or call upon you to carry it through." General McNaughton has made an attempt. Although he has not tried to interpret the provisions of the resolutions, he has attempted to put up a scheme which would overcome those difficulties and enable the parties, and all concerned, to travel to the next stage in which, after all this had been done, the plebiscite could be organized and carried through. If the Council finds that these proposals are fair and we submit that they are eminently fair-then obviously the two Governments should be called upon to carry them out.

 

After all, the Security Council has to take decision in the matter, and it must discharge its responsibility in the face of this problem, which has now continued for two and a half years, with all the apprehended consequences which have been brought repeatedly to the notice of the Security Council and to which reference has been made again in the report of General McNaughton. After all, the world looks to the United Nations, at the moment, as the only means of its salvation in the face of the grave dangers that threaten humanity. Once the peace is broken on a large scale and the conflagration begins to spread, there is no one, statesman, soldier or scientist, who can predict what the ruin and the devastation may be. Civilization might perhaps then be left to flourish in the outlying and unapproachable islands and possibly in the deserts, but it would cease to flourish in what are known today as the civilized portions of the earth. That responsibility lies very heavily on the shoulders of the Security Council as the principal organ of the United Nations charged with taking measures for the maintenance of international peace. If, after the very careful consideration that the Security Council gave to the case in 1948 and is giving to it now, after the extensive submissions that have been made to the Council, after the deliberations among its members, the Council were to lay down or suggest or recommend-I am not concerned about the phraseology that may be employed-that, under the circumstances, it would be just and fair to do this, that and the other, and were to call upon the two Governments to take such action, the Government that refused to do so would be undertaking a very grave and serious responsibility with reference to the maintenance of world peace.

 

There is just one general matter to which, in the few minutes remaining before 6 o'clock, I might draw the Council's attention. In concluding, the day before yesterday, my learned and distinguished friend drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that his Government is so keen with regard to the maintenance of peace that it has already made a proposal to the Government of Pakistan that both Governments should make a solemn declaration for the avoidance of war as a method for the settlement of any disputes between them. It was perhaps the intention of my learned friend to be understood as saying: "You see, we have no warlike intentions. If this position is not accepted by Pakistan, well, the responsibility must lie upon Pakistan."

 

With regard to at least some of the problems-others have since arisen-which are, to say the least, agitating the peoples of the two Dominions and dividing their Governments, the elements are now before the Security Council. The Council is fully seized of the Kashmir affair. I have already referred to the dispute with regard to our canal waters and the matter of irrigation. Members of the Council may have read in the newspapers about the dispute which has arisen between India and Pakistan over devaluation: India devalued its currency, and we decided to maintain the international exchange rate of our currency, and India apparently has a grievance because we decided to do that. The consequence is that all trade between the two countries is now at a standstill. There are other differences, for instance, with regard to evacuee property and settlement of that dispute. They are all piling up because the question of Kashmir has not been settled. It is only with the settlement of the Kashmir problem that a movement will be made toward the settlement of the other problems.

 

But the Government of India says: "All right, let us make a declaration that we shall not go to war over any of these matters." India is in military occupation of the greater part of Kashmir, and it now says: "Let us decide that we shall not fight over it." All right, then what? What shall we do to settle this question? The Indian Prime Minister has said: "Well, but that issue is before the Security Council; we can leave that apart." If that statement about leaving the question apart means anything at all, it can only mean that the Security Council is dealing with manners and will resolve it, and that the way in which the Security Council resolves the problem will be accepted. If India says that we should make a declaration. that we shall not go to war over our disputes, we say in reply: "Let us settle our disputes, or let us at least agree upon the method of their settlement, so that our peoples on both sides may be assured that these disputes will be settled in a just and fair and equitable manner. Then we can make a declaration not to fight over them."

 

Our reply to the Indian offer was this, and I am quoting from the statement made by the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly on 18 January 1950:

 

"Our High Commissioner pointed out to the Indian Secretary-General that the main disputes between India and Pakistan related to Jammu and Kashmir; Junagadh and the neighbouring States which have acceded to Pakistan; the canal waters; the evacuee property; and the assets of Pakistan withheld by India.

 

"Regarding Kashmir he suggested that both Governments should reaffirm their desire to implement as early as possible the UNCIP resolutions by having a free and impartial plebiscite in the spring of 1950, and should agree in advance to arbitrate any differences that have arisen or may arise in implementation of these resolutions.

 

"Regarding Junagadh and its neighbouring States, the High Commissioner recalled that the UNCIP had been entrusted with the task of mediation and suggested, if its efforts did not succeed, that both Governments should agree to abide by arbitration.

 

"Our High Commissioner suggested that in the canal water issue, which is a juridical one, both Governments should agree in advance to refer the matter to a decision by the International Court of Justice.

 

"The settlement of the evacuee property dispute, the High Commissioner stated, depended on the settlement of the canal water dispute and should therefore be reached first. The evacuee property dispute should then be settled through negotiation and, if necessary, through mediation or, if that failed, through arbitration.

 

"India, the High Commissioner added, had withheld various assets, including assets of the State Bank and sterling balances due to Pakistan under the payments agreement. Here too, if negotiations fail, both Governments should agree in advance to refer the matter to arbitration.

 

"Our High Commissioner ended by saying that if the Indian Government accepted a solution on these lines, further negotiations could be undertaken to settle details of the procedure of mediation and arbitration and, when an agreement had been reached, a joint declaration should be made that the two Governments will in no case go to war.

 

"The Indian Government's reply, which, owing to an unfortunate delay in transmission, did not reach the Pakistan Government for several weeks, put forward a counter-proposal. Its draft suggested that both Governments should declare that they condemned the resort to war for settlement of any existing or future disputes, and agreed that the settlement of such disputes shall always be sought through negotiations, mediation or arbitration by a special agency set up by mutual agreement for that purpose, or by agreed reference to some appropriate international body recognized by both of them.

"The Pakistan Government has now replied, suggesting that the only way to promote peace is to resolve the major disputes, since a joint declaration will carry conviction to none unless supported by evidence of some concrete action. For this purpose it had put forward concrete and precise suggestions outlined above regarding the procedure to be followed in their settlement. These proposals have not so far been accepted by the Government of India, though the Pakistan Government has urged it to reconsider its view and to agree to binding formulas instead of mere declarations in general terms which are of doubtful value,

 

"There the matter stands. The Indian Government's reply is awaited. Pakistan is always ready to examine any proposals from the Government of India regarding the precise methods which we have suggested for settling the various disputes. The Pakistan Government feels strongly that even if disputes cannot themselves be settled, at least the procedure for settling them should be laid down by agreement in precise terms so that both parties enter into firm commitments which would, in the course of time, definitely lead to the settlement of these disputes."

 

That was our point of view. The Government of India has said that the question of Kashmir is now before the United Nations, and accordingly it should be kept apart. What does that mean? Do we bind ourselves to do what the United Nations tells us to do? That would be one way of settling this. But keeping it apart means keeping it alive, and what is the use of making these declarations while a major dispute goes on with a risk that any day the fighting may flare up again?

 

There really is no evidence that India is prepared to compromise over these matters to any extent at all. The latest pronouncement of the Indian Prime Minister on this question appears in The Times of London of 7 February 1950. Under the heading "Pandit Nehru on Kashmir" it says:

 

"Speaking at his usual monthly Press Conference today, the Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, said that Government of India proposed to continue to stand by what it considered to be right in Kashmir, and would not tolerate any pressure by foreign sources.

 

"Remarking that his patience was getting exhausted, Mr. Nehru referred with heat to the 'blatant and lying propaganda in the foreign Press' on the subject of Kashmir and also to the 'monstrous and scandalous propaganda of amazing falsehoods', in which, he said, the Government and Press of Pakistan were indulging. Although India had hitherto refrained from retaliation, it was common knowledge that the whole of the North West Frontier Province was a 'vast prison' and the whole of the tribal area was 'in a state of unrest"."

 

The Prime Minister is trying to turn that against the Pakistan Government. Mr. Nehru added: "I am convinced that every step I have taken on Kashmir is correct, and I stake my reputation on that." That is the attitude today. And yet. we are invited to make a declaration not to fight over these things,

 

What happens then? India has already absorbed Junagadh, and has already absorbed Hyderabad, and is in military possession of the major portion of Kashmir. And now we are asked to make a declaration not to fight. Nice and sweet; it settles everything. Let us either settle the matter in advance of the declaration, or if it cannot be settled, let us at least agree upon the procedure for settlement and also for meeting any trouble that might arise during the procedure; and then let us declare that we shall not fight. That is all we plead before the Security Council with regard to Kashmir.

 

I apologize once more to the Security Council for having taken two whole meetings and a considerable portion of another in making these submissions. Although at times, perhaps, I may have said more than was necessary to clarify an issue, and may have spoken even in certain parts with a certain amount of vehemence, I wish to assure the Council and the representative of India, that that emphasis was intended to be neither aggressive nor unfriendly. If I might venture to strike a personal note, those who have heard me speak on questions in Committees and in the General Assembly are aware that I am unfortunately given to speaking with emphasis. I think it helps in clarifying issues. Perhaps I may be mistaken on this point. Nevertheless, I apologize both to the Council and to the representative of India if anything I have said should either. have jarred upon anybody around the table or should have wearied anyone. Finally, I thank the President and the members of the Security Council for the supreme patience and indulgence with which they have heard me.