08021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 464 held on 8 February 1950

08021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 464 held on 8 February 1950

I concluded yesterday afternoon my submission on the principles that emerged from the stand taken by India on the question of the accession of Indian States to one Dominion or the other. These principles were that, so far as Lord Mountbatten, the then Viceroy and Governor-General of India, was concerned, he advised the States to base their decision on factors of geographical compulsion and strategic and economic importance.

The attitude of the Government of India was that the States were to decide the question of accession in accordance with the principle upon which the partition of India was agreed to and was effected; that is to say, the majority non-Muslim States should accede to India and the majority Muslim should accede to Pakistan. But if it so happened that a Ruler who did not belong to the community to which the majority of his people belonged was not prepared to accede to the Dominion to which the majority of his people belonged, the decision must be left to the people. It was clearly enunciated by Sir Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister of India, that on the lapse of British suzerainty, sovereignty in the States lapsed to the people, and that the decision was the decision of the people. If the Ruler took a decision in which the people did not concur, then the Dominion against which a decision was taken would not be prepared to recognize the act of accession. Any consequences that might flow from that would rest squarely upon the shoulders of the Dominion which had encouraged accession to it.

Let us first take the criteria laid down or suggested by Lord Mountbatten, apply them to Kashmir, and see what the situation was with reference to Kashmir; that is to say, the geographical situation, and economic and strategic factors.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir, as the Council is aware, was acquired by the great-grandfather of the present Maharaja by treaty from the British in 1846, a treaty known as the Treaty of Amritsar, by an act of purchase in return for 75 lacs of rupees, which roughly amounts to a couple of million dollars. It has an area of 84,471 square miles, mainly mountainous but with only two planes, the Valley of Kashmir, which is girded around by mountains, and the Jammu plains. It is situated in the extreme northwestern corner of the undivided subcontinent of India. To appreciate its geographical position and certain other factors that arise from that position I have taken the liberty of supplying the Secretariat of the Council, for the use of the members of the Council, with copies of a map entitled "West Pakistan and Jammu and Kashmir State". If those maps are distributed and if the members of the Council will be pleased to look at them, certain factors will become perfectly clear.

A look at the map will show that the boundary between the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Dominion of India bisects the mountainous range practically throughout its whole length. I should explain that near Pathankot, which is a railway terminus near that boundary on the Indian side, there is a gap of about twenty to thirty miles which is plainland. Then the mountains begin and the whole of the common boundary from that point between India and Kashmir is mountainous. Most of the mountains are high and inaccessible. The direct contact with India which can be used for purposes of normal communication with this State is through that gap of about twenty to thirty miles in width. The importance of that factor is that India, as I shall explain when I come to the strategic aspect of the matter, has nothing to fear from the side of Kashmir, inasmuch as there is scarcely any possibility of direct communication between Kashmir and India.

With regard to the boundary between Kashmir and Pakistan, it will be seen that the greater part of the boundary runs along the plains and cuts across three of the main rivers that flow through Pakistan. Then next comes the question of communications, which, of course, is one of the corollaries of the geographical situation. Before the partition, all three roads that led into, and of course out of, Kashmir passed through Pakistan, One started with Srinagar and went in the direction of Rawalpindi, but bifurcated at Domel; the other branch of that road went down to Abbottabad. The one from Srinagar to Rawalpindi is quite clear and near the boundary of the Kashmir State; as can be seen, it bifurcates into another one which joins the railway line at Hassan Abdal, but passes through Abbottabad. The other one travels from Srinagar to Jammu and from Jammu to Sialkot into West Pakistan, although with regard to this latter road it is necessary to submit that it crosses two very high ranges, the Banihal, which is certainly over 8,000 feet, and may possibly be near 9,000 feet. That road is snowed up four to five months in the year and cannot be used for ordinary traffic, so that all year-round communications between the State and the outside world run through Pakistan and still run through Pakistan now.

Since the partition, and after the Indian forces were moved into the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Pathankot has been linked by road with Jammu, so that India, too, now has a direct road communication with the State, but again from Jammu onwards to Srinagar into Kashmir itself, the same road goes over this Banihal Pass, and it is snowed up from four to five months in the year. Thus, the geographical position and communications both indicate the natural integration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan, and not with India. The State has a very short railway line running from Jammu in the direction of Sialkot, and that obviously again runs from the State into Pakistan.

As I have already indicated, three Kashmir rivers-all the Rivers that take their origin in or pass through Kashmir-flow into Pakistan, so that from the geographical position and the position of communications, its integration is Pakistan, and the only rail link is with Pakistan.

Yesterday (463rd meeting) the representative of India stated that the greater part of the trade of Kashmir, so far as its destination was concerned, was with India before partition: that is, with India as it is defined today. I have an issue with him over that statement. To start with, the one single article which is outstanding with regard to Kashmir's resources and trade is timber. The timber is cut down in the mountains. It is dragged down to the rivers and streams and floated down the rivers and streams into Pakistan; and the two markets for Kashmir timber have always been Wazirabad, which, it will be seen, is next to Sialkot on the map, and Jhelum, which is on the Jhelum River, where the river intersects the road and the railway between Wazirabad and Rawalpindi. Thus the whole of the timber production of the State passed through and was marketed and sold in Pakistan. There was no other means; there is no other means of conveying that timber out of Kashmir. The natural means is by way of the rivers.

The Security Council can judge the volume of this trade from the fact that 20 to 25 per cent, not of the trade of Kashmir, but of the revenue of the Kashmir Government, was derived from the sale of this timber.

The next item with regard to the trade of Kashmir is fresh fruits and vegetables. Again, as the Council will appreciate, the fruit starts from Srinagar. Whichever way it goes out, whether by the Banihal route or whether along the Jhelum Valley route to Rawalpindi, it has to travel 200 miles by road before it becomes available to the nearest markets, which are at Rawalpindi and Sialkot, both markets being in Pakistan. Obviously, fresh fruit in the condition in which it has to travel over those roads, where there is no arrangement for refrigeration and so on, could scarcely be kept for any longer period after its arrival in Pakistan. The same applies to fresh vegetables, so that these three large items of export from Kashmir-timber, fresh fruits and vegetables-obviously went to Pakistan and could not go elsewhere.

As regards woollens and carpets also, the largest of these was in the West Pakistan area. With regard to other sale of goods, such as the products of cottage industries and silk work, no doubt they sold farther afield, but nevertheless their transit, that of those that sold in Pakistan and of those that sold outside, was all through Pakistan, so that again from the point of view of its economy, Kashmir was integrated naturally with Pakistan and is integrated naturally with Pakistan. In return, such commodities as Kashmir needed were all obtained from Pakistan, so that the economy is interdependent with the economy of Pakistan. It is true, of course, that, like every other trade, both on the subcontinent of India and Pakistan and elsewhere in the world, there is a certain amount of trade with the outside world, but that really does not affect the question with which of the two Dominions the economy of Kashmir is integrated. But again with regard to its exports abroad, the greater part of the export took place through the port of Karachi, which again, as the Council will observe, is its natural port. Once these exports have arrived in Rawalpindi or Sialkot, the nearby seaport by rail is Karachi, and therefore these circles take that natural route.

So far as Kashmir's imports are concerned, Pakistan used to supply to Kashmir all its official civil supplies, at any rate, soap, rock salt, grain, pulses, cotton and petrol, but there is another and an almost overwhelming economic factor that. must be taken into account. It is this. The three rivers-beginning at the top of the map, the Indus, the Jhelum and the Chenab-which flow from Kashmir into Pakistan, control to a very large extent the agricultural economy of Pakistan itself. The economy of the whole of West Pakistan is based almost entirely upon its irrigation system, that is to say, upon the application of scientific methods to make the water of these rivers available for purposes of agriculture through irrigation works and irrigation channels. As much as 19 million acres of land is irrigated in West Pakistan from the waters of these rivers. There is a system of carrier channels by which, in the end, effectively pools the water of these rivers and then distributes it through these irrigation channels.

If Kashmir were to accede to India, this supply would be cut off altogether. This is not an idle apprehension on the part of West Pakistan. I am aware that every one of the members of the Security Council must think, "Oh, but that is preposterous. How could that happen? These are international rivers and the systems that are based on them would continue in operation. It does not matter to which State Kashmir accedes." But that this apprehension is not idle, I shall be able to indicate in one moment.

If members of the Council will now kindly turn to the map again, they will see that the boundary between West Pakistan and India itself cuts across three rivers. Starting from the Indian side, the first is the Sutlej; the second is the Beas-which is actually cut by the boundary near Amritsar, although there is a mistake in this map; and the third, the Ravi, which is cut near Pathankot. The Sutlej, the Beas and the Ravi have been cut across by this boundary. I will not go into the question of the fairness or the justice of the methods by which the boundary was drawn, but the fact is that it stands there. A good deal of the irrigation system of West Punjab is dependent upon these rivers also. As I have said, we obtain our supply of water from all these six rivers.

On 1 April 1948, that is, in the April following partition, India took up the position that, being the upper riparian State in respect of these rivers, inasmuch as they flow from the mountainous ranges into India and then on into Pakistan, India is the owner of every drop of water in them and is entitled, if it so chooses, to cut off the entire supply which flows down into Pakistan. On the basis of that claim India actually cut off the supply on 1 April 1948, and it was not restored until six weeks later when, at the point of the pistol, India had obtained an agreement from Pakistan that Pakistan would not only go on paying, as it was paying and was prepared to pay, its proportionate expenses in respect of the running of these systems. and the interest charges on the capital involved, but also seigniorage, that is to say, the price of the water supplied. But, obviously, Pakistan could not accept the claim of India and was not willing to pay the price of the water in the shape of seigniorage, but the agreement arrived at was that Pakistan should deposit that amount of seigniorage in escrow pending. the settlement of the dispute. Each side, of course, reserved its legal rights, and so on, but for the moment water is being supplied to us from these rivers on payment not only of the legitimate charges which we have never disputed and have gone on paying, but on the deposit also of what India claims as the price of the water to be supplied from these rivers.

One interesting factor in that connexion is that after the partition it was claimed that the whole of this irrigation system which operates in West Punjab had been a joint asset of the whole Province before the Punjab was divided into East Punjab and West Punjab, and that, therefore, it ought to be valued. It was valued. India insisted that it ought to be valued at a figure higher than the original cost, inasmuch as it was a very profitable investment. The arbitral tribunal which was dealing with these matters decided that it ought to be valued at twice its original cost. It was so valued. West Punjab was debited with the value of its proportional excess of share of this irrigation, India was credited with it, and, as soon as India obtained that credit, it thereupon cut off the water. I know that the Security Council is not yet seized of that dispute, but it shows that whether India is right or wrong-I am not, for the moment wanting anyone to decide who, in that dispute, is right or wrong-India does claim that, as the upper riparian State, it is entitled to cut off the whole of the water flowing into Pakistan from those rivers. Assume, for one moment, that Kashmir was to accede to India. The same would apply to the other three rivers, and not only the water of the three rivers which flow from India into Pakistan, but that of the three rivers which flow from Kashmir into Pakistan, would also be denied to Pakistan, which would be left completely high and dry. Nineteen million acres would be turned into a waste, and millions of people would be faced with starvation and extinction. That is an economic factor the like of which cannot be produced in a comparable case anywhere else.

So much for the geographical and economic factors. What about the strategic factors affecting the situation? Again, I would beg the Council to pay attention to the matter. As I have already indicated, India's security would not be affected one ounce by the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan. There is nothing that would be placed in jeopardy if that should happen. The barrier between Kashmir and India, except for those twenty miles, is all mountainous, and the addition of those twenty miles to the rest of the very long frontier between Pakistan and India-from Karachi right up to Lahore, and then through Sialkot towards Jammu-would make no difference to the security of India, to its strategy or to its defence arrangement. Twenty miles added to, say, 1,000 miles, makes no difference whatsoever. In any case, if there were friendship between Pakistan and India, the question would not arise. But supposing there were not. Then the measures that India would have to take with regard to the 1,000 miles would obviously cover these additional twenty miles also.

On the other hand, look at the question from the point of view of Pakistan. Take the main railway line, running, as can be seen from the map, from Lahore through Wazirabad to Rawalpindi and on to Peshawar. It has a road running parallel to it throughout. These are the two main strategic road and railway systems of West Pakistan. The whole of the defence of that area, which once included the defence of India also, and would still affect the defence of India, is based upon the fact that this line would not be threatened from the flank. If Kashmir acceded to India, the whole of that flank would be threatened and broken. The border of Kashmir is quite a long distance, more than 150 miles of this railway and road, running parallel to the railway and road within a few miles. Now, what would happen? Pakistan might as well throw in its hand so far as making any preparations for defence is concerned. India would obtain direct access to the tribal areas and, through the tribal areas, on to Afghanistan. Pakistan's position would become absolutely untenable. Not only that, but even India's own defence would to that extent be threatened, because the defence of the Pakistan frontier, and consequently of India also, from any threat to it from the northwest, has to be built up along the River Indus and then, beyond the River Indus, between that river and the international boundary known in that area as the Durand Line. If we were threatened on this line, if we were always threatened on our flanks, what attention could we pay to the building up and the maintenance of our defence arrangements along the frontier? It would lay a burden on Pakistan which Pakistan could not possibly undertake to bear.

Again from the point of view of defence, quite as many as 10,000 Pakistan soldiers are drawn from certain areas of the Kashmir State, mainly Poonch. They have their homes there we shall have to make reference to them later on, in the course of the consideration of other factors-and that fact would give rise to a problem for Pakistan which, in itself, would be of great magnitude.

Look at it, then, from any point of view one may choose: India is under no necessity or compulsion to require or to need the accession of Kashmir to itself. India has merely entered upon a gamble. If it succeeds in that gamble, it can crush and break Pakistan-and that is the object of that gamble. India does not need Kashmir from the point of view of any of its necessities. The possession of Kashmir can add nothing to the economy of India or to the strategic security of India. On the other hand, it is vital for Pakistan. If Kashmir should accede to India, Pakistan might as well from both the economic and the strategic points of view, become a feudatory of India or cease to exist as an independent sovereign State. That is the stake of the two sides; these are the considerations.

None of those considerations, in that degree or intensity, applied to any other of the Indian States, particularly with regard to the States as to which India's attitude was that, if they did not agree to accede to India, India would take military possession of them. And India did take military possession of them.

Yesterday, the representative of India, when talking about the constitutional position, said that the Indian States are free -even after the framing and the coming into force of the Indian Constitution, which came into force on 26 January last -to accede or not to accede. But the extent to which they are free to accede or not to accede became quite apparent from the history of Junagadh and Hyderabad, which, in brief, I submitted to the Council yesterday. According to the representative of India, Hyderabad is still free to accede or not to accede to India. Yet, it was not allowed to make the choice not to accede before the Constitution itself was framed.

However, we are not concerned directly with that one point. What we are concerned with is this: that the accession of Kashmir to India means practically nothing to India on the basis of these factors that I have been discussing, but is of absolutely vital importance to Pakistan.

Those are the factors which Lord Mountbatten suggested or recommended to the Rulers as the basis upon which their decision with regard to accession should be made. India says.

"no". Apart from these-it does not matter whether they exist or do not exist-the decision should be based upon the principles upon which the partition of India was agreed to and was effected, that is to say, upon the basis of the population. Well, let us see what the case is with regard to population. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is a composite State in the sense that it has two provinces, one being the Province of Kashmir and the other being the Province of Jammu. The total population of the State is approximately 4 million. The figures that I am about to cite are based upon the 1941 census, which provides the latest available figures. On the basis of those figures, in the Province of Kashmir, taken by itself, and apart from Jammu, the Muslim proportion of the population was over 93 per cent; in the Province of Jammu, the Muslim proportion of the popu lation was 61 per cent. I wish to emphasize that because, in some of the Press reports, it has been suggested that in the Province of Jammu, taken by itself, the Muslims were not in the majority. That is not the case. The Muslims were in the majority in each Province. In the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, taking into consideration the two Provinces, the Muslim proportion of the population is over 77 per cent. Those are the facts as far as population is concerned.

Let one look at it from whatever point of view he does. If one takes the factors that were stressed by Lord Mountbatten, Kashmir ought to have acceded, and ought to accede, to Pakistan, If one takes the factors upon which India has insisted throughout, Kashmir might to have acceded, and ought to accede, to Pakistan,

But, in addition to the population factors, there are all the cultural ties, all the ties that religious brotherhood has created; there is inter-marriage and there are inter-relationships between the people of West Pakistan and the people of Kashmir, and all the other things that bind any two communities together. Pakistan has always been the natural outlet for the people of Kashmir, both from the tyranny of their Ruler and for the development of their culture and their talents. I doubt whether a dozen Muslims of Kashmir could be named who, living under the Maharaja during the last 100 years, have attained to any position of eminence in any walks of life. I challenge anybody to name one dozen who are well known. On the other hand, people from Kashmir, once they have arrived in Pakistan, have always risen to the highest positions. The late Sir Mohammad Iqbal, the founder and originator of the idea of Pakistan, was a Kashmiri. He resided, of course, in Pakistan itself; he would not have been tolerated in Kashmir. The present Governor-General of Pakistan is a Kashmiri. The present Governor of Sindh, in West Pakistan, is a Kashmiri. The present Minister of the Interior in the central Government of Pakistan is a Kashmiri. It seems that the moment a Muslim Kashmiri leaves Kashmir and comes to Pakistan he receives the fullest scope for his cultural and intellectual development, for which there is no room in Kashmir itself. That speaks volumes for the conditions that exist.

Pakistan may be called the Beast of Belsen, as Sheikh Abdullah has called it; it may be so described in photographs to which the Kashmir Government has had recourse as a means of propaganda against Pakistan. But how is it that the Muslims of Kashmir have no scope, and have had no scope for more than a century, for any development in Kashmir itself, whereas, the moment they set foot in Pakistan, they have every scope and have always risen to positions of eminence and to the highest intellectual development? That in itself is the best answer to such posters. This word in the middle, in Urdu, means Pakistan. This is how the Government of India is treating its people about Pakistan.

How then did the dispute arise? When all these factors were in favour of the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan, how did the dispute arise? There again, I join issue with the representative of India in regard to the statement he made yesterday, that up to 22 October 1947 there was no trouble whatever and that it was only the incursion of the tribesmen on that date that created the whole trouble and necessitated the marching of Indian troops into Kashmir, and that those troops did not go into combat the freedom movement-according to him, there was no freedom movement-but only to deal with the tribal incursion. Very well; let the Security Council judge, after it has heard all the facts, what the actual situation was.

On the establishment of Pakistan, that is to say the partition becoming effective on 15 August 1947, there was great jubilation all through the State of Kashmir, particularly among the Muslims, that the time had now come for their liberation from the unspeakable tyranny of the Dogra Raj, against which they had struggled for a hundred years. "Pakistan Day'' was celebrated with great enthusiasm by the Muslims throughout the State, including the towns of Srinagar and Jammu. The principal political organization of the State, namely the Muslim Conference, declared unequivocally in favour of accession to Pakistan. We believe that a good proportion of the membership even of the National Conference, of which Sheikh Abdullah is the head, if left to itself would favour accession to Pakistan. The Maharaja's Government entered into a standstill agreement with the Government of Pakistan on 15 August 1947 and, in pursuance of that agreement, the management of the line of railway owned by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir and of the postal and the telegraphic services and customs in the State continued to vest in the Government of Pakistan. While this, I believe, was done in order to create an impression among the Muslim sections of the population that the Maharaja intended to accede to Pakistan, it now appears that that was not the intention of the Maharaja, but that it was merely a device to lull the population into a sense of security and to cause them to believe that the standstill agreement would ripen into accession to Pakistan. Also, of course, the object was that those services should continue to run as efficiently as they had done hitherto.

The Maharaja almost immediately thereafter embarked upon a systematic plan to import Hindus and Sikhs from East Punjab to overawe his Muslim subjects into admitting accession to India. He also began to use his troops. Now the whole question is, when did this movement on behalf of the people and this repression on the part of the Maharaja start? According to the representative of India, nothing had happened until 22 October, and what then happened was an incursion of tribesmen into a peaceful State. That, according to him, was what started the whole trouble. That is a crucial point. It was asserted before the Security Council by Mr. Setalvad when he addressed the Council in January 1948 [234th meeting] and it has been reasserted again by the representative of India, which means either that India itself is not willing to admit the undisputed facts of the situation or, which is unbelievable, that India is still ignorant of them. The representative of India appealed yesterday to me and to the Security Council to remember that date, 22 October 1947. He said he hoped that this would not be denied. We do not deny that the tribal incursion took place on 22 October 1947, but what we do deny is that there had not been a vigorous freedom movement already started within the State by the people of the State which was in progress weeks before this tribal incursion took place. As a matter of fact, the tribal incursion took place as a direct consequence of that movement, when it began to be suppressed with all sorts of brutalities and atrocities by the troops of the Maharaja, with the Maharaja himself sometimes at their head. Then the people both from Pakistan and from the tribal areas, unable to stand by and witness the further sufferings of their co-religionists in the State, did come in, and the trouble assumed the shape to which the representative of India had referred.

Now let us see what the evidence in support of my assertion is, I shall first draw the attention of the Security Council. to a Press note issued by the Maharaja's Government on 12 September, from which I quote as follows:

"On 24 August 1947..."-and I would beg the Council to note that date-"large and highly excited mobs collected in West Bagh Tehsil and on 25th August, disregarding all efforts to persuade them to dispense, marched on to Bagh, a town in the vicinity, where they reached the number of some 5,000, which swelled considerably during the next two days. These mobs were armed with firearms of various patterns, axes, spears and other weapons."

The measures taken to suppress this movement are the measures which became responsible subsequently for the tribal incursion. Here is an extract from an article which was published in The Times of London of 10 October 1948 by a special correspondent. It was published on 10 October, and therefore the material upon which it was based must have been obtained at least several days earlier and the incident to which it referred must have taken place earlier still. The extract says:

"In the remaining Dogra area 237,000 Muslims were systematically exterminated unless they escaped to Pakistan along the border."

Two hundred and thirty-seven thousand Muslims were systematically exterminated-according to the representative of India, nothing had happened-and by whom? "By the forces of the Dogra State headed by the Maharaja in person and aided by Hindus and Sikhs."

The representative of India yesterday said that he denied the assertion by Pakistan that anything had happened before 22 October. According to him, this is nothing. Here are all the elements that were present: 237,000 Muslims systematically exterminated "by the forces of the Dogra State headed by the Maharaja in person and aided by Hindus and Sikhs". This happened in October 1947, five days before the Pathan invasion and nine days before the Maharaja's accession to India. The extract was published on 10 October 1948, but it relates to those days:

"This elimination of two-thirds of the Muslim population of Jammu Province has entirely changed the present composition of East Jammu. Its communications and economic links, until then almost exclusively with West Punjab, have not been and cannot be reoriented to Pathankot." easily towards. Pathankot Pathankot is India's only road and rail head near the State. That is the point I had made previously. "There can be no doubt which Dominion the whole State would join ultimately if population, geography and economy were to decide."

Of course, the people of Pakistan were deeply stirred by all these events. They could not remain indifferent when their brethren were being massacred, exterminated, compelled to leave their homes, to seek refuge in Pakistan. Therefore, that movement started from Pakistan and the tribal areas into. Kashmir; they had to go to their assistance.

Perhaps this will still be regarded as an assertion on the part of Pakistan. Let me quote to the Security Council what Sheikh Abdullah himself said on that point. It is possible that the representative of India will be disposed to give credence to what Sheikh Abdullah said, as against what other evidence might indicate. Sheikh Abdullah gave a Press statement in Delhi on 21 October 1947. The date is significant; it was prior to any tribal incursion into the State of Kashmir. Of course at that time Sheikh Abdullah was not so completely subservient to the Government of India or to other interests as he has since become. He had been in jail under sentence of treason against the Maharaja-which is to his credit-and was released towards the end of September, I believe, at the intervention of Prime Minister Nehru, and was then in Delhi. He did not know what was likely to happen, but in any case he was not yet in any position of authority, although he was hoping to be so. But on 21 October he gave a Press interview in the course of which he said this-first, with reference to the strategic position:

"Due to the strategic position that the State held, if his State joins the Indian Dominion, he thought Pakistan would be completely encircled."

The map shows that it is perfectly obvious; nevertheless, the representative of India might question it. But that was Sheikh Abdullah's own appreciation of the strategic position. Explaining the difficulties with which the people were beset in making up their minds without a responsible government, Sheikh Abdullah said:

"The happenings in certain States, such as Patiala, Bahawalpur and elsewhere, have naturally caused apprehension in the minds of the Muslims in Kashmir who formed the majority of the population"-in one word, those areas where the Muslim populations had been massacred-"they were afraid that the State's accession to India portended danger to them."

That, according to Sheikh Abdullah, was the state of feeling of the Muslims of Kashmir. Later on in the statement he said:

"The present troubles in Poonch"-and I will remind the Council that he was speaking on 21 October, although the representative of India will say "What troubles?" According to the representative of India, there was no trouble at all; nothing had happened, but, according to Sheikh "The present troubles on Poonch were because of the unwise policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch who suffered under their local Ruler, and again, under the Kashmir Durbar, which was the overlord of the Poonch, had started a people's movement for the redress of their grievances. It was not communal."

That is what the representative of India denies. He said there had been no people's movement; nothing had happened. I do not know what name he will give to Sheikh Abdullah for having made that statement. Sheikh Abdullah went on to say "That movement having started, the Kashmir State sent its troops and there was panic in Poonch". Again, according to the representative of India, the troops

were there only to restore law and order to see that nothing untoward happened. Why, then, was there panic among the people? To whose success, for whose aid, to protect whom according to the representative of India, had these troops arrived? Sheikh Abdullah says:

"The Kashmir State sent its troops and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch were ex-servicemen in the Indian Army who had close connexions.

with the people in Jhelum and Rawalpindi;"-that is to say, the neighbouring districts of Pakistan.-"They evacuated their women and children, closed the frontier and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas."

That was the position on 21 October. But nothing bad happened. The Kashmir State forces were defeated and had to withdraw from the area; these men who were fighting had evacuated their women and children into Pakistan. And yet nothing had happened; it was all peace and quiet; and this was before 22 October. When the delegation of India goes on making repeated assertions of that kind, how much credit is to be given to its airy statements that India is merely there to restore law and order? Why was there panic if it was only a matter of the restoration of law and order? Why did these men evacuate their women and children into Pakistan? Why do human beings act like that? Not purely out of frolic and fun. They would do that when they know that their lives or their honour, or both, are in danger and that the time has come to sell their lives. They started doing it. And they did it so effectively that the Maharaja's forces had to withdraw from the area.

 

I do not know whether the representative of India would pay much attention to that. But there is further evidence on that point. Mr. M. N. Roy, who is a well known Indian patriot, whatever his political and ideological views may be, made a contribution to the Radical Humanist of Bombay in its issue of 2 October 1949, called "India's Lust for Conquest of Kashmir May Cause World War". It is a longish article but I shall quote one or two extracts from it.

"The origin: The Kashmir dispute originated neither in the two nations' theory nor in India's concern for liberty of the people of Kashmir, nor, again, in any strategic consideration. The origin was an undemocratic act on the part of the Government of India, although it could be justified on technically constitutional grounds. The British having

surrendered power, sovereignty reverted to the people of Kashmir, as to the people of any other part of the former British Indian Empire.

"The people of Kashmir had for years struggled against the feudal aristocracy of the ruling dynasty, backed up by British power. On the disappearance of the latter, the opportunity came for the Kashmiri people to overthrow the autocratic Ruler. The majority of the people of Kashmir being Mohammedans, it is only natural that their aspiration had the active sympathy and support of their co-religionists of the neighbourhood. India itself had pledged sympathy and support to the cause of the freedom of the people of Kashmir.

"As the Maharaja would not transfer power voluntarily to his subjects, it had to be expected that the latter would avail of the power vacuum to assert their sovereignty. The issue was entirely between the people of the State and its autocratic Ruler. Unless this basic fact is borne in mind, the Kashmir situation cannot be placed in the proper perspective.

"The rise of a parallel authority challenging the established. one is a familiar feature of such a political crisis. And it was natural that, in its fight to overthrow the established authority, the new one would enlist the support [of outside sympathizers. America enlisted French support in] its struggle against Britain, and a section of the Indian Nationalists wanted to overthrow British rule with the help of Japan. So the establishment of the Azad Kashmir Government and its getting support, either from the tribesmen from the frontier or actually from the Pakistan Government, were quite in the order of things in the critical situation. If Abdullah had established a parallel government somewhere near the Indian border, he would have received help from the neighbourhood, also.

"In that critical moment, confronted with a popular revolt against his autocratic rule, the Maharaja declared the accession of his State to India, and the Government of

India rushed troops to Kashmir. That is how the dispute over Kashmir began. The act of the Government of India implied recognition of the constitutional right of an autocratic Ruler to regard the State as his personal property, and its people as his chattels.

"Since that was an indefensible position taken up in haste, all manner of reasons had to be invented to confuse the simple issue by raising a thick cloud of irrelevant considerations-technically legal and strategic, but mostly emotional.

"The issue thus can be restored to its original simplicity by returning to the status quo ante bellum. With the disappearance of British power, sovereignty has reverted to the people. The Maharaja has no constitutional locus standi nor has the Indian Army in Kashmir, because it went there to defend a position created by an act of the autocratic Ruler."

That is a non-Muslim patriotic political leader speaking. His political views may differ from the Government's, but he is speaking in India and he is a non-Muslim. He talks about that movement, but the representative of India says, "No, nothing has happened."

As against that, with regard to what the representative of India calls the atrocious position taken up by Pakistan, he has quoted Margaret Bourke-White's book, Halfway to Freedom. He was fair enough, just enough, to remark that Pakistan was not responsible and deplored the atrocities to which the book draws attention. But he said that Pakistan did nothing to stop them or to arrest them. I shall take up both points.In the first place, how far this lady's authority may be accepted is open to serious questions. She appears to have drawn very largely upon her own imagination, and one of the very passages quoted by the representative of India proves that. That passage appears in Halfway to Freedom, in the opening paragraphs of a chapter headed "Struggle for Kashmir". I shall repeat the quotation:

"While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital was completing the new constitution, with such clauses as Freedom of conscience and of worship shall be guaranteed for all citizens', across the border in Pakistan a thousand year-old cry was raised: 'Islam is in danger!" "

"While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital...". Will the representative of India inform the Security Council and I shall stop for that purpose-what the People's Government in Kashmir was at that date?.

Whenever I attribute anything to the representative of India or to his Government, I shall quote chapter and verse. I am now reading this quotation from his actual speech: "While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital...". After all, this is a quotation from the speech of the representative of India, and I suppose he endorses it. I should like to know what was the People's Government in Kashmir at that date-according to him, the 22nd of October. Again I quote:

"While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital was completing the new constitution"-which new constitution? "With such clauses as"-and then this lady puts the following phrase within quotation marks-"Freedom of conscience and of worship shall be guaranteed to all citizens"-Where is that constitution? Who was framing it? When was it framed? Where can it be had, so that we may read from it this clause, "Freedom of conscience and worship shall be guaranteed for all citizens"-"across the border in Pakistan"-this and that was happening. When an author is capable of making statements of that kind, what reliance can she claim for other statements which she makes in the course of her book?

That all sorts of regrettable incidents did occur in Baramulla is not denied. As I have said, the representative of India himself was fair enough to say that Pakistan was not responsible for those incidents and that Pakistan deplored them. But he went on to say that Pakistan did nothing to stop them. Very good.

The representative of India made reference to the incidents in connexion with the convent at Baramulla and the injury suffered there by the Mother Superior. On 1 January 1948, Mary Philippa, Mother Superior of all the Sisters of Saint Joseph's Hospital, Baramulla, Kashmir, addressed a letter to Begum Shahnawaz and her daughter, Miss M. Shahnawaz. I quoted from the original of this letter during a previous meeting of the Security Council [229th meeting]. I shall quote it again. The Mother Superior says:

"We cannot let this season for greetings pass without sending you a very affectionate remembrance from us all with our prayers and every best for a very happy New Year and God's blessings on all your undertakings. We will never forget how you two brave girls of the Pakistan Voluntary Service risked your lives to save us from Baramulla when the bombing and machine-gunning from the air made our situation there dangerous and impossible."

Who was bombing? Not the tribesmen. It has never been alleged that the tribesmen were so equipped as to carry out any bombing. Who was machine gunning from the air? Not the tribesmen. They have no machine guns, and in any case they have no aircraft. I have no doubt that the representative of India will explain this, also when his turn comes.

At any rate, from whichever direction the danger was coming, there were Pakistani women helping as far as they could. The Mother Superior goes on: "Be sure we shall never forget you and we want to come to see you again. We have been so busy making clothes for ourselves and working at war refugee camps." It goes on to say, and the sentence is very significant: "We hope to go back to Baramulla soon. Otherwise I think we shall all join the Hazara Kashmir forces." Those are the Azad Kashmir forces, and not the Indian forces. "Please accept a very tiny present we have made for you as a sign of our gratitude and remembrance of you both. Yours affectionately, Mary Philippa."

 

Pakistan was doing something, but I plead guilty on behalf of Pakistan to the charge made by the representative of India in this connexion that Pakistan did not do what it should have done to put an end to these things. It should have marched its forces into the State of Kashmir to put an end to the persecution of the Muslims by the Maharaja's State forces, and also to restore law and order in the areas where it had been disturbed by the tribesmen. It should have done that; it did not do it. And I plead guilty to the charge. It did not do it because, for one thing, it did not want to extend the area of trouble. For another, I shall show what effort Pakistan was trying to make very soon afterward with the Government of India to settle this question amicably, peaceably and in a fair and equitable manner.

What had happened up to that time was that this movement. had taken place. In certain areas this movement defeated and dispersed the forces of the Maharaja. These people, as I have said, had taken women and children across the river into: Pakistan and left them there. They were prepared to sell their lives dearly for the sake of their freedom, and they started this movement. That was the spearhead of the movement. It is true then that these tribal incursions took place on 22 October.

By 26 October the position was such that the Maharaja left Srinagar. He evacuated his capital and went away to Jammu. From Jammu he wrote a letter, which is in the records of the Security Council [227th meeting], to Lord Mountbatten. Part of the letter was read out yesterday by the representative of India. In this letter he asked for Indian troops and said that inasmuch as he could not obtain them without offering accession, he offered accession. In reply to that letter, Lord Mountbatten did say specifically: "The question of accession should be settled by a reference to the people."

However, India's troops landed in Srinagar on 27 October, as mentioned yesterday by the representative of India. It is of interest that the letter of the Maharaja was written on 26 October from Jammu-the Security Council is now in a position to see where Jammu is situated-and that Indian troops were in Srinagar on 27 October, by an airborne invasion. I believe that is a very significant fact as to what had gone on behind the scenes in the meantime.

Obviously, Pakistan could accept that letter of the Maharaja and Lord Mountbatten's reply as any kind of an accession at all. Lord Mountbatten himself had said that the question of accession should be settled by a reference to the people. It is not as if it were just a case as visualized even by the Government of India with regard to other States where the majority of the people are on one side, the Ruler belongs to another community, and the Ruler will not accede to the Dominion which is indicated by the majority of the population. Here a freedom movement had started, and over the greater part of the Province of Kashmir and some portions of the Province of Jammu the Maharaja's authority had effectively been ended. His armed forces were dispersed and he had left the capital. Not only had these incidents taken place, but the Maharaja was practically on the verge of becoming a refugee, and in that desperation, he wrote the letter. What effect that letter can possibly have, and whether it is expected by the representative of India that Pakistan should recognize the validity of that letter, is beyond my comprehension.

The whole of the subsequent legal statement of the representative of India is based upon the fact of that letter. I pause here for one moment. I would beg the Security Council to compare the positions with regard to Junagadh and Kashmir. Junagadh first had a standstill agreement with Pakistan. It then acceded to Pakistan. The ruler offered accession, and accession was accepted. A Provisional Government of Junagadh was set up within the territory of India, and eventually Indian forces marched into Junagadh. There is a picture on one side.

In Kashmir this movement took place, and there was the condition of fighting and disturbance which I have already explained. The Maharaja, obviously for the purpose of obtaining troops to restore his authority in areas where it had been cast off by these people who were seeking to set up an independent government, offered accession. Lord Mountbatten replied: Very good, troops will be sent; the question of the accession of the State shall be determined by the wishes of the people.

Whatever consequences, if any, flow from this letter, far stronger consequences flow from the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan.

Let India apply whatever principle it chooses to both States. and justify it with regard to its attitude of respecting each other. It would then be possible to judge whether India's measures, standards and ideals with respect to each situation are the same or whether India merely adjusts its standards, ideals and declarations with regard to each situation and its aspects which might be beneficial to India itself.

Now what did we do further to stop this type of thing from proceeding? On 28 or 29 October the Governor-General of Pakistan made an offer to the Governor-General of India and to the Government of India to cooperate in working out the best way to deal with the situation and to resolve it peacefully, which was the following. Let the two Governors-General be authorized by their respective Governments to deal with the situation. Then let them take steps to stop the fighting and restore law and order, even if that should necessitate military action being taken against the tribesmen who had committed these incursions. That having been done, let everyone who had gone into the State withdraw simultaneously. That meant the Indian forces, the trib hen, the Pakistani volunteers, and anyone who had gone in. That having been done, let the administration of the State be assumed by the two Governors General. Let them then proceed to organize a free and impartial plebiscite for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to decide whether they wanted to accede to India or to Pakistan.

I should like to know what was there in this offer which was open to objection, and whether it was not a statesmanlike offer to end the situation in a peaceful, fair, just and equitable manner?

That is the contribution that Pakistan attempted to make towards the solution of this problem and towards stopping what was happening within the State. It was not accepted; it was turned down.

The objection taken was that constitutionally it was embarrassing to the Government of India to invest their Governor General with such authority. I shall not comment on that, but we had made that offer, and I again repeat that it was the fairest offer that could, in the circumstances, be made. It would give no advantage to either side, and it left the issue of accession in the hands of the people of the State. Then, later on, the reply was actually received in writing to this offer and is contained in a telegram from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, dated 8 November. I shall read out paragraphs 10 and 11, in which the following was stated:

"It will thus be seen that our proposals"-that is, India's proposals "which we have repeatedly stated are: (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; (2) that the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir's soil as soon as the raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

This is all that we have insisted upon during the last two years. But the efforts of the Security Council, of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and such efforts as we could make to persuade the Government of India to carry this out, have so far unfortunately failed. I now continue quoting:

"The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential" says the Prime Minister of India-"in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions that there should be acceptance of the principle that where the Ruler of a State does not belong to the community to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion the majority community of which is the same as that of the State, the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or the other Dominion should be ascertained by reference to the will of the people."

 

These proposals were not exactly what we had offered, but we nevertheless agreed to treat them as a basis for complete negotiations and a settlement of the matter. And we suggested at that stage that the whole dispute between the two Dominions over these matters should be referred to the United Nations. I quote from a Press statement of the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 14 November, in the course of which he said the following:

"The fundamental principle of the Charter of the United Nations is to prevent might prevailing over right. The whole dispute should therefore be brought before the bar of international opinion. We are ready to request the United Nations immediately to appoint its representatives in Jammu and Kashmir State in order to put a stop to the fighting and to the repression of Muslims in the State; to arrange the programme of withdrawal of outside forces; to set up an impartial administration of the State until a plebiscite is held; and to undertake the plebiscite under its direction and control for the purpose of ascertaining the free and unfettered will of the people of the State."

Also, in a telegram addressed by the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, dated 22 November, the Prime Minister of Pakistan said this:

"The above analysis shows that: first, fighting must stop and all outside forces must withdraw; and secondly, which is no less essential, that the Kashmir administration must be taken over by an impartial and independent authority immediately. Not until these conditions are fulfilled is there any hope of getting a free plebiscite which, in our opinion, need not wait until the spring.

"I hope you now realize the actual position, if you will consider these basic facts. You will, I hope, support our proposal that the United Nations should immediately send. out a commission to undertake the tasks outlined in the paragraph above."

That is paragraph 5 I just read. Our position from the very beginning with regard to the solution of this question, while all these occurrences were going on, is indicated by this. The offer that we made through our Governor-General to the Governor General of India and the Government of India was not acceptable for certain constitutional considerations. There is then the offer we made in reply to Prime Minister Nehru's telegram of 8 November; but let us take that telegram by itself.

Although the two Governments have agreed that this question shall be decided by the free and unfettered expression. of the will of the people, there has all along been a difference between the two Governments as to what would constitute conditions which would guarantee a free expression of the will of the people. There is one factor which I trust the Security Council will note, and it is this: In the case of Junagadh, India. insisted that the plebiscite should be undertaken by the Government of India and the State of Junagadh. We have not, in the case of Kashmir, at any time suggested, much less insisted, that the plebiscite should be undertaken by the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Government of Pakistan, excluding from it the Government of India. All the logic that there might be behind India's suggestion with regard to Junagadh, surely applies to the Kashmir case, too. But we did not consider that fair. We could not, either to ourselves or to anybody else, pretend that under those circumstances a plebiscite would be fair. We therefore were completely willing and have been willing throughout-as a matter of fact, we have insisted that the plebiscite should be undertaken by an impartial authority under conditions which should make it really free and impartial.That is the whole crux of the matter and the whole difference between the Government of India and ourselves. We insist that, as minimum conditions of a free and impartial plebiscite, all foreign troops and other fighting elements should be withdrawn from the State-those who have entered from outside; that a non-partisan administration should be set up in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and that the plebiscite should be organized and conducted by and under the authority of the United Nations. But if anybody says, "Oh, but what you suggest would not enable anybody who wants to vote for accession of Kashmir to India to vote for it; they might be compelled to vote for Pakistan; let that condition be modified," one must ask: What is there in these conditions which would force anybody to vote one way when he wanted to vote the other, and what is it to which anybody could take any reasonable exception?

Then the matter was not brought to the United Nations as we had suggested. We had suggested that we should both join in taking the matter to the United Nations and abide by such arrangements as the Organization might make for a free and impartial plebiscit. India chose to come to the Security Council as a complainant against Pakistan.

Nevertheless, Pakistan welcomed the reference to the United Nations. After all, it was not very material whether both of us made a request jointly to the United Nations or whether one party raised the question in a form in which, in fact, it chose to raise it-a form which we thought unjustified. While we should have preferred the two parties to have taken up the question together, we could, of course, come and explain the situation to the Security Council, and the Council would then be seized of the matter. The position taken up by India and Pakistan is summed up in paragraphs 200 and 201 of the Commission's third report [S/1430], and members of the Council are already familiar with it. As I have said, the whole struggle has been in connexion with the demilitarization of the State and the setting up an impartial administration until the plebiscite can be completed. After careful consideration of the whole matter, all these factors except those that have arisen subsequently, and to which reference was made by the representative of India, such, as tribal incursions, the so-called accession of Kashmir to India, the question of sovereignty, integrity, and so on, were all agitated in detail before the Security Council. The members of the Security Council expressed certain views on the situation and on what measures, in their opinion, would bring about a peaceful solution.

I shall draw attention to only three or four brief quotations. At the 235th meeting of the Security Council on 24 January 1948, Mr. Austin said:

"It seems to me that our advice to the two parties should be, and that is what they are asking for when they come here, that they proceed with the Kashmir matter, without prejudice to the other question, complete the negotiations that are now pending and, with respect to the media and methods of creating those conditions in which a fair plebiscite can be held, arrange an interim government that is recognized as free from the smell of brimstone, as nearly impartial and perfect as two great countries like India and Pakistan can make it, in which the rest of the world will have confidence as being fair."

At the same meeting Mr. de la Tournelle said: "Personally, I would suggest three conditions:

"1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir.

"2. The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race Hindu or Moslem-to their places of origin in that State.

3. The establishment of a free administration which would not exert pressure on the population and would give absolute guarantees of a free vote.

" At the next [236th] meeting of the Council held on 28 January 1948, Mr. Noel-Baker stated:

"In my conception, infinitely the best way to stop the fighting is to assure those who are engaged in it that a fair settlement will be arrived at under which their rights will be assured. In other words, as I remarked to the representative of India in our first talk after his arrival, in my profound conviction, a settlement arrived at quickly in the Security Council is the real way to stop the fighting. The whole thing, from the preliminary measures as to the fighting right up to the conduct of the plebiscite, in the end is all one problem. Only when the combatants know what the future holds for them will they agree to stop."

Finally, at the 237th meeting of the Council, Mr. Tsiang observed as follows: "It is obvious that the key to the problem lies in the plebiscite. If the principle of a free and impartial plebiscite for deciding the all-important question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be accepted, much of the incentive to violence and the use of force would be removed.

"On the other hand, unless we restore peace in Kashmir such a plebiscite would not be possible." The Security Council proposed a resolution on 6 February 1948 [S/667]-known as the van Langenhove and McNaughton resolution which contained the crystallized views of the Security Council. After six members of the Security Council had spoken in support of that resolution [243rd meeting] the Indian delegati intimated that its instructions were that it was to go back to New Delhi for consultation. The representative of India yesterday pointed to two factors, to which I shall come later, as having been responsible for the delay and obstruction of the plebiscite. He charged the Government of Pakistan with having been responsible for this delay and obstruction. The first delay and obstruction took place on 12 February 1948 [244th meeting -or whatever the date was-when the Indian delegation withdrew from the deliberations of the Security Council in order to return for consultations with its Government. I do not blame the Indian delegation for that, but the effect was that the consideration of the case which India had repeatedly insisted was one of great urgency-in fact, one of the expressions used was that the Security Council was not dealing with it with due expedition and that it was fiddling while Kashmir burned-was interrupted when the Indian delegation withdrew on 12 February and did not return again until some date in March.

What was provided by the resolution to which I have just referred? Briefly, it was this. The main provisions were that the question as to whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir should accede to Pakistan or to India should be decided by the democratic method of a plebiscite to be held, as recognized by the parties, under the auspices of the United Nations to ensure. complete impartiality; secondly, that fighting should stop; thirdly, that all irregular forces and armed individuals who had entered Jammu and Kashmir from outside should withdraw; and, fourthly, that the Indian and Pakistan Armies should co-operate.

I draw the particular attention of the Council to this, and I shall come to it again later when I have to deal with the first of the effects of the obstruction of which the representative of India spoke yesterday, and for which he said Pakistan was responsible. It was provided that the Indian and Pakistan Armies should cooperate to establish order and security until the question of the accession had been determined, and that the regular force should be withdrawn as soon as the re-establish ment of law and order permitted. It was further provided that citizens of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who had left on account of the disturbances there should be invited and should be free to return in order to participate in the plebiscite. It was also provided that an interim administration should be set up which should command the confidence and respect of the people of the State, and that the plebiscite must be organized, held and supervised under the authority of the Security Council.

As I have said, the first obstruction took place when the delegation of India refused to go on with the discussion in the Security Council. The second obstruction took place when the delegation of India declined to accept these recommendations. of the Security Council. When the delegation of India returned the discussions went on and the Security Council then adopted its resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726]. In respect of this resolution also I would like to draw attention to one paragraph, paragraph 5. At a certain stage, after fighting has been stopped and so on, the Security Council says:

"If these local forces should be found to be inadequate, the Commission, subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, should arrange for the use of such forces of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification."

Both these resolutions, the one that was not persisted in and the one that was actually adopted, visualized under certain circumstances the use of Pakistan forces for the purposes of pacification. It is a point to which I shall revert later. However, since I was dealing with resolutions, I have drawn attention to it at this stage.

The Government of India rejected the resolution of 21 April 1948. The Government of Pakistan, in my letter of 30 April 1948 addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/735], pointed out that it noted the explanations of the various clauses that had been offered during the discussion of the resolution, but that unfortunately those explanations were not made part of the resolution, and that for that reason the Government of Pakistan regarded the resolution as inadequate for the purpose of securing a fair and impartial plebiscite.

However, whatever the attitude of the parties, the resolution was adopted by the Security Council, and in pursuance of that resolution the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was directed to go to the sub-continent and place its good offices at the disposal of the two Governments in order to implement the resolution of the Security Council.

We now approach that point which the representative of India emphasized so much yesterday afternoon: the entry of Pakistan forces into certain areas of the State. The representative of India said that each side had been asked not to aggravate the situation in any way, but that Pakistan had done so by sending in its forces, and that was something which changed the whole situation and occasioned the delay in, and the obstruction to, the holding of the plebiscite.

While the Security Council was debating the Kashmir case, India, in spite of the appeal to do nothing to aggravate the situation, was building up its forces in the State for an all-out war. offensive in Kashmir. India's attitude throughout the discussions here with Mr. van Langenhove and General McNaughton was that, once a Commission was agreed upon, all that was necessary was to see whether the tribesmen had made incursions into the State or not and whether Pakistan volunteers were fighting there or not, and that the rest would be done by India. I do not want to give too many quotations from the proceedings of the Security Council, but I am sure that even the Security Council proceedings would reflect that. members of the Security Council were anxious to avoid the situation which India was no doubt anxious to bring about: that is to say, to achieve a military decision in Kashmir and to occupy the whole of Kashmir with its troops. And what would happen once they had occupied the areas in which the Azad freedom movement had started and been carried on, can easily be imagined.

It was pretended at one time that the whole population of the State was opposed to Pakistan and that Pakistan was an aggressor and was regarded as a tyrant. But there is the incontrovertible fact today that between 600,000 and 700,000 Muslims of Kashmir, who had their homes on that side of the State which is in the military occupation of India today, are refugees in Pakistan. That fact is eloquent in itself. What does it show? What does it prove? Who are the liberators? Who are the aggressors? Who are the tyrants? After all, it may be possible to present arguments in any juxtaposition. But facts, which are undeniable and which speak for themselves, are more eloquent than any argument at all. If the role of the Indian military forces in Kashmir has been that of restorers of peace and of law and order and protectors of the population, how is it that as large a number as 600,000 to 700,000 Muslim inhabitants of those areas of Kashmir which are in the military occupation of India are today refugees in Pakistan? That number, of course, would have been augmented and multiplied many times if the military forces of India had been able to occupy the whole of the rest of the State. That goes without saying; nobody can deny it.

Then India launched its offensive in Kashmir early in April 1948, while the matter was being debated in the Security Council. This led to a very large exodus of Kashmiri Muslim refugees to Pakistan and threatened the very security of Pakistan itself.

If the members of the Security Council will be good enough. to turn once again to the map which has been supplied to them, they will see that a dotted line starts slightly to the west of Jammu. That dotted line represents the cease-fire line. It runs parallel for many miles to the Pakistan border and then turns northward. Members of the Council can see how close to the Pakistan border the military forces of India had arrived.

More than that, the irrigation system of West Pakistan, based on the River Jhelum, takes off from a point inside the State boundary of Jammu and Kashmir, just where the river parts company with the State's border beyond the railway line and the road. But the actual headworks are inside the State.

There is an arrangement for a 99-year lease, and so on, but that is something with which I need not trouble the Council. At any rate, the headworks, as I have said, are inside the State. It is perfectly obvious what would happen to the headworks once the Indian military forces had pushed their advance to the borders of the State. With respect to other headworks which have been left on India's side by the partition, India has claimed that it can stop our water; and it did stop our water on 1 April 1948, and restored it only on our agreement to make a deposit for the price of water supplied. The same thing would

undoubtedly have happened with the Mangla headworks. These were the factors that were created toward the end of April 1948. On 15 March 1948, the Indian Defence Minister

had already announced in the Indian Constituent Assembly that the Indian Army would clear out all resistance from Kashmir's soil in the next two or three months. What did that indicate? It indicated that India was going to mount a fresh offensive in Kashmir. I am not for the moment discussing whether India was justified or not; I am merely giving facts to the Council so that it may appreciate the situation.

The Times of London of 13 April 1948 had a communication from its special correspondent at Srinagar, in the course of which this was stated:

"The Indian Army has worked extremely hard during the winter months and its position has been much improved. In spite of snow-storms and rain and the resulting drifts, mud and landslides, it has doggedly moved up supplies and reinforcements, improved roads and airfields and intensified the training of its troops. Logistically, it has won a notable victory, but even now in April, traditionally the month for a spring offensive, this necessary phase has not been completed. The road between Jammu and Srinagar, which winds over the Banihal Pass, is still snow-covered and convoys are often snowbound. To improve communications, a daily air service has been organized although weather conditions will make flying unsafe for at least two or three weeks. But the force has been considerably strengthened and it should soon be ready for a limited offensive. Already some units have advanced from Rajouri in Jammu and from Uri and some small successes have been reported. Fighting is bloody. Few prisoners are taken and acts of barbarism have been committed by both sides. Many Pathans have been decapitated by Sikh troops."

That was some weeks before Pakistan moved its forces in, but this leaves no doubt whatever that India was mounting an offensive to clear the State of all military resistance. What was Pakistan at that time faced with? So far as its own security was concerned, it was faced with a deadly danger. Once the whole State was militarily occupied, Pakistan's flank was completely

broken. It was faced with the certainty that at that date all its irrigation system based on the River Jhelum might be cut off Remember, this was at the end of April 1948, and on 1 April 1948 India had stopped the water from the Sutlej and Ravi Canals into Pakistan, and that stoppage was then in progress and was continuing in the month of April.

Obviously, therefore, once they got possession of the Jhelum headworks inside the State, the same would follow. The problem of refugees was already becoming unmanageable so far as Pakistan was concerned, and again it meant that once their troops advanced into the areas held by the Azad Kashmir people, Pakistan would have a large influx of refugees too. At this stage the Government of Pakistan received an appraisal of the military situation from its Commander-in-Chief, dated 20 April 1948, from which I quote:

"General military situation: (a) The build-up of the Indian Army for an all-out offensive in Kashmir started towards the end of February 1948 at a very rapid rate. Eight brigade groups, complete with supporting arms, artillery, armour, engineers etc. backed by a considerable air force of fighters, bombers and transport aircraft are at present deployed in Jammu and Kashmir and the process of building-up continues but appears to be almost complete now. On 15 March 1948 the Indian Defence Minister announced in the Indian Constituent Assembly that the Indian Army would clear out the so-called raiders from Kashmir within the next two or three months. So far the main concentrations are in the south, in the area of Jammu-Nowshera at least one additional brigade group is already reported to have moved into the Valley. There are also indications of two separate commands being organized, one in the Valley and one in the Jammu area. The offensive on a limited scale appears to have started already and Rajouri was captured by Indian troops on 12 April. This was followed by a reign of terror which included the burning of villages, the massacre of the civilian population and other atrocities. Four thousand men are reported to have been victimized in this manner and great panic and confusion prevailed in the area.

"(b) Deduction: It is obvious that a general offensive is about to start very soon now. The present dispositions suggest that it will first start in the south with Bhimber and Mirpur as the most likely objectives with a view to coming right up to the Pakistan border."

This is a long appraisal and I shall not quote the body of it. I shall go on to the summary of deductions towards the end, which says:

"Summary of Deductions: (a) That a general offensive is being planned by the Indian Army in the north and the south is a certainty. Their objectives are likely to be as follows: south: (i) Bhimber-Mirpur, (ii) Poonch; north: Muzaffarabad-Kohala.

"(b) Judging from what happened in Rajouri, an advance by the Indian Army in any of the above areas is almost certain to create a big refugee problem for Pakistan, which is already saturated. Refugees will be an extremely serious strain on the civil administration and a heavy drain on the country's economic and financial resources. From this point of view alone it is imperative that the Indian Army is prevented from gaining any of the above objectives.

"(c) Occupation of Bhimber and Mirpur will give India the strategic advantage of having crossed two major obstacles, f.e., the Rivers Ravi and Chenab, and of coming right up to the Pakistan border, thereby sitting on our doorsteps, threatening the Jhelum Bridge which is so vital for us, and getting further opportunities for intrigue etc. It would also give them control of the Mangla headworks, thus placing the irrigation of Jhelum and other districts at their mercy.

"(d) Occupation of Poonch by the Indian Army is certain to have a most serious effect on the morale of the many Punches in the Pakistan Army, and this in turn will adversely affect the morale of other troops Desertions will undoubtedly increase and discipline will receive a big set back.

"(e) The loss of Muzaffarabad or Kohala will, broadly speaking, have the most far-reaching effect on the security of Pakistan. It would enable the Indian Army to secure the rear gateway to Pakistan through which it can march in at any time it wishes to do so, without any major obstacle such as the River Jhelum to stand in its way. It will encourage subversive elements such as Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan and his party, Ipi, and Afghanistan; and it will certainly cause extreme panic and alarm in some of the adjoining districts of the North West Frontier Province and Punjab resulting in the mass exodus of population which will create an insoluble. refugee problem within Pakistan itself.

"(f) An easy victory of the Indian Army in any of the above mentioned sectors, particularly in the Muzaffarabad area, is almost certain to arouse the anger of the tribesmen against Pakistan for its failure to render them more direct assistance, and might well cause them to turn against Pakistan.

"Recommendations: 7. If Pakistan is not to face another serious refugee problem with about 2,750,000 people uprooted from their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps of Pakistan to the fear and on the flank at liberty to enter at its will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not to be affected to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not to be encouraged and let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Poonch-Naoshera."

I put it to the representatives on the Security Council that if they, in their respective shares, were charged with the responsibility of the defence and the security of their own countries, and they received this report from their Commander-in-Chief and in this case it was not a Pakistan national who had made the report, the Commander-in-Chief was and is General Sir Douglas E. Gracey, a distinguished British officer-if they had received this report which everything else reinforced and supported: the reports of foreign observers to their newspapers, the speeches of Indian statesmen and their Defence Minister both in public and in the Constituent Assembly, and if they were convinced that this was the situation, what is the very least that they would have done in the circumstances? Pakistan did that very least and no more. It sent in its troops to hold that line,

Yesterday, the representative of India said that that was an act of aggression. Did the representative of India expect that the Indian Army should march victoriously forward, crush this freedom movement of which I have now given some slight, inadequate picture to the Security Council, and occupy the whole of the State militarily? India had rejected the Security Council's resolution of 6 February [S/667]; it had rejected the Security Council's resolution of 21 April [S/726]; it was not willing to hold a plebiscite under any conditions that would approximate to conditions which would ensure a free and impartial plebiscite. India's avowed objective was to occupy the whole State militarily and that action, in addition to what it would have done to Kashmir and the Kashmiris, would have put the whole situation of Pakistan in jeopardy and would have. put out of action one of the principal irrigation projects. I say again to the Security Council, what is the minimum that any one responsible for the defence of Pakistan would have done? That is the minimum that we did.

The question that was asked was: Why did you not notify the Security Council?

Did the Government of India, in mounting it's offensive, notify the Security Council, though that was a serious change in the situation? It was an aggravation of the situation. It cannot be pretended otherwise. India not only mounted it's offensive, it subsequently continued to move on to other areas, occupying certain portions and rapidly advancing towards the Pakistan border. Did India notify the Security Council? But we did. Our troops moved in about 6 May, or some such date. It is obvious, of course, that military action of that kind could not be broadcast, and any communication to the Security Council on that subject would have been broadcasting to the world, and certainly to India. Again, as I have said, anybody responsible for the defence and security of his country could not I have taken that step. But by that time the Council had set up a Commission to which it had entrusted the carrying out of the duties which were set out in the resolution of 21 April. That Commission was momentarily expected on the subcontinent of India. Unfortunately-for good reasons perhaps, but unfortunately from this point of view-its arrival was delayed until 7 July.

On the morning of 8 July the Commission gave me the honour to pay me an informal visit so that we could get to know each other. I detained the members for two hours and, with the help of maps, I gave them the most detailed and complete information on military situations that existed then, including the presence, the number and the disposition of the Pakistan armies in the section. We did communicate, but we communicated in a manner which would not have destroyed us. the very objective of that action itself. It would have been the height of folly if we intended and decided to take that action. to stop the further advance of the Indian Army, to have broadcast the matter to the world and to India in particular, but we did communicate with the Commission almost as soon as it set foot on the subcontinent of India.

But what was the aggression against? Against whom was the aggression? Did our people go into areas? Did we make an advance? Did our armies go into areas where they could commit persecution and deprivations of the people? They went, so far as Kashmir was concerned, in aid of the freedom of the people, in order to enable them to hold what territory was left to them against the Indian advance. And so far as we were concerned, that was the main object: to avoid the imminent danger that threatened the security of Pakistan and the economy of Pakistan. But we did take the earliest feasible step to communicate the fact to the Commission.

India has gone on saying all through-the Prime Minister of India and other statesmen-that, before the Security Council, Pakistan denied this, but that before the Commission, it was forced to accept the position, forced to admit it. But what we denied before the Security Council and what we admitted before the Commission had not happened until 6 May, or some such

date, both according to the Government of India and according to us: the first week in May. I could not submit something in January which was neither contemplated nor necessitated until some time in May. It was necessitated by India's action, and India's action became imminent, although the preparation had started in February, in May. How could I, in January, tell the Security Council something that was not thought of till April and did not occur until May? As soon as the Commission arrived on the sub-continent the information was given.

The representative of India used a quaint phrase yesterday -I appreciated the phrase itself. He said: Thus India's complaint...was now proved to be true, or at least to have become true..." It has become true by some action in May of 1948 the complaint that India made on 1 January 1948 has become true. But that is not so much the point. The point is that all through, and this is the first public opportunity of dealing with it, Indian statesmen, led by the Prime Minister, have gone on the basis of that factor, saying that Pakistan's case before the Council was a tissue of lies. Pakistan's troops are in the Kashmir area. Pakistan's troops were not in the Kashmir area until the first week in May and we were under no international obligation not to intervene. India had committed an act of aggression. India was in the course of occupying those areas. I plead guilty to the fact that when these troubles started we should have sent our troops in the beginning in order to stop the persecution of the Muslims by the Maharaja and his troops and to restore the law and order which the tribesmen had disturbed. To that I plead guilty. That was a default which we regret, but that is not to say we were not entitled to do so. As a matter of fact we were under obligation to do so as Kashmir had a standstill agreement with us at that date. We were not guilty of any breach by sending troops on 6 May, and that is not what delayed the plebiscite. How could it?

With regard to pacification itself after fighting ceased, and now fighting has ceased since 1 January, the Security Council contemplated that the forces of both Dominions might be utilized by the Commission or by the Plebiscite Administrator. How does that delay the holding of the plebiscite? And if the forces of any side had to be used, it is not obvious that, at least in those areas in the section of the Azad Kashmir people, Indian troops could not be used for purposes of pacification? It would have to be Azad or Pakistan troops. How does that interfere with the question or the principle of the plebiscite? When the Commission arrived it started negotiations with both sides. 1 must pay tribute to the Commission in respect of its activity on the sub-continent. Its members undertook a great deal of physical discomfort and put in a lot of work in an attempt to bring the two Governments together with regard to some agreement which might result in the holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite.

After several journeys and discussions backwards and forwards, they were able to put forward their resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 75]. The resolution of 13 August 1948 could not be accepted by the Pakistan Government for this main reason: that, though it dealt with the cease fire and, also, with the truce agreement and arrangements, all that it said with regard to the plebiscite was that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir-and I am not quoting this verbatim-would be settled in accordance with the wishes of the people. Pakistan insisted, having had experience of the attitude adopted by India from time to time, that, before it would agree to the cease-fire and the truce, it must know that fair, just and equitable conditions had been agreed to by India with regard to the holding of the fair and impartial plebiscite.

Now, again, the Security Council is aware, since the discussion took place here when the case was previously before the Council, that the whole is one process. I have read an extract from the speech of Mr. Philip Noel-Baker. The whole is one process, and it was repeatedly stated by everybody that fighting could not stop; that nobody could persuade the Pakistan Government or anybody else to stop the fighting unless the people had the assurance that they could have that, for which they were fighting, through the plebiscite; that, unless they were assured that that would happen, a fair and impartial plebiscite would be held, and unless the conditions satisfied

them, at least to a major degree, that the plebiscite would be fair and impartial, no one could expect them to stop. Again, the point today is not whether that stand was justified or not. But that was the position. Eventually, the Commission did take up the question of elaborating part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and they eventually put forward their second resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15], which was, of course, supplementary to the 13 August 1948 resolution, inasmuch as it expanded and filled in the details of part III of that resolution.

Yesterday, the representative of India sought to make a virtue, at least on the side of India, of the fact that India accepted these two combined resolutions, or this composite resolution, on 23 December [S/1196, annex 4], whereas, even at that stage, Pakistan did not accept until 25 December [S/1196, annex 5]. He seemed to think that there was some default on the part of Pakistan, or at any rate, that there was some merit on the part of India in having accepted it on 23 December. Mr. Lozano, then, I think, the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Commission, who was entrusted to the Commission with the task of proceeding to the sub-continent to explain the resolution to the two Governments, went first to Delhi, had conversations with the Government of India, and, as it now appears, obtained the acceptance of the Government of India of this resolution on 23 December. It was only thereafter that he came to Karachi and held conversations with the representatives of the Pakistan Government, on 24 and 25 December. The acceptance of the Pakistan Government was communicated to him on 25 December. Where was the default on the part of Pakistan, if there is any question of default? The juxtaposition of the two dates which was insisted upon yesterday is inexplicable to me. We were not even approached until 24 December. How could we have accepted on 23 December? Mr. Lozano went first to Delhi and then to Karachi. Had he gone first to Karachi and then to Delhi, we should probably have accepted first.

Nothing turns on the two dates. What is essential is that, up to those two dates, 23 and 25 December, the resolutions had not been accepted. The first had not been accepted by us;

The acceptance of the second by India was not known until 23 December. And, obviously, if we had not accepted a resolution, how could that resolution become binding upon us before acceptance? I shall, however, also come back later to that aspect of the matter which the representative of India raised yesterday.

What did the resolutions, taken together, provide? First, that there should be a cease-fire and that, following the cease fire, a cease-fire line should be laid down on the ground. I need not revert to this, because the cease-fire became effective on 1 January 1949, and, since then, though it took a much longer time than it need have, the cease-fire line has also been determined. That is out of the way, and no further reference needs to be made now. The next was the truce stage. These two phases were dealt with in the resolution of 13 August 1948. On the truce stage, the first and main question was the reduction of the armed forces of both sides in the areas concerned. At that date, on the Pakistan side there were the tribesmen, there were the nationals of Pakistan who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting, there were the regular troops of the Pakistan Army, and there were the Azad Kashmir forces. On the Indian side, the forces engaged were the regular troops of the Indian Army, Indian nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting, the State military forces, and the Jammu and Kashmir State Militia. Now, that was the state of the military forces on each side, apart from their numbers and their equipment and the weapons available. The agreed arrangements for the disposal of these forces were as follows:

First, Pakistan was to use its best endeavours to secure the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting. This was to happen in the truce stage, but this was the first thing that was to happen. The truce stage had not yet arrived because the truce agreement had not been settled and a deadlock had been reached. Nevertheless, there was no further object either in fighting or in continuing in the State for that purpose, although the obligation of securing the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals arose only after the signing of the truce agreement, inasmuch as the Pakistan Government was not in a position to assure the people concerned that a free and impartial plebiscite had been agreed upon, to be held under conditions, though not guaranteeing it one hundred per cent, still offering a fair chance of its being free and impartial. Once the cease-fire was arranged, Pakistan succeeded in getting the area evacuated of the tribesmen and such Pakistan nationals who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting. This was an obligation which, though it was to be imposed and would have become applicable to Pakistan only in the truce stage, had already been discharged by Pakistan.

Next, what was envisaged was the withdrawal of the regular forces of India and Pakistan, so arranged that Pakistan would take the first step, but after Pakistan troops had begun to withdraw, India undertook to begin the withdrawal of its forces in stages to be agreed with the Commission. That was the next stage. It was to begin with the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces, and then later on the withdrawal would be synchronized and the entire Pakistan forces on one side were to withdraw, and the bulk of the Indian Army on the other side was to withdraw. The Commission assured the Pakistan Government that the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army and the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army would be synchronized with the two High Commands.

I wish to draw the attention of the Council to paragraph 10 of the appendix to the Commission's letter dated 27 August 1948, annex 27 to the Commission's first report [S/1100]. The letter was addressed to me. Paragraph 10 reads as follows: "In accordance with part II, section B, paragraph 1 of the resolution"-that is the resolution of 13 August-"the Indian Government, when apprised that the Pakistan forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. Synchronization of the withdrawal of the armed forces of the two Governments will be arranged between the respective High Commands and the Commission."

Under paragraph 4 of the resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15] the Plebiscite Administrator was authorized to determine the final disposal, on the one hand, of the Indian forces remaining in the State after the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces, the Maharaja's State forces and the State Militia and, on the other, the final disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces, having due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite,

I think I had better draw the attention of the Council to the actual paragraph in the resolution. The first withdrawals were to take place during the truce stage, then after the truce stage and the plebiscite stage, these final disposals were to take place. I shall draw the attention of the Council to the particular paragraph so that members will be able to appreciate what was then intended. I emphasize this because yesterday the representative of India stated that the Commission's proposal did not visualize any reduction in the State forces or in the State Militia. I was rather surprised. Perhaps it was due to an oversight, but this is the paragraph dealing with the whole of this question. It is contained in sub-paragraph 4 (a). It reads as follows:

"After implementation of parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine in consultation with the Government of India the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such a disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

That was with regard to the Indian-occupied portion. Sub paragraph 4 (b) deals with the Azad Kashmir side:

"(b) As regards the territory referred to in section A, paragraph 2 of part II of the resolution of 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities."

That was the scheme that was established by these two resolutions. There is nothing imperfect there; there is no loophole. The whole thing, the whole demilitarization, has been taken care of. There were two stages during the truce. There was the final disposal during the plebiscite stage. During the truce the tribesmen were to withdraw; Pakistan nationals who were fighting were to withdraw. They have already withdrawn; that is over. Then the Pakistan Army was to begin its withdrawal. When this withdrawal had begun, the Indian Army was to begin the withdrawal of the bulk of its forces, this bulk to be determined with the Commission, in certain stages, and so on. That was to happen during the truce stage. Then, during the plebiscite stage, there was the final disposal of the remaining Indian force and the State armed forces of whatever description, on the Indian-occupied side of Kashmir, and of the Azad Kashmir forces, on the Azad side.

There is no ambiguity; there is no loophole; there is no lacuna. The scheme with regard to demilitarization is complete, and it was accepted both by the Government of India and by the Government of Pakistan.

A further feature of this resolution of 5 January 1949 was that it made provision, after the demilitarization of the State, for the carrying through of the arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite. For that purpose, the Commission's resolution of 5 January provided for the appointment of a plebiscite administrator by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which plebiscite administrator was to be a man of high international standing commanding general confidence, and he was to have all the powers which he considered necessary to hold a free and impartial plebiscite.

The representative of India made reference to the phraseology of that paragraph in one connexion. I will come to this later on.

The main conditions under which the plebiscite would be held were clearly laid down. From this it will perceived that although the resolution was accepted by the Pakistan Government, the Pakistan Government in accepting this composite resolution, had had to give up one of the main guarantees of a free and impartial plebiscite in its anxiety to bring about a settlement of this problem in a peaceful manner, and that was. that both the draft resolution of 6 February [S/667] and the Security Council resolution of 21 April [S/726] had provided for the setting up of an impartial administration in Kashmir, or a coalition of the two administrations which would neutralize any interference with the population in the choice which they were to make in the plebiscite. This resolution got away from that.

I shall now make one comment on that aspect here, although. I shall have to dwell a little more on it later. The representative of India said that the integrity of a State must be maintained. There should not be two authorities. There is no escape from the position that one alternative was to have one authority for the whole of the State, and if there is one authority for the whole of the State, that authority must be acceptable to the people of the State. That is what the Security Council tried to bring about-an impartial administration "as free from the smell of brimstone", as Mr. Austin put it, as any two Governments can make it, as impartial and as perfect as possible. Or, as the resolution said, there must be a coalition Government in which both States would be represented. Nominees of both the National Conference and the Muslim Conference would sit in. such a Government.

The Government of India, however, would not have that.. What is to be done if it will not have an impartial administration? Does it expect either the Pakistan Government to agree, or the Security Council to suggest that the Government responsible for this Beast of "Belsen poster" should be accepted? by Pakistan and by the Azad Kashmir people as the authority which should administer the whole of this State, as one unit, for the purpose of holding a free and impartial plebiscite? If that is expected it cannot be achieved. Therefore, either India must agree to an impartial administration for the whole of the State we have, never objected to this, but are willing and quite certain that we could persuade the Azad Kashmir people to agree-or, if it will not accept that, there is no escape from it.

the position that the Abdullah administration must continue to exercise authority on its side of the cease-fire line, and that the present local authorities, as they have been described out of deference to India's susceptibilities with regard to the expression "Azad Kashmir Government", must continue to exercise authority on the other side of the cease-fire line. How else can the integrity of the State be maintained? That was clearly recognized by the Government of India when it accepted these resolutions, as further consideration of the clarifications given by the Commission will show.

 

The Government of India succeeded in persuading the Commission to give up any attempt to set up one impartial administration or a coalition to administer the whole of the State together. It was, in that way, able to destroy one of the chief guarantees of a free and impartial plebiscite. The Security Council had sought to build those conditions on two main pillars: a free and impartial plebiscite and demilitarization of the State. Then the Government of India made that difficult. Of course, it can be said on the surface, "But this situation is balanced, with Abdullah's administration on the one side and the Azad Kashmir administration and the local people on the other." But it is not balanced. It is not balanced for the reason that almost two-thirds of the population is under the control of Abdullah's Government, with only one-third on the other side. The area differs, but the area on the other side comprises high mountainous valleys, very sparsely occupied, with only a small sector thickly populated. There are two thirds of the population on one side and one-third on the other. There is no balance. Nevertheless, in order to bring about a peaceful settlement, we accepted these conditions. The only guarantee now left is that the Plebiscite Administrator shall have and exercise such powers as he considers necessary for guaranteeing a free and impartial plebiscite. We are placing our trust in that so far as the administration side is concerned, and so far as interference with the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite is concerned. But it is absolutely essential that there should be complete demilitarization before the people can be expected to record their votes freely in this matter, which has aroused passions both in Kashmir and outside, and which has become a tug-of-war between the different parties in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan themselves. India's attempt throughout has been to get rid of the demilitarization provisions. All sorts of excuses are put forward so that the demilitarization should not take place-and, if it cannot take place, then, of course, the plebiscite cannot take place.

I have already dealt with one of the factors which the representative of India said have obstructed the plebiscite: the presence of Pakistan troops. Now, one word more with regard to the actual attempt made by the Commission to secure demilitarization. When the Commission returned to the sub continent early in 1949, after the resolutions had been accepted and the actual cease-fire had taken place, it started consultations with both Governments with regard to the programme of withdrawal, because that was the next subject to be dealt with. Our High Command discussed with the Commission our suggestions with regard to withdrawal of troops and demilitarization, and on 9 March, at a conference held in New Delhi, our representative put forward to the Commission our proposals with regard to the putting into effect of that part of the resolution which sought to secure the withdrawal of the Pakistan Army and the bulk of the Indian Army. We were given to understand that, if we were to lay on the table our plan for the withdrawal of troops and the securing of demilitarization, the Government of India would do the same. In that connexion, I, should like to draw attention to paragraph 168 of the Commission's third interim report [S/1430]:

"The joint meetings began in New Delhi on 9 March. The first meeting was devoted largely to the consideration of the cease-fire line. The Pakistan delegation, understanding that the Indian delegation would respond in like manner in a subsequent meeting, presented a comprehensive scheme (annex 10) for the implementation of part II of the 13 August resolution."

The Government of India subsequently put off the presentation of its scheme. When it did communicate its scheme to the Commission, it insisted that its proposal for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army should not be disclosed to Pakistan until the truce agreement had been signed. That appears in paragraph 232 of the Commission's third interim report.

How were we to accept any synchronization or be satisfied with any proposed synchronization unless, first, we were satisfied that the scheme provided for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces, and, secondly, that the withdrawal was to be synchronized even though it was to be begun by the Pakistan Army first? But the Government of India, in communicating its proposals to the Commission, laid a ban upon the Commission that the Commission was not to communicate the proposals of the Government of India to the Government of Pakistan, although our proposals had already been laid on the table. To this date, those proposals of the Indian Government have not been communicated to us and we do not know what they are.

Then the Commission communicated to the Government of India its own plan for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from Kashmir. The Government of India objected to the Commission's communicating to Pakistan the Commission's own plan for the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian Army, and the Commission has submitted to that ban also. Accordingly, we do not know what the Commission proposed to the Government of India both with regard to what would constitute the bulk of the forces and with regard to what should be the stages of the withdrawal. These proposals-the plan of the Commission itself-have not been communicated to the Security Council either, although our full plan of withdrawal is naturally available to the Security Council.

But though the Indian plan of withdrawal has not been disclosed to us, the Commission's report makes it clear that this plan does not fulfil India's undertaking under the resolution. In this connexion I would draw the attention of the Security Council to paragraph 245 of the Commission's third report:

"As has been seen from the discussion of the Azad problem. and from the foregoing discussion of withdrawals, India is not prepared to withdraw such part of its forces in Kashmir as might be characterized as 'the bulk' whether measured quantitatively or qualitatively, unless agreement with Pakistan on the large-scale disbandment and disarming of the Azad forces is reached."

It appears from the Commission's report that, although the Indian forces in the State are more than double the strength of the Pakistan forces, the Government of India, against the withdrawal of twenty-eight Pakistan battalions, is not prepared to withdraw more than twelve Indian battalions. I suppose it describes twelve battalions as the bulk of its forces. Whether it is twelve or whether it is otherwise, I make one offer to India, and it is this: Let them retain in Kashmir what they have described to the Commission as the bulk of their forces and withdraw the remainder. Let the bulk remain at this stage, because, after all, the bulk means the greater part or the more effective part of a force. India has offered to withdraw the bulk and retain the balance; let it withdraw the balance and leave the bulk there for the moment, to be dealt with in the final disposal. Obviously, though India goes on saying that it is prepared to put into effect the resolution, and it may have said that it is prepared to withdraw the bulk-I do not know whether it has, because its proposal is not available to us, and it has defined "the bulk" in its own way-obviously it wants to keep the bulk in Kashmir. This is the main reason for the deadlock, the main reason why progress cannot be made towards the organization and holding of a plebiscite. I shall now proceed to the other question of the disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces.