17021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 463 held on 7 February 1950

17021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 463 held on 7 February 1950

I have, naturally, listened to the submission that the representative of India has made to the Security Council with the deepest attention which it deserved, coming from a distinguished representative of a great country before this august organ of the United Nations on a matter and relating to an issue which is of the utmost importance not only from the point of view of the peace and prosperity of the two States that are directly affected by it, but which has, since the time of its unfortunate origin, put in serious jeopardy the maintenance of international peace.

One difficulty that I have experienced while listening to my learned and distinguished friend has been that he has chosen, no doubt very properly and wisely from his point of view, to impress upon the attention of the Council certain incidents, events, portions of proposals and agreements to substantiate his thesis. In most cases, however, the representations made by him, taken out of their context and based upon observations and certain reports, were not, as I hope to show, in themselves accurate as points of fact. Nevertheless, the proper appreciation of the whole problem, before the Council decides in what manner it is capable of resolution at this stage. at which it has arrived, necessitates the appraising of those incidents and those factors against their proper background.

It is true that during the winter and spring of 1948, when this matter first came before the Security Council, the discussions that then took place went into every aspect of the matter in detail, and it is fortunately not necessary to repeat all of them or even to refer to every one of them, even as a matter of background. But since then, more than half the membership of the Security Council has changed and there has been some change in the personnel even of the representatives of the permanent members. Again, there is no doubt-and one has had proof of the fact that the distinguished gentlemen who carried the honour of representing their various countries on the Council have been most diligent in their study of this problem. Nevertheless, it is necessary that the outstanding events and factors against which the whole problem has to be viewed, and which form the context and the background of the incidents to which the attention of the Council has been invited should be looked at in their proper setting and sequence I.

shall, therefore, with the President's permission, proceed to place those factors before the Security Council, and while I am doing that I shall invite the particular attention of the Council to some of the incidents and factors to which reference has been made by Sir Benegal N. Rau, so that the Council can properly appreciate and appraise them against their background. At the end of my submission I shall make observations upon any factors commented upon by him which are not thus dealt with by me.

The very first question that would assist the Council in appreciating and appraising the significance of the disputes over Kashmir between India and Pakistan would be an understanding of the considerations governing the accession of the Indian States to the Dominion of India or to the Dominion of Pakistan.

Kashmir is not an isolated case by itself. There were in the whole subcontinent of India some 500 Indian States, and out of them three or four became the subject matter of controversy or dispute between the two Dominions. I think it would be helpful to the Council if it were to attempt, as the result of such study as it has made of the problem and of such factors as may be submitted to it by the parties, to arrive, in the first place, at some principle or set of principles which have governed both India and Pakistan in trying to settle this problem of the accession of Indian States to one country or the other. And I venture to submit that in a sense what the two have done, or have agreed upon, or have indicated by their conduct or by their declarations to be the rule that should apply, should be regarded, in this respect, as a rule that is binding upon both and a rule which both should honour by putting it into force in respect of Kashmir.

As to the Indian States, we need not be detained very long by this aspect of their situation. They enjoyed various degrees and attributes of sovereignty before 15 August 1947. None of them was fully sovereign in the international sense, inasmuch as their foreign relations and some other aspects of sovereignty were managed by the suzerain power, that is to say, by the United Kingdom. But that state of affairs came to an end on 15 August 1947, in pursuance of section 7 of the Indian Independence Act passed by the United Kingdom Parliament. The Indian Independence Act provided a solution for the political and constitutional evolution of the whole of the sub-continent. To start with, the sub-continent was to be partitioned into contiguous majority areas of Muslims, and of course, consequently, contiguous majority areas of non-Muslims. The former were to be constituted into an independent sovereign State to be known as Pakistan and the latter into another sovereign independent State which has since been known as India. I am afraid that in the international sphere that nomenclature has caused confusion to some extent but that cannot be helped. The Council by this time is familiar with the fact that what used to be India is today Pakistan and India.

That left the question of the Indian States. As I have said, under section 7 of the Indian Independence Act, it was provided that the suzerainty of the British Crown over the Indian States would lapse on the due date, which is 15 August, and all treaties and agreements in force would cease to be operative. The Act itself made no further provision with regard to the future of the Indian States, but it had already been explained to the States and their Rulers in the summer of 1946, when the United Kingdom Cabinet Mission had visited India for the purpose of bringing about a settlement, that the void created consequent on the withdrawal of United Kingdom authority from India would have to be filled either by the States entering into a federal relationship with the successor government or governments in British India, or failing this, entering into political arrangements with it or them, that is to say, whether there was one successor government or several.

But after the Act was passed, the then Viceroy of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, told the Chamber of Princes on 25 July 1947 that there were certain geographical compulsions which could not be ignored. He advised the Rulers of the Indian States, in arriving at a decision as to whether to accede to India or to Pakistan, to take into account considerations such as the geographical location of their States, their economic and strategic factors and situations, and the wishes of their people.

As I have said, no trouble arose with regard to the vast majority of the Indian States. Those that were contiguous to India and had a majority of non-Muslim population acceded to India, the exception of Hyderabad. Those which were contiguous to Pakistan and had a majority of Muslims in their populations acceded to Pakistan. We have the exception of Kashmir, the question of which is now before the Security. Council. One Indian State which, although not contiguous to Pakistan by land, had access to Pakistan through short sea trip-that is to say, Junagadh, which had a majority of non Muslims in the population but a Muslim Ruler-acceded to Pakistan.

These are the main difficulties or problems which arose with regard to the accession of States, subject to certain minor or subsidiary matters in connexion with Junagadh, that is to say, Kashmir, Junagadh and Hyderabad. I might, in passing, mention one Indian State, Kapurthala, which had a majority of Muslims in its population with a non-Muslim Ruler. The total Muslim population of that State-those who were not mass acred-was driven out of the State in order to facilitate its absorption into the Dominion of India.

The States of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir presented a problem, and anyone desiring to understand India's stand and Pakistan's stand with regard to Kashmir would do well to study the views and actions of the Government of India with regard to the related cases of Hyderabad and Junagadh also. It is particularly incumbent upon the Security Council to do so, not only for the better appreciation and appraisal of the Kashmir case but also because the Hyderabad and Junagadh cases are matters of which the Council is seized.

On 8 March 1948, addressing the Security Council at its 264th meeting, the then representative of India explained India's position in respect of accession in these words: "No doubt the Ruler, as the Head of State, has to take action in respect of accession. When he and his people are in agreement as to the Dominion to which they should accede, be applied for accession to that Dominion. However, when he takes one view and his people take another view, the wishes of the people have to be ascertained. When so ascertained, the Ruler has to take action in accordance with the verdict of the people. That is our position."

It was not a gratuitous offer on behalf of India, as has just been suggested by the representative of India, that the question of the accession of Kashmir to India, or to Pakistan should be settled on the basis of a free and impartial plebiscite. At the time when India made that reservation to the accession, or made that offer-one may call it by whatever name he chooses-it had before it the problem of Junagadh, which had already acceded to Pakistan on 15 September. Junagadh had entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan on 15 August, and had acceded to Pakistan on 15 September. And up to that point I wish to emphasize this in respect to Junagadh-there had not been a single incident in Junagadh itself between the Ruler and his people. Nevertheless, there was that case, which India had already raised, as I shall presently show, in respect of which India wanted a plebiscite held. And in the background there was the problem of Hyderabad. It was in order to suit India's interest in respect of those States that this principle was evolved and put forward.

Let us accept that principle, but let us see how that principle was applied in practice to the three cases in dispute.

In the case of Hyderabad, the Ruler was a Muslim; the majority of the people were non-Muslim. The Ruler, the Nizam, did not desire to accede either to India or to Pakistan. He desired to enter into special treaty relations with the Government of India in order to preserve a fair measure of independence for his State. The Government of India refused to accept that position and demanded that the State should accede to India unconditionally. The Nizam offered to hold a plebiscite under United Nations supervision in order to ascertain the wishes of the people of the State on the question of establishing a political relationship with India on the basis of accession or by means of a treaty. The Government of India rejected the offer. What it said was in effect this: "You accede first, and the plebiscite can then be held."

When addressing the Security Council on the subject of Hyderabad on 19 May 1949 [425th meeting], I urged that that was at least an acceptance on behalf of India of the principle that it was for the people of the State to decide whether they wanted to remain independent or enter into accession with India. My learned friend, Sir Benegal N. Rau, desired to intervene when I said that, and naturally I yielded to him. He then explained that, although India had said that there should be a plebiscite, there was no intention of giving Hyderabad the choice of independence. The only choice to be offered to Hyderabad was this: either to accede to India, or to accede to India. On that day the plebiscite would be held.

However, that was the position of India with regard to Hyderabad. That is what the actual position was. The policy is set out in a White Paper on Hyderabad, issued by the Government of India on 10 August 1948. I shall invite the attention of the Council to three brief extracts from it. The first is the following:

"The Government of India is firmly of the view that, whatever sovereign rights reverted to the States on the lapse of paramountcy, they vest in the people"-I repeat: "they vest in the people"; there is no question of the Ruler-"and conditions must be created in every State"-this was not a generous or a charitable offer in respect of Kashmir only "for a free and unfettered exercise of these rights."

In the next extract, the White Paper quotes the following declaration made by Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister and Home Minister of India, on 27 August 1947:

"If, however, the Nizam's Government is still unable to decide its course in the only right direction in which it lies" that is to say, to accede to India-"His Exalted Highness must agree to submit the issue to the judgment of his people and abide by the decision. We, on our side, will

be content to accept whatever might be the result of such a referendum."

The third extract from the White Paper is the following:

"When, therefore, the Nizam and his Government complain against the so-called denial of self-determination, they mean, in fact, that a small clique should have unfettered power to dominate the masses."

That is what India claimed: that a Muslim Ruler of a predominantly non-Muslim population should not have the right to determine the question of the accession of this State or the lack of accession, of keeping its independence. I shall repeat:

"When, therefore, the Nizam and his Government complain against the so-called denial of self-determination, they mean, in fact, that a small clique should have unfettered power to dominate the masses.

"The Nizam's Government wishes to hold a plebiscite under the conditions in which a small militant group controls the destinies of the people and the Razakars"-that is to say, the volunteers, like the State Militia in Kashmir-"are left free to terrorize the people into submission. A plebiscite without an interim government representative of and satisfactory to the majority population in Hyderabad will only be a fraud on the people."

And that is the found that India has consistently tried to persuade the Security Council and the Commission to let it practice in Kashmir.

The plebiscite is to be held, to use the words of the White Paper, under the conditions in which a small military group the armed forces of India-control the destinies of the people, and the Razakars-in the case of Kashmir, the State forces and the State militia-are left free to terrorize the people into sub mission. That is what the Government of India said it would not tolerated in Hyderabad. A plebiscite, yes; but let the Nizam first accede to India so that by accession India comes into military charge of the State-in charge of its communications, in charge of its external relations and practically an overall supervision of the whole of the State, and then let the plebiscite be held. That is what India claims in respect of the State where the Ruler was a Muslim and the majority of the people were non-Muslims.

Now when that could not be held, and the Nizam did not agree, what did India do? How far did it respect the sovereignty of the Nizam and the integrity of his State? India marched its troops into Hyderabad, and they have been in military possession of the State in spite of the fact that before the military forces of India marched into Hyderabad, the case of Hyderabad, under the Nizam's directions, had been brought before the Security Council [S/1317] and was then pending before the Security Council. India marched its troops in, they have been in military possession, and it has since been announced that the Nizam has now acceded to India.

That, in brief, was the Hyderabad case and those were the principles put into force by India in respect of Hyderabad.

Junagadh, as I have said, entered into a standstill agreement with Pakistan on 15 August, and acceded to Pakistan on 15 September 1947. The Government of India at once objected both to the standstill agreement, when it took place, and later on to the accession, when it took place. Why did it object? As I have submitted, there had not been a single incident in Junagadh. And if it was for the Ruler to decide, the Ruler had decided. But the Government of India maintained most strenuously that Junagadh's accession to Pakistan was in utter violation of the principles on which the partition of the country had been agreed upon and effected. Now what is the meaning of India's objection that the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was in utter violation of the principles on which the partition of the country had been agreed upon and effected? It means that Junagadh had a majority population of non-Muslims. The partition of India had taken place on the principle of a majority of Muslim areas in Pakistan and a majority of non-Muslim

areas in India, and therefore a State with a majority non Muslim population acceding to Pakistan was in violation of the principles on which the partition had been agreed upon and effected. India also went on to assert that it was an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory, and that it represented an attempt to disturb the integrity of India.

However, the Security Council is well aware, as I shall show when I come to that portion of my case, that the accession or so-called accession of Kashmir was attempted to be effected under conditions very different from those in which the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan took place. Nevertheless, even assuming that there had been an accession, cannot Pakistan with equal justice retort with regard to Kashmir in the very words employed by the Government of India in respect of Junagadh, that Kashmir's accession-so-called, according to India-to India is "utter violation of the principles on which the partition of the country was agreed upon and effected", that it is an "encroachment" on Pakistan's "sovereignty and territory", and that it represents "an attempt to disturb the integrity" of Pakistan? This is the language of the Government of India. If it applied to Junagadh, and I assume India was convinced that this language was justified in respect of Junagadh and applied to it, why does it not apply equally to Kashmir? What is the distinction?

The Government of India insisted that on the basis of geographical, economic and military considerations, and on that of the fact that the majority of the people of the State were non-Muslims, Junagadh should have acceded to India, and that in any case the final decision with regard to this matter must lie with the people of the State.

But what did India propose? How was the decision, the final decision, the wish of the people of the State, to be ascertained? Under what conditions? India proposed that the question of accession should be settled either by negotiation, that is admitting India's claim to the accession of Junagadh, or by a plebiscite organized under the joint control of the State of Junagadh and the Government of India: the State of Junagadh and the Government of India-and the accession had been to Pakistan.

If this was a fair offer, if this was a just offer, if this was an honest offer, why cannot Pakistan with equal justice, equal fairness and equal honesty contend that the ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Kashmir should be by means of a plebiscite held under the joint control of the State of Kashmir and the Government of Pakistan? If that was fair in regard to Junagadh, why is it not equally fair with regard to Kashmir? I shall in this connexion, quote the Prime Minister of India. On 12 September 1947, long before there was any question of the accession of Kashmir, the date of which has been stated by the representative of India quite correctly-whatever took place, whether it was accession or not, it was on 26 October-long before that, on 12 September, the Prime Minister of India sent a telegram to the Prime Minister of Pakistan from which I quote:

"The Dominion of India would be prepared to accept any democratic test in respect of the accession of the Junagadh State to either of the two Dominions. It would accordingly. be willing to abide by the verdict of its people on this matter, ascertained under the joint supervision of the Dominion of India and Junagadh. If however the Ruler of Junagadh is not prepared to submit this issue to a referendum, and if the Dominion of Pakistan, in utter disregard of the wishes of the people and of the principles governing the matter..." --the principles governing the matter being, obviously, that it was a majority non-Muslim State-"wishes to enter into an arrangement by which Junagadh is to become a part of the Federation of Pakistan, the Government of India cannot be expected to acquiesce in such an arrangement."

Why can't this be applied to Kashmir? In Kashmir, in the circumstances to which I shall come, the very fraud practised by the Ruler upon his people gives India all the rights-and they have been claimed on behalf of India before-which the representative of India has claimed today before the Security Council.

Did not the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, as I have said, before any incident had occurred and when there was no trouble whatsoever except protests from the Government of India, give corresponding, if not greater rights to Pakistan in respect of Junagadh? But after the accession, on 22 September the Governor-General of India, in a telegram to the Governor General of Pakistan said as follows-and I quote from that telegram:

"As regards accession of Junagadh to Pakistan, your attention is invited to our telegram addressed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan and delivered personally at Government House, Karachi, by Lord is may on 12 September.. explaining fully the Government of India's position regarding Junagadh. The Pakistan Government has neither acknowledged receipt of our message nor replied to this nor to previous dispatches on the subject. Instead, the Pakistan Government has unilaterally proceeded to action in which it was made plain the Government of India could never and does not acquiesce. Such acceptance of accession by Pakistan cannot but be regarded by the Government of India as an encroachment on Indian sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions. This action of Pakistan. is considered by the Government of India to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of India by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of Pakistan in utter violation of the principles on which the partition was agreed upon and effected.

"In these circumstances I hope that it will be possible for you to prevail upon the Government of Pakistan to reconsider its attitude on the accession of Junagadh. But if the matter is not reconsidered, the responsibility of the consequences must, I am compelled to inform you, rest squarely on the shoulders of the Pakistan Government. The Government of India is, however, still prepared to accept the word of the people of Junagadh in the matter of accession, the plebiscite being carried out under the joint supervision of the Indian and Pakistan Governments."

Now, again, for a moment I shall re-read this portion substituting Kashmir for Junagadh and see how it sounds to the representative of India and to the Security Council:

"The Government of India has unilaterally proceeded to action in which the Government of Pakistan could never and does not acquiesce. Such acceptance of accession by India cannot but be regarded by the Government of Pakistan as an encroachment on Pakistan's sovereignty and territory and inconsistent with the friendly relations that should exist between the two Dominions. This action of India is considered by the Government of Pakistan to be a clear attempt to cause disruption in the integrity of Pakistan by extending the influence and boundaries of the Dominion of India in uttar violation of the principles on which the partition was agreed upon and effected."

I shall not read the rest of it.

In view of these telegrams which were exchanged in the month of September, before any of these incursions took place, and to which the representative of India has referred, the position of the Government of India was that a State with a non-Muslim majority among its people must accede to India. Consequently, then, a State with a majority of Muslim population should accede to Pakistan. Those were the principles that India was insisting upon, but then, if in spite of this, if in contravention of this principle which applied to the very partition of India itself, one Dominion proposes to accept accession on the part of a State the majority of the population of which does not correspond to the majority population of the Dominion itself, then the other Dominion would not acquiesce in such arrangement and would not recognize it. The consequences that flow from it will rest squarely on the shoulders of the Government that accepts the accession.

In respect of Kashmir, India is in that position. It unilaterally accepted accession, although the representative of India this afternoon called it a "tentative accession". So it was, if it was anything at all. Also, Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General, in accepting it, intimated to the Maharaja that the The question of accession would be decided by the free expression of the will of the people. Although these factors themselves take away from that accession the legal character with which, since then, the Government of India had tried to invest it, nevertheless, how does the Government of India expect that Pakistan, so far as it is concerned, should treat the attempted accession of Kashmir to India any differently than India was prepared to deal with the actual accession of Junagadh to Pakistan?

The President (translated from Spanish): I am sorry to interrupt the representative, but perhaps, as it is getting late, it would be advisable to adjourn and meet again tomorrow at 3 p.m.

Sir Mohammed Zafrulla Khan (Pakistan): If the President will permit me an extra two or three minutes to conclude this submission on Junagadh, I am quite willing that the Council. should adjourn, as we shall have arrived at the end of one topic. It will not take more than two minutes for me to conclude this part .

While these negotiations were still proceeding between the two Governments, the Government of India marched its troops into Junagadh. As a matter of fact, even before it did that, a Provisional Government of Junagadh was set up in Indian territory. That is important when the Council comes to assess the allegations that have been made of encouragement given to the people who were fighting for their liberty in Kashmir on behalf of Pakistan.

A Provisional Government of Junagadh was set up in Indian territory and finally, on 9 November 1947, India marched its troops into Junagadh and forcibly annexed the State which had acceded to Pakistan. Subsequently a farcical plebiscite was held -India was in military occupation of the State-and the State was formally incorporated into the Indian Dominion. Pakistan's complaint with regard to Junagadh is still pending with the Security Council, and this plebiscite was held by India notwithstanding this pendency of the question of Junagadh, with which the Commission on India and Pakistan would proceed to occupy itself when directed by the Security Council to do so.