07021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Benegal N. Rau (India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 463 held on 7 February 1950

07021950 Text of the Speech made by Sir Benegal N. Rau (India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 463 held on 7 February 1950

I would like to briefly explain the position of my Government with respect to the proposals submitted by General McNaughton to the parties on 22 December 1949, and subsequently laid before this Council.

I hope that my criticism of the proposals will not be construed as a reflection on their distinguished and gallant author. For the benefit of the new members of the Security Council, I shall begin by inviting attention to a few salient facts which are too often ignored.

It will be remembered that the present dispute started with a complaint by India [S/628] under Article 35 of the Charter.

Let me summarize the complaint in the words of the Commission. I am reading from paragraph 119 of the majority report [S/1430]: "In the complaint India alleged that a situation existed which was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Such a situation existed, the Government of India said, owing to the aid which invaders, consisting of nationals of Pakistan and tribesmen from the territory immediately adjoining Pakistan on the north-west, were receiving from Pakistan for operations against the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This State, according to India, had acceded to the Dominion of India and was a part of India." Pakistan's reply is to be found in paragraph 3 of document I of annex 45 [S/1430/ Add. 1] to the Commission's report and in two paragraphs of document II, section C of the same annex.

I hope that members of the Council will not mind my troubling them to refer to these documents as I go along, because I am very anxious that they should verify every single statement of fact which I make. I am now reading Pakistan's reply to India's charge from paragraph 3 of document I of annex 45 of the Commission's majority report.

"While the particulars of Pakistan's case are set out in document III the Pakistan Government emphatically denies that it is giving aid and assistance to the so-called invaders or has committed any act of aggression against India. On the contrary, and solely with the object of maintaining friendly relations between the two Dominions, the Pakistan Government has continued to do all in its power to discourage the tribal movement by all means short of war. This has caused bitter resentment throughout the country, but despite a very serious risk of large-scale internal disturbances, the Pakistan Government has not deviated from this policy. In circumstances which will become clear from the recital of events set out in document III, it may

be that a certain number of independent tribesmen and persons from Pakistan are helping, as volunteers, the Azad Kashmir Government in its struggle for liberty, but it is wrong to say that Pakistan territory is being used as a base of military operations. It is also incorrect that the Pakistan Government is supplying military equipment, transport and supplies to the invaders' or that Pakistan officers are training, guiding and otherwise helping them."

I continue to read now from two paragraphs of document II, section C, which form part of the same reply:

"The Muslim population of the State have set up an Azad (Free) Kashmir Government, the forces of which are carrying on their fight for liberty. It is possible that these forces have been joined by a number of independent tribesmen from the tribal areas beyond the North West Frontier Province and persons from Pakistan, including Muslim refugees from East Punjab, who are nationals of the Indian Union.

"The allegations made by the Indian Government that the Pakistan Government is affording aid and assistance to the Azad Kashmir forces, or that these forces have bases in Pakistan territory, or that these forces are being trained by Pakistan officers, or are being supplied with arms or material by the Pakistan Government, are utterly unfounded."

Briefly, therefore, Pakistan first conceded that tribesmen and persons from Pakistan might be helping the so-called Azad Kashmir Government; secondly, Pakistan emphatically denied that the Pakistan Government was giving any aid to those tribesmen and the other intruders, thirdly, Pakistan described as "utterly unfounded" the allegation that the Pakistan Government was giving aid to the Azad Kashmir forces or that Pakistan officers were training them. This was the position throughout the discussions in the Security Council, and on this basis the Security Council adopted its resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] which is reproduced as annex 46 to the majority report. Let me read the relevant portions. That resolution provides for the "restoration of peace and order". In this connexion it says:

"The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours:

"(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting, and to prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State."

Then comes the Government of India's part:

"The Government of India should...

"(a)..put into operation consultation with the Commission a plan for withdrawing their own forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them progressively to the minimum strength required for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order."

Then it goes on to provide for a plebiscite:

"The Government of India should undertake... that there will be established in Jammu and Kashmir a plebiscite administration to hold a plebiscite as soon as possible on the question of the accession of the State to India or Pakistan."

This resolution aimed, amongst other things, first, at the restoration of peace and order by the withdrawal, in the first instance, of the tribesmen and the Pakistan nationals that had entered the State for fighting, to be followed later by the reduction of the Indian armed forces that had been sent to repel them; and secondly, at the holding of a plebiscite on the question of the accession of the State to India or to Pakistan.

What happened next? According to the distinguished Foreign Minister of Pakistan himself, Pakistan troops moved into the State early in May. This is mentioned in paragraph 129 of the Commission's first interim report [S/1100]. That is to say, Pakistan troops moved into the State within a fortnight of the above discussions in the Security Council, throughout which the Pakistan Government had denied giving any aid to the invaders or to the Azad Kashmir forces.

I should like to mention that in the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 [S/657], which was reaffirmed in the resolution of 21 April 1948, the two Governments, that is the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, were requested "to inform the Security Council of any material change in the situation which occurs or appears to either of them to be about to occur."

In a letter addressed to the Security Council [S/659] the Pakistan Government agreed to comply with this request. Nevertheless, as I have said, the Pakistan Government sent troops into Kashmir without informing the Security Council. It was only on 8 July 1948, two months after the troops had entered the State, and after the arrival of the Commission on the Indian subcontinent, that the Commission was officially notified by the Pakistan Government of the presence in the State of three brigades of regular Pakistan troops. All these facts have been mentioned in paragraphs 128 and 129 of the Commission's first interim report [S/1100] and in paragraph 128 of the Commission's present majority report.

The Government of Pakistan alleged at one stage that this was a purely defensive move, but the Commission was definitely of the view [S/1100, annex 27] that "the presence of Pakistan troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, however, is a material change in the situation as considered by the Security Council in its resolution of 21 April 1948, which creates obstacles to the effective and immediate implementation of an unconditional cease-fire". I hope representatives will not forget who created this first obstacle to the plebiscite; not only was it the first obstacle, but it has been the direct cause of all the other obstacles that impede our progress today.Not only did the Pakistan Army invade the State, but it assumed command and direction of the Azad Kashmir forces: on 4 August 1948 the Foreign Minister of Pakistan stated to the Commission, "the Pakistan Army is at present responsible for the over-all command of the Azad Kashmir forces"; and on 9 August 1948 the High Command of the Pakistan Army stated that the Azad Kashmir forces were operationally controlled by the Pakistan Army. This is mentioned in sub paragraphs 1 (b) and (c) of the appendix to annex 27 of the Commission's first interim report [S/1100]. Thus, India's original complaint alleging aid by Pakistan, though at first denied by Pakistan [S/646], was now proved to be true or, at least, to have become true in an aggravated form; not only was there aid, but the Pakistan Army was actually inside the State giving aid and direction and, indeed, engaging in actual fighting.

Nevertheless, nothing effective has yet been done about this complaint. The Pakistan Army is still within the State of Jammu and Kashmir and has been there, now nearly twenty months, it has penetrated various parts of the State and built up subversive local forces and authorities. Let me substantiate these points. Let me first read paragraph 203 of the Com mission's present report. I am sorry to have to trouble representatives with constant references to these documents, but I am anxious that every statement which I make should be capable of immediate verification. I am reading from paragraph 203:

"The resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 75] recorded one major change in the situation as contemplated by the Security Council during its deliberations in the early part of that year, namely, the presence of Pakistan troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It did not, however, record a second element which has developed subsequently into a serious problem in the implementation of that resolution: The Azad (Free) Kashmir Movement, the fighting forces of which today number thirty-two well-equipped battalions."

I shall next read paragraph 225 of the same report:

"There is, indeed, no doubt that the Azad forces now have a strength which changes the military situation, and to that extent makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange within a structure which considers only the regular forces of the two armies. Although it might be a matter of discussion whether the numerical strength of the Azad Kashmir forces has actually increased since August 1948, there is no question that those forces, which have since then been working in close co-operation with the Pakistan regular army and which have been trained and offered by that army, have increased their fighting strength. It is reasonable to suppose that if the Commission had been able to foresee that the cease-fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and that Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the Azad territory, the Commission would have dealt with this question in part II of the resolution of 13 August."

The minority report of the Czechoslovak delegation [S/1430/ Add. 3] has the same effect. I am reading from the minority report:

"The 'Azad forces' meanwhile grew by the spring of 1949 into thirty-two disciplined and fully armed battalions, which, according to an evaluation by the military adviser of the Commission, represent a 'formidable force'. Owing to this fact, which is at variance with part I, section B of the said resolution forbidding both parties any increase in their military potential, the situation has materially undergone an absolute change."

Thus it is clear that these forces, as they now exist, were built up by, or with the aid of, the Pakistan Army between August 1948 and the spring of 1949 contrary to the understanding that Pakistan would not use the period for consolidating its position or increasing its military potential. I beg representatives to note who is responsible for creating this second. obstacle to the plebiscite.

With regard to the penetration of the northern areas, the position is equally clear. Let me read from paragraph 272 of the Commission's majority report:

"It seems, however, very doubtful whether the northern areas were in fact in the autumn of 1948 under the 'effective" control of the Pakistan High Command, in the sense that the Commission understood the term 'effective control"."

 

I shall now read from paragraph 274 of the same report:

"When it drafted the 13 August resolution the Commission did not consider the northern area in the same light as it did western Kashmir. However, by January 1949 Pakistan undeniably held military control over the northern areas; the area was administered by local authorities, not of the Jammu and Kashmir Government, with the assistance of Pakistan officials."

In other words, Pakistan obtained military control of these areas between August 1948 and January 1949. The minority report is again to the same effect. I quote from it:

"Moreover, the situation in the 'northern area' had meanwhile undergone a material change, in that the Pakistan Army, which was not bound by the resolution of 13 August 1948, conquered many strategically important places during the interval before, by the resolution of 5 January 1949, it was also sanctioned by the Government of Pakistan."

It is thus abundantly clear that Pakistan penetrated and obtained control of these areas between August 1948 and January 1949; and Pakistan officials assisted in their administration through "local authorities", not the Jammu and Kashmir Government.

Once again, I request members of the Council to note who has created this third obstacle to the holding of the plebiscite.

And yet, in this topsy-turvy world, it is India that is constantly accused of "stealing", of delaying the plebiscite and so forth. Strictly speaking, the Pakistan Army should have been completely withdrawn long ago, and the disruptive forces and authorities created by that army during its unlawful presence in the State should have been completely dissolved, but so far nothing of the kind has been done. I shall have to remind the Council of this broad fact again and again, lest it should be forgotten or ignored in the mass of detail.

When the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, upon its arrival on the Indian subcontinent, found itself confronted with a situation which the Security Council bad not contemplated during its debates, the Commission could have reported the new facts to the Council immediately, and the Council might then have asked the Pakistan Army to be withdrawn, just as it had asked the tribesmen and other foreign elements to be withdrawn, and neither the subversive Azad forces por the subversive Azad administrations would have had time to be built up. But the opportunity was lost. The Com mission doubtless thought, in good faith, that it could deal with the situation itself and accordingly passed its resolution of 13 August 1948, in which it is set forth in part II, section A, paragraph 1:

"As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State."

If this resolution had been accepted and carried out by Pakistan at once, some of the subsequent mischief would have been avoided, for the Pakistan Army would have had to be withdrawn while the Azad forces were still in an embryonic state, and the northern areas were not yet under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command. But while India accepted the resolution with certain clarifications on 20 August 1948, that is, within a week of its receipt, Pakistan made various reservations which amounted to rejection. The matter came before the Security Council in November 1948 [382nd meeting]. If, even at this late stage, the Council had secured the withdrawal of the Pakistan forces, the situation might have improved. The Council, however, merely desired the Commission to continue its efforts for a peaceful solution. On 11 December 1948, the Commission drew up proposals for a plebiscite [S/1196, annex 3], supplementary to the proposals of 13 August 1948.

I should like to emphasize the word "supplementary". These proposals merely amplified those of 13 August and, indeed, the very first sentence of the supplementary proposals ran: "The Commission reaffirms its resolution of 13 August 1948". Therefore, all the clarifications given to India in connexion with that resolution still hold good. India accepted the supplementary proposals on 23 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 4] on the basis of certain explanations and understandings. Those proposals subsequently became the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15; but I hope members will remember that India accepted them on 23 December 1948.

At this stage, that is to say, on 23 December 1948, Pakistan had not accepted either the original or the supplementary proposals. Ultimately Pakistan also accepted the proposals, but the fact remains that the Pakistan Army is still within the State and even after acceptance of the resolution, it has continued its unlawful activities.

Today, the position is that Pakistan which, throughout the discussions here in 1948, denied giving any aid either to the invaders or to the Azad Kashmir forces, is now itself not only an invader but is in actual occupation of nearly half the area of the State without any lawful authority from any source. This is naked aggression of which no one can approve, but the very reverse is the case. By sanctioning the administration there is no history or sign of disapproval in the present proposals. Indeed, of the northern areas by the existing local authorities, these proposals, in effect, recognize and help to perpetuate the unlawful occupation of these areas by Pakistan.

As I have already mentioned, the "existing local authorities" -I am quoting from the proposals-derive their powers not from the Government of Jammu and Kashmir but from Pakistan. They are, therefore, merely instruments of the Pakistan Government.

If I may say so, there is a serious basic defect in these proposals. They spring from an assumed false analogy between the Pakistan Army and the Indian Army, as also between the Azad Kashmir forces and the Kashmir State forces. They completely ignore the legal and moral aspects of the question. The Indian Army went into the State at the request of the lawful Government of the State in order to repel an actual admitted invasion by tribesmen and Pakistan nationals. The request emanated not only from the Ruler of the State but also from the head of its Emergency Government, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, who has been in the van of the Kashmiri people's movement for freedom for nearly twenty years and who has suffered imprisonment nine times in the people's cause. The Pakistan Army, on the other hand, invaded the State without any lawful authority and without even notice to the Security Council, although the Pakistan Government had previously denied giving any aid to the invaders and had promised to apprise the Security Council of any material change that might occur in the situation. As for the Azad Kashmir forces, they are no more than a limb of the Pakistan Army, built up for the most part by that army after its unlawful invasion of the State, and they can therefore in no way be put on the same level as the lawful forces of the Kashmir State.

The proposals of the Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, were accepted by India on certain assurances:

1. That the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir Government would not be brought into question.

2. That no recognition would be afforded to the so-called Azad Kashmir Government.

3. That the territory occupied by the Pakistan troops would not be consolidated to the disadvantage of the State.

4. That there would be a large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. 5. That the question of the northern areas would receive

consideration in the implementation of the Commission's proposals.

Let me explain exactly where these assurances are to be found. The first three will be found in the reply of the Chairman of the Commission of 25 August 1948 [S/1100, paragraph 79 to the Prime Minister of India's first letter of 20 August, paragraphs 3 and 4 [S/1100, paragraph 78).

The fourth assurance-namely, that relating to the disbanding and disarming of the Azad Kashmir forces-will be found in paragraph 2 of the aide-memoire of the conversation between Mr. Lozano and the Prime Minister of India on 22 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 4].

The fifth assurance-that relating to the northern areas will be found in the reply of the Chairman of the Commission of 25 August 1948 to the Prime Minister of India's second

letter of 20 August [S/1100, paragraph 80].

Let us see what has happened to these assurances. Under these proposals the sovereignty of the Jammu and Kashmir State is eliminated, in fact, from the areas on the other side of the cease-fire line, in other words, from nearly one-half of the entire area of the State; secondly, the administration of these areas by "the existing local authorities'', an expression interpreted in some quarters to mean the Azad Government authorities, is recognized; thirdly, the consolidation affected by Pakistan troops to the detriment of the State is allowed to remain; fourthly, the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces is neutralized by similar disarming and disbanding of the State forces and the State militia; fifthly, the claim made by the Government of India in respect of the northern areas is dismissed. Thus the net effect of the proposals is to eliminate or neutralize every one of the assurances relied upon

by India.

India's case is that, just as the entry of the Pakistan troops into Kashmir was wrong and an act of aggression, equally wrong and aggressive was their building up of the subversive Azad Kashmir forces and their occupation of a large part of the State. All these things must be completely undone before there can be a plebiscite. These unlawful activities of the Pakistan Army took place under the very nose of the Commission and in spite of the assurances given to India by the Commission. To recognize the fruits of the aggression in any way is utterly unjustifiable.

There is another point which is apt to be overlooked or ignored in these discussions. According to the resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, paragraph 15], the object of the plebiscite is to decide the question of accession-which necessarily includes continued accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan. Now, accession does not mean dissolution: the acceding State remains intact and fully sovereign in its own field even after accession; it continues as a single unit. If, therefore, the plebiscite is to be held for the State as a whole, if the State is to accede as a whole, it must not be disrupted beforehand. Indeed, sub-paragraph 3(b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 requires that the Plebiscite Administrator shall derive from the State of Jammu and Kashmir the powers which he considers necessary for organizing and conducting the plebiscite and for ensuring its freedom and impartiality. How can he derive these powers from the State in the northern areas if the State is deprived of its authority in those areas beforehand? To disrupt the State in this way and to recognize various "existing local authorities'' would be a contravention of the plain terms of the resolution. We attach the greatest importance to sub-paragraph 3(b), which was inserted in the resolution at India's instance, and which we regard as embodying the assurance that the State would have unquestioned sovereignty throughout its territory before the plebiscite was held.

It is true that in accepting the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1943, the Government of India made certain concessions for the sake of peace, but these concessions were of a limited character, and they were confined to the so-called Azad Kashmir territory in the south-western district. That is no reason why similar or even more far-reaching concessions should now be proposed for the northern areas. This process has gone on long enough. When the case left the Security Council in April 1948, there were only two things standing between Kashmir and the plebiscite. The invaders had to withdraw and then the Indian Army was to be reduced. In May 1948 Pakistan created a new complication by sending in its army. As the price of withdrawing this army, which never should have been there, Pakistan obtained, under the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, the concession that the evacuated territories-then confined to the south-western part of the State-would be administered by "local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission'' subject to the sovereignty of the State. But Pakistan was not content. It did not accept the resolution until 25 December 1948 [S/1196, annex 5]. Meanwhile, it created another complication by building up the Azad Kashmir forces. As the price for the disbanding and disarming of these forces, it obtained a further concession in the resolution of 5 January 1949. Under the McNaughton proposals it is now to receive some more concessions, including the administration of the northern areas by "the existing local authorities' '.

India cannot possibly go on making these concessions and frittering away its position. It is urged that, for the sake of peace, India should acquiesce in them because, it is said, they are, after all, temporary and only a step towards the holding of the plebiscite. But it is incomprehensible to us why pressure should always be brought to bear on India to acquiesce in wrong, and why, for a change, some pressure should not be brought to bear on the other side to acquiesce in the right on the same grounds.

There is no local hostility or resistance to the lawful Government of the State in the northern areas, except such as proceeds from the Pakistan regular and irregular forces; and observers, that the inhabitants of certain villages on the this is borne out by the fact, witnessed by United Nations Pakistan side of the cease-fire line have insisted on moving across to the Indian side. When these forces, including the Gilgit Scouts, the Chitralis and the Baltistan Scouts, are withdrawn, the responsibility for the administration of these areas should revert to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, and for their defence, to the Government of India,

I shall now proceed to analyse in some detail the McNaughton proposals [S/1453] and shall compare them with the corresponding proposals made by the Commission in April 1949. The proposals made by the Commission were not accepted either by India or by Pakistan-of course, for opposite reasons. It will be found that the present proposals are substantially the same as the Commission's proposals, minus certain parts which were intended to meet India's point of view, plus certain additions favourable to Pakistan.

Paragraph 1 of the McNaughton proposals is in general terms, and needs no comment except this: sub-paragraph 1(d) lays down that discussion of disputed past issues should be avoided. But in these proposals many of the past issues are decided against India, and we are asked to accept this position. We think such an approach cannot lead to any settlement because it ignores the origin of the conflict, the subsequent developments and present conditions. The crucial paragraphs, dealing with demilitarization, Azad Kashmir forces and the northern areas, are paragraphs 2 and 3. Let me first read sub-paragraph 2(b) and sub-paragraph 3(a). Sub-paragraph 2(b) reads as follows:

"The 'northern area' should also be included in the above programme of demilitarization, and its administration should, subject to United Nations supervision, be continued by the existing local authorities."

Sub-paragraph 3(a) reads as follows:

"The Government of Pakistan should give unconditional assurance to the Government of India that it will deal effectively within its own borders with any possibility of tribal incursion into Jammu and Kashmir to the end that, under no circumstances, will tribesmen be able unlawfully to enter the State of Jammu and Kashmir from or through the territory of Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to keep the senior United Nations military. observer informed and to satisfy him that the arrangements to this end are and continue to be adequate."

I now request the members of the Council to turn to annex 17 [S/1430/Add. 1] which contains letters dated 15 April 1949 from the Commission to both Governments. The letters are in almost identical terms, and to them were annexed the Commission's proposals for a truce agreement. I shall read the letter addressed to the Government of Pakistan:

"The Commission has considered the developments which have taken place since it last addressed itself formally to both Governments with regard to the implementation of part II of its resolution of 13 August 1948. It has considered the viewpoints of both Governments and it has been studying the steps which have been and might be taken in connexion with the further implementation of the resolution. of the Commission.

"In the light of all the above factors, and in order to facilitate the restoration of peace in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the holding of an early plebiscite, the Commission has decided to urge formally upon both Governments' agreement upon the proposals contained in the enclosed documents.

"The Commission considers that these proposals represent an adjustment of viewpoints within the framework of and consistent with the spirit of the commitments already entered into. It is also convinced that in accepting these proposals, both Governments will have taken a further important forward step toward the attainment of the objective which animates both of them, as well as the Commission: the prompt and peaceful solution of the problem of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through a free and impartial plebiscite.

"The Commission requests that the Government of Pakistan signify its agreement on these proposals as soon as possible, and it hopes to be in possession of the agreement within three days, so that the Commission may then determine its future course of action."

The letter to the Government of India, as I have already said, was in similar terms.

Let me read the proposal then made by the Commission to both Governments. Paragraph 3 of section A states:

"The territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State."

Members of the Council will please note the words: "and without prejudice to the sovereignty of the State." Even more comprehensive is the phrase in paragraph 1 of section F of the same proposals, which states:

"These provisions are without prejudice to the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

That same day, Pakistan asked for the elucidation of this phrase.. That request will be found in annex 18. The elucidation was given in annex 19, paragraph (1) as follows:

"By this phrase, the Commission means that the administration of the area by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission would not bring into question the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole. It has consistently been the view of the Commission, as well as of the Security Council, that, pending the determination of the will of the people as regards the accession of the State to India or Pakistan, neither body will recognize any new sovereignty in the State. To do so would constitute a prejudgment of the will of the people."

I shall return to this point presently and show how, in spite of the consistent view of the Security Council and of the Commission, the reservation as to the territorial integrity, etc., of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been omitted from the present proposals.

Meanwhile, let me turn to another part of the proposals in annex 17. I shall read paragraph 3, section D, which relates to the northern areas:

"The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary. In the sparsely populated and mountainous region of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir in the north, observers will be stationed who, in the event that the defence of this territory becomes necessary, will advise the Commission. The Commission, in this case, or at the request of the Government of India, may agree that the Government of India post garrisons at specified points of this area."

To this, Pakistan objected, one of the objections being that Pakistan had given an assurance to deal effectively with any tribal incursions within its own borders, and that, therefore, the posting of Indian garrisons was unnecessary. The Commission, however, did not agree. After considering the replies of both Governments, the Commission formulated its final proposals in annex 21. This is referred to in paragraph 173 of the Commission's majority report. It will be noticed that the Commission regarded these final proposals as representing "a fair compromise".

I hope that members will now read part I, section D of these final proposals. This contemplates that, if the United Nations observers should so advise, the Commission may request the Government of India to post garrisons at specified points. Even this small concession to the Indian point of view has now disappeared from the present proposals. Sub-paragraph 4(b) of annex 22 shows that the Commission had put it in qualified and diluted as it was-to meet the position of the Government of India. But Pakistan objected to it, as will be found from sub-paragraph 6(c) and paragraph 7 of annex 49, and we find that it has now been omitted from the present proposals. Sub-paragraph 3(a) of the present proposals rests content with Pakistan's assurances; it does not say what is to happen if the United Nations observer is not satisfied that the arrangements made by Pakistan are adequate, May I ask what arrangements Pakistan made to prevent the tribal incursions of October 1947? In fact, members will remember that, in Pakistan's reply to India's complaint. Pakistan's position was that it had done everything in its power to discourage the tribal incursions. Nevertheless, they did occur. What is to happen if the situation recurs? India can take no risks in this matter.

But we are concerned here with something more than tribal incursions. If members will please turn to annex 24, they will find there a letter from the Pakistan Minister to the United Nations Commission, I shall read from the last sub-paragraph of paragraph 7:

"Ever since May 1948, when Pakistan troops entered Kashmir and over-all tactical control was taken over by G.H.Q. Pakistan, the Commandant Gilgit Scouts, a Pakistan Army Officer, has been exercising over-all tactical and administrative control of Gilgit Scouts, Baltistan Scouts and the local militias."

Now, let us see what happened during this period in June and July 1948. I read, in paragaph 7 of the same annex, that a contingent of 400 so-called volunteers from Chitral go and besiege Skardu, while the Skardu forces go and besiege Leh. All this happened under the auspices of the Pakistan High Command. These are not tribal incursions; they are incursions by so-called volunteers from one part of the State into another part-volunteers recruited and organized by Pakistan authorities. Unless this process is checked, it will go on as in the past and no part of the State will be safe from infiltration and attack. India cannot afford to take this risk.

Let me now return to the important point of the State's integrity and sovereignty. This was conceded-if the acknowledgement of a right can be called a concession-in the Commission's proposals of April 1949, set forth in part III, section G of annex 21. But Pakistan objected to it and, once again, it has been omitted from the present proposals although there were repeated assurances given to India that the sovereignty of the State would not be questioned. Sub-paragraph 2(b) of the present proposals merely provides for the continuation of the existing authorities, without any reservation of the sovereignty of the State.

I now come to sub-paragraph 2(a) of the present proposals. These proposals relate to demilitarization. In effect, this paragraph brings together the demilitarization proposals contained in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, but there are two important changes. At no time previously was it suggested that the Kashmir State forces should be disbanded or disarmed. These have never been -expanded, and the proposal to reduce or disband or disarm them is new. So, too, is the mention of the State militia, which is like an armed constabulary. The question of this militia had been raised with the Commission by Pakistan without success more than once. At least one reference to it can be found in annex 10, paragraph 22. That concession which Pakistan did not get from the Commission, is now made in the present proposals.

In effect, therefore, in crucial respects the new proposals are the old proposals minus some of the small concessions previously made to India plus certain new concessions now made to Pakistan. Is it a matter of surprise that India has been unable to accept them as they stand?

We have, accordingly, proposed two main amendments, besides a few clarifying or consequential ones. These amendments have already been read out to the Council; they are reproduced in General McNaughton's report; and I do not think it is necessary for me to read them over to the Council once again.

I should now like to attempt to remove certain persistent misconceptions which have prevented India's case from being properly appreciated.

It is often said that Kashmir (for brevity, I refer to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as "Kashmir") is a predominantly Muslim State and that India is attempting to put off a plebiscite because it feels certain that it would result in a verdict in favour of Pakistan.

I should like to remind members of the Council that the conflict in Kashmir is not a Hindu-Muslim conflict at all: the truth is that a large section of the Muslims of Kashmir are themselves in favour of accession to India. For this choice there are solid grounds. They believe that their real problem is one that is common to all the people of Kashmir, irrespective of creed: the problem of achieving economic and political freedom; and they think they can solve this problem best by remaining in India. Under the new Indian Constitution which has just come into operation, the people of Kashmir, if they decide to remain in India, will have a very large measure of autonomy. They will have complete freedom to make their own State Constitution and even to decide for themselves what is to be the position of the present ruling dynasty. Autocracy is dead in every single State in India; there is a people's government in every one of them. Thus, their political freedom is assured in India. The measures necessary for the economic emancipation of the people of Kashmir, such as the abolition of absentee landlordism, the grant of greater rights to the tiller of the soil, and so on, are in line with similar measures adopted in various parts of India. By far the largest part of Kashmir's trade, whether import or export, has been with the areas now included in India. And so this large section of the Muslims of Kashmir believe that the economic progress of the people would also be best promoted by their remaining in India. After all, there are 35 million to 40 million Muslims in India, and India is a secular, democratic State with human rights and fundamental freedoms for all its citizens guaranteed by the new Constitution.

I should like to mention at this point that under the Indian Constitution which was in force between 15 August 1947 and 26 January 1950, all that was required for the accession of an Indian State to the Indian Dominion was an instrument of accession executed by the Ruler, and accepted by the Governor General, When, therefore, the Maharaja of Kashmir executed an instrument of accession in favour of India on 26 October 1947, and when the Governor-General of India, Lord Mountbatten, accepted it the next day, all the constitutional conditions

for accession were complete. Nothing more was required under the Constitution. Nevertheless, India went out of its way and imposed upon itself the obligation that, as the accession took place at a time of grave disorder, the question should be settled by a reference to the people as soon as law and order had been restored and the soil of Kashmir cleared of the invader. The obligation was entirely self-imposed. This is a fact which critics continually forget: if India did not want a plebiscite there was nothing to compel it to pledge itself to one. That pledge, subject to its conditions, still stands.

Another misconception which dies hard is that the whole trouble in Kashmir was the result of the Maharaja's accession to India. It cannot be repeated too often that the very reverse was the case. Invaders from outside Kashmir began to pour into the Valley of Kashmir on 22 October 1947. This is a historical fact which can be easily proved from the records, and which no one, to my knowledge, has controverted. The Maharaja's letter containing the Instrument of Accession was written on 26 October 1947, four days later. To refresh the memories of the members of the Council, I shall read a few extracts from that letter:

"Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes and desperadoes with modern weapons had been allowed to infiltrate into the State. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer capital of my Government, as a first step to overrunning. the whole State... With the conditions obtaining at present in my State and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally it cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to freebooters...If my State is to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar." It is clear from these extracts that, far from the invasion due to the accession, the accession was forced by the invasion. Nevertheless, one finds this fiction repeated time and again.

I notice that the majority report, in section V of the appendix, observes that the admission of representatives of Kashmir to the Constituent Assembly of India "was undesirable from the political point of view, since it was bound to increase tension between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question." The Belgian delegation has been even more emphatic and has remarked that the matter requires the serious attention of the Security Council. I should like in this connexion to state that the representation of Indian States in the Constituent Assembly was decided on early in 1947 before India was even partitioned and before any question of accession arose. Every Indian State, whether it ultimately wished to accede or not, was then given representation according to its population on the basis of one representative for every million of the population. On this basis. Kashmir was allotted four members, and Kashmir has been entitled to this representation ever since April 1947; it is not a new thing.

The real idea was that all the States should have a share in so moulding the Constitution as to make accession possible, but even so they were completely free to accede or not to accede after the Constitution had been completed and the whole picture was before them. It will be remembered that a similar plan was followed in Canada at the Quebec Convention in October 1864, the resolutions of which subsequently formed the basis of the British North America Act. Quebec and Ontario were represented by twelve delegates, Nova Scotia by five, New Brunswick by seven, Prince Edward Island by seven and Newfoundland by two, but it will also be recollected that although all thirty-three representatives took part in the Conference, nevertheless Prince Edward Island did not join the Federation until six years after the passing of the British North America Act, and Newfoundland did not come into the Federation until some time last year, nearly eighty years later. It is therefore clear that the admission of representatives from any particular State into the Indian Constituent Assembly did not necessarily imply accession. As I have said, Kashmir had this to right representation ever since April 1947; it acceded, tentatively, in October 1947, so that the accession came after the grant of the right and not the other way round.

The question may be asked why the right of accession was not actually exercised until June 1949 and why the representatives of Kashmir did not come into the Assembly until then. One obvious reason is that the Constituent Assembly did not start discussing the provisions of the Constitution in which Kashmir was interested until that stage. It has been made clear by the Prime Minister of India time and again that although Kashmir's accession has been constitutionally complete ever since the acceptance of the Ruler's Instrument of Accession by the Governor-General in October 1947, nevertheless, the people will be free at the plebiscite either to continue the accession or to put an end to it. I have thought it necessary to explain this matter at some length because there appears to have been some misapprehension on this matter in the minds of the members of the Commission.

Another allegation, completely untrue but repeatedly made, is that India sent its army to Kashmir to help the Ruler against the people and is keeping the Indian Army there for the purpose of coercing the people of the State to vote in favour of India at the plebiscite. As I have already stated, if India desired to secure Kashmir without a plebiscite, it could easily have done so by not making the offer of a plebiscite at all. It is really fantastic to suggest that, in order to seize Kashmir, India first. offers a plebiscite, which it was not bound to do, and then sends an army to influence the plebiscite.

The real reason for the sending of the Indian Army is clear from what I have already read out from the Maharaja's letter containing his Instrument of Accession, but I should like to emphasize this part of our case in order that the fiction may never again be repeated, and for this purpose I should like to read out to the Security Council accounts of eye-witnesses of certain incidents which took place at Baramulla, about thirty-five miles from Srinagar, on the evening of 26 October 1947. I should like representatives to bear that date in mind-the evening of 26 October 1947. These incidents have been described for us by a well known United States citizen, Margaret Bourke-White, in her recent book Half Way of Freedom. There is a chapter in this titled "Struggle for Kashmir". I shall read the opening half dozen paragraphs of this chapter:

"While the People's Government in Kashmir's capital was completing the new constitution, with such clauses as 'Freedom of conscience and of worship shall be guaranteed for all citizens, across the border in Pakistan a thousand year-old cry was raised: 'Islam is in danger!'

"But when the fanatic Muslim tribesmen began streaming into Kashmir, it seemed as though it was Christianity that was in danger. The tribesmen quickly reached Baramulla, a picturesque river town that commands the western slopes of Kashmir valley, and they selected the orchard of St. Joseph's Convent for a motor pool. The stories that began leaking out about the violating and shooting of the nuns of the Order of St. Francis sounded like old-fashioned atrocity tales.

"I was in Pakistan when the invasion was beginning, and I did not find it easy to make my way to the scene of action. Pakistan officials explained on rather contradictory grounds their reluctance to let me cross into Kashmir. On the one hand 'there was nothing to photograph'; on the other it was very dangerous for a woman; tribesmen abducted women.

"I managed to get as far as Abbottabad, the last outpost on the Pakistan side of Kashmir, when the nuns who survived the carnage were rescued, and I was successful in meeting them as they escaped over the border at dawn. The Mother Superior had been seriously wounded and was rushed to the hospital. The grave-faced sister from whom I got the details had been in the babies' ward on the convent grounds when the tribesmen began smashing up X-ray equipment, throwing medicine bottles to the ground, ripping the statuettes of saints out of the chapel, and shooting up the place generally. Two patients were killed; an Englishman and his wife who were vacationing at the mission were murdered; two nuns were shot. They didn't hurt my babies,' added the sister triumphantly.

"For nine days there was a reign of terror in the convent. The nuns, their hospital patients, and a few stray townspeople who had taken refuge at the mission were herded into a single dormitory and kept under rifle guard. On one of these days, after an air attack from the Indian Army had left the tribesmen in a particularly excited and nervous mood, six of the nuns were brought out and lined up to be shot. It was by accident that one of them had a conspicuous gold tooth that saved the sisters. One of the riflemen wanted to get that tooth, before his colleagues had a chance at it. In the scuffle that followed, one of their chiefs arrived; he had enough vision to realize that shooting nuns was not the thing to do, even in an invasion, and the nuns were saved."

This account is corroborated by the story of another eyewitness, Father Shanks, reproduced in the Daily Express of London, dated 11 November 1947. It gives me no pleasure to read these details, and I shall omit them.

I do not for a moment suggest that this particular outrage was approved by Pakistan. Indeed Pakistan must have deplored it as much as India; but that is just my point. Pakistan deplored it but did nothing to prevent it, whereas India not only deplored it but sent its army to prevent the recurrence of such incidents. The truth of this matter was accurately described in a letter by a British Colonel written from Pakistan on 2 November 1947, to a brother-officer in London:

"This Kashmir show was I think unsafe, and in my opinion amounts to an unofficial war on Pakistan's side. These tribesmen from the Frontier, who have poured up past here during the last fortnight, and are now fighting, killing, looting and burning in Kashmir-some thousands of them did not arrive by themselves though. Quite obviously the whole business was well organized by a central hand for supply, for transport and for direction.

"A very dangerous machine has however been let loose, one which I doubt whether Pakistan can control generally, and certainly cannot control locally. The wretched European residents of Kashmir, people on leave, in convents, etc., have not escaped the general fury which is going on a hundred miles from here."This explains why the Indian Army was sent to Kashmir. It arrived at Srinagar on the morning of 27 October 1947. It will be remembered that the outrage at Baramulla took place on the evening of 26 October. I do not think there is a single country represented in this Council that does not wish that the Indian Army had arrived a day earlier. It is a complete travesty of the facts to say that the Army was sent to Kashmir for purposes of aggression or that it is being kept there for purposes of coercion.

Before concluding, I should like to caution the Council against a plausible argument often employed in this controversy. It is put in this way: "India and Pakistan have both agreed that there should be a plebiscite to decide the question of accession. So here is something agreed upon by both parties; let us not disturb it. Starting from this point let us gradually reduce the areas of disagreement which still remain." That is the argument. It sounds like an attractive argument, but it is fundamentally unsound. India offers a plebiscite upon certain assurances or conditions which amount briefly to this, that the State must be restored to its normal condition before the plebiscite is held. India stands by that offer, subject to those conditions. Pakistan, on the other hand, appears to desire a plebiscite with the State in its present disrupted and abnormal condition. The two positions are fundamentally irreconcilable. Where there has been no meeting of minds, it is not possible to spell out an agreement.

I shall bring my observations to a close with two quotations: the first is from a telegram sent by the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 12 December 1947, shortly before India decided to bring its complaint before this Council:

"Ever since my return from Labore I have given the most earnest thought to the settlement of all outstanding matters in dispute between India and Pakistan. My colleagues share my desire for such a settlement which is essential for the well-being of both India and Pakistan... The major cause of this conflict at present is Kashmir... We would gladly co-operate in an attempt to restore peace by settlement...

This shows the spirit which animated India then. The second quotation is from the speech of the President of the Indian Republic made a few days ago:

"Our history and culture, as well as the unalterable facts of geography, compel both India and Pakistan to live in friendly cooperation with each other. But the grievous wound caused by recent events will take some time to heal. It is my Government's policy to endeavour to help in every way this process of healing. In pursuance of this policy my Government has proposed to the Government of Pakistan that both Governments should make a solemn declaration. for the avoidance of war as a method for the settlement of any disputes between them."

This is the spirit which animates India even now.

This completes what I have to say at this stage. I fear that I have somewhat trespassed upon the patience of the President and the members of this Council, but there has been so much misrepresentation of my country, due perhaps to wrong or inadequate information on the subject, that I have thought it necessary, even at the risk of wearying the Council, to explain our point of view as fully as possible.