25111948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan) In the Security Council Meeting No. 382 held on 25 November 1948

25111948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan) In the Security Council Meeting No. 382 held on 25 November 1948

I have no desire to start a controversy over anything that my friend, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, has stated because it would be very inept at this stage to take up a statement sentence by sentence and to say how much one agrees with it and how much one differs with it.

I have submitted to the Security Council the picture of the military situation, and my friend on the other side has made his comments on it. The actual situation, the Security Council will perceive, is no different from what I described it to be. What are the apt words to describe it? It may be a matter of difference, of controversy between the representatives of the two Governments. I do wish to say this: it is not somewhat curious, to say the least, that whereas Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai seeks to assign the offensive role to Pakistan, it should be Pakistan which is anxious that the fighting and the killing should come to an immediate stop. Is it ever the desire of a party taking the offensive role, and wishing to carry it to completion, to be keenly anxious that fighting should come to an end?

As I have said, I will enter no controversy as to what is the particular appellation which might fitly describe what has been happening during the last week or so, particularly in the military sphere. Call it by whatever name or expression it might please the Council or might please the representative of India, intensive fighting has flared up. Of course, when there is a fight, both sides have to participate in it; but apart from the fighting itself, which results in killing and destruction, large numbers of people are subjected to a great deal of privation, destitution, misery, leaving of their homes, and so on.

If it is true that, whatever the legal position may be, -and the Security Council knows well that the two sides differ on the appreciation of the legal position-India regards Kashmir as part of its territory as a result of the accession which was attempted last year, Pakistan has never accepted that position. But whatever may be the legal implications of the situation, and

whatever rights each side may reserve to itself of sending troops, of carrying on the fighting and to trying to exclude the other side from the territory of Kashmir, at least in order to provide the best chance and to afford a peaceful atmosphere for the consideration of the proposals now before the two Governments, the fighting, the killing, and the migrations of people should be stopped, if not permanently, at least temporarily.

They say they have no aggressive designs, at least for the time being, until every avenue of a peaceful settlement has been explored and investigated. We say that we have had no aggressive designs from the very beginning, whatever our legal position may be, because, from the very beginning, we have not recognized the validity of the accession at all. If that is so, if each side is sincere in its declarations to the Security Council then what difficulty is there in stopping the fighting-I assure the Council that that can be done before the sun sets tomorrow and letting the Commission carry on its extremely valuable efforts in a peaceful atmosphere, since that is the only chance of bringing about some kind of peaceful settlement of this dispute, and thereby preventing further exacerbation of the situation?

On the eve of its departure from the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, the Commission made an appeal to both sides, an appeal of which the Council was aware, not to take any action. which might worsen the situation. Within the last few days it has repeated that appeal to both parties, requesting that nothing should be done on the political or military side which might further exacerbate the situation. They have already taken the step of drawing the attention of the Secretary-General to the request made as early as July for the appointment of a military advisor to the Commission. No doubt that request is receiving the attention of the Secretary-General. These measures ought to be encouraged rather than obstructed.

As I have said, I have no desire to start a controversy on the appreciation of the military situation. Let the appreciation of my friend on the other side be accepted, but even if that is done, at least while these proposals are being considered and have any chance of being accepted by either side, why should there not be a cessation of the fighting? Once those proposals are accepted, though they are based on certain principles which for instance will require details being worked out, and that could be done in the later stages-the truce proposals will then immediately come into operation, and those truce proposals, ** the members of the Council are aware, involve and require the withdrawal of all Pakistan forces and that has been agreed to by the Pakistan Government.

The controversy that arose and stopped the progress of the work that the Commission was then doing arose over the third part of the Commission's resolution, that is as to what was to happen after the truce. There was no trouble with regard to the cease-fire or the truce itself. The Commission is now engaged upon formulation of its plebiscite proposals, so that if the cease-fire could provide an opportunity allowing these proposals to be calmly considered and for some principles to be accepted by the two sides, the truce would come into force at once. And then India would have gained the point on the military side to which it attaches a great deal of importance. The subsequent stages of the agreement arrived at and could then be worked out.

In submitting this letter to the Security Council as I was directed to do by my Government, I have had no other purpose whatsoever in view except that something should be done so that this constant irritation and inflaming of feelings, not only between the two Governments but also between the two peoples and between the Press of the two Dominions, should be brought to an end, and so that the efforts made towards a peaceful settlement should have some chance of succeeding.

Therefore, I have no desire either to controvert the statement made on the other side, or to make debating points on this side, or to try and show that it is correct, or that it is not, proving that we were not to blame in this situation. This is no occasion for that. My appeal is a simple one: that without prejudice to anything else and with the sole desire of carrying forward the work of the Commission, something may be arranged which should stop the further deterioration of the situation on the spot. You may call the Indian military action "defensive", but it has resulted in thousands of people being rendered not only homeless, but having to make a long and difficult trek in order to reach security. It may be that they are unreasonably afraid. But it must be fear of a very grave character which compels a person to leave his own home and hearth, however modest, however humble, or on however poor a scale it was being conducted, in order to make the difficult journey and to become a stranger in a comparatively strange country. Well, that is happening on a very large scale. At least that would be stopped. The further deterioration of that situation would be stopped.

What difficulty stands in the way of the attainment of that at least? The request to the two Governments, the direction to the two Governments, the order, if you so choose to call it to the Governments, in that respect, may come from the Commission or may come from the Council; it is immaterial; but our object is that if anything has to have a chance of success, the deterioration of the military situation must be stopped. Otherwise, as I have said, one or two of the very grave and most regrettable consequences are bound to ensue. There is no threat from either side. No threat has been expressed by us; none has been expressed by the other side. There is a certain amount of difference with regard to the descriptions to be applied to the situation. But there is agreement on this, that India took certain military actions in order to achieve certain objectives. We differed with regard to the character of the action taken. This is what has happened. We cannot reverse it. We are not asking the Security Council or the Commission to take steps to reverse that, but let us at least stop the further deterioration of the situation which would result, one day or the other, in something that would be disastrous from every point of view.