19041948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed ZafruUah Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 285 held on 19 April 1948

19041948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed ZafruUah Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 285 held on 19 April 1948

As I listened to the very able exposition that Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar has just concluded making to the Security Council, I wished that I possessed in a similar degree the gift of placing before the Council matters, palatable and unpalatable, in such eloquent, and particularly such polished, language. I apologize in advance for the fact that my approach to the consideration of the resolution now before the Security Council wili be more direct than his, and may, I fear, also be more ruggedly expressed.

The fundamental question before the Security Council has been this: with respect to the Kashmir dispute, the parties have agreed that the question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan is to be determined by means of a free and impartial plebiscite. The problem with which the members of the Council have been struggling during the past few weeks is to determine and propound the essential conditions for such a plebiscite .

I freely and sincerely associate myself with the opening words of Mr Gopalaswami Ayyangar, in which he has paid a generous and handsome tribute to the .labours of the Security Council as a whole, and more particularly to the labours of the President for the current month and the Presidents of the Security Council since the month of January, and to the other representatives who have been associated with them in find.ng a solution to that question. The delegation of Pakistan, as much as the delegation of India, fully appreciates, and is duly grate­ful for, the labour and care that have been devoted by the Security Council to this question. Various aspects of this problem were propounded to the Security Council at great length both in the meetings of the Council and in the discus­sions that took place with the Presidents and their associates during several months.

As far as I am concerned, I was so much indulged in that respect by the Security Council that I fear that, on some occasions, I expressed myself at wearisome length. Therefore, when the Council found itself in a position to be able to pro­pound its own views on this matter in respect of the lines on which its settlement should depend, which appeared to it to be fair and proper, there could have been no feeling in the minds of the members of the Security Council that they had not been supplied with sufficient data or that light had not been thrown to their satisfaction on the various aspects of this problem.

At a certain stage, the Security Council gave expression to the principles on which the settlement of this question should be based, and perhaps it might be of some worth and advantage, even at this late stage, to remind members of the Security Council of the view that they took on the fundamentals of this question and to request them once more to consider whether or not, m us more important aspects, the draft resolution now before the Security Council embodies those principles. It is true that parties that are contesting against each other will always be apt, to take partial views on the question. I am not, there­fore, moving the members of the Security Council to consider as I fear the representative of India has done, to what extent they have or have not complied with his request or my request. That is beside the point.

At this stage, after the debate on this question which has continued for more than three months, I venture to invite the Security Council to consider whether the solution that the Council has finally embodied in this draft resolution satisfies the tests which those very members who were parties to the resolution laid down, themselves, as crucial to the matter. That may surely be regarded as an impartial approach to the matter. In this connexion I would first invite the attention of the Security Council to certain very weighty and valuable observa­tions made by the representative of the United States on 24-January 1948.

The representative said:

"...with respect to the media and methods of creating those conditions, arrange an interim government that is recognized as free from the smell of brimstone, as nearly impartial and perfect as two great countries like India and Pakistan can make it, in which the rest of the world will have confidence as being fair [235th meeting]."

1. is one of the passages. At the same meeting the-representative of Canada said:

"...so that a basis of agreement may be reached to terminate the fighting, to afford security to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir under some authority which will be recognized-by everyone concerned as strictly impartial..."

 

At the same meeting the representative of France stated:

'I feel that three conditions are required in connexion with this plebiscite. In the first place, all foreign troops must be removed from Kashmir. Secondly, all original inhabitants of Kashmir, both Muslim and Hindu, must be allowed to return to their places of residence there. Thirdly, a free administration must be set up in Kashmir which will not exercise any pressure on the population and will thus ensure the fairness of the plebiscite."

After the representative of France had spoken, the represen­tative of Syria added to what he had said by stating that not only should foreign troops be removed, but the tribesmen also must withdraw.

The representative of France further explained his point of view in these words:

"From my viewpoint, the word 'troops' means not only regular troops but also irregular troops, that is, both troops under the command of a State authority and tribal forces not recognizing allegiance to any State."

Obviously the representative of France meant a Government and not a State. There is a distinction in India between a Princely State and the Dominion of India or the Dominion of Pakistan.

Later, on 29 January, the representative of the United States of America said:

"The other question of a fair plebiscite will also naturally involve a consideration of the form and substance of the administration of the Government leading up to and during the period of the plebiscite. I do not desire to say any more about this, because I do not want to get into a detailed discussion of details (237th meeting)."

"Ever since the first speeches were made on this subject in India and Pakistan months ago, I have been considering what significance could be attached to the phrase 'under the auspices of the United Nations'. The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that that phrase must imply not only that the plebiscite must be fair in itself, but that it must seem fair to all concerned; not only that in fact justice shall be assured, as I am certain it would be assured by the sole action of any one Government at this table if it had a free hand, but that it must seem fair to both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan, to all the members of the Security Council, to all the Members of the United Nations and, I add—and I think this is the crucial point in stopping the fighting, as I have said before—(hat it must seem fair to the combatants, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in Kashmir itself."

On 4 February, the representative of the United States of America said:

"How is it possible to induce the tribesmen to retire from Jammu and Kashmir without warfare and without driving them out? That is the only way it can be done, unless the tribesmen are satisfied that there is to be a fair plebiscite assured through an interim government that is in fact, and that has the appearance of being, non-partisan. Only by that method could one hope to have that retirement on a peaceful basis [240th meeting]."

The representative of the United States went on to state:

"The interim government need not exist for a long time. It need exist for only such time as is necessary to set up the machinery for the holding of a fair plebiscite. After the plebiscite, what then? That interim government will be functus officio; it will have completed its job and it will have no more authority. There are many such institutions in government and they are especially important in interna­tional affairs. Of course, we would not be interested in this matter if it were purely a domestic affair."

The next day, the representative of the United Kingdom stated:

"What the Security Council does must seem fair to these two parties. I must also seem fair to the Government of Pakistan, to the insurgents, to the tribesmen, to the Government of India to the other inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir and to the outside world. That is why I arrived at the same conclusion as the other members of the Security Council who stated that impartial, interim administrative arrangements must be made[24 Ist meeting}:'

On 5 February, the President, as representative of Canada, submitted to the Security Council what was first described as a private memorandum, and which subsequently, at the request of the representative of Colombia, became a draft resolution. I shall draw attention to only two paragraphs of that resolution, as representing the views of the President on this question.

Paragraph D states:

"That an interim administration which will command the full confidence and respect of the people of the Jammu and Kashmir State is essential to the attainment of the aims and purposes of this resolution [document s/671]."

In paragraph 1 of this draft resolution, it is stated:

"The Security Council recommends to the Government of Pakistan to use all their efforts to persuade the tribesmen and all trespassers who have invaded the territory of Jammu and Kashmir State to withdraw there from.

"In this connexion, the Commission shall seek to ensure cooperation between the military forces of India and Pakistan with a view to bringing about an immediate cessa­tion of fighting in the Jammu and Kashmir State and to maintain order and security until the question of accession shall have been determined by the plebiscite."

In other words, he made two recommendations. The first was that an impartial interim administration in Jammu and Kashmir was essential, and the second that the practical method of securing both the withdrawal of the tribesmen and the restoration and maintenance of law and order during the period While the plebiscite was being organized and held, it was for the Commission to seek the cooperation of the military forces of India and Pakistan. These are the two main matters on which the difference persists between the representative of the Government of India and the representative of the Government of Pakistan.

On 10 February, the representative of Canada presented to the Security Council, of which he was then the President, a draft resolution dated 6 February. He explained that the draft proposals which had been submitted to the parties

"...represented an effort, pursuant to the mandate of the Security Council, to produce a comprehensive framework of principles based upon suggestions made by members of the Security Council, within which the discussion of detailed specific proposals might usefully proceed [243rd meeting]."

That is to say, the draft resolution was not the work of the representative of Canada alone—as President of the Security Council for the month of February—or of the representatives of Canada and of Belgium alone, but it represented views expressed by members of the Security Council during meetings of that body.

I wish now to draw the attention of the Security Council to certain extracts from this other resolution [document S/667] which bear upon the question which is now mainly the one which divides the two parties. It says:

"(a) Acts of violence and hostility must end;

"(b) The withdrawal and continued exclusion of all irregular forces and armed individuals who have entered Jammu and Kashmir from outside must be brought about, each party using to that end all the influence at its disposal;

"(c) Regular armed forces, in aid of the establishment and maintenance of order, must be made available. In this connexion the Governments should seek to ensure cooperation between their military forces to establish order and security until the question of accession shall have been determined by the plebiscite;

"(d) Regular armed forces must be withdrawn as soon as the re-establishment of law and order permits"; and

“ (f) The conditions necessary for a free and fair plebiscite on the question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan, including an interim administration which will command the confidence and respect of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, must be established."

Both the President then in office, General McNaughton, and the President for the previous month, Mr. van Langenhove, who had acted as Rapporteur, requested members of the Security Council to say whether the articles embodied in this resolution did or did not represent the views to which they had hitherto given expression.

The representative of Argentina, who now has the honour to be President of the special session of the General Assembly, stated on 10 February:

"I think that this draft resolution does sum up the opinions expressed by the members of the Security Council in our debate on this question, and I wish to give my approval to ft."

He went on to say, later:

"In summary, t approve the draft resolution submitted by the President, which was drafted in consultation with Mr. van Langenhove, the representative of Belgium [243rd meeting]."

The representative of France stated, on the same day:

"Like the representative of Argentina, I wish to thank the President and the Rapporteur for the work that they have done in order to bring together the various views which have been expressed here in this connexion and to facilitate our study of this question."

Other representatives expressed themselves as follows:

The representative of Syria:

"It is in full conformity and harmony with the views expres­sed by the members of the Security Council during the last meetings.*'

The representative of the United Kingdom:

"The representatives of Argentina, Syria, and, if I under­stood him, France, have answered this question affirmatively. They think that this draft resolution does sum up the views of the Security Council as they have been expressed in our debates hitherto; that we ought now to intimate to the President and the Rapporteur our gratitude for their work, and our approval of what they have done; and that, in the phrase of the representative of Argentina, we ought to con­sider that such a resolution would be a useful basis for further discussion."

Later in the same meeting, the representative of the United Kingdom was pleased to state;

"I have come to the conclusion that while, of course, the statement of the President is not more than an outline, nevertheless it is a faithful translation into broad principles of the way in which the Security Council thinks—that we ought to proceed towards a settlement of the difficult, dangerous and immensely important question of Kashmir."

The representative of the United States:

"Our view, as indicated thus far by trends of opinion, must be clear. I think that there is no confusion at all about the fact that the trend of our opinion, which is not yet in the form of a resolution, is towards a pacific settlement of this matter—an arrangement with terms of such character that they command the respect and the confidence of the parties to the dispute. As I have said, there seems to be no other way of bringing peace to that part of the world than this specific method of agreement between the parties, which.

involves such management and such control of the plebiscite to which both parties have assented—as to ensure that everyone interested will know that it is free, fair and just."

Iater, he added:

"I want to say that I fear my own position here has been misunderstood. When I spoke about an interim government, I only envisaged as much control of the machinery of government as is necessary for the limited time and purpose of holding a fair plebiscite...My own position does not relate to the future government. I can think of many ways -in which that situation might be handled without the least derogation of the present Interim Government's life or powers, except for that special purpose; and that is a purpose which I believe both parties desire and which all the world would be glad to see pursued."

On 11 February, the representative of the United Kingdom said:

"'Our problem in the Security Council is to make all parties, including Pakistan and the Kashmiris now fighting against the Indian Army—whom the Indian representative admitted to be parties the other day—regard the plebiscite as fair {244th meeting]."

On the same day the representative of Argentina presented his views to the Security Council under nine heads, of which I shall read the third and fifth, which are as follows:

third, that Kashmir is not a territory of India—no power will either propose or accept a plebiscite to surrender a part of its territory, as India's Government did;"

fifth, that the cause of the present war is the rebellion of the Kashmir people against their ruler, and the only remedy is to look to the will of these people 245 th meeting That concluded the first part of the deliberations of the Security Council, the part which was devoted to determining and propounding not what either party thought but what the Security Council thought were the essential conditions for the-holding of a fair and impartial plebiscite. And, if one might so put it, up to then, one could almost see the process that was . working behind the discussions in the Security Council and behind the resolutions that from time to time took shape.

1. that stage, the Indian delegation felt it necessary to go-back to India to hold persona) consultations with its Government. Thereupon, if one might be forgiven for saying so, the matter went underground; that is to say, one was no longer contagious of what was happening. One had to depend upon scraps-of information that appeared in the Press from time to time to which one did not know how much value to attach. The Security Council will forgive me if I give expression to the reeling that subsequent events have shown that these indications-in the Press were not so unfounded as one had, in one's innocence and simplicity, imagined at the time. They indeed gave a very accurate reflection of what was going on behind the scenes. If that ,s so, it would appear that at least, some of the: members of the Security Council seemed to have realized during; that interval, with a sense of sharp surprise, that the Security Council had for "once let itself slip into a position of fairness, and Partiality between two contending parties which might help to restore to the United Nations a fraction of the prestige-that it was so rapidly losing in the eyes of the world. They therefore beat a hasty retreat from a position so unfamiliar and embarrassing and fraught with the possibility of such undesired consequences.

The first positive indications of this change came to my notice on 3 March 1948, communicated to me from a quarter that need not be further particularized. They outlined quite clearly the shape of the draft resolution now before the Security-Council.

A significant summary appeared in the Indian Press on 8 March 1948. At this stage, I draw the attention of the Security Council to a clipping from The Statesman of^ New Delhi of 8 March 1948, in which the following appeared:

"Lake Success, March 7-A new approach to the Kashmir problem will be tried when the Security Council resumes our debate on Kashmir tomorrow, it was reliably learned today. Although the exact nature of the new approach is not revealed, well-informed sources predict that the trend of thought would be along the following lines:

"The Council will acknowledge that there was some justifica­tion in the Indian complaint that Kashmir raiders were obtaining aid in Pakistan, though not necessarily by direct Government assistance. On this point, the Council was considered likely to request the Pakistan Government to use its best efforts to stop alleged illegal activity in its territory or by its nationals.

"The disputed problem of an interim administration for Kashmir during the plebiscite might, according to the same sources be solved by broadening the present administration under Sheikh Abdullah on a wider political basis. "On the question of Indian troops in Kashmir, it was under­stood that the new line of the Council's approach might be to consent to their presence but, at the same time, to ensure that their activities were of a purely military character and did not include police duties.

"It was believed that there was no crystallized resolution in view and that discussion in the Council might produce substantial changes."

That was a remarkably accurate summary of what has subsequently come to the surface.

The draft resolution is now before the Security Council in its final shape. As the representative of China explained, his first draft resolution of 18 March 1948 [document S/699] under­went certain modifications, and it emerged in the shape of his draft resolution of 30 March 1948. The draft resolution now before the Security council is with some slight modifications substantially the draft resolution of 30 March 1948 This draft resolution, as was bound to happen, in many respects takes a view, makes a recommendation or suggests a course of action that may not, in its entirety, or in some aspects, be acceptable to one party or the other. That surely cannot be a grievance against a resolution which seeks to resolve a dispute in which the parties have held the points of view that the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan hold with regard to Kashmir.

In this regard, there are two questions to which I most respectfully wish to draw the attention of the Security Council. In the first place, to what extent is this resolution based upon the principles which the members of the Security Council themselves have said are the only principles upon which a fair settlement of this problem can be arrived at? In the second place, getting away from that, on its own merits, apart from any discussions that may have preceded this resolution, to what extent does it fulfil that very desirable purpose? Again I venture to submit that nobody will pretend that with regard to the two. main matters in dispute-the withdrawal of the armed forces of India and the setting up of an impartial administration-this resolution proceeds on the principles which the Security Council itself thought were essential and were the foundation of the whole scheme.

Those two basic principles have been materially, if not altogether, departed from. But as I have said, it is due to the eminence, ability, experience, and the standing of the authors of this draft resolution, and to the labours that they have devoted to the framing of it, as they viewed it, with the sole desire and single-minded purpose of building a structure which might help peacefully to resolve this dispute-it is due to all these factors that the provisions of the draft resolution should be examined with care on their merits to see how far it is likely to achieve the purpose for which it is designed.

To begin with, it will strike anyone who studies the draft resolution, even cursorily, that in its main aspects it is all one sided. It has been contended, on behalf of the Indian delegation, that it is not one-sided enough. But then, one appreciates their position. Their position is that the whole trouble in Kashmir should be resolved on the basis that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India is legal and constitutional; that the fighting which is going on in Kashmir has no justification or validity; that it is an attempt by outsiders to disturb the peace, order and tranquillity of the State; that Pakistan ought even to undertake military action at its own borders and frontiers to stop the tribesmen from coming into Kashmir, and that once that objective has been achieved, the military occupation of the whole of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the civil administration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be taken over by the Government of India; the Government of India would then, in consultation with the Security Council and under its auspices, carry out a plebiscite.

Of course, if that is the correct approach to the problem, the delegation of India is right in stating that Pakistan has nothing to do with the matter except to arrange for the withdrawal of the tribesmen by persuasion or by such other action as may be necessary, and to ensure that their infiltration back into the State is out of the question, and that the rest must be left to the Government of India and to the Security Council.But of course, not only is that not the view of the Pakistan Government-which, after all, would be the view of one of the parties to the dispute-but throughout these discussions it has been made quite clear that that is not the view of the Security Council.

The essence of the matter is this-and there is no escape from it-the question of the accession of Kashmir to India or to Pakistan is a question which is equally vital to both Dominions, and they are equally vitally interested in its result. That being so, the position cannot be equitably maintained that, by virtue of what happened on 26 and 27 October, the legality of which has been from the very beginning persistently questioned by Pakistan, India alone is concerned with this matter.

If both Dominions are vitally interested and if fair conditions have to be brought about in Kashmir-which should not result in any prejudice to either party's position-and if, from that

point of view, if the draft resolution is studied, it will be found to be all too one-sided.

One test that I venture to submit is the following: if what Pakistan submits should be brought about were acceded to, would it weigh the plebiscite in favour of Pakistan in any respect? If what is insisted upon on behalf of India were accept­ed, agreed to and persisted in, would it or would it not weigh the plebiscite in favour of India? That, I venture to submit, is a fair enough test.

Would the withdrawal of Indian troops from Kashmir— provided law and order were to be re-established and could be maintained with the help of local arrangements or with the help of neutral military troops—put any pressure or have any chance to put pressure upon any of the voters inside Kashmir to vote for accession to Pakistan? Would it stop anyone who wanted to vote for accession to India from voting in that way? Obviously not.

Would the setting up of an impartial administration in Kashmir put pressure on anyone to vote for accession to Pakistan? Would it stop anyone from voting for accession to India if he wanted to do so?

These two matters are the crux of the whole question. The position of Pakistan with regard to them is to bring about a fair and impartial state of affairs in which no one would be influenced in one direction or the other.

The continued presence of the armed forces of India in the State of Jammu and Kashmir would either, under the safeguards contained in the draft resolution, not affect the plebiscite, or in spite of these safeguards, might affect the freedom of the plebiscite.

In the first case, no harm is done. In the second case, in which direction would it affect the plebiscite? Obviously it would be in favour of India, and therefore the arrangement would not be fair; it would not be impartial. The continuation of Sheikh Abdullah at the head of the administration might, to some extent, be rendered nugatory by the fair interpretation of paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, and its faithful enforcement. But the continuation of Sheikh Abdullah at the head of the Kashmir Government is, in our view, bound to heavily influence the fairness and impartiality of the plebiscite. If our fear is justified in which direction would it influence the plebiscite? In favour of India-

Can anyone contend that the setting up of a truly impartial administration would force or influence anyone to vote in favour of Pakistan who would otherwise not wish to vote that way, or would it stop anyone from voting for India who desired to vote for India?

My contention is that on these two central crucial matters on which differences still persist, Pakistan is asking only for an impartial field, from which all suspicion of favoritism from one side or the other will be removed.

The things upon which India insists, whatever may be the reason advanced for them—constitutional, legal, the relationship between the State and the Federation—are among those which, in our view, would work prejudicially against Pakistan and in favour of India. At the very best it may be hoped that they would not, but if they do at all, those factors will influence the [plebiscite in only one direction; there is no possibility of their influencing it in the other.

It is from this point of view that I desire the Security Council to approach the consideration of the draft resolution, and to consider whether it effectively meets the situation. It obviously does not proceed along the lines which the Security Council itself earlier propounded. That much is not only conceded but has been stressed by the representative of India, so it is not a matter of dispute.

Last Saturday afternoon at the 284th meeting, in a very powerful and moving speech, the representative of China explained the safeguards embodied in the resolution. His explanation was fair; I am not disputing it, so far as it went. And I, in the first place, he himself said that in his experience—and I am afraid that I have not even a fraction of that experience—no international plebiscite had been hedged around so many safeguards as this proposed plebiscite. Why is that? Why has the Security Council been at pains to devise so many safeguards ? It is because the Security Council has moved away from the position that the continued presence of the armed) forces of India in the State of Kashmir during the plebiscite and* the continuation of the administration of Sheikh Abdullah-would guarantee a fair and impartial plebiscite. It is an-admission that Pakistan's apprehensions on that score are-justified. That is why recourse is being had to safeguards. The purpose is to minimize as far as possible—I recognize that—the effect of those two factors.

But why merely minimize as much as possible? This is a matter which has been in dispute between the two Dominions from the very beginning. On 8 November, the Prime Minister of India, in that telegram which I have often quoted to the Security-Council and from which I need not «read again this afternoon,. made this declaration: that, as soon as law and order had been restored, Indian troops would be withdrawn from Kashmir.

It has subsequently been stated here by Mr. Gopalaswami  Ayyangar: ' Yes, but conditions have changed." In what respect? On 8 November, the State of Kashmir was in turmoil.. That turmoil, it is true, has more or less continued. But what new factor has arisen which today necessitates that, after-fighting has ceased and law and order have been restored, the troops of the Government of India should remain?

The representative of India says: "Oh, it is because we are responsible for the defence of Kashmir under the terms of accession." Were they not responsible for the defence of Kashmir on 8 November under the terms of accession? Has that liability, that obligation, that duty, been imposed upon the Government of India since that time? They were quite conscious of their obligations under the instrument of accession when they made that offer, and today that offer is not being adhered to.

It was stated in that very telegram that Mr. Jinnah, the-Governor-General of Pakistan, had pointed out —to Lord' Mountbatten that there was no chance of holding a fair plebis­cite under the present administration of Kashmir. For the* purposes of the plebiscite, that point was not disputed. The~ Prime Minister of India may have felt that too much stress Being laid upon that point, but he did not attempt to argue that was not valid. His reply was that the remedy was to hide the plebiscite under the authority of the United Nations. What the authority of the United Nations means has been interpreted by the representative of the United Kingdom before the Security Council, and I have read out his interpretation. We are asking for no more; throughout, we have asked for no more. What we are asking for would establish the absolute impartiality and fairness of the plebiscite.

The Government of India has insisted upon its position sometimes on the basis of the sovereignty of the Maharajahs— I suppose that is the result of the treatment accorded to them by other Indian States, which I have brought to the attention of the Security Council, and one has not heard much of that argument lately—and sometimes on the basis of the relationship between the Federation and the States. Whatever the reason may be, however, what they are asking for is this: to hold the plebiscite while the whole of the State is under the military occupation of the armed forces of the Government of India and while the administration is under one of their nominees.

So far as Sheikh Abdullah is concerned, he appeared before the Security Council, which was able to make an estimate as to how far that gentleman was impartial in this question. Since then, he has made many other pronouncements after returning to India and after the Maharajah proceeded to appoint him Prime Minister. I shall not weary the Security Council with too many citations, but I should like to draw the attention of the Security Council to what was said by The Statesman of New Delhi in its issue of 25 March. Under the heading "Rash Remarks," this editorial comment was made:

'Reports from impartial sources reaching this sub-continent suggest that Sheikh Abdullah, during the Indian delegation's first New York stay to argue their case about Kashmir, proved rather an embarrassment to his colleagues. His remarks were sometimes noticeably injudicious..

Apparently undeterred however, the Sheikh, back in this state, has continued to make statements which, if reported to New York, may embarrass his colleagues anew. So Unqualified is the anti-Pakistan sentiment revealed, and so extreme the language clothing it, that unbiased folk, reading what he has said—and it has been said often and at length —must wonder more deeply whether a plebiscite in Kashmir under his administration could be fairly run."

That is the statement of an impartial newspaper issued from New Delhi, the capital of the Government of India, a newspaper known for not taking extreme views. What Sheikh Abdullah has done, since he became Prime Minister, to show his impar­tiality in this matter may be gathered, to some extent, from That appeared in The Times of London of 13 April 1948. It says, in the course of an article:

"The local administration..."—all new men—"chosen by Sheikh Abdullah are vociferously anti-Pakistan and the people, by nature excitable and easily malleable, have

reacted accordingly."

Later on, the same article says:

"Meanwhile, Sheikh Abdullah's administration has en­trenched itself. All government officials are now National Conference Party men. The Party, naturally, calls them the chosen representatives of the people, and they have found that power is both sweet and profitable."

They are not the only ones who have found that out. That, again, is the conclusion of the special correspondent of The Times. We have received information, in the form of a telegram, setting out a statement of Chaudhri Ghulam Abbas who is president of the Muslim Conference and has recently been released from gaol, saying:

"Since his ascendancy to power, Sheikh Abdullah has clapped into jail about three thousand Muslim Conference workers. Almost all gazetted officers..."—this refers to the civil service; it does not refer to the military—"under state service, suspected of pro-Pakistan leanings, have either been jailed or discharged from the service. The administration has banned listening to Radio Pakistan."

certain that this kind of measure brings to the minds the representatives on the Security Council comparable pictures of what happened in certain countries of Europe some years ago.- It is suggested that this gentleman at the head of the Kashmir Government will magnanimously invite some represen­tation in his Ministry from other political groups, in order to fulfil the conditions laid down in paragraph 6 of the revised draft resolution under consideration by the Security Council. It has even been said that Sheikh Abdullah has authorized Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, if he so chooses, to reveal to the Security Council that Sheikh Abdullah has already chosen a colleague from among the ranks of the Muslim Conference.

Let me invite the attention of the Security Council, first, to the policy of Sheikh Abdullah in these matters. It is reported in The Hindustan Times, a semi-official organ of the Govern­ment of India, published from New Delhi, in its issue of 7 March 1948—therefore, the authority of the statement is beyond doubt —under the heading "Kashmir Will Live and Die with India," in an article on a statement by Sheikh Abdullah, that:

"The Kashmir National Conference was not only completely non-communal, but also did not suffer from ideological differences. Socialists, Communists, Nationalists and others, all work together, no single group dominating its policy. In his cabinet too, he proposed to include people of all parties and communities, but they would be chosen according to only one criterion, their loyalty to the National Conference and their country."

Sheikh Abdullah says:

I shall take them from other parties but they must be loyal to my party."

Later On the article goes on to say:

"There was no question of releasing ail Muslim Conference *• i nose who were likely to act as the fifth columnists of a foreign State would remain in gaol, but if his Govern­ment was satisfied that any one of them would remain loyal to his own country, he would be let out."

No explanation or comment is necessary. The meaning J$-perfectly obvious. The foreign state is Pakistan. He who is in favour of accession to Pakistan will remain in gaol. He who will give assurance that he will work for accession to India will be let out. A claim has been made that Sheikh Abdullah has already very generously taken one gentleman from the Muslim Conference into his cabinet. In the first place, if he has done so, it was subject to that condition*. That gentleman must have given assurances of his loyalty to the National Conference. Therefore, he says he is to be a Muslim Conference member^ but it so happens that this telegram from Chaudhri Ghular Abbas, to which I have already invited reference, says:

"The gentleman in question had been expelled from the--Muslim Conference three years ago."

True, at one time he was a member of the Muslim Confe­rence; and if that makes him a representative of the Muslim-Conference, much more so is Sheikh Abdullah himself a repre­sentative of the- Muslim Conference, because he started his-political career in Kashmir as a member of the Muslim Confe­rence. The only time that he was ever elected to the legislature of Kashmir was on the Muslim Conference ticket, from which, he has subsequently departed, but that does not make bin* today a representative of the Muslim Conference. However,. that is the kind of representation that he proposes to give an* has given to other parties.

I shall now draw the attention of the Security Council to-certain features of the revised draft resolution. What is Pakistan-required to do under this draft resolution? In this connexion, I shall refer to sub-paragraph 1 (b), although this logically should have been sub-paragraph 1 (a). It was at one time sub-paragraph 1 (a), but it has subsequently again become sub-paragraph 1 (b), although it obviously comes first. This sub" paragraph reads as follows:

To make known to all concerned that the measures indicated in this and the following paragraphs prov.de full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, and that therefore they should cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order."

If it had been to make known to all concerned the measures indicated herein, that would be easy and that would be all right and the people could themselves then judge, from the language of the proposals, from the scheme as a whole, and from the manner in which it was being put into force, whether it did or did not provide full freedom to everyone to do this, that, and the other.

I quite realize that the Pakistan Government, as a party to this dispute, must go further, is bound to go further, and should undertake this obligation if it were true and honest: to state to those people that the following paragraphs provide full freedom to ail subjects of the State, regardless of this, that, and the other. If the Pakistan Government is convinced that the articles amount to what they claim, the Government will certainly undertake that obligation, not only discharging it to the full, but doing whatever is possible to bring about the maintenance of peace and order. But so long as it is not satisfied that the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State-this, that and the other—then it cannot surely in honesty be expected to give that assurance to the people who are fighting.

The Security Council has agreed that the only thing that could persuade these people even to agree to the withdrawal would be an assurance which would satisfy them on the matters set out in sub-paragraph I(b). If it did not satisfy them, then it would be no use for Pakistan to make any effort in the direction of sub-paragraph l(a).

Let us assume for one moment that the rest of the resolution was satisfactory, that the rest of the resolution did embody proposals which would give full freedom to everyone concerned with regard to the plebiscite and other matters. Even then, how could Pakistan in practice discharge this obligation that is laid down in sub-paragraph I(a) without some further authority being invested in Pakistan? I shall immediately proceed to explain what I mean.

There are among the representatives sitting in the Security Council are eminent men with direct and others with indirect experience of military situations. Surely, they are able to fully appreciate the situation that is required to be dealt with in Kashmir where fighting is taking place, so far as the cessation of the fighting and the withdrawal of the tribesmen are concerned.

In the first place, it is absolutely essential for the purpose of bringing about a stoppage of the fighting—asset out in the preamble "that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting.."—it is absolutely essential in actual practice that people from the two sides meet in order to settle arrangements for the cessation of fighting; at what time the fighting shall stop, and when, and how the withdrawal is to be arranged.

The people who have been fighting are not to be shot down; they are not to be victimized; they must be permitted to proceed peacefully back to their homes—those who are Kashmir nationals—and those who do not belong there, out of the State; and then, when they are withdrawing, they shall not commit any act of violence or persecution of the population.

Thus, obviously, this matter requires two aspects to be dealt with: first, some machinery—not that I mean that this machinery is to be set up in this resolution, but it must be contemplated—which will bring about an arrangement for the cessation of the fighting, and can settle the points of that arrangement. Secondly, some machinery must be set up which will see to it that that arrangement is put into force, that is to say, which will supervise the putting into force of the arrangement for the cessation of fighting, for instance, will supervise the withdrawal of tribesmen.

Two telegrams have been read by the representative of India as to the atrocities alleged on both sides, one from the Azad Kashmir people and one, a summary of what has appeared in The Hindustan Times. It is a horrible state of affairs, irrespective of the fact whether the truth lies on one side or the other, or whether it lies between the two; whether it is non-Muslims who have been butchered and massacred and have been expelled from their homes, or whether it is Muslims whose eyes have been gouged out and who have been massacred.

With a horrible state of affairs such as that, with that kind of people fighting each other, when a cessation is brought about there surely must be supervision, especially on the side of the tribesmen, who are an irregular force owing allegiance to no one. It is absolutely inescapable that military force must be available in the areas under the control of the Azad Kashmir Government to supervise the putting into effect of the cessation of fighting and the withdrawal of tribesmen.

India says "Our forces will do it." When that statement is analysed, what does it come to? What does it amount to? It amounts to this: Pakistan is called upon to exercise its influence to do whatever it can to ask these people to stop fighting the forces of India, and the forces of India thereupon are to march into their territory, to occupy it militarily and to expel these people. Is that the solution that the Security Council is putting forward? If not, then it is obvious that the Pakistan Government, in order to discharge this obligation, if it undertakes it, must have at its disposal a certain number of its forces to supervise the carrying into effect of the arrangement for the cessation of fighting, and to supervise the withdrawal of the tribesmen. There is no escaping it. It is contemplated in the resolution itself that there will have to be an arrangement for the cessation of the fighting.

I draw attention to sub-paragraph 2 (a):

 

"When it is established to the satisfaction of the Commission set up in accordance with the Council's resolution of 20 January that the tribesmen are withdrawing and that

arrangements for the cessation of the fighting have become effective-.."

Somebody has got to settle these arrangements between the two sides, and somebody has got to supervise their becoming effective. The Commission cannot get satisfaction until the matter is being properly carried out in an orderly manner.

That is one defect in the resolution that it does not provide for that contingency. Then, the representative of India has raised one or two matters with regard to clarification, and I agree with him. If these paragraphs, these articles, contain something which to one party might mean X, and to the other party might mean Y, and X and Y are opposed to each other, it will not lead to a settlement. It will lead to further disputes. Therefore, to the extent to which the meaning can be made clear, the meaning should be made clear, and the articles should not contain conundrums to be solved subsequently by somebody else. The representative of India has asked for a clarification, and I join him in asking for a clarification of what is meant by "forward areas" and what is meant by "base areas". He has said that if "forward areas" are to be confined to areas within the control of the Government of India at the moment, he rejects this proposal. On the other hand, I desire to submit most respectfully to the Security Council that if by "forward areas" is meant any areas within the areas at present under the control of the Azad Kashmir people, they cer­tainly will not, under any circumstances, agree that they should lay down their arms and that the Indian army should march forward and occupy their areas. Therefore, some kind of definition of "forward area" and "base area" must be made so that the parties will realize what is meant by these terms -Whoever was responsible for drafting this must have had something in his mind that ought to be made clear.

Certain changes have been made in paragraph 3. The representative of India said tbit nothing had been done to bring the resolution more in accord with their wishes and that everything that had been done worsened it from their point of view. So far as the changes in the draft resolution, as it stood on 30 March, are concerned, except for two phrases, every change that has been made in the draft has been an attempt to meet the Indian point of view. I do not say that that in itself would be anything to object to; if a particular point of view can be met without in any way interfering with the fairness or impartiality or the practicability of a-proposal, by all means that attempt must be made. That is the only way to bring the parties closer together or to make a proposal as acceptable as possible to the parties. It was not correct when the representa­tive of India contended that all changes in this draft have worsened it from his point of view.

Let me compare paragraph 3 as it stands in the present draft with paragraph 3 as it stood before. His main criticism is directed against paragraphs 4 and 5 read together. I also have a fairly serious criticism to make of paragraphs 4 and 5 read together. In the first place, if the local forces provided for in paragraph 4, and referred to in paragraph 5, should be found to be inadequate, as paragraph 5 postulates, the Commission is authorized to arrange for the use of such force of either Dominion as it deems effective for the purpose of pacification.

But it makes this authority of the Commission subject to the agreement of both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan. Exactly what does that mean? If the Commission feels that in certain areas, for the purpose of the effective re-establishment and maintenance of law and order, it would be best to use Pakistan troops and that the desired result would be achieved best in that way, it must ask for the agree­ment of the Government of India. If India refuses, what is to happen then ? Or put it the other way round .

The paragraph is open to that criticism. But there is also another one. Does that paragraph mean what it says? Presumably it does. That is why it is there. If it does mean what it says, paragraphs 4 and 5 between them provide for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order, and that being so, where is the necessity for paragraph 9? Paragraph 9 says:

 

"The Government of India should at the request of the Plebiscite Administration make available from the Indian forces such assistance as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions."

For the performance of its functions the Plebiscite Administration may require assistance of many kinds. But the only assistance it could possibly require from armed forces would be assistance in the maintenance of Jaw and order when the voters' registers and lists are being prepared, and for the maintenance of law and order at the polling stations when the plebiscite is actually being held. That is all a part of the maintenance of law and order. That being so, if paragraphs 4 and 5 fully set up the machinery for the re-establishment and maintenance of law and order, all that is necessary is to add at the end of paragraph 5 the following words:

"The Commission shall place at the disposal of the Plebiscite Administration such assistance as the Plebiscite Administra­tion may require for the performance of its functions'*, or "such forces as the Plebiscite Administration may require for the performance of its functions."

The fact that paragraph 9 provides separately for the forces of India to become available to the plebiscite administration for a purpose which could only be the maintenance of law and order seems to suggest—it may not have been meant that way, but if it stays there it seems to suggest—that paragraph 5 is not intended to mean what it says. If it does mean what it says, paragraph 9 is not at all necessary.

Under paragraph 9, all the forces required for the direct purpose of preparing and holding the plebiscite are Indian forces. Why? If it is true that the two parties are equally and vitally interested in this matter, if it is admitted that the whole arrangement should be made fair and impartial, why are the forces to be employed for the very direct purpose of preparing for and holding the plebiscite confined to the forces of the Government of India? Why? For the restoration and establishment and maintenance of law and order people from the local areas are to be employed. If more assistance is required, both parties are to be called upon to contribute. But for the direct purpose of the plebiscite, the main object of the whole arrangement, any forces that are required are to come only from one side and not from the other. What is the justification for that? Is that fair? Is that impartial?

What is the kind of thing in actual practice that the .plebiscite administration will have to control in respect of law and order? A clash of clashes between the supporters of Pakistan and the supporters of India may be apprehended, and it may be thought that a knowledge of the fact that the security forces are there in proper order will stop these clashes. But, if the people know that these forces will be drawn only from one side, that will be direct incitement and encouragement to the supporters of that side to commit aggression against the supporters of the other side, knowing that all the military forces for keeping order will be from one side. A cruel and pitiless experience of that kind of thing has already been the fate of millions of people in East Punjab and West Punjab. Does the Security Council require a repetition of that?

Throughout, as the Security Council claims to establish a fair and impartial field, the plebiscite administration is to keep order in connexion with the plebiscite directly. They are afraid the two sides might fight. Why? The fighting is bound to take place if the military forces which are to be there to keep order are drawn entirely from one side, because, if they are drawn entirely from one side, it is not only that they are the forces of the Government of

India but they are also composed only of non -Muslims. Having regard to the recent loot, arson, murder, massacre rape and abduction to which certain parts of the country near Kashmir have been subjected, is it desirable that a similar state of affairs should be brought about again? What will the administrator do to prevent it from the start? He may report afterwards that a certain side was to blame, that the troops misbehaved and that, under the circumstances, a fair plebiscite could not be held. Therefore, it ought to be post­poned and a new arrangement ought to be made. But who will restore the lives lost, the misery inflicted and the injury done after it has happened? This is not a chimera of my imagination. That has happened to millions during the last few months in East Punjab and West Punjab. But, on the other hand, if clashes are apprehended, it might have a quieting effect if both sides know there are troops that will be impartial at the dis­posal of the administration. One side will not be encouraged to incite aggression, as it is bound to do in another situation.

We then proceed to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution^ which, as the representative of India says, is crucial. It certainly is. Again, what does it mean?

"The Government of India should undertake to ensure that the Government of this State invites the major political groups to designate responsible representatives to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level, while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried out,"

If it means what it says or what it appears to mean, it may in actual practice provide what is necessary. But it is so framed that it may be pulled one way by one side, or the other way by the other side. If it means that the major political groups— that is to say, the National Conference, etc—will be invited to designate responsible representatives to have a full and equal share in the Council of Ministers, then, after all, "to share equitably and fully in the conduct of the administration at the ministerial level" is somewhat of a certain designation. What is meant? Will they be ministers, or what will they be? If they are going to be ministers, why not say so? If that is meant, that might be the solution. If that is meant, then let us be quite clear as to what is meant. It says "ministerial level" and, if it mean* ministers, why put it in that round-about way?

After all, it must also be remembered that though some of us are fairly intimately familiar with the English language, it is not our mother tongue and, therefore, the simpler the language employed the more helpful will it be to those who may have to decide what the articles mean and whether they guarantee that freedom to the people of the State of Kashmir which is predicated in sub-paragraph 1(a) as it was or sub-paragraph 1(b) as it is now.

Then, sub-paragraph 10(c) has been objected to. Again, I have no doubt that my learned friend, Mr. Ayyangar, has compared this as it now stands with the form it had in the draft of 30 March. This, to a considerable degree, has been watered down, and, having been watered down to that extent, the safeguard has been attenuated. There is no doubt that this is a valuable safeguard. One apprehends that it is intended to deal with such a state of affairs as when a man makes a speech and is prosecuted for sedition. The man says: "Look at my speech. Its burden is 'accession to Pakistan'. That is why I am being prosecuted." That kind of case should then be transferred to the special magistracy that was contemplated, but that has now been watered down in sub paragraph 10(c). Apart from such a speech, a trumped-up charge may be brought against an active earnest worker of one side, who might say: "This has no foundation; it is due to prejudice against me because I have consistently and throughout made no secret that I am a supporter of accession to Pakistan." If he makes good that statement, then they would say: "There might be something in it, and he had better be tried by impartial people.'' There are all sorts of occasions where the judicial machinery of the State is sought to be made an engine of oppression in order to help one side. That was broadly the object of this safeguard -a valuable safeguard-but it has been considerably watered down.

Then there is paragraph 11, which states:

"The Government of India should undertake to prevent and to give full support to the Administrator and his staff in preventing any threat, coercion or intimidation, bribery or other undue influence..."

This is very valuable again, and the article goes on to state: "... the Government of India should publicly announce and should cause the Government of the State to announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on* all public authorities and officials in Jammu and Kashmir."

Then it becomes academic. You are trusting too much too--the moral sense of the people, with regard to whose moral sense-the whole of this arrangement expresses doubt as to whether-they have moral  sense to that degree or not. Therefore, it. ought to be supplemented by a provision that a contravention.. of this obligation shall be punished in a certain manner, or that the plebiscite administrator will have the authority to deal with contraventions and to set down the law independently and the-procedure under which these contraventions are to be dealt with. Otherwise, you lay down the law, but put no sanctions^ behind it.

Then, what about the threats, the coercion, and the intimi­dation that have already been employed? Obviously, these must be neutralized as far as possible, at least in respect of dismissed government officials.

Persons who have been dismissed since the question of" accession to Pakistan or India became acute, and those who-have been dismissed from the public service merely because they were in favour of accession to one side or the other, must be restored to their official positions. That is the important first step in creating confidence in the minds of the people that a fair and impartial opportunity for recording their votes will be provided.

1. who have been penalized for political activity— (those who have been sent to gaol without trial, and even those who have been imprisoned after trial—must be restored to-liberty and freed from the effect of the penalties imposed upon them. It is not enough that those who are still languishing in poverty should be restored to liberty. A man's house or property may have been sold in order to raise the amount of a fine imposed upon him for his advocacy of accession to Pakistan-There must be authority to settle that kind of thing. It must be-part of sub-paragraph 14(b), which provides that there shall be no victimization. If there is to be no victimization, then past victimization must be neutralized.

paragraph 16 reads:

"The Governments of India and Pakistan should each be invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commission for such assistance as it may require the performance of its task."

The status, functions and duties of these representatives must be set out so that they know where- they stand vis-a-vis the Commission. Their rights of access and advice to the Com­mission, and their obligations, must be stated so that the Commission can insist that they perform and discharge the obligations they have undertaken.

As the President is aware, we submitted, on 7 April, amend­ments to this draft resolution which would bring out and provide for the contingencies I have mentioned this afternoon. I have taken the liberty of having our draft resolution mimeo­graphed. It is now being circulated to representatives, and if I may I should like to take a few minutes to draw the attention of the Security Council to the changes which have been proposed therein.

The preamble and sub-paragraph l(o) stand as they stood in the draft which the Security Council communicated to us before it was slightly further modified in these respects. But at the end of sub-paragraph l(b), as you will notice, a sentence has been added. It reads as follows:

"The Government of Pakistan may, if it considers it neces­sary for the purpose of fulfilling this obligation, employ its armed forces in the State."

That would meet the first contingency to which I drew attention-a settlement of the arrangements for the cessation of fighting and supervision of the withdrawal of the tribesmen.

Then, article 1-A has been suggested for the purpose of bringing about an arrangement for the cessation of fighting. I am bound to point out, of course, that it is based upon the assumption that the Security Council does not desire that upon cessation of fighting, the armed forces of India shall march into the areas under the control of the Azad Government and occupied them militarily. Therefore, it reads as follows:

"The Governments of India and Pakistan shall instruct their military authorities in the State to co-operate with each other in converting measures to bring about a cessation of fighting at the earliest possible date and the Government of India shall issue orders that from the appointed time and date of the cease-fire order Indian forces shall not advance further into the State."

Then, in the fifth line of sub-paragraph 2 a), instead of a plan "in consultation with the Commission," we have suggested: "A plan approved by the Commission for withdrawing their forces from Jammu and Kashmir and reducing them pro­gressively to the minimum strength, which together with the military forces of Pakistan, may be required by the Com­mission under article 5 for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order."

That is obviously necessary because article 5 contemplates that, in a certain contingency, the Commission may draw upon the forces of both Pakistan and of India.

Sub-paragraph 2(c) is deleted from there and is put into a separate article, article 2-A. But the Security Council will now have forces of both Pakistan and India to station, and the following scheme is put forward:

"(i) Pakistan troops shall be stationed in predominantly Muslim areas and Indian or State troops in predomi­nantly non-Muslim areas;

'(ii) The presence of troops—Pakistan, Indian or State-should not afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation to the inhabitants of the State."

Article 2-A (ii) is the same as sub-paragraph 2 (e) (i)  which was deleted.

.iii The number of troops to be stationed within the State shall be the minimum. Any reserve shall be located outside the State boundaries.``

Any reserve may be next to the boundaries but we suggest that it should be outside the boundaries.

There is a redraft of paragraph 5. Instead of making it contingent upon the agreement of the two Governments, article 5 reads as follows:

"The Governments of India and Pakistan shall make avail­able to and place under the direction and control of the Commission armed forces in such strength as the Com­mission may consider necessary for the support of the civil power in the maintenance of law and order."

The decision is left to the Commission and, under our -scheme, any forces that go into the State of Jammu and Kashmir, whether Pakistan, Indian or State forces, shall be under the complete control of the Commission. That will give unity of control.

To sub-paragraph 10(b), for the purpose of clarification, we have added the following at the end of the paragraph: "- which'—that is to say, the Government of the State—"shall for this purpose delegate the necessary powers to the Adminis­trator General." That is only a drafting arrangement. It imports nothing new.

Article 10(c) retains in the first part the original suggestion -contained in the draft of 30 March:

The Administrator General, acting through an Assistant chosen by him as his Deputy from a panel of neutral justice….”

"The Administrator General, acting through an Assistant chosen by him as his Deputy from a panel of neutral jurists prepared by the President of the International Court of Justice.

It retains that draft, but we do not consider it so essential that we insist that the draft must be reverted to. If the present draft is preferred, we shall have no objection to it. But it was based upon the draft of 30 March, which reads:

'. . . may appoint special magistrates to deal at any stage, to the exclusion of jurisdiction of the ordinary courts. . ."

That phrase we insist upon. It was contained in the original draft and we think that it is an essential part of the safeguards. Then there is a certain redrafting, namely:

". . . with cases which in the opinion of the Deputy have a bearing upon the proper conduct of a free and impartial plebiscite or which might in any way influence the free expression of opinion concerning or the free exercise of the vote in the plebiscite."

If safeguards are necessary, it will be agreed that this phras­ing will make the objective more assured than the present, as I have said, watered-down version of it.

Article 10(d) states, in part:

"The terms of service of the Administrator General shall be decided by the Secretary-General of the United Nations after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan."

The draft resolution refers only to the Government of India.

Article 11 has, in the first part, two slight modifications. In addition to "intimidation, bribery" and instead of—"undue influence" it states: "or pressure on the voters in the plebiscite, •and shall publicly announce this undertaking as an international obligation binding on all public authorities and officials and other persons in Jammu and Kashmir." This includes the pro­vision that others besides officials must not interfere in the plebiscite. We have then added the sentence:

"The Administrator General shall prescribe the law and the procedure to deal with such offences and the punishment there for."

There is a slight modification to sub-paragraph 14(a) which adds the provision that people who were expelled from The State will be provided, upon their return, "with all necessary facilities and assistance for their rehabilitation" by the State Government.

The important modification is m paragraph 16. I have already submitted that the status and working functions of the representatives are not set out, and article 16 of my draft resolution seeks to do that.

It reads:

"The Governments of India and Pakistan are each invited to nominate a representative to be attached to the Commis­sion for such assistance as it may require in the performance of its task."

We add to the paragraph as it now stands, the following:

"The representatives shall advise the Commission in all matters arising out of or connected with its functions and shall be entitled to take part in the meetings and discussions of the Council but shall not have the right to vote."

That is to say, the decision shall always be the decision of the Security Council. Our meaning may be expressed in a different manner; we do not insist upon this phraseology. Our meaning is that the representatives shall have complete liberty to represent the full claims of their Governments to the Commission.

We also add the sentence:

"The representatives shall be responsible for the carrying out by their respective Governments of all obligations arising out of the present Articles of Settlement and shall have the power to cause to be fulfilled by the State Govern­ment all such obligations."

"The representatives shall be responsible for the carrying out by their respective Governments of all obligations arising out of the present Articles of Settlement and shall have the power to cause the State Government all such obligations."

This statement requires an explanation. Obviously, the Pakistan Government will have undertaken obligations under these articles. Its representative will be present to be called upon at once by the Commission, which might wish to say,

"We have received this information and your Government ought to do this in the discharge and fulfilment of its obligations." With regard to the Government of the State, if it is to be constituted under article 6, it will be a Government representing all the political groups in the State. Therefore, both the representative of the Government of India and the representative of the Government of Pakistan must jointly undertake the obligation to see that their respective State Governments fulfil their obligations.

The representative of the Government of India may say: ''We warned you against a coalition government. It is this minister who was taken from the Muslim Conference who is not doing his duty with regard to the We cannot do anything with him. We are unable to do anything with this minister from the Azad Kashmir Government. We told you they were insurgents and rebels. You said they were to be taken into the Government. We would not touch them with a pair of tongs."

But then, if this happens, there is the representative of Pakistan who will say, "You have got to ensure that the obligations are fully discharged." In case a situation of this type does not occur, we say that our provision is an insurance that ought to be included in order to make the scheme workable.

I shall now revert to the crucial paragraph—paragraph 6. If that has been re-drafted again, it is to clarify it in the direction that I have explained. If it means what it says, then obviously this is the form which it ought to take:

 

"The Government of the State shall forthwith be reconstitut­ed so as to give equal representation to each major political group in the State—viz., the National Conference, the Muslim Conference and the Azad Kashmir—which will each be invited to designate an equal number of responsible representatives to constitute a Council of Ministers. This Council of Ministers may choose one of its members to act as President, but in the allocation of portfolios it will be guided by the advice of the Commission."

It may be the advice of the Commission; it may be the advice of the Administrator General. We do not care which it is. However, in order to make the Council function, in order to ensure that it does not fail at the very first stage of our dispute with regard to portfolios, somebody should have the authority to advise and his advice should be accepted.

There is a further correction, to which my attention has been drawn. In the middle of article 16, there appear the words ``entitled to take part in the meetings and discussions of the Council". Obviously the word "Commission" should be substituted for "Council".

There are slight changes of phraseology in other places. However, nothing turns on them and I need not take up the time of the Security Council in drawing attention to them.

This is a clarification and, in some respects, a modification in accordance with the views that I have just submitted to the Security Council. This draft carries out those views, and we submit that it is fair and impartial. Three-quarters of the amendments to which I have drawn attention merely carry out the object of the provisions which are already in the resolution, but make them quite clear and make them workable. The rest of the amendments are, to some extent, modifications. However, they follow logically, so far as the military position is concerned, from paragraph 5, and so far as the administrative position is concerned, from paragraph 6-if those paragraphs mean what they appear to mean.

In conclusion, I wish to submit that neither I nor my Government nor my delegation is unconscious of the gravity of the issues involved in this matter. That is indicated by the mere fact that I have now been attending upon the Security Council for more than three months-primarily, no doubt, for my own purposes, and not with any thought that I am thereby putting the Security Council under any obligation in these matters-although, while I cannot claim the experience and the standing and the ability of my friend on the other side. of the table, I have nevertheless undertaken, however adequately I may be equipped for it, the obligation and the duty to look after the foreign affairs of Pakistan. My absence has to some extent been felt, and is being felt, in my country. I myself seriously feel it. Nevertheless, my continued presence here is in itself some indication that the Government of Pakistan does realize the gravity of the issues before the Security Council.

On the other hand, the Government of Pakistan is entitled to expect that the Security Council, which is the organ of the United Nations primarily charged with the safeguarding of international peace and security, in approaching these questions, at the stage at which an attempt is being made to settle them by agreement—no doubt from the point of view of a com­promise which may meet the views of both sides—and at the stage at which the Security Council has charged itself with the duty of producing a workable, fair, impartial scheme, will make that scheme as impartial as any that the wit of man can devise, or, to borrow the phraseology employed by the representative of the United States, as "free from the smell of brimstone" as it can possibly be.

True, the Security Council has to be occupied mainly with the different aspects of each question that comes before it. But it certainly has a higher duty to perform also. It has to build up its own prestige and the prestige of the United Nations on a moral and ethical basis. I am not suggesting, by any means, that every member of the Security Council is not fully con­scious of that aspect of its obligations. But I do submit that even when other things are equal, the final decision ought to be swayed by those considerations and, with all respect, I submit that other things are not equal here.

I venture to submit—and I shall respect this as my last point to the Security Council—that what we have asked for is aimed at bringing about a fair and impartial field for the holding of a plebiscite. What is insisted upon by the representative of India is bound to affect the impartiality and fairness of the plebiscite. If it does affect it, it can affect it in only one direction and cannot possibly affect it in the other.

I submit, therefore, that if the revised draft resolution under consideration by the Security Council can be clarified and expanded in the directions which I have submitted, my Govern­ment will undertake to discharge such obligations as are laid Upon its shoulders to the utmost, to more than the complete satisfaction of the Security Council, the Commission and the plebiscite Administrator, and my Government will go to whatever lengths may be necessary to give complete satisfaction in every respect.

Claims have been made by the delegation of India that India is a peace-loving State. I do not dispute that. They have said that India is not only willing but eager to discharge its obligations under the Charter. I do not dispute that, But if there is any implication that Pakistan is not equally a peace-loving State and is not equally eager and willing to discharge its obligations under the Charter, that is an implication that I seriously and strenuously contest.