18031948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar {India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 269 held on 18 March 1948

18031948 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar {India) in the Security Council Meeting No. 269 held on 18 March 1948

I desire, in the first place, to invite the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the Indian delegation, equally with the delegation of Pakistan has not had the time necessary for a thorough study of the draft resolution which the President placed before the Security Council this afternoon.

The draft resolution tries to deal with the important matters at issue in this controversy, and these are of the greatest signi­ficance to as. Before we can formulate our final views on the contents of the draft resolution, it is necessary that we should have adequate time to study its terms, to digest all the implica­tions of its different paragraphs, and to come to a considered conclusion as to how far it can be acceptable to us.

I wish, at the outset, to express my deep sense of obligation and gratitude to the President of the Security Council for the great trouble he has taken to understand the respective points of view of the two delegations on this controversial matter, and to place before the Security Council a draft resolution which, in my opinion, attempts to in spite of any suggestions for modi­fication that we may have to make at a later stage—a fair solution of the points in controversy.

That does not mean that we accept here and now all that is contained in this draft resolution. The President has himself described it as being very tentative. The President has asked his colleagues to take this draft as a basis of discussion and has expressed himself as being willing to welcome amendments, suggestions and modifications which could improve the draft resolution and the direction of making it acceptable to both parties.

That being the nature of the draft resolution that we have to consider today, I wish, at this time only to indicate my initial reactions to it.

The President is perfectly right in pointing out that in spite of the differences between the points of view of the two dele­gations on matters which have been in controversy, there has been, throughout, an undercurrent of feeling in what has been said on behalf of both delegations, that we should make every endeavour to arrive at an amicable settlement. I take it that the President's effort in this connexion is a bonafide, honest and — if I may say so—a fair attempt to solve this problem.

It has been a matter of some disappointment to me that this draft resolution has not received at the hands of the leader of the Pakistan delegation the appreciation that I had hoped it might receive. But I still entertain the hope that, after he has given its contents his full consideration, he will see more in it to accept and will be more able than he has been today to see eye to eye with the points of view that the President has tried to stress.

This draft resolution tackles the three essential points on which it had not been possible for both delegations to agree in the past. The first of these refers to the question of the with­drawal of the armed forces of India from the State; the second, to the suggestion for the setting up of an impartial, neutral government in the State, and the third, to the machinery that is to be employed for the conduct of the plebiscite.

However, as a condition precedent to the consideration of what should be done for the taking of a plebiscite, it is neces­sary that the Security Council should recognize that the first thing to do is not to blind its eyes to the obvious fact that those who fight the Governments of Kashmir and India today have received assistance on Pakistan territory, both material and otherwise, which has enabled them to carry of this fighting up to the present moment. It is still going on; it will go on even in the future unless we take a decision here which will put an end to it.

That first fact has to be recognized, and before the Security Council does anything in the way of blessing agreements on the question of the plebiscite, it has become necessary to obtain from the Government of Pakistan an undertaking that it will do its utmost to prevent this assistance from being rendered on its territory to people who are invading and fighting in Kashmir.

So far as the plebiscite is concerned, I have mentioned to the representatives on the Security Council the three points on which there has been the greatest controversy.

In the matter of the withdrawal of troops from the State, I take it that the Security Council recognizes that even after fighting has stopped, and in order to secure that maintenance of law and order which is so necessary for the taking of a plebis­cite under proper conditions, the presence of an army in the State is absolutely essential; and that army, in the circumstances that exist today, can only be the Indian Army.

The withdrawal of this Indian Army has been pressed in the debates on this question before the Security Council only for the purpose of ensuring that no coercion, no intimidation, and no undue pressure is exercised upon those who are to cast their votes at the time of the taking of the plebiscite.

This draft resolution, therefore, apparently proceeds on the premise that, while the Indian Army has to remain, every precaution should be taken and every safeguard given for the purpose of ensuring that that army will not exert any undue pressure on the voters. That, I take it, is the intention of the President in the particular suggestions which he has made in this draft resolution.

The leader of the Pakistan delegation has not attacked the merits of the safeguards that are suggested for this purpose. He has a link to the telegram of 8 November, from India to Pakistan, which has been read to the representatives on the Security Council a number of times already. It is true that the Prime Minister of India said that, after fighting stops and normal peace and order have been restored, the troops of India would be withdrawn.

But we have to take account also of what happened after 8 November. In a previous speech [242nd meeting] I drew atten­tion to negotiations which took place between the two Domi­nions during which it was admitted and conceded that the Indian Army had to remain, but that conditions should be imposed which would confine it to certain places, and perhaps reduce its numbers, in order to see that what remains in the State is retained only for the purpose of discharging the consti­tutional obligations of the federal centre for the defence of a unit of the federation, and for going to the aid of the civil power when it was absolutely necessary that an army should intervene in putting down civil disorder.

That was more or less conceded. And why, is it that in the Security Council itself, on the occasions on which this particular aspect of the matter has been debated, suggestions have been made that some other kind of army might be stationed there-British forces, Commonwealth forces, an international force, or a sort of combined force consisting of both Indian and Pakistan units? All these suggestions are recognition of the fact that an army has to remain because the State's integrity has to be protected and law and order have to be safeguarded, in the last resort with an army available whenever its assistance is neces­sary. That is the reason why the army should stay, and that army in the present constitutional position can be no other army than the Indian Army.

So far as the Indian delegation is concerned* I made its position perfectly clear the last time I spoke on this matter [266th meeting]; but I added that, if any member of the Security Council made any suggestions for the purpose of ensuring that .this army shall not improperly interfere with the voting, we should be prepared to consider suggestions in that regard. Here I find, in this particular draft resolution, that a suggestion has been made that the Government of India should so arrange that such portion of the Army as has to be retained in this State should be stationed at such points as would not permit it to exercise any kind of intimidation or appearance of intimi­dation of the inhabitants of the State. I am prepared to give the assurance to the Security Council today that the Govern­ment of India, which without anybody's prompting, offered a plebiscite and offered subsequently also the conduct of a plebiscite under international auspices, and which is as interest­ed as anybody else in ensuring that the vote cast at The time of the plebiscite is free and unfettered—that Government will take every step possible for ensuring that its Army which is stationed in Kashmir will not act in such a way as to negative this objec­tive of its own Government.

Towards the end of his remarks, the representative of Pakistan drew attention to a speech which had been made by Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, the leader of the Kashmir Muslim Conference, who was released from prison under the orders of Sheikh Abdullah's Emergency Administration. Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas is reported to have made a speech in which he charged the Indian troops in the State of Jammu and Kashmir with having been guilty of atrocities and unmentionable out­rages. I think that, if he made such a statement, it was a calumny on a force which, by the accounts of all right-minded persons, has been praised for the way in which it has conducted itself towards the population of Jammu and Kashmir; parti­cularly, it has been praised for the protection it has given to the Muslim population of the State.

I challenge any impartial inquiry in this matter. Chaudhry Gbulam Abbas is supposed to have challenged the Indian Prime Minister to order an inquiry into this matter by any authority which he might nominate for the purpose. I ask that the Commission which it is proposed to send to the State of Jammu and Kashmir should make the most thorough inquiries into this matter and report to the Security Council whether there is even an iota of justification for this calumny on a force which has not only won laurels in the field but has elicited approbation and praise as regards the manner in which it has dealt with the local civilian population in this State. I do not wish to say more on this question of the stationing of the Indian Army.

There is only one small matter which I would like to bring to the notice of the President in paragraph 2 of part A. Sub-paragraph (a) refers to the progressive withdrawal from Jammu and Kashmir of such of India's troops as are not required for the purpose of defence and security. I wish only to suggest that this particular sub-paragraph must be conditioned by one fact, namely that this question of the progressive withdrawal can arise only after fighting has stopped and hostilities have ceased in the State.

The Security Council listened to the terms of the telegram of 8 November which the representative of Pakistan quoted a little while ago. In the course of that telegram, reference was made to a suggestion made by the Governor General of Pakistan that the withdrawal of Pakistan and Indian troops should be simultaneous with the withdrawal of the raiders and invaders. Lord Mountbatten, the Governor General of India, very properly pointed out in answer to this suggestion that there could be no question of the Indian Army being asked to with­draw before the raiders had withdrawn and the fighting had stopped. That is a very necessary preliminary to the commencement of the withdrawal of such troops as may not be required for defense and security.

The whole argument of the impropriety of Indian troops remaining in Kashmir was based upon the statement of Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas. The fact that this statement appeared in a Hindu newspaper means nothing either way, because news­papers, whether they are Hindu or Muslim, have got to report speeches and press conferences. If that argument is based only upon that consideration, then I put it to the Security Council that it is based upon an allegation which I contend it would be impossible to prove as regards Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir.

We, as a Government responsible for the conduct of those troops, give the Security Council the assurance that not only has no such thing happened in the past, but that we shall see to it that no such thing takes place in the future.

In any case, if there is misbehavior on the part of our troops, the Commission of Security Council will be there to bring it to the attention of the Security Council. It is the duty of the Commission to certify whether or not the plebiscite is conducted impartially. It will be open to that Commission to bring any acts of misbehavior on the part of our troops to the notice of the Security Council at the time it has to judge the nature of the plebiscite that has been held.

In regard to the question of impartial administration, we have debated it so many times and in such fullness that it seems unnecessary for me to go into detail again on this matter.

After all, what is the ground for asking that Sheikh Abdullah be ousted from his position in the present administra­tion and for substituting in his place someone who is impartial, neutral, colorless and so on? Is not the main ground for making this demand the argument that otherwise the plebiscite that will be taken under the auspices of such a government could not be held to be impartial? On the last occasion that I spoke of this matter, I referred to the considerations that must be weighed in coming to a decision-. I begged the Security Council not to press on us with this suggestion of pushing Sheikh Abdullah out of an office in which he, at present, has the support of what we hold to be the great majority of the people of the State, both Muslims and Hindus. On the same occasion I said that if the Security Council thought that his possible influence in connexion with the plebiscite should be reduced practically to nil, and if it had any suggestions to make for ensuring this, we should be quite prepared to consider such suggestions. I stated that, if any suggestions were made for ensuring that the administration of the plebiscite was placed in hands which could act independently, and which would act with authority derived from the Kashmir Government, we should, as a matter of course, be quite prepared to consider them.

In the draft resolution placed before the Security Council by the President, the suggestion is made that the authority to conduct the plebiscite should be headed by a director with five assistants who will be the nominees of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, but who will be formally appointed by the Kashmir Government. They will frame the regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite and those regulations will be promulgated with binding force under the authority of the Kashmir Government. They will have the right to make direct reports to the Secretary-General directly.

In addition, I find that the draft resolution of the Presi--dent contains the suggestion that the Government of India might place an officer of its own in the Jammu and Kashmir State, whose duty it will be to see that this authority receives all the help that is necessary for the purpose of conducting the plebiscite and to ensure its efficient administration so far as the conduct of the plebiscite is concerned.

This means that while Sheikh Abdullah will be Prime Minister in the Jammu and Kashmir State and will run the ordinary administration of the State, the organizing, contract and completion of the plebiscite will be in the hands of men who are nominees of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

That being so, is it necessary for the Security Council to commit an encroachment on the sovereignty of a State like Jammu and Kashmir, and oust the Government which is , acceptable to the people of the State, in order merely to appear before the world as having set up an administration in which Sheikh Abdullah has absolutely no influence?

We are willing to eliminate the influence of the Administra­tion in practically all respects in regard to the conduct of the plebiscite. That is about the utmost that I think the Security Council can afford to request in this respect.

It was suggested that the placing of this officer in the State by the Government of India for the purpose of seeing that the obligations created by the articles of settlement are properly implemented might even have the reverse effect, the argument being that the officer concerned mi.sht advise the Jammu and Kashmir Government to do something against the recommenda­tions of the Commission. What would happen then would be that, if it were minded to do the wrong thing?, the Government of Jammu and Kashmir would have the support of an officer of the Government of India against the Commission sent out by the Security Council. I think that this is a suggestion which, on behalf of the Government of India, I must repudiate with all my might.

As I have already said, the Government of India is as keen as anyone with regard to the impartiality of the plebiscite. It conceded the plebiscite on its own, and agreed that it should be taken under international auspices, so that it is only natural that it should agree to the further guarantee which the President of the Security Council has demanded—namely, that it should place an officer in the State with the duty of seeing that impartiality is ensured to the maximum possible extent.After all, the President is right in demanding that responsibi­lity for seeing that the plebiscite is held impartially should be shouldered by India, which is a Member of the United Nations, the more so since the Government which has to implement this particular obligation is not a Member and is certainly in a position to take and to act upon the advice which the Government of India might give.

I do not wish to take up very much more of the Security Council's time this afternoon. I shall consider it my duty to ask for the modification of certain of the details in this draft resolution, perhaps at a later stage, but I think that the Presi­dent's object today is to obtain from me the opted reactions of my delegation to his proposals. On the main issues which arise for consideration I am prepared to concede at once that the proposals are worthy of serious consideration. While, as I have indicated, we may have something to say about details, about the manner in which certain clauses are worded, about the order in which some of them appear in the draft resolution, and about the contents of the preamble—which, to my mind, seem to admit of improvement—the attitude of the Government of India on the substance of what has been proposed, so far as I am able to interpret it to the Security Council, is such that it would be.

quite prepared to consider the draft resolution on its merits, and will have nothing very serious to propose by way of alteration or modification.

I say this fully recognizing the fact that the proposals mean further concessions from our side. I do not blind my eyes to that fact, but we are anxious that we should reach a settlement, and we are very keen that fighting in Jammu and Kashmir should cease at the earliest possible moment. If the substance of the draft resolution, clothed in language slightly more acceptable to us than it is now, will produce the effect which we have in mind, we shall be glad to welcome it after the modifications to which I have referred have been affected.