18031948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Kaftan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 269 held on 18 March 1948

18031948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Kaftan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 269 held on 18 March 1948

On 11 March, the day after the Security Council discussed this matter on the last occasion [266th meeting], the President was pleased to send for me to seek my reactions to one or two suggestions that he mentioned, and I submitted my reactions to him. A week later—that is to say, today—the President was pleased to send for me again, and 1 presented myself before him as desired at 12.15 p.m. He then told me that this draft resolution was being typed but was not quite ready and that within a few minutes he and I should both have the typed text. When it became available about a quarter of an hour later, the President helped me to study it, and he was kind enough to explain some of its provisions to me. As he very kindly and very hospitably suggested, when he asked me to visit him, that I should accompany him to Lake Success and have lunch with him, I have had no opportunity to discuss the terms of this draft resolution with the members of my delegation, and obviously, of course, there has not been time to obtain any reactions from my Government. Between the time that I waited for the President at his office and the opening of the meeting here, I have been at his service. I might even submit that I have not yet had the opportunity of very thoroughly studying the terms of the draft resolution myself.

I do not know how long a time the Indian delegation has 'had to consider the draft resolution, but I did submit to the President that perhaps he might find it convenient—it would certainly be more convenient for me-if I were called upon to make my submission to the Security Council on this-draft resolution after the Indian delegation had spoken, but the President expressed his preference that I should speak first and, as I have explained, I therefore proceed to do so.

My very first reaction to the draft resolution is one of bewilderment that I should so utterly and singularly have failed to convey and interpret to the Security Council the point of view of my Government on this matter as to leave the President under the impression that a scheme of settlement of the kind that is embodied in this draft resolution is likely to meet with my Government's approval. But I have, as I have said, no authority at the moment to speak on behalf of my Government.

I shall submit the draft resolution to them and ask that their reactions be transmitted to me at the earliest possible moment so that I can submit them to the Security Council. But as I have already stated, on the basis of the instructions I have received and on the views of my Government with which I am familiar, I shall be very much surprised if their reactions are any different, or at least materially different, from what I have already led the Security Council to believe they would be.

It strikes me as a curious thing that, when there was brought -to my notice a message that was sent out from New York by Reuters on either 7 or 8 March and that was printed in The Statesman of New Delhi on 8 March, I should have dismissed it merely as press speculation. As I said, it is curious, because, though the draft resolution is a great deal more detailed than the press message, to a certain extent it follows the ideas outlined in that press message. Far be it from me to suggest that there is any connexion between the two, but it does instill one with greater respect for press speculations than one has had hitherto.

As the President and the Security Council are aware,.the two main matters upon which debate has so far centered, because they bear directly upon the question of a free plebiscite, .are, first, the withdrawal of all outsiders, including people who have been described as raiders and intruders and also the armed forces of the Government of India; and second, the setting up of an impartial administration so that the proposed plebiscite should, in the terms that the President has just employed, not-only be manifestly free and fair but should also appear to be so.

Keeping that in mind as the main proposition, it is not necessary for me to say much, even on my own personal reactions, to part A, paragraph 1 of the articles of settlement as set out in the draft resolution. I might, however, submit the general observation which I have already intimated to the Security Council—and which I believe I have repeated—that once the essentials of a fair settlement are agreed upon between the parties or are laid down in a manner that would make them, obligatory upon the parties, the Government of Pakistan will bind itself to do its utmost in every possible way to achieve the objective of the restoration of peace and order, even unto the taking of joint military action with the Dominion of India if, unfortunately, such action should become necessary.

It is therefore not necessary to make any further observation, on part A, paragraph 1.

Part A, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) contemplates station­ing the remainder of the armed forces of the Government of India at such points in Jammu and Kashmir State as not to afford any intimidation or appearance of intimidation of the inhabitants of the State. The Security Council is aware that troops have been fighting a section of the people of the State; that, though the Government of India has categorically denied it, there have been allegations throughout of atrocities commit­ted by these troops on the people of the State. The latest report on that is the statement attributed to Chaudhry Ghulam Abbas, President of the Muslim Conference, who has recently been released from prison. On 10 March 1948, the Sind Observer, a Hindu newspaper, stated the following:

"He spoke of the inhuman reign of terror let loose by the Indian Dominion forces who were indulging in-rape, arson, and loot on a scale far bigger than ever attempted by the triblas in Kashmir. 'I challenge Pandit Nebru,' be said, 'to appoint an impartial commission to investigate.

the misdeeds of his troops. I will prove it to the hilt that the people of Kashmir have been the worst sufferers at their hands.' "

To suggest that such numbers of these troops as may be determined to be necessary by the Indian Government should still be stationed within the Kashmir and Jammu territory for purposes of defence and security, and to expect that there will not be further incidents or adverse reactions, or that will establish a fair and free field for a plebiscite, is to expect the impossible. But even more important in this connexion is the undertaking of the Government of India, to which I have already had occasion to draw attention, that their troops are in Kashmir for the sole purpose of repelling the raiders and that once that object has been attained and law and order have been restored, those troops will not be kept in Kashmir a moment longer.

It would perhaps be worthwhile to draw attention again to that undertaking. It is contained in a telegram of 8 November 1947 from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The relevant portion of that telegram 'reads as follows:

"Lord Mountbatten, on his return from Lahore, gave me a full account of his talk with Mr. Jinnah, in particular, of two important suggestions which had been discussed, namely: one, the withdrawal of Indian Dominion troops and tribes­men from Kashmir, and two, the holding of a plebiscite at the earliest possible date.

"As regards the first proposal, Lord Mountbatten told me that Mr. Jinnah desired that withdrawal of the Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen should be simultaneous, but that he, Lord Mountbatten, had pointed out that it was clearly impossible for the Indian troops to withdraw from Kashmir Valley until the raiders had left Kashmir soil and law and order had been restored in Kashmir. Lord Mountbatten had also made it quite clear to Mr. Jinnah that the Government of India had no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than was necessary.

"As regards the second point, Lord Mountbatten reports.. that Mr., Jinnah had expressed the view that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir autho­rities. To meet this point, Lord Mountbatten had suggested that it should be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Mr. Jinnah had put forward the counter-proposal that the two Governors-General should be given plenary powers to settle the matter. Lord Mountbatten had pointed; out that it would be constitutionally improper for him to-undertake this duty."

1. Mountbatten had reference there to his position as. Governor-General].        

At a later point, the telegram reads:

"As regards your proposals one and two, armed raiders have-entered Kashmir to the accompaniment of massacre, arsons and loot. Our troops have been sent there to drive out these raiders and protect Kashmir. So long as these raiders remain there and law and other have not been established,, our troops must discharge their duty. Afterwards, they with be withdrawn, as I have already undertaken." A subsequent paragraph of the telegram states:

"It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have-repeatedly stated, are:

"1 That the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir;

"2. That the Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; and

*'3. That the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to under­take a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible; date."

I venture respectfully to submit that the Government of India clearly and repeatedly, even in the course of this single document, undertook to withdraw its troops on the restoration of law and order, that is to say, before the plebiscite could be held. The whole controversy was whether the withdrawal should be simultaneous with the withdrawal of the tribesmen or should await the restoration of law and order. There was no-question at that time of the plebiscite being taken while the State was occupied, although only at strategic points, by Indian troops.

I beg to submit that part A, paragraph 2, sub-paragraph (b) of the draft resolution clearly contravenes that undertaking. When I say that, I am not unmindful of the fact that since that time the Government of India, through its representatives here, has not adhered to that position. However, I do wish to stress the fact that that undertaking was given by the Government of India.

With regard to the plebiscite, it is not necessary for me to enter into any discussion of the paragraphs of the draft resolu­tion which attempt to deal with that subject. The President has drawn attention to two or three items which, in his opinion, constitute a safeguard. Perhaps, to some extent, they do consti­tute such a safeguard, but they do not go far enough to establish those conditions which are absolutely essential before a plebiscite that could be regarded as fair can be held. For instance, the President has drawn pointed attention to part B, paragraph 9 of the draft resolution, which reads:

"The Commission of the Security Council...shall at the end of the plebiscite certify to the Council whether the plebiscite has been really free and impartial."

It is true that to some extent, and perhaps to a large extent, that would ensure that no pressure or coercion would be applied which would be of a physical and visible nature and which could easily be assessed and could come to the notice of the Commission or its observers. On the last occasion on which I addressed the Security Council [266th meeting], I drew attention to the normal kind of pressure which may be resorted to on such occasions, and often is resorted to, by people who are in authority in a given administration. How is the Commission going to ensure the elimination of that kind of pressure, and what means will it have to assess whether such pressure has or has not been exercised? Assuming that some evidence of such pressure were to come to the notice of the Commission, on what basis would the Security Council judge whether the plebiscite had or had not been fair or impartial? And if, unfortunately, there should be two views on that matter in the Commission, how far would that help to correct any pressure which might in fact have been exercised?

It has been suggested that another safeguard is contained in part C, paragraph 10 of the resolution, which reads:

"The Government of India undertakes to use its best endeavours to ensure that in the composition of the Interim Government of Jammu and Kashmir provision is made for adequate representation of all major political groups in the State."

The Security Council is aware that Sheikh Abdullah flow happens to be the Prime Minister of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah's own declarations and speeches were brought to the notice of the Security Council in order to show to what extent he could be regarded as impartial and what degree of impartiality he would exercise in his position.

But Sheikh Abdullah himself spoke before the Security Council 24lst meeting] and gave the representatives an oppor­tunity of judging his impartiality from his own declarations. Since his return to India, he has made some further declarations one or two of which I shall venture to draw to the attention of the Security Council.

On 9 March, Sheikh Abdullah delivered a speech at Gurdaspur, in the course of which he said:

"We must bind ourselves"—meaning Kashmir and India — "by chains which can never be broken. I believe that every inch of Kashmir belongs to India and every inch of India to the Kashmiris. Jawaharlal's Kashmir will never be separated from Jawahar lal s India. Our answer to the question whether Kashmir will choose ultimately to stay in India is being given daily by Kashmiris with their blood."

On 16 March, at Jammu, Sheikh Abdullah said:

"We shall prefer death rather than join Pakistan. We shall have nothing to do with such a country."

The grievance is not that a person belonging to Kashmir, particularly a political leader, should express himself in favour of accession with one Dominion or the other. Everybody's free to hold what views he may choose to entertain on a question which is in controversy, but that the Prime Minister of a State, the question of whose accession is in dispute and has to be settled by means of a plebiscite, should express himself in that manner and that, nevertheless, hopes should be entertained that under his administration, merely by means of certain safeguards, it would be possible to hold a fair plebiscite, is, to say the very least, most surprising.

On the question of accession, I have given enough informa­tion to the Security Council with regard to the attitude of Sheikh Abdullah. In the course of a press conference in Delhi on 6 March, Sheikh Abdullah said that the people of Kashmir had finally decided to work with India and to die with India.

But let us see what his attitude is with regard to two other matters that are mentioned in the draft resolution: first the representation in the Interim Government of various groups, and secondly, the release of political prisoners, giving liberty to everybody to express his views. A report in the Hindustan Times of New Delhi of 7 March quotes Sheikh Abdullah as follows:

"In his (Sheikh Abdullah's) Cabinet, too, he proposed to include people of all parties and communities, but they would be chosen according to only one criterion, their loyalty to the National Conference and their country."

This is a strange declaration. He is prepared to include, in his Government, representatives of all political parties and groups, provided these representatives satisfy one criterion, their loyalty to his political party. The press report goes on to say:

"In answer to a question about the release of a Kashmir Muslim Conference leader, Sheikh Abdullah explained that there was no question of releasing all Muslim Conference workers. Those who were likely to act as the fifth columnists of a foreign State would remain in jail, but if his Govern­ment was satisfied that any one of them would remain loyal to his own country, he would be let out."

Now what does the expression "fifth columnists of a foreign State" mean in this context? Obviously not fifth columnists of India, because Sheikh Abdullah has declared he would live with India, work with India and die with India. The expression "fifth columnists of a foreign State" obviously means people who favour accession to Pakistan, on which question Sheikh Abdullah expressed himself here before the Security Council in certain terms which I need not repeat, and on which he has already expressed himself sufficiently in the press.

This is the manner in which the safeguards embodied in this draft resolution will be carried out by the administration of Kashmir, because at the head of the administration is Sheikh Abdullah, and he has already furnished the Security Council with his interpretation of such safeguards.

The President was pleased to draw attention, further, to the proposal contained in paragraph 11 of the draft resolution, which he presented on behalf of the delegation of China, that the Government of India would agree "to appoint an official of high standing to be stationed in the State during the interim period, who shall have the power to cause to be fulfilled by the State Government all international obligations arising out of the present articles of settlement."

Assuming that this paragraph would be accepted by the Government of India in the sense in which it is intended to work—that is to say, as a safeguard—my first comment would be: what is in practice, then, the difference, if this is intended to work in that manner, between having an impartial head of the administration and having this arrangement; and if this proposal is not intended to work in that manner, and to that degree, then what is the safeguard?

As a matter of fact, the safeguard might work the other way around: the Commission would be dependent upon this officer for the carrying out by the State Government of its international obligations, and would very largely accept his interpretation of conditions and the advice that he might tender to the Government, so that instead of being a safeguard, it might in actual practice operate to the prejudice of Pakistan and in favour of the Dominion of India, the parties being at variance over this question with regard to almost everything and the situation being so very delicate.

It must be recognized that this question of a plebiscite is not a mere question of an election in a constituency which, at the worst, might influence the return to the legislature of a person belonging to one party or another. This is intended to settle for all time the question of the accession of the State to one Domi­nion or the other, and to set at rest not only this controversy, but all the other controversies which have either arisen from it or are likely to arise on account of this dispute. That being the case, the utmost care is necessary that the plebiscite should be held under fair and impartial conditions. I must earnestly sub­mit to the Security Council that a plebiscite held under the authority of a Government which has a man like Sheikh Abdullah at its head, in a State occupied by the troops of one side, to say the very least is not likely to satisfy anybody that-it was being held under fair and impartial conditions.

But there is more than that to this question. There is also the fact that, apart from any view that the Pakistan Govern­ment might take of the terms of this or of any other draft resolution, the resolution must bring about a settlement or recommend a settlement which shall appear so eminently fair and satisfactory to the Azad Kashmir Government that it shall put its faith in that resolution, the terms of the settlement and the machinery set up, and that it shall be prepared to lay down its arms and to give up the struggle upon which it entered some time in September of last year, [f the resolution fails to achieve that object, then it will fail to achieve anything. I doubt very gravely whether the terms of this resolution could have that effect upon the Azad Kashmir Government.

In conclusion, I wish to refer to a matter of procedure, though I freely recognize that that is not my province but is the busi­ness of the Security Council itself. I would like some enlighten­ment on the following point: When the Kashmir matter was adjourned on 12 February 1948 [246ih meeting], the Security Council had before it two draft resolutions: one resolution sponsored by the representative of Canada [document S/667], and the other by the representative of Colombia [document SJ671]. We now have this third draft resolution which has today been put forward by the representative of China.

What exactly is the procedural position, so far as the Security Council sees it, with regard to the consideration of these draft resolutions? I do not propose—even merely perso­nally, on my own behalf, and tentatively—to add to the observations that I have just now submitted.