10031948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan {Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 266 held on 10 March 1948

10031948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan {Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 266 held on 10 March 1948

I find myself on the horns of a dilemma. If I were to say noth­ing on this occasion, my silence might be misconstrued; if I proceed to submit certain observations to the Security Council, I shall only weary the representatives by repeating what has been said before so often, for I have no doubt that the represen­tatives on the Security Council have perceived that, though the opening remarks of the representative of India raised the hope that some considerable modification of the attitude of the Government of India would be revealed by the submission that he was going to make, that hope has proved to be vain.

It was four weeks ago that the Indian delegation made the request to the Security Council for adjournment of the proceed­ings to enable the delegation, at the request of its Government, to hold consultations with its Government so that a way might be found out of the difficulties with which the delegation said it was confronted at that stage of the discussions in the Security Council.

During the interval, the delegation conferred with its Government and they laboured on this very grave issue together. I hope I shall not be accused of levity if I say that I have failed to discover even the proverbial mouse in the result of that labour which has been produced before the Security Council. The position of the Indian delegation on the questions then under discussion is exactly the same today as it was when the proceedings were adjourned. True, towards the end of his remarks, the representative of India said that his Government was quite willing to adopt any measures—reasonable measures, he was careful to add—that might ensure non-interference by the military with the free exercise of the right of voting, and which would ensure that the machinery which might be set up for the purpose of conducting the plebiscite would work in a perfectly free manner. I have no recollection that the represen­tative of India had, on any previous occasion, either stated or implied that his Government intended to have its military forces in Kashmir to interfere with the plebiscite, or that his Government desired to encourage its military forces to do so, or that his Government would permit its forces to do so. That which today has been sought to be given the air of a great concession has, I venture to submit, been implicit in the situa­tion all the time.

The discussion did not concern any design—expressed or implied—on the part of the Government of India to encourage or permit  troops directly to interfere with the exercise of the vote in connexion with this proposed plebiscite. The discussion concerned the conditions which it would be necessary to esta­blish, having regard to the circumstances that exist in Kashmir, , and which would ensure not only the free exercise of the vote but the satisfaction of everybody concerned that the vote was in fact to be free. The position taken up by the Indian delega­tion in that respect has been merely reiterated this afternoon.

On the question of the impartial administration, it has been submitted that that involves a fundamental constitutional prob­lem. That fundamental constitutional problem was most ade­quately dealt with by the representative of the United States in the course of one of his very learned speeches made during these discussions [240ih meeting]. In dealing with the fundamental constitutional problem I ventured, on a previous occasion, to invite the attention of the Security Council and of the Indian

delegation itself to what had happened in Alwar and Bharatpur [244th meeting). I sought to argue then that the emergency arrangements proposed with regard to the plebiscite in Kashmir did not go nearly as far as the arrangements imposed by the Government of India upon the States of Alwar and Bharatpur.

1. question involved there was entirely one of domestic jurisdiction: investigation into an alleged conspiracy, which is a police matter. The action which the Government of India took in order that that investigation might be carried out in a free atmosphere was briefly this. The Maharaja of Alwar was asked to come to Delhi and was told that he must remain there and must not return to his State so long as the investigation was not completed. His Prime Minister was dismissed by the Government of India, which appointed one of its own officers as administrator of the State. Almost identical action was taken in respect of Bharatpur, although in that case the Maharaja was not directed to remain outside the State. The administration of Bharatpur was also taken over by the Government of India, and an administrator was appointed.

These facts were brought to the notice of the Security-Council, but here is a further very interesting development that has since taken place in respect of Alwar. I respectfully invite the attention of the Security Council to the following item of news appearing in the Hindustan Times of 25 February, published from Delhi:

"The Alwar Executive Council has been dissolved. Mr. K.BX. Seth, Administrator, Alwar State, summoned all the ``ministers of the Executive Council yesterday morning, and informed them that, in the interest of good administra­tion, he had decided to dissolve the Executive Council with, immediate effect and dispense with the services of the ministers, who were all nominated persons."

Thus, the Administrator appointed by the Government of India proceeded to dismiss all the ministers who had been appointed by the Maharaja. The Prime Minister had already-been dismissed. Was not a fundamental constitutional problem involved here? Was not the sovereignty of the Maharaja. involved? If, for the purpose of carrying out a freer investiga­tion into the ramifications of an alleged or suspected conspiracy, it is open to the Government of India to summon a Ruler out of his State, to order him to remain outside his State, to dismiss his Prime Minister and to appoint an officer of its own to administer the State, and if it is then possible for that administrator to dismiss all the other ministers, and to dissolve the Executive Council in the interests of good administration, to what extent is it competent for the Govern­ment of India to argue that, in order to carry out an under­taking it gave in its telegram of 8 November—to which the attention of the Security Council has been repeatedly invited — designed to ensure that the plebiscite to decide the question of the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan or to India shall be perfectly free, it, the Government of India, should advise the Maharaja of Kashmir, if advice should become necessary, to app tint an impartial administrator? Where is the difficulty? What bars the way—except that in one case the Government of India desired to do it and in the other case it does not desire?

When addressing the Security Council on a previous occasion [241st meeting], Sheikh Abdullah said that it was an extraordinary demand that the head of an administration should be changed while a plebiscite was being held. He went on to compare the situation with that which will exist in this great country a few months hence when the head of the executive department of the United States Government will be elected. He said that it is as reasonable to ask that there shall be an impartial administrator at the head of the administration ia Kashmir for the purpose of the plebiscite as it would be to require that, before the presidential election is held, Mr. Truman should stand aside himself lest the administration should influence the election.

However, he then forgot, apart from the factors that distin­guish Kashmir from the United States and which are perfectly obvious, that Mr. Truman is himself the representative of the people of his country, freely chosen and elected by the people and a man in whom they place complete trust. There are numerous other distinctions in this situation, but to cite this instance is to beg the whole question.

The whole question in Kashmir is whether Sheikh Abdullah, or any other person who might be handpicked by the Maharaja or by the Government of India and who is not acceptable to the people who are fighting that very Maharaja and that very Government of India, should be in charge of the administration when the question in dispute is to be decided by means of an election. For the Government of India to argue or to pretend that under those circumstances a free plebiscite could be held might succeed in impressing people who have not had the experience the representatives on the Security Council, who are of various walks of life, have had. But it certainly could not succeed in persuading people who had a fraction of the experience that the representatives on the Security Council have

in these matters.

As a matter of fact, when the objection was raised on behalf of Pakistan that, under the present authorities in Kashmir, there could be no hope of a fair plebiscite, what was the reply on behalf of the Government of India? Was the reply that there is a fundamental constitutional problem involved? Was the reply that the sovereignty of the Maharaja would not permit that arrangement to be questioned? No, the reply was—and it implicitly admitted the validity and the strength of the objection —that the plebiscite cannot, as suggested by the representative of Pakistan, be held under the authority of the two Governors-General, as the constitutional position of the Governors-General stands in the way. But in order to meet the objection of the representative of Pakistan, let the plebiscite be held under the authority of the United Nations. It was admitted that a free plebiscite could not be held or hoped for under the authorities then in power in Kashmir, and today we are told it cannot be held under any other arrangement.

It is then incidentally suggested that the present administra­tion in Kashmir has the support of the people of Kashmir. However, if that were so, there would be no question and no problem to solve. It is just because a considerable section of the people of Kashmir are fighting for the right to set up their own administration that the whole matter had to be brought before the Security Council.

I didn't quite follow the representative of India when he mentioned the name of the person who has been appointed Prime Minister by the Maharaja since the discussion, ott question was adjourned by the Security Council. From i newspapers one is given to understand that this person is none other than Sheikh Abdullah, who was a member of the In ia delegation in the earlier stages of the discussion before W Security Council. Again, that was one of the main questions. dispute between the parties. The contribution that the Government of India has made, during the interval, toward the solution of these difficult questions, is that it has procured the; appointment of Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister, so that it should be able to confront the Security Council with another/** accompli. Sheikh Abdullah is Prime Minister; he has been appointed.

We are informed that this Prime Minister is now engaged in preparing a list of persons to be presented to the Maharaja lor appointment as ministers. We are further informed that this Government will, as far as possible, act as a responsible government. Responsible to whom? Responsible in what sense. But that is neither here nor there.

The representative of India started his submission to the Security Council by stating that the first question in dispute before the Security Council was the setting up of an impartial administration. In the course of dealing with that question, he informed the Security Council that the Maharaja has taken one step to solve that problem, at any rate. He has appointed Sheikh Abdullah as Prime Minister and will now proceed to appoint ministers on Sheikh Abdullah's advice.

At the 26th meeting, the representative of India made a grievance of the fact that when, on 18 February [250th meeting), I drew the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the Government of India had declined to accept the request of the Indian delegation to postpone the holding of the plebiscite in Junagadh, I had not then proceeded to put it in the form of a complaint. I do now proceed to make a formal complaint if a complaint is necessary to make a grievance of the fact— and, as that seems to carry some weight with the representative of India, the complaint is that the Government of India and the Maharaja should in this interim have acted in this manner and taken a step which, far from contributing towards a solution of these difficult problems, makes that solution much more difficult.

The representative of India stated that, so far as the question of the military forces is concerned, they are there for the purpose of the defense of Kashmir and for the purpose of coming to the aid of the civil power for the maintenance of law and order. If my memory serves me rightly, these are the exact words that the representative of India used on a previous occasion [242nd meeting] with regard to the purpose of the armed forces of the Government of India in Kashmir. I am making no grievance of the fact that the representative of India should repeat himself, but I do wish to draw the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the position with regard to every one of these matters that has been disclosed today on behalf of the Government of India is exactly the same as the position held by the Indian delegation when it departed for consultations with its Government, although, as I have said, the representative of India declared toward the close of his statement that the Indian delegation would be prepared to accept any reasonable arrangement proposed to ensure that the troops shall not interfere with the free exercise of the vote.

In the first place, may I venture to ask what will be the authority for imposing any such arrangement upon the Maharaja? How will that square with the sovereignty of the Maharaja in the matter? How will that get over the fundamental constitutional problem?

Secondly, if in spite of measures taken to prevent the armed forces from interfering in any manner, interference does take place, what will be the remedy?

Thirdly, will these assurances be enough to satisfy those who are fighting in Kashmir that they should lay down their arms? After all, that is the immediate problem to be resolved.

The representative of India quoted the President in this connexion. If my memory serves me tightly, I believe the President [speaking as the representative of China] did express himself [243rd meeting] in the sense that the best way of putting an end to the fighting is to assure the people who are fighting that that for which they are fighting may be achieved without further fighting, and therefore they need not continue their military struggle. That is the crux of the matter.

Let us say that a proclamation is made to these people to the effect that if they will lay down their arms, and if the whole of Kashmir can thereupon be occupied by the military forces of the Government of India, then under the Premiership of Sheikh Abdullah, whom they have been fighting, and under a Ministry composed of the people chosen by him, a plebiscite will be arranged with regard to which assurances will be given, under any reasonable scheme that may be put forward, that the military and other machinery of the Government will not exercise any pressure or coercion. Does any representative on the Security Council suppose that a proclamation that kind will persuade these people to lay down their arms? And, if it does not, what would be achieved by any such-whatever you may call it-settlement, arrangement or plebiscite?

Let me put it another way. If a plebiscite were held under conditions which were in fact impartial-conditions in which, in the eyes of everyone, a free plebiscite would be fully ensured and if under those conditions the plebiscite disclosed a majority in favour of accession to India, however much Pakistan might dislike the result, that would be a solution of the question. The people would have decided and that decision must be accepted.

Now look at it the other way. If a plebiscite is held under the conditions proposed by the representative of India, and the result discloses the majority to be in favour of accession to India is anyone likely to accept that as a fair and just decision? Will that settle the matter?

The representative of India has stated, "We shall ensure that no interference takes place." I wish to present one illustration to him, an illustration with which I am sure he must be familiar. If he is not familiar with it, at least many people in India are.

The Prime Minister sends for the heads of the district administra­tion in Kashmir. He sends for them for the purpose of a perfect­ly innocent conference to be held in the evening- He asks them for dinner and he states to them across his hospitable table: "This plebiscite is going to be held now and arrangements are being made. You are aware of how keen I am that we should accede to India; I am honestly convinced that that is the course for us to adopt. I rely upon you gentlemen to ensure that in your respective areas people shall vote in favour of accession to India-'' These people return to their areas and they send for their subordinate officers in the district—the revenue men, the policemen—those who work in the rural areas among the people and whose authority the people recognize and are in the habit of obeying. These petty officials are told what to do. They go back to the rural areas where they work and get in touch with the head men of the villages and other leading people and explain to them that it is desired that they vote in favor of accession to India. This explanation is emphasized by the state­ment that Sheikh Abdullah is Prime Minister; the people have got to live under his administration and they can imagine what might happen to them if they do not obey his directions.

How is the representative of India going to ensure that this kind of thing will not happen? We know for a fact that even in British India, where conditions have always been comparatively very much better in these respects than they possibly can be in Kashmir, that kind of practice has been extensively resorted to in connexion with elections. This has been officially established by the findings of election commissions appointed subsequent to elections in order to resolve doubts concerning the validity of particular elections.

How is the representative of India going to ensure that this type of practice will not happen? And if it does happen, who is* going to pretend that the plebiscite is free?

There is another question that arises. Between the cessation, of fighting, or the restoration of order, and the holding of the plebiscite, leaders of different political parties and people interested in this question presumably will be, and indeed must be, at liberty to go lawfully about to try to persuade the electo­rate to cast their votes for one side or the other. If Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues, who are at the head of the administration, go about disseminating propaganda in favor of accession to India, and the other side attempts to go about disseminating propaganda the other way, will the scales be even? Does not our experience in India show that on the eve of elections even under a reasonably fair administration, numerous cases have occurred where election agents, canvassers or inspectors on one side were proceeded against with trumped-up charges of this, that, or the other thing; or in any case, that it was made extremely difficult, if not impossible, for people in certain areas to carry on their propaganda? Those who were on the side that had the support of the official machinery were able to go to extraordinary lengths in trying to secure support at an election. These are facts; these are within our knowledge. We know that this kind of thing happens. What has to be ensured is that this will not happen in Kashmir, and that everybody here can be content that the plebiscite was free and without interference.

I shall conclude with this final observation: In the conditions that we have submitted, which are essential for the holding of a free plebiscite, and which—I venture to submit that the discussion hitherto has disclosed—find favour with the majority of the Security Council, is there any condition to which even a suspicion might attach that the acceptance of that condition will in any way put pressure upon any portion of the electorate' to vote in favour of Pakistan? If that is so, we shall give up. that condition.

In the conditions insisted upon by the representative of India, there is clear evidence and well-founded apprehension that they will in themselves amount to pressure and coercion upon the people to vote on the other side. That is the whole crux of the matter.

I am grieved by the fact that the submissions made this afternoon by the representative of India do not carry the matter any further than the stage that it had reached when the Security Council adjourned the discussion. Though the representative of India has made his submissions in softer, more diplomatic language this afternoon than he had previously employed, the softness amounts to no more than an invitation to those who are fighting in Kashmir, and to others who are interested in this matter, to enter the spider's parlor.

The President: I propose that we defer this discussion until next Tuesday afternoon, 16 March. In the meantime I shall undertake to get in touch with the two parties to explore terms of settlement which will seem fair to the members of the Security Council.

1. this difficult work I certainly hope that the Security Council will authorize me to utilize the services of other members of the Security Council.