11021948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed ZafruUah Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 244 held on 11 February 1948

11021948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed ZafruUah Khan (Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 244 held on 11 February 1948

Before I submit observations to the Security Council this morning, I wish to call attention to a press report which appear­ed yesterday morning in the New York Times, which, if not explained, might occasion some misapprehension. The press report appeared under the heading, "Deferment urged on Kashmir Issue." The sub-title of the press report is "India, with Pakistan agreed, will ask Council to put off Question in­definitely". The sub-title is incorrect, at least to the extent that it states that India, "with Pakistan agreed", will ask the Council for an adjournment. Pakistan has expressed no agreement.

The news item itself, which is dated 9 February 1948, states: "The United Nations Security Council will be asked tomorrow by India, with Pakistan concurring, to postpone consideration of the Kashmir question indefinitely, it was reliably reported here tonight." Again the reference to Pakistan is incorrect. Pakistan did not concur.

The news item then adds: "Following an informal meeting in New York earlier today"—that is 9 February 1948—"between Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, and N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, representative for India.'* Well, that is incorrect. There was no meeting, either formal or informal, between Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar and myself on 9 February 1948, and we did not even have a telephone con­versation about the matter.

The article continues: "...It was learned that the Council Chairman, Canada's General A. G. L. McNaughton, who is mediating at the private sessions being held by the two countries in an attempt to iron out their differences, took under advise­ment a formal proposal to put the case off." That is between the President and the Indian delegation, but Pakistan had nothing to do with it.

The news item then continues: "According to reports emanating from the closed chamber..." —if it was meant that there was a closed or an open chamber meeting on 9 February, I have already submitted that it is incorrect—"...the two delegation chiefs have agreed to ask for an indefinite deferment so that they can return to their countries and confer at length with their Governments concerning the long stalemate in the negotiations at Lake Success."

I have already submitted that I, on my side, have no infor­mation with regard to this request, except that conveyed by the President.

The news item then continues: "It is understood that the original proposal to defer further debate here on the three-week old dispute came from Mr. Ayyangar for India, but that quick concurrence came from Sir Zafruliah." That again is incorrect. Neither quick nor slow concurrence came from me. As a matter of fact, I shall immediately submit the point of view of my delegation on the adjournment requested.

It then states: "Tonight, however, officials of both delega­tions refused to comment under orders from their chiefs to maintain tight secrecy until the Council meeting tomorrow afternoon."

Immediately thereafter, we are informed that: "One spokesman for the Pakistan delegation expressed surprise at the report of the deferment request...." The world was warned that officials of both delegations refused to comment and then we were given something on the authority of a spokesman, "...and emphasized that India had been urging from the start for quick action on Kashmir. He added, however, that if India made such a request before the Council, 'undoubtedly Sir Zafruliah would be very willing to return to Karachi to take up pressing affairs which have been neglected since the Foreign Minister arrived here."

I am thankful for the suggestion and for being reminded of my duties in Karachi, but I have taken great pains to check up with every member of our delegation and every member of our staff, and not one of them has been in communication with the press with regard to this matter, so this is wholly incorrect. I have taken the time of the Security Council to point this out since, in the absence of any indication as to whether the report was or was not correct, the members of the Security Council might have been puzzled with regard to what I am going to submit.

It is only fair to add that the following appears in today's issue of the New York Times: "Meanwhile, the Pakistani delega­tion announced that it was not in favor of putting off the Kashmir case. Sir Mohammed Zafruliah Khan,Pakistani Foreign Minister, did not get a chance to speak today but told the press that his country felt that the dispute over the fighting in the Princely State and the question of its future should be settled as quickly as possible."

It was explained to the press, in addition, that the items to which I have drawn attention were incorrect. However, it is for the press to correct or not to correct any mistake into which it: may have fallen. I thought it was my duty to the Security Council to explain what the situation was.

With regard to the request for adjournment by the dele­gation of India, it is not only a matter of great embarrassment to us, but we were considerably upset, having regard to the stage which has been reached on these questions before the Security Council, when we learned that the delegation of India felt itself to be under the necessity of having to go to India at this stage, and was preferring a request to the Security Council for adjournment of the matter.

The situation which exists between India and Pakistan with reference to the Kashmir question as well as to the other ques­tions that we have raised in our documents, is delicate in the extreme. In some of its aspects it is even explosive, and we had hoped that the deliberations of the Security Council with regard to these matters would be continued without interruption until the structure of a settlement—as was expressed by the represen­tative of the United Kingdom—had been built and could then-bj put into effect.

Indeed, one was encouraged and cheered by the final obser­vations which fell from the lips of the representative of India during the 242nd meeting of the Security Council, held on Friday, 6 February, when he said that having regard to the views that had been expressed that afternoon in the Security Council, he now had better hopes of arriving at an agreement. This intimation that on Sunday, 8 February, he had asked for an adjournment [document S',668] was, to say the least, extre­mely disappointing after one's hopes had been raised with regard to the early possibility of a settlement.

The representative of India, when making a submission yesterday gave expression to his disappointment, which appeared to amount almost to a grievance that the Security Council had not shown great eagerness or sense of urgency in dealing with what he thought were the urgent and immediate aspects of the question.

This is not our feeling. We feel that the Security Council, to start with, has been extremely indulgent with both parties in affording them ample, even generous, opportunities for present­ing their cases and their different points of view, although the presentations very often involved what might have appeared to the members of the Security Council as wearisome repetitions.

Secondly, we are conscious that, not only inside the Security Council but even outside, members of the Security Council have devoted a good deal of their time and their anxious consi­deration to these matters. It must be recognized that, as must indeed be the case with almost every matter that comes before them, they have had to deal with a very delicate situation. Subject to their concern that nothing done or said by them should make the actual situation any worse, one has not only not noted —if one might say so without impertinence—any slack­ness on the part of the Security Council to deal with this matter, but, indeed, eagerness and dispatch in an anxiety that the situa­tion should be speedily, fairly and justly resolved. One must give expression to one's gratitude with regard to that, whatever one's views may be with regard to the specific proposals that may have come up for discussion" or may have been laid before the Security Council.

One thing is that India's sense of grievance arises from its own insistence that the problem now before the Security Council must be viewed from only one angle, that angle being the angle from which India views it; and that the consideration of the problem should be limited to only one aspect, that aspect being the aspect which India considers most urgent, with the consequence that India insists that only that solution of the problem should be adopted which appears to indicate to it the solution which it is seeking to this problem. The delegation of India has refused throughout to look at the problem as a whole, and has refused to appreciate that the object should be to arrive at a settlement. They forget that The whole problem of the restoration of peace in Kashmir, and the restoration of friendly relations between India and Pakistan, is before the Security Council.

Even the problem of Kashmir has been raised before the Security Council not by India alone but by both India and Pakistan. I would beg to invite the attention of the Security Council in this connexion to document II, which we submitted along with our letter of 15 January [document S/646], Part C of that document, in its different paragraphs, sets out the Pakistan case with regard to Kashmir, although the details are set out in document III. In document II, the different points of section 4 deal with what the Security Council is requested to -do in connexion with these matters. Section 4 says:

"The Pakistan Government requested the Security Council:

1. To call upon the Government of India..." to do certain things.

"2. To appoint a Commission or Commissions...

'(e) To arrange for the cessation of fighting in the State of Jammu and Kashmir; the withdrawal of all outsiders, whether belonging to Pakistan or the Indian Union, including members of the armed forces of the Indian Union; the restoration and rehabilitation of all Muslim residents of the Jammu and Kashmir State as on 15 August 1947, who have been compelled to leave the State as a result of the tragic events since that date, and the payment to them by the Indian Union of due compensation for the damage and injuries suffered by them; to take steps for the establishment of an impar­tial and independent administration in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, fully representative of the people of that State, and thereafter to hold a plebiscite to ascertain the free and unfettered will of the people of the Jammu and Kashmir State as to whether the State shall accede to Pakistan or to India...."

This is the request of the Pakistan Government to the Secu­rity Council with regard to the question of Kashmir alone.

1. are several other matters dealt with in our documents to which I shall draw attention later this morning. But, as I was--submitting, the Indian delegation has refused to consider that there is anything before the Security Council except its request that a directive should be issued to Pakistan to do this, that,, and the other thing, and to refrain from doing this, that, and the other thing. It is because the Indian delegation views the question only in that limited aspect that it has a sense of grievance lhat the urgency and the immediacy of the problem have not been appreciated by the Security Council. But even if it were not a fact that Pakistan itself has also raised the question of Kashmir before the Security Council, even if the#reference before the Security Council were confined to the Indian, reference and the request that the Indian delegation has made,, it would be the function of the Security Council, if one might so submit with due respect, to look into the matter and to try to bring about a pacific settlement of the dispute, as was indeed, so eloquently pointed out yesterday afternoon by the represen­tative of the United States.

One apprehends, again without any impertinence, that the Security Council would view every problem brought before it under these Articles of the Charter as a problem which must be settled in a pacific manner, and not merely as a sort of plaint which a party might bring into a court of law, upon which issues are framed and the court makes its pronouncement, limited to those issues, and if it finds those issues established, it decrees, the claim in accordance therewith, and if it finds they are not established, it dismisses the claim and is done with the matter.

When a situation of that kind, which, like the situation here —in accordance with the parties* own estimation of it, apart from any investigation—is a situation likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. the notice of the Security Council, one understands that the very first anxiety of the Security Council would be that the situation should be so resolved as to remove all danger to the maintenance of international peace and security. If the Indian delegation had been prepared to view the dispute between them, and Pakistan from that point of view, I venture to think that it-

would not have entertained that sense of grievance to which it gave expression yesterday.

For instance, the representative of India gave expression, at the 243rd meeting, to this grievance: "I am constrained to tell the Security Council that it is because [ feel that the trend of opinion in the Security Council has not adequately appreciated the urgency and the immediacy of the solution of this problem, and that this trend has gone on to consider problems which, if not altogether irrelevant to the main issue, could certainly have waited for consideration for a considerable time...."

I am surprised that the feeling of the Indian delegation should be that the issues relevant to Kashmir which the Secu­rity Council has been considering have been altogether irrele­vant to the main issue, or that, at the very least, they could have waited for consideration for a considerable time. One's own perusal of the record of what has been said by the mem­bers of the Security Council leaves this principal impression upon one's mind: what the Security Council was addressing itself to was, at the very threshold: What will bring to an end the fighting and the killing and the disorder and the violence that are going on in Kashmir? The difference arises with regard to the answer to that question. The Indian delegation thinks that a directive to Pakistan from the Security Council, couched as it desires, is all that is needed. The Security Council has felt that this will not bring the fighting to an end, and, I submit, it has very rightly appreciated the situation in that respect. To persuade the tribesmen who are already in Kashmir to go back' from Kashmir and to keep out, and to persuade the Azad Kashmir Government to Jay down its arms, to co-operate in the restoration of peace and order in Kashmir and to partici­pate in a free and unfettered plebiscite, it is essential that all these parties should be assured as to what would happen once they had laid down their arms. That was the manner in which the Security Council appraised the situation.lt felt that without such an assurance, without the guarantee of the Security Council, it was useless to expect that fighting would stop. That, I venture to submit, is a correct appreciation of the situation.

The representative of India went on to say: "I have asked' again and again for immediate action calculated to stop the-fighting in Kashmir." The Security Council has been engaged in determining immediate action to stop the fighting in Kashmir.

Then the representative of India presented a grievance' against the representative of the United Kingdom, saying: "... while he has appreciated the urgency and immediacy of stop­ping the fighting, when it came to the consideration of concrete steps, he concentrated rather on the steps which could certainly afford to wait, and wanted us to consider and to find solutions-for them first before he would concede our request....' Again,, the concentration on those matters is for the purpose of bringing an immediate end to the fighting. Here, one might submit a distinction to the members of the Security Council, which there is no reason to think is not already clearly in their minds; that is, that a settlement as to what shall be done is. essential for bringing the disorder and violence to an end, though, of course, it is obvious that the settlement must be put into effect by stages.

If the representative of India, when he draws attention to-matters that could wait, means that obviously the plebiscite-cannot be held until order has been restored and, therefore, in chronological order, it must come after the cessation of violence-and must follow the restoration of order, of course he is per­fectly correct. But if he means that no attention need be paid, at least for b some considerable time, to the holding of a free and fair plebiscite, I venture to differ with him entirely. It is only an assurance on that matter—as was stressed by the repre­sentative of China yesterday afternoon—which will help to persuade both the tribesmen and the people who are fighting in Kashmir to lay down arms and to help in the restoration of normal order.

Then the representative of India goes on to say: "...if we did solve the ultimate, long-range problem...." That is where-the difficulty arises. He goes on to insist that the plebiscite is a long-range problem, whereas it is the immediate problem. So far as the direct dispute between India and Pakistan is concern­ed, that is the crux of the matter. That dispute exists because India claims that Kashmir has, at least for the moment, acced­ed to India. Pakistan repudiates that. In any event, the dispute between the two parties is whether Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan. It is not a long-range problem. That is the problem that has given rise, even according to the represen­tative of India, to the situation with which India has invited and requested the Security Council to deal. Even the Indian case, right or wrong, is that the violence in Kashmir has origi­nated from the coercive attempts of Pakistan to compel Kashmir to accede to Pakistan. Pakistan repudiates that, but that is India's allegation, that the violence in Kashmir has started as the result of the pressure and coercion exercised by Pakistan in order to bring about the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.

How, then, does the representative of India argue that this is a long-range problem? It is the very crux of the matter even from his point of view. This attitude reveals a fundamental difference in the approach to the problem by the delegation of India. What India desires is to create conditions which they think at the moment do not exist and which they think Pakistan could help to create for them, which would enable India to stage a quick military victory in Kashmir.

One has previously refrained from stating the position in this manner as one had hoped that the necessity for stressing it in those words would not arise; but one must face the situation as it has emerged. India, throughout these deliberations, has stopped short at that stage. The representative of India says that everything else is a long-range problem; it can await consi­deration; one need not bother with it. This situation was brought into focus very sharply by the question which the representative of the United Kingdom addressed to Sheikh Abdullah at the end of his speech at the 241st meeting. The President told Sheikh Abdullah that he was under no compul­sion to attempt to answer the question. Sheikh Abdullah said that he desired to answer the question and he gave his answer.

1. question was: "In what manner would you propose to bring the fighting in Kashmir to an end?" The answer was: All that we desire is that the Security Council should direct Pakistan to do this, that or the other, and stop it from doing this, that or the other. Assuming that this directive had been given, and assuming that there was room for that directive to be given, and that it had been obeyed, he did not say one word with regard to how it is proposed to stop the fighting in Kashmir, not one word. This amounted to saying "Well, we shall do the rest," meaning that they would then feel they "would be able to crush the revolution in Kashmir by military force.

As I have submitted, it is the insistence upon this aspect of the problem, and the complete exclusion from consideration of everything else, that is responsible for the attitude which was expressed on behalf of the Indian delegation yesterday after­noon. Even the Prime Minister of India, in his telegram, to which I have already drawn attention, appreciated what imme­diate questions were to be settled. He said in that telegram: "Lord Mountbatten, on his return from Lahore, gave me a full account of his talk with Mr. Jinnah, in particular of two impor­tant suggestions which had been discussed, namely: one, the withdrawal of Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen from Kashmir; and two, the holding of a plebiscite at the earliest possible date."

The Prime Minister does not say: "Oh, these are long-range problems. We are for the moment not concerned with these. Why are you trying to draw these red herrings across the trail?" No, h"e goes on to say: "As regards the first proposal, Lord Mountbatten told me that Mr. Jinnah desired that with­drawal of the Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen should be simultaneous; but that he, Lord Mountbatten, had pointed out that it was clearly impossible for the Indian troops to with­draw from Kashmir Valley until the raiders had left Kashmir soul and law and order had been restored in Kashmir." It is not described as a long-range problem. All that is stressed is a practical difficulty as they saw it.

The telegram goes on to say: "Lord Mountbatten has also made it quite clear to Mr. Jinnah that the Government of India had no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than was necessary." As to the withdrawal of troops, it is admitted that it is one of the principal problems to be settled. The principle is conceded that the troops shall withdraw and shall not be retained in Kashmir a. moment longer than is necessary. The difficulty that is raised is that simultaneous withdrawal may be difficult to arrange in practice.-

The telegram continues: "As regards the second point, Lord Mountbatten reports that Mr. Jinnah had expressed the view that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities." Was that disputed by the Prime Minister? No. He says: "To meet this point, Lord Mountbatten had suggested that it should be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. Mr. Jinnah had put forward the counter proposal that the two Governors General should be given plenary powers to settle the matter. Lord Mountbatten had pointed out that it would be constitutionally improper for him" —that is to say, Lord Mountbatten—"to undertake this duty." Again, there is no dispute with regard to the plebiscite being held at the earliest possible date, and it was admitted that the objection that a free plebiscite could not be held under the present authorities was valid and had to be met.

Two methods were put forward to meet that objection. Mr. Jinnah said that the two Governors General should undertake this. Lord Mountbatten said that, so far as he was concerned, it would create a constitutional difficulty for him. Therefore, what was the remedy? A free plebiscite under the present authority in Kashmir was out of the question. There was no hope for it. What was the remedy? Lord Mountbatten said that the remedy was to hold the plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. Let us see what the Prime Minister himself says. He says: "It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated, are: 1. That the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; 2, That the Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; and 3. That the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date." Now we are told that the withdrawal of troops and the holding of the plebiscite are long-range problems, whereas in this telegram they are treated as the two questions that require settlement and upon which depends the settlement of the whole problem of Kashmir.

There is subsequent portion of this telegram to which I shall have to invite the attention of the Security Council in another connexion later. What is the position taken here on these matters, both of which are conceded to be essential and immediate by the Prime Minister? It is said by the Indian representative: "We are not prepared to agree to the existing Emergency Administration's being replaced by another, either at once or after being converted into a council of ministers with Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as Prime Minister. That administration has to be there until a national government, based upon a national assembly for which our scheme provides — has come into existence. It is under that national government that we said the plebiscite should be taken."

Is that carrying out the pledge that was put forward—"The Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date"? This would postpone it for a period of from three to five years. Then there are the anxieties caused by the proposed appointment of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as Prime Minister with a council of ministers appointed by the Maharaja on the nomination of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. Then that administration takes various steps that are necessary for the establishment of a national government.

The representative of India cited to the Security Council yesterday a Tamil proverb from his part of the country: "you cannot conceal a pumpkin in a bowl of rice." Here is the pumpkin popping up—Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as the Prime Minister of Kashmir.

Has anyone entertained the hope that the Azad Kashmir Government could be persuaded to lay down arms in order to submit to Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah's administration in Kashmir? Could insistence upon this demand secure a cessation of the fighting in Kashmir? The people of Kashmir who are fighting look upon Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as one who has joined their enemy—the Maharaja—who had undertaken a campaign for their extermination. They are fighting Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as one representing the Maharaja. Even during the short period in which he has been associated with the Prime Minister of Kashmir as head of the Emergency Administration, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah has been res­ponsible for imprisoning many of their leaders without trial. Among them are five elected deputies of the legislature.

Ever since Sheikh Abdullah was released from gaol at the end of September, and even before he consented to become an instrument in the hands of the Maharaja, he has taken no part in the struggle for liberty in Kashmir, at least in the eyes of those people, whatever his own estimate of his prowess may be. He says he has taken part in battles. If he means the recent fighting that has been going on in Kashmir, then he has taken part in battles against the people of Kashmir on behalf of the armed forces of India. What the people of Kashmir are bound to conclude from that, is obvious.

In their eyes, he has joined the forces of oppression and has become their tool. In his speech here, he used very harsh expressions as indicating his views of Pakistan and those who desire to accede to Pakistan. But here are two significant facts which would enable the Security Council to judge, to some-slight extent, what the actual feeling of the people of Kashmir is towards the administration of which he is the head, and which is supported by the armed forces of India.

The Security Council is aware that as many as—and, by this time, more than—200,000 Muslim refugees have fled from areas under Sheikh Abdullah's administration. Where have they fled? They have fled to Pakistan. Sheikh Abdullah said that Pakistan is a reincarnation of the spirit of Hitler and Goebbels. Why is-it that, from areas under his administration, where apparently Complete peace prevails with the help of the bayonets of the Indian forces; over 200,000 Muslims have fled into the arms of Hitler and Goebbels. How does he explain that fact?

According to him and according to the leader of the Indian delegation, the Muslims of Kashmir—at least in those parts where Sheikh Abdullah is associated with the administration— are anxious to kiss his feet. Yet, they ran away from under his feet to kiss the feet of "Hitler and Goebbels." Does that not show that the Muslims in Kashmir do not feel secure under the administration headed by him? They do not feel secure where Indian troops are in charge. They are ready to abandon—not only are they ready, but they have, in actual fact, abandoned— their homes and all that makes life attractive in order to save themselves by running away. Where did they run? They ran into Pakistan, which Sheikh Abdullah says is the reincarnation of the spirit of Hitler and Goebbels. Yet, that is where his co-religionists are fleeing from his administration.

Jammu Town is the seat of his Government. The Maharaja himself is in Jammu. Will Sheikh Abdullah explain what has happened to the vast majority of the Muslim population of Jammu Town with the Maharaja there, the seat of government there and Sheikh Abdullah there, who, according to his own statement, has been fighting for the liberty of his people; who is now associated with the administration; and who hopes, under the patronage of the Indian Government, one day to be nominated Prime Minister by the Maharaja, the premiership still being dangled before his eyes? Where are they today? Why are they not in Jammu? That is one significant fact.

Perhaps he will explain, then, this second fact. Under his administration there is a regulation—and it is only fair to state he is not responsible for that regulation, which was put into force some years ago—that the Dogras, the Hindus, may carry arms in the State of Jammu and Kashmir without a licence, while the Muslims may not. That is one factor that has helped in the massacre of Muslims in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is now responsible for the administration. Has he at least put these wretched people in a position of equality with their oppressors? Will that kind of administration be a guarantee of a fair, free and unfettered plebiscite?

 

The Indian delegation insists that it will not have that administration touched in spite of the fact that its Prime Minister admitted the validity of the contention that there was no hope of a free plebiscite being held under that authority, and that its own suggestion was that the plebiscite should be undertaken by the United Nations.

Then, with regard to the withdrawal of troops, it was said yesterday that Kashmir is a part of India, and India is responsi­ble for its defence, and that Indian troops will not withdraw until after the plebiscite is held, Once the plebiscite is held, if the plebiscite goes in favour of Pakistan, India shall withdraw its troops to a man. This is very generous. Then there is no question of the withdrawal of troops. It was further said that if the plebiscite goes the other way, India being responsible for the defence of Kashmir, it is a matter to be arranged between Kashmir and India. Now where is there any reflection here of this proposal made on behalf of India's Prime Minister, "that the Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored"? And earlier, the proposal said that "India has no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than is necessary'', not until after the result of the plebiscite is known, a plebiscite to be held under the authority of the kind of administration to some features of which I have drawn attention and under the shadow of the bayonets of the troops who have been mass­acring at least a section of the population, which will then be expected to record a free vote on whether they want to accede to Pakistan or to India; an administration which has sent people to gaol merely for shouting, "Pakistan Zindabad"; that is to say, "Pakistan forever," an offence for which many people are behind the bars of the gaol today in Kashmir.

"But,” it is said, "Kashmir is part of India." That is begging the whole question. What is the dispute between Pakistan and India over Kashmir? India claims that Kashmir was acceded to India; Pakistan repudiates the validity of that accession, and questions its legality. It is said—even admitted that this accessory is not final. Paragraph 15 of the very telegram to which I have already drawn attention says:

"The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions that there should be acceptance of the principle that where the ruler of a State does not belong to the com­munity to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or other Domi­nion should be ascertained by reference to the will of the people."

Applied to Kashmir, this wording means that in the case of a State like Kashmir, where the ruler is a Hindu and the majo­rity of his subjects are Muslims, and the State has not acceded to Pakistan, the question as to whether the State has finally acceded to one or other Dominion shall be ascertained by reference to the will of the people. This applies wherever such a state of affairs—or the reverse—exists with regard to any State. In other words, in the case of a State such as this, there is no accession until the will of the people declares to which side the State shall accede. They say that this shall apply not only to Kashmir but also to all other States similarly situated — obviously, Junagadh for example, and possibly other States too —but they are not willing to recognize any accession unless it is based upon the will of the people. Until the will of the people is ascertained, the question of accession is, as it were, in suspense.

Today we are told, "Kashmir is part of India." On their own principle, it is neither part of India nor part of Pakistan. It will become part of India or part of Pakistan when the will of the people has been ascertained. Meanwhile, if it is said that India is interested, Pakistan is more interested in Kashmir than India is. The majority of its people are Muslims, nine-tenths of its border on the Pakistan-India side is contiguous with the Pakistan border; all its communications are through Pakistan; and the greater part of its economy depends upon Pakistan. But, so far as the legal question is concerned, according to their own proposal and suggestion, there is no accession and no decision with regard to accession until the will of the people has been ascertained. Therefore, where a dispute has arisen, where violence is being resorted to, and where fighting is going on, it becomes necessary that this question of accession should be decided at the earliest possible opportunity. It becomes the most urgent question and is not a long-term problem.

Then it is said, with regard to the plebiscite: "We are will­ing to invite the observation and even the supervision of the United Nations." In the first place, that alone will not bring about a cessation of the fighting. The Azad Kashmir Govern­ment people will not lay down their arms if a plebiscite is to be held under the authority of Sheikh Abdullah's administration and under the bayonets of the Indian Army, while the only part that the United Nations is to take is to observe, or possibly even to supervise.

In the second place, there is the question of pressure in matters of this kind, and I have already explained that the people of Kashmir are in a peculiarly vulnerable position in this regard. Pressure is not brought to bear merely at the polling station. As a matter of fact, pressure is never, or at least very seldom, applied at the polling station. All the subtle means of applying pressure go on behind the scenes. What will the Commission observe in the way of freedom or otherwise of the plebiscite? There are a hundred and one devices and threats which are resorted to, and forms of pressure which are exercised upon people to make them vote one way or the other. How will a commission, merely observing—or even supervising—the actual polling and recording of the votes, be able to gauge that pressure? Time and again petty tyrannies and threats by petty officials are brought into operation. The man there in the rural areas—the head constable, the revenue officer, and so on—has been telling the people, under orders: You have to vote this way; otherwise I shall have to know the reason why." That is the kind of pressure tint has to be: excluded. What will the United Nations observers be able to do in that direction?

Even if they are able to observe something of the kind which is objectionable, what would be the remedy? We are told that they can be present as observers and can even supervise—provided there is no exercise of executive authority. Very well, they report lhat in their opinion pressure was brought to bear and that, therefore, it was not a free plebiscite. Another plebiscite would be held, a similar report would be made, and there might be yet another plebiscite. Having regard to the circumstances of this particular case, what is the remedy if these people are merely observers?

Given the kind of people that the inhabitants of Kashmir are, it would be enough to invite attention to the opinion of an ex-administrator of Kashmir, Sir Albion Bannerjee, with which I am sure the leader of the Indian delegation would not dis­agree since he was one of the most eminent Prime Ministers of Kashmir over a number of years, and did his best while he was there, under the limitations which operated upon him, to administer the State fairly and equitably. Sir Albion Bannerjee has said:

Jammu and Kashmir State is laboring under many disad­vantages, with a large Mohammedan population absolutely illiterate, laboring under poverty and very low economic conditions of living in the villages, and practically governed like dumb, driven cattle. There is no touch between the Government and the people, no suitable opportunity for representing grievances, and the administrative machinery itself requires overhauling from top to bottom to bring it up to modern conditions of efficiency. It has at present little or no sympathy with the people's wants and grievances. There is hardly any public opinion in the State. As regards the press, it is practically non-existent, with the result that the Government is not benefited to the extent that it should be by the impact of healthy criticism."

It is only fair to add that since that was written, an oppor­tunity has been afforded for the ventilation of grievances in the few and far-between sittings of the legislature—so long as the deputies are not behind prison bars for boldly giving expression to their views. There is also a certain amount of press. That is.

the kind of population for which conditions of a free and fair plebiscite have to be established.

I should now like to draw attention to some observations made by the representative of China in this connexion during the 243rd meeting. He stated that the proposal to set up an impartial interim administration might place the Government of India in great constitutional difficulty. He then went on to say; "I am not sure that the Central Government at New Delhi has the right to order a change of government in one of its federal States." The representative of China then added: "We are interested in the impartiality of the plebiscite. We should do all we can to see to it that the plebiscite will be really free and impartial.*'

That is the principle involved, and whatever that requires as an essential condition, no doubt must be put into effect.

I should like to make a few observations on the constitu­tional aspect of the matter, though it was adequately and brilliantly dealt with the other day by the representative of the United States [240th meeting}. However, the question was raised on behalf of the Indian delegation also and was stressed by Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah 241st meeting]. I might first explain, with reference to the apprehension expressed by the representative of China, that the Department of Education and the Department of Health, for instance, need not be interfered with, and that the administration should be controlled only to the extent which might be necessary in order to hold a free plebiscite. The representative of China stated, "...I feel that it is well for us to concentrate on those instruments of govern­ment which have to do with the plebiscite and to leave the other part alone" [243rd meeting].

That is true enough. Nobody has asked for any unnecessary interference with the machinery of administration. The machi­nery of administration can go on functioning normally, except only to the extent and only during the time that it may be necessary to control it, or to issue directives to it in order to secure the essential conditions for a free and fair plebiscite.

With regard to the constitutional objection raised, the reply has been furnished by the Government of India itself. Here, it has been solemnly stated that this plebiscite is the business of the Maharaja; the Government of India cannot interfere with it. To start with, that is an untenable proposition. It is not the business of the Maharaja—at least not the business of the Maharaja alone. The Maharaja has agreed, as part of the scheme for accession, that in order to decide, the people's will with regard to accession shall be properly recorded; and the Government of India has agreed that the plebiscite shall be free and impartial and should be undertaken by the United Nations. If the United Nations can only undertake it—their own guarantee in that case will be involved—under certain essential conditions of impartiality and fairness (and that is not really a question for the Maharaja) it is useless to contend that you are .willing to concede a remedy but you are not willing to concede the conditions under which that remedy can alone be applied. It is tantamount to saying: "A free and fair plebiscite we con­cede, but conditions under which alone a free and fair plebiscite can be held, we do not concede."

As I have said, the reply has come from the Government of India itself. Here it was said that there can be no interference with the domestic affairs of a State. Now the maintenance of law .and order inside a State—in normal times at least—is the busi­ness of a State. The investigation of an offence is much more the business of a State.

Here are two items of news which have come from India only recently—one this morning. The first, dated 7 February, is taken from the New York Times of 8 February and is headed "India takes over Princely Regime." The subtitle is "Maharaja, Premier to be kept out of Alwar State while Gandhi Inquiry goes on."

The news item states: "The investigation of the assassina­tion of Mohandas K. Gandhi began reaching into his places today.

"The Government of India suppressed the administration of the Princely State of Alwar and called its Prince and Prime Minister to a hearing.

"The Sikh Prince"—this has subsequently been corrected; though the name sounds like a Sikh name, the Prince is not a Sikh but a Rajput —"Maharaja Tej Singhji, and the Alwar Prime Minister, Dr. N.B. Khare already was in New Delhi and was ordered to stay there for at least a month while the investigation proceeded.

"An announcement said that this drastic step was necessary to pursue without any obstruction as investigation into the administration's alleged 'support or connivance' in activities of the outlawed R.S.S.1, and 'its possible complicity in the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi and other, serious crimes.'

"The Government of India took over rule of the State of one million persons and named C.S. Venkatachar, Regional Commissioner of Indore, as temporary administrator." Then there are further particulars with regard to the Maharaja in the State. Here is one case. It is a case of investigation into a crime. The whole world has been horrified at that particular crime. The victim was an august person, greatly beloved and revered, but to the constitutional doctrine, the personality of the victim makes no difference. It is an investigation into a crime, into an offence of murder and its ramifications. In order to secure what is said with reference to a free investigation into a crime, the Maharaja and the Prime Minister are sent to New Delhi. They are told to stay out: "You cannot go back to your State." The administration is taken over; the Maharaja's administration is suppressed. The Government of India appoints its own administrator, "until," it says, "the investigation is completed."

In question of principle, what comparison is there between the investigation of an offence and the holding of an international act—the plebiscite —to determine whether a State is to accede to one Dominion, a Member of the United Nations, or to another Dominion, another Member of the United Nations? What comparison is there between the two? How much more essential is it not that conditions of a free and fair plebiscite should be established than it is—even keeping out of consideration for the moment the personality and the status of the victim—that a single private offence should be properly investigated?

1. Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh.

If this last justifies the suppression of a State administration and is not unconstitutional and illegal, with what force — or with what plausibility, even—can it be argued that it is unconstitutional and beyond the powers of the Government of India to suggest to the Maharaja, after he has agreed that the plebiscite should be undertaken by the United Nations, that for the purpose of, and temporarily until, the plebiscite is determined, the administration shall be neutral? That is one instance.

Here is another report which appears in today's edition of the New York Times. The heading is: "India again assumes control of a Maharaja's Administration." The sub-title is: "Princely State of Bharatpur placed under Dominion's authority while check on violent groups is made." The news item is dated 10 February, and it emanates from New Delhi. It reads as follows:

"The Indian Government moved in today on still another Princely State—Bharatpur—in the purge of communal activities following the assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi.

"Bharatpur, like Alwar, which was taken over by the Dominion Government last Saturday, was notorious for atrocities committed against the Moslems in the upheavals following the division of India into two independent Dominions on religious lines.

"The Maharaja of Bharatpur, Lieutenant Colonel His Highness Shri Brijendra Sawai, was required to turn his State over to an administrator appointed by the Indian Government. However, unlike the Maharaja of Alwar, he was not required to remain out of the State until the clearing of his administration.

"The Maharaja's Government is accused of complicity in the activities of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, Hindu extremist semi-military organization outlawed by the Indian Government after Mr. Gandhi's death. The Maharaja said that he was 'shocked' at the evidence presented and agreed to give 'fullest cooperation' to the new administrator and police chief to be appointed by India."

 

Then there are certain particulars with regard to the State, after which the report contains the following language:

"The Maharaja is resigned to the growing view here that the institution of the ruling Princes is on the way out.

"In fact, he professes to believe that the Maharajas Have no place in free India' and is willing to join in a movement for merging the Princely States with the provinces."

After having assumed in that manner the administration of these two States, it is the idlest pretence to contend that it would be against constitutional principles it* the Government of India agreed to the establishment of conditions which alone could guarantee a free and fair plebiscite.

Towards the end of the statement which he made at the 24?rd meeting of the Security Council, the representative of India said: "Therefore, in dealing with questions of such a leisurely character,"—this question, according to him, is of a leisurely character—"there is no harm at ail—and, in fact, there is everything to be gained,—by taking an adjournment and trying to solve those problems in the most satisfactory manner possible to both parties. That explains my request for an adjournment."

I wish to submit that these questions are not leisurely; these questions are of the gravest urgency, as has repeatedly been urged by us throughout and, until yesterday, by the delegation of India. They are the very crux of the matter. They alone can settle these problems; they alone can help to bring about peace.

The representative of India drew attention to the battle that had taken place in Naushera. He described it as another raid. I shall not enter into an argument on that aspect of it. It could not have been a raid. There have been battles in that area over several weeks by forces of the Azad Kashmir Government, as of the war that is going on between the Azad Kashmir

Government and the forces of the Dominion of India in that part of the country.

However, it is claimed that great slaughter took place. Well,, the slaughter of human beings is the slaughter of human beings, and the earlier an end is put to it, the better for the peace and the credit of all concerned. These are not leisurely questions; these are questions as grave as death, and they must be settled^ at the earliest possible opportunity.

With regard to the draft resolution that was circulated by the President to the two delegations [document S',667], I have one-or two brief observations to make. I may state that we intimated to the President that, so far as we were concerned, although we took exception to the language of certain clauses as drafted, we were willing to accept the principle of the draft resolution in order to help forward a solution. The head of the Indian delegation has complained that sub-paragraphs (a) and (b)1 following alternative B of part 4 do not go far enough. Sub-paragraph (a) reads: "Acts of violence and hostility must end."" Sub-paragraph (b) reads: "The withdrawal and continued exclusion of all irregular forces and armed individuals who have entered Jammu and Kashmir from outside must be brought about, each party using to that end all the influence at its disposal,"

How far do these sub-paragraphs go? They go to this extent: that there must be a cessation of violence and hostility, a withdrawal of armed people who have come in from the outside, and measures must be taken to keep them out. The rest is a question of detail, and if the details or the methods by which this is to be brought about have to be expressed more specifically! I venture to submit to the members of the Security Council that they will not find the Pakistan delegation unhelpful in that respect.

As to sub-paragraph (c) following alternative B of part 4, the objection of the representative of India was that they could not contemplate sharing with Pakistan the responsibility for the restoration of law and order in Kashmir. In that connexion, he apostrophized Pakistan at length.

I do desire to explain that Pakistan is anxious and keen that the armed forces of India should withdraw from Kashmir. It is obvious that, for the restoration of peaceful conditions, India must withdraw the troops that have been fighting with the population and that have been guilty of all sorts of atrocities-denied by the representatives of the Government of India, but asserted with persistence by the Azad Kashmir Government. So long as they are present, it is useless to expect the restora­tion of normal peaceful relations. As I have explained, this also has a vital bearing on the freedom of the plebiscite.

We are not anxious that Pakistan troops should necessarily go into the State. Somehow, the representative of India seemed to think—or at least I felt that he thought, both in his conver­sation with the President on 6 February and when he was speaking yesterday—that this was some sort of man oeuvre for Pakistan to get its troops inside Kashmir. Pakistan is not anxious about that; what it is anxious for is to secure a withdrawal of the Indian armed forces.

Then the question arises: If it is necessary to maintain a certain amount of armed force in Kashmir for the preservation of law and order, what is the device to which recourse shall be had for that purpose? Our suggestion is an international force. It will be said, "Well, there is no international force in exis­tence. The problem is urgent. An international force cannot be brought into existence by saying 'Presto!' " Very good, then, let us have British forces, Dominion forces—let us say Commonwealth forces—or any force that will be neutral. But, having regard to the urgency of the problem, if any of these-suggestions should prove impracticable, Pakistan is willing to share the responsibility and to make its troops available. That is only a demand of necessity. We are not anxious to do so; as a matter of fact, we are anxious to keep out, as we want everything to be done not only under the observation of the Security Council, but also under the authority, the direction, the supervision and the arrangements of the Security Council. If the Security Council can think of anything that will establish free, impartial and peaceful conditions without bringing in Indian troops and Pakistani troops, we shall welcome it. If it thinks this is the only way it can be done, we shall be prepared to share the responsibility.

With regard to the withdrawal of forces, I have dealt with the objection of the representative of India.

With regard to paragraph (e) of the draft resolution circu­lated by the President, I do not think either side would have any observation to make. We both desire that the points set out therein should be accomplished.

The Security Council's attention must be drawn to this factor: there has been a good deal of massacre of the Muslim population. We have the percentages of the population at the Last census available to us, and with regard to areas where massacres on a large scale may have been indulged in, some sort of remedial measures with regard to ascertaining the result of the plebiscite will have to be devised. But that is a matter of detail.

With regard to paragraphs (f) and (g), we have no obser­vations to make. But on that subject, too, we are prepared to accept such suggestions in detail, with a view to securing conditions essential to the holding of a free and fair plebiscite, subject to any other suggestions that we may have to make or any modifications that we may have to suggest.

With regard to the question of adjournment itself, that again, of course, is a matter for the Security Council, but it will appreciate that this request on the part of the Indian delegation does place the Pakistan delegation and the Pakistan Government in a position of great embarrassment. We do not know where we stand. The Indian delegation knows what is in its mind; we know only so far as it has chosen to disclose its plans to the Security Council. Therefore, we are not able to make any arrangements or adjustments on our side. If we knew the whole background, consultations with our own Government might become necessary. As it is, it may be necessary for me to arrange to have some member of my delegation fly back to Karachi to hold consultations over this new development that has arisen. But it does place us in a position of deep embarrass­ment. Apart from that—embarrassments can be overcome—it holds up the progress of the Security Council's proceedings with regard to this very urgent and grave matter. Therefore, if an adjournment there must be, I respectfully submit that the

The Security Council should keep it to a minimum period, subject to all the other safeguards that have been suggested which relate to procedure, upon which I need not dwell.