06021948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan {Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 242 held on 6 February 1948

06021948 Text of the Speech made by Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan {Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 242 held on 6 February 1948

I am very grateful to the Security Council for affording me this opportunity to comment on such of the points raised in the two speeches made on behalf of India yesterday afternoon and this morning as might require further clarification. I shall not try to repeat matters that have so far been made sufficiently clear to the Council, except in so far as it may be necessary to invite the attention of the Council to any aspect of the matters which might help to prevent any confusion arising as the result of what has recently been submitted.

For instance, Sheikh Abdullah, in his statement, appeared again to take the position that nothing of any moment had taken place of an objectionable character in the State until the raid of 22 October occurred. One would have thought it had been made sufficiently clear—and was, in any case, within his personal knowledge—that a good deal of that kind of thing had gone on before that particular incursion took place.

Sheikh Abdullah even went so far as to say—or, at least very clearly to imply—that the disturbances in West Punjab in the months of August and September of last year started the

trouble between West Punjab and East Punjab, another matter which, one would have thought, had been made sufficiently clear in the opposite direction.

Of that, he himself would have had no personal knowledge, as he was then, unfortunately, in gaol. But there can be no question that the August disturbances, so far as East and West Punjab were concerned, started with the massacre of Muslims-in Patiala State and with the dynamiting of special trains carrying Government of Pakistan personnel from Delhi to Karachi. The disturbances then spread rapidly. Though the occurrences in West Punjab were of an equally deplorable character, they started as the result of the occurrences in East Punjab, by way of reprisal.

Let me return to the events in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah^ said that he suddenly woke up one morning and heard that there had been a raid at Muzaffarabad and that later on these disturbances spread to Baramulla. That would have been the morning of 22 October.

The dramatic description may well be true, but it is neces­sary to add that Sheikh Abdullah woke up that morning not in Kashmir but in Delhi. He may have heard of the raid in that manner. But he should have heard, and later on should have known, that the whole of Poonch had been placed under martial law in August by the State and that the atrocities by the State troops in Poonch had started in September; and he: should not have forgotten at least his own statement of 21 October made to the press in Delhi at a time before he could have wakened on the morning of 22 October to the news of this raid. A newspaper report of his remarks states: "Sheikh Abdullah said that the present troubles in Poonch...were caused by the unwise policy adopted by the State. The people of Poonch, who suffered under their local ruler and again the Kashmir Maharaja, the overlord of the Poonch ruler, had started a people's movement for the redress of their grievances." This statement was made on 21 October, before the raid, and refers to the movement as having been in progress for some time: "...had started a people's movement for the redress of their grievances.'* The article then goes on to report Sheikh.

Abdullah's remarks were as follows: "It was not communal. Kashmir State sent its troops, and there was panic in Poonch. But most of the adult population of Poonch, he explained, were ex-servicemen in the Indian Army with close connexions with the people of Jhelum and Rawalpindi. They evacuated their women and children, crossed the frontier, and returned with arms supplied to them by willing people. The present position was that the Kashmir State forces were forced to withdraw in certain areas." The whole matter was between the people of Kashmir and the forces of the Maharaja and has been going on for some time.

Sheikh Abdullah has tried to make the whole matter appear as though everything arose as the result of the raid on 22 October.

I shall not deal with every one of the allegations Sheikh Abdullah made or the pleas that he put forward. It was quite clear from his statement that he was putting forward a desperate plea, on his own behalf, that he was the head of the Emergency Administration in Kashmir; that by every possible means he intended to remain head; that he was looking forward to becoming Prime Minister, appointed by the Maharaja; and that, as he put it, no power on earth could, or at least should, displace him.

Sheikh Abdullah did give expression to some sentiments which would indicate how much impartiality and neutrality • might be expected from an administration of which he continued to be the head.

He also tried to give a picture of the military situation in Kashmir which is somewhat different from the picture the Security Council had hitherto been invited to contemplate. For instance, the Security Council had been told that the movement inside Kashmir had received a certain amount of support, strength and stiffening from the tribesmen who had joined the people who were fighting in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah asked the Security Council yesterday to believe that these tribesmen could not be adequately dealt with by the Indian forces for this reason. They made raids and incursions into State terri­tory—their number sometimes being as large as 5,000—but as soon as the Indian military arrived to deal with them, they ran< back into Pakistan, at which point the Indian armed forces, being very scrupulous with regard to preserving their good relations with Pakistan and not desiring to trespass across the-border, were unable to follow them.

That the Indian troops, particularly Indian airmen, have not been scrupulous in this matter, I have placed sufficient material before the Security Council in my earlier speeches to demonstrate this. Several attempts were made from the air to bomb the Kohala Bridge, which is the property of the Pakistan Government and which connects the Kashmir State with.' Pakistan over the Jhelum River. Several bombings of* Pakistani villages by the Indian Air force have been made. With regard to some of them the Indian Government explained that the action had taken place by mistake.

Apart from this, if the trouble with regard to tribesmen is-that they make raids and then run away, what about the people of Kashmir, who have not run away and go on advancing? It is not alleged with regard to the people who are carrying on this movement that they run away into Pakistan and hide themselves there. And that is the main trouble which the Indian forces have to settle. No reference was made to that situation by Sheikh Abdullah. The only trouble, apparently, concerns these raids which take place by tribesmen who then go back into Pakistan, raids which, according to Sheikh Abdullah, are preventing the restoration of peace, the stoppage of fighting, and the restoration of law and order within the State of Kashmir. After all, these raids could only be border incidents. But what about the movement inside the State? Is that not an admission that the real fighting with which the armed forces of India had to contend was the fighting which was being maintained by the people of Kashmir, to which Sheikh Abdullah had already referred in his statement of 21 October?

What treatment may such people expect from Sheikh Abdullah and from an administration of which he is the head? Whether that treatment would be just, fair, neutral and impar­tial, is for the members of the Security Council to determine. I shall not comment upon the degree to which he went in trying to demonstrate that, if he were not at the head of the administration, it would be impossible to secure any administra­tion which would be neutral and impartial.

In his zeal in his own behalf, he committed—I would not say deliberately; perhaps he fell into it—what every Muslim and, as a matter of fact, every right-thinking person, would only describe as a blasphemy. It should be quite possible to ensure that, during the short interval which may be necessary between the cessation of violence and disorder, .and the holding of the plebiscite, the head of the administration in Kashmir should be so neutral and impartial an authority that he would be so considered by everyone concerned.

After all, since when has Sheikh Abdullah become the head of the administration? Roughly, only since the beginning of November. Even now, as I pointed out the other day, the Prime Minister is not in Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah has made this plea: Would the Security Council wish to deprive 4 million Kashmiris of their due share in the administration of their own country? No one has expressed any such desire. All that is suggested is that during the interim period the authority of the administration should be in impartial hands. In any case, how much of the share in the running of the administration has been given hitherto to the people of Kashmir by the Maharaja? He has always imported people from outside and placed them at the head of the administration. If, in the very attempt to secure that henceforth, permanently and forever, the people of Kashmir themselves shall take into their own hands the running of their own State—if in the attempt that that shall be fairly and impartially carried out, and that the foundations of such a system shall be so laid that it shall not be subject to frequent earthquakes—the device has to be resorted to, let us say for another three months, to have a person at the head of the administration not connected with either political party in Kashmir, then obviously, that device would represent no novel suggestion at all.

Sheikh Abdullah, however much in his own estimation, he may be the quintessence of the representation of his own people, has not been elected by the people or by any section of the

people to be placed at the head of the administration. His being associated with the Prime Minister at this moment is the act of the Maharaja, at least on the surface, and if it is not the act of the Maharaja himself, unprompted by anyone from the outside, it has been done at the suggestion of the Prime Minister of India.

1. representative character Sheikh Abdullah may, in his own estimation, or in fact, occupy, until that character has been demonstrated through the exercise of the will of the people, he is today only the handpicked instrument of the Maharaja and is just one person and no more.

In that connexion, document No. 2, presented by the Indian delegation to the President of the Security Council at the 236th meeting, not only assumes but definitely makes the proposal that, in order to set up a representative interim government, the Maharaja shall immediately appoint Sheikh Abdullah Prime Minister—again, handpicked, and appoint a council of ministers on the advice of Sheikh Abdullah; and that that government, so selected and so appointed, shall proceed to take measures as a result of which a national government shall be set up.

The whole scheme is split up into stages, the object of it being that no plebiscite shall be held until the power and authority of the government headed by Sheikh Abdullah have been consolidated over the State of Kashmir. I submit that no scheme of that kind is likely to satisfy the people who are fight­ing for their liberty in Kashmir, nor will it have any influence over them in the way of persuading them to lay down arms, which should be, and is, the first declared objective of the Government of India—and indeed it is the objective of the Government of Pakistan and of everyone who is concerned with this dispute.

I shall now make brief comments on some points which have been raised this morning on behalf of India. The representative of India stated that, after I had made reference to the international obligations that might or might not arise over the present situation, I went on to deal with the origin of the Maharaja's rule and with the origin of the rule of his dynasty over Kashmir; and then I went on to quote from letters of the Agent to the Governor General and of the Governor General himself. I admit I may have been remiss in concluding that portion of my remarks, without reference to the relevance which those letters had to the status of the Maharaja, the position that the Maharaja occupied, the nature of his sover­eignty and what remedies were available against misrule, if it should continue. My object in quoting Lord Lawrence's letter was to show that, under the suzerainty of the paramount Power—the British—it was an essential condition of such protection and help as was given by the paramount Power that the ruler should behave properly towards his people and should discharge his obligations in a just and fair manner.

That letter leaves no doubt that, if the ruler failed in any of these respects, he could be set aside—as indeed has often happened in the history of British rule in India and in the history of the relationship of the paramount Power with the princes in India. There have been numerous instances where a prince has been set aside because he had failed in one or more of his obligations toward his subjects.

It is also clearly indicated in that letter that, when the paramount Power took up the obligation of rendering assistance to a rule against disturbances in the State, it had to insist upon the ruler's behaving, because, by the very fact that it had to insist upon the ruler's remaining in power, it was taking away from the subjects of the ruler the ordinary normal remedy which would have been open to them—that is to say, to rise against acts of tyranny and to set aside the rule of the Maharaja. It is clearly indicated in that letter.

The conclusion from that is that, paramountcy having been withdrawn—and almost simultaneously with the withdrawal of paramountcy the Maharaja having started a campaign of atrocities and extermination of his subjects—the validity of his rule had ceased, and those subjects were now entitled, since there was no paramount Power there to make the Maharaja be­have, to settle matters by themselves. The movement in Kashmir was a movement of that kind. These people had succeeded in breaking completely the forces of the Maharaja. As a matter of fact, quite large numbers of them have gone over to the insurgents and they are today fighting among them. The Maharaja's forces split. The Dogra troops were defeated and ran away. The Muslim troops joined the freedom movement, and the Azad Kashmir Government today exercises authority over eight of approximately thirteen districts of the Kashmir State. The Maharaja's authority has ceased to run Muzaffarabad, Poonch, Mirpur, Riasi and Gilgit, which is divided into two or three districts. They have set up a Provisional Government. They have asked for recognition of the Government as such. They are exercising de facto authority.

That being the state of affairs, it is a very delicate question—as I set forth in an earlier submission to the* Security Council—to determine what, if any, international obligations arise out of the situation. It was for that reason that I said it was profitless to enter upon academic discussions of inter­national obligations.

A too delicate probing of the situation may reveal that the Indian troops were in Kashmir to bolster tyranny and oppression; that the Azad Kashmir Government was fighting for the establishment of liberty and freedom. For the purpose of resolving the questions which are today before the Security Council, for the purpose of bringing about a settlement, for the purpose of stopping violence and disorder, and for the purpose of laying the foundations for something which might grow along beneficent lines, it will not be necessary, and it can serve no purpose today, to make a meticulous examination of what are the international obligations. That was my object in bringing to the notice of the Security Council the basis of the title of the* Maharaja to the State of Kashmir, the tyranny that has always continued, the warnings which had been given to Rajah Gulab Singh and the conditions of sovereignty that were laid down and explained in the letter of the Governor General. However, I do apologize because, after I had quoted these documents, I did not make this aspect of the matter quite clear, so that the representative of India had to have a grievance to the effect that I started the matter on one basis,. and then, towards the conclusion, left it hanging in the air.`

The representative of India went on to explain that the accession of Kashmir to India was not provisional, but he did say that it was accepted by India as the result of an emergency. He drew the attention of the Security Council to the telegram of 8 November from the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan. However, a careful study and perusal of that very document will put beyond doubt the crucial matters that are in controversy between the delegations of India and Pakistan. I do not think it will be necessary, once the significance of that telegram has been grasped, to press in aid any further juristic documents or conceptions in support of the proposals contained in our draft resolution of 27 January [236th meeting] and in support of the proposals that have been made by several members of the Security Council. There­fore, I beg to draw the Security Council's attention further to the contents of that telegram, and more particularly to the portions which have been read by the representative of India this morning.Paragraph 4 of that telegram says: "In the last paragraph of your telegram, you say that Lord Mounthatten promised to let you know the views of the Indian Government on the proposals discussed between the two Governors General, but that you have heard no more about them.

Here again, it is necessary to set at rest one doubt that might have arisen as the result of Sheikh Abdullah's submission yesterday and the statement made today by the representative of India. The proposal first to settle the situation in Kashmir came from Pakistan, and I am not referring here to the attempts made before the situation had been clarified, but to those made even after the accession had been proclaimed.

The accession was announced on 27 October. On 28-October, the then Supreme Commander, Field Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, flew over from New Delhi to Lahore, where both the Governor General of India and the Prime Minister of India then were, both being ill; and he consulted with the Governor General of Pakistan as to whether there was any means of settling this matter amicably between the two Dominions.

The Governor General of Pakistan first told the Supreme Commander that Pakistan not only had not been consulted with regard to this matter of the accession, but that no notice or indication had been given to Pakistan that this accession was under contemplation, was being offered, or had been accepted; but that, nevertheless, he was quite willing to make proposals on the basis of which the whole matter could even now be amicably settled. The proposals in question were the ones which I have already read to the members of the Security Council, namely, that the two Governors General should be authorized by their respective Dominion Governments to issue a proclamation calling upon everyone who had come in from the outside to withdraw, and asking for a cessation of hostili­ties, giving 48 hours' notice that fighting should stop.

It was made clear that the Governor General of Pakistan had no authority over the forces of the Azad Kashmir Govern­ment or the tribesmen, but that it would be made perfectly clear in the proclamation that if fighting did not stop within 48 hours, the forces of Pakistan would join the forces of India to fight all those who were creating a disturbance or violence; that once violence and disorder had been stopped, the two Governors General should temporarily take over the adminis­tration and should arrange for a fair and impartial plebiscite, in order to enable the people of Kashmir to decide whether they would accede to Pakistan or to India.

This suggestion was made on 28 October 1947, and it was requested that Lord Mountbatten and the Prime Minister of India might come over to Lahore in order to discuss the details of how to put this scheme into effect. It was communicated to Lord Mountbatten over the telephone by the Supreme Commander, and he said he would be quite willing to come over and that he had no doubt the Prime Minister also would do so. Later on, however, information was sent over the telephone to the effect that the Prime Minister was ill and was unable to travel to Lahore, so that the proposed meeting, which was fixed for 29 October, was postponed to 1 November. Again on I November, the Prime Minister being unable to travel, the Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, came alone to Lahore in order to preside over a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. But while he was in Lahore, this proposal was communicated to him. He said that he would place it before his Government and would send a reply. It was because a grievance was raised by the Prime Minister of Pakistan, to the effect that no reply had so far been received and the situation was delicate, that this telegram deals with the matter. The telegram states:

"In the last paragraph of your telegram you say that Lord Mountbatten promised to let you know the views of the Indian Government [with regard] to the proposals discussed between the two Governors General but that you have heard no more about them. On this point there seems to have been a misunderstanding. Lord Mountbatten on his return from Lahore gave me full account of his talk with Mr. Jinnah and in particular of the two important suggestions which had been discussed, namely:

"(i) The withdrawal of Indian Dominion troops and men from Kashmir; and

;(ii) The holding of a plebiscite at the earliest possible date.

 

"As regards first proposal Lord Mountbatten told me that Mr. Jinnah desired that withdrawal of the Indian Dominion troops and tribesmen should be made simultaneously but that he (Lord Mountbatten) had pointed out that it was clearly impossible for the Indian troops to withdraw from Kashmir Valley until the raiders had left Kashmir soil and law and order had been restored in Kashmir."

There was no objection raised with regard to the principle of withdrawal; it was acceptable. The dispute was with regard to the arrangements as to the timing.

The telegram then continues with the second point raised and this is paragraph 7 of the telegram. I say that because, subsequently, this paragraph is referred to by number. It states:

"Lord Mountbatten had also made it quite clear to Mr. Jinnah that the Government of India had no desire to retain troops in Kashmir for a moment longer than was necessary. As regards the second point, Lord Mountbatten reported that Mr. Jinnah had expressed the view that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities...."

1. was the second point, which is also under discussion here, namely, that Lord Mountbatten reported Mr. Jinnah had expressed the view that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities.          

The telegram continues: "To meet this point Lord Mountbatten had suggested that it should be continued under the auspices of the United Nations. The objection on behalf of the Governor General of Pakistan was that we could not hope to have an impartial and fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authorities. The answer to this was: "Very good; then let it be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations."

No question of domestic sovereignty has been raised here. No question has been raised here as to whether it will be for the Maharaja to decide. As a matter of fact, all these develop­ments are very recent, having occurred during this past week.

The telegram then continues: "Mr. Jinnah had put forward the counter-proposal that the two Governors General should be given plenary powers to settle the matter. Lord Mountbatten had pointed out that it would be constitutionally improper for him to undertake this duty." There was no constitutional impropriety or lack of jurisdiction so far as Kashmir was concerned. Lord Mountbatten said: "I am a constitutional head of a responsible Government, like the Governor General of any Dominion under the Commonwealth System. It would be constitutionally improper for me to take on duties of this character."

This was the only objection raised with regard to the two Governors General dealing with the matter. However, the answers to the two solutions put forward by Mr. Jinnah were:

1"As regards the withdrawal of troops, we do not wish to retain them there for a moment longer than necessary. However, we must be satisfied that those who have come from outside, and have joined in the trouble in Kashmir, have left Kashmir soil.

1. Mr. Jinnah said that there could be no fair plebiscite under the present Kashmir authority; and Lord Mountbatten said, "Very good. Well, then, let the plebiscite be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations." Mr. Jinnah said, "Why not under your authority as Governor General, provided the two Dominion Governments would vest us with that autho­rity?" Lord Mountbatten said, "No, that is not feasible because, constitutionally, it is incompatible with my position."

That is how the situation stood when these matters were discussed on 1 November 1947 at Lahore by the two Governors General. No question was raised with regard to domestic jurisdiction or any other jurisdiction. Indeed, as was so forcibly pointed out by the representative of the United States at the 240th meeting of the Council, here is this matter of foreign affairs, of external jurisdiction. To which Dominion shall the State of Kashmir accede for the purposes of its foreign affairs, its defence and communications?

A dispute has arisen over that. The method by which that dispute is to be removed, how a just and fair settlement of the problem is to be arrived at, and what machinery is to be employed to put that settlement into effect, are parts of the same question. It is true that this dispute has arisen. It relates to external sovereignty or external affairs. The Security Council has full jurisdiction over this dispute. However, over the manner of settling this dispute, the Security Council has no jurisdiction. That is attempting a division which would stultify, in almost every case, all the efforts of the Security Council to settle any dispute between two States.

It was in the course of this telegram that, in paragraph 13, the following was said:

"As regards proposal number 3 in your telegram of November 6"—that was with regard to the fairness of the plebiscite—"we entirely endorse Lord Mountbatlen's view (vide paragraph No. 7 above)."

So the Prime Minister of India endorsed Lord Mountbatten's view. He agreed to that. Then he stated the following:

"It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated, are:

"1. That the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to complete the raiders' withdrawal from Kashmir."

The Government of Pakistan, since 28 October 1947, has repeatedly and publicly stated that it will do its utmost to persuade the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir provided a settlement has been reached. If persuasion should fail, it will do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw.

"2. That the Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir soil as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored."

Well, now, if it is only a question of the timing of the withdrawal on either side, that is one of the functions which the Commission, which has already been decided upon by the Security Council, will perform. That Commission can formulate provisions on the details of the withdrawal.

"3. That the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to under­take a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

Here are three elements in this proposal which clearly indicate what was then contemplated. In the first place, there is a joint request to be made by India and Pakistan to the United Nations. There is no question of jurisdiction in that request. In the second place, the request is that the United Nations shall undertake the plebiscite. Why? This is the answer to Mr. Jinnah's charge that there was no hope of a fair plebiscite being held under the present Kashmir authorities. The answer to meet this objection was: "We shall request the United Nations to undertake the plebiscite so that there is no question of its being fair and impartial. It shall not be held under the present Kashmir authorities, but shall be undertaken by the United Nations." The two things are in juxtaposition.

In the third place, this plebiscite is to be held at the earliest possible date. Now in respect of all these three matters, difficulties are being raised—there are questions of sovereignty concerned; there are questions of jurisdiction concerned; then, we can agree to somebody watching or supervising, but we cannot agree to the plebiscite being undertaken by the United Nations. Yet, the suggested solution solved that very difficulty: that if a plebiscite were held under the present Kashmir authorities, it would not be fair and impartial. The answer is not, "Why should it not be? Arrangement will be made as it should be. The authorities will be neutral." The objection is admitted as fair, and the answer is that the plebiscite shall be undertaken by the United Nations, and it shall be undertaken after the trouble has ceased. After the trouble has ceased, the Indian troops will not remain on Kashmir soil for a moment longer. Indeed, the proposals go together.

Now the suggestion is: "Well, even after the trouble has ceased, in order to aid the civil authority, troops must be there during the plebiscite." How does that accord with what was being discussed then?

As I have already mentioned, the third provision is that the plebiscite shall be held at the earliest possible date. It is recognized that this provision is the main matter in dispute between the two parties, and, therefore, it must be settled at the earliest possible date.

Now we are told, first, that Pakistan should do this and that; next, that we shall deal with the trouble inside Kashmir and terminate hostilities; next, the restoration of law and order [is called for]; and, finally, an invitation to people to return, which may take six months.

Then, the Maharaja would immediately set up a government with Sheikh Abdullah at its head, and would form a council of ministers appointed on the recommendation of Sheikh Abdullah. That government would take steps to have a national conven­tion summoned. It would then be the business of that national convention to set up a national government, and it is that national government which would proceed to hold the plebiscite.

Does that accord with the "earliest possible date", or with the anxiety to settle this matter as soon as possible so that tension and suspicion should cease, or with the wht>Ie cluster of problems and questions which give rise to daily friction?

The whole object is to set up an administration with Sheikh Abdullah at its head; to enable that administration, by various steps, to consolidate itself in Kashmir; to have time to do so; and then to hold the plebiscite under that administration, although United Nations observers might come at the moment of taking the plebiscite itself—the recording of votes and the poling—to see that no pressure is being exerted upon anyone.

Then the argument was advanced that there was no question of whether any accession was provisional or final, and that "provisional" and "final" were terms which had been used loosely by the newspapers. As a matter of fact, it was con­tended, all accessions are final, but as this one particular accession took place in the face of an emergency, "We announce that we shall be prepared to release Kashmir from its accession should the verdict of its people not ratify accession to India."

In this connexion I would again draw attention to para­graph 15 of the telegram to which I have already referred, and which reads:

"The above conclusions relate only to Kashmir, but it is essential in order to restore good relations between the two Dominions that there should be acceptance of the principle that where the ruler of a State does not belong to com­munity to which the majority of his subjects belong, and where the State has not acceded to that Dominion whose majority community is the same as the State's, the question whether the State has finally acceded to one or other of the Dominions should be ascertained by reference to the will of the people."

To get down to rock bottom and away from any kind of camouflage—although I do not imply that this paragraph attempts any—I should explain that the situation was this. In the case of by far the greater part of the Indian States the majority of the population and the ruler himself belonged to the same community, so that this particular difficulty was not foreseen. However, in the case of some States—quite important ones among them—the ruler belonged to one community and the people to another. Kashmir is one such instance where the ruler is a Hindu and the majority of the people Muslims, but there are other States, Junagadh being an example, where the situation is the same. Obviously it was Slates such as Junagadh, and others like it, which were in the mind of the Prime Minister of India when he said, "We accept this principle with regard to Kashmir but we also ask that it shall be applied to other States"—in other words, States where the ruler is a Muslim and the majority of his people are Hindus. It is obvious that in such cases they did not recognize the accessions which had taken place or which might take place. The question of the final accession must depend upon the expression of the will of the people. That is a clear interpretation of the telegram.

After that telegram it is pointless to pretend today that the necessity for troops must continue, on this, that and the other pretext, until after the plebiscite has been held. "If," it is said, "the result of the plebiscite is a decision that Kashmir shall accede to Pakistan, we shall, on necessity, withdraw our troops. But if the plebiscite goes in favour of India then that is a matter between Kashmir and ourselves, because defence will be one of the questions covered by the accession, and if the troops are necessary they can be maintained there." Nothing of the kind contemplated in the telegram for the settlement of the dis­pute is adhered to at all.

With regard to the administration, it is clearly accepted: here is the objection of the Governor General of Pakistan. accepted, and an alternative is proposed. This alternative, how­ever, is rejected on the ground that the Governor General of the Dominion of India would be in a constitutional difficulty if the plan it suggests were carried out.

The Indian alternative, however, is this. They reply: "You. say that the plebiscite should not be held under the authority of the present Kashmir Government but under that of the two-Governors General. That is difficult and we cannot accept the suggestion. What we propose is that it should be held under the authority of the United Nations, and that we should both request the United Nations to undertake the task of holding a. plebiscite." Where is there any room for doubt?

The representative of India went on to express his feeling of satisfaction that some progress had been made during yesterday's debate towards a settlement. I am glad that he feels that progress is being made. He voiced the hope that a settle­ment might possibly be reached by mutual agreement, and I join in that hope, but his analysis of the memorandum pre­sented by the representative of Colombia—at least, as far as. he has gone, because he reserved his opinion on some points— indicates that the only features in it which he considers

satisfactory are those which are in accord with the document which he himself submitted to the President on 27 January [236th meet­ing]. I do not quarrel with that. Obviously, those were the parts which were bound to be satisfactory to his delegation, but the, whole question has to be settled on the basis of the considera­tions which have already been stressed by various members of the Security Council.

It is not a question merely of stopping the infiltration of tribesmen; it is a question of settling two outstanding matters. One of these is to satisfy the people of Kashmir, who have taken up arms under the circumstances that have been detailed, that they may now safely lay down their arms because they are assured of honour, of safety, of non-persecution; that they, along with all the inhabitants of Kashmir, can decide the question of accession as soon as they wish; and that they will, ultimately be able to decide the constitutional forms of their own government. The second matter to be settled is that Pakistan should be satisfied that the question of the choice of Kashmir with regard to accession to Pakistan or to India will be fairly and impartially determined.

If these two matters were settled, Pakistan would then use all its persuasive and moral means and if, unfortunately, need should arise, even military means—to convince the tribesmen— and we hope it will not be necessary to do more than that — that they, as the co-religionists of the majority population of Kashmir, need entertain no fear with regard to their extermina­tion, with regard to their oppression and with regard to their being forced to do something that they do not want to do; and that, under this settlement, not only Pakistan, but the Security Council as the guarantor, will see that everything shall be done in a fair and impartial manner.

That is the only way of settling the dispute between the two Dominions, as well as between the Government of India and the people of Kashmir, the Government of Kashmir and the people of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah and the people of Kashmir, and whoever else may be interested in this matter.

We reserve such comments as may be necessary, with regard to the various proposals that are under the consideration of the Security Council, until such time as the proposals themselves are under discussion, either between the parties under the guidance of the President, or when they are being taken into consideration specifically by the Security Council.