04021948 Text of the Speech of Sir Mohammed ZafruUah Khan, Representative of Pakistan in the Security Council Meeting held on 4 February 1948

04021948 Text of the Speech of Sir Mohammed ZafruUah Khan, Representative of Pakistan in the Security Council Meeting held on 4 February 1948

When the Security Council rose yesterday afternoon, I had finished dealing with the text of the draft resolution proposed by us on 27 January [236th meeting] and submitted to the Presi­dent of the Security Council. I now come to the consideration of the draft resolution presented yesterday on behalf of India, and the document on which it is based, document No. 2 of 27 January 1948.

Before I take up the text of the resolutions and of that document, I should like to draw attention to the terms? as it were, of the accession of Kashmir to India.

The accession was brought about by the exchange of letters between the Maharaja of Kashmir and the Governor-General of India. In his letter replying to the letter of the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Governor-General of India said the following:

"In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India in consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the ques­tion of accession should be settled by a reference to the people."

In drawing attention to this part of the letter, the represen­tative of India, when making his submission to the Security Council 227 the meeting], observed as follows:

"I would invite the attention of the members of the Security Council to the high-principled statesmanship characteristic of the Government of India under its present leadership. In accepting the accession they refused to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself and informed the Ruler that the accession should finally be settled by plebiscite, as soon as peace had been restored. They have subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreeable to the plebiscite being conducted if necessary under international auspices."

This was emphasized further in various pronouncements made by the Prime Minister of India on the subject, so that it was made quite clear at the time of the accession that the accession was provisional and that the final decision would be taken by means of a plebiscite. This condition was, perforce, accepted by the Maharaja, as it was only on that condition that the Dominion of India was prepared to accept the accession of Kashmir. Therefore, it is entirely irrelevant today to inquire whether, juristically, the holding of a plebiscite for this specific purpose falls within the domestic jurisdiction of the Maharaja or within international jurisdiction.

The whole question of accession has been raised. It is admitted that it is one of the principal disputes between India and Pakistan. India's reply and India's stand throughout has been: "We accepted Kashmir's accession provisionally—for the moment—in order to deal with the emergency that had arisen; and once the emergency was out of the way, the question of accession would be decided by the people through a plebiscite. In order to have any value at all, a plebiscite naturally must be an expression free from any kind of pressure or coercion. It must be a free expression of the people's will. That has already been established beyond doubt.

It was also stated, as the representative of India has said, that the Government of India had announced that it was agreeable to have the plebiscite held under international auspices. That also has already been agreed upon.

I might, in this connexion, draw attention to some of the references made to this subject in the speeches, the telegrams and the broadcast made by the Prime Minister of India. In a press statement made on behalf of the Government of India, issued on 30 October 1947, it was said: "It is desired to draw attention to the conditions on which the Government of India has accepted Kashmir's accession." These are conditions attached to the accession; they are a part of the accession itself. The statement goes on to say: "Consistent with its policy as declared in the case of Junagadh, it has been made clear to His Highness the Maharaja that as soon as the invaders have been driven from the soil of Kashmir and law and order restored, the people of the State should decide the question of accession."

The following is stated in the report of Pandit Nehru's broadcast of 2 November 1947:

" 'The Government of India is prepared, when peace and law and order have been established in Kashmir, to have a referen­dum held under international auspices like the United Nations,' declared the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, broad­casting tonight. Pandit Nehru declared that: 'We, o» our party, had no intention of using our troops in Kashmir when the danger of invasion was passed.' "

Two things are made quite clear in this report of Pandit Nehru's broadcast—first, that once the danger of invasion is over, the troops of the Indian Dominion shall be withdrawn from Kashmir; and, secondly, that the question of accession shall be decided by a free plebiscite to be held under inter­national auspices like that of the United Nations.

In his telegram of 31 October 1947, addressed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the Prime Minister of India stated as follows:

"Kashmir's accession to India was accepted by us at the request of the Maharaja's Government and the most nume­rously representative popular organization in the State, which is predominantly Muslim. Even then, it was accepted on Condition that as soon as the invaders had been driven from Kashmir's soil and law and order restored, the people of Kashmir would decide the question of their accession. It is open to them then to accede to either Dominion."

In a subsequent paragraph of the same telegram, the Prime Minister of India stated as follows:

"Our assurance that we shall withdraw our troops from Kashmir as soon as peace and order are restored and leave the decision regarding the future of the State to the people of the State is not merely a pledge to your Government, but also to the people of Kashmir and to the world."

Then, in a telegram addressed to the Prime Minister of Pakistan by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom on 7 .November 1947, the following statement occurs:

"As I understand the broadcast made by the Prime Minister of India on 2 November, he gave two undertakings which seemed to be in conjunction with your own suggestions. First, he undertook that the Indian forces would be withdrawn from Kashmir as soon as order was restored. Secondly, "he undertook that the will of the people should be ascertained, and he proposed that this should be done under the authority and supervision of the United Nations."

In the telegram dated 8 November 1947, from the Prime "Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, the follow­ing occurs:

"It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated, are:

1. That the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do their utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir;

2. That the Government of India should repeat their declaration that they will withdraw their troops from Kashmir as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; and

3. That the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to under­take a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

Now those are the three proposals made by the Prime ^Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan in his telegram No. 304, dated 8 November 1947. So far as the  Government of India is concerned it will withdraw its troops.

from Kashmir as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; and so far as the Government of Pakistan is concerned, it will publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir. Of this, the Government of Pakistan has given repeated assurances—that once a settlement was arrived at, the Government of Pakistan would do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; that if a joint notice issued by the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan calling upon the raiders to withdraw was not obeyed—and we suggested that the notice should give the raiders 48 hours to withdraw—and provided a settlement has been arrived at and agreed upon between the parties, the Government of Pakistan would be prepared to take military action in conjunction with the Government of India in Kashmir to compel the tribesmen and the invaders to withdraw; and that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake, a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date. Well, we are already making that request to the Security Council.

These were the conditions attached to the accession. This was what happened at the time of the accession. The conditions laid down clearly that the troops should be withdrawn once the invaders had been got rid of, and that an impartial plebiscite under the authority of the United Nations should be conducted; as a matter of fact, that a joint request should be made by the two Governments of the United Nations that it should make arrangements for the conducting of the plebiscite.

I beg, to submit further that, in order for the plebiscite to be free and unfettered, and in order to ensure impartiality, it goes without saying that the administration, until this question is decided, must be impartial and neutral.

I draw the attention of the Security Council to document No. 2, which was submitted on 27 January 1948 on behalf of the Indian delegation to the President of the Security Council. The Security Council will be able to appreciate that the propo­sals contained in that document reveal a position very different from that taken in the documents and the declarations to which* I have just invited attention.

Paragraph A of that document says:

"The 6rst objective to be achieved is the stoppage of fighting and the termination of military operations in the Jammu and Kashmir State. For this purpose, the Government of Pakistan should use all its efforts to stop the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir by persuading the tribesmen and others now in the State territory, who have invaded Kashmir, to withdraw from that territory; it should further prevent the passage through Pakistan territory of such invaders to the Jammu and Kashmir State, deny the use of such terri­tory for operations against the State and also refuse supplies and other material aid, direct and indirect, to such invaders." That is the only position to which they have adhered throughout.

Paragraph B reads:

"After fighting has ceased and there are no raiders from outside left in the State and there is no further need to continue military operations in the State, the next objective should be the restoration of peace and normal conditions."

Here again, the same position, to which I have repeatedly -drawn attention, is adopted, so that there is a gap, however, cleverly concealed, between the stopping of the infiltration of the tribesmen into the State and the stoppage of fighting. There is no suggestion here as to how, once the invaders have been driven out, the fighting will then come to an end. The obvious implication is that those from among the State's subjects who are fighting inside the State will then be subdued by military action, and their effort at liberation put down by force.

It is stated that for this purpose of restoring peace and normal conditions:

"1. All citizens of the State, who have left it on account of the recent disturbances, will be invited, and be free, to return to their homes and to exercise all their rights as such citizens;

"2. There shall be no victimization;

"3. All political prisoners in the State shall be released; and

1. No restrictions shall be imposed on legitimate political; activity,"

There is no suggestion here with regard to the actual fight­ing itself. It could have been said, "The next objective shall be the restoration of peace, which includes the conclusion of hosti­lities." The paragraph says, "For this purpose the following1, action shall be taken...," but that is action subsequent to the' stoppage of fighting. The paragraph does not indicate how the-cessation of hostilities between the Azad Kashmir Government: and the forces of the Maharaja and the Indian armed forces is. to be brought about.

The document continues by saying that it is anticipated that a period of about six months will be required for this purpose of persuading people to come back to the State, because enough confidence must first be created that they will be secure when they return.

The paragraph then develops a further idea, and says:

 

"It is further recognized that due, among other things, to* the present upheaval in Kashmir, the resources of the Jammu and Kashmir State are not at present adequate to-maintain law and order. The efficient maintenance of law and order in the State during the interval between the ter­mination of military operations and the taking of the plebiscite is essential if the plebiscite is to be free and. unfettered..."

It is agreed that the plebiscite is to be free and unfettered-There is no doubt about that, but it is said that the maintenance of law and order, after fighting has been stopped, might neces­sitate some further step. What is that step? The paragraph continues: "So long as the State remains acceded to India, the Government of India is responsible for its defence." True, but not for the maintenance of law and order inside the State. If" we are dealing only with juristic principles, it will be recognized*, that this is a domestic matter and not one for the Dominion.

"Though," it is added, ''after the cessation of hostilities, the strength of Indian troops in the State will be progressively reduced, it will be necessary to maintain Indian troops of ade­quate strength to ensure not only protection against possible future attacks from outside, but also for giving support to the civil power when required in the preservation of law and order."

What a distance there is between this declaration and those to which I invited the attention of the Security Council a few minutes ago. This contemplates a permanent military occupa­tion of the State because the object is to maintain within the State troops of adequate strength to ensure not only protection against possible future attacks from outside, a possibility which exists for any State all the time, but also for giving support to the civil power when required in the preservation of law and order, which is also a continuing necessity.

Paragraph C states: "The Emergency Administration under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah will immediately be converted by the Maharaja into a Council of Ministers in which Sheikh Abdullah will be Prime Minister and his colleagues will be appointed by the Maharaja on his advice. The Ministry will, as far as possible, function as a responsible ministry." I suppose that is in order to meet the condition that the administration shall be neutral and impartial, and to provide a fair field for the plebiscite in which the people would be able to express their wishes without fear or favor. That is the kind of administration that will be provided.

In this connexon, I should like to draw the attention of the Security Council to the position occupied by Sheikh Abdullah, although I have already referred to it on two or three occasions in the course of my submissions. Some time ago, as will be recalled, Sheikh Abdullah took up the attitude that the Maharaja must leave Kashmir inasmuch as his dynasty was alien to Kashmir which he had obtained as the result of the treaty to which I invited attention yesterday. Sheikh Abdullah contended that the dynasty had no claim to Kashmir and that, in any case, the people must take the administration into their own hands. As the result of raising this cry of "Quit Kashmir"

he was tried for sedition and sentenced by the courts of the State to nine years* imprisonment. That was the relationship between Sheikh Abdullah and the Maharaja while he was in gaol. It is well known, I believe, that Sheikh Abdullah has always been at least a sympathizer of the Indian National Congress, the views of which he shared. None of these points is a matter for reproach—neither the cry of "Quit Kashmir," the trial, the imprisonment, nor Sheikh Abdullah's politics. I am merely stating a fact so that the background of the position may be appreciated.

Over a long period of years Sheikh Abdullah has been a personal friend of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru—a matter of honour, but again a fact to be noted. So much was this the case that when Sheikh Abdullah was arrested and put on trial for sedition, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, who at that time had already been nominated a member of the Government of India and was a Minister at the centre although he had not then taken over his portfolio, rushed up to Kashmir on the plea that, as a lawyer, he wished to undertake the defence of Sheikh Abdullah against the charge of sedition. That is very creditable to the sentiments, emotions and loyalty of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. He was expelled from the State, on that occasion, by the Maharaja. That was the relationship between Sheikh Abduallah and the Maharaja on the one side, and Sheikh Abdullah and Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru on the other. As I said, Sheikh Abdullah was eventually sentenced to gaol and had served about a year and a half when these troubles— the raids by Hindus and Sikhs upon the Muslim population of Kashmir; the trouble in Poonch, and the atrocities committed by the Dogra troops—started in Kashmir. The Maharaja was accordingly faced with this flare-up.

At that stage, Sheikh Abdullah was taken out of gaol and travelled to New Delhi, the seat of the Government of India. Later on, Mr. Menon, Secretary of the State Department of India, travelled to Kashmir, and the letter to which attention had already been drawn was written by the Maharaja to Lord Mountbatten proposing the accession of the State. In the course of this letter, the Maharaja stated: "I may also inform Your Excellency's Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim government and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister." It is curious that, apart from the fact that Sheikh Abdullah was chosen, he is mentioned in this letter in a form which assumes that Sheikh Abdullah is a personality already well known to Lord Mountbatten. There is not one word explaining who Sheikh Abdullah was or is. It is assumed that His Excellency knows all about him—as probably by that time His Excellency did.

In his reply, Lord Mountbatten said: "My Government and I note with satisfaction that Your Highness has decided to invite Sheikh Abdullah to form an interim government to work with your Prime Minister." Again, he does not inquire or say anything about Sheikh Abdullah. It is assumed on both sides that there is perfect knowledge as to who Sheikh Abdullah is. The obvious inference is that the placing of Sheikh Abdullah at the head of the emergency administration to work in association with the Prime Minister was an arrangement already arrived at between the two sides. As I have said, knowing the relation­ship of the Maharaja with Sheikh Abdullah, and the relation­ship of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru with Sheikh Abdullah, the conclusion is irresistible that Sheikh Abdullah was handpicked by the Prime Minister of India and that the Maharaja was required, as a condition of the accession, to appoint Sheikh Abdullah as head of the Emergency Administration, on arrange­ment to which Lord Mountbatten expressed his satisfaction and that of his Government.

The kind of administration that would be set up, according to this document, is that Sheikh Abdullah would immediately be appointed Prime Minister and his colleagues would be appointed by the Maharaja on his advice. That is the kind of neutral, impartial administration which is proposed to be set up.

From the "Quit Kashmir" agitation, Sheikh Abdullah's position today is—again, I do not blame him; I am only explaining facts—that he has announced that he desires the Maharaja to be not only the Maharaja of Jammu but also the Maharaja of Kashmir. That is some distance for Sheikh Abdullah to have travelled. I am not blaming him for that position; I am not even questioning the legitimacy of that posi­tion; but I am stating a fact. He is irrevocably committed to accession to the Dominion of India.

I have already drawn attention to the report of a statement Sheikh Abdullah made on this subject in Indore on 25 December, but I shall repeat a portion. It reads as follows: "Speaking at a mass Praja Mandal rally, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah declared that Kashmir has finally resolved to remain with India, ruled by the Kashmir Jewel,1 Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. Pakistan can conquer Kashmir only after each and every Kashmiri has dedicated his life in fighting with Pakistan [235tft meeting}."

With sentiments of that kind—again, I do not say those are objectionable sentiments or that they are not honorable senti­ments; each person is at liberty to adopt any objective that he chooses, political or otherwise—and having reference to the issue that is before the Security Council, I do say that a gentle­man entertaining sentiments of the nature of those to which he gave expression on 25 December, cannot, by the remotest stretch of language, be justly or fairly described as neutral or impartial. As a matter of fact, as the members of the Security Council are aware—again, it is a matter of no objection what­soever, and possibly a convenient arrangement on the other side—Sheikh Abdullah is so much identified with the Indian case that he is a member of the Indian delegation to the Security Council.

Paragraph D of document No. 2 reads as follows:

"The Commission already decided on should go over to India at once for the purpose of watching, ensuring by advice, and mediation, that the measures agreed on as neces­sary for the stoppage of fighting and the termination of military operations are implemented effectively and without loss of time; and of reporting to the Security Council its conclusions.'*

1. Jawahar, the first part of Mr. Nehru's first name, is translated "jewel".

Nothing is said about the holding of the plebiscite. Part H of the document deals with "Ascertaining the wishes of the people of the State." The members of the Security Council will recall that the third assurance given by the Prime Minister of India to the Prime Minister of Pakistan in the telegram of 8 November 1947 is that the two Governments should make a joint request to the United Nations, to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date. The Security Council will appreciate, by means of this document, how this is sought to be implemented. We have already been told about the stoppage of the tribesmen, the subduing of this liberation movement, the restoration of law and order, and the period of six months necessary to create enough confidence for people to return to their homes. Then we have these further passages in document No. 2:

"E. The principle is recognized that the new constitution to be framed for the State and the determination of the question of accession are matters entirely for the free decision of its people. It is hoped that the Maharaja of Kashmir and his Government would undertake to ensure this by taking the following steps:

"1. The interim Government should, as soon as the restora­tion of normal conditions has been completed, take steps for the convoking of a National Assembly based upon adult suffrage and having due regard to the principle that the number of representatives from each voting area should, as far as possible, be proportionate to the population.

"2. A national Government based upon the National Assembly should then be constituted.

"3. The National Government will then proceed to have a plebiscite taken on the question of accession. The plebiscite will be taken under the advice and observation of persons appointed by the United Nations.

"4. The National Assembly will then proceed to frame a new constitution for the State for promulgation by the Maharaja, based on the principle of full responsible government."

I venture to submit that there is no resemblance between the declarations made immediately after the accession and the pledges then given, and their scheme of implementation that was put forward on behalf of the Indian delegation to the President of the Security Council in this document. The two draft resolutions that were presented to the Security Council yesterday by the Indian delegation do not take the matter any further. The language of the new draft resolution is carefully guarded so as to conform, as far as it goes, to*the basic principles laid down in the document to which I have already drawn attention.

The representative of India, when he discussed the question of plebiscite in his last speech, said that no international plebiscite had been taken under conditions any different from those that were being proposed by him. I venture to submit that that is not quite an accurate statement. A good many plebiscites have been taken under international control and arrangements, and in many of those cases international troops were brought in to be in charge of law and order, and also to assure a perfectly free and fair vote. I might, in this connexion, draw attention to the plebiscites taken under the Treaty of Versailles and the Treaty of St. Germain in various places such as Schleswig, Allenstein and Marienwerder, Klagenfurt, Upper Silesia, Vilna, and the Saar in 1935. I do recognize that the peculiar features of each case have to be taken into consideration by any body that is called upon to deal with a particular problem.

I have already submitted to the Security Council—but I wish to repeat it—that, so far as the attitude of Pakistan is con­cerned, Pakistan is extremely anxious that the whole of the series of disputes between Pakistan and India, including the one relating to Kashmir, which unfortunately have arisen and require to be resolved, shall be resolved by a settlement pro­posed by the Security Council at the earliest possible date.

The representative of India and I feel the same way with regard to the urgency of the matter, and with regard to the need to save, if possible, not only days, but also hours and minutes. Because of the situation between Pakistan and India and because of the unfortunate results of the awful tragedy enacted in Delhi on the afternoon of 30 January,1 the situation in India is momentarily in danger of worsening and deteriorat­ing. It is necessary, therefore, that steps should be taken immediately and urgently to settle these matters between the two Dominions on a fair and just basis.

With regard to the draft resolutions presented to the Secu­rity Council [237th meeting] by the representative of Belgium [documents Sf66l and SJ662], our position is this: We feel that they distinctly mark a step forward in the process of achieving a settlement between Pakistan and India, and one also affecting the people of Kashmir, with reference to the Kashmir question-We are, therefore, without too meticulous an examination of the actual phraseology of the draft resolutions, prepared to accept them in the light of, and subject to —and I beg respect­fully to repeat: in the light of, and subject to—the interpreta­tion put upon them by the members of the Security Council who have spoken upon the subject so far.

I might again briefly draw attention to some of the features of these draft resolutions that have been stressed in the speeches that I have in mind. With reference to the fighting the repre­sentative of the United Kingdom asked [236th meeting]:

"...What will stop it, and in what way should it be stopped? I do not believe for a moment that the Indian delegation or the Indian Government desire to stop this fighting by a mili­tary victory if it can be stopped by any other means. They do not want to crush those who are up in arms against their troops at this moment if they can be brought to an agree­ment in another way. They want them to stop fighting, as we all do because they are convinced that it is not necessary for them to go on fighting; in other words, because the Kashmiris can secure peace, safety for their families, and a free choice as to the future of their country without any more fighting. Everyone must agree that no matter what measures are taken, by way of refusing supplies, and so on, the process of stopping the fighting by a military victory may be long and bloody."

1. The allusion is to the assassination of Mohandas K. Gandhi.

The representative of the United Kingdom went on to say:

"What these two Governments want, and what we all want, is that the moral power and authority of the Security Council be brought to bear on the situation so that there can be a conviction on both sides that justice is to prevail, and that violence need not go on. Moreover, our object is not only to stop the fighting, but to keep it stopped. We have to arrive at a settlement which will prevent a new outbreak."

Mr. Noel Baker then went on to say: "The fundamental difference of view between the two parties is on the question: To which Dominion shall the people of Kashmir accede? But they both hold the view that that question is to be settled by the free expression of the people of Kashmir."

Later, reverting to the same subject, Mr. Noel Baker observed:

"To which of the Governments, India or Pakistan, shaft Kashmir accede? In my conception, infinitely the best way to stop the fighting is to assure those who are engaged in it that a fair settlement will be arrived at under which their rights will be assured...in my profound conviction, a settle­ment arrived at quickly in the Security Council is the real way to stop the fighting....However, we are on firm ground if we discuss the three points on which, as the President reported, the parties are agreed: first, that there shall be a-plebiscite to settle the question as to whether Kashmir shall accede to India or to Pakistan; secondly, that this plebiscite must be held under conditions which will guarantee its fair­ness and impartiality; and thirdly, that the plebiscite must be held under the auspices of the United Nations."

The portions of Mr. Noel Baker's speech which I have quoted were delivered on 28 January 1948.

On 29 January 1948 [237th meeting] when the debate on the India-Pakistan question was continued, the representative of the United States of America observed:

"We hold the view that no party to this transaction wishes to have hostilities and violence stopped by violence. No one wants to see a superior force sent into the Kashmir area to drive out the invaders of that area. Everyone, we assume, wants to see this situation so settled by an agreement that it will not be necessary to use any force to carry it into effect.

"It is also our view that, if we continue in the spirit of amity and with the wonderful sense of fairness that has been shown up to this point, it is possible here to adopt resolutions which would finally determine the conditions upon which the hostilities could be stopped.

Later, Mr. Austin went on to say:

"This agreement upon complete impartiality is of impor­tance not merely to these parties but also to the whole world....There is nothing, in my view of the matter, that will command that approbation"—Mr. Austin had just said that whatever we decide here must command the approbation of good people all over the world—"as will machinery that is free from suspicion and that gives to all the world the appearance of impartiality by actually being an impartial administration of the plebiscite.

"...I say that because I think that each of these draft resolutions is a part of the whole idea that one cannot have cessation of hostilities and violence unless one has also an understanding, as one negotiates, as to the manner in which the hostilities shall be terminated, an agreement that satisfies everybody concerned in the agreement that the arrangements for the plebiscite have been advanced far enough so that it is apparent that the plebiscite will be free and fair."

The representative of the United States concluded by saying: "The other question of a fair plebiscite wilt also naturally involve a consideration of the form and substance of the administration of the Government leading up to and during the period of the plebiscite...." But Mr. Austin observed that he would not express himself on that subject at that stage.

During the same meeting of the Security Council, the representative of China, in giving expression to his views, said in part:

"It is obvious that the key to the problem lies in the plebiscite. If the principle of a free and impartial plebiscite for deciding the all-important question of the accession of Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be accepted, much of the incentive to violence and the use of force would be removed."   

At the same meeting the representative of the United Kingdom made the following statement:

"...I am glad that members of the Security Council seem to share the view, which I have expressed more than once, that a general plan of full settlement of outstanding differences will, in fact, be the quickest way to stop the fighting., one cannot have a cessation of violence unless one has an agreement that satisfies everybody that the plebiscite will be free and fair, and, therefore, one must have an agreement as to how the plebiscite is to be prepared. I hope, therefore, that the Security Council will move as rapidly as possible to such a full agreement."

Mr. Noel Baker then said with regard to the commission that had*already been agreed upon:

"-.I suggested to the parties and to the Council that we should regard it primarily as a commission to apply a settlement which was made here in the Council [230th meeting] - I hope that, before we end our work here, we shall have had not only the framework, but the full structure, of a settlement which will clear this matter away and remove it entirely as a cause of misunderstanding between India and Pakistan."

He also said:

"The more I think about it, the more convinced I am that that phrase 'under the auspices of the United Nations' must imply not only that the plebiscite must be fair in itself, but that it must seem fair to all concerned; not only that in fact justice shall be assured, as I am certain it would be assured by the sole action of any one Government at this table if it had a free hand, but that it must seem fair to both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to all the members of the Security Council, to all the members of the United Nations and, I add—and I think this is the crucial point in stopping the fighting, as I have said before—that it must seem fair to the combatants, both Muslim and non-Muslim, in Kashmir itself.

"Unless we can get such a system, I am sure that the Security Council would not be justified in undertaking any responsi­bility in the matter in the name of the United Nations.*'

In the light of these observations and subject to the condi­tions explained in these speeches, we are prepared to accept the two draft resolutions presented by the representative of Belgium as marking a definite and salutary step forward in the settle­ment of the dispute relating to Kashmir.

I was grieved to observe that the representative of India, at the conclusion of his submission, seemed to utter what sounded like an ultimatum. Those disputes have been brought before the Security Council for settlement, by agreement if possible, but, if not, then according to the recommendations of the Security Council, or by such other action of the Security Council as may seem to it to be fair and just and required by the situation. The situation does constitute a threat to the maintenance of international peace and security. It is the duty of the Security Council to deal with it so as to eliminate that threat. We have full trust that the Security Council will proceed to do so. The representative of the United Kingdom observed as follows:

"If the negotiations which have taken place under the guidance of the President do not lead within a very short time to some definite result or to some hope of a full settlement in the early future, I feel sure that it will become incumbent upon the Security Council to see whether it cannot help in some more direct and collective way."

I trust that the Security Council will see its way to securing at a very early date a settlement not only of the Kashmir question, but also of the other disputes which are for the moment

1. the relations between the two Dominions, by agree­ment between the two parties if possible, but if unhappily that should prove impossible, then by giving such directions as seem fair and just to the Security Council.

(SCOR, 3rd Year, Mtg. No. 240, pp. 353-366)