03021948 Continuation of the Text of the Speech of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Representative of India in the Security Council Meeting held on 3 February 1948

03021948 Continuation of the Text of the Speech of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Representative of India in the Security Council Meeting held on 3 February 1948

I had not finished what I had to say on the two draft resolu­tions placed before the Security Council by the former Presi­dent, the representative of Belgium, when we had to adjourn the meeting on Thursday afternoon last. I had hoped to resume my statement on the following day. However, a great tragedy intervened, and the resumption of my statement had to be postponed for another four days.

As there has been a substantial interval between the time when I made the first part of my statement and today, perhaps it will help the members of the Security Council if I briefly recapitulate the points which I tried to make at that time.

I pointed out that the first business of the Security Council, in connexion with the Jammu and Kashmir situation, was to take concrete steps immediately for the purpose of bringing about a stoppage of the bloodshed and the fighting that is now going on inside the State. For this purpose, I drew attention to what I considered to be the obvious obligations of Pakistan as an international personality, and, in that connexion, I drew the attention of the members of the Security Council to what had been accepted as such obligations in similar situations.

I then went on to demonstrate to the members of the Security Council that there was already enough material before them to enable them to give advice and make a recommendation to Pakistan, with a view to bringing about this stoppage of fighting as soon as possible. In that connexion, I put aside all the material which we may be able to place before a commission, if and when it starts any detailed inquiry. 1 put aside material which perhaps would require more adequate proof than is possible to obtain in New York. I also put aside opinions and mere impressions which gave some idea of the state of things with regard to the points that we ourselves had raised. I pro­posed to invite the attention of the Security Council only to admissions which the representatives of Pakistan—not merely those who are here, but those in Pakistan—had made in this connexion.

I proposed also to invite the attention of the Security Council to accounts of what I called eye-witnesses, persons who were given special opportunities for observing facts and report­ing them. I had almost completed the part of my case dealing with admissions. I was about to read the account of someone who might be expected to be very familiar with the state of things in the theatre of fighting when I had to interrupt my speech.

Before I take up the thread of the story from that point, I wish to fill in an omission which, unfortunately, occurred in the earlier portion of my statement. It relates to what I have des­cribed as the obvious obligations of Pakistan as an international personality. I quoted, I think, two extracts from the report to the Security Council of the Commission of Investigation concer­ning Greek frontier incidents. Those extracts showed what was the correct attitude in those circumstances.

I now wish to invite the attention of the Security Council to what happened after that Commission reported, first in the Political and Security Committee, and later on in the General Assembly of the United Nations. After a great deal of debate in the Security Council, the matter was finally brought before the General Assembly, and the United States delegation sub­mitted a draft resolution to the First Committee. I shall not read the long resolution that was submitted; I shall read only paragraphs 3 and 4 of that resolution [document Aic,l!19lY which are as follows:

"Finds that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, in contraven­tion of principles of the Charter of the United Nations, have given assistance and support to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek Government;

"Calls upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to cease and desist from rendering any further assistance or support in any form to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek. Government."

That was taken up in the General Assembly, and in view of what has fallen already from the lips of the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States and France, I desire to draw attention to what happened in the course of the debate-regarding that draft resolution. The representatives of the United Kingdom and France proposed amendments to it. Their amendments were in similar terms. They were to the effect that paragraphs 3 and 4 of the United States proposal be-deleted and be replaced by the following:

1See Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly',

First Committee, annex 15b, p. 591.

2Ibid., annexes 15jand J5o.

"Taking account of the report of the Commission of Investi­gation which found by a majority vote that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia had given assistance and support to the guerrillas fighting against the Greek Government;

"Calls upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia to do nothing which could furnish aid and assistance to the said guerrillas."

I have read there portions of the resolution and amend­ments to the Security Council merely to show how, in a similar situation in Europe, these three great countries took the view that, before anything further was done in connexion with the situation they had to consider, it was absolutely necessary that those countries on the borders of Greece, from which those who invaded Greece were receiving help and assistance, should be called upon to stop that help and assistance.

The members of the Security Council are probably already aware of the fact that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics did not see eye to eye with these three great countries as far as this matter was concerned. I do not wish to go into the merits of the different cases presented by these two sets of countries, but there is one point which I think is relevant so far as my case is concerned. I venture to submit that the opposition of the USSR to this resolution calling upon these three countries on the borders of Greece not to do anything which would assist or aid the invaders or raiders, was due to the fact the USSR did not accept as correct the finding of the Commission of investigation concerning Greek frontier incidents as regards the actual giving of aid and assistance. While the USSR attacked the resolution on other considerations as well, it did not vote for this part of the draft resolution—I believe it abstained, rather than voting against it, but I am subject to correction in that regard— because it was not convinced of the case against those three countries.

I express the hope that, had the USSR been convinced of the correctness of that finding, it would not have had the slightest hesitation in subscribing to the obvious proposition that

international obligations required that these three countries should be called upon to stop the help which was being given from their territory.

I think the USSR also took the position that a great deal was needed for putting right the Government inside Greece, and that that was the ultimate and fundamental objective that had to be achieved before dealing with the stray border inci­dents, and so on. With regard to that position, if the members of the Security Council will look at the scheme that India has presented for solving this Jammu and Kashmir trouble, it can be seen that we suggested proposals which are calculated to achieve the end which was so insisted upon in the case of Greece by the countries which did not vote with the majority.

Having said that, I wish to invite the attention of the Security Council to certain passages in the speeches of representatives of countries voting with the majority, which show how important they considered the question of asking Greece's northern neighbours to stop giving aid and assistance.

Mr. Johnson, the representative of the United States of America said: "The evidence shows beyond doubt that Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have furnished material assistance to Greek guerrillas fighting against the legal Government of Greece. It shows that this assistance was continued even while the Security Council was actively debating the problem all through this last summer."

Interpreting it as assistance derived from these areas, this description of what was taking place in these three countries in relation to Greece is exactly what we say is taking place today in regard to Jammu and Kashmir. While we are sitting and debating this question at leisure in the Security Council, this assistance is being rendered, and fighting is actually going on. Mr. Johnson described the part of the resolution to which I referred as the operative part. He said: "It also calls upon Albania, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, on the one hand, and Greece, on the other hand, to settle their disputes by peaceful means.'

1. See Official Records of the Second Session of the General Assembly, Plenary Meetings, Volume I, 98th meeting, p. 402.

Turning now to another portion of Mr. Johnson's remarks-during the debate, here is an observation made by him which, I think, is of particular importance in connexion with our case. Mr. Johnson said: ''Further, since [the Greek Government] was the legal Government of Greece, no State had the right to give assistance to armed bands wishing to overthrow it. That was the essential situation before the Committee."

I would now read some portions of a very thoughtful speech which was delivered by Mr. Delbos, the representative of France. He said: "The Greek question seems to us to have two aspects, or more precisely, to have a general aspect and a particular aspect. The general aspect is that this question is but an episode in the major trends of the world. The particular aspect is the actual situation on the frontiers between Greece and her northern neighbours."

Then, after referring to various considerations in dealing with these two aspects, he went on:

"That, from the outset, singularly restricts the possibilities and the efficacy of an intervention on the part of our Organization. Such an intervention must be limited to the particular aspect of the Greek problem of which I spoke just now, I mean to say the existing situation on the fron­tiers of Greece with Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria and the repeated, frontier incidents, which are not contested by anyone. That is the problem with which we are actually — and so to speak, statutorily—confronted. That is what lays on us a responsibility, because we have the right, and consequently the duty, to do everything we can to prevent peace and security in the Balkans, and perhaps throughout the world, from being endangered by a repetition of these incidents.

"That is the real question, which must not be obscured by polemics and propaganda activities."

'The essential thing," he proceeded to say "is to find a way to prevent any aggravation of the situation." I do not wish to

1Ibid., First Committee, 72nd meeting, p. 110.

2Ibid., Plenary Meetings, Volume I, 99th meeting, p. 440.

weary the members by quoting from other parts of speeches made by various members of the Security Council, but what I wish to insist on is this: When we are confronted with a situation such as has been brought before the Security Council by India, and India asks the Security Council to do something which would immediately stop the fighting and, therefore, eliminate the threat to international peace and security, t submit to the Security Council, with the profoundest respect, that its first duty is to take the steps necessary for bringing about a stoppage of the fighting.

India is not trying to avoid the consideration or discussion of the measures that may be necessary, once the fighting has been stopped, to keep it stopped—to use a phrase which I think the representative of the United Kingdom used. India is not afraid of discussing those measures. In fact, in the scheme that India has submitted for consideration [236th meeting] which is one of the documents before the members of the Security Council, it has made suggestions which would deal with this long-range aspect of the problem.

Having filled in what I considered was an omission, because I thought it was necessary to draw the attention of the Security Council to what has happened in a similar case, I shall now proceed with the thread of my story from where I left it on 29 January. I was then referring to a person who is an ex-sergeant of the United States Army Air Force. I think he went over to certain Eastern countries in search of employment, but apparently he was also a soldier of fortune and drifted into the service of the organization which is conducting a certain amount of fighting inside the State of Jammu and Kashmir.. The members of the Security Council have all heard of the Azad Kashmir Government. He entered the service of this organization and became a brigadier-general in charge of troops, or fighters consisting of both local inhabitants and tribesmen.

Robert Trumbuli, the representative of the New York Times in India, who has been quoted by the representative of Pakistan, sent a dispatch to his paper here, under the date of 28 January. It is a longish dispatch and I do not propose to read the whole of it. It is not my purpose to slide over anything that he may have said, but I am trying to make two points and I think it will suffice if I quote only those portions of the dispatch which have a bearing on the points I am trying to make.

This is what Mr. Trumbull says:

"I interviewed Mr. Haight clandestinely in Lahore, Pakistan, twelve days ago, but I agreed to hold his story until he let me know by code telegram that he was leaving the country. This was because there had already been three attempts on his life, and when I met him he felt that his safety in Pakistan was none too secure. He was in fact very decidedly 'on the lam'" —whatever that may mean. "Wearing a jungle green uniform with a brigadier general's insignia and the black and white Azad Kashmir flash, written in squiggly Urdu, on his shoulder, Mr. Haight led tribesmen and native Kashmir Poonchis in several engagements against the Indian Army. The slim, blond, former United States Army Air Force sergeant was a picturesque figure in his kula—a straw „' bonnet shaped like a beehive—and an eighteen-foot Poonchi turban which he learned to wind himself. In the field, he discarded his ten-gallon Stetson because it looked too much like the hat worn by the Indian Army Gurkhas."

Then he describes more of the characteristics of this man and the experiences he had when he was in the service of the Azad Kashmir Government. Thereafter, he proceeds to say: "Mr. Haight said gasoline—a scarce and strictly rationed commodity—was supplied plentifully to the raiders by the Pakistan authorities." It is part of our case that help, in the shape of petrol, among other things, has been received by the raiders and rebels in Kashmir from certain Pakistan authorities. Here is someone who was actually leading the army of the raiders and rebels, and who told Robert Trumbull that gasoline was supplied plentifully by the Pakistan authorities.

He then proceeds with the dispatch as follows;

"Mr. Haight also found Pakistan Army personnel running the Azad Kashmir radio station, relaying messages through their own Pakistan Army receivers, organizing and manag­ing Azad recampments in Pakistan, and supplying uniforms, food, arms and ammunition which, he understood, came from Pakistan Army stores through such subterfuges as the 'loss' of ammunition shipments.

-"Although he insisted that the Kashmir fighting broke out in rebellion against atrocities committed upon Moslems by the Hindu Maharaja's Dogra troops, Mr. Haight characterized the Azad Kashmir Provisional Government, beaded by Sardar Mohammed Ibrahim Khan (who is now in New York), as 'Pakistan puppets.' He also deeply implicated high Pakistan Government officials, notably the Premier of the North West Frontier Province."

I do not wish to read more of this. I understand that on -landing in New York this estimable gentleman had an interview in which he is reported to have said that both India and Pakistan were lying. It may be his opinion that we are lying, but we only hope that in the statements made to Robert Trumbull he did not himself lie, and that he will stick to what he says. I read these passages from Robert Trumbulls dispatch merely because they furnish corroboration of matters about which we can produce any amount of acceptable proof on any properly conducted inquiry. I have quoted them, too, because I am interested in convincing the Security Council that the material now available to it is sufficient to enable it to take immediate action in the direction I have indicated; and I hope that it will be realized that an American speaking to another American, and having intimate knowledge of what was happen­ing in these disturbed areas on account of the position he held, was not likely to have concocted a story for mere newspaper consumption.

That is about the latest dispatch which I have but I should like to quote passages from other sources of a similar nature which support the case I am trying to make. Here is an extract from a dispatch published in The Times of London on 20 .January 1948, from its special correspondent at Rawalpindi. One fact .to note is that the dispatch gives an account of Press conference held by one of the ministers of the Azad organization, at Rawalpindi. It says:

"Although this Government"—that is, the Azad Government —"has al! the nomenclature of Government machinery, it is difficult to assess either its power or the amount of its-control. At present it could be just a facade, an effort to dignify revolt and invasion being fought in far-away hills completely foreign to the back rooms and hotel lounges in which its members work and talk. These men have none of the characteristics associated with revolutionary leaders, but it is obvious that the military commanders of* the Azad forces are in agreement with them.

"The military commanders are more impressive. Many of them are ex-officers of the 'Indian National Army* formed by the Japanese, but this despicable background in no way detracts from their obvious prowess and efficiency."

A description is then given of the troops these officers commanded, and the report continues:

"These mobs, however, were composed of thousands of Punches and Mirpuris with military experience—9,000 Poonchis served overseas in the late war—and they were now more or less organized into twenty-four battalions. The? tribesmen constituted the other half of their forces, but were an undependable element."

Then comes a paragraph which is somewhat significant:    ;

"In spite of the recent efforts of the Pakistan Prime. Minister, Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan, to persuade (he tribesmen, not to take part in the Kashmir campaign, hundreds of them are still swarming down on the Grand Trunk Road* through the North West Frontier Province and West Punjab.. Many of them, although not in such large numbers as alleged by Pandit Nehru, can be seen in (be towns near the* Kashmir and Jammu border,"

I rely on that last paragraph as proof of one of the main allegations that we are making—that Pakistan gives access to these people, that they pass through Pakistan territory before entering Kashmir, and that in Pakistan territory they have a number of bases.

If the members of the Security Council will look at [heir maps, I can enumerate for them the points concerned, from the northwesternmost corner to the southeast corner of the boun­dary between Kashmir and Pakistan, starting from Abbottabad, passing through Rawalpindi, coming down to Jhelum, Lalamusa, Gujarat, Sialkot, Shakargarh and Chak Amru. All along that border from one end to the other, there is a series of places where these gentlemen from the northwest are concentrated and looked after, and from these places they make raids on Kashmir territory. When Indian troops engage them, they run back into Pakistan territory.

That is our case. I challenge any member of the Security Council to go to that area and to satisfy himself whether or not what I say is almost literally true. The things are there for any member to see. They happen every day, and here is the special correspondent of The Times of London who tells how these people go through the two Provinces of Pakistan—the North West Frontier Province and West Punjab—from end to end along the border with Kashmir, from where they conduct their operations.

I also have a later account, again published in The Times of London, dated 26 January 1948. It comes from that news­paper's special correspondent at Lahore, and is an account of the tour of the tribal territories by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. In the course of that account this passage occurs, describing the fighting in Kashmir:

"Religion can be a double-edged weapon. Many tribesmen describe the fighting in Kashmir to be a Jehad (holy war); others are willing to use such a movement as an excuse for their love of fighting and desire for loot. Peaceful elements may be willing to cooperate with Islamic Pakistan, but a _ 'holy war  combined with bloody excursions in search of loot and women is more to their taste. "Appeals to support Pakistan by not participating in the fighting in Kashmir fall on deaf ears, and any effort on the-part of Pakistan to restrain them will further antagonize-them.

 

"There is ample evidence that Pakistan has tried to restrain-them. Throughout his tour Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was met with complaints about lack of official assistance for the-Kashmir campaign and about attempts by political agents to prevent the departure of volunteers."

Close to the end of this account is a passage which is of more than ordinary significance. It urges:      

1. spite of these efforts the Indian indictment which now lies before the Security Council alleges Pakistan intervention in Kashmir. While they are roaming over the hills of Kashmir and Jammu, the tribesmen do not constitute any direct threat to the already uneasy peace in the Dominion,.. but Pakistan leaders are well aware of the difficulties which lie ahead. The Grand Trunk Road through the North West Frontier Province and West Punjab is swarming with armed; bands marching and riding in the direction of Rawalpindi,. Gujarat, Jhelum, and other points of access to Kashmir. Many, for the first time in their lives, are seeing well-irrigated fields and bazaars bewildering in the variety of the goods, displayed. Frightened shopkeepers have seen their stocks-disappear into tribal fighters' haversacks without payment. Little loot remains on the cold, rain-soaked hills in Jammu,. and there is thus a real danger that many tribesmen will turn westwards." By "turn westwards", the writer means, into Pakistan itself.

It is further stated in this dispatch: "The total number of tribesmen engaged in the operations is estimated at between 10,000 and 20,000. The task of removing them will be extremely hazardous, if not impossible, and the resentment of the tribesmen will be Pakistan's only reward."

I referred to the tour of the tribal areas by the Pakistani Prime Minister. He did his utmost to fraternity and make.

friends with the tribesmen. I should like to repeat that these people are not of a metal which is easily susceptible to offers of friendship and fraternization. This is obvious from the way in which the tribesmen acted on the advice apparently given by Mr. Liaquat AH Khan. However, one has to recognize that these people have to be tackled with strength and firmness-. Fraternization interspersed with encomiums on whatever they are doing or whatever they propose to do in Kashmir, will not aid in stopping these people from going to Kashmir.

A report from the Daily Telegraph of London, dated 20 January 1948, by its correspondent Douglas Brown, carries an account of an interview which Mr. Brown had with a member of the Azad organization. I shall ask the Security Council to note that this interview was granted to this correspondent at the Pakistan Army Headquarters in Rawalpindi. I shall not touch upon what happened between the Minister and Douglas Brown. The following is Mr. Brown's report of the speech of Liaquat Ali Khan:

"In a speech Mr. Ali Khan reiterated what he said many times during the past week, that Pakistan was heart and soul with the Azad Government, but refrained from joining the struggle for fear of causing war between Pakistan and the Indian Union which would be disastrous to Moslem interest generally."

Here is another account of part of this tour which appeared in the New York Herald-Tribune; it is by Margaret Parton, who has already been quoted by the representative of Pakistan:

"The tribal chieftain, the Chief of the Shinwari tribe, a sub-sect of the Afridis, is supposed to have said in the course of this tour :'Our blood has been shed in Kashmir and we are determined to have revenge. There is a blood feud now between the Muslim tribesmen and the Dogras of Kashmir. The fight is between us and has nothing to do with Pakistan or with any other United Nations Member Nation. Kashmir belongs to us by right of religion and contiguity, and as soon as the snows are gone, we shall capture it. After the conference the leaders said they had told the Prime Minister they would not accept any compromise on Kashmir reached between India and Pakistan. 'We want revenge not only on the Kashmiris, but also on India. We will fight this battle not only in Kashmir, but also in Delhi and Patiala.' "

 

Discussing the matter with these tribesmen, the Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, is reported to have said that he had made no commitments to the tribes but felt they could eventually be influenced by a fair argument. I hope his anticipa­tions will be realized. However, according to our knowledge of these tribesmen, and we have known them for over a century and a half, this is perhaps too optimistic a note*even for a prime minister. The article continues: 'If the United Nations decision appeared to have been made with Muslim interests in mind, Pakistan would be able to persuade them to accept the decision provided it seemed just."

With regard to the whole of this tour, there is one signifi­cant adjective which is used in an account sent to the New York Herald-Tribune by Margaret Parton on 16 January. I shall read it to the Security Council but refrain from making any comments on it. The account states: "The Malik's principal complaint was the same one which had been voiced with almost suspicious unanimity, Liaquat Ali Khan has talked during the fast four days. They are not being allowed to proceed to Kashmir, where they are determined to go, in order to save their Muslim brethren from carnage by the Hindus." What is suspicious about the unanimity I shall leave unexplained.

I have read the Security Council accounts which support the case that we are trying to make, and which come from people who are neither Indians or Pakistanis.

In this connexion, I would once again refer to the raids that have occurred and which are still occurring. They happen every day. Day after day I receive reports from my Govern­ment which describe these raids—the casualties inflicted, the number of villages burned and the manner in which the raid is accomplished; namely, having come overnight to perpetrate this, act of destruction these raiders disappear in the early hours of the morning back into Pakistan territory.

I do not wish to weary the Security Council with accounts or quotations in regard to these matters. However, I would refer once more to three incidents which occurred during the month of January. These incidents show that, unfortunately, this lust for blood, for loot, for arson, and so on, is still going unchecked in Pakistan. I have already referred to what hap­pened in Karachi on 6 January, and my colleague on the Indian delegation has dealt with it in some detail. Some accounts have also been given of the massacre of passengers in a train at Gujarat. Figures have already been given to the Secu­rity Council about the massacre that took place at Parachinar.

I refer to these incidents in order to indicate one inference which I ask the Security Council to draw from the present state of affairs in India and Pakistan. If these three incidents had taken place in the first half of October instead of in January, I am almost certain that there would have been acts of retalia­tion on the Indian side, acts which perhaps might have been even more drastic than those which took place in these three incidents in Pakistan. Those retaliations have not taken place. That they have not taken place was primarily due to the great restraining influence that Mahatma Gandhi exercised during his life. That restraint was also due to the fact that those who are responsible for running the Indian Government are deter­mined to see that such retaliations do nor recur. That is why it is found that, while these incidents happened in the Pakistan area, retaliations have not taken place in the Indian area.

Unless the Government of the area concerned is prepared to take drastic action and does not stop with talking nicely to the people who break the law, the situation will not be brought under control. That is why I have pleaded with the Security Council that if measures short of war—which, let us assume, Pakistan is taking—have not been able to stop the incursions of these people into Kashmir territory and thus aggravating the fighting, then Pakistan should take to force in order to put down this kind of violence and breach of international obliga­tions. That this is the feeling even in Pakistan is obvious. I shall read to the Security Council an extract from an article which appeared in the Pakistan Times, a newspaper published in Lahore, commenting on the Gujarat incident. It reads as follows:

"A large number of non-Muslim men, women and children have been killed in and near Gujarat. All these innocent souls were in our charge, and Pakistan had guaranteed them

protection until they crossed our frontier. We have betrayed our ideals, and broken our pledged word. People who call themselves Muslims and fellow citizens of Pakistan have

been guilty of gross savagery and inhuman brutality. The name of Pakistan has been blackened and besmirched, and the name of our people and our religion has been once more dragged into the dust."            

After some further remarks, the article proceeds as follows:

"It is not enough to bow our heads in shame. We had much rather lift up our heads and look for the causes and agencies which still make the perpetration of such heinous deeds possible.... The madmen who committed the crime, for some official agency, we do not know which, also must share the blame for what has happened. There must have been either indifference or lethargy, a lurking unwillingness in some quarter, which held back the hand of law from dealing out sterner measures before the foul deed was done.

"We must formulate and enforce immediate measures to persuade, cajole or coerce our citizens into more civilized conduct."

Now during the last few days, these raids are becoming con­centrated on the only line of communication between Jammu and India. Large crowds of these raiders have attacked this road. and the villages beyond this road inside our limits. They have set fire to houses in a number of villages. They come overnight and perpetrate these dastardly acts, and they go back into Pakistan-territory in the morning. Our troops have strict orders not to overstep our territory. The thing goes on from day to day: blood is shed and property is lost. There is no sense of security in any village along this border.

In the light of all the facts which have brought in the notice of the Security Council, I say that the imperative duty of the Security Council is to ask Pakistan to take measures to prevent these miscreants from finding help, assistance, bases, transport—everything that is needed for carrying on a cam­paign—on Pakistan territory. Unless that is done, the evil will go on in an intensified manner. Whatever decisions we may take with regard to other questions, we shall not be stemming the tide of this ruthless destruction.

We have had placed before us 237th meeting] a draft resolu­tion [document S/662] which I already have described as-innocuous, in our opinion. Perhaps it might be described more harshly, but I would content myself with that. What I would say is that this draft resolution is not going to take us any further forward from where we are. If we are going to tackle this problem of the cessation of fighting, we ought to do some­thing more positive. In this connexion, I would like to make a suggestion for the consideration of the Security Council. I know that, being only a party to a dispute which is under adjudication by the Security Council, I am not entitled to move any amendments; however, I certainly can submit a suggestion which, if it finds favour, can be moved to an amendment by some member of the Security Council.

What India is prepared to accept with regard to this part of the case—and I wish to insist that India is not prepared at this moment to accept anything less—would be something along the following lines. Instead of the draft resolution which I have been discussing, I should like the Security Council to consider something along the lines of what I wish to put forward in the form of an amendment, but I submit it only as a suggestion for the consideration of the members. If my suggestion is accepted, it would read as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Considering its resolutions of 17 document S-651] and 20 [document S/654] January 1948;

"Considering the urgency of achieving the cessation of fight­ing and other acts of hostility;

"1. Recommends to the Government of Pakistan that it should use all its efforts to persuade the tribesmen and others now in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir State who have invaded Kashmir, to withdraw from that territory; to prevent the passage through Pakistan territory of such invaders to the Jammu and Kashmir State; to deny the use of such territory for operations against the State, and also to refuse supplies and other material aid, direct and indirect, to such invaders; and

 

"2. Further recommends that the Commission of the Council shall, among its duties, regard as particularly urgent the promotion of measures intended to bring about as expeditiously as possible the cessation of fighting and other acts of hostility; and lhat in the pursuit of this end, the Commission shall ensure that its func­tions under subparagraph C (2) of the resolution of the Council dated 20 January 1948 [document SJ654] are exercised without delay and with every diligence."

In the second part of this draft resolution, we have retained the substance of what is proposed m the draft resolution [document S;662] which was placed before us by the representa­tive of Belgium [237th meeting] when he acted as President of the Security Council.

In the first part of this draft resolution, we request the Security Council to implement the suggestion which we have made both today and the previous day on which I spoke. In the first place, we ask the Government of Pakistan to use its efforts in order to stop this help as from tomorrow, if possible. It may be that in the conditions in which that Government finds itself today, with the tribesmen in Pakistan, any advice it gives to the raiders and to the tribesmen may not be listened to with alacrity. However, we have no doubt that if this request should go forth to these invaders and raiders with the weight of the authority of the Government of Pakistan, there would be a tremendously welcome change in the situation as regards the fighting in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

We appeal to Pakistan, not merely in the interests of the fighting in Jammu and Kashmir, but in its own interests and in the interests of the preservation of law and order in the Dominion of Pakistan itself, to take this action with the least possible delay. Our feeling is that unless this help comes from or through Pakistan, the fighting in Kashmir will not stop. If this assistance dries up, then there is every likelihood of the fighting in Kashmir stopping as soon as possible.

Part 2 of the draft resolution has for its object the function­ing of the commission when it undertakes its mission. Certainly, it will use all its mediatory influence in bringing' about agreed understandings between the two Dominions. It will also see that part 1 of the draft resolution is carried out and is imple­mented in the spirit in which it has been proposed. That is why reference is made to sub-paragraph C (2) of the resolution dated 20 January 1948.

We wish to say nothing more with regard to the second Belgian draft resolution set forth in document S/662, although we took it up first for consideration. We pass on now to the first Belgian draft resolution on the question of the plebiscite [document SJ661]. I should like to be as brief as possible with regard to this matter.

As far as India is concerned, after fighting is stopped, normal conditions are restored and everybody belonging to the State has returned to his home and land, we want conditions to be established with a two-fold objective: first, the establish­ment of a system of self-government acceptable to the people of the State and secondly, a final settlement of the question of accession.

We have made proposals in this regard in our scheme [236th meeting). When I say we have made proposals, I should like the Security Council to understand clearly that these are fields in which India as such has no jurisdiction, Pakistan as such has no jurisdiction and, if I may venture to say so without dis­respect, neither the United Nations nor the Security Council could be said to have jurisdiction to give any direction. The matter is one entirely for the State of Jammu and Kashmir and its people. I venture to say that this particular position is common ground between India and Pakistan.

I shall read to the Security Council one or two passages from Mr. Jinnah's pronouncements. He said some time near the end of Just July, "the Muslim League recognizes the right of each State to choose its destiny." He was referring to the Indian States. He continued: "It has no intention of coercing any State into adopting any particular course of action." A year previous to that—I think in June 1946—when he was talking about the Muslim Conference in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and its objective, he said, "I hops the Maharaja will now without further delay meet the demand, not only of the Muslim Conference, but of the people of Kashmir gene­rally, namely, that full and responsible government be granted immediately, and steps taken to implement the declaration without delay." The Muslim Conference of the     The State also declared its policy to be "one for the attainment of responsible government under the aegis of the Ruler''. It never supported the idea of wiping off the Ruler."

I quote these passages from statements of Mr. Jinnah and the Muslim Conference of Jammu and Kashmir from documents for which those two were responsible, and I add that that is the objective which leaders in India have in view. That is the objec­tive which the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir headed by Sheikh Abdullah have in view. Our Prime Minister and others have declared times without numbers as the objective which they would like to see realized for Jammu and Kashmir. That being so, the only question is whether the person who at the moment centres in himself all the powers of sovereignty is willing to part with those powers in favour of representatives of the people, because that is what responsible government means. The question exists because we cannot dictate this to him, nor can anyone else dictate this to the Maharaja. I am in a position to say, however, that the Maharaja himself is prepared to take the steps necessary for the establishment of responsible government in the State at the earliest possible moment. A matter of that kind cannot be a matter of agreement between India and Pakistan. It cannot be the subject of a directive from the Security Council. But in order to ease matters and in order to show that the grievance for which the local insurgents might be said to be fighting no longer exist and the cause for such fighting might thus be considered to have ceased to exist, [ have taken the trouble to ascertain what the Maharaja's wishes are and what he is prepared to do.

As I have said, I am in a position to say that the Maharaja is prepared immediately to take the steps necessary for the establishment of responsible government as peace is restored. A matter of this kind cannot go into an agreement between us and Pakistan, but the Government of India is willing and the iMaharaja of Kashmir and his people are willing that the intention of the Maharaja and his Government with regard to the question of responsible government should be stated in any document that might go forth as a result of the Security Council's labors.

Before I proceed I might say that, apart from the stoppage of fighting the two parties interested in the Jammu and Kashmir question—each for its own reason—are the insurgents, who want a responsible government, and Pakistan, which wants the question of accession to be finally settled. As far as the insurgents are concerned, I have indicated what the Maharaja is prepared to have announced in his name as his decision. As the Security Council is aware, the Government of India is fully committed to the view that, after peace is restored and all people belonging to the State have returned there, a free plebiscite should be taken and the people should decide whether they wish to remain with India, to go over to Pakistan or to remain independent, if they choose to do so. That being so, the only question for consideration is whether the Maharaja and his people are willing that this plebiscite be taken. On that point also, I am in a position to inform the Security Council that the Maharaja has agreed to the taking of this plebiscite after fighting has been stopped and after normal conditions have been restored.

A further point that arises for consideration in this context is what is meant by a free plebiscite. I am afraid that there is a lot of mixed and, perhaps, confused thinking in regard to this particular matter. We have to take the verdict of the people of a State which is now being governed by machinery which it has had for years. Kashmir has functioned as a State for many years. It conducts its own administration. It has an administrative machinery which does not compare with the administrative machinery of any other Indian State. The question is whether, when one wants to take a vote on a parti­cular question, one can oust that machinery completely and put something which comes from outside in its place. I think that would mean an amount of encroachment on the ordinary sovereign powers of any State, to which no State would be willing to agree.

In so far as I have been able to gather through reading, in connexion with arrangements made in similar cases else Where in the world under the auspices of the United Nations, I have no,1 seen a case—and I am subject to correction —where the established Government of a State was superseded and the United Nations imposed another administration upon it for the purpose of conducting a plebiscite. After all, the draft resolution before us [document S/66I] confines itself only to the conduct of the plebiscite. The draft resolution says: "The Security Council is of the opinion that such plebiscite must be organized, held and supervised under its authority.'' I think this has not happened anywhere else. What is the reason for suggesting that we must make an exception in the case of Jammu and Kashmir?

Our position and the position of the Maharaja—after all, it is his view and that of his people which should count in this connexion—is that the plebiscite should be taken; but as doubts have been raised as to whether everyone will have a free vote and the minorities will have their chance, we are quite willing that the plebiscite should be conducted under the advice and observation of people whom the Security Council may appoint in this connexion; that is to say, these advisers and observers could go in and lay down procedure, from the preparation of the electoral registers, if necessary, down to the stage of polling, counting of the votes and the declaration of the result. The Maharaja and his Government are quite prepared to-accept that position.

In This connexon, I also have a constructive suggestion to make for the consideration of the Security Council. This is what the Maharaja and his Government are prepared to accept this connexion. It is merely a suggestion and the Security Council may adopt it as an amendment if it agrees with the proposal. The proposal reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Whereas India and Pakistan agree that the question of accession of Kashmir may be determined by plebiscite and the plebiscite be held under international auspices,

“ Recommends that the plebiscite be taken under the advice of and subject to the observation of persons appointed by the Council."

The proposal has been worded in this fashion advisedly, because both Pakistan and India have interests in the question of accession, and therefore some agreement has to be reached between them. Therefore, the preamble states that India and Pakistan agree that the question of accession may be determined by plebiscite. But the actual plebiscite, the actual taking of it, as I have already contended, is a matter for the Government and people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. That is why it states: "The Security Council...Recommends that the plebiscite be taken under the advice and subject to the observation of persons appointed by the Council.'

We are making this recommendation and we hope that it can provide a basis for agreement between India and Pakistan. The implementation of the recommendation will be carried out by a third party who is not before us, but that third party, I am in a position to assure the Security Council, will be prepared to implement this particular recommendation of the Security Council. We have taken out the words which conferred authority on the Security Council for organizing, supervising and directing this plebiscite; on the other hand, we give the Security Council the right to appoint advisers and observers. After all, even under Chapter IV of the Charter of the United Nations, most of what has been resolved here is but in the form of recommendations; in fact, in the draft of the other resolution, I have taken out the words which spoke of opinion and that sort of thing. I have used the word "recommends" advisedly. A recommendation of that sort applies so long as we continue to be Members of the United Nations; if we are parties to that resolution, we are supposed to implement that recommendation. The use of the word "recommends" removes the objection which States, sensitive to ideas of sovereignty, have to be directed or ordered about by the Security Council. So that when the Council uses the word "recommends", it really means that it is the Council's advice and the Council expects the advice to be carried out, provided we are parties to the Council's giving us that advice.

That is why we have deleted here the words which might be considered objectionable by those in whom the authority is vested today. We have made it a recommendation, and .although the party concerned is not before the Security Council to help in the solution of the question, we are in a position to give an assurance that that party would be ready to accept the resolution if it were worded in that way.

In conclusion, I should like to commend to the Security Council these two draft resolutions which I have been discussing in a speech more lengthy than any I have had to make previously in my life. The draft resolutions are interlinked, and we would impress upon the Security Council most strongly our view that unless both are agreed to in the form we have suggested, it would be difficult for us to agree to either by itself.

There is one further aspect of this matter which I must not fail to place before the Security Council. My colleagues of the Indian delegation and I have given most anxious thought to the draft resolutions which were placed before us on 29 January [documents S/66I and S/662], and have spent a great deal of time in trying to devise something we could accept in connexion with the matters treated therein. The form which we have now suggested represents about the maximum to which we are prepared to go. If anything short of that were adopted by the Security Council we should be placed in the most difficult position, and should have them to consider what we might have to do. I trust that this development will not take place, and

that the Security Council will find it possible to agree to what we have suggested for consideration after so much anxious thinking.

Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan): I begin my submission with no grievances with regard to the procedure that has so far been adopted nor with reference to the fact that the two draft resolutions now under discussion were placed before the Security Council without the facts having been made available to us in advance. In point of fact, these two draft resolutions were the outcome of the discussions that had gone on in the Security Council and between the parties under the guidance of the President. Not only did they contain nothing new of which we could have desired notice, but neither of them went so far in some respects as others of the draft resolutions which had already been under discussion between the parties.

Another preliminary observation which I desire to make is that, since Pakistan is not a member of the Security Council, my delegation is not aware of the details of its procedure. I want to explain, however, that my interventions, at the 236th meeting and again this afternoon, are due likely to a desire to supplement certain features of the picture placed before the Security Council by the representative of India. I noticed that at the 236th meeting, when the President had wished to present his interim report and called upon the parties to make such submissions as they might desire, neither the representative of India nor I took advantage of the opportunity. But, as soon as the President invited the Security Council to discuss the proposal which he had presented, the representative of India was anxious to draw attention to certain matters.

Of course, he had a perfect right to do this if he thought that the Security Council would be assisted in its deliberations by his intervention, and the Security Council, for its part, was fully justified and entitled to permit either of the parties to speak at whatever stage it considered proper. The present intervention of the parties has also taken place in the middle of a debate in which members of the Security Council were themselves engaged, Again, it is not my purpose either to suggest that any different procedure should have been adopted, or to complain that this particular procedure has been adopted, but I want to-explain that I should not have intervened on either occasion ia. the middle of a debate on certain draft resolutions. If I do so now, it is solely from a desire to stress some of the features of the picture which may have been left in some confusion or-doubt as the result of the very able and ingenious submission:, to the Security Council which the representative of India has. just concluded.

1. this stage of our submissions it is not necessary for me to-follow the representative of India into every one of the argu­ments or explanations of fact that he has undertaken. By this time the Security Council must be more or less fully in posses­sion of the salient features of the situation with regard to-Kashmir, both as to facts and as to the considerations that result from those facts. Nevertheless, with regard to broad questions, a few observations may be justified.

1. Ayyangar has made a grievance of the fact that raids continue to be made upon Kashmir territory from Pakistan. I have already drawn the attention of the. Security Council to the continuous series of raids that goes on from Kashmir territory into Pakistan territory, with regard to which repeated but unavailing protests have been made to the: Government of India. I shall draw attention, in this connexion, to one or two additional pieces of evidence which I have not yet-disclosed to the Security Council. I did inform the Security Council, on a previous occasion when I touched on this subject,,, that I had with me the dates and the brief particulars of over 100 such raids committed upon Pakistan territory. The list has. since it has swelled to more than 150.

I would draw the attention of the Security Council in this connexion to a telegram dated 29 December 1947, addressed to-the Prime Minister of India by the Prime Minister of Pakistan. in the course of which it is stated:

"The latest reports state that Indian artillery in Jammu and-Kashmir State shelled Pakistan villages"—and then the-names of the villages are given—"in Gujarat District. Also,, aircraft strafed them on the 19th, killing and injuring meti' and cattle. Jammu raiders and military men raided villages-.Chak, Salehrian, et cetera, in the Sialkot District, on the 18th, and fired on field workers, killing three, injuring one, - and abducting one. In addition, Jammu civilians fired on Pakistan field laborer’s near the Sialkot border on the 20th, killing one."

On 8 January, the Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed the prime Minister of India a telegram, as follows:

"Fresh reports have reached me of continued aerial activity over Pakistan territory adjoining the Jammu State. Indian aircraft flew over border villages in Gujarat District between the 6th and 8th and machine-gunned village Gotriala. Indian troops opened fire with Bren guns and mortars on our border post in the village Assar; one Sepoy was reported killed and another injured. Indian aircraft flew over villages Nandwal, Chirianwala, in Gujarat District, and dropped bombs. On 8th morning an Indian aircraft flew over Jhelum. I would earnestly request you to prevent recurrence of such incidents."

But here is evidence from the other side of what has been going on, though it is extremely naively put. Mr. Ghulam Mohammad Bakshi, who is acting in place of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as head of the Emergency Administration in Kashmir during the latter's absence, is reported to have stated at a Press conference in New Delhi that the burning of villages by the raiders was not confined to the State territory on the Pakistan border, but also extended to border villages in Pakistan. He went on to say that this was being done to "establish" that troops of the Indian Dominion were actually crossing over into Pakistan and setting villages on fire. The setting on fire of villages is admitted, but the explanation given is that it is being done by us in order to manufacture evidence against the other side.

Here is a dispatch published in Dawn of 22 January from Lahore, dated 20 January:

"Twenty persons were found dead when a heavily armed mob of nearly 500 strong crossed the border into Pakistan and launched a sudden attack on the village of Dandot, according to a report from Sialkot received on Monday, 19 January. Besides, about 100 head of cattle were found* burned to death. The raiders were immediately engaged by the police picket on duty, who took up positions outside the village and fired 260 rounds. The encounter lasted several? hours, but (here was no casualty on the side of the police. Earlier, a minor attack by a number of non-Muslim civilians from Jammu State was beaten off by our border police: patrol."

A similar piece of news with reference to another raid from Jammu territory into other villages was also published on the same day.

These are instances showing that the series of raids, to* which I drew the attention of the Security Council in an earlier submission, has continued throughout this period from the other side.

Then the representative of India went on to say that, since-Indian troops had entered Kashmir territory, that is, since 27' October, with the solitary exception of the regrettable incidents of 4 and 6 November—which really constitued one incident,, according to him—when Muslim refugee convoys were attacked,, there had been no group killing of Muslims in the Kashmir State. He implied thereby that, at least in the territories occu­pied by and under the control of Indian troops complete peace had prevailed since their arrival, except for the misbehaviour of the State troops with reference to these convoys on 4 and 6 November. That statement, taken along with the statement made by M*. GopaJaswami Ayyangar's colleague at the 236th' meeting—that nothing of the kind had taken place before 4 November—would seek to present this picture to the Security Council: that no killings having taken place before 4 November and none having taken place after 6 November, the only incident of the kind that happened in Kashmir was this incident of 4 and 6 November.

The incident of 4 and 6 November was an attack upon-convoys of Muslim refugees from the State, If nothing had taken place before, why were these people leaving the State, in-

which the Muslims constituted a majority, in those convoys in which they massacred? That is with regard to the "before".

With regard to the "after*", here is evidence not only that mass killings have gone on since Indian troops entered Kashmir, but that such troops themselves have on occasion taken part in them. I have a telegram from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of India, dated 19 November, that is to say, over three weeks after the Indian troops had gone into Kashmir. In the course of this telegram it is stated:

"I am pained to see that you appear to have taken no-action regarding atrocities which are being perpetrated on Muslims of Jammu and Poonch. I have drawn your atten­tion repeatedly to large scale massacres of Muslims and to the abduction of women. The brutality and cold-blooded murders and crimes against women of which Dogras and troops of the Indian Union have been guilty in Jammu and Poonch, are of a most heinous kind. The thousands of Muslims who are pouring into Pakistan from Jammu and Poonch tell tales of woe too horrid to be repeated. Your Government appears to be completely indifferent to this murder, rape, abduction, loot and arson, the only purpose of which is to liquidate entirely the Muslim population of this State."

On 29 October the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in his tele­gram to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, stated that, up to then, there were about 100,000 Muslim refugees from the Kashmir State in the West Punjab: that is to say, up to the time when the Indian troops entered Kashmir. la his telegram of 25 November, that is to say, nearly a month later, to the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister of Pakistan stated: "...in spite of the protestations of the India Government, the number of Muslim refugees into Pakistan swells day by day and is now over 200,000."

If complete peace has prevailed in Kashmir since the entry therein of the troops of the Government of India, what has led to this further large-scale emigration of Muslims from Kashmir into Pakistan?

On 2 December an Azad Kashmir communique was published in Dawn to the following effect:

"The Azad Kashmir troops on entering Kotli were received by about 200 Muslims, who were the only remnants of the Muslim population. It was found that all good stores and cattle had been removed by the retreating Dogra and Indian troops. Some of the Muslim localities had been burnt to ashes. According to the Azad forces commander, 4,735 Muslims of Mirpur are missing, including a fairly large number of women."

Here is another telegram from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of India, dated 4 December in which it is stated:

"When I was in Sialkot on 30 November and 1 December" —that is more than a month after the entry of Indian troops into Kashmir—"and in Rawalpindi on 3 and 4 December, I was told most harrowing stones about Muslims in Jammu and Kashmir State. According to all reports I received, the Muslim population of a large number of towns and villages in Jammu has been massacred, and the number of killed runs into six figures. The abduction of Muslim women has taken place on a very large scale, and women from respectable families have been specially attacked. But apart from abduction, there are other aspects of treatment of Muslim women which are too shameful to put in writing. - Until I had visited Sialkot and Rawalpindi and received first-band evidence, I had not realized the full gravity of the situation. The two Governments must, as a matter of the highest urgency, concert measures to put a stop to this state of affairs."

I have another telegram dated 24 December from the Prime Minister of Pakistan to the Prime Minister of India. It states:

"I have been greatly disturbed by the news which has reach­ed me during the course of the last month regarding the situation of Muslims in Jammu. A number of reports have already appeared in the Press, and I understand that Messrs. Alexander and Symonds of the Friends Service Unit have made a joint representation to you regarding the appalling atrocities that have been committed in the Jammu area on defenceless Muslims. The evidence of many eye witnesses has been checked and counter-checked, and there is not the least doubt that State forces and armed civilians have slaughtered thousands of Muslims, in some cases under the very eyes of Indian Union troops. There is evidence, too, that Indian Union troops have, in some cases, participated in the massacres. I do not wish here to quote the tragic details of which you must already have had news , from Mr. Alexander, but I must emphatically protest against your Government's complete failure to fulfil its duties towards the Muslims of the State."

As late as 25 December, the late Mr. Gandhi himself had stated that he had heard of murders of numberless Muslims and of the abduction of Muslim girls in Jammu. The Maharaja must assume the responsibility, as the Dogra troops were under his direct control.

On 13 January the Prime Minister of Pakistan addressed the -following telegram to the Prime Minister of India:

"I am surprised at your statement that atrocities committed in the Jammu area on defenceless Muslims in the presence of Indian troops bear no relation to what has happened there. My statement was correct and was based on evidence from many witnesses, closely checked by Messrs. Symonds and -Alexander of the Friends Service Unit. Mr. Alexander, who visited Jammu on behalf of Pakistan, had submitted a report of his visit, and I presume that Mr. Symonds, who also visited Jammu and adjoining areas in Pakistan, would have submitted one to you."

This is ample evidence that the entry of Indian troops into Kashmir not only made no difference to the plight of the Muslims there, but that, in several instances, the massacres and other atrocities were committed under the eyes of these troop* and in some instances these troops themselves participated in these occurrences.

One has been very disagreeably surprised that, with regard to incidents of this kind—with reference to which the evidence leaves no doubt of their magnitude, whatever may be the difference with regard to their details—the attitude adopted by the Government of India and its representatives throughout has been, "Nothing has occurred." I shall not go further in the pursuit of these matters, as a fairly complete picture of the conditions in Jammu was laid by me before the Security Council on an earlier occasion.

I have drawn attention to these two aspects of the statement made by the representative of India, lest it might have been assumed, in the absence of further evidence from this side, that my earlier speech was subject to the qualifications now sought to be made by the representative of India. It is not.

The greater part of the statement made by the representative of India has been confined to discussion of the obligations of Pakistan with regard to what is happening in Kashmir. In that connexion, it is necessary to remind the Security Council that the trouble in Kashmir, though it has taken on a very acute form in this latest manifestation, has continued throughout the period during which the State has been under the rule and the tyranny of the alien rulers who obtained the States as a result of a very questionable transaction with the British East India Company. The great-grandfather of the present Ruler,Rajah Gulab Singh, during the fight over the Punjab between the British and the Sikhs, went over to the British and rendered to them service which, at this stage, need not further be characterized. As a reward for that service they sold to him all the hill territory—it was so described and nothing was even specified upon the map—between the river* Ravi and Indus for 2,250,000 dollars, without any reference being made to the people of those areas.

Lord Lawrence himself subsequently described this transac­tion as follows: "...by a very questionable stroke of policy, which had been arranged beforehand and which has brought innumerable woes on the happy Kashmiris ever since, we hand­ed it over to the Dogra Rajput, Gulab Singh, who paid us down at once in the hard cash which he had stolen from the Lahore Durbar." He stole the money from the Sikhs, went to the British with the money stolen from the Sikhs, and bought Kashmir from the British. That is the title of the present Ruler of Kashmir to that area which at that time was inhabited 100 per cent by Muslims.

A little later, Lord Lawrence referred to "The iniquitous arrangement by which Kashmir and its ill-fated inhabitants were to be transferred without their consent, as though they were so many logs of wood, to Gulab Singh, a Dogra Rajput who had nothing in common with them." To describe that arrangement and its consequences, as well as the rule and tyranny that resulted, as something which pertains to a legal and consti­tutional Government, and the attempt of the people of the territory to rid themselves of that kind of tyranny as just a disturbance created ty insurgents who ought to be put down by force, is, to say the very least, the reversal of fact.

Now it is apparent from these documents that, from the very first, this Government bore the character which I have tried to ascribe to it. A letter addressed to the purchaser of Kashmir by the agent to the Governor-General and resident at Lahore on 29 November 1847 states:

"With much grief I have heard from Mr. Agnew that you have not fulfilled the terms of agreement voluntarily made by Your Highness with Lieutenant Taylor. Mr. Agnew moreover informs me that you have not only relieved the distress of your people as you promised to do, but that you have added to them; that you still trade contrary to promise."

The man who purchased the State had now become the ruler of a vast territory, but he could not escape from his tendency to squeeze money out of every possible transaction. I shall now resume the quotation:

that you have not removed your internal custom houses, as you agreed to do; that you not only do not promise the free sale of rice, but that you directly or indirectly taxed grass and other small articles that never before were taxed. Already, Mr, Agnew says, many families have abandoned Kashmir and he says that it is only your chain of guard houses on the different roads that prevent larger numbers flying from oppression.

"All this is very painful to me to hear. Just as I am leaving Lahore, and when I had hoped from Lieutenant Taylor's report that Your Highness was employed in measures con­ducive to your own best interests as well as the welfare of your people..."

I shall not quote the entire letter, but it goes on: "I wrote this time that you may not mistake my sentiments, and I send my own confidential agent Diwan Jwala Suhae to you.'*

The last paragraph of the letter states: "Pray well, this, my parting address, and do not allow it, like many others, to pass unheeded or to be thought of for a day, or a month, and then forgotten." This means obviously, that there were continuous protests against this tyranny to

which the Maharaja paid little or no attention. The letter then continues:

"The least that will occur will be that one or two officers will at an early date proceed to Kashmir to examine the report on the real state of the country. Recollect that the British Government wants nothing from you, ask nothing of you for themselves, but that, eschewing the practices of a trader, you will fulfil those of a sovereign.

I now shall refer to a letter from the Governor-General him­self to the Maharaja, which is of particular interest, as it shows the relationship between the two authorities and the protection given by the British so long as certain things continued. I have here a letter from the Governor-General to Maharaja Gulab Singh dated 7 January 1848, which states:

"My friend, I am about to take departure for Europe, and I am anxious, before I leave India, to address Your Highness with the freedom and sincerity of a friend anxious for your welfare and, above all other considerations, for the happi­ness of the people committed to your charge by me when I signed the treaty of March 1846. Your Highness is aware of the principle by which the British Government is guided in its treaties with Eastern Princes, where cessions of terri­tory are involved—that whilst it will scrupulously fulfil all its obligations for the protection of its ally,, it never can consent to incur the approach of becoming indirectly the instrument of the oppression of the people committed to the Prince's charge. If the aversion of the people to a prince's rule should, by injustice, become so universal as to cause the people to seek his downfall, the British Government is bound by no obligation to force the people to submit to a ruler who has deprived himself of their allegiance by his misconduct."

This is the very thing that, one hundred years later, the Indian representative solemnly invites the Security Council to do. This letter continues as follows:

"If the British Government, by its treaties with neighboring princes and proximity of its own forces on the frontier, can so far protect the prince as to enable him the more securely to apply all his forces to the oppression of his subjects, such a state of things would be still more repugnant to the feelings of the British Government because it would indirectly prevent the people from rising and redressing their own wrongs."

That invitation is very naively being extended by the representative of India to the Government of Pakistan. The letter continues as follows:

"In no case, therefore, will the British Government be the blind instrument of a ruler's injustice towards his people, and if, in spite of its friendly warnings the evil of which the British Government may have the just cause to complain be not corrected, a system of direct interference must be resorted to which, as Your Highness must be aware, would lower the dignity and curtail the independence of the ruler.

Near the end of his remarks today, the representative of the ruler.”

Near the close of his remarks today the representative of India stated that the business of the security Council is to direct Pakistan to do this and that. He stated that the business of the Security Council is to see that measures are adopted to prevent tribesmen from infiltrating into Kashmir-and that the business of the Security Council stops there. As a favour, the Maharaja is quite willing to have it announced through the instrumentality of the Security Council that he is prepared to set up a responsible government in his State. Indeed, he is anxious that such a declaration, although made fully out of his sovereign authority, should be made through the instrumentality ol the Security Council. He is further quite willing-and I am in a position to make this statement on his behalf," says Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar-to have it made known that he recognizes that India and Pakistan are agreed that the question of the accession of the State to Pakistan or India should be decided as a result of a free plebiscite.

1. he is prepared to have a plebiscite held for that purpose under his own authority and management; but he will accept such persons as the Security Council may appoint to advise him with regard to the preparation of the electoral rules, arrangements for the polling stations, and the recording and counting of the votes. However, the British Government recognized that, so long as it afforded conditions of protection to those princes, any misrule, oppression and tyranny would involve measures of the kind which would be direct interference with the sovereignty of the ruler.

The letter continues:

"Your Highness must be well convinced that I have never been actuated by any such desire-on the contrary it has been my inclination, as evinced by my acts and those of the Resident, Colonel Lawrence, to give Your Highness every possible support. This desire must, however, be regulated by the duty of the British Government towards Your Highness* subjects, and governments cannot submit to the stigma of tolerating oppression. Let my friendly advice to Your High­ness make a salutary impression. Avoid the interference of the British Government by a ready compliance with its just demands in which the Governor-General can have no other interest than to secure the well-being of Your Highness* subjects, and to witness the success of your rule over a happy people."

That treaty of the year 1846, it is true, bore the character which Lord Lawrence himself subsequently attributed to it; but it is also true that Lord Lawrence repented fairly early over that treaty. Before he left India, he tried to impress upon the purchaser and the oppressor of Kashmir some of the duties he owed to his unfortunate subjects.

One of the incidents of oppression which came later to the notice of the Government of India was so described in a letter dated 16 May 1865 from the officiating Under-Secretary to the Government of India, to the Secretary to the Government of the Punjab and its dependencies. This is paper No. 414 which states:

"Sir, I am directed to request that a copy of the corres­pondence with the Commissioner of Rawalpindi concerning the woman from Jammu whose tongue had been cut off, referred to in entry No. 26 in the abstract of the proceedings of the Lieutenant-Governor in the Political Department, for the week ending 6 May, may be submitted for the informa­tion of the Governor-General in Council."

The Security Council may be curious to hear what was the offence of this woman. This woman's offence was that she had bitten a cow. Then she was brought before the Prince, and an order was given to the effect that the woman's tongue should be cut out, her hair shorn off, and she, herself, exhibited through the five districts as a warning to others.

Because of a continuous succession of this type of rule, the attention of the Security Council has been drawn to a war of liberation which the people in question have been forced to wage under the terror of being otherwise completely extermi­nated, as their co-religionists have been exterminated in the Indian States which I have already named before the Security Council. That is the struggle.

The representative of India tries to justify the legal and constitutional interpretation of a local disturbance as opposed to the justification of a legal and constitutionally established Government where, however, some people from the outside are interfering. He draws a parallel between the conditions in Kashmir and the conditions which were presented to the Security Council,, and later to the General Assembly, with regard to Greece and its neighbours. That is a point over which the Security Council and the General Assembly have differed. There­fore, I have no desire to proceed to a discussion of that situation. When I say that they have differed, I mean that there were diffe­rences of opinion among the Members of the United Nations. However, whether the alleged facts be established or not, and whether the positions taken with reference to that question on either side be justified or not, there cannot be the least com­parison between the two positions. Here is an alien oppressor over a people with whom he has nothing in common one way or the other. These people have repeatedly risen against tyranny and oppression. In some instances they have not obtained relief. On this occasion the Maharaja undertook a campaign of oppression against his people which might well, under the conditions that were then prevailing in other parts of India — notably in the East Punjab States—have taken on the com­plexion V a campaign of utter extermination; and, in their desperation, they sent their women and children away and took to arms. They have established a provisional Government; they have some sort of an army. They are occupying almost half, or even more than half, of the really populated portions of the State. It is that kind of struggle which has come before the Security Council and with which it has to deal, and with, reference to which the international obligations of Pakistan—as-they have been described—have            to be determined, if any international obligations arise under those conditions.Then the representative of India has gone on to give details, and has supported his statement by extracts from newspapers, as to what is happening or not happening with regard to the infiltration of tribesmen into Kashmir. It is true that the Security Council is not sitting as a judicial tribunal. Therefore, in order to obtain a picture of the situation, it is perfectly fair and proper that all material available should be looked at and properly appraised.

However, one cannot always accept whatever might appear in a newspaper as the gospel truth. Here, for instance, in the New York Times of Thursday, 29 January 1948, in a sub-leader which is devoted to the Kashmir case and is so headed, and which, I suppose, was written by responsible people on the editorial staff, the following statement appears with regard to Kashmir: "Its present Prime Minister is a Muslim who had led the fight for independence from the Maharaja since 1931, and who was only recently released from prison. Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, Kashmir's Prime Minister, holds Pakistan to blame for the present trouble."

Well now, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, according to his own statement, according to his own grievance as a matter of fact, has never been and is not the Prime Minister of Kashmir. The Prime Minister of Kashmir is Meher Chand Mahajan, an ex-judge of the Lahore court, a Hindu and a non-Kashmiri who has had nothing previously to do with the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This is the statement of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah. However, I happen to know the facts myself, as I know Mr. Meher Chand Mahajan very intimately.

In a statement attributed to Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah and printed in The Statesman of New Delhi of 29 December 1947, the following appeared: "He was administrator for the emergency but the Maharaja retained intact his entire cabinet, including the Prime Minister." And then, in quotations, the following is said: "This is unfair." This is Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah speaking. "I hope that Sardar Pates visit to Jammu will clear the constitutional cloud."

Thus it is quite easy, in regard to matters with which people are not familiar, to fall into mistakes of that kind or of a kind which might confuse the issue. The war correspondents, not always being present on each occasion where any incident might take place, also have their sources of information at large. They gather their information and, in good faith, they try to provide for their readers a picture of the situation with which they are dealing. But it would not be safe to take every description as the gospel truth, and to attach too much importance to it.

Subject to that precaution, I might also draw the attention of the Security Council to some passages from the very article in The Times of London of 26 January to which the represen­tative of India has drawn attention. It reads as follows: "There is ample evidence that Pakistan has tried to restrain them." Reference is to the tribes. "Throughout his tour Mr. Liaquat Ali Khan was met with complaints about lack of official assistance for the Kashmir campaign and about attempts by political agents to prevent the departure of volunteers." A political agent, I might explain, is an official appointed by the Government in order to watch the movements of the tribes, and to give them such advice as may be useful or needed. "The power of these individuals"—that is, of the political agents— "both Pakistani and British, is immense, though they are few among thousands, and are stationed many miles from the nearest military post. Many political agents, by sheer force of personality, backed admittedly by threats that subventions and allowances would not be paid, prevented the calling of & jehad" —that is to say, the proclamation of a holy war—"in their agencies, and dispersed several lashkars" It is explained in brackets that lashkars are "raiding parties." Literally, a lashkar is an army.

"In Miranshah one agent alone stopped two raiding parties with a total strength of 8,000 rifles. The efforts of these men were probably overlooked by the Indian statesmen who accused Pakistan of not even attempting to hinder the tribesmen from marching on Kashmir."

But there is a further paragraph in this article which should be drawn to the attention of the Security Council. It reads as follows:

"The pronouncements of the Security Council and its Commission are awaited here with some trepidation. If the evacuation of raiders from Kashmir is ordered, it is expect­ed that Pakistan will be made responsible for the operation. The total number of tribesmen engaged in the operations is estimated at between 10,000 and 20,000. The task of removing them will be extremely hazardous, if not impos­sible, and the resentment of the tribesmen will be Pakistan's only reward."

Up to this point this paragraph was quoted by the representative of India; however, the quotation continues with the following:

"Moreover, if the decisions of the Security Council are considered unjust by the Muslim population of Kashmir, the result may be further invasions. Thus, the maliks"—that is to say the tribal chieftains—"have already threatened, and among the 400,000 potential fighting men in the northern territories, there are thousands still eager to march. Members of the United Nations Commission will doubtless realize the possibly grave consequence of any decision they are likely to make. The nature of Pakistan's co-operation will be governed by its effect on the tribes."

An ex-sergeant of the United States Army, who rose or jumped up to be a brigadier-general under the Azad Kashmir Government, has been cited by the representative of India. The representative of India stated that this ex-army sergeant made the statement that petrol was being supplied to the Azad Kashmir Government by Pakistan authorities. However, the explanation of how the petrol was being obtained was given by the representative of India himself, or by his colleague, the other day when he was addressing the Security Council. He said it was being obtained from petrol pumps without payment and without coupons. Where is the hand of the authorities in this matter? If a man chooses to run the risk of being prosecuted -for issuing unauthorized petrol ,or chooses to make a gift of it

by not charging for it, out of his genuine and undoubted sympathy for the movement that is going on in Kashmir, how can the Pakistan authorities—and by that I mean the governmental authorities—be charged with any complicity in the-matter?

The representative of India then stated that radio messages-were being sent by Pakistan officials. I have submitted to the Security Council the communiques of the Pakistan Army Head­quarters, issued under the authority of General Merservey, a-high-ranking British officer, who stated that none of his army-officers are at all concerned in any of these matters. But if anjp of the Poonch officers, who served previously in the Indian^ Army when it was a joint army for both India and Pakistan*, are now serving and helping the forces of the Azad Kashmir Government,    that is not the concern of the Pakistan Government.

It was then stated that Mr. Haight, the ex-sergeant in the. United States Army, had said that he understood military stores had been supplied by the Pakistan Government or the: Pakistan authorities by some process. He hints that the stores, so supplied, had been written off as "lost". How can he know what was being done in Pakistan when he was serving ia. Kashmir? Here is a gentleman who has gone out, according to-the representative of India, as a soldier of fortune, who has. come away under circumstances that he has himself explained,, and who has been making statements both with regard to the time when he was in Pakistan and to that when he was outside Pakistan. If we are to accept his statements, there are all sorts of things which he has said, including some things which the representative of India would not be willing to admit. He stated, the following in a radio broadcast,       as it was printed on* 17 December in the newspaper Dawn:

"It reminded me often of the American War for Indepen­dence, in what is represented—a fight to make a government of the people, by the people and for the people, to destroy,, once and for all, the rule of tyranny. The war in Kashmir* which the Azad forces are waging against the forces of/ reaction and tyranny, is truly a people's war for liberty and-.

justice. You can probably imagine how much brutality and oppression it took to arouse a

peace-loving people to this magnificent effort. I have passed through most of the affected areas and I have seen utter devastation of Muslim villages perpetrated by the Dogras. Their houses were razed to the ground, their womenfolk abducted, their crops burned, and themselves driven to the hills for safety, there to start their fight for freedom, ill-clad, ill-fed and ill-equipped. The Azad forces have fought their battles with little more than sheer courage against vastly superior odds: the organized forces of the former Maharaja and the Government of India. With all the might of their modern equipment, this unholy alliance has not been able to win a single major battle yet, nor diminish the confidence of the Azad forces in ultimate victory."

He stresses here the fact that there is practically nothing on •one side, or very little, but sheer courage; that the forces are ill-clad, ill-fed and ill-equipped, as against the well-armed forces of the Government of India. However, here is his estimate of -the entire situation, if we are to attach any importance to him. 'This is what he said after he arrived in the United States:

"They are good soldiers over there, but they don't have the modern touch and they have no imagination. With two bazookas and ten United States Army infantrymen, I could conquer Kashmir, maybe all of India."

 

That is his testimony. It is a sad prospect for the Indian Army if that is true.

In dealing with the situation in Kashmir, the representative of India has also dragged in some of the incidents inside Pakistan itself, and he has cited them as showing that some conspiracy on the Pakistan side is still in progress against the Dominion of India. He has drawn attention to the regrettable incident at Karachi of 6 January, the attack on the train at

-Gujarat and what he described as the massacre of Parachinar. He said that, had these incidents happened in the month of October, there would have been much worse reprisals in the Dominion of India, but that there had been nothing of the kind since, and that the policy of the Dominion of India was to suppress anything of that kind with a ruthless hand.

Let me draw the attention of the Security Council to what happened in Karachi on 6 January. In the Province of Sind, of which Karachi is the capital-it is also the seat of the central Government of Pakistan at the moment—there are at the present time pockets of non-Muslims, including numbers of Sikhs who desire to leave the Province of Sind by way of the sea and to go down to Bombay. The Government of Sgid has come to an arrangement with the High Commissioner for India, stationed in Karachi, that this must be done under some properly organized arrangement so that no untoward incident should occur. It had been explained to him, as indeed he was-himself well aware, that as there were large number of Muslim refugees in Karachi who had escaped from East Punjab and Rajputana and from the Indian States, where that campaign of genocide had been carried on mostly at the hands of the Sikhs, the sight of a Sikh to them was like the proverbial red flag to a bull. Therefore it would be wise, in the evacuation of these Sikhs who were anxious to get to Bombay, to have them brought down from up-country by night trains, and taken over immediately from the railroad station to the particular vessel they intended to board, and on which arrangements had been made for them to travel.

That arrangement had worked quite smoothly for some time until on this particular day, in January, unfortunately a number of Sikhs took it into their heads to travel to Karachi by a day-train. When they arrived in Karachi, they hired hackney carnage to drive to a central place in Karachi where they intended to put up. But the spectacle of this procession of Sikhs driving through the main streets of Karachi to their intended destination upset the refugees, who then staged a riot, in the course of which, most unfortunately and deplorably, seventy to* eighty Sikhs lost their lives, and a number of houses of the local non-Muslim residents of Karachi were looted.

The military had arrived on the scene within a couple of hours, had shot down a number of the raiders, and had brought the situation completely under control. The Government made arrangements for the shelter, feeding and conveyance of all the non-Muslim Sikh and other refugees, and proper and adequate measures for their comfort and protection were promptly taken. In the course of two days 1,000 arrests were made of people who were suspected of complicity in the looting of the houses. The Ministers of the central Government and the provincial government went about in an effort to persuade people volun­tarily to produce the articles they had looted, a campaign which met with singular success. On the occasion when I spoke of this incident to the Security Council [235th meeting], I read of the gratitude expressed by the non-Muslim inhabitants of Karachi for the prompt help that they had received from the central Government and the provincial government.

Nevertheless, since then there have been regrettable mass­acres of Muslims in the Dominion of India and particularly at Allahabad and elsewhere in the United Province. There were also smaller incidents in other places. There is no use in blink­ing the fact that conditions continue to be very subnormal from the point of view of law and order. There are explosive elements and an explosive atmosphere in many places, which threaten to bring about a conflagration. Though credit is due to the Governments on both sides for such action as they have taken in the restoration oflaw and order, a great deal more still needs to be done to restore normal conditions, to which I shall draw the attention of the Security Council when I deal with the case under the heading of genocide.

What are the practical suggestions made by the represen­tative of India? He says it is the province of the Security Council to bring about a stoppage of fighting. There is no difference of opinion on that. It is the duty of the Government of India, the Government of Pakistan, the people in both dominions, the Maharaja, the people of Kashmir, and every­body, to see that fighting and killing, and whatever else of an undesirable character is going on, should be brought to an end at the earliest moment. There is no difference of opinion on that. The representative of India has tried to make it appear as if someone here was trying to shirk his duty in that respect. But that is not so. The difference between him and us who represent Pakistan is with regard to the method, the steps to be taken, the procedure to be adopted and the objective to be achieved. One can say: "Fighting must be stopped." Of course fighting must be stopped. The first business of the Security Council is to see that fighting does not take place and that, if it takes place, the fighting should be stopped; and having been stopped, as was stated by the representative of the United Kingdom, that it should stay stopped.

The problem before the Security Council, in this state of affairs, is to determine the quickest method of bringing about a cessation of violence and disorder,.and also the most desirable and equitable method of bringing about that result. When that result will have been achieved, the question will arise: Is there something further to be done to settle the situation; and if there is, how is it to be achieved?

What does the representative of India suggest? He says that, for the sake of argument, he is prepared to assume that Pakistan has done all it could do, short of war, as proclaimed by its Prime Minister, to stop the infiltration of tribesmen into Kashmir. He says: I assume that; but if whatever it has done short of war has not achieved this objective, Pakistan should not hesitate to go to war to achieve this objective. That is strange advice to give when the object, even of the representative of India, is to bring about an immediate stoppage of the fighting. In order to bring about an immediate stoppage of fighting, according to him, not only should this war in Kashmir continue between the people of Kashmir and the Maharaja, but Pakistan should start a new war on the frontier with the tribes in the tribal area. That would widen the area of conflict and might even start a conflagration, and if there were no other means but this of stopping the fighting, there might be no escape from it. But there is a readier, more equitable, just and fair means of stopping the fighting, and not only of stopping the infiltration of the tribesmen into Kashmir, but of stopping the fighting bet­ween the people of Kashmir and the forces, such as they remain, of the Maharaja, and the forces of the Indian Union now in Kashmir.

These are the steps which India proposes should be taken to stop the infiltration of troops. Very well, that leaves the forces of the Indian Union and the people of Kashmir, As for the people of Kashmir, although the words have not actually been used, that gap in the argument can be filled by saying that they would be easily subdued. I use the word "subdued" because, when I said "crushed" on a certain occasion the representative of India objected.

The representatives of India then say: Having brought the resistance to an end by the use of force we are authorized, on behalf of the Maharaja, to say that he will take steps to set up a responsible government in Kashmir. What steps he will take, and how he will achieve this purpose, is his business. Once that has been done, he will also take steps to have a plebiscite held in Kashmir in order that the vote of the people may determine whether Kashmir wishes to accede to Pakistan or to India.

The representative of India does concede that, in this ques­tion of the accession of Kashmir, Pakistan is vitally concerned. Nevertheless, he says, it is the business of the Maharaja. He will organize and conduct the plebiscite, although subject to the supervision or advice of such persons as the Security Council might appoint. With all respect, I submit that that is no solution to the problems with which the Security Council is faced, and that it is not the way to bring about a cessation of the fighting. However, a promise on behalf of the Maharaja to the people of Kashmir that, once they had been subdued and their resistance broken, he would take steps to set up a responsible government, would not persuade a single one of them to lay down his arms. It is a vain hope, and would not be a method of bringing about a cessation of violence and disorder.

The object of the Indian Government is to bring about con­ditions under which it might be able to make sure of a military triumph and to teach the people of Kashmir a lesson. Even if this were achieved, however, it you merely leave the embers -of discontent smouldering under the surface, with the possibility of their flaring up again at any moment. It would not bring peace, although it might bring suppression and a good deal of oppression.

Assume that the draft resolution presented by the represen­tative of India this afternoon is adopted, that the Commission appointed by the Security Council is directed to make an investigation, and that Pakistan is directed by the Security Council to do nothing which is contrary to its international obligations. If Pakistan is already doing nothing contrary to those obligations, the draft resolution carries the matter no further. On the other hand, if there is a difference of opinion between India and Pakistan on that point, what happens? Pakistan takes stricter and more rigorous measures to stop what the Dominion of India desires. How­ever, that does not end the fighting. How could it?

If even these measures do not stop the tribesmen coming in, then, it is said, war should be waged against them. I have already commented on that solution. But, even assuming that every single tribesman can be prevented from coming into Kashmir, how does that stop the fighting? Obviously, it does not. Thus, it is argued, the only method of stopping the fight­ing is either to crush the whole of this movement in Kashmir, or to give up the struggle against it if it gathers such force that it cannot be controlled there. In either event the fighting will eventually stop. But is that the way in which it is desired that it should be stopped—by means of a military triumph on the part of one side or the other? Is it the function of the Security Council to bring about a cessation of fighting, whether in Kashmir or elsewhere, by this means, and to hold the ring, as it were, and say to the parties: "Now you can go ahead. Who ever proves stronger will vanquish the weaker, and thus we shall bring about a stoppage of the fighting?" That stoppage would come about in any case.

The whole of the argument of the representative of India, if it amounts to anything, amounts to this: The infiltration of tribesmen into Kashmir has afforded a strengthening, a stiffen­ing to the resistance of the people of Kashmir which is making it very difficult for the forces of the Indian Dominion to suppress the revolt in Kashmir or to neutralize it. Make Pakistan stop tribesmen from coming in, by rigorous measures if possible, by going to war with them if other measures fail. Then the fighting in Kashmir will be stopped. How? According to the representative of India, by enabling the armed forces to crush the rebellion in Kashmir.

 

That is the method suggested. But nothing will be achieved by so doing. There will be no end to the fighting. The people may be suppressed for a time, but they cannot be suppressed for all time. If Pakistan is forced to go to war with the tribes­men, the only result will be that instead of one conflict there will be two, and instead of one party fighting, there will be two. Moreover, there will be the added danger of a much vaster conflagration on a much larger scale.

Now I come to the draft resolutions. I should like to draw the attention of the Security Council first to the draft resolution that we had the honor to submit to the President on 27 January. We took the course, perhaps mistakenly, of going, carefully through the proceedings of previous Security Council meetings devoted to the study of the Kashmir question, and we made careful note of what had been said by the members with regard to the measures that might be taken and the methods that might be adopted to achieve an amicable settlement of the-dispute between Pakistan and India and to bring peace and security to Jammu and Kashmir. We also took careful and respectful note of the draft resolution that the President circulated among the delegations on the afternoon of 24 January after the meeting of the Security Council [235th meeting]. We framed our draft resolution on the basis of the draft resolution of the President and the observations that had been made by the members of the Security Council, and I most respectfully submit that there is not one word in the draft resolution we submitted, let alone a whole suggestion or proposal, that is not taken literally from either the President's draft resolution or the speeches of members of the Security Council. There is not one word which is not based directly upon what was said in the Security Council.

I shall now respectfully draw the attention of the Security Council to the draft resolution we submitted. The first para­graph reads:

"The Security Council,

"Whereas India and Pakistan recognize that the question whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to Pakistan or to India must be decided through the demo­cratic method of a plebiscite to be held under international authority, control and responsibility, in order to ensure complete impartiality...."

The first paragraph differs in two respects from the Presi­dent's draft resolution: First, the word "referendum" was omitted, although that omission, as the President himself explained, was by agreement; and second, in place of the phrase "the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir", there was substituted the phrase "the question whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall accede to Pakistan or to India". That change, also, was made by agreement.

The next paragraph reads:

"Whereas the parties, being both Members of the United Nations, agree that such plebiscite should be organized, held and supervised under the authority and responsibility of the Security Council..."

These are the very words of the President himself. The draft resolution we submitted continues:

"Take note with satisfaction of this agreement, and

"Being of the view that the establishment of certain condi­tions is essential for the holding of such a plebiscite,

"Resolves to direct the Commission set up under its resolu­tion of 20 January 1948 [document S-654] as follows:

"The Commission shall arrange for:

"1. The establishment of an impartial interim administra­tion in the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

"2. The withdrawal from the territories of the State of Jammu and Kashmir of the armed forces of the Indian Union and the tribesmen; also all trespassers whether belonging to Pakistan or the Indian Union;

"3. The return of all residents of the Jammu and Kashmir State who have left or have been compelled to leave the State as a result of the tragic events since 14 August 1947;

"4. The holding of a plebiscite to ascertain the free, fair and unfettered will of the people of the State as to whether the State shall accede to Pakistan or to India.

 

Those are the four sub-clauses in the latter part of the draft resolution. As I have submitted, they have all been taken from what has been stated by the members of the Security Council in meetings on this question. As a matter of fact, there is not much dispute with regard to sub-clause 3, "the return of all residents of the Jammu and Kashmir State who have left or have been compelled to leave the State...." Therefore, authority for sub-clause 3 need not be cited, though it does exist.

In the 235th meaning of the Security Council, the representa­tive of the United States said:

"It seems to me that our advice to the two parties should be—and that is what they are asking for when they come here—that they proceed with the Kashmir matter, without prejudice to the other question; complete the negotiations that are now pending; and, with respect to the media and methods of creating those conditions in which a fair plebis­cite can he held, arrange an interim government that is recognized as free from the smell of brimstone"—whatever that might mean—"as nearly impartial and perfect as two great countries like India and Pakistan can make it, in which the rest of the world will have confidence as being fair."

That though is included in the draft resolution under sub-clause 1, "the establishment of an impartial interim administra­tion in the State of Jammu and Kashmir."

The representative of the United States went on to say: "Of course, the agreement should be such as would invite the return of emigres to their homes." This thought is included in sub-

1. 3.         

Continuing the statement of the representative of the United States: "It should be such an interim arrangement as would open up the ballot boxes to everybody with the utmost free­dom, and without any restraint except the restraint of main­tenance of order under the law." This thought also aims at having an impartial interim administration, as set forth in sub-clause 1 of the draft resolution.

The representative of the United States then went on to say that it might be "worthwhile for the parties involved, in their search for peace and for a real, true settlement of a very com­plex situation, to conduct all these proceedings—the plebiscite especially —under the ae^is of the Security Council." This thought supports the preamble drafted by the President of the Security Council.

The representative of Canada then stated: "..the discussions between the representatives of India and Pakistan, under the auspices .of the President of the Security Council, will continue so that a basis of arrangement may be reached to terminate the fighting; to afford security to the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir under some authority which will be recognized by everyone concerned as strictly impartial; and, most important, to provide for a plebiscite of the people in which all of them will be permitted to express without fear or favour their wishes as to the future government of the State."

The representative of France then suggested three conditions which he believed to be necessary in connexion with this plebis­cite, as follows:

"1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir." This requirement is contained in sub-clause 2 of the draft resolution.

"2. The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race —Hindu or Muslim—to their places of origin in the State." This requirement is contained in sub-clause 3 of the draft resolution.

"3. The establishment of a free administration which would not exert pressure on the population and would give absolute guarantees of a free vote." This requirement is contained in sub-clause 1 of the draft resolution.

The representative of France, after an intervention of the representative of Syria, explained that by "troops" he meant both regulars and irregulars, including the tribesmen.

That is the authority for that draft resolution. However, we were disappointed, when this draft resolution was presented, that the representative of India was not prepared to regard it even as a basis for discussion. As I have said, every word in it was based upon the advice, to say the least, that the members of the Security Council had given to the parties.

The later course of the negotiations was summed up by the President when he made his report. I now come to the two draft resolutions that are under discussion [documents S',661 and Sj662. As will be observed, the draft resolution relating to the plebiscite....

The President: May I interrupt the representative of Pakistan for a moment. I am informed that, if this discussion is to con­tinue, it would be of convenience to most of the members of the Security Council to adjourn at this time. However, if the representative of Pakistan will be able to conclude shortly, we shall continue to hear his statement.

(SCOR, 3rd Year, Mtg. No. 239, pp. 314-351)