28011948 Text of the Speech of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Representative of India in the Security Council Meeting held on 28 January 1948

28011948 Text of the Speech of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, Representative of India in the Security Council Meeting held on 28 January 1948

I gathered that the idea of an exposition at length with regard to the scheme proposed on either side had been dropped for the time being, because, when the President put the question as to whether either party wanted to say anything on what had been :placed before the Security Council, neither the representative of Pakistan nor I responded. The President then went on to suggest that the Security Council might proceed to consider his own proposal and, further, that instead of dealing with the report as a comprehensive document, the Security Council might concentrate attention at different stages on particular portions of that report.

In this connexion he remarked that we might take up the question of the plebiscite. Unfortunately, lam suffering today under a physical disability in the shape of throat trouble which affects my voice, and while I am desirous of speaking at consi­derable length on any issue which the President may place before the Security Council—particularly that of the plebiscite—I have to give some consideration to the condition of my voice and should not like to overstrain myself to the point of being unable to speak at all during the rest of the debate.

As the President has mentioned the plebiscite, I should like to make one or two observations for consideration by the Security Council before it goes on to consider that particular issue. If the Security Council is to consider the report as presented by the President, I think that it would be of enormous help to the parties concerned if the President could indicate at this stage the procedure which he proposes to follow: that is, whether he intends to take up particular aspects of this matter, debate them and arrive at conclusions on one aspect after another, or to debate this as an issue which has many different aspects and, although discussion takes place on particular aspects at particular stages, to defer conclusions until the discussion of the whole matter is completed.

I would suggest respectfully that, having reached the stage that we have, and having also decided that we must discuss the President's report—which includes two schemes which are very much opposed one to the other in regard to two or three fundamentals—the Security Council must decide whether it intends to follow any particular plan in considering the report. I desire that this matter should be elucidated before offering my comments on the suggestion of the President that we should take one particular aspect and debate it now.

I wish to say this because it seems to me, that since the President himself has said that the one matter on which we are all fundamentally agreed is the stoppage of fighting and the measures necessary to bring that about, it would be putting the cart before the horse if the Security Council omitted to consider that point at the very beginning but proceeded instead to deal with the question of a plebiscite which, if it is in fact a matter for discussion and decision by this body, should come at the very end.

For these reasons I suggest with great respect to the Security Council that it should now take up the question of the order in which it intends to consider the various questions connected with this trouble. I attach the very greatest value to its consideration of the question of the measures necessary to bring about the stoppage of the fighting before it enters upon the discussion of anything else. I am sorry that I cannot speak at greater length owing to the disability I have mentioned.

The President (translated from French): First of all 1 am sure the members of the Council, like myself, are sorry to have learned that the representative of India was finding it difficult to speak. I am sure we all wish for his early recovery and for an improvement in the condition of his throat.

To avoid any misunderstanding T should like to emphasize that I am particularly anxious, and I feel sure all the members of the Council agree with me on this, that the parties should have the fullest opportunity to state their views on anything I have just said in my report. If I have been as discreet as possible in commenting on the proposals submitted by the representatives of India and Pakistan, and on their views on the suggestions I have made myself, it is precisely because I wanted to give them the opportunity of making, on these matters, all the amplifications and comments they judged proper.

I therefore suggest that, in this first discussion at any rate, no restrictions should be imposed, and all points arising during the discussion should be examined. After such a general dis­cussion we should be able to see whether it is advisable to concentrate our attention on any particular point.

Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan): At the outset, I desire to express our deep gratitude to the President of the Security Council for his continuous and unfailing efforts to bring the parties together, and to seek a way of settlement between them by agreement. I very much fear that we must have been the source of great weariness to him. However, we never noticed any signs of impatience on his part.

The President of the Security Council has indicated the possibility that his responsibilities in, connexion with this particular matter, which he has so far carried with admirable patience, impartiality and courtesy, may have to be transferred to his successor. Of course, that is a matter for the Security Council to decide, but I do venture to express the hope that if it is at all possible, the President, in his capacity as represen­tative of the member States of the Security Council, might be requested to carry on the functions which he has been carrying on hitherto with respect to this matter.

I also desire to associate myself with the wish expressed by the President that the representative of India will soon be rid of the impediment from which he is unfortunately suffering this afternoon.

With regard to what the representation of India has just submitted to the Security Council, I desire to say the following. I respectfully venture to submit that it would be of help to the Security Council if it kept in view the scope of the debate with which it is dealing at the moment. It has been represented on behalf of India that the dispute lies within a very narrow scope. India has, in fact, set out this position at the outset of docu­ment No. 2, which was submitted by it to the President of the Security Council on 27 January.

Paragraph A of section I of document No. 2 summarizes the point of view of the representative of India. In his opening address, also, he said that the issue was simple and straight­forward; that, according to his Government's view, the State of Jammu and Kashmir having acceded to India in regard to defence, foreign affairs and communications, it became India's duty to deal with this threat to the security of the State which had arisen. Accordingly, the representative of India submitted that his Government's dispute with Pakistan is that Pakistan has failed in the discharge of certain obligations of an inter­national character that fall upon Pakistan vis-a-vis India and vis-a-vis the State of Kashmir.

That is a very simple view to take of the matter. At the very threshold of this problem, Pakistan raised the question of the legality and validity of Kashmir's purported accession to India. That is one problem.

There is another problem: Why is there fighting in Kashmir? Who is fighting? For what are they fighting? What are the incidents that led to that fighting? This problem raises a number of questions to which I have already advertised in the submissions I have made to the Security Council hitherto. But one outstanding fact is that the fight is being carried on mainly by the people of the State, whatever may be the degree of help they are receiving from outside, and the causes which led to that fighting, as well as the objectives which those people set for themselves when they started the fighting. This I have already submitted to the Security Council, particularly in the words of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah

himself. That is another aspect of the overall dispute, True, India has claimed at various stages that all it desired from the Security Council was a directive to Pakistan to do certain things or to refrain from doing certain other things which India alleged it was the duty of Pakistan to do but which it was not doing, or which it was the duty of Pakistan to refrain from doing but in which it was indulging. All those allegations, even if they could be made out in fact—which is disputed—are based upon the assumption of the validity and the legality of the accession of the State of Kashmir to India, which raises, as the Security Council will observe, questions of fact and questions of law.

I submit, with all respect, that the reason why the question of a plebiscite is so important is that, irrespective of the views which the parties take of the questions I have submitted, this is the one point of agreement which can lead to a settlement without the Security Council's having to engage in investigation of facts and an investigation of questions of law which might be of so complex and of so delicate a nature as to necessitate an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice.

Pakistan was and is willing to forego all these investigations if the one point on which the parties are agreed, namely, the question of the accession of the Kashmir State to India or to Pakistan shall be decided by means of a plebiscite, and if, in order to secure its fairness and impartiality, the plebiscite is carried out under the aegis of the Security Council. If this objective is agreed upon, if the method of settlement is not in dispute between the parties, it seems to me, with all respect, that it is futile to enter into debates that may turn out to be purely academic, having regard to the object that has to be achieved. Therefore, I respectfully submit that the suggestion made by the President should be followed; that the Security Council should concentrate upon securing, at as early a date as possible and under conditions which will ensure that it will be free and impartial, the verdict of the people of Kashmir upon this question.

Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar (India): I have asked the President's permission to intervene, at this early stage, on the particular point which has been raised by the representative of Pakistan. The Security Council was considering whether the question of the plebiscite should have precedence over every other question connected with this problem.

I urged that the stoppage of fighting should have precedence over everything else. The representative of Pakistan has urged that the substantial matter in issue is the question of accession, and, therefore, the question of the plebiscite must have prece­dence over everything else. In supporting this position, he advanced an argument which, it seems to me, cannot appeal to an international body the primary function of which is to see that every Member of the United Nations respects the rights of other nations and discharges, in the proper manner, its own obligations to other nations.

The argument advanced was: Let us assume that Pakistan is guilty of everything that it has been alleged to have done which it should not have done, and that it has refrained from doing what it should have done. Even so, it seemed to be argued, the question of Pakistan's international obligations would depend, primarily, upon the other question: whether or not Kashmir's accession to India was valid. I submit to this international body that this argument will not stand examina­tion, for this reason: Let us assume—I shall use the same kind of argument that was used by the representative of Pakistan— that this accession was invalid, which we do not for a moment admit; Pakistan would still have been under the obligations from which we say it has departed in this connexion.

Let us assume that Kashmir's accession to India is illegal. What would be the position? The position would be that Kashmir has not validly acceded to India: but it has not acceded to Pakistan at all. So that the position would be the following: Kashmir as a State, standing by itself, contiguous to both India and Pakistan, in difficulty, appeals to its neighbour, India, for help. The legitimate Government of Kashmir applies to India for help. India goes to its aid. By all principles that govern international relations, India has the right to go to the aid of a legitimate Government, even if the opposition to that Govern­ment is from its own insurgent nationals. India was perfectly within its rights in going to the aid of Kashmir.

What would be Pakistan's position? I am assuming for the moment, though I do not grant the assumption in full, that the bulk of the trouble in Kashmir is the work of Kashmir nationals, the people from outside having only helped those nationals. I say, in those circumstances, a neighbouring country has to respect the obligations resting upon neutrals under international law in such matters. It has not the right to go, and it cannot claim the privilege or the liberty of going to the help of insurgents against the constituted authority in a neighbouring State. That I submit, is a well understood principle in international law.

Even if India went into Kashmir not as a Dominion to which Kashmir had acceded, but as an independent neighbour­ing country, we were within our rights. Pakistan, as a similar independent neighbouring country, has not the right to go to the help of insurgents in a neighbouring State. I think the Security Council must recognize this principle of international law. I am not putting this forward as a mere legal, technical argument, but when it is sought to subordinate the precedence of the stoppage of fighting to a question like the plebiscite, then I have to point out what Pakistan's obligations are under international law, even supposing we conceded all that Pakistan claims.

Now the stark fact is there: the fighting is going on today; day after day, hour after hour, the situation is deteriorating. Yet it is proposed that we proceed to debate leisurely the question of the manner in which a plebiscite is to be held. On the question of when the plebiscite will be held, there is no difference. The only difference is in regard to the manner of holding the plebiscite, the conditions under which the plebiscite should be held. Are we going to waste time on this matter, before we consider the urgent, immediate question of stopping the fight in Kashmir?

Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan (Pakistan): I do not claim to be any kind of authority on international law, but even on the point of view submitted by the representative of India, the question is not disposed of so easily.

I have already submitted to the Security Council the cause of the fight in Kashmir. I drew attention, in my first speech, to the tragic events which have gone on in some of the other Indian States, not very far from Kashmir, where the Muslim population has been altogether wiped out. The people of Kashmir sensing that their Ruler, in spite of the overwhelming population of Kashmir are Muslims, was designing to accede to India and, consequently, fearful that if accession to India were brought about, their fate would be similar to the fate of the Muslims of those States in East Punjab which had acceded to India, were in a state of terror. In Kashmir, the troops of the Maharaja, presumably under his orders, undertook what appeared to the people of those areas of Kashmir to be a campaign of extermination of Muslims. These people, therefore, rose against these acts of extermination; they drove away the forces of the Maharaja from large areas of Kashmir; they set up a provisional Government of their own large tracts of the Jammu and Kashmir State, in which the rule of the Maharaja no longer prevails. Gilgit is one of those huge territories which is in that position, and there are several other portions of Kashmir territory which are in that position.

These people took to arms in order to preserve their very existence and to win back their liberties. I do not know at what stage international law would draw the line as to the provisional Azad Government of Kashmir being a Government legitimately fighting for the preservation of the existence and liberty of the people of Kashmir. But that is the picture, and that does raise a delicate question.

The representative of India stated that the immediate and grave question concerns the stoppage of the fighting. But what does he mean by "stoppage of the fighting"? The only pro­posal that he has advanced with regard to the stoppage of the righting is that the Security Council should issue a directive that Pakistan do more than it has been doing to stop the

infiltration of the tribesmen. That is all. Will that stop the fighting in Kashmir? I submit that it will not. Undoubtedly, the object should be to stop the fighting. We are not saying the fighting should not be stopped. But we desire to stress the fact that what we must first consider, is: What will stop the fighting in Kashmir? What will stop the righting in Kashmir will be the removal of the apprehension of the people of Kashmir that they will be subjected to the fate to which Muslims similarly situated in Kapurthala were subjected or to which Muslim minorities in the States of Patiala, Jind, Nabha and Faridkot were subjected in spite of the fact that, at that time, those States were in accession to India.

That is the first step which will lead to the stoppage of fighting. Once that assurance can be devised and made effec­tive, it will also be the strongest step leading toward the stoppage of the infiltration of the tribesmen. Once the people of Poonch, Mirpur and Gilgit are satisfied that it is for them to decide the question as to whether they will accede to Pakistan or whether they will accede to India, that there will be no perse­cution of victimization, and that the decision will be entirely in their own hands, the principal grievance—or at least the reason for their terror and apprehension—will have disappeared. It will then be possible to stop the fighting easily.

I ask the President and the members of the Security Council to assume for a moment, without our making any admissions, that the tribesmen could be physically stopped altogether from coming into Kashmir. Docs that put an end to the fighting inside Kashmir? Does that settle the dispute between the people of Kashmir and the Maharaja? Up to a certain time, the Maharaja did represent the legitimate Government of Kashmir. I submit that when his troops—as I said, presumably under his orders and direction—undertook this campaign, the elements of which I have already submitted to the Security Council, regardless of what the legal position may have been, the moral validity of his continuing to rule over Kashmir disappeared, and that does raise a delicate question of inter­national law. The only way to settle the dispute, and therefore the only effective way also to stop the fighting, is to convey an assurance to the people of Kashmir, so that they may be satis­fied that, under impartial conditions, the decision will now be in their hands. That will bring an end to fighting. The mere stopping of infiltration from this side will not stop this trouble inside Kashmir. That is the point which I desire to stress.