Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

The French delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us on the conflict between India and Pakistan. It considers that it was essential for the Security Council, after having confirmed the need for strict compliance with the cease-fire, to provide for measures to ensure the formulation of a plan for the withdrawal of armed personnel which would really be applicable in the field.

My Government is sure that, once this condition is fulfilled, India and Pakistan will decide, as required by the Council's resolutions, to withdraw their armed personnel back to the positions held by them at the beginning of August. We think that it was also useful that the Council, in the hope of a lasting settlement of the problem of Kashmir- which is at the root of this conflict-should have reaffirmed its resolution 211 (1965) "in all its parts", thus marking its decision to consider, as soon as operative paragraph 1 of resolution 210 (1965) has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards that settlement, and also that the Council renewed its appeal to the two Governments to utilise all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, to this end.

It is, in fact, both the responsibility of the Security Council and the wish of all countries friendly to India and Pakistan and thus of France-that an atmosphere of peace and understanding should be restored in this deeply disturbed area of the world.

While this is the desire of my Government, I should like to state that our approval of this draft resolution is subject to the reservations which I made at the 1247th meeting on the principles which, in our opinion, should guide the Security Council in the application of its decisions.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 5 November 1965

I regret the necessity to take the floor again. I understand that the representative of the Soviet Union has a difference in principle-not only with the United States but very broadly with other members of the Security Council as well, as is evident from the statements made here today about the role of the Security Council and other organs of the United Nations, including specifically the Secretary-General. That difference in principle has been stated here, and I shall not repeat our opposing views.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

In connection with the statement just made the representative of the United States, I should like to draw attention to the following.

First, that part of the statement in which that representative tried to depict the United States delegation as having been constructive and co-operative in regard to the question under consideration does not correspond to reality. It is at variance with the truth, and, in our statement at the 1247th meeting of the Council, we were obliged to remind the Council of what had really happened during the discussions, in particular during the very lengthy, highly complex, tense and so-called informal consultations. The United States delegation failed to show the slightest desire to cooperate with regard to the questions of principle to which I referred a moment ago, either with the USSR delegation or with other delegations. With the permission of the French representative, I should like to draw the Council's attention to the fact that our position on this subject coincided with his.

Thus, the United States delegation did not wish to co-operate with any one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

Secondly, it is regrettable that although the Security Council has just adopted a resolution, the United States representative continues to maintain his position and argues that it is consistent with the United Nations Charter and with the rights and competence vested in the highest organ of the United Nations, the Security Council. We differ in our understanding of the provisions of the Charter and the basic responsibilities of the Security Council and we reject the interpretation given by the United States representative.

I thought it necessary to draw attention to these two points in connection with the United States representative's statement.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

I am only going to say a very few words. The position of the United States in reference to the matter of principle to which the representative of the Soviet Union has referred was stated at length when we met last to consider this problem and it needs no reiteration. It is perfectly apparent that it is broadly supported in the Security-Council. I should like merely to point out that the United States has been very anxious and has attempted by every means at its disposal, without sacrificing Charter principles important to the integrity of this Organisation, to arrive at an accommodation of all points of view in the discussions that have been going on. It has not demonstrated any attempt to be intransigent, but, on the contrary, has tried to cooperate, in a spirit of friendship, conciliation and compromise, to arrive at a solution of all the problems which have been raised. Unfortunately, this has not come about, and if it has not come about, it is not the responsibility of the United States for this outcome on this phase of the situation.

I should like, finally, inted out that it was not the United States which injected this problem into the debate; rather it was the representative of the Soviet Union who did so. We would have been more content had we continued to deal with the substance of the problem, which we have dealt with today, without prejudice to principles that anybody holds and without prejudice to a resolution of those principles at an appropriate time by the Security Council. This has not, fortunately, been possible. Therefore, what the sponsors of the draft resolution did today is, in my view, the only thing that could have been done under the circumstances.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

In connection with the vote just taken, the USSR delegation would like to make the following statement.

The main task now before us is, as we have pointed out in various statements in the Council, to ensure the observance of the provisions relating to the cease-fire and the speedy withdrawal of the troops and military personnel of both sides to the positions which they occupied before 5 August 1965. We continue to maintain that position, in the belief that it is in conformity with the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan and with the interests of peace.

My delegation also drew the Council's attention to certain matters of principle regarding the practical implementation of the resolutions which the Council adopted earlier. In its statement at the 1247th meeting of the Council on 25 October 1965, my delegation stated that the action taken by the Secretary-General with regard to the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan following the adoption by the Security Council of its resolutions 210 (1965) and 211 (1965), was at variance with the basic provisions of the Charter. We emphasised that under these basic provisions of the Charter only the Security Council was competent to take the necessary decisions on all specific matters connected with the United Nations military observers.

It is the Council that must decide such questions as the functions of military observers, their number, their command, their terms of reference, the financing of their activities, and so on. We have drawn particular attention to the fact that the Security Council set a definite time-limit for the stay of the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan, which should in no case exceed three months.

We must, unfortunately, what out that, although the Soviet Union raised this question of principle both during the prolonged consultations among members of the Security Council and at the first meeting of this series [1247th meeting], this anomalous situation and this irregular practice, which are at variance with the basic provisions of the Charter, have not been discontinued or corrected. These extremely important specific questions concerning the United Nations military observers continue to be decided Council. outside the Security

This shows that the questions of principle and constitutionality raised by the Soviet delegation were not given due consideration or taken into account. In the draft resolution that was adopted because of the negative position taken by various members of the Security Council, particularly the United States, the above mentioned question of principle was passed over. It was as a direct result of the negative position taken by these States that the unanimity prevailing in the Security Council during the discussion of the India-Pakistan conflict was destroyed.

In the light of the foregoing, and considering such a position to be intolerable, we were unable to endorse the draft resolution and therefore abstained in the vote.

In conclusion, the USSR delegation wishes to state that, if specific questions relating to the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan are in future decided outside the Security Council and in violation of the Charter, the Soviet Union reserves the right to draw the appropriate conclusions and reconsider its position accordingly.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Fernando Ortiz Sanz as representative of Bolivia in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

If no other member of the Council wishes to speak. I shall take the liberty of speaking briefly as the representative of BOLIVIA.

An armed conflict of vast proportions, involving two States Members of the United Nations, with a population of almost 600 million human beings, was unchained during the early days of August 1965, to the concern of the world.

Fully aware of its primary responsibility to maintain international peace and security, which is expressly conferred on it by Article 24 of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council met immediately to discuss the problem. Resolutions 209 (1965), 210 (1965), 211 (1965) and 214 (1965), unanimously adopted by the members of the Council, bear eloquent testimony to the great sense of responsibility of all members here and to the laudable spirit of negotiation and compromise which endowed those resolutions with the powerful force of unanimity.

The Secretary-General, acting with commendable zeal and with the speed which the circumstances required, soon managed, in spite of the size and complexity of the problem, to see to it that the resolutions which we are discussing began to be effective and obtained a cease-fire which was, and still is, the essential first step towards the total implementation of our decisions. The Secretary-General's reports [S/6699 and S/6710], together with their addenda, are proof of the impartiality and dedication with which he has acted in this delicate matter and my Government would like to record its express approval of all the measures adopted.

Additional information was subsequently provided which showed the precarious nature of the cease-fire and other factors intervened which impeded progress towards the withdrawal of troops. Thus, the Security Council, acceding to the request from Pakistan mentioned in our agenda, has decided to discuss the problem once more, in order to continue to fulfil its duty. For it is our duty, as it is that of all the servants and organs of the United Nations, not only to draft resolutions but to ensure, with all the means within our power, that those resolutions are effective.

History is not nourished by isolated documents, however important they may be. But when documents are objective, adequate and practical, they do point the way to coherent and permanent action.

In the case before us it can be stated that the Council's resolutions, which were unanimously adopted, do point, in each and every one of their paragraphs, a clear way towards a solution of this grave dispute, namely: cease-fire withdrawal of armed personnel, an appeal to all States to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation in the area and, at the proper time, a consideration of the steps which could be taken for co-operation towards a settlement of the basic political problem.

For this reason, the Bolivian delegation has decided to co-sponsor the draft resolution before us since it considers it a new, clear and strong instrument to promote the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan through application of our previous resolutions in all their parts.

Speaking as President, I consider that the moment has now come to put to the vote the draft resolution co-sponsored by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay [S/6876].

A vote was taken by show of hands

In favour Bolivia, China, France, Ivory Coast, Malaysia, Netherlands, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Uruguay. Against: None.

Abstaining Jordan, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The draft resolution was adopted by 9 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

The French delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution before us on the conflict between India and Pakistan. It considers that it was essential for the Security Council, after having confirmed the need for strict compliance with the cease-fire, to provide for measures to ensure the formulation of a plan for the withdrawal of armed personnel which would really be applicable in the field.

My Government is sure that, once this condition is fulfilled, India and Pakistan will decide, as required by the Council's resolutions, to withdraw their armed personnel back to the positions held by them at the beginning of August. We think that it was also useful that the Council, in the hope of a lasting settlement of the problem of Kashmir- which is at the root of this conflict-should have reaffirmed its resolution 211 (1965) "in all its parts", thus marking its decision to consider, as soon as operative paragraph 1 of resolution 210 (1965) has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards that settlement, and also that the Council renewed its appeal to the two Governments to utilise all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter of the United Nations, to this end.

It is, in fact, both the responsibility of the Security Council and the wish of all countries friendly to India and Pakistan and thus of France-that an atmosphere of peace and understanding should be restored in this deeply disturbed area of the world.

While this is the desire of my Government, I should like to state that our approval of this draft resolution is subject to the reservations which I made at the 1247th meeting on the principles which, in our opinion, should guide the Security Council in the application of its decisions.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. E.L. Farra (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

My first pleasant duty is to extend to you, Mr. President, on behalf of my Government and on my own behalf our warmest congratulations on your assuming again the Presidency of the Council for this month. Your past experience as Professor of law, culture and history, your well known record as a diplomat and a statesman, your tact and wisdom, all these high qualities will, I am sure, contribute to the success of our work.

We have before us a draft resolution submitted by five non permanent members of the Security Council. This draft resolution is the result of much consultation and hard work, and my delegation pays tribute to the co-sponsors for their patience and constructive efforts. We wish to state, however, that it was not possible for us to co-sponsor this draft resolution, and we regret that we are not in a position to vote for this draft resolution.

We made our position clear earlier, and we do not see any development which would warrant a change in our stand. The draft resolution, in our opinion, does not adequately reflect the reality of the situation. We think it would help to solve the problem if a cease-fire, a withdrawal and a solution were all given the same emphasis in the present draft resolution. We all have rightly concentrated on the cease-fire and withdrawal. This is important, but we know that after a cease-fire and withdrawal we shall again come face to face with the basic problem, the problem which led to the unfortunate hostilities. To concentrate only on the cease-fire and withdrawal will bring us no nearer to a solution, and for this reason we believe that we should benefit from our own experience.

There was a cease-fire for more than seventeen years between India and Pakistan. The problem came again and again before this Council, but no adequate steps were taken to bring about a solution; as a result, what do we find ourselves facing today but open and full-scale, undeclared war between the two friendly States of India and Pakistan. Time did not and cannot erase the problem. We cannot, therefore, give our endorsement to any measure that, instead of taking us forward, may freeze the problem and keep it where it was.

I wonder whether this draft resolution in its present form would bring permanent peace to the area. We submit that, if there is a will, both the cease-fire and the withdrawal can be completed within a very short time. Twenty miles on one side and perhaps fifteen miles on the other side certainly do not require weeks and months. And, if there is a genuine desire, a solution is also certainly attainable. That is why I submit that withdrawal and solution are two sides of the same coin. They go together, and it is not realistic to insist on one and not to put the same emphasis on the other. This has been the mistake made in the past, and the Council in its wisdom may want to benefit from its own experience.

In this connection, I must state that the leader of the Uruguayan delegation, Mr. Paysse Reyes, who was our President in October, made in his brilliant intervention this morning a constructive approach to the problem. His statement should be given adequate attention by the Security Council, for he raised many points which deserve study and consideration. We should ponder them, since they come from a man of rich experience. To my delegation, this was a sincere effort to avoid further difficulties and more bloodshed, and it is for this reason that we insisted on our same stand vis-a-vis this draft resolution.

The situation is becoming more serious every day and calls for further consideration. We are unhappy to find ourselves in a position in which we have to voice a point of view which may not be acceptable to both parties. Our Foreign Minister stated: "... Jordan, as part of the Arab world, has always been linked by the closest bonds of brotherly friendship to these two great countries [India and Pakistan]." We want these close ties to continue. We should like to see permanent peace restored on the Indian subcontinent between these two sister States. This not only would be to the mutual advantage of India and Pakistan but also would benefit Asia, this Council and the rest of the world. We appeal to the parties to stop the violence, to exercise restraint and to negotiate this dispute with the help of the United Nations, if need be. A settlement can be reached, but this Council has to play its role in helping the parties to reach a just solution.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

Before addressing myself to the draft resolution before us, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. President, on again assuming the presidency of the Council although I was not present at the United Nations during your previous occupancy of the presidency, your distinguished career is well known and your reputation for judicious and efficient conduct of the business of this Council are well established among your colleagues, new as well as old, and has again been confirmed in your current tenure as President. I welcome your experienced leadership in what promises-as is already clear to be a busy period of activity in this Council.

We have before us today, thanks to the diligent efforts of our colleagues in the Council, a new draft resolution on the India Pakistan question. I wish to express my appreciation particularly to the sponsors and to all of the non-permanent members, as well as the permanent members, of their patient consideration of this difficult question in an attempt again to achieve the unanimity which has characterised our actions on this subject throughout the past month as well as the present month.

I share the opinion of the representative of the Netherlands that this matter has been thoroughly explored in the private consultations which have taken place and I believe that those consultations, as this draft resolution demonstrates, I have been most constructive.

In the opinion of my Government, the draft resolution fully reflects the intent of the resolutions which this Council adapted in September and represents a necessary effort to add urgency to the aspect of those resolutions which, as the Secretary-General's impartial reports demonstrate, is the most pertinent at this time, namely, the problem of withdrawal. My delegation will vote in favour of this draft resolution and we trust that it will be supported with the same unanimity which has characterised the actions which the Council took in adopting its resolutions 209 (1965), 210 (1965), 211 (1965) and 214 (1965).

Resolution 211 (1965) made a demand of the parties. This demand, as I said at that time [1242nd meeting] in supporting the resolution, was not lightly made; no demand upon Governments, Member States, is lightly made, or should be lightly made, by the Security Council. It was a demand that voiced the sentiments of virtually all Member States, as reflected in the plenary meetings of the General Assembly, and it surely reflected world opinion. It was a demand for the acceptance of a cease-fire, and that demand was, happily, accepted by both India and Pakistan.

Today, in the draft resolution before us, the Council makes a renewed demand, a new demand, in order to assure the permanence of the cease-fire. It is a demand for unconditional acceptance of the proposal on withdrawal made by the Secretary-General. I think that I can repeat what I have just said, and what I said then, that I am sure that this demand is supported by virtually all states Members of the United Nations and supported as well by world opinion, which is looking for the restoration of peaceful conditions on the subcontinent. I may say further that, as was the case with the cease-fire, this demand is likewise in the interests of both parties concerned. The sponsors have chosen the world "demand" with the utmost seriousness, and we trust and the world has the right to expect that there will be full recognition by both parties of its weight and gravity.

The emphasis in this draft resolution on withdrawal does not, in my view, alter the even balance of resolution 211 (1965) which my Government, along with all of those who voted for that resolution, supports in its entirety. The draft resolution before us today, as has been pointed out by previous speakers, reaffirms resolution 211 (1965) in all its parts. The Council stands committed to the entire resolution and I am confident that the Council will honour this commitment. It is the stated objective of the Council, as far as Council action is concerned, that the implementation of resolution 211 (1965) should take place in sequence: cease-fire, withdrawal and the steps which the Council affirms. And I quote from that resolution:

"Decides to consider as soon as paragraph 1 of Council resolution 210 (1965) has been implemented, what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict, and in the meantime calls on the two Governments to utilise all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end".

In this draft resolution, we reaffirm the declaration in all its parts, and this is only appropriate under the circumstances. On 20 September, when we had just passed the basic resolution which the draft before us today reaffirms, I emphasised, as President of the Council and speaking on behalf of all the members that the Council had spoken in terms of friendship to both parties. This morning, speaking for my Government, I should like again to stress this spirit of friendship, and again to call upon the parties to accept and implement today's draft resolution and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and his representatives and with all organs of the United Nations in implementing the resolution.

This is the obligation of both parties under their commitment to the Charter, to which we are all pledged, and the world hopefully looks for this necessary step of withdrawal as a further step towards the restoration of an honourable and permanent peace on the subcontinent.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. De Beus (Netherlands) in the Security Council ting No 1251 held on 5 November 1965

In our present debate on the conflict between India and Pakistan various questions have come up which, although they are all in some way related to the implementation of the Council's resolutions, nevertheless belong to two different categories. On the one hand, some members have discussed the steps taken. by the Secretary-General for the execution of these resolutions and the financing of the operation. Those are questions which, as the representative of the Soviet Union put it, have some significance in terms of principle, questions which reflect old differences of approach. On the other hand, the reports of the Secretary-General oblige us to pay attention to a number of unsatisfactory aspects of the implementation of our resolutions notably, at the present stage, the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel. For the sake of clearness, I intend to deal first with the more general, principal aspect-that is, the Secretary-General's mandate and the financing-and thereafter with the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed forces.

In dealing with the conflict between India and Pakistan, the Security Council has up to now been able to act with unanimity or near unanimity. The greatest significance of that lies in the fact that the Council in all its four resolutions has been able to achieve the unanimity of the permanent members. That is a new and hopeful departure, because that is how the Security Council was originally intended to operate. For many years it had been virtually impossible to obtain the unanimity of the permanent members on almost any important subject.

My delegation was therefore highly gratified at this return to action on the basis of the unanimity of the permanent members, and considers it of the utmost importance that the Council should, if possible, continue to operate on that basis.

It would, however, have been unrealistic to assume that the basic differences of opinion with regard to the organisation and financing of peace-keeping operations-differences with which we are all familiar and which played such a large and almost disastrous part during the nineteenth session of the General Assembly-would suddenly disappear. Therefore, it is certainly not surprising that at this moment, when the Security Council has initiated a new peacekeeping operation in the India-Pakistan conflict, the old differences of approach should come out again in our debate-as they did, in particular, on 25 October 1965 [1247th meeting]. Now that the question has been brought up, I should like to make clear my delegation's attitude on the subject.

In doing so, I should like above all to emphasise that my delegation can find no fault with the manner in which the Secretary-General has acquitted himself of the heavy and very difficult task imposed upon him by the Council. As has been proved here in the statements, supported by quotations, made by several speakers in the debate, the resolutions of the Council gave him a clear mandate to carry those resolutions into effect, and he did so expeditiously. Furthermore, in doing so he reported regularly and elaborately to the Council, in no less than ten reports, on all the steps he had taken. If the Council had been of the opinion that in some way the Secretary-General had gone too far, it could have expressed that view in connection with any one of his reports-but it did not do so.

That being said, however, I should add that the matter does not rest there. Our debate has shown that there are basic principles involved, on which the permanent members do not entirely agree. This my delegation highly regrets and I should like to make an attempt to find a practical way out, which we hope would enable the members of the Council to maintain their unanimity in a case such as this.

There is no urgent need at the present moment for the Security Council to lay down once and for all rules of precedents for future peace-keeping operations. The Security Council is confronted today only with the practical problem of how to have its resolutions carried out in the most effective way, without prejudice to future decisions on principle by the General Assembly, and in a manner which can command the unanimous support of its members. If is highly desirable, both for the restoration of peace between India and Pakistan and for future operations, that we should find such a method. The Security Council has raised great hopes and restored confidence in the United Nations by its unanimous and determined action in this conflict. It would be tragic if we were to squander part of that gain by differences of opinion, no matter how fundamental, over the margin of authority between the different organs of the United Nations. My delegation believes that it should be possible, and that it is possible, to achieve a practical way of proceeding further in such a case.

Let me first try to summarise briefly the different viewpoints which have been defended here. They are, roughly speaking, three. In the first place, there are those countries that hold that the basic resolutions of the Security Council contain sufficient authority for the Secretary-General to take executive measures for their implementation. Those countries believe that the Secretary-General, in doing so, should have a reasonable margin of authority and that it is sufficient if the Secretary-General regularly reports to the Security Council on his executive measures, to which the Council can then raise objections if it so wishes.

The second school of thought holds that the Security Council should be entitled, if not obliged, to pronounce itself upon the main characteristics of a particular operation initiated in the execution of its resolutions. Those directive should, according to the countries holding that view, deal with such aspects as the strength, the composition, the command, the duration and the financing of peace-keeping forces. With regard to the financing, the Council should, in that view, indicate a ceiling for the expenditures on the basis of the Secretary-General's proposals and indicate a method of financing. Within the context of the directives of the Security Council, the Secretary-General should then have freedom of action to take the necessary steps for the implementation of Security Council resolutions.

Different variations of flexibility of this point of view are possible. The reasoning behind this attitude is that under the present system extensive commitments are being made on behalf of the United Nations before the Security Council knows it, commitments which could afterwards not be rejected even if the Council should wish to do so. So much for the second school of thought.

There is a third school of thought, which goes even further and holds that decisions concerning all aspects of peacekeeping forces should emanate exclusively from the Security Council.

My delegation believes that if the aim is to guarantee a certain degree of control by the Security Council over the execution of its own resolutions, it is possible to achieve that by steering a middle course, based on a few general considerations. A first, and in our view self-evident, consideration is that the Security Council should always be entitled to interpret its own resolutions. Consequently, and in addition, it would be helpful if the Council would from time to time, whenever it. deemed that desirable, give broad directives-I emphasise the word "broad" for the execution of those resolutions. A second principle is that the ultimate approval of the financial aspects and the apportioning of the expenses rests with the General Assembly in accordance with the provisions of Article 17 of the United Nations Charter. A third principle to which we believe one should adhere is that the Secretary-General, as principal administrative officer of the Organisation, should have sufficient freedom of movement to carry out the resolutions of the Security Council without having to ask the authorization of the Council for every step in detail. If the Secretary-General should have to ask such authorization for each separate step, once the task of the implementation of a resolution had been entrusted to him, his work would, we fears, become practically impossible and the implementation of the Council's resolution would become fictitious.

A practical system based on those three principles implies that the Secretary-General should continue to report formally and regularly on the steps taken, as he has always done, but also that it might be helpful if in the future, perhaps more than heretofore, the Secretary-General and his staff would consult informally with members of the Security Council about any intended steps.

With regard to financing, it means that the Secretary General should, as soon as possible after the adoption of a Security Council resolution of this nature, make an estimate of the expenses so that the Security Council could give a directive on the general level of expenses, but that the final approval and the apportioning of these expenses should be left to the General Assembly.

These are only the rough outlines for a procedure which we could try to apply in cases such as the India-Pakistan conflict. We believe that such a procedure would go a long way in meeting the desire, which we understand, of those members who hold that the Security Council should exercise greater control over the execution of its own decisions; at the same time this procedure would, we believe, be flexible enough to leave the Secretary-General the necessary leeway in order not be hamstrung in the exercise of his important and heavy executive functions.

It may be an advantage that the Council need not take decisions on these matters as a general rule for all cases and for all time, but that it can feel its way through by practical experience. What we wish to achieve above all for the moment is a practical solution which maintains the unanimity of all permanent members in order that we may, through experience, gradually arrive at a permanent system.

So much for the questions of principle raised by the implementation of the Council's resolutions. The attention given to these aspects, important as they are, should, however, in no way take precedence over the more immediate and urgent aspects of the implementation of the Council's resolutions, which constitutes today the real problem before us.Unfortunately, these aspects give rise to serious concern.

The appeals which the Council addressed on four subsequent occasions to both parties to effect a cease-fire and a withdrawal of their armed personnel have received only partial response. Although both India and Pakistan have expressed their readiness to accept a cessation of hostilities and, in spite of the fact that the cease-fire came into effect more than six weeks ago today, it is obvious from the Secretary General's many reports on the maintenance of the cease-fire that its continuance is constantly danger. There reports on further shooting and shelling, on actions on both sides to improve positions and on other military activities that are in complete contradiction with a cease-fire. It is to this ominous situation that the Council has now to direct its immediate attention.

It is clear, at least in the mind of my delegation, that the cause for these many violations of the cease-fire does not lie with the military observers of the United Nations, who are performing an admirable and difficult task. It is thanks to their activities that the existing explosive situation has not reverted again to open hostilities.

My country is also deeply disturbed by the stream of Press reports coming out of Kashmir about the total suppression of the liberty of political expression as well as about excesses reportedly taking place in the fighting area. The representative of Pakistan has asked the Council: "Will the world remain unmoved ?"

My answer would be, "No, the world is certainly not; nor is the Council. "But the remedy lies not in condemning or investigating specific examples of such acts, but in putting an end to the circumstances which gave rise to such excesses. The Council, therefore, has to concentrate on the three elements of its resolution, just as they have been enumerated by the representative of Uruguay: the cease-fire, the withdrawal of the forces, and tackling the underlying political problem. These elements are closely interwoven, as I said in the Council [1242nd meeting] when introducing resolution 211 (1965), and my delegation stands by that declaration. It is not because we have departed from quoted in the Council meeting last week. I did not do so because, in our view, it was not the interconnexion between the different parts of the resolution which was then at stake, but the old tradition that representatives on the Security Council should be entitled to speak their mind on all questions connected with the subject under discussion, as long as they do not use insulting language.

But even if it is true that the three elements of the resolution are closely interconnected, and that none should be overlooked, it is nevertheless obvious that they cannot all be achieved at once and at the same time, and therefore we have to proceed in phases. The first phase was the cease-fire. It has been achieved, but is still precarious; it will remain precarious as long as huge armed forces remain in close contact facing each other. Therefore, we must now concentrate on the second phase, the withdrawal of forces. Almost six weeks have elapsed since we adopted our key resolution of 20 September [resolution 211 (1965)] and since the Secretary General first asked the parties to draw up withdrawal plans, but precious little progress has been made in this direction. Undoubtedly, commanders on both sides are understandably inspired by what to them is a duty and a primary consideration, namely to safeguard their positions. Therefore, the clear orders to withdraw should come from their Governments, orders based on higher considerations and on greater interests than that of maintaining a few hundred yards of terrain or a favourable strategic outpost. If such orders should not be forthcoming or should not be fully understood or fully carried out, it is the duty of the Security Council to act and assist the Governments by indicating in clear and concrete terms what action should now be taken.

For this reason, my delegation has, in very close co operation with all the other members, both permanent and non-permanent, worked out a draft resolution [S/6876], which I should now like to submit in the name of Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. The

draft is submitted in the name of these five non-permanent members of the Council, but it has been drafted in constant consultation with the permanent members. I think we can say that it contains no language which could give rise to objection. It indicates, we believe, in clear and unmistakable language what concrete steps could and should now be taken. to achieve a withdrawal of forces.

The text of the draft resolution needs, I believe, little comment. Paragraph 1 reaffirms the key resolution of the Council of 20 September 1965 on this subject in all its parts``, and should dispel any possible doubt about the fact that the Council stands by its previous resolution in its entirety and intends to see it carried out in all its parts. This reaffirmation is put first in the text because the next two paragraphs concentrate on those phases which are at the moment the most urgent, namely the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed. personnel.

Paragraph 2 requests the parties to cooperate towards a full implementation of paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965), calls upon them to instruct their armed personnel to cooperate with the United Nations and to cease all military activity, and insists that there be an end to violations of the cease-fire. It will be noted that this language is stronger than that of previous resolutions, for the reason I mentioned earlier, namely that this insistence may be needed to overcome the present deadlock.

Paragraph 3 demands the prompt and unconditional execution of the proposal which has already been agreed to in principle by the Governments of India and Pakistan, for a meeting of their representatives with a suitable representative of the Secretary-General, to be appointed after consultation with both parties but without delay, for the formulation of an agreed plan and schedule for the withdrawals by both parties. It furthermore "urges that such a meeting take place as soon as possible and that such a plan contains a time limit on its implementation; and requests the Secretary General to report on the progress achieved in this respect within three weeks". The demand contained in this paragraph has been formulated by the co-sponsors in this stringent form because the failure to arrive at a common plan for withdrawals has hitherto constituted the main obstacle to progress in the implementation of resolution 211 (1965).

Finally, paragraph 4 requests the Secretary-General to submit to the Council as soon as possible a report on compliance with the resolution. Insofar as is necessary, I should point out that this applies to the resolution as a whole, while the request in paragraph 3 applies particularly to the content of that paragraph.

This draft resolution, as we hope is apparent from the text, is not directed against any of the parties. It is, on the contrary, intended to help them to break the present deadlock in order that we may thereafter proceed further with the implementation of resolution 211 (1965).

The draft resolution concentrates, as I said, on those points which are at the moment most urgent; the cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel. We realise, of course, that some members of the Council would have liked to see some other aspects dealt with as well in the draft resolution. The co-sponsors have tried very hard, their utmost, to achieve this, but they have in the end come to the conclusion that the best way is, consciously and deliberately, to leave out of the draft any matter which does not deal directly with the most urgent points, anything which might be controversial and might, therefore, endanger it.

As the text now stands, every word of it has been the subject of extensive consultations. All members of the Council have had their say on it and the co-sponsors believe that all their wishes have been accommodated. I am sure, therefore, that I speak on behalf of all the co-sponsors if I appeal fervently to all the members of the Security Council that no one should, because of any subject that might not be mentioned, break the unanimity of the Council. If it should be possible to adopt this draft resolution with unanimity, or near unanimity, this would be an important step towards solving the conflict between India and Pakistan and also towards the firm establishment of a new basis for action by the Security Council such as we have inaugurated.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Paysse Reyes (Uruguay) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1251 held on 5 November 1965

The dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir directly involves peoples who make up almost one-quarter of the population of the earth. Since that is the cease, it might he said that this question imperils the fate of all Asia. As Mr. Shastri, the Prime Minister of India, said in his letter of 14 September 1965: "the world may find itself embroiled in conflict which may well annihilate mankind." [See S/6683, para. 8.] In turn, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan on 13 September 1965 said that we must "save the subcontinent from being engulfed in what would clearly be an appalling catastrophe" [Ibid., para. 9]

Such facts lead us to inescapable conclusions. First, no amount of attention, tact, care and prudence given to the consideration of this problem will be excessive. Secondly, the responsibility of the great Powers in the consideration and application of solutions is enormous. Lastly, those of us in this Council who have lesser obligations are in duty bound to remain silent at times about the truths in which we believe in order to be constructive and useful. But we cannot avoid the responsibility of stating where we stand.

Given these conclusions, I must, as the representative of the Government of Uruguay, say a few words.

First, we enecase the unanimous concern-stressed, in this most recent episode through which we are living, by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and Malaysia-about the essential requirement: a complete cease fire and respect for the line marking the positions held by the armed personnel and troops on 5 August 1965.

Secondly, we appreciate the noble efforts which the Secretary-General has unstintingly made to this end and we support the decisions he has taken. However, we note that for some weeks now he has found it difficult to act. We do not think that an extensive discussion on the formal aspects and on the exercise of competence should divert the Council's attention from the main issue. Since, fortunately, there is unanimous agreement to facilities and finance the Secretary General's programme, within reasonable limits, we see no objections in this case-to proceeding in this manner, so long as the Secretary-General continues to inform the Council of any new steps which he proposes to take.

Thirdly, Uruguay voted for resolutions 209 (1965), 210 (1965). 211 (1965) and 214 (1965), of 4, 6, 20 and 27 September. In doing so, my delegation stated that it understood that the Security Council was considering the problem of Kashmir as a whole that is, both the present crisis and the need to make some effective contribution to removing the cause of the crisis. The means, in our view, that resolution 211 (1965) implies that the protagonists should make a triple commitment: a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops and armed personnel, a decision or a desire to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the basic problem which has been under the jurisdiction of the Security Council since 1948. To think otherwise would be to close one's eyes to the facts. If we are given a bleeding foot with a raw would, it is logical to cure it, anaesthetize it and calm the pain. But it would be neither wise nor adequate to do all that and then to put back the same shoe so that the same puncturing nail, becoming sharper each day, would immediately reopen the wound. What would have been gained? How can we not but think it logical to oppose a return to facing the cause of the crisis without any guarantee that it would receive, at the very least, immediate attention from the Council ?

With this thought in mind, I personally tried during the period when I had the honour to be President of the Council to see if it was possible to bring the parties concerned together so that, if there was a feeling that the spirit of operative paragraph 4 of resolution 211 (1965) was being respected, it might be possible to insist on an immediate cease-fire and the complete withdrawal of armed personnel. I found the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan quite willing to undertake direct conversations. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of India also gave me sure guarantees that his Government was willing to achieve a complete and immediate cease-fire and to respect the line of 5 August. This was all an initial step before any conversations of a political nature. I agree with the Secretary-General's desire to obtain at this stage from the Governments of India and Pakistan a statement analogous or similar to that made by them on 29 November 1962. That would be a basis for the immediate and unqualified implementation of the resolutions of the Council on the cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces and armed personnel and would demonstrate the feeling of unity we attributed to resolution 211 (1965).

Fourthly in his statement of 25 October to the Security Council [1247th meeting], the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan while speaking about the concrete problem of the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops-made in dramatic manner a series of grave charges about the whole problem of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and invited the Council to substantiate the truth of his charges. We recognize that that statement creates a profound impression, but it should not be a condition for the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops. At the same time, we should like to point out that the Council's reply should not merely be a debate on the formal aspects of the application of the resolutions in question, although that may be of vital importance.

As long ago as 1948, the Council appointed first a committee [resolution 39 (1948)], and later in 1957 its President [resolution 123 (1957)], to collect direct information on the spot. The experience was fruitful. My delegation, if there seemed to be a favourable atmosphere for it, would support the idea that our President or a special three-man committee should be entrusted with the task of gathering impressions on the situation in Jammu and Kashmir without the power to investigate.

Fifthly, the Security Council is on the eve of facing other problems concerning the self-determination of peoples. Its legal, moral and political authority depends on its subsequent acts and conduct. Wl at the Council says and does now regarding this lamentable situation will constitute a precedent for the situations with which the Council may have to deal tomorrow We certainly realise that a complete and effective cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops and armed personnel must be achieved immediately, but we are quite convinced that this will only check the effects; it will leave the cause untouched. Since this is the case, any brezee might fan the flames again unless we do something specific to prevent it.

Sixthly, the time factor-the mere passage of years has an overwhelming influence. This dispute has already been before the Council for eighteen years. No one could contend that the present-day realities are identical with those of 1947 and no one can deny that the present-day realities have legal and political consequences which affect the rights claimed by the parties. Often time, the passage of time, is a wise arbitrator of troublesome situations. In the present case we are concerned test time may be giving rise to complications; instead of working as a sedative, it may become a cause of aggravation. For this reason, the Council cannot renounce, its obligation to work towards a solution of a dispute which might he termed a threat to universal peace.

This being our state of mind-and since we are anxious to maintain the points of view common to the so-called great Powers, which, as Raymond Cartier says, now seem to be breathing the spirit of Yalta-we are going to vote for the draft resolution before the Council. It does not fulfil all our wishes, but at least it is one step forward.

Lastly, it merely remains for me to regret the absence of any representatives of the Government of India from this debate and the withdrawal of the representative of India from this chamber. As President of the Council, I considered it my duty to do all I could to ensure the presence of the representative of India and I must pay a tribute to the very kind attention he paid to my request. For that reason, since I was aware of his state of mind, I did allow myself to speak as President in order to prevent something which I considered was hardly conducive to direct understanding between the parties. Without impairing the President's position of complete impartiality, I acted in accordance with my judgement-without giving any views on any substantive matters and without attempting to restrict the right of freedom of speech. Now I urge the representative of India, and I think I am expressing the feelings of all of us, to honour us with his presence and to cooperate with us in our heartfelt desire to relax the tension which exists between two noble and friendly peoples.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1249 held on 28 October 1965

Consistent with the views my delegation has expressed during the several occasions last month when the question of Kashmir came before this Council, I am anxious once again to emphasise, at least as far as it concerns us, that the immediate and urgent task for the Security Council at this moment is to set its sights no higher and no wider than the strengthening of the cease fire and enforcement of the steps to be taken to arrange the withdrawals. For that reason we would support any resolution which has those immediate objectives.

We should have thought that, in the present context, when the Secretary-General is endeavouring to obtain a modus vivendi between the two States concerned on the implementation of the withdrawal of forces ordered by the Council and has not confessed to any failure in getting, any reaffirmation of the earlier resolution merely because we have had to debate the whole question again would not help the Council or strengthen its arm in reaching its objectives. Indeed we are almost inclined to feel that such reaffirmation, far from strengthening only tends to create a doubt about the firmness of the earlier decisions and to that extent weaken them. Still we do perceive that any possible suggestion of delay in the implementation of the earlier resolution would be met by any resolution which imports into the situation a greater sense of urgency.

It is most essential that our immediate objective should be to strengthen the Security Council's approach to this problem of a cease-fire followed by withdrawals, and once again we repeat that that is my delegation's sole immediate concern: the restoration or revitalization of the Council's moral and legal authority.

It is a thousand pities that the participation of the Indian delegation in the debates that commenced on Monday last, 25 October, should have been aborted and that delegation should have found itself in a position not permitting its further participation in this debate, as the Indian Foreign Minister's letter [S/6833] sets out. It is not for us to examine or to approve or disapprove the reasons that compelled such an attitude.

In this connexion we cannot help recalling that at the 1242nd meeting, on 20 September, I took great pains to make it clear that first things must come first and that second things, if I may use such an expression, merely come in the way of a dispassionate discussion of the first and essential things. Had our view prevailed, we should not find ourselves presenting the spectacle that we now witness in the Council, with one of the principal parties finding it impossible to participate. It is heartening to find, however, that in the letter of the Foreign Minister of India there is to be found the clear statement indeed it is stated more than once-that his Government is ready and willing to co-operate with the Secretary-General in the implementation of the cease-fire and withdrawal. The Government of Pakistan has also already stated its readiness to cooperate with the Secretary-General in this behalf. In the words of the representative of the Soviet Union, when he spoke on Monday: "These are the questions that must be settled first, these are the questions to which attention must be given in the situation that has now arisen." [1247th meeting, para. 241].

However, we are anxious not to be misunderstood, at least by those who have a willingness to understand. We have repeatedly stated and we wish to reiterate our position. We do not say, and we have never said, that there do not exist between the two countries political problems that require solution. We feel too that for the sake of peace and security in that area the sooner they are resolved, and resolved through peaceful processes, the better it would be not only for them but for the whole of Asia and indeed for the whole world. We merely wish to emphasise that the immediate problem I repeat "immediate" is the problem of a cease-fire and withdrawal of forces. Indeed we think we have now arrived at a stage in which actual withdrawals would even more significantly contribute to the strengthening of the cease-fire than peremptory admonitions by the Council periodically addressed to the

parties. I should like to add a word in connection with the statements that were made at the 1247th meeting by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United. Kingdom and France regarding the question of the Secretary General's authority in carrying out the resolutions of this Council.

The representative of the Soviet Union, if I may be permitted to summarise his attitude to this question in his two successive interventions, referred to the matter in two aspects. First, he said that the Secretary-General did not have the specific authority of the Security Council to take the steps he had taken, pursuant to its resolutions in the instant matter and second, that he had acted in breach of the provisions of the Charter. Of the two I should consider the second as the more serious criticism, if it is well founded, because the Secretary General's functions do not have even the vestige of an existence outside of the Charter and the necessary intendment of its provisions. This whole question, with all its ramifications, is due to come up for debate in other forums during the twentieth session of the General Assembly. They will provide the appropriate occasions to delve more fully into all aspects of this matter. Therefore my delegation at this stage wishes only to go on record as saying that it is not aware of any provision of the Charter which can sustain that criticism.

With regard to the first criticism, it is only fair to point out that, since resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September, the Secretary-General has supplied us with no less than ten successive reports as of today on his efforts to give effect to resolution 211 (1965). On 27 September, even before the Council met again, the reports had added up to no less than six.

In the very first of those reports, that of 21 September [S/6699], the Secretary-General not only gave us a very detailed report, running to several closely typed pages, of how he was proceeding with the organisation of observers into two groups but also gave us reasonably precise particulars of their number, their staff and their logistical support-both on the cease-fire line and on the international boundary. In that very first report he estimated the cost for a three-month period in the sum of $1,645,000. That figure alone demonstrates that a detailed. compilation of costs had been made, and that he was not merely. guessing

In the third report, dated 23 September [S/6699/Add.2], the Secretary-General circulated copies of his telegrams to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, in which he explained why he felt it necessary to regard the two operations as separate exercises-in his own words, "because of the difference in origin of the two operations"-and stated that the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan would continue to supervise the cease-fire line and the new group of observers would be organised as the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission.

In his fourth report, dated 23 September [S/6699/Add.3], he dealt with the two operations under separate heads and again explained the need to differentiate between them. He also gave information regarding the countries to which he had applied for assistance in providing military observers for the new group.

In his report dated 24 September [S/6699/Add.4], he indicated his designation of General Macdonald of Canada as the Chief Officer of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission.

In his next report [S/6699/Add.5] circulated on 27 September just before the 1245th meeting of the Council, he indicated particulars of transport and other logistical support he had been endeavouring to obtain and stated that he was airlifting it to the subcontinent.

For our part, we cannot help but feel that the Secretary General has been diligently and efficiently carrying out the precise duties cast upon him by this Council and has been keeping this Council informed of what he has been doing almost from day to day. If-I repeat if-he was acting in excess of the authority given him by the Security Council in its resolutions, surely it was open to any one of us who felt doubts about the extent of the authority he was exercising in any particular matter to bring them immediately to the notice of the Secretary-General, and if necessary to the Security Council, if a more particularised and precisely delimited authority appeared to be required. And all of us, in any event, had that opportunity during the lengthy gathering we held on 27 September.

I do feel without any intellectual hesitations whatever, that having regard to the crisis that was on our hands with respect to Kashmir, the Secretary-General did have all the authority he needed to mobilise the strength of observers he felt would meet the emergency-and this, precisely and without any ambiguity, was the authority we, the Council, gave him.

Indeed, I venture to think that not to have done what he in fact did would only have left him open to the more legitimate criticism that would have occurred to some others of us: why did he not act and act with the speed the situation demanded, in accordance with the mandate given to him by the Security Council ?

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Chun-Ming Chang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1249 held on 28 October 1965

I wish to make a few brief remarks at the present stage of our proceedings. Before I do so, let me extend the congratulations of my delegation to you, Mr. President, on your assumption of this high office. With your long record of public service in your own country, and with your vast experience in international affairs, we are confident that under your guidance the Council will be able to bring about peace on the subcontinent. It is to be regretted that the withdrawal of troops called for by the Council's resolutions has not been implemented and that violations of the cease-fire continue to take place. If the situation is allowed to deteriorate, there is the possibility that fighting on a large scale will be resumed, with frightful consequences for all concerned.

It is fair to not that as far as the cease-fire is concerned there is a large measure of agreement. What has made the implementation of the Council's resolutions so difficult is that the atmosphere of suspicion, fear and mistrust continue to poison the relations between India and Pakistan. So long as this is the case, violations of the cease-fire will continue, withdrawal of troops will be delayed, and progress towards a final solution of the Kashmir question will not be possible.

It is therefore the clear duty of the Security Council to reaffirm its determination to bring about an effective cease-fire and to demand the speedy withdrawal of troops. My delegation endorses the proposal of the Secretary-General [see S/6719/Add. 2, para. 4] for a meeting of the representatives of India and Pakistan with a representative of the Secretary General for the formulation of an agreed plan and schedule for the withdrawal of the armed forces of both parties. We hope that such a meeting will take place as soon as possible. We also hope that both India and Pakistan will cooperate with the Secretary-General in such a manner as to make the meeting a success. I believe all of us are agreed that in order to achieve a durable peace in the subcontinent a solution to the political problems will be required. But unless calm and reason prevail, there is no hope for an eventual political settlement of the Kashmir question.

In this connection, my delegation believes that the actions taken by the Secretary-General to give effect to the Council's resolutions have not been inconsistent with the mandate given to him by this Council. Whatever reservations we may have in regard to the Secretary-General's role in certain political areas, we have no reason to think that he has, in the present case, exceeded his authority.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1249 held on 28 October 1965

After the many communications which have been addressed to the Security Council by India and Pakistan during the last month, as also the Secretary-General's reports, the information given to us at the 1247th and 1248th meetings would confirm, if that were necessary, that the situation in the subcontinent is still extremely serious. The cease-fire is still precarious and only partially applied, while the withdrawal of the armed forces of both countries has been effected only in very limited areas, both in Kashmir and along the international border.

What is even more disturbing is the fact that during the past month there has not been the slightest sign or indication that any contacts will be initiated between the two parties, within the foreseeable future, in order to lay the foundations for a settlement of the question at issue. On the contrary, the crisis has continued to deteriorate and it is in fact this profound lack of agreement that is the most serious aspect of the situation.

The French delegation, which of course hopes that the debate will continue in the presence of both parties and in a calm atmosphere, considers that it would be advisable, in the circumstances, for the Security Council to make a final appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to comply fully with the resolution which it adopted unanimously in September 1965. We think that at the present stage it would be particularly useful if, after inviting them to end hostilities completely and, this time, definitively, the Council urged them to begin without delay the withdrawal of their forces of the positions which they held before the outbreak of hostilities.

Certainly, such operations are very delicate, as is clear from many examples in history. That is why I think that, in order that they may have the degree of precision which alone can make them applicable, the withdrawal plans should be drawn up, in cooperation with a representative of the Secretary General, by the responsible authorities of both countries at the very site of the hostilities. Only in this way would it be possible to arrange a phased withdrawal which would be appropriate to a military situation which is complicated both by the nature of the terrain and by the extent of the combat areas. It is certainly no easy task, but we are convinced that it can be carried out if both parties realise that their dispute can only be settled in an atmosphere of combination and if, for its part, the Security Council keeps before it the idea that its mission is, in the last analysis, to study possible measures to promote a settlement of the political problem, namely, the problem of Kashmir, which is at the root of this conflict.

I need hardly add that it is the most fervent hope of the Government and people of France that peace and co-operation will eventually be established between two great countries in which they take great interest and for which they have much friendship.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Usher (Ivory Coast) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1248 held on 27 October 1965

After eighteen years of fruitless search for a solution, the latent conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has in recent months taken a dramatic turn. The threats, the verbal violence, the sporadic military actions and the subversive acts, added to the already existing tension, have degenerated into a bloody and fratricidal conflict.

The Government of the Ivory Coast, which is on friendly terms with the two great Asian countries of India and Pakistan, has watched with much emotion and apprehension the outbreak of violence in that region. India and Pakistan are great, not merely because of the size of their territories or their populations, but because of their civilization, their religious feelings, their age-old wisdom and, in particular, because of the metaphysical strength inherent in the doctrine of non violence taught by the Master, Gandhi, and the subsequent treasury of talent amassed by the great Nehru.

The Ivory Coast, which considers non-violence the essence of moral perfection and has adopted it as the primary element of its international policy, could not stand by unconcerned and watch it fail; that is why we participated in the drafting and adoption of the Security Council resolutions calling for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965. The parties, displaying a wisdom which does them honour, accepted the essential provisions of those resolutions and proclaimed a cease-fire. In fact, however, only the pitched battle has been halted and the firing continues. The Secretary-General's report of 23 October 1965 [S/6710/Add.5] casts a specially disturbing light on the situation.

Press reports and documents transmitted daily by the parties give accounts of the various violations and tell-unfortunately of the virtual disruption of the cease-fire, indicating that tension is once again at its height and that war might break out again at any moment.

This situation prevails only because resolution 211 (1965) has not been fully applied, because the parties are holding on to what they have won by force and are therefore still confronting each other, and also because each of them, with a view to a possible resumption of hostilities, is seeking to improve its strategic position. In these circumstances, the Council must do its utmost to secure full implementation of its resolutions. The Council's resolutions were adopted at a time when peace had been broken in one part of the world, and their aim was therefore to restore peace. These resolutions are decisions, and under the Charter the parties are committed to respect such decisions.

However, how can the Security Council carry out its mission of peace if the parties to the dispute-which, moreover, are influential Members of the United Nations-do not collaborate with it? How can the Council be asked to find a solution to a conflict when, at the same time, the parties affirm that they are not prepared to make any concessions? Dialogue and negotiation require a certain attitude of mind, a mutual willingness not to impose all one's views on one's neighbour, and an atmosphere of concession.

The Security Council is acting only in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Chapter. Under Chapter VII, the Council may use force to restore peace or to prevent aggression, but never to solve a contentious dispute between two States. In the last case, the only recourse is to Chapter VI, which requires not only the goodwill of the parties but also their necessary and essential collaboration. That is why the Council must demand an effective cease-fire and reiterate its request for the withdrawal of all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, as stated in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 211 (1965).

The Secretary-General has taken steps to that end and we must encourage him to continue his efforts and to ensure that India and Pakistan cooperate with him and with the United Nations observers. But we should perhaps also ask our colleagues in the Security Council to cooperate with the Secretary General. You cannot give with one hand and take away with the other, as the saying goes. The Council requested the Secretary General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel. What is necessary depends on the length of the frontiers and the kind of warfare the parties are engaged in. We believe that the Secretary-General, in acceding to our request and in taking steps which, perhaps because of their inadequacy, have not yet been successful, has not so far exceeded his mandate. Accordingly, we shall not criticise him prematurely.

In any event, the Council had the opportunity of knowing the financial implications of the resolution it had adopted; all it had to do was to ask the Secretary-General for a preliminary report. This is a perfectly normal procedure and in certain cases is obligatory under the rules of procedure.

The Council could also have specified the number of United Nations observers in Kashmir, as it did in the case of Santo Domingo. It may, however, have thought that the situation called for prompt action and that it was best to leave that decision to the Secretary-General. The Council was right to do so and it was right for the Secretary-General to act as he did.

Our intention was merely to encourage the Secretary General in the fulfilment of the difficult task we entrusted to him. I am sure that the Council as a whole, faced with a problem, so delicate because of the extent to which the feelings of both parties are involved, would not wish to lose its way in this labyrinthine tangle of procedure.

My delegation therefore believes that the present debate should strive to create a propitious atmosphere for renewing negotiations between the parties. By making the cease-fire effective, by supporting the measures advocated by the Secretary-General for the withdrawal of the armed forces, by inviting the parties to cooperate with the Secretary-General and the United Nations observers in order to achieve that objective, the Security Council, with the Secretary-General's collaboration, will be able to appropriate diplomatic means to seek a political solution which, without offending the susceptibilities of either party, will enable them to eliminate a latent cause of war between two brother countries.

Text of the Speech made by Lord Caradon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1248 held on 27 October 1965

For a number of reasons I greatly regret that I was unable to be present at the 1247th meeting of this council on Monday.

I was particularly sorry not to be here to be able to congratulate you, Mr. President, on the assumption of your duties as President of this Council. My congratulations are no less sincere because they are late. From what I hear, there may have been moments in Monday's debate when perhaps you may have felt some doubts about the advantages and privileges which appertain to your high office, but I wish sincerely to assure you of our warm regard for your long record of public service and our great respect for your authority.

I have, of course, made it my business to study very carefully the record of the meeting and as I did so, there was one main conclusion which formed and developed in my mind. I wish to speak very shortly on that one proposition. It is that we must surely continue to concentrate all our attention at this time on the immediate target of progress towards the full re-establishment of peace in the great sub continent which has been so torn by dangerous conflict. That is the primary task of this Council.

I do not for a moment wish to suggest that the questions of authorization which were raised at the end of that meeting are unimportant. The frustration of the General Assembly during its nineteenth session provides sufficient evidence that they are indeed of great consequence. They must be considered, and, we trust, satisfactorily settled, if the United Nations is to carry out its responsibilities in the future.

But while I do not doubt the importance of those constitutional and financial questions, I put it to this Council that our immediate task and the task on which we should concentrate all our effort at this time is the task of taking every possible action to render effective the cease-fire between India and Pakistan which this Council demanded, together with the withdrawal of all armed personnel. If we lose sight of those immediate aims we shall have failed. We shall fail to maintain. the momentum of success which our previous resolutions initiated. We shall fail in our duty to all concerned to show that we are seriously determined to carry out the provisions of the resolutions we passed. Everything will depend on whether we now take effective action to win and maintain a secure peace.

I do most earnestly urge upon the Council that, whatever else we do, we must facilitate and accelerate the withdrawal which we demanded. For, as long as the withdrawal is delayed, the daily dangers of further violations of the cease-fire will continue. The hope of progress towards a peaceful settlement will recede. The situation might easily deteriorate into renewed confusion and conflict and catastrophe.

Moreover, while we have ample evidence of the intensity of feeling in India and Pakistan arising from the events of the past few months, it has been encouraging to realise that on the necessity for a cease-fire and withdrawal there has already been a measure of agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan. On this issue at least there appears to be good reason to hope for agreement and for effective action.

We welcomed and endorsed the efforts which the Secretary-General has so persistently made to achieve this aim. I was glad that the spokesman for may delegation immediately made it plain that in our opinion the Secretary-General has throughout acted in complete accord with the clear mandate given to him by this Council. Particularly we commend his consistent endeavour to make the cease-fire effective and to proceed with the withdrawal. We especially welcomed the proposal to appoint an officer to meet the military representatives of each side to seek urgent agreement on a practical plan for withdrawal.

Last month we rejoiced when, in a series of four resolutions, this Council acted with such commendable confidence and speed and in a spirit of such full agreement and cooperation. As a result of that successful action, the dangers were at once effectively reduced. But they have not been removed. Violation of the cease-fire and failure to withdraw threaten renewed conflict and renewed bloodshed. They could even lead to a resumption of full-scale hostilities, with all the terrible consequences which could then ensue.

I greatly hope that this Council will now rise to the level of its high responsibilities. I trust that the Council will concentrate on the action which is immediately required. I trust that we shall show that we meant what we said when we passed resolution 211 (1965). The cease-fire and complete withdrawal are in effect the only door to a sound settlement. I trust that we shall now open that door leading to a permanent and just and honourable peace.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. EL-Farra (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1248 held on 27 October 1965

The cease-fire which formally went into effect on 22 September 1965 has not become fully effective, and the steps to carry out the withdrawal of armed personnel have not yet been taken. Violations of the cease-fire are becoming more numerous and more serious, and the situation is rapidly deteriorating. So far, practical wisdom and restraint have prevailed, but the continuance of the present situation may have extremely dangerous effects.

Of course, we know that both parties are expected to honour the cease-fire, but violations, if continued, may invite other violations, and these, unless checked, may defeat the very purpose of resolutions 211 (1965) and 214 (1965). We know, of course, that it is difficult to have the complete picture without complete and adequate fact-finding reports, and this requires more United Nations observers on the cease-fire line. The original number of observers is certainly inadequate. The Secretary-General, relying on Council resolution 211 (1965), made certain arrangements to increase the number of observers along the 1,500 mile cease-fire line in order to provide more United Nations control of the cease-fire.

We note with appreciation the steps taken by the Secretary-General to implement these resolutions. We know that the Secretary-General will continue his efforts to make the cease fire effective and to bring about the withdrawal of armed personnel on both sides. We endorse all the steps that have been taken to implement resolution 211 (1965); we express appreciation of the value of the Secretary-General's reports on this matter. Resolution 211 (1965) aimed at achieving three results : first, an effective cease-fire and the withdrawal of troops to the old positions; second, the reestablishment of the old cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir; and, third, working for a political settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.

We feel that those requirements should go together as far as possible. To concentrate exclusively on one of them, and to leave or postpone the others may result in our facing the real danger of a resumption of hostilities, the consequences of which no one could predict. I say this because I know that this is what happened in the past, and I am sure we all agree that this is what we are here to prevent.

The elements of the resolution, and here I am using the words. author of the resolution, the representative of the Netherlands, "are closely interwoven". I would say that they constitute one unit, and any discussion of any resolution which is one unit should cover all the resolutions; otherwise, it would be an inadequate and incomplete discussion. We invite both India and Pakistan to cooperate fully with the Secretary General and the United Nations observers in their efforts to implement all parts of the Council's resolutions,

What is going on in the whole area of conflict, and now. in Kashmir itself, leaves no room for doubt that an early settlement is essential and that the need for a political solution now is more urgent than ever. We cannot and should not ignore this fact. The dispute cannot go on without more violations and more violence and more bloodshed, and this may lead to the danger of war extending to more areas and bringing in more parties, thus threatening international peace and security and perhaps escalating to uncontrollable proportions.

With the cease-fire in effect, our Council is duty bound to formulate a procedure which would be workable, equitable and in conformity with standing resolutions. Lasting peace cannot be secured by any other means.

We stress the need for a cease-fire, and we want the cease-fire to continue. We want efforts to be made to bring about the withdrawal of armed personnel on both sides. We need to get on with the task of the cease-fire and with task of withdrawal of armed personnel: above all, we want to see permanent and brotherly relations between the two friendly States of India and Pakistan. We feel that to achieve all this the cease-fire should be followed by a real, workable and practical settlement in accordance with the United Nations resolutions. We have, therefore, to apply ourselves to the causes of the present unfortunate development.

Why is the situation today more dangerous than even at the time when the problem first arose? For an answer to this, we have to look at the problem in its proper perspective.

In his report of 3 September 1965 on the current situation in Kashmir, with particular reference to the cease-fire agreement, the Secretary-General stated:

"...the cease-fire... would afford the most favourable climate in which to seek a resolution of political differences. The differences over Kashmir are sharp, great and ominous. They must be resolved if peace in that area is ever to be secure." [S/6651, para 2.]

This continues to be the case today. It is for this reason that we believe that we cannot ignore the background which brought about a kind of undeclared war in Asia. The historical background of the problem is essential, and the question must be viewed against that background. This Council should not overlook and it cannot erase the history of the problem, the most important part of which is that both India and Pakistan agreed that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. This stand was given the United Nations' blessing. On 21 April 1948, the Security Council endorsed this agreement [resolution 47 (1948)] and authorised a commission to implement it.

It is not open, at this stage, for either India or Pakistan. to claim that Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of its territory. This will be decided by the people of Kashmir themselves. They have the right to choose their destiny, and until such time as they do, both parties are stopped from making any claims of sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand, it is not open to any of the parties to deny the arrangements reached. We need not remind the members of the Council around this table that human relations are regulated sometimes by other means than formal treaties, which are the substance of international law. Informal arrangements, especially when endorsed by the Security Council, are one of them. I submit, what is the use of conference tables and negotiations, agreements and arrangements of this kind if they are reached today only to be negated tomorrow? In fact, what is the use of the whole Charter, which is itself a negotiated agreement ?

Needless, to say, self-determination is a right we always support. But annexation which does not stem from the free will of the people is something we do not endorse. It does not convey a right. It imposes a duty-a duty on the people to oppose it, and a duty on us here to protect the legitimate right of the people to choose their own destiny.

We say this because we believe that 5 million people cannot, without their free will, be forced to share a single statehood with either India or Pakistan. Our stand stems from United Nations resolutions on this problem. None of the members challenged the validity of those resolutions. Some members here may take issue with the means, the methods or the timing but --and I stand to be corrected on this we do not differ on the validity of the Security Council's resolutions. They were based on the agreement of the parties. They were never negated. They still stand.

Needless to say, Jordan, which has always maintained close bonds of friendship with both of the two sister States of India and Pakistan, seeks in this case to express its strong desire and its unalterable wish to keep and to strengthen those bonds. However, its first desire and duty is to stress as a basic principle the necessity of respecting the decisions of the United Nations. Jordan has the greatest admiration for the ancient cultural heritage of India. It also stressed the importance of India as a major Power in the forces of nonalignment, the aim of which is to maintain world peace and security. With Pakistan, Jordan has close links of culture and religion, but neither of these factors can influence my country's position vis-a-vis the decisions of the Security Council, respect for which must be an unquestionable principle to be upheld by all Member States in the interests of the United Nations and of world peace.

Some members called on the two parties to respect all Security Council resolutions of September 1965. I in turn, would like to call on all members of the Council to respect its resolutions in order to protect the prestige and dignity of the council and protect the hope of mankind. Jordan is a small country. Small countries derive their strength from, and depend for their security on, the effective discharge by the United Nations of its own responsibilities to protect its own Charter. By ignoring or disregarding its resolutions, the Security Council would create an unhealthy precedent. We cannot insist on the implementation of our resolutions in a given case and overlook it, or let expediency play its part, in another case.

Quoting a great leader of our time, a former Republican President of the United States, Dwight D. Eisenhower :

"We cannot, in the world any more than in our own nation, subscribe to one law for the weak, another law for the strong; one law for those opposing us, another for those allied with us. There can be but one law, or there will be no peace."

President Eisenhower also stressed the point that :

"There can be no peace without law. And there can be no law if we were to invoke one code of international conduct for those who oppose us and another for our friends."

My delegation subscribes to these views. It is through. the collective will and wisdom of the members of this Council. that we can put these sound views of the former President of United States into effect.

Much has been said recently about the scope of the authority of the Secretary-General. Some uncertainties have been expressed in this connection. We know that complete clarity and understanding of this matter the work entrusted to him may be hampered. We deem it fit, therefore, to make a few observations on this important matter.

The Secretary-General is appointed by the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Security Council. The Security Council's recommendation unanimous agreement among the five permanent Council members. This is a Charter requirement embodied in Article 97 of the Charter. And the question arises: Why is all this? It is simply because of the importance of this office. It is one of the main organs of the United Nations. To be able to use this office effectively, the Secretary-General, in his election, needs to have the unanimous support and acceptance of all permanent members of the Security Council. His functions are not only administrative, but diplomatic and political, at times, as well.

Whether the Security Council, in interpreting the Charter and acting within the scope of its authority, would give the Secretary-General special mandates and/or more power is up to this body. The Security Council can always do this. But, I submit, we have nothing to say about vested rights embodied in our Charter, and interpreted in the past through the practice of this United Nations organ. When powers are clear, to invoke them the Secretary-General need not come to the Council for directives. When, for instance, Pakistan requested the Secretary-General to go there, or to send a representative on his behalf, to see and report to the Council on certain charges, we do not believe that this needed the Council's approval. It is his discretionary right. Otherwise, what would be the meaning of Article 99 of the Charter, which gives the Secretary-General, besides other functions the right to bring to the attention of the Council any matter which, in his opinion, may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security ? This authority, which involves a task of great responsibility implies the discretionary right to visit places of conflict and to make inquiries. This is the more so since the Charter made provisions for securing the independence of the United Nations.

We do not want to see his activities freeze and become ineffective. I am sure the Secretary-General would wish to help us in this respect. It is his office, which is one of the main organs of the United Nations, and his authority which should be protected.

Where to draw the line between matters which need the Council's directives and approval and those which do not, is something which has been determined through past practice. In some cases, the Secretary-General can play a part which neither the Security Council nor a State or group of States would be able to play. Let me reiterate that the Secretary-General takes his office after the unanimous consent of the permanent members of the Council's recommendation of the Security Council and the appointment by the General Assembly. We do not believe that those who drafted our Charter and incorporated all these conditions and limitations in the Charter intended, after all this, to confine the role of the Secretary-General to "negative neutrality". Certainly he is expected, being an independent body, to play a more effective, positive and helpful part.

I have one more general observation. As the United Nations grows close to achieving universality, it becomes imperative for all its main organs to function properly and effectively, even if this requires a liberal interpretation of the Charter. The United Nations Charter is our constitution, which is bound to respond to the changing needs of our international society. It is an evolutionary document and it must live in the evolutionary world in which we live. It must be interpreted, therefore, in such a way so as to reflect the intention of those great statesmen who drew it up. And I must say once more, Mr. President, that you are one of those statesmen who drew up and signed this great document, the Charter of the United Nations. This kind of liberal approach is the one that has been adopted by the United Nations on the domestic jurisdiction issue, on the colonial issues, on the issue of human rights and on many issues involving international conflict. Before concluding, I should like to refer to a letter submitted by the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, dated 22 October 1965 [S/6821]. This letter embodies charges of a serious and alarming nature. The same. is true of the statement that the representative of Pakistan made on Monday [1247th meeting]. These charges, if established, should arouse our deepest concern, as issues of a humanitarian nature are also involved. We are glad that the Secretary-General has already sent his representative to the area of conflict. His representative could also be directed, if this is possible, to look into these charges and ascertain the facts. On the other hand if the Secretary-General deems otherwise, we think that, by virtue of his own right and the powers. entrusted to him by the Security Council in paragraph 5 of its resolution 211 (1965), the Secretary-General may want to consider visiting again the area of conflict. His personal and prestige and weight would be of great help, and his visit at this. time may certainly bring fruitful results.

In conclusion, my Government feels that urgent steps are needed in order to have an effective cease-fire and withdrawal, with a time-limit for complete implementation. This is a preliminary step to arresting the deterioration of this situation. We should ask the two Governments to cooperate with the Secretary-General and with the United Nations observers in their efforts to fully implement Council resolution 211 (1965). We should remind the Governments of India and Pakistan of the Council's wish and determination that, pending further action by the Council under paragraph 4 of resolution 211 (1965), they should utilise all peaceful means, including those listed in Article 33 of the Charter, with a view to reaching a just and honourable settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, which is underlying the present conflict.

The Council also needs to reaffirm its decision to reconvene in order to consider what steps could be taken to assist towards a just and honourable settlement of this dispute. We would like to see the observer machinery of the United Nations now on the cease-fire line made more effective, and we endorse all steps taken on this matter. We express the hope that the Secretary-General will visit the area involved as soon as possible. The Council, in its wisdom, may want to establish a special committee with a special mandate to help the Council in this respect.

Finally, I would say that all organs of the United Nations can be effective if we have the will to make them so, and I hope we are all in agreement that there is such a will.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Secialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

We note with satisfaction the calm tone of the objective acknowledgement the representative of the United States has just made. Our statement was based solely on facts. These facts have been acknowledged as was proper. Nevertheless, the United States representative is attempting to make out that they should have been presented differently or in some other way.

As for the suggestion that we should have done this at a previous meeting of the Security Council, may I remind the representative of the United States that this is the first meeting to be held in the interval and that we are therefore taking the first opportunity to present our position in the Security Council. By saying this he is detracting from other ways and means. Indirectly, as it were, he is expressing lack of confidence in the other steps we have taken informally. However, we are well aware that he has always been in favour of using all available means to settle such matters, particularly through informal consultations, contact between delegations, and so on. such methods did not help, failed to produce the desired results. Only if or proved unsatisfactory, should the matter be raised officially.

We exhausted all possible and available methods. We consider that all we had done might have led to a settlement of the problem, but since that was not the case, the Soviet delegation took the first opportunity to explain its position officially here. This is a perfectly proper thing to do, and only shows that we sought to bring about a final settlement of the problem. We tried various ways. This should be clearly understood and duly appreciated. Once again I should like to ask that no consecutive interpretation be made of my remarks.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Goldberg (United States of America), in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

The hour is late. I shall say only a few additional words. The representative of the Soviet Union is quite correct in saying that informally, at the Foreign Minister level, and in conversations between him and myself, and while I was President of the Security Council, he did express the view that he has expressed here today. It is also correct that I expressed a view, similar to the view that I have expressed today-as did my Government at all levels and throughout took the position that whatever the Secretary-General had done was in strict

conformity with the resolutions which had been adopted. That being the case, it was not my obligation under the provisional rules of procedure to bring this matter to the attention of the Security Council. Under the rules, any member of the Security Council may bring to the attention of the Council any matter that he desires. My esteemed friend did not elect to do so until today. And when I said what I did, it was in terms of submitting the matter formally, as was done today, before the Security Council.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No 1247 held on 5 October 1965

The Soviet delegation has already stated today quite unequivocally-its position on the resolutions adopted by the Security Council and the existing procedures for sending United Nations military observers to India and Pakistan. We should like to reaffirm that position.

As for the views just expressed by the United States representative, they cannot be regarded as convincing, nor do they in any way justify the actions we referred to previously, despite the fact that he spoke most resoundingly. We did not consider it appropriate to offer an interpretation of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council. How ever, since this question has been raised in the Security Council we feel obliged to express our views on it.

What are in fact the provisions of Security Council resolutions 210 (1965) and 211 (1965) ? Resolution 210 (1965) refers to measures to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. We are choosing our words with care and wish to stress the phrase "strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan". In resolution 211 (1965), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General "to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel". These are the provisions of the Security Council resolutions that contain nothing else.

resolutions and in our view they are sufficiently clear. These What in reality is taking place? It is common knowledge that in fact measures are being taken not to "strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan" but to expand it considerably. This is a substantially new departure. In addition, we note that a completely new body is being set up a mission of United Nations military observers. But is any mention made of this in the resolutions we have adopted? There is not a single word about it in the Security Council's decisions. If the Council had really intended to set up this new group, then obviously-in fact necessarily-it would have taken a clear decision to that effect. Why, merely to "strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan" a special provision was included in the Security Council resolution. How is it possible to depart so far from adopted decisions when carrying them out ?

Thus a large number of military observers is being sent to India and Pakistan to be precise, four times more than the original number of the existing group. A new military observation mission is being set up, and the posts of command are being assigned mainly to senior NATO officers. Considerable expenditure is being planned for the maintenance of these military observers, and the representative of France has rightly and with a sense of responsibility stressed this fact. And all this is being done in circumvention of the Security Council.

However the representative of the United States may interpret the resolutions of the Security Council, this cannot alter the obvious fact that they provide no justification for the actions taken with a view to carrying out the resolutions. To this I must add the fact that the United States representative tried to present the matter as though he were hearing the position of the Soviet delegation on the subject for the first time.

May I remind the United States representative-although we discussed the matter with him earlier that we drew the attention of the United States at the proper time, after the publication of the Secretary-General's first report, to the impropriety of the steps tal This was done by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and also by the Permanent Representative of the USSR to the United Nations.

We should further like to recall that we drew this to the attention of the President of the Security Council in September, when that responsible office was held by the United States representative. We will remember-and we hope that Mr. Goldberg also remembers this clearly-that, as President of the Security Council, he agreed in the course of our discussion that these matters fell within the competence of the Security Council and should be considered by it. Nevertheless, this oral admission was not followed by any practical measures on the part of the President of the Security Council.

We should like to draw the attention of the United States representative to the fact that, in Security Council resolution 214 (1965), to which he referred, the Council did not in any way take note of the Secretary-General's reports which refer to military observers, but of reports containing information the observance of the cease-fire (S/6710 and Add. 1 and 2).

May we also recall that our position on this subject was presented in detail in the course of consultations-informal consultations-among members of the Security Council. All these are simple facts-facts which are not new to you, Mr. Goldberg, but which are known to everyone and of which you must have been aware. Therefore your references and your attempts to depict the situation as you did are not confirmed by the actual state of affairs. We pointed out the discrepancy between the actions taken and the provisions of the United Nations Charter, and drew attention to the exclusive competence of the Security Council-the highest body of our Organisation. We pointed out the need to consider and adopt decisions on this matter in the Security Council. In so doing, we believed that the adoption of suitable decisions would help the Secretary-General to take positive action in carrying out the resolutions. And our explanations today are intended to achieve precisely this end, and no other which might give someone grounds to speak from a different position in defence of something that requires no defence. In fact, Mr. Goldberg, you are defending yourself.

For this reason we again venture to point out the need to comply strictly with the provisions of the Charter and not to depart from them, and the need also to show respect for the competence of the Security Council, whose task it is to decide such matters.

Since you have all understood what I have said and as it is already late, I shall not insist on the consecutive interpretation of my statement.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

Because of the lateness of the hour, I had not intended to take part in the debate which has just taken place. However, in view of its unexpected scope, I am compelled to state my Government's views here and now. The statements we have just heard from the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom do emphasise the importance of the problems related to the Security Council's peace-keeping powers. While I should not like to divert the Council from its search for appropriate solutions to the conflict between India and Pakistan, I have myself during the last few weeks draw the attention of several of my colleagues to the need to make the Council fully capable of fulfilling its own responsibilities with regard to methods of carrying out the resolutions it has adopted. We intended not to make anyone's task more complicated, but to prevent the recurrence of situations similar to those which almost jeopardised the future of the United Nations. Therefore, my delegation regrets that its recent efforts, with other delegations, to bring about a settlement of these questions have not been crowned with success.

Having made these comments, the French delegation. considers it necessary briefly to recall the principles which should guide our action whenever the Security Council decides to set up a peace-keeping operation-even if it is merely sending an observation or inspection mission. Without challenging the emergency measures which the Secretary General may be led to take, we consider that it is for the Security Council, taking into account the information the Secretary-General gives it, to decide on the size and the command, as well as the principal characteristics, of the mission or force it has established. The Council should not get lost in detail, which would paralyses it, but it should make sure that the proposed methods correspond, at all stages, with the political data about the problem as assessed by the Council itself. We consider that in that kind of a framework, the Secretary-General's action would avoid the difficulties which would not fail to arise if his terms of reference were defined too vaguely, thus leaving the door open to deep differences of interpretation on the part of members of the Council. The Council should also not forget the financial aspects of an operation it decides to undertake; its basic task is to set a ceiling for expenditure on the basis of the Secretary-General's proposals and to decide how the operation is to be financed, whether on a voluntary or on a compulsory basis; in the latter case it should invite the General Assembly to provide the funds required in the Organisation's regular budget. I do not want now to reopen a discussion on this point,

which the Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations has had to deal with and will probably deal with again, but I do want to stress once again that the Security Council cannot be asked to take simple decisions of principle and then leave. to other bodies the task of carrying them out. Similarly, my delegation considers that it is for the Council to establish, in resolutions, the duration of their application. A rule of that kind, which must be interpreted with all necessary flexibility, would enable the Security Council to reassess, periodically if need be, the means made available to the Secretary General in relation to the political objectives on which its members have reached agreement. These are the comments my delegation wished to make with regard to the questions of principle which, we think, will be raised in the future on the application of Security Council resolutions on peace-keeping. Naturally, I reserve the right to speak again at a future meeting, and, if necessary, on the substance of the problem.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

My delegation and my Government strongly support all the resolutions which have been adopted by the Security Council, beginning with resolutions 209 (1965) of 4 September, 210 (1965) of 6 September, 211 (1965) of 20 September and 214 (1965) of 27 September, in dealing with this matter. We have done so in the spirit of great friendship with the great nations of India and Pakistan, and we have done so in the interests of world peace and security.

It has been a source of great strength to all peace-loving people throughout the world that the Security Council in all these instances, has acted with virtual unanimity. It was a source of great satisfaction to my Government and to all the members of the Council that the Governments of India and Pakistan responded to the Council's demand that there be a cease-fire in this dispute.

We also share the conviction of, I am sure, all the members of the Council that the resolutions which were adopted are solemn commitments by the members of the Security Council that all parts of the resolutions that we adopted must have full implementation.

We have met today because of reports that have been filed with us by the Secretary-General referring to what we know from reading the newspapers, as well as from his reports, that the cease-fire is in jeopardy and that it will continue to be precarious unless there is a disengagement of forces between the two countries. The has made concrete proposals to both Governments, in order to give effect to the Security Council's resolutions, that there be a prompt withdrawal following the cease-fire to which both Governments are pledged. This Council has a right to expect, as all peace loving people have the right to expect, that, in the words of our resolution, there will now be a withdrawal of all armed personnel of either party which may be located in the territory of the other party or on the other party's side of the cease-fire line in Kashmir.

That is what we all agreed upon, in the Council, and we believe that it is the obligation of both India and Pakistan faithful to their commitments under the Charter-to respect, to honour and to comply with the of the Security Council. I should like to emphasise that my Government continues to fully support these resolutions of the Council, which were adopted in September, and we urge most strongly that these resolutions, particularly the key resolution of 20 September [211 (1965)], be fully implemented. We do so in the necessary spirit of seeing to it that peace, to which we are all pledged, is restored in full measure on the subcontinent. As far as we are concerned, my Government is pledged to that resolution, to its full terms, to the sequence of steps which the resolution contemplates, and we shall continue through this Council and through the United Nations to play our part in co operating and seeing to it that the resolutions are implemented.

My Government has no question in its mind concerning the actions of the Secretary-General taken to carry out the resolutions we have adopted. Nor indeed do we think that any question can be raised appropriately under those resolutions in the light of their clear language and in the light of the very careful steps which the Secretary-General has taken in order to give effect to them.

On 6 September 1965, this Council, in resolution 210 (1965), after calling upon the parties to cease hostilities and promptly withdraw all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, unanimously went on to say that it :

"Requests the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to the present resolution and to resolution 209 (1965), to take all measures possible to strong then the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan, and to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the resolutions and on the situation in the area".

Our Secretary-General did exactly that. He filed a steady stream of reports indicating the steps that he was taking pursuant to this resolution in order to give effect to what the Council had decided. And he frankly shared his thoughts, his views, his recommendations and his actions with the members of the Council. In his report of 16 September-I shall not read all his reports as they are too voluminous and the hour is late the Secretary-General said this:

"I have taken immediate steps to obtain extra transport and communications equipment to facilitate. UNMOGIP in its task. I have also made provisional arrangements to increase the number of military observers in UNMOGIP at short notice, should developments make this increase necessary." [S/6686, para. 10.]

We were on notice of this when we met on 20 September to consider the deteriorating situation which had developed in connection with this dispute. Being on notice of this, the Council again adopted a resolution which, in this respect, was agreed to by all parties. The Council in this resolution [211 (196)] requested " the Secretary-General to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel". In another paragraph we requested "the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to the present resolution".

The next day the Secretary-General supplied us with another of his many reports. In this report he pointed out what had transpired during this period. The original cease-fire line was a cease-fire line of a little less than 500 miles. The Secretary General reported that there were crossings of the border, the international boundary between the two countries, and then he went on to say:

"The border between India and West Pakistan, where fighting has been taking place between Indian and Pakistani armed forces, extends for a distance of over 1,000 miles from the Arabian Sea to the foothills of the Himalayas on the southern edge of the State of Jammu and Kashmir." [S/6699, para. 10.]

Then he went on to point out specifically in detail that because of this situation :

"In the supervision of the cease-fire and of the withdrawals, it is the intention to deploy, at least initially, a team of approximately 100 military observers the necessary logistical and staff support." [Ibid., para. 11.]

He was not talking at that point about the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; he was talking about recruiting a team of military observers for the international boundary, as we all necessarily understood. The Secretary-General continued:

"It is the purpose to have those observers in the area. at the earliest possible date after the cease-fire becomes effective. According to tentative plans, the locations outside of Kashmir where observers might be most usefully stationed would be the following..." [Ibid.]

Then there are specified in detail the headquarters on the Indian side and on the Pakistan side for this group of observers. Then the Secretary-General went on in a separate paragraph to talk about what he intended with respect to the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan. He stated:

"The Security Council, in its resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September 1965, calls upon the Secretary-General 'to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan'. To this end, I have already made specific approaches to the Governments providing military observers to make available additional observers so that the overall strength of the Group can be very substantially increased. As stated in my second report to the Council on my mission to India and Pakistan [S/6686], I have also taken urgent steps to provide extra transport and communications equipment for the Observer Group." [Ibid., para. 16.]

The Council met on 27 September and noted reports of the Secretary-General. There was not a voice raised in the Council at the time, although we were full apprised of every step that the Secretary-General had taken, that the Secretary General in any sense was deviating from the mandate that this Council had given him in carrying out the task and avy responsibility we had entrusted to him.

And the Secretary-General did not leave us in the dark as to what he was doing; quite the contrary. On 1 October 1965 he told us in specific detail what observers he was recruiting for both these forces: "As of 30 September, a total of ninety observers has been provided for the United Nations India Pakistan Observation Mission." [S/6699/Add. 6, para. 3.] Then he goes into it in detail. Then: "As of 30 September, a total of fifty-nine additional observers had been provided for the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan." [Ibid., para. 8.]

Now, it seems to my Government and to my delegation that the Secretary-General has proceeded exactly in accord with the resolutions that the Security Council has unanimously adopted and that he has advised the members of the Council, step by step, of every step he has taken in order to execute the Council's resolutions. There would have been time at any point during these proceedings to raise the question of whether the Secretary-General was proceeding improperly, and that was not done. That was not done although the facts were known and were laid before us.

My Government wishes to commend the Secretary General for the steps taken by him to carry out what we agreed upon here. And in regard to the status of the cease-fire, it is a plain and simple fact of life that we owe much to the patient efforts of the United Nations observers, who have promptly gone to work thanks to the Secretary-General's expeditious action in response to the Council's mandate to him, in paragraph 2 of resolution 211 (1965), "to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire and the withdrawal of all armed personnel", as well as the mandate in resolution 210 (1965) "to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan". Had the Secretary General not acted rapidly and firmly, with our authorization, and had not received the prompt cooperation of the Governments to which he turned for observer personnel and equipment, it is highly likely, in my view, that we would be meeting today not to call for the implementation of withdrawal, but to call anew for the cessation of hostilities. There have been violations, regretfully, of the cease-fire, and complaints from both sides have been confirmed by the observers on the spot; but it is nevertheless true, and it is apparent from the reports of the Secretary-General, that the observers are there, and the fact that they are and that they arrived very promptly had much to do with the fact that the situation is not worse.

I wish to make it clear that my Government emphatically rejects the suggestion that the Secretary General acted beyond his mandate or that he should have consulted the Council in advance on the details of the actions he took under that mandate. In our view, his actions were entirely reasonable, and well within the limits that could be envisaged in view of the problem. If forty three observers were appropriate, as has been long recognized by this Council, to observe a cease-fire under peaceful conditions and in a cease-fire line of less than 500 miles, then 200 observers are obviously reasonable for supervising a cease-fire line that now extends 1,500 miles under the grave and troubled conditions that now exist between India and Pakistan.

I think that I for one understood what the Council was asking for in our discussion. We made it very clear that we asked and requested and directed the Secretary-General to take steps to strengthen the observer force, and also to take steps to see to it that there was appropriate supervision of what we had demanded that India and Pakistan should do. Therefore it seemed to me that there can be no question about this. It is interesting to see that there is not always consistency in this area. Today we are told by the representative of the Soviet Union that the Secretary-General acted improperly in the face of a resolution we adopted which called upon the Secretary-General to strengthen the observer force. I would like to remind the representative of the Soviet Union of his actions and his comments when the Dominican problem was before the Security Council. The Security Council adopted a resolution on 14 May 1965 [resolution 203 (1965)] inviting the Secretary-General "to send, as an urgent measure, a representative to the Dominican Republic". On 9 June, the representative of the Soviet Union had this to say about that resolution:

"We also take a favourable view of the suggestion that the representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic should continue to keep the cease fire under observation. The USSR delegation likewise agrees that the membership of the group headed by Mr. Mayobre should be enlarged in order to enable it to carry out effectively the tasks entrusted to it by the Security Council." [1222nd meeting, para. 90].erudi

And on 20 July 1965 the same thoughts were expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union. Now, it seems to me quite clear that if a resolution is

adopted that says a representative is to be sent and it is the view of the Soviet representative that this means the representative may recruit additional observers, it is quite inconsistent with the position taken today, that when the Security Council adopts a resolution requesting the Secretary-General to strengthen an existing observer force of forty-five, the actions taken by the Secretary-General are not appropriate under the circumstances.

I think that we ought to stick to the problem at hand, the real problem at hand. And our real problem at hand is a grave one: it is the problem of implementing the resolutions which we unanimously adopted; it is the problem of seeing to it that there is a prompt withdrawal of engaged forces; it is the problem of seeing to it that there is an honourable settlement between India and Pakistan; it is the problem of seeing to it that, when the withdrawal is effected, we then do what this Council determined to do, and that is, in the terms of paragraph 4 of resolution 211 (1965), to decide "what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict". That is the task of the Council, that is the task that the world is waiting for us to perform. It is not our task, in my opinion, and with all due respect. o raise questions which cannot properly be raised under the terms of the resolution which directed what has been done and which authorised the Secretary-General to do precisely what he did.

Mr. Hope (United Kingdom): It had not been my intention to speak this evening, but the representative of the Soviet Union has spoken about the actions of the Secretary General following the passage of Security Council resolutions 209 (1965), 210 (1965), 211 (1965) and 214 (1965), and I have listened very carefully to his words. My delegation is, however, unable to agree to what has been said on this subject by the Soviet representative. We shall wish later to put more fully reserve the Council our views on this question, and I therefore reserve our right to speak on this again.

I would only say now that we are satisfied that the Secretary-General has throughout acted in complete accord with the clear mandates given to him by the Security Council by its resolutions 209 (1965), 210 (1965), 211 (1965) and 214 (1965). We believe that what he has done under those resolutions has been a proper exercise of his responsibility.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

The Security Council is today again considering the situation that has arisen as the result of the conflict between India and Pakistan. The Soviet Union, which maintains friendly ties with the peoples of India and Pakistan, has repeatedly expressed serious concern over this armed conflict between India and Pakistan, its main desire being to see peace restored between two of the greatest Powers in Asia.

The Soviet Union's position on the Indo-Pakistan conflict. has been quite clear from the very beginning. We have been. deeply grieved by the outbreak of the conflict and by the blood shed it has entailed.

We should like to stress again that this conflict is not in the interests of the peoples of either India or Pakistan. Its continuation would threaten the peace of the world and would impair the solidarity of the forces which are for peace, national independence and progress. That is why the Soviet Union, from the very first, has urgently appealed, both in its messages to the Governments of India and Pakistan and in the discussion of the matter in the Security Council, for the prompt cession of fratricidal bloodshed and an immediate peaceful settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan.

We welcomed the agreement between the two sides-India and Pakistan-on a cease-fire with great satisfaction. In this one must see, first of all, a demonstration on the part of the statesmen of India and Pakistan of due realism, restraint and awareness of the dire consequences of a further continuation of the armed conflict.

The Security Council has played the role assigned to it under the Charter of our Organisation in connection with the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The positive results that have been achieved, namely, the agreement of the parties of a cease-fire, are of course important, but only a first step. Now the main task is to consolidate the cease-fire, to ensure strict and scrupulous observance of the cease-fire agreement and to take the next step towards strengthening peace between India and Pakistan. The withdrawal by both sides of their troops and all their armed personnel from the positions they occupied up to 5 August 1965, as provided for in the Council's resolutions, must proceed more rapidly.

These are the questions that must be settled first, these are the questions to which attention must be given in the situation that has now arisen.

The Soviet Union, as everyone will remember, supported the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. These resolutions are an essential factor in the restoration of normal relations between India and Pakistan. And the Soviet Union has constantly called for, and calls for, strict compliance with the Council's resolutions.

Regarding the practical application of these resolutions, there arises a question which involves matters of principles. The Soviet delegation considers it necessary to draw the Council's attention to the fact that the action taken by the Secretary General with regard to the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan following the adoption of resolutions 210 (1965) and 211 (1965) of 6 and 20 September 1965 is at variance with the provisions of the Charter, under which only the Security Council is competent to take the necessary decisions on all specific matters connected with United Nations observers, namely, their functions, number, command, the financing of their activities and so on. Meanwhile, all these questions are being settled outside the Security Council, whose members are merely informed about measures that have already been taken. This situation is, of course, abnormal and, as we have noted, at variance with the Charter.

We consider it necessary to stress particularly that the Council should set a definite time-limit for the stay of the United Nations observers in India and Pakistan, which it is our firm conviction should be strictly limited to three months. Those are the views we wished to express at this stage in Council's work. In view of the late hour and on the usual understanding, I shall not insist on the consecutive interpretation of my statement into the languages.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

It is not my intention to speak on the subject of the debate this afternoon or to canvass the reasons why we recessed and resumed. I was just going to refer to one matter of great interest to me, which was explained by the representative of France. That relates to the question of parties who are in a position to raise points of order. He explained, undoubtedly in the light of his very long experience in the Security Council, to which I always defer, that no one who is not a member of the Council has ever been in the past or should hereafter be permitted to raise points of order. Mr. President, you accepted that and you entirely agreed with it. I do not wish to give the impression that I challenge that ruling. I, of course, bow to that ruling and I accept it in any event until the end of October, because I want to put forward the view that the question is not concluded in the way in which the representative of France put it before the Council. I want him to acquit me of succumbing merely to the temptation of putting another point of view just because it is a point of view opposed to his own.

Rule 30 of the provisional rules of procedure states: "If a representative raises a point of order the President shall immediately state his ruling." The question then arises: who is a representative for the purpose of raising points of order? Rule 14 states:

"Any Member of the United Nations not a member of the Security Council and any State not a Member of the United Nations, if invited to participate in a meeting or meetings of the Security Council, shall submit credentials for the representative appointed by it for this purpose. The credentials of such a representative shall be communicated to the Secretary-General not less than twenty-four hours before the first meeting which he is invited to attend."

Therefore, once he is invited he puts on the garb of a representative. The Charter, in Articles 31 and 32, repeated in rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure, clearly puts limitation on the right of a representative so invited. Rule 37 states:

"Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as the result of a decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council...." Paucity there, if the persons who are invited to participate should be forever regarded as standing outside the door of the Security Council, it would be unnecessary to say that they shall participate without vote; and therefore their participation in the discussion is permitted. The only thing that is denied to them is the right to cast a vote. If you go on to rule 38, that engrafts a second limitation on the right to participate. Rule 38 states:

"Any Member of the United Nations invited in accordance with the preceding rule or in application of Article 32 of the Charter to participate in the discussions of the Security Council may submit proposals and draft resolutions. These proposals and draft resolutions may be put to a vote only at the request of a representative on the Security Council."

Therefore, we arrive at this result. A State invited to participate has to provide a representative, and the moment he becomes a representative he participates in the discussion before the Council. One can easily imagine dozens of possibilities in which the ability to participate in a discussion may be gravely hampered, if not prevented, if points of order may not be raised at appropriate times.

I submit that there is another point of view: that any person other than a person called under rule 39, who only gives information-who is invited to participate and make his submissions is entitled to participate in the discussion. There are two things and two things only that he cannot do : first, he cannot vote, and secondly, though he may submit a draft resolution he cannot have it voted upon unless a member of the Council so requests.

That is what I wanted to say. Undoubtedly, it might be that in the past the position was not clarified in this manner. I had to pay some attention to it during the time when I was President of the Council. All I want to say at the moment is that there is another point of view.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

Mr. President, allow us to associate ourselves with the congratulations addressed to you by members of the Council. We greatly esteem the qualities and abilities of the scholar and diplomat who has assumed the position of President of the highest organ of the United Nations, an organ which bears the chief responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Experience, as we know, is acquired and enriched through practice, and we wish you every success in your efforts in this august and very difficult post.

Polemics on procedural matters have gone to excessive lengths at this meeting. This is liable to create an unfavourable atmosphere for the discussion of the substance of the items on today's agenda. We are clearly moving towards a situation in which the substance will be replaced by a polemical discussion on procedure and formalities. An unusual and, indeed, strange situation is being created in the Council, in which we are turning over and over again to discussion of the agenda which we adopted at the very beginning of today's meeting.

It is our conviction that our most important task at present is to secure strict observance of the cease-fire agreement in the area of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. Unfortunately, we know that violations of the cease-fire agreement are continuing, and this might have very dangerous consequences for peace in the area. Obviously our main attention should be concentrated on matters connected with the direct settlement of the armed conflict and, first of all, on scrupulous observance of the cease-fire agreement, which would create more favourable conditions for seeking a solution to other questions that both sides can accept.

That is in fact the principle behind Council resolution 211 (1965), which clearly provides in paragraph 4 that only after a cease-fire and the subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel will consideration be given to the question of what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict. The conclusion is obvious.

At the present time, when these decisions of the Council calling for a complete cease-fire and the withdrawal of armed personnel have still not been fully implemented, it would hardly be in keeping with the spirit and letter of resolution 211 (1965). for it to consider other aspects of the problem. Accordingly, it is our view that at this stage the Council's discussion should be on questions directly connected with the settlement of the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. That is how we

understand the agenda adopted for this meeting of the Council. The Soviet delegation will not insist on consecutive interpretation of its statement into the other languages in view of the time factor will subject to the usual understanding in the Council on this question.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1247 held on 25 October 1965

It has been apparent for a long time, and it is apparent today, that the problem of India and Pakistan is a grave one. It is a difficult one. It is difficult in all its aspects, and certainly our procedural difficulty today was an illustration of this. I asked for brief period for consultation-not an unusual thing, as I have discovered in my brief experience in the Security Council-so that we could confer together to see whether or not, in a friendly and amicable way, the procedural difficulty which had arisen could be resolved. It was not intended in any way to interfere with the provisional rules of procedure, but only so that I could myself have an opportunity to task to some of my colleagues and some of the parties concerned. It is helpful to me to hear all the parties on every aspect of their problems and we have been doing this ever since the proceedings began. I understood your ruling, Mr. President, when you approved the agenda. We were to meet here today to consider the problems of cease-fire and withdrawal. I also understand the long line of unbroken precedents according to which we always hear everything that anybody has to say, and we respect the right of free speech, not only of members of the Council, but also of any body who appears before this body at our invitation.

I am respectful both of the subject which is before the Council and of the tradition of the Council. For my part, bearing that in mind, I am prepared to hear anything which the representative of Pakistan has to say and, I might add, anything which the representative of India has to say.

Text of the Speech made by the President. Mr. Arthar J. Goldberg in the Security Council Meeting No. 1245 held on 27 September 1965

In addition to the report of the Secretary-General which is included in the agenda [S/6710 and Add. 1-2] and to the other relevant documents which were circulated this morning, an additional report by the Secretary-General has just been submitted in documents S/6719, to which I should like to draw. the attention of members of the Council.

We now have a draft resolution which reflects the consensus of the members of the Council on the basis of my consultations with them. The text is as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Noting the reports of the Secretary-General (S/6710 and Add. 1 and 2),

"Reaffirming its resolutions 209 (1965) of 4 September, 210 (1965) of 6 September and 211 (1965) of 20 September 1965,

"Expressing its grave concern that the cease-fire agreed to unconditionally by the Governments of India and Pakistan is not holding,

"Recalling that the cease-fire demand in the Council's resolutions was unanimously endorsed by the Council and agreed to by the Governments of both India and Pakistan,

"Demands that the parties urgently honour their commitments to the Council to observe the cease-fire, and further calls upon the parties promptly to withdraw all armed personnel as necessary steps in the full implementation of resolution 210 (1965).**

We note that the representative of Jordan made a reservation to resolution 211 (1965) of 20 September at the time of its adoption, which reservation is still maintained.

I have had no request from any member of the Council to speak. Since this draft resolution has been fully discussed in the informal consultations which have taken place throughout the day, if I hear no objection and if there are no other requests to speak, I shall consider the draft resolution adopted.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg in the Security Council Meeting No. 1244 held on 22 September 1965

Speaking on behalf of the members of the Security Council, I should like to express the profound appreciation of the Council to the distinguished Heads of State of India and Pakistan, who, in compliance with resolution 211 (1965) adopted by the Council on 20 September 1965, have ordered a cease-fire between their armed forces so that the end of hostilities and conditions of peace can be brought about on the subcontinent.

This is an important day in the history of the United Nations and of the world. The Council and the United Nations have addressed themselves to perhaps the gravest problem of which the United Nations has been seized in the course of its history. The Council has debated this matter at length, has heard the representatives of the countries concerned at length, and has had the benefit of the profound impartial, courageous efforts of our Secretary-General, who went on a mission of peace to the subcontinent.

The end of bloodshed on the subcontinent is highly important. But, as Security Council resolution 211 (1965) clearly states, that is a first step. There are other steps which must be taken. The other steps which must be taken are for the parties involved and the Council to work together to bring about conditions of permanent peace between their two countries. Resolution 211 (1965) recognized that there had to be a cease-fire and a withdrawal of forces, and that there had to be an honourable settlement, under peaceful conditions, of the underlying political problems existing between the two countries.

In concluding our debate the other day, I said that if India and Pakistan were members of the Security Council, instead of countries presenting their cases to the Council, they would have decided as the Council decided in its resolution; I was sure of that because of their past history of dedication to the principles of the Charter and to the cause of international peace and justice.

The cease-fire must be a prelude to better understanding, so that this tragic war that has occurred will never be repeated and so that these two neighbours, for which all of us have great friendship, will resume friendly relations in a spirit of friendly cooperation, peace and amity.

The members of the Council, and the Council itself, will do everything they can to assist in what is the most noble of all tasks, that is, the task of bringing permanent peace to the area. Under the resolution adopted by the Security Council, the Secretary-General has been authorised to provide the necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the cease-fire, and that assistance is at the disposal of the parties under the text of the resolution adopted by the Council. I have noted in the course of this debate that the representatives of both India and Pakistan have stated repeatedly their confidence in the Secretary-General-in which all members of the Council are at one-and their conviction that his efforts in this and all other areas are designed to assist in the restoration of peaceful conditions.

I am sure that the announcement of the Government of India, through its distinguished Prime Minister, which is noted in the report of the Secretary-General, and the announcement made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan will be greeted with great relief and acclaim by a very troubled world. But it is necessary, as I have said, to go on from there and to restore the conditions which will lead to a permanent peace, a lasting and honourable peace between these two great neighbours, these two Members of the United Nations, these two great members of the world family.

India and Pakistan have very much to contribute to the world and the world looks upon these two countries with great affection, concern and interest.

In view of the announcement that is made today, I, as President of the Council, on behalf of the members of the Council, wish to express our appreciation to both countries for honouring the Council's request, and the Council, of course, will continue as its resolution prescribes-its consideration of this matter so that it can make its contribution towards the resolution of the problems involved.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Aka (Ivory Coast) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1242 held on 20 September 1965

During the six weeks of the conflict between India and Pakistan many efforts have been made at various levels to restore peace between these two neighbours, these two great Members of the United Nations. A special tribute must, however, be paid to the efforts made by the Secretary-General since the outbreak of hostilities and to the vigilance and the impartial and tireless endeavours of the Council, which, on two occasions-on 4 and 6 September 1965-called upon the parties concerned to order an immediate cease-fire. Unfortunately, the underlying problems and the passions they arouse, together with all the resentment that has accumulated since the hostilities began, have made it impossible to implement resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965), adopted by the Council on 4 and 6 September 1965.

Nevertheless, whatever justification there may be for feeling of vengeance and of injured national honour, experience shows that vengeance engenders vengeance, that hate engenders hate, and that nothing can be settled in an atmosphere of unbridled passion.

It was therefore necessary and urgent to bring the hostilities to an end, unconditionally and without delay, in order to spare those lives which could still be saved and in order to work out, by peaceful means, a solution to the problem of Kashmir, which is the bone of contention between India and Pakistan, because it is certainly not beyond human ingenuity, and particularly the ingenuity of the two parties involved, to compose the differences.

To meet this need, the Council adopted resolution 209 (1965) and 210 (1965). The Ivory Coast voted in favour of them, and has for the same reason just voted for the draft resolution submitted by the Netherlands, because it does not wish to miss any opportunity of cooperation in humanitarianism. and peace-keeping endeavours.

We therefore wish our vote to be understood thus and we think that this new resolution which the Council has adopted will secure the cooperation of the parties concerned, which have, on many occasions, shown their love for and faith in the United Nations and peace. We also have in mind, however what the United Nations ought to do, as quickly as possible, to help India and Pakistan to reach, by peaceful means, a solution to the Kashmir problem which divides them and which has only too often been a source of world-wide anxiety.

I am not saying that in the form of an ultimatum. I am saying it as I am in honour bound to respect the very purposes of the Charter. In leaving the United Nations, Pakistan will be fulfilling the Charter. And then one-third or more of the world will be outside this Organization, and some countries which call themselves States will be members of the Security Council.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1242 held on 20 September 1965

The Security Council has just adopted a resolution which is important for two reasons: first, it demands a cease-fire, without which the situation could only grow worse for the two countries concerned; secondly, it confirms the Council's interest in the political problem which is at the root of their dispute, and indicates the ways and means of dealing promptly with the substance of the problem. These two major provisions of the document adopted are, in our opinion, complementary and, as I have said in earlier statements, my delegation attaches equal importance to them. Nobody denies that the cessation of hostilities is a primary objective in the present serious situation; nor does anybody dispute that the serious disagreement between the parties concerning the political and legal aspects of the Kashmir affair means that a long-term solution. will not be found without great difficulty. It was essential, however, for the Security Council, at the present stage, to demonstrate its objectivity and impartiality and that today's resolution should not in any way prejudge the position of either party on the substance of the matter. It was also essential for the Council to recognize that, as soon as fighting has ceased, a further effort, a serious effort, will have to be made to bring about a genuine political settlement which will ensure a lasting peace. These are the reasons why the French delegation voted as it did.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1242 held on 20 September 1965

I should like to offer a comment or two on the draft resolution to which we have given our support, but before I do so permit me to offer a word of comment on the references made by the representative of Pakistan to certain statements I made at the 1241st meeting. It is very unfairly urged that the fair sex like to have the last word, but I think men too have a habit of talking the last word. Nothing would have given me the highest pleasure than to have left the representative of Pakistan with the comforting thought that he had the last word on this controversy of his own creation, but I would have been responsible for the misunderstanding which has been generated in his mind. I think that in fairness to him, and certainly in fairness the myself, I should try to explain what precisely I should do, if he will permit me..

I normally try to express myself in as precise the language as possible, but, even though I read from the written text, I must have been particularly obscure in the use of language. The first complaint of the representative of Pakistan related to my reference to that fateful day in August 1947. He asked to whom I was referring and who the peoples were. I was humbly referring to the fact that India was partitioned in August 1947. As Minister of Law, having learned the Constitutions of the countries, he would know that the parliamentary act that divided India and liberated Pakistan and India referred to "undivided India" many times. Therefore I referred to what India was before 15 August 1947, which by parliamentary usage be referred to as undivided India, which became divided and became Pakistan and India. I could not think the integrity of the States.

Undoubtedly the Minister of Law came rather late in this debate. He was not present on the two earlier resolutions on which I took the floor when I had the real fortune or whatever else it may be of introducing those two other resolutions. On the first resolution, which was on 4 September, I said the following in introducing the resolution :

"As I said, the draft resolution does no more than just call a halt to this escalation. India and Pakistan, as two great world Powers, have less a duty to themselves than. to the wider cause of world peace and world order. They have been and should continue to be an example to the Afro-Asian world." [1273th meeting, para. 137.]

The day before yesterday, when I was speaking on the substance of the debate, I said the following:

"My country enjoys the most friendly relations with Pakistan as well as India and we are anxious that this relationship should continue and mature."

I would like him, when he has a little time, to dwell on those passages and realise I was not at any time denying-I did not, I could not have denied-the integrity of the existence on the status of Pakistan.

The other matter to which he referred was my reference to the "musty records of the Council. As to that, he was here on Saturday and therefore he must have heard what I said, which was:

"In resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) we called for a halt to hostilities-the sole concern, I repeat, in the present context of the Security Council. It is not to recall ancient resolutions from the musty records of the past, nor to express pious hopes for a peaceful settlement in the future, nor to get side-tracked from the main objective." [1241st meeting, para. 32].

So what I did say was that our attention should not be turned backward, it should be turned forward. I understand, if I may be permitted a personal reference,

that the Law Minister of Pakistan is a member of the English Bar, and I understand also that he and I come from the same Temple. Now, he knows, and I know as a practising lawyer, that especially when you go to court, they must hear your records, they must hear the authority that you cite; the more ancient the doctrine that you can press into service, the more ability you demonstrate to the court. And no lawyer, certainly no one who has been trained as a lawyer would ever refer in that context to "musty records" as something derogatory or disrespectful. I do hope he will accept my explanation. I am. sorry if I did not make myself clearer, as I now find I ought to have.

I would now like to go on and make a few comments on this resolution. My friend, the representative of the Netherlands, undoubtedly deserves the greatest of praise for the tremendous amount of effort he exerted. The inspiration did not come to him; he had to shed a great deal of perspiration over this matter. We are all conscious of this, and we tender to him our gratitude.

To my Government, the resolution is subject to certain reservations It is, if I may say so, like the curate's egg-good in parts and not so good in other parts. The fourth preambular paragraph specifically reads:

"Noting the differing replies by the parties to an appeal for a cease-fire as set out in the report of the Secretary General, but noting further with concern that no ceasefire has yet come into being". The words "different replies" have now been a handed to read "differing replies," which some might regard as a distinction without a difference. The word "but" therein rather gives the meaning that, whatever might have been said by the parties, the thing is going on. It therefore suggests a rather derogatory attitude; it is almost a pejorative reference to the replies from both parties. One may deserve it, the other may not; both may deserve it, but may not. But I think that the word "but" there is not something that is conducive to a clear understanding of what we intended to convey. I think it was Cleopatra who said: "But' is like a goaler that brings forth the malefactor", and the malefactor is there. I would have preferred to have that expanded and put in plainer language; but I understand also that, as all feeble compromises must do, they hide themselves and nobody can manage to find either their lineaments or their form.

With reference to operative paragraph 4 of the resolution, in the context of my own statement made to the Council, we should have liked not to have this resolution cluttered up with a reference to the political settlement. I have all the time understood that all views expressed in this Council had to be taken into account; but to the extent to which we have had the pleasure and the privilege of listening to the representative of Pakistan, even before we voted, I almost ventured to think that the child had been killed even before it was born, and that we were listening to an inquest of paragraph 4- that it will not work and it is not intended to work. Therefore, had my friend from the Netherlands not objected to the resolution's being put to the vote in separate parts, we would not have voted in favour of operative paragraph 4. In any case, we have a forecast of what is going to happen to operative paragraph 4. I suppose it does not matter if I do not venture into further criticism about what it might do or what it might not do.

My Government is undoubtedly just as anxious as anyone else at this table that there should be a cease-fire and that it should arrive as soon as possible; with the reservations I have just stated, and because we are so anxious, we voted in favour of this resolution.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. De Beus (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1242 held on 20 September 1965

On behalf of the delegation of the Netherlands, I have the pleasure to introduce a draft resolution [S/6694] on the conflict between India and Pakistan. I should add at once that although the draft resolution is presented in the name of Netherlands, it would not have been possible for us to arrive at the text of this draft resolution if it had not been for the cooperation of the other non-permanent members and the unanimous support of the permanent members. Therefore, the contents of this draft resolution are the outcome of informal consultations with all these members. As members will have understood from the many hours which they have had to spend waiting, it has not been easy to obtain agreement on a text which could command a wide degree of agreement in the Council. That it nevertheless has been possible at all to obtain such a degree of agreement on the present text is due to the fact, and only to the fact, that all members of the Council have been guided by one overriding consideration-a consideration which we felt had to weigh more heavily than all the others namely, the absolute need, in view of the international situation in Asia, to stop the fighting before it could spread to other areas. That is the first and main object of this draft resolution.

Its second main object is to open up an avenue to the parties for renewing negotiations on their underlying political problem from which the present fighting originated.

For both these purposes-the cease-fire and the negotiations-the draft resolution offers the assistance of the United Nations.

With regard to the cease-fire, I should furthermore like to point out that the draft resolution this time uses stronger language than before. After having twice "appealed" for a cease-fire, the Security Council now "demands" it to take effect on a given date and at a given hour. I should explain that the hour mentioned in the draft resolution is this coming Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hour GMT, which corresponds to 1130 hours Rawalpindi time, to 12 noon New Delhi time, and to 3 o'clock in the morning New York daylight saving time, which means that it will give a little more than forty-eight hours to carry out the orders for the cease-fire which we hope will take place.

The draft resolution, I think, speaks for itself. I have little to aid to the text. It is a draft resolution which neither condemn nor condones; it deals with the past less than with the future; it does not try to look backward but forward; it does not assess fault to the parties, but offers assistance to them: assistance in supervising the carrying out of the cease-fire, and assistance in subsequent negotiations.

The authors of the draft resolution fully realise that there are serious disappointments involved in this draft resolution for both parties. One party, we know, would have liked no mention at all of certain aspects; the other party would have preferred far more and stronger mention of those aspects. The authors, I can assure them, have had no choice but to adopt the middle course which was achievable. This means that neither India nor Pakistan gets all that it wanted. All I can say is that this is the essence of compromise; it is inevitable in any peaceful settlement. In return, we believe that they do get two invaluable things: the first is peace for their nations, and the second is an opportunity to start talks again on the main problem which has envenomed relations between India and Pakistan ever since their birth.

My delegation and all those who stand behind this draft resolution therefore ardently hope that both parties will accept and execute it notwithstanding certain objections which they will undoubtedly have against it. In so doing they will make sacrifices, but these sacrifices, we believe, are the most honourable contributions that Pakistan and India can make to the peace of the world.

In view of the lengthy informal consultations which have preceded the present draft resolution, and in view of the blood shed which is going on at this very moment, I would suggest that we vote on this draft resolution as soon as possible. We hope that it will be passed by the Council this morning, with as many votes as possible, and above all with the unanimity of the permanent members.

I have only this to add. There has been much talk in the past about the crisis of the United Nations and about the paralysis of the Security Council because of a lack of unanimity among the permanent members. If the Security Council takes this decisive action at this critical hour in this very difficult matter, it will have proven, we believe, that the United Nations has overcome its crisis and that the Security Council can indeed exercise its primary responsibility for international peace and security.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Vidal Zaglio (Uruguay) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1242 held on 20 September 1965

Before beginning this statement on behalf of my country, I should first like to thank the President of the Security Council for the kind words he has spoken about me. Since, however, I take his words as being addressed to the country I represent, I wish to express my deep gratitude for the sentiments they contained, which reflect the generosity and goodwill of the President and are a source of pride and satisfaction to me and to Uruguay, particularly since they come from such a distinguished jurist as Mr. Goldberg, who has had an outstanding career in his own country as an eminent member of the Supreme Court. He has spoken of Uruguay so kindly and aptly, in terms which we cannot forget or ignore. I am grateful for the gracious and warm welcome addressed to me and, as an Uruguayan, I have listened to them with the greatest satisfaction.

On taking my seat in the Security Council, I wish to express my country's genuine interest in and its opinion on the item under discussion. Uruguay is occupying a seat on the Council for the first time and, because it is aware of the responsibility which this implies, because it knows that its statements-by virtue of its own tradition and of the fact that it is one of the two Latin american members of this body-are inspired by a steadfastly peace-loving tradition, by the rejection of all solutions based on aggression and force and by an unswerving faith in solutions based on international law, it has studied this case, in which two Member States face each other in battle and which is endangering peace and general security, with all the seriousness which the circumstances require.

Uruguay was one of the sponsors of Security Council resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) adopted unanimously on 4 and 6 September 1965, and we are accordingly in general agreement with the conclusions of the reports made by the Secretary-General on returning from his mission [S/6683, S/6686]; his devotion to the cause of peace has once again been demonstrated by the accomplishment of his difficult mission.

The matter is now before the Security Council, under Article 24 of the Charter which confers on it primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and it must therefore take appropriate action. This action, which must be directed towards achieving the immediate and most important aim of securing peace, may take the form of a cease-fire and the withdrawal of all military forces, irrespective of their nature.

These provisional measures will not affect the rights, claims or positions of the parties concerned, since the fundamental problems involved in this case ought to be settled and will have to be settled in due course in accordance with the principles and purposes of the United Nations, and with Article 1, paragraphs and 2, of the Charter, in particular. The Council will therefore continue to consider this problem in order to ensure full compliance with the Charter and respect for its decisions.

We have before us the text of draft resolution [S/6694] submitted by the Netherlands. Generally speaking, we find it fully satisfactory, because basically it is an effective contribution towards maintaining peace in the world and because two Members are to help in the most important way of all, by the cease-fire, to ensure that peace will reign among the countries which signed the Charter.

My country hopes that the two great States, which are now facing each other in conflict which can hardly be termed other than deplorable, will realise that the problems that separate them can be solved only by observance of the law and by co-operation, that fighting will solve nothing and that, moreover, their attitude creating an international situation which may lead mankind into catastrophe of incalculable magnitude.

Uruguay firmly believes that true spirit of international co-operation prevails among all the States Members of the United Nations, spirit which, Dag Hammarskjold said, all times demands firm belief the ability of men and Governments to exercise common sense in order to find the way out of the frightful labyrinth of irreconcilable conflicts and insoluble problems in which we find ourselves.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

Today the Security Council again meets in disquieting circumstances, when the armed conflict between India and Pakistan is continuing to spread and the situation is becoming increasingly menacing.

The hostilities between these two States, which began. in Kashmir, are spreading day by day, engulfing more. and more regions and involving increasing numbers of armed forces on both sides. Serious losses are being sustained, and not only by the armed forces: the peaceful population is being. sorely tried. Not only military zones but cities far inside the territory of India and Pakistan, including the capitals, are the targets of air raids.

The spread of the armed conflicts is aggravating the already tense situation in South and South-East Asia, created by the aggression of United States imperialism in Viet-Nam, and is still further increasing the threat to world peace.

It is quite obvious that such a turn of events is not at all in the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan or the people of Asia as a whole. It is fraught with an ominous threat to international security and is doing great harm to the cause of world peace. It is all too evident that the armed conflict between India and Pakistan merely serves the purposes of the forces which are trying to disunity and set against each other the States that have liberated themselves from the colonial yoke. It is equally clear that the continuation of this conflict benefits only the forces which are pursuing the criminal policy of dividing peoples so as to achieve their imperialist and expansionist aims.

It is natural therefore that all who cherish the cause of peace should show legitimate concern about the tragic turn taken by relations between the two biggest Asian States, India and Pakistan, which were the initiators of the Bandung Conference. Concern about the armed conflict between India and Pakistan has been clearly expressed by the Governments of numerous countries. As we know, a number of statesmen have appealed for an immediate end to hostilities and a settlement of the Indo-Pakistan armed conflict by peaceful means.

The Security Council, fulfilling its great task as the United Nations organ with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in its turn adopted resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) calling upon the warring factions to cease hostilities in the entire area of conflict immediately and promptly withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965.

With this same end in view, as we know, the Secretary General made efforts in pursuance of the decisions of the Security Council. The results of these efforts are reflected in his reports [S/6683 and S/6686]. They testify to the extremely disturbing turn of events and the vital need for the Council to adopt immediate measures.

Hearing the thoughts expressed today in the Council about the steps taken by the Secretary-General in the course of his honourable and responsible mission, we see clearly that the Council must exert further effective efforts in order to bring about a decisive solution.

As we know, the reports indicate that the Secretary General, fulfilling the mandate entrusted to him by the Security Council, requested the Governments of India and Pakistan to order an unconditional cease-fire and cessation of all hostilities in the entire areas of the conflict. The positions of the warring factions are presented in the respective messages of the Governments of India and Pakistan. They speak for themselves.

The reply to this appeal received from the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Shastri, on 15 September 1965 and quoted in the report of the Secretary-General, states inter alia:

"I reaffirm my willingness, as communicated, to order a simple cease-fire and cessation of hostilities as proposed by you, as soon as you are able to confirm to me that the Government of Pakistan has agreed to do so as well." [See S/6683, para. 11.]

The report of the Secretary-General also quotes the reply from the President of Pakistan, Mr. Ayub Khan, received on 16 September 1965. The reply states as follows:

"While we are agreeable in principle to stop fighting... a cease-fire can be meaningful only if it is followed by such steps as would lead to a durable and honourable settlement in order to preclude the recurrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens the subcontinent. To bring about such a settlement, it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute." [Ibid., para. 14.]

It should be particularly emphasised that the recognition of the need for an immediate end to the current armed conflict between India and Pakistan, the recognition of the extreme importance of this for the cause of peace, has been reflected in a whole series of international moves. The Security Council too made this point quite unequivocally in its decisions, which are extremely serious and must be implemented.

The Soviet Union, which has unwaveringly attached primary importance to the maintenance of world peace, has likewise expressed grave concern about the armed conflict between India and Pakistan. The leaders of the Soviet Union have repeatedly made it clear that we are far from indifferent to what is happening now between India and Pakistan.

It is a well known fact that we are bound to India by a friendship which by now has become traditional. The Soviet Union appreciates India's peace-loving foreign policy and devotion to the principles of peaceful coexistence and non-alignment, the principles of national freedom and friendly cooperation among peoples. And it may be appropriate here to recall that our country has done a good deal to help its friends in India to advance along the road of peace and progress and consolidation of the country's independence.

At the same time, we are in favour of the development of good-neighbourly relations with Pakistan too, since such relations are in the mutual interests of both our countries. The Soviet Union has therefore on many occasions noted with satisfaction that these endeavours of ours meet with understanding on the part of the Government of Pakistan.

All this explains why our concern about the current armed conflict between India and Pakistan represents above all the sincere and disinterested feelings of friends of the peoples of India and Pakistan and desire for peace to be restored between the two countries. At the same time, we cannot but note that the conflict arouses our concern also because the hostilities are taking place in a region immediately adjacent to the frontiers of the Soviet Union.

The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the question being considered by the Council is determined by the general lines of the peace-loving foreign policy of our country and by our profound conviction that when disputes arise between States-whatever their origin-they should be settled by peaceful means, by negotiations. There is no other possibility for the settlement of conflicts.

As was indicated in the messages sent by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan on 4 September 1965, [S/6685] the Soviet Government has expressed willingness to lend its good offices in this matter-provided of course that the parties so desire.

We venture to recall again that the Soviet Union is most anxious to see peace strengthened in that region. As you know the Soviet Government has called upon India and Pakistan to cease hostilities immediately and withdraw their respective troops to the positions held by them before the beginning of the conflict. And with that in mind, the Soviet Union support ted the decisions of the Security Council designed to achieve this aim. In present circumstances, attention must be focus on the need to implement the resolutions of the Security Council and on strict compliance with its decisions. It has become more clear than ever that the main task now is to achieve an immediate cessation of hostilities between India and Pakistan and to put an end to the bloodshed. The deafening roar of guns and thunder of bombs are obstructing negotiations. Belligerent moods and heated passions are very dangerous counsellors of reason. In an atmosphere of armed conflict it is hardly possible to solve the problems which exist between the two States, and their solution is most desirable in the interests of good neighbourly relations between them.

It goes without saying that it is first and foremost the Governments of India and Pakistan themselves which can and must settle the present conflict. The Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung principles cry out for statesman-like wisdom on the part of the leaders of both countries and for restraint and good will..

At the same time, it is obvious that in the situation. brought about by the Indo-Pakistan conflict, much depends on other States too. Attempts to use this conflict in their own selfish interests, disregard for the fate of the innocent people who are being killed, and still more, incendiary and provocative statements could only aggravate the situation and help to fan the flames of the conflagration. Such conduct could bring with it the risk of further spreading the conflict and involving many States in it one after the other, with all the serious consequences this would entail.

The Soviet delegation feels it necessary to emphasise that in present circumstances the efforts of all States, including the members of the Security Council, should be concentrated on the main and most urgent task of ending the bloodshed and restoring peace between India and Pakistan. We see this as the direct and unfailing duty of the Security Council. If normal conditions could be restored, the parties would be able in the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations and the Bandung principles, to enter into negotiations on the subject of a peaceful settlement of the current disagreements.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hsueh (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

I wish to associate my delegation with the expression of appreciation extended to the Secretary-General for his mission of peace to India and Pakistan. While his efforts to give effect to the Council's resolutions have not received positive responses in all cases from the parties concerned, my delegation is gratified that the mission has not been altogether fruitless.

His two reports have thrown a flood of light on the critical situation. The impressions he has formed and the recommendations he has made should receive the Council's most serious consideration. The Secretary General has found that both India and Pakistan are desirous of a cessation of hostilities in the entire area of the current conflict. But in an atmosphere of suspicion, fear and highly charged emotionalism, it is not surprising that both parties have found it necessary to make charges and counter charges against the other, rather than to accede in a clear-cut manner to the cease-fire appeals of the Security Council and to the personal appeals of the Secretary-General. This has made the mission undertaken by the Secretary-General even more difficult and complicated.

In this respect, it is only fair to note, as was ably pointed out a while ago by the representative of Malaysia, that India did indicate to the Secretary-General its readiness to accept a simple cease-fire. On the other hand, Pakistan made its acceptance conditional upon certain measures that were unacceptable to India. As a result, the fighting continues unabated and the situation remains grave.

As the organ responsible for the maintenance of peace and security, the Security Council clearly cannot evade its responsibility. It must act immediately in such a way as to enable the leaders of both India and Pakistan to find it possible to get out of a blind alley.

In his report [S/6626] to the Council at the 1239th meeting the Secretary-General suggested the advisability of applying Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter to enforce the cease-fire. This may very well turn out to be quite unnecessary. But it appears to be a logical step to take in order not only to uphold the authority of the Council, but, what is more important, also to put an effective stop to a war which though as yet local in nature may well escalate to such a scale as to endanger world peace.

My delegation welcomes this and the other recommendations of the Secretary-General and will be happy to support any initiative leading to a resolution that will bring about an effective cessation of hostilities. For, in the present grave situation, the foremost prerequisite to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute is an immediate cease-fire. The Kashmir question has been with us for seventeen years.

It is sad to note that with the passage of time there seems to be a progressive hardening of positions. It is this erosion of flexibility that has made the present conflict inevitable. It seems to my delegation, however, that the present tragic events should have the effect of demonstrating the futility of trying to settle disputes by force of arms. This is a time for a change of positions. The leaders of India and of Pakistan need all the magnanimity they are capable of to bring the Kashmir question to a lasting solution. It is suicidal to allow this running sore to go on festering until it is beyond all cure.

In his statement before the Council at our meeting yesterday, the representative of India referred to the fact that the communists of my country have made use of this fratricidal struggle between India and Pakistan to threaten intervention. Let me take this opportunity to state, with all the emphasis at my command, that the warlike behaviour of the group of men in Peiping is alien to the peaceful traditions of the Chinese people.

China and India have lived together as good neighbours for thousands of years. Their relationship has been marked. by mutual respect and cultural collaboration. Throughout the centuries there has been a continuous exchange of scholars, artists and religious teachers. There has never been a time and I repeat, never-when the peoples of the two neighbouring countries confronted each other in armed conflict. It saddened me to listen to that part of the statement of the representative of India in which he related how the communists on the mainland of China have taken advantage of the present conflict on the subcontinent to threaten India with war This is another example of the aggressive proclivities of the Chinese commu nist regime. It is only too obvious that if India and Pakistan should continue to lock themselves in mortal kombat, the ultimate victor, not only in Kashmir but also on the sub continent would be neither India nor Pakistan, but the evil forces represented by Peiping.

Before concluding, may I take this opportunity to pay a high tribute to His Excellency Ambassador Rifa'i of Jordan, who is leaving us very soon. We will sorely miss him. We

will miss his wisdom, but we wish him success and the best of health wherever he goes.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

Before speaking on the item on our agenda, I should like to say that my delegation is very sorry to witness the departure of our friend Mr. Rifa'i, who has occupied an eminent place in this Council. Several of my colleagues have referred to his qualities of intellect, his high mindedness, and the moral authority which attached, one might say almost naturally, to his opinions and his conversation. My colleagues and I associate ourselves unreservedly with these expressions of praise. We also admire his unfailing courtesy, his unusually keen diplomatic sense, the strength of his convictions and the courage with which he has expressed his ideas.

Since the adoption of resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September, fighting has not ceased on the subcontinent. Despite the personal efforts of the Secretary-General, who was in a particularly favourable position-perhaps more so than anyone else-to persuade the two parties to listen to the voice of wisdom, they have continued along the dangerous path of war. Such a situation is profoundly alarming, and harmful for India and Pakistan, for the United Nations itself, and for the peace of the world.

My delegation wishes to add its voice to those which have been raised to urge the two Governments to comply with resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 4 and 6 September last: it hopes that these resolutions will be reaffirmed here in the most forceful manner because it is essential, in the interests of these two great friendly nations, that the military operations in progress should be ended with the utmost possible speed.

My delegation considers that the urgent nature of the emergency action required does not relieve the Security Council from the duty of giving the closest attention to the causes underlying the crisis which has been coming on over the last few weeks. The present phase of our debate should not, in our view, be concluded without at least opening the door to discussions in which a settlement of the basic political problems between India and Pakistan-in the first place, that of Kashmir -could be sought under conditions justifying the hope of a

reasonable outcome. But, I repeat, nothing reasonable can be obtained by prolonging a fratricidal struggle. It is high time that the two camps-whose eminent speakers we have heard yesterday and this morning, with interest but also with sadness-should be made aware of this.

I shall limit myself now to these few general comments, reserving our right to speak again when a draft resolution is before the Council.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg as representative of the de Wo United States of America in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

I should now like to make a statement in my capacity as representative of the United States of America.

The United States believes it crucial that the Security Council pursue urgently, with all the capability at its disposal, its efforts to secure an immediate and effective cease-fire between India and Pakistan and to restore peace in the sub continent. The Secretary-General has reported to us in full on his mission of peace. The United States commends the Secretary-General for his impartial efforts to give effect to the Council's resolutions and achieve an honourable settlement. My Government fully endorses his proposals to the parties and urges this Council, in the light of the seriousness of the situation, to proceed promptly to implement them.

We agree with the comment just made by the representative of the Netherlands, that time is of the very essence in this grave situation.

We regard the Security Council as the appropriate and the most effective agency to meet this crisis. We believe the Security Council must act, that it must act firmly, decisively and promptly. We trust that all peace-loving countries will fully support its efforts.

and While we are meeting, in direct contradiction to our efforts, the Chinese Communists are pursuing a course clearly designed to aggravate further the already grave situation. The world is thus confronted with an increased threat to peace which can only be designed to increase tension and to I complicate the peace-making efforts of the United Nations, the Security Council and the Secretary-General.

If a cease-fire between India and Pakistan was necessary on 4 and 6 September when resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) were adopted, it is imperatively necessary today. And it is doubly necessary that our voices be raised firmly against any efforts to spread the conflict and exploit what is already a tragedy.

I most strongly urge that we proceed here with our task and join in calling on both Governments involved in the conflict to cease-fire immediately and to respond favourably to the Secretary-General's proposals in order that this threat to world peace may be ended before it involves more nations, more peoples, more suffering.

The Secretary-General, has also expressed the view to the two parties that the Council would wish to explore, "as a matter of urgency, methods for achieving enduring peace between India and Pakistan'' [S/6683, para. 6], and has noted that as late as November 1962 the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India had agreed on the need for renewed efforts to resolve their outstanding differences. We agree with the Secretary-General that renewed efforts to resolve these differences should be made and that they can only be effective under conditions of peace.

The position of the United States in this matter is simple and forthright. We ate in full support of the United Nations activity in this area. We are in full support of resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) adopted by the Security Council and the efforts of the Secretary-General to give effect to these resolutions. And our full support of these resolutions is but a continuation of our consistent attitude on the India-Pakistan question, which has always been to support a peaceful solution of all aspects of the differences between them.

Since the birth of India and Pakistan as independent countries, my Government has developed relations, close and friendly, with both countries, relations which we sincerely want and hope and expect to continue. We have many ties of friendship and common interest with the peoples of both India and Pakistan. And these are expressed not only in our broad governmental programmer, but also in the form of many non governmental programmes and activities. particularly in the fields of health, education and economic development. And as I said in the Security Council a week ago, a Saturday, 4 September 1965, and I would like to repeat that statement:

"We know intimately from our close relations with both countries the intricacies of the underlying problem which is at the root of today's conflict..." [1237th meeting, para. 190].

Our attitude in the United Nations on the India-Pakistan question today, as in the past, continues to derive from the existence of this spirit of friendship with both countries and a deep interest in world peace. That is why we have shared the deep concern expressed by us, together with all members of the Council, in resolution 210 (1965), about extension of the fighting which adds immeasurably to the seriousness of the situation. The world community has a right to expect, in the wake of the Security Council resolutions twice adopted unanimously, that both parties cease hostilities and respect the Council's resolutions, which are even-handed resolutions between the parties.

These resolutions are based on a common conviction that a peaceful resolution of the differences between the two countries can be effected only in conditions of peace and not by continuing hostilities or violence. It is the overriding necessity of this very hour, in the face of truly disastrous consequences, for both of these great countries and for the whole world, to achieve a halt in the fighting. And this is why the Council requested the Secretary-General to exert every possible effort to give effect to resolutions 209 (1965), and 210 (1965), and this is precisely what the Secretary-General did on his mission of peace to the subcontinent.

The Secretary-General said, of India and Pakistan: "...it is not only the fate of the peoples of India and Pakistan which is at stake. Both States are linked in a peculiarly intricate way with the mainstream of world affairs." [1239th meeting, para. 17].

The threat to international peace and security is apparent and must be obvious both to the parties and to every member of this Council. The Council must act firmly and quickly, and all States truly dedicated to peace and security and to the Charter of the United Nations must heed its voice.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. DE Beus (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

First of all, I wish to express the deep concern of my delegation a concern undoubtedly shared by all members of the Security Council-that a cease-fire as called for by the Security Council almost two weeks ago, in its resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) of 4 and 6 September has still not come into being. At the same time it seems to us that some progress towards a cease-fire has been made, thanks to the invaluable and unrelenting efforts of the Secretary-General. It is on the result of those efforts that I should like to speak first.

My delegation has studied carefully the Secretary General's two reports which are before us [S/6683 and S/6686]. I am sure that we are all deeply grateful for the tactful, yet determined, way in which the Secretary-General carried out his most difficult mission. He has not yet been able to achieve a cease-fire, but from a careful reading of his reports one gains the impression that it has been brought some-what closer. Let us examine for a moment the position of the parties to the conflict with regard to responsibility for the outbreak of fighting, as this position emerges from the Secretary General's reports as well as from the statements of the two parties to which we have listened with great attention.

The contention of India, to begin with, is-and here I quote from the reply of Prime Minister Shastri of 14 September -that:

"...Pakistan launched a massive attack on India on 5 August 1965 by sending thousands of armed infiltrators equipped with Pakistani arms and ammunition and officered by men of the regular forces of Pakistan..." for [S/6683, para. 8.]

This allegation, it must be said, is confirmed by the Chief United Nations Military Observer in Kashmir, to the extent that the Secretary-General's report of 3 September states:

"...that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease-fire line from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side." [S/6651, para. 6.]

We must therefore assume that extensive infiltrations. across the cease-fire line did indeed take place from the Pakistan side from 5 August on, even though we must add that my delegation would not necessarily subscribe to the qualification of these infiltrations as "a massive attack on India".

From this contentions India's demand, repeated here yesterday, that Pakistan be identified as the aggressor, and furthermore India's request- and I quote again from Prime Minister Shastri's first reply:

"We must urge that Pakistan should be asked forth with to withdraw these armed infiltrators... we will have to insist that there must be no possibility of a recurrence of armed attacks on India, open or disguised." [See S/6683, para. 8.]

This constitutes, I believe the essence of the Indian position with regard to the outbreak of the present hostilities and of what India expects of the Security Council in connection with a possible cease-fire.

Pakistan's contention, on the other hand, is that it is India which committed aggression. I quote from President Ayub Khan's reply of 13 September :

"... India attacked Pakistan on 6 September. This was an act of naked aggression. It is astonishing that the cease-fire resolution of the Security Council of 6 September, which you are urging us to implement, completely ignores this basic fact." [Ibid., para. 9.]

It is an uncontested fact, I believe, that Indian armed forces crossed the international border between Pakistan and India on 6 September-which was about one day after the Security Council's first appeal for a cease-fire. On the basis of this fact, Pakistan wishes India to be branded the aggressor. The Pakistani President, furthermore, declares himself prepared to accept a cease-fire on the following conditions:

"...the cease-fire must be accompanied by action which would resolve the real cause of this conflict. This would be possible if the cease-fire is followed immediately by complete withdrawal of the Indian and Pakistan forces from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the induction of a United Nations-sponsored Afro-Asian force to maintain order in the State and the holding of a plebiscite in the State within three months." [Ibid.]

The Secretary-General thereupon made a second appeal to both Heads of Government. Prime Minister Shastri, in his reply to this second appeal, declared his country's preparedness to accept a simple cease-fire without attaching conditions. President Ayub Khan, in his reply, declared himself "agreeable in principle to stop fighting" [Ibid., para. 14]. He went on to say, however, that a meeting with Prime Minister Shastri seemed to offer little hope of success. President Ayub Khan furthermore stated :

"However, a cease-fire can be meaningful only if it is followed by such steps as would lead to a durable and honourable settlement in order to preclude the recurrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens the subcontinent. To bring about such a settlement, it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute." [Ibid.]

A comparison of the first and the second replies of both Governments shows that, although unfortunately they have not yet come together on a cease-fire, the gap which separates them has been narrowed. India no longer poses any conditions, although it is clearly worried about a possible repetition of armed infiltrations. Pakistan still makes it a condition that a cease-fire should be followed by effective steps leading to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

So much for the position of both parties to the conflict. The question for us now is: what can the Security Council do to achieve a cease-fire and a settlement of the underlying political questions?

I have noted that each of the two parties accuses the other of aggression, that each of the parties adduces established facts to prove that contention, and that each of the parties wishes the Council to brand the other side as the aggressor and draw the conclusions from such a condemnation.

It seems to my delegation that it would become a very complicated and rather fruitless process for the Council to weigh all the actions by one party against those of the other. It is obvious that actions have taken place on both sides by which hostilities escalated, and we believe that it would be almost impossible to single out one specific act or date at which aggression started. The task of the Security Council is to maintain peace and security, not to sit in judgement like a tribunal and award damages after weighing the seriousness of the mutual claims and counterclaims. Our duty today is to stop the fighting and, beyond that, to promote a settlement of the problem from which the fighting originated. We should, therefore, concentrate on steps leading to that double goal. Rather than trying to pronounce judgement on recriminations about the origin of the fighting, we should now try to stop the fighting and open a road to eliminate the underlying causes of conflict from which the fighting sprang.

Returning to the positions of the parties to the conflict with regard to a cease-fire, it seems to my delegation, as I have said, that the two positions are no longer so far apart that the gap cannot be bridged. Upon the Security Council rests the heavy responsibility and the duty now to make a supreme effort to help the parties to bridge this gap. It can do so by making its own contributions to this end, here and now, by trying to alleviate the understandable fears of both parties.

India, I repeat, fears a repetition of armed infiltration. The Security Council cannot, of course, guarantee that no infiltrations or other violations of the cease-fire line will ever take place again. It can, however, greatly contribute to that effect by increasing the present obviously insufficient strength of its military observer corps in Kashmir to the degree necessary. This should go a long way to give India a reasonable guarantee against a repetition of massive infiltrations.

Pakistan, on the other hand, fears that if it agrees unconditionally to a cease fire this will in fact simply mean a return to the status quo, without anything else being done to go to the main root of all the troubles between India and Pakistan during the last eighteen years: namely, the Kashmir question. That fear, too, certainly seems justified on the basis of the history of the last eighteen years, since the many decisions of the Security Council on this subject have never been carried out.

As is well known, the attitude of my country has always been that the Kashmir question should be solved on the basis of the free self-determination of the people of Kashmir and Jammu and that the decisions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the Security Council on that subject offered a just means to achieve that aim. Therefore We can sympathise with Pakistan's apprehension on this aspect, namely that the basic political conflict might be left unsolved. If that were done, the Council would be only dealing with the symptoms of the disease and not with the disease itself, the underlying cause of all the conflicts between India and Pakistan.

Here again, the Security Council can make its contribution to alleviating that fear of Pakistan by making it clear beyond doubt that a cease-fire and a withdrawal of troops will have to be followed by talks between the parties and effective measures to solve on a just and durable basis a problem which has for nearly one score years now envenomed the relations between these two great nations of the subcontinent, which are so dependent on co-operation between them. As the Secretary-General said in his appeal of 12 September to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, a cease-fire is "a necessary prelude to further measures towards the restoration of lasting peace" [see S/6683, para. 6].

If, then, the difference which separates the two parties on a cease-fire has been narrowed, the military situation too seems at the moment to be more propitious for a cessation of hostilities. After several weeks of fierce battles the fighting seems to have diminished somewhat on several fronts, and a military stalemate appears to be developing. This proves once again that neither party can gain its aims by military means and that the tremendous bloodshed now going on between the two brother nations is, therefore, senseless and should be stopped.

I should like to point to another aspect of the matter and express the great regret which is felt in countries such as mine that these two neighbouring countries, which were dedicating themselves with great energy and obvious results to their economic and social development, are now engaged in a fratricidal conflict which threatens to undo all the valuable work that has been performed in the past. My country is among those which are happy to participate actively in the important assistance which both countries receive on a large scale from many industrialised countries, and we are distressed to see that this development effort which we are so actively supporting is thus in danger of being undone by the waste of warfare.

To this political and military situation and to this economic aspect there has in the last few days been added another and more ominous reason for ending the fighting without delay. New and serious developments in Asia during the past few days, which have been referred to by the representative of India, have rendered more acute the danger of an extension of the conflict to other areas and to a large-scale conflagration. This makes it absolutely essential that the fighting should be stopped before such a further extension can take place. My delegation, therefore, believes that the Security Council should do its utmost to achieve a cease-fire before this weekend is over. It sincerely hopes that the circumstances which I have mentioned will lead the parties to the same conclusion. At any rate the Security Council should brook no longer delay and should act now. When I say "now" I mean not later than today or tomorrow. The situation is fraught with danger, and time is of the essence.

My delegation considers that many of the suggestions made by the Secretary-General in his second report [S/6686] point the way and are most likely to lead to the desired result. The Security Council should, we believe, as he proposes, on the basis of Article 40, now decide on a specific moment in the nearest future at which hostilities should cease. It can offer its assistance for ensuring the observance of the cease fire. In taking these steps for a short-range solution, we should, however, not lose sight of our long-range objective, which is to eliminate the underlying political conflict. The Council cannot impose a specific solution to that conflict, which in the end depends on the parties. However, it can set in motion a process to that end. It can set the parties on the road to negotiations and assist them there if desired. My delegation is prepared to support or to co-sponsor

any resolution containing those basic elements. My delegation hopes and trusts, however, that the Council does not need to go further. India has already declared itself prepared to accept a cease-fire without conditions. Pakistan has declared itself prepared in principle to do so, though maintaining certain fears. The Governments of both countries have stressed their responsibilities towards their nations to defend their own interests. Surely their main responsibility is, however, to put an end to a useless waste of human life as a first step to a durable settlement. Certainly to bring this about is the duty of the Security Council, in view of its responsibility for international peace and security, but also in view of its responsibility towards the nations of India and Pakistan themselves.

Text of the Speech made by Lord Caradon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

I do not propose now to endeavour to comment on the two very able speeches to which we have listened this afternoon. We shall wish to study what they have said very carefully, and it may well be that at a subsequent stage in our debate I would comment on them. I would make no excuse at all this afternoon for speaking at this stage only in order to emphasise the need to concentrate our attention on the statements of the Secretary-General. I shall do so very shortly because I am concerned not to go back over the that but to look to the future. It is the action to be taken on those statements of the Secretary-General is which our whole attention must surely now be directed.

I am sure that all of us at once recognized the gravity of the report [S/6686] made to us by the Secretary-General at the 1239th meeting yesterday. It was a clear, and forthright report suitable to the gravity of the situation.

Now as we meet to take action on that report I am confident that we do so with an overriding sense of urgency. In this Council we acted with urgency and unity when we unanimously passed resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) of 4 and 6 September. The Secretary-General followed up those resolutions without delay and without any hesitation. The United Nations did not fail to move quickly to meet the danger. Now the need for further urgent action is greater than ever.

From the first, the Secretary-General has had the full support of my Government. The Prime Minister of the United. Kingdom at once appealed in the most urgent terms to President Ayub Khan and to Prime Minister Shastri to respond to Council resolution 209 (1965) and to bring the fighting to an immediate end. And the British Foreign Secretary confirmed personally to the Secretary-General, when he passed through London on his way to Pakistan and India, the wholehearted support of Her Majesty's Government.

We wished the Secretary-General good fortune when he set out on his brave endeavour. Throughout, he has carried with him the fullest confidence of my Government, and we pay our tribute to his energy and his patience and his persistence and his courage. We are more than ever grateful to him for his readiness to continue to carry such a heavy burden of responsibility.

We most sincerely endorse the Secretary-General's statement on leaving Delhi that even though an end of the fighting had not yet been achieved, there was no reason for slackening our efforts to achieve it. On the contrary, as the Secretary-General emphasised in the report he made to us yesterday, the need for a sustained and accelerated effort is now greater than ever. There is and can be no question of failure. It is a continuing and reinforced initiative on which he and we are engaged, an initiative which must succeed. As the Secretary-General said to us yesterday-and we closely marked his words:

"If success has not yet been achieved in securing compliance with the Council's resolutions, that is all the more reason for making further strenuous efforts for a cease-fire as well as for long-term solutions." [S/6686, para. 8.]

We are encouraged and inspired by the Secretary General's example and his call "to show that peace can be restored and international harmony promoted by the concerted efforts of the international community" [Ibid.]. We, with him, are "thinking not only of the well-being and future of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan, but also of the hopes of mankind for a more peaceful world which are centred on the United Nations." [Ibid.]. This is the text of the statement issued by my Government in London earlier today:

"The British Government have made it clear that they gave the fullest support to the recent mission undertaken by the United Nations Secretary-General at the request of the Security Council in an attempt to reach a peaceful settlement of the tragic conflict between India and Pakistan. They believe that the courses of action set out in the Secretary-General's report, which in his judgement might be helpful in considering how to achieve an effective cease-fire, provide a useful basis for further urgent discussions in the Security Council. The British Government wishes to express their profound gratitude and great admiration of the Secretary-General's untiring efforts for peace."

Now, looking to the future, we trust that both of the great countries involved in this conflict will respond to the appeal which we so earnestly and urgently shall now make to them. They will do so, I confidently believe, not only in the interests of their own peoples so that they may be saved from the scourge of much wider conflicts, but in the interests of establishing and maintaining international order and international seace and achieving the honourable and equitable settlement which has long been the declared objective.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

Exactly fourteen long days passed since the Security Council was called to meet on the initiative of our President adopted resolution 209 (1965) of 4 September-an occasion of urgency reflected in the urgent and anxious language in which it was expressed. We had then asked for and hoped for a response within three days: but even before half that short period had gone by we became gripped with the fear that the course of the war was accelerating in its insane speed and gave no promise of halting or abating. We therefore met again-again in circumstances of grave urgency-and within two days adopted resolution 210 (1965) and sent the Secretary-General on this most difficult of all the tasks to which he had in four long years lent the strength of his hand and the persuasive talent with which he is immeasurable endowed. I then praised his courage for the readiness with which he undertook the accomplishment of this exhausting task, which I then felt could be matched only by his personal characteristics and the exalted position to which he so significantly adds lustre. He has returned with empty hands but with courage undiminished and his hopes for a successful outcome by no means lessened. He deserves our gratitude to the fullest measure. "Certain great questions are put to mankind," said Tolstoy, "not that men should answer them but that they should keep on trying." We should therefore continue to hope till, as the poet puts it, hope creates from its own wreck the think it contemplates.

In a very real sense without mincing words, we cannot help but regard the situation at which the Security Council has arrived as a test of its ability to stand up to the exacting burdens of international life and justify the hopes that mankind have entrusted to it. If the Security Council can be baulked, bent or beaten, there is no longer any hope for man in this pitiful world of ours. It is therefore our duty to give it the strength to face up to its present peril. But we must have a clear understanding of what we are about before we can decide our course of action. The representative of Pakistan cautioned us only this morning, at our previous meeting, against advocates who, if they cannot convince, at least endeavour to confuse the judges; I entirely agree with him. We should not either confuse ourselves or, what is even better, allow ourselves to be confused.

The conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir has had a very long and chequered history. We listened to some parts of it when we last met: we listened to more of it this morning. It is indeed almost as old as the United Nations. What is worse, it threatens to last as long as the United Nations is hopefully expected to last, that is, for ever. It is therefore quite easy without much ingenuity to plunge into its labyrinthine paths and bye lanes and satisfy one's predilection for the extremes of political polemics, and thus lose one's way. I venture to think that the present problem-I wish to repeat, the only one with which we in the present context are concerned-lies entirely within a small compass. It is capable of a clear and quick answer.

On 3 September the Secretary-General presented a report [S/6651]. It painted a picture of "the current situation in Kashmir'' which jolted us into activity. Neither India nor Pakistan we should bear this in mind-had asked for a meeting with a complaint in hand with regard to any political dispute which was gnawing at its mind. There was a sudden flare-up along the cease-fire line and you, Mr. The President rightly, if I may say so with respect, urgently called us into meeting. We were not concerned then with the simmering situation between India and Pakistan. It began simmering on that fateful day in August 1947 when one ancient country and one ancient people were cut into two unequal parts. It continues simmering to this day. It is most times quiescent: sometimes it bursts into flames as it did in August and September. Something suddenly went wrong on 5 August 1965.

May I digress here for a moment. My esteemed friend, the representative of Jordan, in a short intervention at the 1239th meeting, offered what he called a clarification to the significance which in the statement he made to us, the represenatative of India sought to attach to the date. He quoted me in support of his contention, and I wish to assure him and also to assure the Council that I stated by every word I said then. It is true indeed that we made no judgement on that occasion. We had taken no position on who committed aggression on whom nor indeed did I understand the representative of India to say that we had, by incorporating that date, judged one party as guilty of any misconduct. But and this is a vital fact the date is indeed of the greatest significance. I do not wish to mar by any words of mine this afternoon the very close and friendly personal relationship that the representative of Jordan, Mr. Rifa'i and myself have enjoyed over the years and the even more close and more affectional feelings that we have developed towards each other since we came to be seated at this Council. It was my good fortune that the arrangement of the English alphabet has made it possible for us to sit side by side. More than ever, speaking on this significant day-the last day Mr. Rifa'i will grace this table and add distinction to our company and the last day of my nine-month-long privilege to have been so closely associated with him, since he is leaving us tomorrow-more than ever, as I said, do I hesitate to enter into a controversy at all with him. But I am perfectly sure that he will agree with me that the date has a significance in the context of the Secretary-General's report: we, the sponsors of resolution 210 (1965), did not invent it for fun or choose it arbitrarily because we liked the look of it on a calendar. The date of 5 August is the vital date in this debate. It is in fact and in truth, the starting point in the long and sorry train of tragic events narrated by the Secretary-General in his report of 3 September [S/6651], which is, I repeat, the foundation of this debate.

The fifth of August as the vital date to this debate if referred to at least seven times in that report, and I crave the Council's indulgence to enumerate it.

First, the sub-beeding above paragraph 5 is entitled: "Events since 5 August 1965." Secondly, the opening sentence of paragraph 5 reads: "The current serious trouble affecting the cease-fire and the cease-fire line in Kashmir dated from 5 August 1965..." Thirdly, the concluding sentence of the same paragraph reads:

"The adequacy of the present number of observers and of their function may well be re-appraised in the light of experiences since 5 August."

Fourthly, the opening sentence of paragraph 6 begins: "General Nimmo has indicated to me that the series of violations that began on 5 August were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease-fire line from Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side."

Fifthly, part II of the same report is entitled: "List of those incidents since 5 August 1965 which have been investigated by United Nations observers prior to 3 September 1965"

Sixthly, General Nimmo, on his letter transmitting that list said:

"This list comprises only incidents on which complaints have been submitted asserting violations of the cease-fire and the cease-fire line between 5 and 30 August 1965..." Seventhly, and lastly, the list itself sets out the first and second incidents as those of 5 and 6 August.

I do not think I need say more. Nor will it be proper for me to lift the veil over the varied and various consultations that indeed did take place relating to the incorporating of it, the formulation of words in it, the omission of some and the inclusion of others, the dotting of the I's and the crossing of T's, the inspiration and perspiration behind the final form. That would provide good copy, but it would hardly be good diplomacy.

I now return to where I left off. In the remarks that I propose to make, I do not wish it to be thought that I am more critical of the one side or less critical of the other. My country enjoys the most friendly relations with Pakistan as well as India and we are anxious that this relationship should continue and mature. For that reason alone I have guarded myself from accepting one version of what happened or another as proceeding from the two parties. But we are bound to accept the reports of the Secretary-General, beginning with the report of 3 September, which we know are unbiased, objective, impartial. I shall therefore confine myself in such comments as I may make to the statements contained in the reports and no other version of what one side or the other has alleged to have happened.

According to paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's report [S/6651] of 3 September, General Nimmo, as a result of investigations and "in the light of the extensiveness and character of the raiding activities", reached the conclusion that large-scale infiltrations of heavily armed irregulars from Pakistan across the cease-fire line took place on 5 August and subsequent days. If one examines, as I have, the annotated list of incidents annexed to the Secretary-General's report, one finds that not until after the first eleven incidents, spaced within 5 August and 14 August, had occurred, each with increasing intensity and severity, did the Indian troops for the first time cross the cease-fire line and reoccupy the position northeast of Kargil, from which previously in May, upon the appeal of the Secretary-General, they had withdrawn.

In these eleven incidents there are to be found confirmations by General Nimmo's observers of attacks within the Indian side of the cease-fire line by large armed groups varying from forty and seventy to as many as "exceeding 1,000", leaving large quantities of arms with tell-tale markings. This could not go on with impunity and indeed provoked self defensive reactions. Subsequently, the pace of the response kept in step with the pace of infiltration, until by the beginning of September everything went out of hand.

One realises-none more than I do that the Security Council is not a court of law. How I wish it were, if only to a limited extent of requiring the rules of relevance being observed in debate. But it inevitably must function as a quasi judicial body examining facts and weighing probabilities before it can make determinations and take decisions which are indeed judgement-making processes that fall within its sole competence. I would venture to suggest that from the Secretary General's report, supported by the careful findings of General Nimmo as a part of it, one can only and I say this with the deepest regret reach the conclusion that the highly armed, well-trained and well-led infiltrators came from Pakistan's side of the cease-fire line.

We in our part of world have been facing for over two years this kind of war-infiltration, subversion, sabotage and we may speak with some large knowledge learnt in the hard school of experience. It is an exhausting, exasperating war where the initiative is forever with the aggressor, where the real casualties are not so much human bodies or valuable material, but the slow erosion of the steel, the determination, the will to fight, the will to stand firm in the face of odds, possessed by the passion to give one's all to save one's country.

Military pundits have calculated the defensive human costs of such operations in the ratio of at least ten to one. The art and science of this wearing, wearying, wasteful war have now been perfected in Asia. The peril of our times is the expansion, export and propagation of this kind of war into regions farther beyond, regions which are judged to be ripe for revolution. Today, however, Asia is its testing ground.

When the truth with regard to these infiltrations became known, Pakistan answered with vague details and claims that these are but the symptoms of an ancient malignancy and the Security Council should direct its mind and employ its energies in exterminating the root cause of all: the denial by India of a plebiscite in Kashmir, agreed to by India as long ago as 1948. This was repeated this morning at our previous meeting by the representative of Pakistan. This has been a time-honored refrain.

I have referred to the chequered history of this ancient conflict, and were it relevant to the matter in debate I should have felt compelled to address myself to it. But for the moment let me say only that it is claimed by India that it is capable of an answer as effective as it is complete. But I suggest that is not our task in this debate.

Pakistan has claimed that a cease-fire should be purposeful and should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The only "purpose" that I see in this argument is that the purpose of this infiltration was to provide Pakistan with a lever which at one stroke releases it from the obligation of November 1962 to engage in direct talks with India to settle all outstanding differences and enables it, at the same time, to return to the pre-1962 claim of nothing but a plebiscite in Kashmir. I must venture this thought If a plebiscite or an undertaking to have one is to be regarded as an essential prerequisite for a cease-fire, the logic of that argument would commit the Security Council to have secured for a State the happy position of provoking a conflict so as to be able to secure a political profit from it.

I suggest that we take good care that the Security Council does not walk into any position of that kind. Our duty was and is plain. In resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965) we called for a halt to hostilities-the sole concern, I repeat, in the present context of the Security Council. It is not to recall ancient resolutions from the musty records of the past, nor to express pious hopes for a peaceful settlement in the future, nor to get side-tracked from the main objective.

Far be it from me even remotely to give the impression of being critical of the Secretary-General. But I must confess I do share slightly the grievance expressed by the representative of India when he spoke to us at the 1239th meeting. as I read the Secretary-General's preliminary report of his Even visit to India and Pakistan, the terms of his second letter to Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan caught my attention because they contained the following words:

"I note however, that both Governments, to their replies to my request for an unconditional cease-fire, have added conditions and qualifications upon which I have no right under the Security Council resolutions to give firm undertakings." [See S/6683, para. 10].

The moment I read those words, I underlined the words "both Governments" and put a double query in the margin, as if to ask myself "How come ?" Presumably the pattern of the letters lends itself to the view they were composed in identical terms to avoid obvious suggestions and difficulties. But the replies, quite patently, are not cast in the same terms. It was only fair that there should have been some indication of the essential difference between the ready willingness of the one and the reluctant response of the other.

But in Prime Minister Shastri's reply of 14 September, we find this statement :

"In deference to the wishes of the Security Council and to the appeals which we have received from many friendly countries, we accept your proposal for an immediate cease-fire. We would, therefore, be prepared to order a cease-fire effective from 6.30 a.m. Indian standard time, on Thursday, 16 September 1965, provided you confirm to me by 9 a.m. tomorrow that Pakistan is also agreeable to do so." [Ibid., para. 8.]

This letter concludes with these two sentences :

"We sincerely hope that the forces of peace will win and that humanity will go forward towards ever increasing progress and prosperity. It is in this spirit that we are agreeing to your proposal for a cease-fire." [Ibid].

It is therefore entirely understandable that in a reply couched in the politest terms a note of incredulity can be detected in Prime Minister Shastri's second letter. In the report the Secretary-General sets out the reply that he received from Prime Minister Shastri on 15 September:

"Thank you for your message of 14 September, which was conveyed to me late last night. "You have said that you cannot give any undertakings.

I fully appreciate and understand this and in fact I did not ask you for any. It was, however, essential for us to state clearly our stand in regard to certain matters which are of vital importance to us.

"I reaffirm my willingness, as communicated, to order a simple cease-fire and cessation of hostilities as proposed by you...". [Ibid., para. 11].

I regret, with the utmost deference, that I cannot agree with or accept the analysis of this correspondence made at the previous meeting by the representative of Pakistan when he gallantly tried to graft on to an unconditional acceptance a series of conditions that are not there.

I pass on to another aspect of the reports. This readiness. and willingness-as I read it in the correspondence-of India, to my judgement, contrasts strangely with the consistently unhelpful attitude of Pakistan. I now go back to the first report that was circulated to the Council [S/6651]. In that report there is a chapter entitled "Efforts of the Secretary General". With the indulgence of the Council, I should like to read out paragraphs 9 and 10 of the report by the Secretary-General :

"On the morning of 9 August 1965, a cable was received from General Nimmo warning that the situation was deteriorating along the cease-fire line. On the basis of this report, I saw the representative of Pakistan at 1230 hours on that day, and asked him to convey to his Government my very serious concern about the situation that was developing in Kashmir, involving the crossing of the ceasefire line from the Pakistan side by numbers of armed men and their attacks on Indian military positions on the Indian side of the line, and also my strong appeal that the cease-fire line be observed. That same after-noon I saw the representative of India, told him of the information I had received from General Nimmo and of the demarche I had made to the Government of Pakistan, and asked him to convey to his Government my urgent appeal for restraint as regards any retaliatory action from their side. In subsequent days, I repeated these appeals orally for transmission to the two Governments, asking also that all personnel of either party still remaining on the wrong side of the line be withdrawn to its own side. I have not obtained from the Government of Pakistan any assurance that the cease-fire and the ceasefire line will be respected henceforth or that efforts would be exerted to restore conditions to normal along that line. I did receive assurance from the Government of India, conveyed orally by its representative at the United Nations, that India would act with restraint with regard to any retaliatory acts and will respect the cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire line if Pakistan does likewise. In the meantime, reports from UNMOGIP as of 2 September indicate a continuation of violations of the cease-fire and the cease-fire line from both sides.

"In view of the continuing deterioration in the situation as of 16 August, I gave consideration to a further step in the form of a draft statement about the cease-fire violations which was designed for public release. The draft was handed to the two representatives to be transmitted for the information of their Governments. Both Governments reacted promptly. The Government of India had no objection to the release of the statement but at first wished certain modifications which in part at least regarded as unacceptable. The Government of Pakistan was strongly negative about the statement in general on the grounds that it favoured India in that it dealt only with the current cease-fire situation without presenting the political background of the broad issue and thus was lacking in balance since a cease-fire alone supports the status quo to India's benefit." [S/6651, paras. 9 and 10].

On the question of the attitude of the Pakistan Government to the cease-fire, I wish to draw the attention of the Council to two extracts from that report. This is a reply from the President of Pakistan to the Secretary-General's first letter:

"Nevertheless, Pakistan is not against a cease-fire as such. In fact, in order to save the subcontinent from being engulfed in what would clearly be an appalling catastrophe, we would welcome a ceasefire. But it must be a purposeful cease-fire one that effectively precludes that catastrophe and merely postpones it. In other words, it should provide for a self-executing arrangement for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is the root cause of the India-Pakistan conflict.

"While you propose a 'cease-fire without condition' you go on to add that the Security Council would, soon after the cease-fire, proceed to implement its resolution of 6 September. The provisions of the Security Council resolution of 4 September and 6 September that the cease-fire be followed immediately by withdrawal of all armed Pakistan personnel to the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and the consolidation of the cease-fire line through the strengthening of the United Nations Military Observer Group would result in restoring India's military grip over Kashmir. We would thus merely revert to the same explosive position which triggered the present conflict." [S/6683, para. 9].

Lastly, I quote the final paragraph of the second letter from the President of Pakistan :

"However, a cease-fire can be meaningful only if it is followed by such steps as would lead to a durable and honourable settlement in order to preclude the recurrence of a catastrophe such as now threatens the subcontinent. To bring about such a settlement, it would be necessary to evolve an effective machinery and procedure that would lead to a final settlement of the Kashmir dispute." [Ibid., para. 14].

Mr. President, I have done.

My delegation feels that in the present context any resolution of the Council should have these four essential parts first acknowledgment of India's ready acceptance of the Security Council's call for a cease-fire; secondly, regret that Pakistan felt unable to agree to an unconditional cease-fire; thirdly deploring of the recourse of large-scale armed infiltrations into Kashmir as a design by no means consistent with the continuing desire to settle all disputes with India on peaceful terms; and, fourthly, a call on Pakistan, not on India which has not once but twice accepted the Secretary-General's, proposals to cease hostilities as of a particular date and a particular time.

Those without embroidery or irrelevance, are the immediate need. My delegation would be happy to support every effort to get a resolution of that content passed by the Council. No more can be or should be expected of the Council - certainly, no less.

Before I conclude I wish to say this. I have listened with great sorrow to the catalogue of human tragedy that the representative of Pakistan narrated to us this morning. I have not the slightest doubt that the representative of India does have his own story to tell of unspeakable tragedies. In human terms they should tug at our hearts and stir our souls with revulsion for war; and pity and compassion for those that are the unwilling legatees of the misery, starvation, homeless ness and sufferings innumerable let loose by war, a situation in which swift death would be a great mercy. I trust that that mental picture alone will give this debate a sense of urgency as nothing else can.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Rifa i (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1241 held on 18 September 1965

We have come to an important stage in the debates of the Security Council on the question before us-more substantive in nature and, I hope, more productive.

At the 1237th and 1238th meetings of the Security Council, held respectively on 4 and 6 September, the discussions we held and the resolutions we adopted were of an emergency character. Most of the members tried to confine themselves to the question of maintaining a cease-fire on the demarcation lines in Kashmir and between India and Pakistan. Therefore, the debate did not go, as it normally should, into the fundamental political question of Kashmir; nor did it deal with any claims or counterclaims by the two parties to the dispute. Since then armed activities between the two nations have reached wider dimensions and rendered Security Council resolutions 209(1965) and 210(1965) of 4 and 6 September respectively a failure. Indeed, the question became no longer a violation of the cease-fire line but rather military operations across international borders. The question, therefore, required a broader treatment.

We were disturbed at the fact that these activities were taking place at a time when the Secretary-General was undertaking his peace mission to the area and indeed during his visit to the two countries. The conclusion we draw from that reality is that efforts towards the enforcement of a cease-fire can in no way be practical, nor can they yield positive results, if the basic issue is not squarely faced. That is why in all past resolutions and agreements related to a cease-fire between India and Pakistan the political issue, namely the right of self-determination of the people of Kashmir, was always emphasised side by side with a cease-fire. Special references could be made to Security Council resolution 47 (1948) of 21 April 1948 and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which resolutions were repeatedly reaffirmed in all subsequent decisions of the Council.

It follows that an enforcement of a cease-fire in such a way as to seal the basic issue would amount indeed to a political gain to one party and a loss to the other. Therefore it was easy for us to understand the difficulty which the efforts of the Secretary-General encountered when he went with a limited mandate to cope with a situation as grave as the one obtaining at present between India and Pakistan. Recognizing his devotion to the cause of peace, his integrity, his impartiality and his deep involvement in the problem-an involvement which stems from the responsibilities of his high office and from the fact that he is a faithful son of the Asian soil recognizing all this, we felt that the political problem in the question of Kashmir weighed heavily on the practical implementation of a cease-fire. The Secretary-General correctly said, as he was about to leave on 7 September 1965 from Kennedy International Airport on his mission :

"I have no illusions about this mission: the issues are infinitely complicated and difficult and the situation out there is extremely grave.

"Kashmir has posed a baffling problem for the United Nations for seventeen years." [See S/6683, para 3.]

We therefore attached great importance to the efforts and accomplishments of the Secretary-General and to his talks with the two Governments of India and Pakistan. The preliminary report of the Secretary-General [S/6683] which he made available at the time of his return to Headquarters is a valuable document which presents the official positions of both Governments in the present crisis. As I was reading the report of 16 September 1965, my admiration for the honesty and objectivity of U Thant was, as usual, at its highest. The Secretary-General addressed the two Governments of India and Pakistan in the letter and spirit of the Council's resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965), adding to that his own faith in his mission of peace. His request and his endeavours were aimed at securing an immediate and unconditional cease-fire in the whole area. For this he worked and it was this he urged. The reaction of both Governments, however, did not correspond to his hopes. In his report of 16 September, he says:

"The replies from both Governments to my message of 12 September have shown clearly the desire of both for a cease-fire, but both pose conditions which make the acceptance of a cease-fire very difficult for the other side." [Ibid., para. 13.]

In analysing the positions of the two Governments as stated in their official messages to the Secretary-General, one can conclude that India's conditions for a cease-fire could be summarized as follows: first, there must be no possibility of a recurrence of armed attack on India, open or disguised; second, a cease-fire should have no bearing on the political issue of Kashmir; and third, Kashmir is an integral part of India and falls under its sovereignty. These are the bases which constitute India's acceptance of a cease-fire and which India invites Pakistan to accept.

In direct opposition to this Indian stand is Pakistan's acceptance of a cease-fire which is qualified as follows: first, that the cease-fire must be purposeful: second, that arrangements must be made for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute, which is the root-cause of the India-Pakistan conflict: and third, that the pledges to the people of Kashmir that they may choose their own destiny must be honoured and fulfilled. Comparing these two sets of contradictory views, one fails to find any common ground on which the two parties could meet or even be called to negotiate. My delegation wishes to stress in this regard, and as a general rule, the point that no direct discussions or negotiations between two parties can serve any positive purpose if there is no agreement on either the basis of such discussions or the objectives thereof. It is to our deep regret that this element of common understanding on the fundamental issue in the conflict is lacking between India and Pakistan. This regrettable but does not enable the members of the Security Council to cherish the hope that a settlement of the basic problem can be reached through direct talks between the two Governments. The Security Council should therefore itself turn its attention to the problem.

The Security Council will be prolonging the difficulties between India and Pakistan and perpetuating the dispute if it does not take serious and definite steps to resolve the question of Kashmir, which has proved to be the real cause of the unpleasant situation between the two sister States. I am afraid that we would be reducing the responsibilities of the United Nations to the minimum if we were to restrict them to the mere task of stopping the fighting. The responsibilities of the United Nations are much greater and much higher than this. The responsibilities of the United Nations are mainly directed towards the settlement of the disputes which are the causes of fighting among nations. If we are to live up to our duties in the maintenance of international peace and security, we much accept this fact.

The passing of time did not bury the question of Kashmir; on the contrary, it allowed the pressure of the years to create an explosive situation. This is the case with all other old, long-standing problems, where the blue waters we see are no more than a mirage. The Security Council must act not only for the sake of preserving peace between the two Asian nations, but even more for the purpose of suppressing the flame of war before it is blown by political winds in directions yet unknown. And if this fear is present in our minds and it seems that it is-them let us look at matters from the right angle and let us act promptly before it is too late. Let us save the situation from falling into other hands.

The question of Kashmir is knocking heavily at the door of this Council. We are all called upon to propose practical means for its settlement and in order to be practical, steady and correct in our proposals, we must uphold the principle of self-determination as it is embedded and reaffirmed in all past pronouncements of the Council on this problem. My delegation will not fail to join in any efforts in this Council aimed at serving this end. We have therefore noted with satisfaction the following remark of the Secretary-General in his report :

"I am sure also that the Council will wish to explore, as a matter of urgency, methods for achieving enduring peace between India and Pakistan." [Ibid., para. 6].

The Secretary-General, in his unrelenting efforts to surmount the present acute crisis, has introduced to the Council in his report [S/6686] some ideas and has stated his own view. The general and deep concern at the situation between India and Pakistan, together with the fear that further serious developments might be underway, has preoccupied the minds of the members of the Security Council with what should be done to face the immediate necessities. I wish on behalf of my delegation to emphasise, in this regard, some essential points which determine our position in evaluating the appropriateness and effectiveness of any suggestions or proposals for meeting the situation.

First, the continuance of fighting must in no way be allowed and a cessation of hostilities must be enforced at once. Second, the immediate necessity for dealing with the crisis is part and parcel of the permanent necessity. Third, in order to give effect to its orders for a cease-fire, the Security Council must widen the base, not only increase the pressure.

We want, therefore, to proceed on the main road that leads to a clear destination, not on the sideways which lead to dead-ends.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg as representative of the United States of America in the Security Council Meeting No. 1239 held on 17 September 1965

I have no other speakers inscribed for today. I should like to make a brief statement in my capacity as representative of the United States of America.

The United States enjoys, and hopes to continue to enjoy, friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. I should like to emphasise that we have suspended air shipments to both countries, since we want, in support of the Security Council's resolution calling for a cease-fire, to help bring about an end to this conflict and not to escalate it. It is the sense of the Security Council's resolution that there be a prompt end and not an intensification of hostilities. We deplore the use in this conflict, in contravention of solemn agreements, of arms supplied by us.

The United States, along with all members of this Council, profoundly believes that the differences between India and Pakistan can be resolved-must be resolved under conditions of peace. This is the stated objective of the Security Council, and has the Secretary-General has made clear in his report, it is his earnest hope and desire. We have supported the Security Council and the Secretary-General in this objective. We shall continue this support in pursuit of peace on the subcontinent.

This completes our business today, and in my capacity as President, I would merely wish to say that members of the Council, and indeed the entire world, will have taken note of the momentous statement made by the Secretary-General this morning. It is now incumbent upon this Council again to take up its responsibilities as the agency of the international community with primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The Secretary-General has warned us that a real danger to world peace is imminent as a result of the conflict on the subcontinent. New and serious developments which have broadened the threat to the peace can only increase tension and complicate the peace-making efforts of the United Nations, the Security Council and the Secretary-General. We must therefore proceed with a sense of urgency and responsibility. My consultations with the members of the Security Council have indicated that we may best do this by proceeding, for the rest of today, through private consultations regarding the actions we must now take.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Rifa'i (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1239 held on 17 September 1965

After having listened to the highly important statement of the Secretary-General at today's meeting and to the weighty ideas which he introduced, I would prefer, with your consent, to make my statement at the next meeting of the Council, which you may wish, Mr. President, to convene soon. However, since I am taking the floor-and with my apologies to the members of the Council for this short prolongation of this meeting-1 feel in duty bound to clarify one point which was brought up by the representative of India in the statement he has just made. I do so because the point raised is related to the meaning of Security Council resolution 210 (1965) and because I notice that the representative of India has attached special significance to it.

I understood him to have interpreted the date of 5 August 1965 contained in Council resolution 210 (1965), as signifying the beginning of what he called aggression by Pakistan against India. Inasmuch as such an interpretation reflects on the intentions of the authors of the said resolution, my delegation cannot subscribe to it. Having had the privilege of taking part in the consultations and discussions which brought about the text of that resolution, I feel that I am in a position to say that the meaning suggested by the representative of India does not represent the understanding of my delegation as one of the authors of the said resolution. The date of 5 August was intended merely to be an indication regarding the lines behind which the armed forces of both India and Pakistan were asked to withdraw. It was no ant to judgement on the claim of infiltration or to establish a fact in this regard.

At the last two meetings, the members of the Council never discussed at any length the question of infiltration. Furthermore, time did not allow us to discuss more serious developments, such as the armed operations against the international boundaries of Pakistan.

As the Secretary-General stated in his report the events since 5 August consisted "of a large number of violations of the cease-fire line by crossings of the line, by firing across it with artillery pieces, and by the occupation of position on the wrong side of the line" [S/6651, para. 5].

Prior to those events there were also similar violations and more serious events. In the same report, the Secretary General stated:

"Among the most serious of the violations was one that occurred in May of this year when Indian troops in battalion strength attacked and captured Pakistan positions in the Kargil area of Kashmir and remained in occupation of them. In the interest of preserving the cease-fire line, I appealed to the Government of India to withdraw its troops from the Pakistan side of the line." [Ibid., para. 4]. That chain of events could also be traced back to the beginning of 1965. Regarding violations committed up to mid-June, the Secretary-General said that some "took the form of heavy and prolonged firing' from weapons up to the caliber of field artillery" [Ibid.].

I should add that the date 5 August was introduced after a thorough and considerable discussion, as a substitute for an earlier text of the draft resolution which called on India and Pakistan to withdraw their armed personnel behind the cease fire line and the international boundary. It was for the sake of accommodating the position of all members around this table without going into details-that the mentioning of this date was thought to serve the purpose of defining the lines in question.

I wish further to add that the draft resolution [S/6662] was introduced to the Council without any explanations. I recall with special appreciation the words of my friend and colleague Mr. Ramani, representative of Malaysia, when he introduced the draft resolution. He said:

"If this draft resolution proceeds on any findings at all, it proceeds on two undeniable facts: first, the Security Council is still waiting for some hopeful or helpful response to its appeal for a cease-fire and, secondly, the conflict is obviously expanding and spreading. This draft resolution, therefore, merely decides that the Security Council, being naturally concerned with he serious developments, is anxious to do something and to it at once to give effect to its own resolution, so that this bloody conflict is halted and does not spread." [1238th meeting, para. 65].

I am making this clarification in fairness to the meaning of resolution 210 (1965).

Text of the Speech made by the Secretary-General in the Security Council Meeting No. 1239 held on 17 September 1965

In my preliminary report [S/6683] on my mission to India and Pakistan in pursuit of the mandate given to me by the Council in its resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September 1965, I informed the Council of my formal approaches to the two Governments and of the replies I had received from them. I now wish to advise the Council briefly of the views that I have formed as a result of my talks with the Governments of India and Pakistan. In the course of my talks with Prime Minister Shastri,

President Ayub Khan and their colleagues, I had the opportunity to hear from both sides a detailed exposition of their views on the present critical situation which has developed over Kashmir. I also requested, and received from both sides, aide-memoirs on their positions and views. Since the Council obviously wished me to report to it as soon as possible after my return, I have thought it best-having reached New York at 3.15 p.m. on Thursday, 16 September-to confine myself at this time to relatively brief report on the impressions and conclusions I have formed during my mission. I have also thought it best at this time not to give a detailed expose of the views of the two Governments as expressed to me, since the replies of Prime Minister Shastri and President Ayub Khan to my message of 12 September 1965, contained in my above mentioned preliminary report to the Council, give an official summary of the positions of the two Governments on the Security Council's call and on my own appeals for a cease-fire.

The following brief account of my own observations of the present situation will serve as a prelude to certain thoughts which may, I hope, be helpful to the Council in its further consideration of this critical situation. In this tragic war two closely associated nations find themselves locked in a destructive struggle. Regardless of the merits of the case, the present situation is crippling and potentially disastrous for both nations. Each nation feels that it has been abused by the other, and each is convinced that the other has committed aggression. In common they have a feeling of having been let down to some extent by their allies and by the United Nations, whose Members, for the most part, watch in bewilderment and anxiety the spectacle of two sister nations, with both of which many

countries have close links, engaged in fratricidal struggle. Inherent in this situation are all of the phenomena-the aroused emotions, misunderstandings, long-pent-up resentments, suspicions, fears, frustrated aspirations and heightened national feelings-which throughout history have led to needless and futile wars. These are factors which also make it difficult for the leaders on both sides to respond to the unconditional cease-fire appeals of the Security Council. The present war is clearly to the ultimate disadvantage of both nations and can bring no lasting good to either. Both countries have vast economic and social problems which they have been facing courageously and with considerable success. The war will slow down, or even bring to a halt, these vital efforts towards economic and social development.

The present crisis has inevitably served to harden even further the previous positions taken by the two Governments, since both find it impossible to make concessions under the threat of force. Each has the feeling that only outside support has made it possible for the other to commit what it believes to be aggression.

The Security Council is thus faced with a paradoxical situation. It has passed urgently and unanimously two resolutions [resolutions 209 (1965) and 210 (1965)] requiring an immediate cessation of hostilities. It has authorised me to exert every possible effort to give effect to these resolutions. Before and during my mission, I have received messages of support and offers of assistance from leaders in all parts of the world. Both sides have expressed their desire for a cease-fire and a cessation of hostilities in the entire area of the current conflict. Nevertheless, up to now, I have not succeeded in securing an effective practical measures of compliance by the two sides with the Security Council's resolutions.

What further course of action may be open to the Security Council ? In older and less interdependent times, the international community could perhaps have now washed its hands of the matter, leaving the parties to fight it out, heedless of the ruin which such a course must certainly bring to millions of innocent people in both countries. Such a course of action is inconceivable today. Moreover, it is not only the fate of the peoples of India and Pakistan which is at stake. Both States are linked in a peculiarly intricate way with the mainstream of world affairs. The very unanimity of the Security Council on this matter and the direct appeals from so many Governments are indications of how serious a threat this crisis poses to world peace. Quite apart from the well-being of the two nations concerned, there can be little doubt that a real danger to world peace is now imminent.

Before advancing some ideas, I feel that I should also state my own views about the role of the United Nations, and of the Security Council in particular, in the present crisis. The Council is faced, as I have said, with a situation of the greatest difficulty and complexity. It has acted with both speed and unanimity. If success has not yet been achieved in securing compliance with the Council's resolutions, that is all the more reason for making further strenuous efforts for a cease-fire as well as for long-term solutions. I feel strongly that in this situation, when the hopes of the world are focused on the Security Council, which has the primary responsibility under the Charter for maintaining international peace and security, the Council faces not only an exceptionally difficult task but also a rare opportunity to show that peace can be restored and international harmony promoted by the concerted efforts of the international community. In saying this I am thinking not only of the well-being and future of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan, but also of the hopes of mankind for a more peaceful world which are centered on the United Nations.

With the above impressions in mind, and being convinced -as I stated in my second message to the two Heads of Government on 14 September [see S/6683, para. 10] and in my statement at the airport in New Delhi on my departure for New York-of the fundamental desire of both parties to end the fighting, I am taking the liberty of expressing the following thoughts in the hope that they may be helpful to the Council and to the two Governments themselves in facing the immediate necessity of obtaining an effective cease-fire.

First, the Security Council might now do what it has done once before, and successfully, in another dangerous conflict situation: it could order the two Governments concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further hostile military action and to this end to issue cease-fire orders to their military forces. The Council might also declare that failure by the Governments concerned to comply with this order would demonstrate the existence of a breach of the peace within the meaning of Article 39 of the Charter.

Second, the Security Council may wish to consider what assistance it might provide in ensuring the observance of the cease-fire.

Third, Security Council resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September also calls for a prompt withdrawal of all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965, and the Council may wish to study means of assisting in the carrying out of this requirement.

Fourth, the Council could request the two Heads of Government to meet together at the earliest possible time to discuss the current situation and the problems underlying it as a first step in resolving the outstanding differences between their two countries and in reaching an honourable and equitable settlement. Such a meeting might take place in a country friendly and acceptable to both. In this connection, I might draw the attention of the Council to my message of 15 September to Prime Minister Sharti and President Ayub Khan, the text of which is set forth in my preliminary report [Ibid., para. 13]. The Council could also consider the possibility of creating and making available a small committee to assist in such talks should its services seem useful and desirable to the two parties.

Fifth and finally, I may again assure the Council of my availability and of my desire to continue to be of assistance in this matter in any way which may commend itself to the Council and to the two Governments.

Since Security Council resolution 210 (1965) also requested me to take all possible measures to strengthen UNMOGIP, I wish to inform the Council that, as a matter of course, I had consultations with Lieutenant-General R. H. Chief Military Observer, during my mission. Nimmo, the While in the present situation the role of UNMOGIP is obviously more difficult than usual, I have benefited much from the knowledge and experience of General Nimmo. I have taken immediate steps to obtain extra transport and communications equipment to facilitate the task of UNMOGIP. I have also made provisional arrangements to increase the number of military observers at short notice, should developments make this increase necessary.

In its resolution 210 (1965) the Security Council asked me to keep it informed on the situation in the area. The military situation is covered in a separate report [S/6687]. I would not wish to let this occasion pass without

expressing my warm appreciation and gratitude to the many statesmen and Governments from whom I have received, both before and during my mission to India and Pakistan, messages of support and encouragement as well as practical measures of assistance.

Finally, I wish to express my appreciation to the Governments of India and Pakistan both for their kindness and hospitality to me and my party and for their frankness and helpfulness in their talks with me. I hope and believe that these talks will eventually contribute to a peaceful solution of the present crisis.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg (United State of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1239 held on 17 September 1965

May I, on behalf of the Security Council, welcome the Ministers and high officials of both India and Pakistan who have joined their delegations here today. It will, I am sure, be my pleasure in the course of our discussion of the matter before us formally to introduce the Ministers to the members of the Council. Gentlemen, you are welcome here today.

In my closing statement as President of the Security Council at our last meeting, I stressed the fearful potential in the current conflict between India and Pakistan. Since then, substantial military operations have continued, although the Council adopted two forthright and unanimous calls for a cease-fire.

In spite of the hazards intrinsic in this situation, the Secretary-General travelled promptly to the subcontinent to give effect to the mandate given to him by the Security Council in its resolution 210 (1965) of 6 September 1965, and every possible effort to give effect both to that resolution and resolution 209 (1965) of 4 September 1965, to take all possible measures to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the implementation of the resolutions and on the situation in the area.

You have all, I am sure, read, from the preliminary report of the Secretary-General [S/6683] and from newspaper accounts, of the intensive and arduous efforts of the Secretary. General in carrying out the mandate of this Council. And I understand that today the Secretary-General will give us a further assessment of his trip.

Again I know that I speak for all the members of the Council when I welcome the Secretary-General back from his mission of peace, on which he carried with him not only the resolutions of the Council, but also the good will, the hopes and the prayers of all people everywhere.

In light of the return of the Secretary-General yesterday, I suggested our meeting today in spite of the short space of time we have had in which to examine the preliminary report of the Secretary-General. I believe that the urgency of the situation requires us to lose no time in our deliberations on this matter, I consulted with members of the Council, who were of one mind that we should promptly reconvene to hear the Secretary-General's important report. Accordingly, I now recognize the Secretary-General.

Text of the Speech made by Lord Caradon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1238 held on 6 September 1965

When we have received the reports which have come to us today, and indeed when we have heard the speeches to which we have listened today, it is unnecessary to emphasise the great dangers which arise from the extremely grave and serious situation which is presented before us. I believe that it would be the wish of all members that we should at this stage limit our comments to giving the Secretary-General our warmest good wishes for the effort which he is now undertaking.

I am sure that every one of us hopes and trusts that both the great nations involved in this conflict will respect the authority of the Security Council and will heed the call which the Council has already unanimously made. We pray that they may do so before it is too late. We urge with all the forces at our command that they should give the Secretary General the fullest possible cooperation. Meanwhile, I am sure all of us will be determined to refrain from any action likely to aggravate the dangerous situation in any way. It is with that intention and with that confidence and with a sense of the utmost urgency of the need for further action that, speaking for my Government, we have supported the draft resolution which was introduced today in the names of Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. If I may, I should like very respectfully to congratulate the representatives of those countries for having led us to the conclusion which we have reached this evening. I should not like to make any distinction, but perhaps it would be the wish of those whom I have mentioned that I should pay a special tribute to the representative of Malaysia for the contribution he has made. Not only on this occasion but on the other occasion, he has shown us a leadership which we all respect.

Finally, I am sure that we all wish to join in wishing the Secretary-General well as he embarks on this great adventure in the cause of conciliation and peace.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1238 held on 6 September 1965

I am privileged-it is rather melancholic privilege-once again to introduce a draft resolution sponsored by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay [S/6662].

The formulation of this draft resolution is the result of many hours of efforts not only to express the ideas relevant to the immediate developments; but also to find the proper words to describe them accurately.

We apologize for having made it necessary for the President to convoke this meeting after the hour originally fixed for our meeting this afternoon.

As I said at the 1237th meeting of the Council, when I introduced the previous draft resolution calling for a cease fire, no words of mine are required to elucidate or explain any of the terms of the present text. They are plain as plain can be. I wish to emphasise once more-since fears and doubts have been expressed that this text or resolution 209 (1965) might presuppose acceptance of a certain political attitude on one side or the other-that this draft resolution, too, makes no find produces no judgements, on the basic issues which, unfortunately and tragically, have bedeviled the relations between the sister countries of India and Pakistan.

If this draft resolution proceeds on any findings at all, it proceeds on two undeniable facts: first, the Security Council is still waiting for some hopeful or helpful response to its appeal for a cease-fire and, secondly, the conflict is obviously expanding and spreading. This draft resolution, therefore, merely decides that the Security Council, being naturally concerned with the serious developments, is anxious to do something and to do it at once to give effect to its own resolution, so that this bloody conflict is halted and does not spread.

It throws, we realise, on the shoulders of the Secretary General, burdened and bent as he is with the numerous problems of a strife-prone would, the additional burden of bringing some calm to this distracted area of the world, which has continuously lived under the shadows of war and conflict for eighteen long years. I am sure, as we all are, that he will find the means to give prompt effects to our draft resolution If there is anyone who can find such means, he alone can and, if I may say so, I am confident he alone will.

I commend this draft resolution to my colleague, and I have no doubt that it will receive the same unanimous support that the previous resolution did.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

It is rather unusual for one of the sponsors of a draft resolution to want to explain his vote; but, if you will permit me, I would like to offer a brief comment on the statement made by the representative of Pakistan with regard to what he thought were errors of fact that had been allowed to creep into this resolution.

The second preambular paragraph refers to having heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, and he thought it was rather singular that we should have used the plural. But I wish to remind him that all that we say here is that we heard the statement that the representative of Pakistan made. That statement was that he reserved the right to make a fuller statement on the vital positions in the political context of the conflict between India and Pakistan on a later occasion. He also said that he repudiated everything that was said by the representative of India. Without meaning to be derogatory either to the representative of India or to the representative of Pakistan, I may say that what had been said by the representative of India was no more relevant to this resolution than what had not been said by the representative of Pakistan. They were both concerned with the situation as it occurred. Until we have heard either the representative of India or the representatives of Pakistan deny the facts as they have been portrayed in detail in the report of the Secretary-General, the draft resolution that we presented and that has been unanimously accepted has the soundest foundation that any resolution could have.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

I apologize, Mr. President, for taking the floor at this late hour, but I must convey to you the French delegation's deep satisfaction on seeing you take your sent today at the head of the United States delegation. There can be no doubt that the Council will benefit enormously by the abilities which you have so amply demonstrated in the course of an exceptionally brilliant career.

The French delegation voted in favour of the draft resolution just adopted by the Council because that resolution, submitted by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherland and Uruguay, meets the immediate requirements of a situation with which we are all deeply concerned. We are unanimous in our desire that the fighting should stop, that the cease-fire line should be strictly observed from now on, that the work of the United Nations observers should not be impeded, and that the Secretary-General, whose patient efforts since the beginning of the crisis deserve our gratitude, should continue to follow events and report to us.

The French delegation is not unaware that these are only emergency measures and that the problem of the root cause of the present crisis remains intact. However, in view of the fact that blood is being shed in Kashmir and that any prolongation of hostilities would greatly jeopardise peace in a whole region of the world, these emergency measures are an essential preliminary to the more basic examinations which the Council will later decide to undertake.

Thus, the resolution adopted today does not, in our opinion, prejudge the Council's future attitude towards the contradictory positions held by India and Pakistan with regard to the true nature of the present conflict.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg as representative of the United States of America in the Security Council Meeting No 1237 held on 4 September 1965

As no other members of the Security Council wish to speak, I shall now speak as the representative of the United States of America.

I speak for my Government in total support of the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. I should like to compliment the sponsors for drafting a resolution which represents, as is apparent from the discussion here this afternoon and now tonight, the overwhelming sentiment of the members of the Security Council.

We are meeting here, as is apparent, in a spirit of grave concern for peace on the Asian subcontinent. The reverberations of fighting between the forces of India and Pakistan are reaching us in increasing volume. As the Secretary-General has reported so well and so objectively, the cease-fire has been broken and there have been serious breaches of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir. Armed personnel as well as military units of the regular forces of both India and Pakistan have now crossed the cease-fire line established by agreement on 27 July 1949. I shall not attempt to recapitulate the facts, which have been set out in the report of the Secretary-General, but shall only share his concern. for future peace between India and Pakistan.

The United States, and, as has been made evident here today, all other members of this Council, have viewed these events with the greatest apprehension and concern. Since the birth of India and Pakistan, my Government has developed close and friendly relations with their Governments, relations which we wish with all sincerity to continue. The people of the United States have many ties based on friendship, common interest, and shared goals with the peoples of both India and Pakistan. These are expressed not only in the broad programmes which my Government has pursued, and is pursuing, to assist the development and security of these countries, but also in the form of many non-governmental exchanges and programmes, particularly in the fields of health, education and economic development. We know intimately from our close relations with both countries the intricacies of the underlying problem which is at the root of today's conflict, a problem which has been emphasised in the discussions which have taken place here today.

The immediate task at hand, however, is the cessation of a conflict, which unfortunately has been threatening since early 1965. All of us here today-Governments and individuals have been watching with apprehension the upward trend in the temperature in this area on the subcontinent during the past year. All the world breathed a little easier when in June the very dangerous crisis which had developed over the Rann of Kutch was overcome through the wise statesmanship of the Governments of Pakistan and India and the skilful good offices of the Government of the United Kingdom. The respite, un happily, was all too brief.

It was emphasised, in the comprehensive and carefully prepared report of the Secretary-General of 3 September, that there has been a disturbing increase in both the number and scale of incidents in the area of the cease-fire line in Kashmir since early 1965-violations of the agreement, signed by representatives of both Governments on 27 July 1949, which established the cease-fire line. In June, the Secretary-General, persevering as he does, was able through quiet persuasion to effect a solution of the threatening situation in the Kargil area-a very great contribution in the cause of international peace and security.

As noted in the report of the Secretary-General, the tempo of incidents rose again in early August. I shall not recount those incidents; they are fully and, I think, objectively reported in this report and in the details submitted to the Secretary-General by General Nimmo, Chief of the United Nations Military Observer Group.

As indicated in the report, the Secretary-General has, since early August, been endeavouring persistently and through quiet diplomacy to promote a restoration of calm and respect of the cease-fire. In his report to the Council, the Secretary General sets forth a number of conditions which he considers prerequisite to a restoration of the cease-fire. In his telegrams of 1 September to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri, appealing to both leaders to respect the cease-fire agreement, the Secretary-General again outlines these conditions. They are, in the view of my Government, both sound and reasonable and they are, in effect, endorsed by the cease-fire request made in the draft resolution.

I should like to point out that cooperation with the military observers, which is one of the Secretary-General's proposals, must mean full freedom of movement and access for the observers in the discharge of their functions. These functions are to observe and report any violation of the cease-fire and the cease-fire line and to supervise the cease-fire order. This clear supervisory function of the military observers derives from the terms of the resolution of 13 August 1948 of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan, part I of which was the basis for the cease-fire of 1 January 1949, which, in turn, is endorsed in the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949, establishing the cease-fire line. Paragraph D of part I of this resolution reads:

"In its discretion and as the Commission may find practicable, the Commission will appoint military observers who, under the authority of the Commission and with the cooperation of both Commands, will supervise the observance of the cease fire order."

It is clear that all the conditions enumerated by the Secretary-General in his appeal are prerequisite to an effective cease-fire, which the draft resolution before us endorses.

When the Secretary-General's appeal to President Ayub Khan and Prime Minister Shastri was made public, I immediately announced, with the authority of President Johnson, my Government's complete endorsement of that appeal. I have the authority from the President to reiterate that endorsement here today. It is all too clear that the latest developments in Kashmir bear tragic witness to the imperative need for an immediate cease-fire. I do not think I need to point out, after what has been said here today, the devastating consequences a war between India and Pakistan would have on the peoples of the subcontinent and I dare say on the entire world.

The world has been privileged to witness the remarkable economic and social progress of these two great countries in behalf of their peoples, and many of the nations represented in this Council have been able to contribute to this process. It ought to continue, under conditions of peace, in the interests of the inhabitants of both countries. It would be an unthinkable tragedy should these great achievements, past and present and future-be annulled by a failure to end the current fighting promptly and firmly. I profoundly believe that this Council can do no less than give its fullest support to the appeal of the Secretary-General and to the draft resolution just submitted by my colleague from Malaysia speaking on behalf of representatives and nations which participated in the drafting of this text.

Moreover, my Government believes that it is of the highest importance to the cause of world peace and security, and indeed to the cause of the Charter, which is dedicated to these great principles, that the Security Council must clearly and unequivocally place its great authority behind these grave appeals, and we party that the parties involved will hear our voices and draw back from the catastrophe which threatens all of them. The first to them, and to the world, of their failure to do so would be beyond any measure that any of us here today could even contemplate.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Aka (Ivory Coast) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

We have before us the report of the Secretary-General dated 3 September 1965. This document is particularly disturbing because of the light it sheds on the development of certain events in Kashmir which we have been following in the past few weeks. Not only Press reports, but statements from official sources clearly confirm, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report, the seriousness of the situation in that part of the world, where the intensity of certain military operations on land and in the air are a manifestation not only of the threat of force, which is already prohibited by the Charter, but of the undeniable use of force between two great nations.

Many communications, much information, including denials and accusations, have reached us since the cease-fire was broken in Kashmir. My Government, which attributes great value to negotiation and to the need for all Member States to settle their disputes by peaceful means, cannot emphasise too strongly how vain and transient are solutions achieved by force. At this moment, when blood is being shed in Kashmir and innocent people, women and children are meeting sudden death in the horror of war, may Government believes that it is imperative for the Council to do what it has done in other circumstances to bring about peace and that is why we have been instructed to co-sponsor the draft resolution submitted to the Council by Malaysia. We hope that the draft resolution will be adopted.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

The Security Council has before it the question of the armed conflict which has arisen between two neighbouring Members of the United Nations. In the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir there is the sound of gunfire, blood is being shed, and events are taking place which arouse the serious concern of all peace-loving people.

In view of our feelings of sympathy and friendship for the peoples of India and Pakistan, we cannot remain indifferent to the sufferings of the peaceful inhabitants of Kashmir and to

the worsening of relations between the two States.

As we all know, there are substantial differences of opinion between Pakistan and India on the question of Kashmir. Unfortunately, many new States have to deal with the legacy left by the departing colonialists-the evil legacy of the well-known colonialist policy of dividing peoples and sowing enmity between them.

My delegation, at previous meetings of the Council devoted to this question, has repeatedly pointed out that the tension between these two important Asian States over Kashmir is one of the grim legacies of colonialism. The imperialists have always tried to use the Kashmir question to stir up quarrels between the peoples of India and Pakistan, to set them against each other now they have freed themselves from colonial bon dage, to undermine their solidarity, to aggravate international relations and exploit the situation thus created for their own selfish purposes, and to create in Asia yet another hotbed of tension.

It goes without saying that the conflict in Kashmir can benefit neither side: neither India nor Pakistan. Engaged as they are in the great task of developing their national economies, the peoples of India and Pakistan have a stake in peace and friendship with all countries, in friendship with each other.

The people of the Soviet Union are sincere friends of the peoples of India and Pakistan. That is why they are concerned. over the bloodshed in Kashmir and the armed conflict between these two neighbouring States.

The Soviet Union has, of course, traditionally been a friend of India. We have high esteem for India's adherence to the policy of non-alignment and to the principles of peaceful coexistence between States. The Soviet Union supports the Indian people's courageous struggle against colonialism.

The strengthening of the ties uniting the Soviet Union and Pakistan is part of my Government's general policy directed towards safeguarding peace in Asia and throughout the world.

In pursuing a policy of peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union at times supports the settlement of disputes through negotiations and by peaceful means. It should be pointed out that India and Pakistan have already shown willingness to adopt that course with a view to establishing good-neighbourly relations. In June of this year, for example, they concluded an agreement for a cease-fire in the Rann of Kutch. In doing so, both sides showed the greatest common sense, restraint and patience.

We consider it necessary to point out that any further exacerbation of the conflict in Kashmir might further aggravate tension on the Asian continent. That is why at this time we should like to express our confidence that, above all, India and Pakistan themselves will find a way to put an immediate end to the bloodshed in Kashmir and to halt his conflict. The two neighbouring States must resolve the outstanding issues between them by peaceful means, with due regard for their mutual interests.

It is to be hoped that a cessation of the armed conflict will in turn gradually lead to the establishment of mutual understanding and cooperation between India and Pakistan. In the opinion of my delegation, settlement of the conflict in Kashmir would be an important contribution to the maintenance of peace.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Rifa'i (Jordan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

Before I speak briefly, for the time being, on the question before the Security Council today, I should like to welcome you, Mr. President, as an outstanding representative of your country. Your first appearance in this Council as the representative of the United States of America coincides with your presiding over our meetings for the current month. This dignified advent is in keeping with the high office which you have just left and with the distinguished position which you are just assuming. You come from the highest judicial body in your country, where right and justice reign supreme, to the highest international body, where right and justice in the relations among nations must be the basic pillars of peace. I sincerely hope that the success which accompanied you in your past career will continue to be with you in the tasks ahead.

Just as members of the Council have followed with deep concern the recent armed clashes in Kashmir, the efforts of the Secretary-General to halt those dangerous activities have also been followed with special appreciation. In recognition of his valuable contributions to the cause of peace, it should be said that our Security-General is shouldering with devotion and perseverance much of the heavy tasks in the maintenance of international peace.

It is therefore quite appropriate that, in their turn, members of the Security Council should feel called upon to meet and consider a situation as dangerous to international peace and security as the one before us today. It is most unfortunate to see that force of arms has become the spoken language between two great nations that belong to the same continent and share the heavy responsibility of protecting peace in the great continent of Asia. With both those nations my people and country have the most cordial relations and strong ties, and we cherish the same ideals and serve the same principles as they do.

We therefore regret to see that the cease-fire line in Kashmir has been opened to wide and expanding armed conflict. Yet we know that this thin barrier cannot continue to resist the pressure of the political weight in the underlying factors and interests of both nations. Nor can it last long in providing hope and patience in a demanding situation. Our duty now, as the Security Council, is to see to it that the cease fire established between India and Pakistan in Kashmir is respected and strictly observed. But such a protection against damage cannot always be guaranteed by the repetition of appeals and pronouncements whenever the cease-fire is in jeopardy. It needs, first and foremost, a strong conviction on the part of the disputing forces that the political problem between them must be settled peacefully and with due regard for the claims, resolutions and agreements pertaining to the question. And here the Security Council should charge itself with the task of assisting the Governments of India and Pakistan in the effort to resolve the fundamental question which has been a source of trouble between the two countries for eighteen years and which, furthermore, has in the course of the years acquired additional weight, to the extent that it has become an influential factor in the attitude of both Powers in international politics.

In the opinion of my delegation, the present meetings of the Security Council should yield positive results. To meet the immediate requirement, the Council should call on India and Pakistan to halt forthwith their armed clashes and return, each of them, to the original position on its side of the line. That requirement has indeed been met in the draft resolution just introduced by the representative of Malaysia. Once this purpose of a cessation of armed hostilities has been achieved, it should be followed by a serious attempt on the part of the Security Council to look into the wider and basic aspects of matter.

As regards the present regrettable state of events, we wish to take note of the important report of the Secretary-General on the current situation in Kashmir, and we trust that the Secretary-General will continue, as he always does, to enable us to be promptly informed of the developments in the situation.

Text of the Speech made by Lord Caradon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

My Government has been following with grave and growing concern the recent violent and dangerous developments in Kashmir. These developments are described in the Secretary General's report which is before us today.

We have noted the report made by General Nimmo, described in paragraph 6 of the Secretary-General's report, that the series of violations of the cease-fire line that began on 5 August "were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the cease-fire line from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side".

We have also noted the Secretary-General's conclusion, set out in his telegrams dated 1 September 1962 to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan, that, without any attempt to apportion blame, it may be said that acts of violence "now come from both sides of the line, involve an increasingly large number of armed men on each side, and take place in the air as well as on the ground". The Secretary General added that, most serious of all, "regular army troops from both countries are now engaging in military actions along and across the line".

The fact that after seventeen years the Kashmir question, in which the Security Council has been for so long involved, has given rise to such an explosive situation is a matter for special concern to this Council. The fact that two great nations should be engaged in such a conflict is a mother of anxiety to the whole world. Surely we all now have one overriding and imperative and most urgent first duty that is, to exert every effort and every influence and every pressure to bring the fighting to an end. dilate purpose and obligation. That is the obvious and mim

We have always believed that the Kashmir problem must be solved if there is to be peace and stability in the sub continent. That is still our view. But we also believe that the problem can be solved only by peaceful negotiation and not by force. We earnestly hope that the present situation can be resolved in a manner which makes resumption of such negotiations possible.

Whatever the individual views of members of the Council on the substance or the history of the Kashmir dispute, surely all of us must now concentrate all our endeavours on that one aim the aim of convincing both countries that continued fighting can bring only disastrous consequences to all directly concerned and to the whole sub-continent and also to the cause of international security.

We should in this Council act quickly. We should speak with one voice. We should make our call for an end to the conflict unanimous and unmistakable. In doing so we shall be speaking with the true voice of the United Nations.

We are sure that our purpose of stopping the fighting is in the interests of both India and Pakistan, and we trust that the two Governments will respect and heed an appeal which, it is not too much to say, carries with it the wishes and hopes of people through-out the world. We trust too that they will recognize that we act, and must act, in accordance with the needs of international peace and security, which under the Charter we are all charged to maintain.

We entirely endorse the actions which have already been taken by the Secretary-General, and we shall continue to give him every support. In particular, we are grateful to him for making out the steps required to restore the cease-fire. That he did in the most earnest and eloquent appeal which he addressed to the President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India three days ago.

My Government immediately supported that appeal and made the following statement :

"The British Government have been following with close attention and considerable anxiety the development of the situation in Kashmir. They wholeheartedly support the appeal made by the United Nations Secretary General to both sides in the dispute to agree to an immediate cease-fire and to respect the cease-fire agreement which both entered into in 1949."

You, Mr. President, at once publicly expressed your country's full endorsement of the Secretary-General's appeal. Now is the time for the Security Council to take the lead in rallying support behind the Secretary-General's initiative.

My Government is ready now and will remain anxious to support any action this Council may now decide to take for the immediate purposes which the Secretary-General has declared.

It is with those considerations in mind, therefore, that my delegation approaches the draft resolution submitted by Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay. It seems to me that the draft resolution contains the essential elements of the action which today, in immediate support of the steps taken by the Secretary-General, this Council is in duty bound to take. I hope that we shall all be able rapidly to agree to make the call for a cease-fire, as is proposed in the draft resolution.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Quarles Van Ufford (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

The alarming reports of recent events on both sides of the cease-fire line in Kashmir have filled the delegation of the Netherlands with concern. It is with sorrow and perplexity that my delegation is forced to recognize that a problem with which the Security Council has grappled since 1947 has abruptly returned to a degree of frightening intensity. The occurrences of the past weeks, if that world suffices to describe the acts of violence that have taken place-have, unfortunately, made it imperative for the Security Council once more to give its urgent attention to the situation in Kashmir.

At this particular moment, my delegation has no desire to enter into a detailed examination of the broader issue, for the obvious urgency of the situation calls for few words but clear expressions. These clear expressions of the opinions of the members of the Security Council should be an endorsement and an affirmation of the earnest appeals that have already been made to the two parties engaged in this distressing conflict.

The message which the Secretary-General sent on 1 September to the President of the Republic of Pakistan and to the Prime Minister of the Republic of India represents the culmination of a series of steps which the Secretary-General undertook to check further deterioration of the situation. My delegation is appreciative of the unrelenting efforts of the Secretary-General and is all the more disappointed to not that these earnest appeals have not as yet been heeded by the contending parties.

Likewise, the messages from a number of Governments, equally appalled at the breaches of the peace in Kashmir, although those messages were an obvious indication of general and deep concern with this frightening situation, have so far received no reassuring replies.

Where all these earnest and direct appeals have produced no hopeful results, it is the opinion of my Government that the Security council cannot remain inactive with regard to acts which come clearly within the purview of the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter.

It is the primary duty of the Security Council at this stage to call for respect for the cease-fire agreement and the cease-fire line freely agreed upon by both Pakistan and India on 27 July 1949. It is urgent that the parties be called upon to cease forthwith all hostilities and to restore the cease-fire line.

Force cannot settle the issue. However deeply rooted the differences may be, however strong the passions may flow, a solution cannot be reached as long as armed might is used to force an outcome. As Members of the United Nations, having subscribed to the Charter and to the words of the Preamble, "to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours", we are all obliged to act, in all circumstances, in accordance with the spirit and the letter of the Charter.

At the present stage of our deliberations and of our dealing with the grave situation in Kashmir, the Netherlands delegation is of the opinion that the Security Council should urge both Governments to respect the cease-fire line agreed to in 1949, to cease immediately all military actions and hostilities, to prevent crossings by armed personnel or civilians from both sides of the cease-fire line, to halt all firing across that line, to withdraw all armed personnel from the other side of the line and to cooperate with the United Nations Military Observer Group, which should have full freedom of movement and access.

Therefore my delegation considers the draft resolution which has been presented by the representative of Malaysia on behalf of the non-permanent members of the Security Council

to be a useful and necessary step towards restoring peace in Kashmir. It hopes and trusts that this draft will be unanimously adopted. This resolution should be seen as but a first step in order to create a favourable climate for the restoration of peace. This urgent appeal by the Security Council should not preclude its obligation to follow vigilantly the developments in Kashmir and to take further action if that were required.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

On behalf of the six sponsors-Bolivia, the Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Netherlands and Uruguay-I should like to introduce to the members of this Council the text of a draft resolution [S/6657].

The text is self-explanatory, and I need not dwell on its contents; it is entirely and solely designed to meet the present emergency in Kashmir.

I wish to emphasise that the draft resolution makes no findings; it produces no judgements on the distressing and tragic situation that has suddenly developed along and beyond the cease-fire line between India and Pakistan in Kashmir. I am sure either side has at its elbow allow all the valid reasons to explain, and perhaps also to justify, how this came about and also why it could not be avoided and had to occur . For the immediate present, I venture to think, we should avoid getting entangled in these reasons, having regard to the urgency which faces the Security Council this afternoon.

Hardly thirty minutes ago, as here we exchanged compliments, before proceeding to exchange arguments, a Reuters' report received in New York at 4.28 p.m. disclosed that:

"Pakistani forces pushed deeper into Indian Kashmir today" Saturday, 4 September-"as air fighting between the two countries intensified and the United Nations Security Council met to try to solve what the Secretary General, U Thant, called and 'ominous situation'" and so on.

I have referred to this in passing by way of emphasizing the urgency of the problem with which the Security Council is faced at this very moment.

The Security Council has before it the report of the Secretary-General. It discloses a state of affairs of the gravest kind, with unpredictable potentialities not merely for India and Pakistan but for the wider world as a whole. Even the characteristic moderation of the Secretary-General in the use of language in all his reports has had to be exceeded in the language in which he has presented this report. It underlines the somber shades in the situation and emphasises the risks that the world would be consciously running if nothing were done to moderate and modify the attitudes that created this situation.

The Security Council therefore is faced with an objective situation on, the ground and in the air in Kashmir which cries for the intervention of the Security Council if as indeed it is, the supreme world organ solely concerned with and responsible for the peace and security have received their profoundest shock by the recrudescence of the present violence on a disturbing scale, even in the normally unstable conditions that have prevailed in Kashmir.

The Security Council therefore owes itself and the high purposes for which it has been called into being a duty: to cry a halt to this manifestation which, with every day that passes, is escalating towards a wider war. Limited objectives in a situation of such potential danger cannot for very long remain limited, posting the potential threat of a large conflagration.

As I said, the draft resolution does no more than just call a halt to this escalation. India and Pakistan, as two great world Powers, have less of a duty to themselves than to the wider cause of world peace and world order. They have been and should continue to be an example to the Afro-Asian world. Certainly neither of them, with the wealth of political talent and wisdom with which they have been generously endowed, can seriously believe-whatever the rationalised and articulated motivations behind their respective present stands-that the course in which they have launched themselves, a course, if I may say so, so utterly alien to their cultures and their manifest destiny in the world, can in fact and in truth contribute towards a peaceful solution of their decades-old problems, to which they both have unreservedly committed themselves in the eyes of the world.

The draft resolution calls attention to the obligations already undertaken by the two States and just asks them to desist from pursuing their objectives through the dangerous paths of violence and injustice to their duty to themselves, and in deference to the Charter of the United Nations and their duty to the world.

The world Press has in recent days pressed on and presented to the Governments of India and Pakistan the anxieties of the Heads of States and Governments all over the world at the alarming drift of the situation in Kashmir, and all of them have directly addressed appeals to the Heads of Government in India and Pakistan. Perhaps I may be permitted to mention the attitude of Mr. Lester Pearson of Canada, offering his immediate and personal services to help to bring about a cease-fire, which brings to this problem

its deserved measure of urgency. I trust that this Council will suffer no delay, will act promptly and with all possible speed and accept this draft resolution without a dissenting voice so that the appeal of the Secretary-General may be endorsed with the unanimous strength of the whole of this Council.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

Mr. President, I should like to point out that in your second statement you conceded that in the future you would avoid creating a situation like that which resulted in my delegation not being consulted about the time of the Council's meeting.

Although coming at this time, that is not enough to give me, as representative of the Soviet Union, full satisfaction, it is in any case considerably better than the statement made by my distinguished neighbour on the left. Reproaching me for trying to lecture the Council-which I leave to his conscience the United Kingdom representative expressed himself more or less as follows: Oh, you were not informed? But I was informed, so please be satisfied with that." Of course, if we are going to act in that way, it will hardly contribute to the success of our work. In any event, it has already resulted in the loss of time which we could have put to considerable better use.

My second observation is that we could, of course, continue at great length the discussion of the meaning of rules 1, 2 and 3. I wish to reaffirm the position which I stated initially in answer to your statement, Mr. President; I remain of that opinion. However, I am very grateful to the representative of the Netherlands. He did not, it is true, support my point of view with regard to the interpretation of the extent of the President's authority, but he did, in a highly practical way, come to the rescue, I might say, of the whole Counsel-both you yourself, Mr. President, and all those others who, like you, have until now been considering what steps they should take to convene the Council. The representative of the Netherlands made two points in his statement. First of all, he said that his Government considered it essential to call a meeting of the Security Council. Well, better late than never. It seems that this saying has been translated into all languages. Thus, we have a formal proposal to call a meeting of the Council. And since we have not yet started the meeting and have not yet considered the Council's agenda-even though it is not quite customary, and I would have preferred to see that proposal in writing under the name of the country represented by my distinguished neighbour on the right-I am prepared, in view of the circumstances in which we find ourselves, to accept it as a formal proposal to call a meeting of the Council.

The Netherlands representative said further that since his Government considered it essential to call a meeting of the Council-that is how he began-he supported your decision, Mr. President. This is, as the French say, a manner of speaking. However, if it pleased him to state that the Government of the Netherlands considered it essential to call a meeting of the Council on this question and to add something more, as I have just pointed out, then, in view of the service which he has done us all by removing the necessity for continuing this particular discussion, I am prepared to forgo any comment on what he said.

 Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthor J. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

I believe that the views of the President and of the representatives of the Soviet Union and other Council members on the subject now before us have been amply expounded. I would add just a few words. We have checked the records of the Council meeting prior to the one convened by Ambassador Morozov this summer to which reference has been made, and there is no record of any special authority being given to the President with regard to calling further meetings.

With respect to the question of consultation, I would hope that it is very clear that there was extensive consultation, and I think that appears from all that has been said here. This morning, because of the urgency of the situation, I felt that if we were to meet today-which was our anticipation yesterday-word ought to go out immediately, for the convenience of the members of the Council. When I said that I apologised if I caused any inconvenience to any member, I meant it in those terms. do not apologise for doing my duty, as President of the Council, in convening a meeting when it is necessary, as rule 1 provides.

On the other hand, I fully understand what the representative of the Soviet Union said because, under comparable circumstances, Mr. Zorin, as President of Council, faced a similar complaint on the part of the United States representative. That was on 13 November 1961. On that occasion, the representative of the United States raised a question as to the notice he had received, just as Mr. Morozov has done today. Apparently the same circumstance existed which impelled me today to act as urgently as I did, without the President's having the opportunity to consult with any member of the Council as to the precise hour of the meeting, and the representative of the United States raised a question about not having received adequate notice as to the time of the meeting. Mr. Zorin replied in almost the same words that I used here today. He said :"I feel that I acted reasonably. The representative of the United States, apparently, does not entirely agree with me. I am sorry he does not agree with me,"-I take that as a similar word of apology-"but I feel that everything which could have been done on my part, by way of consultation with members of the Security Council, was in fact done. I intend to continue in the future to consult all members of the Council on the calling of meetings of the Council,"-I repeat that, for myself-"and I think that all members of the Security Council will cooperate with me in this matter." [973rd meeting, para. 20]. I intend to do the best I can in this area in the future, so long as I sit in this seat.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Liu (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

At this grave hour I really hesitate to take up any time of the Council by my intervention. After listening to the statement which the President gave at the beginning of the meeting, I should have thought that reasons for convening the Council

this afternoon were unchallengeable, whether considered from the point of view of rule 1, rule 2 or rule 3 of the provisional rules of procedure.

But I wish to advance to another point. Even if we start from the premise that there is a relationship between these three rules, let us remember that the President of the Security Council is, at the same time, a member of the Council. In ordinary circumstances, if a member of the Council wants to request a meeting, he goes to the President, and then the President consults with the other members. But when the member happens to be the President himself, he has nobody to go to except himself.

May I say, Mr. President that the consultations that you had with other members of the Council were extensive, and that no President could have done more, even if the request had come from any other member of the Council. I want to submit that if a member of the Council happens to be the President, this does not abrogate his right as a member to initiate a meeting. It would be absurd to interpret our rules in any other light. The meeting of the Council has been convened in the name of the President and as a prerogative of the President, but it is the inherent right of a member to initiate a meeting.

204. Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthor J. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

I believe that the views of the President and of the representatives of the Soviet Union and other Council members on the subject now before us have been amply expounded. I would add just a few words. We have checked the records of the Council meeting prior to the one convened by Ambassador Morozov this summer to which reference has been made, and there is no record of any special authority being given to the President with regard to calling further meetings.

With respect to the question of consultation, I would hope that it is very clear that there was extensive consultation, and I think that appears from all that has been said here. This morning, because of the urgency of the situation, I felt that if we were to meet today-which was our anticipation yesterday-word ought to go out immediately, for the convenience of the members of the Council. When I said that I apologised if I caused any inconvenience to any member, I meant it in those terms. do not apologise for doing my duty, as President of the Council, in convening a meeting when it is necessary, as rule 1 provides.

On the other hand, I fully understand what the representative of the Soviet Union said because, under comparable circumstances, Mr. Zorin, as President of Council, faced a similar complaint on the part of the United States representative. That was on 13 November 1961. On that occasion, the representative of the United States raised a question as to the notice he had received, just as Mr. Morozov has done today. Apparently the same circumstance existed which impelled me today to act as urgently as I did, without the President's having the opportunity to consult with any member of the Council as to the precise hour of the meeting, and the representative of the United States raised a question about not having received adequate notice as to the time of the meeting. Mr. Zorin replied in almost the same words that I used here today. He said :"I feel that I acted reasonably. The representative of the United States, apparently, does not entirely agree with me. I am sorry he does not agree with me,"-I take that as a similar word of apology-"but I feel that everything which could have been done on my part, by way of consultation with members of the Security Council, was in fact done. I intend to continue in the future to consult all members of the Council on the calling of meetings of the Council,"-I repeat that, for myself-"and I think that all members of the Security Council will cooperate with me in this matter." [973rd meeting, para. 20]. I intend to do the best I can in this area in the future, so long as I sit in this seat.

Text of the Speech made by Lord Caradon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

I wish to make a short comment on the procedural point that has been raised this afternoon.

We have listened with great defence, as always, and also with a certain impatience, to the point which has been elaborately stated by the representative of the Soviet Union. Three points, perhaps, he raised. The first point, which he took some time to explain to us, was that we must observe the rules duly laid down for the conduct of affairs in this Council. I should scarcely have thought that it was necessary even allowing for his great experience in these matters, to lecture the Council in such a way. We all, of course, accept that the rules of the Council must be scrupulously obeyed.

The second point, however, was the main point which he wished to put to us, in relation to rules 1 and 2. Now, whether we are lawyers or not lawyers I think we must take it that rule 2 does not cancel rule I, nor in detract from it or supersede it in any way. Both rules stand on fact their own feet. Rule 1 establishes the general principle that meetings of the Council shall be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary-and, as the representative of Malaysia says, that means what it says. Rules 2 and 3 are separate and distinct, and set out the circumstances in which the President is required or obliged to call a meeting of the Council. These rules are, of course, without prejudice to the general discretionary powers which are so clearly set out in rule

1.Then there was a third point, which was a question of fact. Of course I do not know exactly the consultations which took place with the delegation of the Soviet Union, but I would say that we have known for several days that a meeting of this Council might well become necessary. All of us have been in touch with the Secretary-General, and in the past day or two with the President himself. I received, and I would: be surprised if the delegation of the Soviet Union had not also received, warning that an early meeting of the Council might be required. It certainly came as no surprise to me when I heard today that finally a meeting had been called by the President in exercise of the powers which, it seems to us, are perfectly clear.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Quarles Van Ufford (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

The report we have in front of us by the Secretary General on the current situation in Kashmir not only is a confirmation of the dispatches that have reached us on the deterioration of the situation in Kashmir, but also throws a harsh light on the disconcerting events in that part of the world. It is the view of my Government that urgent circumstances exist that should be examined without delay by the Security Council. Therefore, Mr. President, my delegation supports your call for this meeting and hopes that the Council will be able to discuss the matter that is brought to our attention without delay.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ramani (Malaysia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

I should like to occupy a little of the Council's time on the very interesting discussion to which we have listened with regard to the interpretation of rules 1 and 2. For the present purpose one may ignore rule 3.

Before doing so I should like to state at the outset that I hesitate before trying to controvert the elucidation given to the Council by such a member of the Council as the Soviet Union, which undoubtedly has had perhaps the longest experience of any of us gathered here with regard to the interpretation of the rules. I should like to say also that, having once been a President and not hoping to be a President at any future time, I may claim to be unhampered by any suggestion of having a vested interest in the activities and authority of the President.

Mr. President, because of your juridical background and you come to us with the authority of a Judge of the Supreme Court of the United States-I hope it will not be thought that, as a mere lawyer, I am too ready to be deferential to a judge. However, I am bound to say that I agree with the interpretation given by you, and I do so not as representing the Malaysian delegation or as a politician but as one who has served some apprenticeship in the profession of the law.

I understand that the basic contention of the Soviet representative is that rule 1 and rule 2 are not mutually exclusive, that the one impinges on the other, that rule 1 should be construed in the context of rule 2 and that rule 2 only enables rule 1 to be applicable. That would mean that the phrase "at any time" which is used in rule I means, according to him, at any time in terms of chronology-whether it is to be today, tomorrow or the day after. Unfortunately, I have only the English text and I am not educated in the Russian language, so that I do not quite know what that text contains. However, in the text before me, it is stated that: "Meetings of the Security Council shall... be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary". The word "necessary" in the English language, I take leave to point out, is indeed appropriate to the calling of the meeting and not to the timing of the meeting. Where it says that meetings of the Security Council shall be held at the call of the President at any time he deems necessary, it means at any time he deems a meeting necessary. Indeed, it does not say: at any time the President deems necessary, provided a member of the Security Council has made the request under rule 2.

Therefore, quite clearly, rule 1 and rule 2, in my sub mission, are mutually exclusive. Rule 1 gives the authority and the power to the President; provided only he deems it necessary to convoke a meeting of the Security Council, he shall be at liberty to do so. Undoubtedly, Mr. President, your experience may be even shorter than mine, but I do not believe that any President would want to call a meeting just on his own fiat; when he finds it necessary, that necessity would undoubtedly have to be fortified by opinions he would have collected from his ten other colleagues.

Now, going on to rule 2, it says: "The President shall call a meeting of the Security Council at the request of any member of the Security Council." It does not go on to say "the date and time of the meeting being at the discretion of the President under rule 1".Therefore, rule 1 provides for the authority of the President which is inherent in his duty as President, and rule 2 provides for the calling of a meeting by any member of the Security Council. I should therefore think, with the utmost deference to the representative of the Soviet Union, that purely as a matter of interpretation of the English language in the two rules appearing side by side, they are incapable of the interpretation put upon them by him.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

Thank you, Mr. President. By raising this highly important matter, which has a general bearing on the proper organisation of the work of any meeting of the Council, regardless of the specific matter under discussion, you have made my task very much easier.

However, I am bound to say that my expression of gratitude to you for bringing this general question before the Council -a question which is, so to speak, a common denominator of all the matters dealt with by the Council-unfortunately ends at this points, because I do not agree with your decision and interpretation with regard to this important question.

The Security Council is the principal organ of the United Nations bearing exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on behalf of the United Nations. For that reason, the question of the methods and rules of procedure in accordance with which this important organ acts is, of course, of more than purely formal or legal significance; in view of the important work of the Council and the tasks which it is called upon to perform, this question inevitably assumes great political significance.

That is why my delegation has always insisted not only on strict observance of the provisions of the Charter in matters relating to the work of the Council but also on strict observance of the rules of procedure, which are based on the Charter and were adopted by the Council, even though, by an irony of fate, these rules have continued for two decades to be referred to as "provisional". This designation does not diminish the significance of the rules. I do not think that any members of the Council would contend that the Council can ignore the rules of procedure in one case and adhere strictly to them in another.

If we were to follow that course, our consideration of extremely important questions affecting the maintenance of international peace and security would be utterly chaotic.

Thus, the first point which I am trying to make is that the Council must conduct its work in strict accordance with the established rules, whether it is considering the question of Kashmir or some other question. I think it would be superfluous to say anything further in support of this point.

Turning to the question of the most unusual procedure if the adjective "unusual" can be applied to the word "procedure"-concerning which you have just reported to the Council, I shall try to use the mildest possible terms in demonstrating that it is essentially a violation of the established rules of procedure for preparing for and announcing a meeting of the Council.

Rules 1, 2 and 3 cannot be considered separately. Rules 2 and 3-I shall not read them out before this well-informed audience-establish the principle that meetings of the Council cannot be called as it were "anonymously". When a meeting of the Council is called, the request for a meeting can originate with a member of the Council, a Member of the United Nations or even, under certain circumstances, a State not a Member of the United Nations, assisted by a Member State. Under certain circumstances, if the General Assembly and here, of course, I am not referring to those resolutions whose illegality has been frequently pointed out by my delegation-addresses itself to the Security Council in the manner prescribed by the Charter, its action may be regarded as a reason for calling a meeting. Finally, a meeting may also be called if the Secretary-General submits a report to the Council under Article 99 of the Charter. These are the safeguards provided by the rules of procedure to ensure that a situation does not arise in which a meeting is called even though no member of the Council, and no one else authorised under the rules of procedure to raise the matter, has in fact requested the meeting.

I need hardly dwell on the fact that the General Assembly and the Security Council, when they adopted the relevant rules, intended that a request for a meeting of the Security Council should imply a certain assumption of political responsibility.

Not only today but on previous occasions we have maintained, when these questions arose in the work of the Security Council, that rule 1, to which you, Mr. President, referred, must be taken in conjunction with rules 2 and 3, if we are not to make the provisions of those two rules meaningless. Thus, the words which you cited from rule 1 to the effect that the President may call a meeting of the Security Council at any time he deems necessary can be interpreted in only one way: it is the President who, by virtue of the discretionary powers vested in him, has in the final analysis the exclusive right to decide the time when a meeting of the Council should be called.

If we take a different position and do not regard rule 1 as dealing solely with the right of the President of the Council to decide the time when the Council should be convened, then rules 2 and 3 lose their significance and we become involved in contradictions from which we will be unable to extricate ourselves.

I shall clarify this with an illustration. If, let us say, delegation A considers that the Security Council should be convened in one hour's time, delegation B considers that it should be convened in one month's time, and delegation C considers that it should be convened in one week's time, then rule 1 indicates the way out of the situation so that the Council can be convened. The rule authorises the President, acting alone on the basis of his discretionary powers, to decide that the Council should be convened at some time other than those requested by delegations A, B and C. His decision may be criticised and various views may be expressed about it, but it cannot be called into question. The President may decide to call a meeting of the Council ten minutes after a request to that effect has been received, or after any other interval of time, hearing in mind but not necessarily following the various proposals put forward. There would be no solution to the problem if the President did not have this power to decide when the Council should be convened. However, that is the extent of the provision. Rule 1 does not grant the President any other powers.

However, it appears, Mr. President, that you yourself are not particularly convinced of this, since you attempted to buttress rule 1 by referring, first of all, to the explanation given by the Chairman of the Committee which drew up the rules of procedure and, secondly, a recent precedent.

Let us start with the precedent to which you referred when you were good enough to mention me as a recent President of the Security Council. This president actually proves nothing, and for a very simple reason. During the period to which you referred, each time that discussion of the Dominican question in the Security Council ended, it was agreed that the would convene the Council whenever circumstances warranted or when any member of the Council so requested.

The very fact that the Council adopted this formula and came to an agreement that the President would call a meeting whenever circumstances warranted is the best possible confirmation that rule 1 does not decide this question.

Council gave its President a free hand in advance on a Moreover, it is quite clear that in the case in question the specific matter, under specific circumstances and in a specific context. The Council authorised the President in advance to act in this way on the Dominican question, which was before the Council. However, the whole point is that no such authorization was given to the President by the Council on the Kashmir question.

When the Council takes a similar decision, at this or any other meeting, and authorises the President to act in this way, then and only then will the President be able to do so.

With regard to your second argument, Mr. President, namely, your reference to the conclusion of the Chairman of the Committee of Experts which drew up the rules of procedure, I am bound to say that, generally speaking, when we have to be guided by as strict and specific a document as a set of rules of procedure, we must follow the provisions of those rules and not some explanation which may have been given after their adoption by one of those who drew them up. Therefore, from a legal point of view, the reference to the statement by the Chairman of the Committee which drafted the rules of procedure neither adds to the rules nor detracts from them. Thus, everything said in this regard remains valid.

There is a further matter on which I should like speak, a matter regarding which, Mr. President, you offered an apology, namely, the fact that the Soviet delegation was not consulted at all, even on the question of when the Council should be convened, when you, as President of the Council, decided-in our view, wrongly-that, despite the fact that no one had requested it, you could call a meeting of this Council under rule 1. I am referring here only to official consultations and leaving aside various circumstances which would take us too far afield, that is to say, matters which were the subject of consultation between delegations, between you and me and other delegations. Referring only to official statements, I must state that at about 10 p.m. yesterday I was informed officially and by your authority that the President requested the Soviet delegation to stand by on Saturday, because on that day he intended to hold consultations regarding the convening of the Security Council. Those consultations were not held until almost midday, and in any event not until you had taken the decision in question.

I am bound to say that those consultations were not held at all before the meeting of the Council was opened. Quite the contrary, since it was at about 12 o'clock-I did not note the exact time that I was informed that the President had decided to call a meeting of the Council for 3 p.m.

I profoundly regret, Mr. President, that as you entered upon your duties as President of the Council, you felt that you could make such a flagrant departure from the accepted procedure for consultations, if only regarding the time for convening the Council, to say nothing of the substance of this question. Your reference to the urgency of the question, to the need for an urgent decision, and your reference to the fact that you had been unable to consult all the delegations have a discriminatory ring about them. As everyone knows, there are eleven delegations in the Council. The number of members of the United States delegation who could have talked to the members of the Council is clearly more than eleven; thus, if you had wished, they could have held consultations on your behalf with all members of the Council for five or ten minutes. I should therefore like to point out that your argument regarding the urgency of the situation proves nothing. Furthermore, it is merely a cover-up for the deplorable fact which you yourself acknowledged and for which you were forced to apologize. For my part, I would have preferred not to hear those apologies but to come to an agreement, at the very outset, that during this month of your Presidency we shall be guaranteed against any repetition of this situation and that you, Mr. President, will follow the practice which was established here long before your arrival and is in keeping with the businesslike methods of communication between the President and the members of the Council which alone can enable you successfully to carry out your duties in conducting our meetings.

I should like to point out that, under the rules of procedure and the Charter of our Organisation, the President has no powers other than those relating to the conduct of our meetings. Outside those meetings, therefore, the President must be very careful not to adopt any course of action which might later necessitate apologies of the kind we have heard here, which only emphasise the completely abnormal atmosphere which has been created in the process of calling this meeting of the Council.

Thus, to sum up, the breaches of and departures from the rules which occurred during the preparations for the present meeting of the Council are intolerable not only in considering this particular question-I do not wish to link this matter with the position which my delegation will take on the substance of the question when the Council comes to discuss it but also because, of course, they greatly complicate the Council's performance of its functions. A repetition of these breaches and departures can only have a most undesirable effect on the future work of the Council. I would therefore request you, Mr. President, not to insist on the thesis which you have tried to defend and justify here.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1237 held on 4 September 1965

In convening this meeting of the Security Council and before saying a few words in deserved tribute to my predecessor as President of the Security Council, I would like to address myself to the calling of this meeting.

For the past few days, the Secretary-General, I myself as President, and members of the Council have been in consultation about how the United Nations could best exercise its responsibility to help maintain peace in Kashmir, where, as is well known, United Nations observers are on the ground, and with respect to which the Security Council has taken action of numerous occasions in the past.

On 1 September, three days ago-I almost said three long days ago the Secretary-General sent to the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan an appeal for a cease-fire [S/6647]. Virtually continuous consultations since then have revealed a general desire that the Council be convened urgently to take up its responsibility. The military news from the area, as is well known and as has been reported in the world Press, continues to be grave, and the United Nations observers on the ground have been unable to carry out their functions freely. In the light of these consultations and these extraordinary and serious circumstances, as President of the Security Council I called this morning for a Council meeting this afternoon in the following words:

"Consultations by the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council with members of the Council have revealed a general desire that the Security Council be convened promptly to consider, in the light of the Secretary-General's appeal for a cease-fire, the serious conflict now taking place in Kashmir.

"Since, under the circumstances, a meeting is necessary, I have, as Security Council President, called a meeting of the Council for 3 p.m. today, 4 September."

Rules 1 to 3 of our provisional rules of procedure provide that the Council can be convened by the President under various circumstances: when issues are brought to it by the General Assembly, the Secretary-General or a Member State (rule 3); when a member of the Council requests a meeting (rule 2); and at any time that the President deems a meeting necessary (rule 1). This was explained to the Council by the Chairman of the Committee of Experts on the rules, in his report of 5 February 1946, almost twenty years ago, as follows:

"...the Committee adopted a new and more flexible wording which does not expressly provide for 'extraordinary' meetings, while, however, leaving to the President of the Council the power to call meetings :

"(a) When he deems it necessary (rule 1); "(b) At the request of any member of the Council (rule 2);

"(c) When it is provided for by the Charter (rule 3)." In addition, perhaps because of my juristic background, I have researched the relevant precedents. A specific precedent for the convening of the Council in these or comparable circumstances can be found in its 847th meeting, on 7 September 1959, when the representative of Italy was the President of the Council, In July 1965, in fact one day after the lamented death of my distinguished predecessor, Adlai E. Stevension, the President of the Security Council, at that time the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Morozov, asked for the Council to be convened on the basis of a telegram from Mr. Jottin cury, which was never transformed into a formal request for a meeting by any member of the United Nations or the Security Council. It would appear to me, therefore, in reading this background, that the President of the Council was at that time convening a meeting on the basis of his judgement as President, I believe that in that case, as I read the record, members of the Council were willing to meet, but not on an urgent basis, and that the meeting in fact took place, without a change in the underlying circumstances, on 20 July 1965.

The practice of the Council-although not the rules--is that the President consults members about the timing of the meeting. There have, in this case, been extensive consultations over the past three days-not only by myself, but by the Secretary-General as well-both about the desirability and about the timing of the meeting. I know the Secretary General has done everything possible, and I have tried to the best of my ability in the present urgent circumstances, to keep all members informed of developments as they occurred. The Secretary-General, I believe, has seen all members of the Council; I have been in touch personally with most members of the Council at various times over the past few days; and in addition, of course, we have had the benefit of a flow of information about these consultations by the able and hard working members of the United Nations Secretariat.

Members of the Council were informed yesterday that the time of a meeting might be announced then, and later were also informed that they should be available this week-end as it might be necessary to call a meeting today. This morning, as President of the Council, I set the time for the Council meeting at 3 p.m. today. I regret that, in the light of the emergency and the extraordinary circumstances which face us, time did not permit me to advise all members in advance of the exact hour of the meeting. I hope that, if this has inconvenienced any members, they will bear with me in these serious times, and that we can all turn our attention promptly and substantively to helping restore peace in Kashmir. I would tender my profound apologies to any member of the Council who was inconvenienced by my inability-and it was only a physical inability, due to lack of time to call each one early this morning in regard of the precise time of the meeting.

I have made this preliminary statement to make clear the circumstances under which this meeting has been called.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Roger Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1117 held on 18 May 1964

I should like to begin this meeting by apologizing to the Ministers of India and Pakistan for having kept them waiting so long, but, as they must know, this was due to circumstances beyond the President's control.

At the close of the meeting on 13 May 1964 [1116th meeting], the Council, on the proposal of the representative of Brazil supported by the representative of Norway, was good enough to ask me to attempt to draw up the conclusions from our debate.

It seemed to me, and I believe to my colleagues, that the task was to investigate the possibility of finding common conclusions in which all members. of the Council could acquiesce.

I have been carrying out this task in consultation with all the members. I must now place on record that, despite the goodwill displayed by my colleagues, it has not been possible to reach complete agreement. Unanimity has not been achieved on one of the important points under discussion.

Consequently, your President is not in a position to identify any comprehensive conclusion. His report will contain three points. He must confine himself to a statement, in the first part to those points on which there was no difference of view between the members of the Council, and, in the second part, of the different opinions indicated on a further point :

"I"(a) The members of the Council noted that this week's debate was a continuation of our discussions of February and March on the question of Jammu and Kashmir. They recalled that they had already, particularly during the debate in February, stated the views of their Governments on the basic facts of the problem, including the relevant United Nations resolutions, the question as to the juridical status of Jammu and Kashmir, and the principles of the Charter applicable to the case. They confirmed that the statements which they had made at that time were still valid;

"(b) The members of the Council expressed their concern with respect to two great countries which have everything to gain from re-establishing good relations with each other and whose present disputes, particularly that centering upon Jammu and Kashmir, should be settled amicably in the interest of world peace;

"(c) The members of the Council expressed their feeling that recent developments were such as might lead to the adoption of more flexible positions, to better mutual understanding, and therefore to a situation in which conversations between the parties concerned would have better prospects of leading to a settlement;

"(d) The members of the Council expressed their conviction that everything should be done to consolidate those favourable factors and to avoid jeopardising those prospects, and that this required an attitude of conciliatory moderation on the part of both parties and an attitude of caution, but also of vigilant attention, on the part of the United Nations;

"(e) The members of the Council expressed the hope that both parties would refrain from any act which might aggravate the situation and that they would take steps calculated to re-establish an atmosphere of moderation between the two countries and peace and harmony between the communities;

"(f) The members of the Council expressed the hope that, in the light of our recent debates, the two countries concerned would resume their contacts in the near future with a view to settling their disputes, particularly that centring upon Jammu and Kashmir, by negotiation; "II"Several members of the Council expressed the view that the Secretary-General of the United Nations might possibly give useful assistance to the parties in order to facilitate the resumption of negotiations on the question of Jammu and Kashmir, or might help them continue such negotiations in the event of the latter encountering difficulties. Other members of the Council, however, expressed the view that the negotiations between India and Pakistan might be complicated by any outside intervention, and that even the principle of having recourse to the Secretary-General should be a matter for agreement between the parties.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Roger Scydoux as representative of France in the Security Council Meeting No. 1116 held on 13 May 1964

On several occasions, and most recently on 14 February 1964 [1091st meeting], the French delegation has made known its views which have not changed-on the basic issue relating to Jammu and Kashmir. Instead of repeating these considerations, therefore, I think it will be more expedient to confine myself, as indeed most of the other speakers have done, to the developments that have taken place since the last session of the Security Council and to the prospects they appear to hold out for the future..A number of new facts deserve to be noted.

First of all, there is the remarkable and very fortunate fact that this time we are not meeting in an atmosphere of mourning and alarm like that created early in the year by the new outbreak of bloodshed in various parts of the subcontinent, beginning with Kashmir. Of course, it would be far from the truth to say that everyone is calm again. But at least it is a relief for the friends of India and Pakistan to see that good sense is now tending to prevail over passion.

In this connection, the meeting between two members of the Governments concerned and the discussions-considered useful by both sides which they have held are another encouraging sign. All the problems involved have probably not been tackled, and no definite conclusions have yet been drawn from this initial exchange of views; but contact has been

established and it has been agreed that there will be further contact.

This is a step in the right direction. Lastly, for the French delegation, and for many others, one important development is the release of a leading figure in Kashmir who is now in a position to use his influence and personal authority to promote a better understanding, encourage the trend towards conciliation and perhaps clear the way towards a possible settlement of the dispute in his native country.

On the whole, the prospects are better today than they either side to wear a little while ago. My delegation considers that it is imperative that nothing should be done on jeopardise them either by resorting to violence or even by reverting to sterile polemics. It sincerely hopes that, taking advantage of the favourable aspects of the current situation, both parties will resume their talks without delay and endeavour to find a solution to the problem of Jammu and Kashmir by negotiation.

In the belief that such a solution would certainly play a decisive part in helping to re-establish good-neighbourly and friendly relations between India and Pakistan, my delegation would like to have the assurance that, despite the obstacles which will probably arise on the way, the negotiations will be conducted with a genuine desire to succeed and carried through right to the end.

It is no doubt with the same concern in mind that so many speakers, both yesterday and this afternoon, voiced the opinion that our Organisation, and more specifically the Secretary-General, to whom a fitting tribute has once again been paid, would have a part to play in such circumstances. The French delegation endorses it. It considers that it would be desirable for the Secretary-General to ensure that the Security Council is in a position to keep abreast of developments in a matter which is of concern to us all, that for this purpose he should be kept regularly informed by the two parties of the progress achieved or the difficulties encountered in the course of their bilateral negotiations, and that he should be able to offer them his assistance or advice, if necessary, so as to prevent the talks, once started, from being broken off again.

I assure the representatives of India and Pakistan that no country would be happier than my own at seeing a settlement of the differences that still divide these two great countries, and no country is more hopeful that they will succeed for the good of all the peoples involved and for the future of the civilization to which they have both fallen heir.

Text of the Speech made by Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1116 held on 13 May 1964

The basic position of my Government on the Kashmir dispute is well known and I have at this stage nothing to add on this topic. Since the Council last discussed Kashmir, certain developments have taken place in the sub-continent which ought to be taken into account.

My delegation expressed the view on 10 February 1964 [1090th meeting] that the first step towards finding common ground between India and Pakistan should be that both India and Pakistan should restore normal conditions and inter communal harmony in their two countries, and forthwith undertake talks on their communal problems, with a view to preventing further outbreaks.

We note with very great satisfaction that a meeting between the Ministers for Home Affairs of India and Pakistan has been held to this end, and that a further meeting between them is planned in order to resolve points left outstanding at the earlier meeting. My Government attaches the greatest importance to these meetings of representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan as a means of reducing dangerous tensions on the subcontinent. As the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, said in a statement in the Indian Parliament on 13 April 1964: "There is other way for India and Pakistan to live except to live at peace."

The second development since the Council last met is that Sheikh Abdullah has been released, and has been having discussions with Mr. Nehru and other Indian Ministers in Delhi. We note that in his statements he also has laid great stress on the prime necessity of restoring amity between India and Pakistan as neighbours in the subcontinent.

Time is required for the constructive developments to which I have referred to yield their results. We therefore believe that the Council should content itself with encouraging the parties to continue the consultations which are in train in order that an honourable solution, satisfactory to the peoples of India and Pakistan, including, of course, the people of Kashmir themselves, may be reached. If at any stage they believe that a degree of outside assistance would be helpful, my delegation would urge the parties to consider the possibility of engaging the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

The Kashmir dispute remains of concern to the United Nations as a whole, but if the parties most directly concerned, including the people of Kashmir, reach a mutually acceptable conclusion, it will have the whole-hearted endorsement of my Government and, I would expect, of the Security Council.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1116 held on 13 May 1964

After an interval of one and a half months, the Security Council is again considering the Kashmir question, which has been included on the Council's agenda at the request of the Government of Pakistan.

Members of the Security Council have repeatedly heard the positions of the parties, as set forth in the statements by the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Bhutto, on 5 May 1964 [1112th meeting] and by the Indian Minister of Education, Mr. Chagla, on 7 May 1964 [1113th meeting]. We have also heard more statements by a number of members of the Council.

As we said in our statement to the Security Council of 14 February 1964 [1091st meeting], the Soviet delegation is compelled to note the absence of any essentially new circumstances since the last discussion on this subject.

If, however, one takes the balance of the Security Council discussions about the differences between India and Pakistan, it is unfortunately only the obvious fact and on which we have heard the members of the Council agree, that the further exchange of statements is by no means helping to resolve these differences, but is needlessly exacerbating them. In other words, this again confirms the position which the Soviet delegation has always firmly maintained and continues to maintain that the India-Pakistan dispute must be resolved directly by India and Pakistan through bilateral negotiations, particularly as soon as a normal and calm atmosphere has been created for such talks.

The Soviet Union's position of principle on the substance of the Kashmir problem has already been stated more than once by the Head of the Soviet Government, Mr. Khrushchev. As is well known, our position is that the question of the ownership of Kashmir has already been solved by the people of Kashmir themselves. The Soviet delegation recalled this in its last statement to the Security Council, on 14 February 1964.

Of course, if one is to be realistic, one cannot close one's eyes to the fact that there are differences and serious friction between Pakistan and India, particularly in connection with the Kashmir question. Unfortunately, many states still have to deal with the legacy of colonialist policy, when the departing colonists leave behind sinister relics of their well-known policy of dividing peoples and sowing enmity among them. Is it not clear that the India-Pakistan dispute is having an extremely bad effect on the lives of the peoples of this region? The people themselves, in both countries, are primarily interested in the creation of favourable conditions for the solution of their most important problems- the strengthening of their political independence, the development of their economies and the improvement of their living standards.

It therefore seems particularly important that, with regard to the questions which are the subject of dispute between the two States concerned, nothing should be done which might worsen relations between them or involve any deflection of their efforts from constructive goals. The Indian Minister of Education, Mr. Chagla, quite rightly pointed out, in his statement yesterday, the impossibility of forgetting that quite recently-only seventeen years ago the peoples of India and Pakistan were fighting side by side for their liberation.

It is therefore difficult to understand why, in his statement of 5 May 1964, the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan saw fit to say that there exists at present no truce agreement between Pakistan and India and that even a ceasefire between them could in present conditions be considered obsolete. Such utterances can only complicate the situation.

On the other hand, one idea expressed here by Mr. Bhutto is worthy of attention and support. He said that, precisely at this time "...a stage has been reached in the affairs of India and Pakistan which offers an unparalleled opportunity to both countries to open a new era of good-neighbourliness and constructive endeavours" [1112th meeting, para. 92].

It gratifying that, in his statement to the Council on 11 May 1964, the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan again confirmed his belief that "it is within our power to transform the climate of our two countries" [1114th meeting, para. 93].

One may also note with satisfaction-as did the Indian Minister of Education, Mr. Chagla-that India and Pakistan have already started direct discussions at the level of Ministers for Home Affairs, with a view to settling a number of questions of importance to the two countries. It can be seen from the well-known statement by the Pakistan Minister for Home Affairs, which has frequently been quoted in the Security Council, that already, after the first round of discussion by the two sides, 90 percent of the relevant matters in dispute have been settled. As is equally well known, these discussions are to be resumed shortly, during the current month.

We attach particular significance to this fact, which introduces important new elements into the existing relations between the two parties concerned. The fact that direct discussions have been started between those parties, on their own initiative, and have already led to an agreed solution of a number of important problems must be regarded as valuable progress, inspired by a correct understanding of the interests of both countries. In addition, it clearly demonstrates the unconvincing nature of arguments to the effect that at the present time some outside impetus is required for a settlement of the problems dividing India and Pakistan.

As the Indian Minister of Education, Mr. Chagla, rightly stated in his speech to the Council on 7 May 1964 [1113th meeting], the discussions between the Ministers for Home Affairs of India and Pakistan may, if successful, bring about an atmosphere conducive to the discussion of other questions. outstanding between the two sides.

Accordingly, the settlement of the points in dispute between India and Pakistan is in fact already on the right and, as experience is showing, the fruitful path-the path of direct bilateral discussions. It can be said with certainty that this approach to the matter is yielding positive results, because it promotes the interests of both countries, India and Pakistan, equally.

This being so, we find hope in the fact that, as this discussion in the Security Council shows, practically all members of the Council have explicitly agreed that the method of direct bilateral talks between India and Pakistan is the best and most promising method.

It is natural in these circumstances to assume that the efforts of members of the Security Council, and of the Council as a whole, will be directed towards making a positive contribution to the establishment of a propitious and calm atmosphere.

It is essential that the path which is acceptable to both sides, and on which they are in fact already proceeding, should not now be obstructed by any new factors. The Security Council cannot of course fail to take into account the well-known views of India, which were stated yesterday in the Council by the Minister of Education, Mr. Chagla, in the following words:

"If this Council is interested in the maintenance of peace and international relations, it should avoid any superimposed solution upon the two countries or any intervention in any talks or discussions we might have with each other." [1115th meeting, para. 35].

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation, the Security Council should do everything to promote the creation of a calm and propitious atmosphere for the bilateral discussions which are already taking place between India and Pakistan on a number of questions. This is its duty and its responsibility, since experiences shows that it is this path-direct discussions between India and Pakistan-which may lead to a solution of the questions still, unfortunately, dividing these two countries.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Plimpton (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1116 held on 13 May 1964

Three months ago, on 14 February 1964 [1091st meeting, the considered views of the United States Government concerning the Kashmir question were placed before the Security Council. These views I will augment only briefly.

The United States Government believes that the Security Council has a real obligation to contribute to the creation of as favourable an atmosphere as possible for the prompt and peaceful resolution of the Kashmir problem. We can do so by demonstrating our willingness to assist the parties to compose their differences in any way they may find helpful. My Government fully shares the views expressed here by other delegations as to the role of the Secretary-General, and we join in the belief that the Security Council should call upon him to assist the parties in ways which they may deem appropriate.

It is now for the parties to the dispute to come to grips with the substance of the issue and to negotiate in a sincere effort to reach a solution reasonably satisfactory to all concerned, with such assistance from the Secretary-General as may be useful. New developments in the area have pointed out the desirability of taking a fresh look at the Kashmir situation, and the necessity of renewed efforts to bring about a peaceful solution of the problem and of all other differences between them.

We also wish to encourage the continuation of talks between India and Pakistan on another of the urgent problems existing between them, namely the relations between the Muslim and Hindu communities.

We believe that the peoples of these two great countries desire to live in peace. Surely they are more aware than we can possibly be that the present state of affairs contains the seeds of tragedy for both countries. To the extent that the voice of friends can lend encouragement to their efforts to find some peaceful accommodation of their differences, let us say that now seems to be a propitious time to make a renewed attempt at reconciliation. Our concern is deep, and we wish them well.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Castrillo Justiniano (Bolivia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1116 held on 13 May 1964

In the course of a previous statement in this Council, we said, and we now repeat, that the delegation of Bolivia most profoundly admires and respects both of the countries involved in the matter which we are discussing, because of the tremendous contribution that both of them have made to the world's culture; and in view of that historical contribution we expressed the hope that they would succeed in solving their difficulties in an atmosphere of friendly understanding.

The Bolivian delegation firmly believes that the question of Jammu and Kashmir will not be settled simply by resolutions adopted by this Council, however well conceived they may be, but only through friendly and constructive talks between India and Pakistan.

During this debate, we have heard some statements inspired by a noble and healthy optimism, and others in which a certain skepticism engendered by the continuing nature of the factors which are aggravating the crisis could discerned. The Bolivian delegation does not wish to adopt either of those attitudes. It advocates a realistic view of the matter. Certainly, there are grounds for increased optimism, perhaps the strongest of which is the exchange of views between Prime Minister Nehru and Sheikh Abdullah which lasted two weeks, according to press reports. Although the results of these consultations are not yet known, it is to be hoped that they represent the start of an endeavour which will ultimately lead to the solution of this problem.

There can be no doubt that the efforts to reach a final solution must be encouraged with the interests of both sides in mind. The Security Council must not dictate decisions which might be rejected by one or other of the parties. We have learned from experience that, regardless of the amount of underlying goodwill, no resolution can be effective as long as the parties concerned are not disposed to accept it. We feel that the same consideration applies to the suggestion that the Secretary-General should offer his assistance in connection with the holding of bilateral consultations. Gation is convinced that the wise advice and cool-headed assistance of the Secretary-General would undoubtedly help to ensure that the conversations between India and Pakistan continued until a fair solution has been found to the question of Kashmir. We have the highest respect for the clear sightedness and remarkable talents of U Thant, and we have noted with great satisfaction that many of his endeavours have proved successful. For these reasons and because of the particular respect that we feel for the Secretary-General, we should like to emphasize that, in our opinion, he should accept the role which it has been suggested he should play in regard to Jammu and Kashmir, provided that this meets the wishes of the Governments of India and Pakistan and that they clearly express their agreement.

The Bolivian delegation stresses once again that countries such as India and Pakistan, which were linked together in the past, should rather fight together for more noble causes, for peace and progress, through proper economic and social development.

Mr. President, I wish to forgo the interpretation into French and English, as I am entitled to do under the relevant rules.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Vejvoda (Czechoslovakia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1115 held on 12 May 1964

When the Council discussed the India-Pakistan question, which is now on our agenda, in February 1964, all of us shared the possibility of learning in detail the present state of the problems as well as the points of view of the two parties concerned. The Czechoslovak delegation studied all the aspects of the problems which might come up for consideration, and came to the conclusion that the substance of the dispute existing between the two Asian countries which were so close to each other resides in the remnants of the past. Speaking on the character of the disputes between India and Pakistan and on the possibility of their solution, our Ambassador, Mr. Hajek, declared at the meeting of the Security Council on 14 February 1964:

"...it can basically be regarded as a relic of the problem created for the people of the Indian subcontinent by the former colonialist regime, this dispute can be settled only by these people themselves." [1091 st meeting, para. 26.]

The method of peaceful solution of disputes among States, in particular of such disputes as have remained as a sad legacy of the defeated colonial system, has been increasingly put to use in modern times and has become firmly rooted in international practice. This trend has been particularly strengthened since the presentation by the Soviet Union of the draft treaty on the peaceful solution of territorial disputes which received a favourable reception and positive support all over the world, and above all by the absolute majority of the Member States of the United Nations. On various occasions we meet an increasingly growing opinion that the solution of existing disputes through direct negotiations among the States question offers the best way for the liquidation of this legacy of the past.

We are aware of the fact that this method requires a good deal of patience, perseverance and goodwill. A number of minor problems may be very delicate and complex. However, if a sufficient amount of goodwill appears on either side, if factors producing unnecessary difficulties are removed, if a sincere wish to reach understanding and mutual harmony prevails over intolerance and hostility, then even the most complex problems may be solved in a satisfactory manner. An example of such an approach may also be seen in the question on our agenda. This question has recently produced some factors which added further to our belief that the final solution of the rest of the questions in dispute between India and Pakistan has made a good and hopeful start. A favourable factor has doubtlessly been the liberation of Sheikh Abdullah in accordance with the decision taken by Indian authorities on 8 April 1964. In connection with that, a suggestion has been submitted to consider whether the Council should use the procedure provided for in article 39 of the provisional rules of procedure. We studied that suggestion and weighed all its aspects. We have come to the conclusion that the use of that procedure would not be appropriate.

We consider it very important that India and Pakistan, since our last talks, have continued their discussions at a high and responsible level. We have been informed that those discussions will be resumed during the course of this month. The Minister of Education, Mr. Chagla, in his statement in the Security Council on 7 May, mentioned the report by The Pakistan Times of 25 April 1964. He said inter alia:

"The Pakistan Home Minister said that in spite of serious obstacles the meeting of the Home Ministers was quite a success, as the two Governments succeeded in settling about 90 per cent of the points necessary to restore communal harmony and peaceful atmosphere." [1113th meeting, para. 44.].

Discussions actually took place; they were not unsuccessful, and that is why they were continued. That is also what the majority of the members of the Council had in mind during the negotiations in February. We consider direct discussions on questions in dispute, without conditions one way of another, between India and Pakistan to be the only useful and beneficial way. It does not seem to us that, for the time being, the strengthening of favourable conditions for the discussions could be helped if the Council urged a third element to be included in the bilateral negotiations. The parties to the problem have entered into negotiations, and they will continue their discussions in a few days. They themselves know best the substance of the problems, and that is why they alone can find the best solution. We are not impatient. We believe that in future they will be even more successful than ever before.

To ensure a successful continuation of negotiations, the parties concerned have to promote a favourable atmosphere in regard to the actual situation. It is not possible to omit all historical aspects as well as consequences of the recent political development. We proceed from the fact that within the scope of the constitutional arrangement that enabled the will of the Kashmir population to be expressed, the question of the home rule position of Kashmir has been solved. In this connection I should like to recall the statement made by our Prime Minister at a Press conference in Calcutta on 14 April 1958. When asked by a correspondent, our Prime Minister answered inter alia :

"I consider the Kashmir question to be settled. It was done so in accordance with the will of the Kashmir people. I regard Kashmir as an integral part of the Republic of India."

It will be to the benefit of world progress and will strengthen international security and peace if, in the area concerned, the forces that stand firmly on the position of peace, freedom, and independence of nations, as well as of peaceful coexistence are further strengthened, and a peaceful solution of disputes is consistently promoted. We believe that the strengthening of those forces is also beneficial to the proper development of the people of the Indian subcontinent, for whom the Czechoslovak people have always maintained very friendly relations. The Czechoslovak people sincerely wish that these relations be promoted in the future as well.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Bernardes (Brazil) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1115 held on 12 May 1964

During the Council's debate on the question of Jammu and Kashmir in the month of February 1964 [1092nd meeting], I had the opportunity to present the views of my Government on the substance of the matter now under consideration by the Security Council. I shall, therefore, refrain from restating the position of the Brazilian Government since it has not changed in the time that has elapsed between last February and today. I shall limit myself to noting with satisfaction that talks between the Home Ministers of the two countries directly involved have taken place and are scheduled to continue. Although no definite answer to the many problems that confront India and Pakistan in relation to Jammu and Kashmir has yet been found, it is encouraging that direct negotiations between responsible Cabinet Members of the two Governments have been initiated and that the Home Minister of Pakistan has been able to say that a substantial measure of agreement has been reached.

We are particularly pleased with these developments since we firmly believe that a final and lasting solution to this fifteen year old problem can only be found by the parties themselves taking into account the wishes of the people of the area which is the object of our attention. I do not mean that the United Nations, and the Security Council especially, do not have an important role to play. On the contrary, I believe that the Security Council has already discharged its duties in relation to the question of Jammu and Kashmir in a way that is conducive to a fair and just settlement of the issues and I trust that it will continue to do so. The present situation, however, requires, in our view, that the United Nations exert what I might call friendly pressure on the two Member States in order that they may set aside, difficult as it might be, the emotional attitudes to which the long and protracted dispute has given rise and employ their statesmanship to explore all possible avenues of agreement so as to bring to an end this most natural litigation.

It was also with hope that we learned of the release of the Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, and the ensuing talks between him and the Prime Minister of India. To say that we fervently desire that these talks may come to fruition would be an understatement. According to reports which have appeared in the press in the last few days, a number of very interesting suggestions have been put forward by Sheikh Abdullah. Although I would not by any means comment on their merit at this time, I welcome them as an indication of the serious and constructive way in which these conversations are being held.

These recent developments demonstrate that a realistic approach is perhaps beginning to emerge. In spite of the fact that, in my view, there is no substitute for direct talks in the present case, the parties should keep in mind the fact that the United Nations, through its twenty years of existence, has developed and polished the best available international machinery for the settlement of disputes. They should bear in mind that this well-oiled machinery is at their disposal at all times and can be set in motion at a moment's notice. Moreover, the Secretary-General, as the head of the United Nations Secretariat, is especially well qualified by his background and his personal knowledge of this complex issue to assist both India and Pakistan whenever they themselves request that assistance. U Thant enjoys, deservedly, the trust and confidence of the two great Asian nations. Both the representative of India and the representative of Pakistan have stated, either publicly or privately, that he is welcome to visit their countries whenever he deems it opportune to do so and that, during his visit, he would be at liberty to go wherever he pleased and to talk with whomever he wished to talk. If the Secretary-General, in his wisdom, should consider that a visit to the two countries might be helpful at this juncture, I am sure that, in his capacity as the principal servant of the United Nations, he would undertake to inform, either privately or openly, the members of the Security Council of the situation as he sees it. He might also present any suggestions he might have as to the ways and means of achieving the peaceful and orderly solution so greatly desired by all.

The Council would act wisely, in our view, if, upon concluding this round of talks, it would empower its President to recall some of the positive new elements that have arisen since we last met, to express the fervent hope of all the members for a prompt and fair settlement of the Jammu-Kashmir question, and to remind the parties of the availability of the Secretary General's assistance and the United Nations machinery to aid them in their endeavours.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hsueh (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1115 held on 12 May 1964

We have so far heard two statements each, from Pakistan and from India, during this resumed debate on the Kashmir question. All of them were forceful and well-documented statements in support of the positions respectively taken by the two parties. They are helpful to the members of the Security Council in that they further clarify the many points at issue in this question. My delegation has studied them with all the attention they deserve.

We feel somewhat disappointed because the statements, taken together, have not presented to the Council a picture much brighter than what has obtained in the past, rather they resemble in tone and in many points of substance those statements made by the two parties earlier this year when the communal disturbances in India and in Pakistan seriously strained their relations.

It appears that a good deal of the suspicion and the mistrust between the two neighbours still remains. We had been expecting a more favourable atmosphere during this debate, for in the interval between the last session of the Security Council and the present one there have been, in the view of my delegation, some hopeful and encouraging developments here. I refer first of all to the subsiding of the communal disturbances. The situation in India and in Pakistan, though not yet completely normal, has become much calmer. There has been a discernible improvement in this respect since the Security Council last considered the question in February and March 1964.

Secondly, as referred to by the Minister of Education of India in his statement last Thursday, initial contact has been made for direct talks between the responsible officials of India and Pakistan. This is certainly an important move which, if continued, will help solve impending difficulties and generally improve the relations of the two countries.

Then of course there is the release of the Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Abdullah, which occurred a little over a month ago. It is reported that, in his recent talks with leaders of India, Sheikh Abdullah has made suggestions for a solution of the Kashmir question. This, my delegation ventures to think, is also an important positive element in the situation.

All these events appear to my delegation to be signs indicating a turn for the better. It is the hope of my delegation that the debate here in the Council will not only reflect such a trend, but also create an atmosphere conducive to more favourable developments. It ts only in this way that the Council can be helpful in this dispute, deadlocked so long. I am sure that both India and Pakistan have come to the Security Council with the Kashmir question not just for a debate but for a settlement. One common. denominator is that the prolonged dispute over Kashmir is detrimental to the interests of both parties.

The Minister of Education of India, in his statements, has referred repeatedly to the armed attacks on India's eastern border. It is only too obvious that India would have been in a much better position to meet such attacks had the Kashmir question been settled. I should like to add that India will not be the only country in the area to be threatened by such a perilous danger if the situation created by the Kashmir question should be allowed to continue for exploitation by aggressive forces. It is most deplorable that armed attacks coming from China, as mentioned by the Minister of Education of India, should have occurred. China and India have lived peacefully as neighbours for centuries. The Chinese people have always cherished the long history of peaceful relations with India, characterised by mutually beneficial exchanges in trade and in culture. There may have been disputes in the past between the two countries; there was never any armed conflict until recent years. This is another evidence of the fact that the militant, warlike regime imposed on our people on the mainland provinces of China does not represent their will and their civilization.

The position taken by the Security Council on the Kashmir question is well known. All its relevant resolutions. are in the books. The Council has been consistent in all these sixteen years in holding that, in the absence of an agreement between India and Pakistan, the question cannot be solved without regard to the principle of self-determination. While the Council must uphold the principle, it cannot impose a solution which is not acceptable to either of the two parties. Within the framework of the resolutions of the Council and, above all, the principles of the Charter, the modalities by which a settlement may be effected could be discussed for agreement between the parties. Adjustments could be made to meet the changes in the conditions throughout these years and to accommodate the different views of both parties.

Therefore, the Council should urge the two parties to take advantage of the recent favourable developments in the situation and make further efforts to improve their relations. The Council should also call upon them to resume negotiations at the earliest possible date, with a view to arriving at a mutually agreeable settlement in accordance with the spirit of the Charter and with due regard to the United Nations actions.

My delegation agrees with what has been said by the previous speakers about the role which the Secretary-General may be persuaded to play in helping in the search for a solution to the question. I wish to recall my statement made at the 1012th meeting of the Council on 15 June 1962 when I made mention of the possible help from the Secretary-General. My delegation feels that the Secretary-General, coming from a country neighbouring both India and Pakistan, is in a special position to have intimate knowledge and appreciation of the intricacies of the problem. At an appropriate time the parties concerned may very well avail themselves of the services of the Secretary-General.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Nielsen (Norway) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1115 held on 12 May 1964

For the third time this year the Security Council is debating the India-Pakistan question. In our view there can be no doubt about the seriousness of this question which is straining relations between two great neighbour States and which involves the fate of more than four million inhabitants of the former state of Jammu and Kashmir, an area of strategic significance.

The former sessions of the Council this year took place against a background of communal uprisings and violence in both countries, leading to bloodshed and loss of human lives. This time the Council is meeting after new developments have lead to a definite improvement of the situation. I am aware that this assessment may appear optimistic or even unrealistic against the background of some of the statements made to the Council by the parties during this session. The facts which nevertheless make me believe that the situation has improved are the following. Both parties in the dispute have taken strong action to put an end to the communal uprisings and violence, and no major outbreaks of communal riots have occurred in recent months. This development, in our view, is a tribute to the sincere desire of the parties to improve relations between themselves. Furthermore, in accordance. With the desires expressed by a number of members of the Security Council at earlier sessions, the matters have reopened discussions on ministerial level.

Another important step has been taken with the release from prison of one of the most prominent spokesmen of the population of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah. My Government sincerely welcomes this conciliatory gesture. The talks that are now taking place between the Prime Minister of India and Sheikh Abdullah have greatly strengthened our belief that a peaceful and amicable solution can be found to the question of Kashmir.

It remains the view of my Government that a solution. to the Kashmir question will prove to be durable only if it is satisfactory to the population of Jammu and Kashmir. Furthermore, its main features must also be acceptable to both States involved in the dispute, that is to say acceptable to India as well as to Pakistan. We do not believe, however, that the Security Council should proceed in any manner that could be interpreted by the parties as a prescription for a particular solution. It is our view that in the present improved circumstances the most constructive role for the Security Council would be to consider what encouragement and assistance it can render to the parties in order that they may utilise vigorously the more promising circumstances now prevailing.

We have noted as yet another positive element the fact that both parties during the present session of the Council have stated that the way to overcome their differences is to be found in negotiations or conversations between them. Admittedly, they have also stated their differences concerning the procedure and scope of these conversations. In these and in other regards where the need may arise the parties would, in our view, benefit greatly from having recourse to the impartiality and wisdom of the Secretary-General. We have no doubt that he will be prepared to help and be in the best possible position in this regard, as both parties have repeatedly stated their confidence in him. If 2ndwhen the parties deem it appropriate and useful, the Secretary-General could also be of assistance in providing the good offices of a country or a statesman that would, of course, have to be acceptable to both parties.

We also believe that the Security Council ought to renew its appeal to the parties concerned to refrain from any action or attitude which could lead to a renewed tightening of relations between them.

I would finally venture to express the hopeful view that a new and more promising stage has been reached in this tragic dispute that divides two great nations. Naturally, the Council will remain seized of the question. It therefore appears to us that the Council should be kept informed, as appropriate from time to time, of the progress achieved towards a settlement as well as of further assistance the two parties may desire if the need arises.

With your permission, Mr. President, I would waive the interpretation of my statement into French, it being understood that this will not create a precedent.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Usher (Ivory Coast) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1115 held on 12 May 1964

After the theft of the sacred hair of the Prophet. Mohammed, which gave rise to the demonstrations and clashes. between the Moslem and Hindu communities, first of Kashmir and later of India and Pakistan, the world was suddenly and understandably shocked at the emergence of a conflict and a problem already sixteen years old yet still unsolved, in spite of the useful attempts made by the United Nations to bring the two parties together.

So tragic and threatening for peace in that part of the world were the developments following this incident, this joke in bad taste, that on 3 February 1964 [1087th meeting] and subsequently on 17 and 20 March 1964 [1104th and 1105th meetings] the Security Council met at the request of Pakistan. We know what part the Council has played in this matter in its anxiety to avoid a crisis.

Having heard the statements of the parties concerned more violently, unfortunately, than before-my delegation, in taking the floor today, wishes to express satisfaction at the results we have achieved regarding the protection of minorities and the reassurance of the masses. These results are doubtless meagre compared with the basic problem underlying the incident of the stolen hair, namely, the problem of the peaceful coexistence of the Indian and Pakistan peoples and, more particularly, the problem of Jammu and Kashmir which deeply affects this coexistence and calls for a solution acceptable to both parties, bearing in mind above all the wishes of the Kashmir people.

This was the aim of the invitations to negotiate which formed part of the general agreement reached during the recent meeting devoted by the Council to the question. My delegation recognizes, of course, that for all the goodwill expressed by both India and Pakistan and the relative calm of their populations, the basic problem remains, as is pointed out above, but it seems reasonable to believe that though the situation as it now stands has undoubtedly not ceased to be a matter of concern for international security, it should nevertheless be kept at government level. For now that the unbridled fury of the masses has given way to diplomacy based on United Nations recommendations, the immediate dangers of conflict are less apparent, and my delegation believes that since the Council has thus fulfilled its peaceful mission, the parties should resume negotiations with a view to finding a solution acceptable to both sides-at any rate in conformity with the best interests of the people of Kashmir.

Negotiations would be facilitated by the co-operation of influential persons and political and spiritual leaders of Kashmir, which, as the main interested party, should be a constant point of reference in the inevitable give-and-take as the negotiations proceed.

In this respect, we feel that in the light of new facts, a solution along these lines should be sought by the Security Council before it is in a position to take a definite stand on the problem. In other words, it should confirm the results of the negotiations if they are successfully concluded on the basis of the recommendations already mentioned, which require the parties to take into account the interests of the peoples of Kashmir in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. When we spoke just now of making use of new facts we were thinking of course of taking advantage of the situation arising from the release of the uncontested leader of Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah.

My delegation regards it as particularly fortunate that the Sheikh was released in the present circumstances, and that after eleven years of captivity he has approached the problem with considerable realism, without passion or bitterness, but always hearing in mind the interests of the people of Kashmir, the vast majority of whom he still represents, to judge by the welcome he was given on his return to his country. Since his release, Sheikh Abdullah has been negotiating with the Prime Minister of India, working unremittingly, as himself puts it, on certain proposals which might constitute the basis for a solution acceptable both to India and to Pakistan and Kashmir. Nor did he decline the invitation extended to him by President Ayub Khan to visit Pakistan. In other words, he might perhaps be able to play a role in this conflict in which a country is the stake.

Here, within the Security Council, apropos of similar disputes between neighbouring States, my delegation has tried briefly to define for purposes of reference the underlying aim of the international policy followed by the Government of the Ivory Coast. It was, we said, the indefatigable search for good neighbourliness, the a priori acceptance of the good faith of any partner in negotiations, and the solution of disputes by diplomatic means which is binding upon Member States under the United Nations Charter.

My delegation feels that the general criteria underlying these fundamental principles apply aptly to the present stage of the problem of Kashmir which divides India and Pakistan. Statements by Presidents, leaders and politicians of India and Pakistan lead us to believe this, for they are all based on an unquestionable desire to seek a peaceful and just solution to the dispute through bilateral negotiations.

Indeed, despite certain displays of feeling still perceptible, the outcome of a very natural pride, the chances of success for such negotiations are undeniable. In saying this, my delegation is not closing its eyes to the difficulties which will undoubtedly have to be overcome at the outset. It recognizes that for one reason or another the resumption negotiations may not be spontaneous or that there may be certain psychological difficulties. Similarly, during the negotiations, an obstacle may arise and threaten to bring them to an end.

In this case, in the opinion of my delegation, we should avoid hasty recourse to the Security Council, for the ensuing debate would become highly inflamed and would merely accelerate the breakdown of the talks or make it a certainty. In order to avoid such an eventuality, my delegation feels that the Council would be very wise to entrust a certain role to the Secretary-General. His wisdom, his balanced judgement, his experience of the matter-qualities which have won him the unanimous admiration of us all as Members of the United Nations should be placed at the disposal of our two friends, India and Pakistan at difficult moments during their negotiations.

Thus, my delegation strongly advocates that the Secretary General should ease the way for the resumption of negotiations and their successful conclusion, if necessary.

In the light of all this, and having already noted the favourable developments in the long-standing dead-lock between India and Pakistan over Kashmir, what can we put forward by way of conclusion ?

To sum up, it seems to us that the Security Council, at the conclusion of this debate should give due weight to the new development referred to above as an additional factor in the case.

On this basis, the delegation of the Ivory Coast suggests that the Council should reiterate to the parties concerned its initial recommendations for a resumption of negotiations with a view to finding a solution which is just, honourable and in conformity with the interests of the Kashmiri people. Also, the Security Council should request the Secretary General to assist, if necessary, in the resumption of the negotiations, their progress and their successful conclusion in case of difficulties. These are the reflections which my delegation felt it should put forward at this meeting on the dispute involving Jammu and Kashmir.

Bearing in mind the meagre headway made up to now in the attempts to settle this problem, recalling the sad memory of the repeated scenes of bloodshed which this dispute has so often provoked, and placing above all else the fundamental interests of the people of Kashmir, whose considerable history of tragedies has in many ways been complicated and aggravated by this unfortunate opposition between the two sister States of Pakistan and India. My delegation unreservedly supports frank and friendly bilateral negotiations with the authorised spokesmen of Kashmir brought in to reconcile the views. It may well be that where there has been intransigence and incomprehension there will be flexibility and success and that everything will conspire to enable India and Pakistan to achieve what we called in this Council, in other circumstances, the inevitable and logical conclusion of their development, namely, good neighbourliness and friendship, to which they are insolubly bound by a long common history.

My delegation believes that an improvement can be brought about in the relationship between India and Pakistan and it considers that the Kashmiri leaders, who are the main interested parties, could help to bring it about.

Text of the Speech made by Mr, Benhima (Morocco) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1195 held on 12 May 1964

In considering the India-Pakistan question, there are many factors which might lead the Moroccan delegation to approach the debate today with some scepticism; never has any problem held the attention and interest of the Security Council for so long or so frequently. It may not be one of those anomalies of international life which were bequeathed to the United Nations at its birth, but it does constitute one of the most distinctive threads in the fabric of its history; it is still one of the Organisation's main preoccupations, and having already taken on all the earmarks of a chronic crisis, it may well become-if it is not already so to some extent-the bitter proof of the limitations of the United Nations. Yet the permanent members of the Council and the representatives of more than thirty countries who have successively assumed the responsibilities of Council membership since 1948 have gone on steadily, exerting tremendous efforts and exhausting all the resources of their countries' political genius and of their personal talents and experience. My delegation, in approaching this question for the second time in the Council, does so in the awareness that the delegations which preceded it are entitled to compliments and its gratitude.

Solutions hitherto were sought and found in a judicious balance between historical, political and legal considerations. Principles genuinely based on the United Nations Charter provided the foundation for the spirit and the terms of the resolutions successively adopted on this question, and the acceptance and reaffirmation of these resolutions by both the interested parties constitutes an acknowledgment of the Council's fairness and objectivity. The reason why we-the third generation, as it were, of the Council since 1948-are now required once more to take up the question if not because of any shortcomings on the part of the Council but because, unfortunately, the principles established for its settlement could not be applied and the continuance of discord between the two parties prolonged the dispute and cast doubt upon the authority of the decisions already taken.

It goes without saying that Morocco would have been much happier not to have to deal with a conflict between two countries whose friendship and excellent relations with Morocco have constantly been in the forefront in its dealings with and interests in Asia.

Nor is this in any way arbitrary. The struggle of the Indian subcontinent was one of the movements which directly nourished the liberation movements, not only in North Africa, but wherever the drive for freedom was at that time still timid and hesitant. The radiance cast by a man like Gandhi had its reflection in the lives of many leaders and influenced the will of many peoples, who are indebted to him both for the virtues of struggle by pacific means and for strength of purpose in winning their freedom.

Together with Mr. Jawaharlal Nehru, however, one of Gandhi's intimates was Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, who although brought up in a different spiritual environment, trod the same heroic path in friendship and solidarity with the master of India and his best disciple.

To other liberation movements, this community of hope and action between the leading figures of the two main spiritual families of India was both a symbol and an example of what national unity should be, irrespective of dividing lines of ethnic or religious origin.

On the day when India and Pakistan became free, many leaders and militant youths in my own country suffered prison or exile, perhaps for the first time, because of their participation in demonstrations to which that great event has given rise in countries still seeking sources of inspiration for their future action.

That the subcontinent unfortunately paid the price of partition for its freedom was a cause of grief which, undoubtedly, all its children have not yet stifled. We also note that, unfortunately, they have not bound up the wound.

So many of the present friends of India and Pakistan were unable at the time either to take action to prevent the tragedy or to intervene in the years immediately following to correct the aberration or to limit its consequences.

The principles on which India based its internal structure and its external policy were to cast their aura over the world in the same way as the philosophy which underlay its struggle. Thus my country sought to strengthen its ties with India from the very first months of its independence, to stand with it internationally in support of the same policies, and to base its action on the same values-the defence of liberty, the right of peoples to self-determination, devotion to the United Nations, peaceful coexistence and international cooperation.

These principles have become a credo in the African Asian family, and constant fidelity to them has become a criterion by which to judge the sincerity and independence of its members' policies.

We, like India, have built up our friendships, on our own continent and elsewhere, not on the basis of identity of political systems or adherence to one ideology, but on mutual respect and a common purpose underlying international action which at times is differently inspired. Together with India, we have defended our mutual friends at the cost of repeated misunderstandings and difficulties which, in some cases, have seriously affected our respective national interests.

In recalling these facts, my purpose is to reaffirm that friendship and cooperation with India remains a fundamental and unchanging part of our policy. The Government of India has received assurances of this on various occasions, and I wish to reaffirm it today to the delegation headed by the Minister of Education, as it was reiterated by His Majesty the King of Morocco and the members of his Government to the two. delegation which recently paid visits of friendship to my country.

However, while we repeat this assurance because it is in keeping with our complete adherence to the series of intangible principles to which I referred a moment ago, it will scarcely come as a surprise to the Indian delegation when I state in this Council that we adhere with the same constancy and fervour to the principles of the Charter and, of course, to resolutions adopted by any United Nations organ with respect to any problem, whenever such resolutions scrupulously reflect the provisions of the Charter.

My delegation is proud to follow in the footsteps of a number of representative of the African-Asian family who have unflinchingly viewed their responsibilities in the Council as being to uphold, not in an emergency but at all times, the values and principles which alone confer on the Council its moral and legal authority. While it may at times be clever to set these principles lightly aside, it is always more honest, although sometimes more difficult, to renew them with sincerity. On several occasions, the Council adopted resolutions on the problem now before it which had the merit, not only of providing a possible solution, but also of being solemnly accepted by both the parties involved; it was confidently left to them to implement the resolutions in a framework of cooperation and mutual willingness to find, by peaceful means, a solution to a tragedy that inflicted equal suffering on both their peoples, though neither of them in fact bore the initial responsibility. I am not convinced that time has robbed these resolutions of their validity. My fear is rather that time may have affected the excellent frame of mind of the two parties and that the frequent confrontations before the Council may have further prolonged this dispute and introduced new features into it.

My delegation was greatly saddened to find the statements of the heads of both the Indian and the Pakistan delegations raised points relating to religious antagonism or differences of foreign policy. I am not convinced that it can be in any way helpful for the Council, in appraising the specific problem brought before it, to allow itself to be led into areas where individual liberty and the free choice of foreign policy by both sides scarcely concern it.

I am sure that the Indian Minister of Education will believe me when I say that my delegation has never, either here or elsewhere, attributed any importance whatsoever to the religious component of the problem, which may perhaps. shed light on some of its aspects but which cannot in any way alter the fact that this is a territorial conflict bequeathed by the authors of partition to the two States which they set up. The Pakistan Minister for External Affairs knows that His Majesty the King of Morocco recently repeated to the Pakistan delegation visiting my country that our responsibility in the Council, if it is to remain objective, must transcend emotional or subjective elements, which must be eliminated from such a conflict at all costs.

Unfortunately, we find some degree of fanaticism among the defenders of any cause, even when the antagonists are atheists, and violence in fratricidal struggles is often more extreme than between hereditary enemies.

Religion cannot explain how a quarrel takes place when politics is powerless to solve the problem in dispute. Just as I do not doubt the Indian people's tradition of tolerance and reaffirm this to the representative of India, who is custodian of its spiritual greatness and its moral virtues-neither do I doubt the respect which even the most ardent Pakistan militant has for the Indian, who is still, in more ways than one, his brother..

The Council has heard arguments on both sides concerning the validity of the friendships or alliances chosen and entered into by Pakistan and India, now or in the past. Here again, analyses and judgements of the parties concerning their foreign policies cannot be taken as positive contributions to the Council's own analyses or judgements. The relations which India has deemed fit to maintain with its immediate neighbours, on the Asian continent and outside Asia, in order to consolidate its independence and accelerate its development, and the friendship or assistance it enjoys today from any given group of Powers in order to safeguard its territorial integrity, may have different repercussions in the various capital cities. In any event, the freedom of India is vital to the world to which both we and India belong.

If, however, Pakistan has deemed fit, at a specific moment in its history, to have recourse to a type of assistance capable of securing it against an attack the possibility or imminence of which Pakistan alone could gauge, and if it is now offered a policy of good neighbourliness which may lessen its fears, the safeguarding of its freedom in a new context of international relations is just as precious to us as before. So far as the Council is concerned, the freedom of both parties is an intrinsic part of international peace, which is our responsibility.

The Moroccan delegation would have wished to find, in the arguments expounded in the Council, more that would help us either to go further along the lines of the Council's earlier decisions or to chart a new course which might be acceptable to both parties and might lead them, either alone or with such assistance as might be desirable, to a peaceful settlement of this most unfortunate conflict. If the resolutions laboriously arrived at and adopted by the Council have proved inapplicable in practice while the conflict itself was moving towards a deadlock, if the advice and assistance of mutual friends have been unable to break through the rigid stand which the parties seem to have assumed in recent years, and if the search for a solution by the parties themselves, in direct discussions, has been equally unproductive, the council is nevertheless still responsible; and the importance of what is at stake, both to the two parties themselves and to world peace, is such that the Council must maintain its concern and its responsibility for ensuring that a final break between the parties or a long period of impotence on the part of the Council itself does not cause a conflagration in an area already unsettled enough. This would tend to spread outwards and jeopardise a balance achieved with difficulty in the Asian continent.

It is encouraging that both India and Pakistan continue to be ardent supporters of the role of the United Nations and of the quest for a peaceful and negotiated settlement. They both tell us that the higher interest of the population of Kashmir continues to be the sole objective of their policies. The will of the people of Kashmir can be expressed in various forms and by a number of procedures. Even on the basis of the present widely divergent positions, a further effort by the Council might be made with the collaboration of both parties, since neither of them closes the door to the possibility of a further attempt at bilateral talks, and these would not a priori exclude either the past findings of the Council or the current facts of a conflict constantly changing in character. However, such bilateral negotiations should likewise not exclude the Council's responsibility or its interest in their progress and in any results they might achieve.

The principle of direct negotiations would thus be preserved without the Council relinquishing its jurisdiction or washing its hands of a problem for which it has assumed responsibilities for the past sixteen years and must continue to assume them until it is finally settled.

The Secretary-General has given us proof on several occasions of his wisdom and skill. The moral authority attaching to his office and his person and the advantages of the direct and discreet contacts which he can make encourage my delegation to suggest that the Council should once again, subject to consent, call upon those attributes to help the two parties to resume direct negotiations-on mutually agreed bases in the course of which the Secretary-General could both been equally unproductive, the council is nevertheless still responsible; and the importance of what is at stake, both to the two parties themselves and to world peace, is such that the Council must maintain its concern and its responsibility for ensuring that a final break between the parties or a long period of impotence on the part of the Council itself does not cause a conflagration in an area already unsettled enough. This would tend to spread outwards and jeopardise a balance achieved with difficulty in the Asian continent.

It is encouraging that both India and Pakistan continue to be ardent supporters of the role of the United Nations and of the quest for a peaceful and negotiated settlement. They both tell us that the higher interest of the population of Kashmir continues to be the sole objective of their policies. The will of the people of Kashmir can be expressed in various forms and by a number of possible procedures. Even on the basis of the present widely divergent positions, a further effort by the Council might be made with the collaboration of both parties, since neither of them closes the door to the possibility of a further attempt at bilateral talks, and these would not a priori exclude either the past findings of the Council or the current facts of a conflict constantly changing in character. However, such bilateral negotiations should likewise not exclude the Council's responsibility or its interest in their progress and in any results they might achieve.

The principle of direct negotiations would thus be preserved without the Council's relinquishing its jurisdiction or waits hands of a problem for which it has assumed responsibilities for the past sixteen years and must continue to assume them until it is finally settled.

The Secretary-General has given us proof on several occasions of his wisdom and skill. The moral authority attaching to his office and his person and the advantages of the direct and discreet contacts which he can make encourage my delegation to suggest that the Council should once again, subject to consent, call upon those attributes to help the two parties to resume direct negotiations-on mutually agreed bases in the course of which the Secretary-General could both lend his advice and assistance to the parties and inform the Council as to the progress of the negotiations and the results to which we hope they might lead.

If the Council should feel that such a suggestion is acceptable, my delegation would be quite prepared to consider, with the other members of the Council and in collaboration with the Secretary-General and the two parties, the possible form and scope of such a mission.

Morocco is not prepared to admit-whether as a friend of Pakistan and India and a member of the same African-Asian family or as a member of the Council that events n. ust alwaysbe stronger than human goodwill.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Stevenson (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1091 held on 64 February 1964

So much has been said on the Kashmir case in this Council over the past sixteen years that I shall not impose on the Council's patience by reviewing the case again.

It is a matter of the greatest regret to my Government, as it is to so many Governments here represented, that India and Pakistan have been unable to reach a settlement either through

the mechanism set up by the Security Council or in bilateral talks, and that this dispute continues to occupy so much of the time of the international community. We are also profoundly concerned with the recurring communal disturbances in India and Pakistan which have caused such appalling loss of life, destruction of property, displacement of people and human misery. It is hard for us to understand why these two countries have not found it possible, during all of these years of bloodshed and of violence, to take joint action to calm this situation, to allay the suffering, and to stem the panic and migration of thousands of frightened human beings. Until there is a far greater effort to resolve these problems, they will continue to threaten the integrity and the prosperity of both countries.

I should like today to review the essentials of the approach which my Government has taken, and continues to take, toward this everlasting question of Kashmir. The origin of the dispute is complicated and deeply buried in the history of the great subcontinent. But, in 1948 India and Pakistan agreed to the resolutions of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan as a political compromise of the difficulties which followed from the partition of the subcontinent into two countries and the ensuing dispute over the status of Kashmir. The essence of this compromise was that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should have the right to determine their future without coercion or intimidation by the military forces of either country. Our support of the United Nations resolutions is based on this principles of self-determination. The political compromise has not been fulfilled, and so we have seen no progress, only further embitterment of relations between these two great countries.

Throughout the history of this issue, it has been the desire of the United States to do what it could to compose the differences between two friends. In doing so, we have started from the point of agreement between them, because it was an equitable compromise based upon the sound principle that the people whose political affiliation and national status were subject to dispute have the right to express their will. We continue to support this principle as providing a sound basis upon which a political compromise of the dispute between India and Pakistan can be achieved through peaceful means.

If India and Pakistan are genuinely desirous of composing their differences, which is a prior condition of any political compromise, a fresh attempt must be made, in light of today's realities, to see how the basic principles can be applied to achieve such a political settlement. India, and indeed part of the very area in dispute, is under threat of Chinese Communist military attack. For this reason, as well as because of our long-standing concern that the Kashmir question be peacefully resolved, we urged bilateral talks between the parties last year. While these talks did not bring agreement, neither were they useless. Exploration of disputes through negotiation is a fundamental principle of the United Nations. It is the only way agreement can be achieved, short of imposition by force. An agreement cannot be imposed from outside.

We recognize that the legitimate security interests of both India and Pakistan involve intricate internal problems of law and order and political consent. However, the international community has a right to expect of these two great and ancient countries what we expect of all members of the United Nations community, and that is a diligent and unrelenting effort to resolve their differences peacefully through negotiations. It must be recognized by both countries that the problem of Kashmir cannot be settled unilaterally by either party. It can only be settled, as I say, by agreement and compromise, taking into account the free expression of will of the people concerned. The United Nations was created to assist Member States in this regard, and its resources are available to help the parties in the search for a solution. Friends of both countries also stand ready to help.

Given the history of efforts to resolve the issues between India and Pakistan in the past, my Government believes that the two countries should consider the possibility of recourse to the good offices of a country or a person of their choice to assist them in bringing about the resumption of negotiations and in mediating their differences. My Government also suggests that the Secretary-General might be of assistance to the two countries in exploring the possibility of such third party mediation. There has already been some progress toward bilateral talks on the communal conflict and the migration question.

I hope that the two nations may now resume their efforts to agree upon this first step towards finding a firmer basis for communal harmony and dealing with the problem of refugees.

These suggestions are accompanied by the earnest hope of stimulating these two Members of the United Nations to make a new approach in a new and urgent effort to resolve their differences. These problems are not susceptible of quick solution, we know only too well. My Government has no illusions on that score. But a fresh start must be made, and Pakistan and India have, we believe, a responsibility to their own peoples, to the people of Kashmir and to the world community to set these issues on the road to final solution for the sake of humanity and of peace.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Castrillo Justiniano (Bolivia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1091 held on 14 February 1964

The delegation of Bolivia has listened very carefully to the statements made in the Security Council by the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan and the Minister of Education of India on the dispute between the two countries regarding the legal status of the peoples and territories of Jammu and Kashmir.

My delegation realises that the Council is faced with an unduly complex problem, which cannot be reduced to a single factor. It seems that it was this complexity-due to all kinds of elements, including the most sensitive and primitive such as those of a religious nature-which has prevented the Council from intervening more forcefully since the problem arose fifteen years ago.

Nevertheless, however difficult or complex the problem may be, there is still hope that a speedy and suitable solution will be found. This hope is based on our confidence in the peaceful and conciliatory inclinations of the two countries involved. Both peoples have devoted all their energies and efforts to the most noble tasks undertaken by mankind in our time, and we all owe an immense debt to the ancient Hindu and Muslim cultures.

In recent years, we have seen India and Pakistan fighting boldly and equally strongly for the abolition of colonialism; we have found them ranged in battle against racial discrimination; we have seen them both searching for suitable ways to raise the social level of living of their peoples; and we have joined them in their campaign to ban violence as a method of political enforcement. Because of all this, we still have faith that, loyally responding to their most noble traditions, India and Pakistan will manage to overcome this crisis in their neighbourly relations.

The international conduct of Bolivia, which has always been based on the support and practice of methods of peaceful settlement, gives us the right to urge the Governments of Pakistan and India to strive for a direct understanding, for we have always supported all the efforts made here in the Council in that respect.

The delegation of Bolivia has at all times and from the beginning of this debate been pleased to follow the African Asian delegations such as those of the Ivory Coast and Morocco in their efforts to find an equitable solution to the problem under discussion.

My delegation doubts whether the adoption by this Council of a new resolution of the question of Jammu and Kashmir can lead to the goal to which we all aspire. In support of this attitude, it is sufficient to contemplate the results obtained in practice by previous resolutions of the Council. A resolution should be the result of a confrontation with the facts, which are constantly changing and creating new circumstances that must be considered. We are not doubting the value of the Council's resolutions; we consider their value indisputable, if it is analysed dogmatically; but none of this prevents us from looking at the facts to see whether or not these resolutions are operative. By comparing these factors, we shall see whether the resolutions clearly retain their original validity or whether, on the contrary, it will be necessary to seek new paths leading to a final solution of the problem.

In the controversy over Jammu and Kashmir, one thing seems certain to us: direct negotiations between both parties. have not been exhausted, and nothing can officially be done under the peaceful procedures provided for by the United Nations Charter until it has been announced that the two countries have nothing more to say to each other. What the Council is obliged to do in the present circumstances is to help. to create a propitious atmosphere in which such direct negotiations can be continued in an attempt to reduce the tension between the two Governments.

In order to attain this objective, it is essential to separate the positive from the negative aspects of the problem. For example, we could start by taking advantage of the parties' willingness, expressed in the Council by the representatives of Pakistan and India, to continue measures which ensure an atmosphere of peace and prevent fresh outbreaks of violence.

The delegation of Bolivia warmly supports the motion put forward here in this Council at the last meeting to the effect that, from this high tribune of world peace, the Governments of India and Pakistan should be urged to analyse, in an atmosphere free of violence, the responsibility which they bear, not only towards other nations but towards their own peoples, for finding a peaceful solution so that Pakistani and Hindu can live in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and strive together to overcome the great problems confronting peoples and men that aspire to a better life in all latitudes of the world.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Fedorenko (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1091 held on 14 February 1964

Mr. President, at the request of the Government of Pakistan, the Security Council is again examining the question of Kashmir. In the letter dated 16 January 1964 from the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council it was stated that an immediate meeting of the Council was necessary "to consider the grave situation that has arisen in the State of Jammu and Kashmir" [S/5517].

The Government of India, for its part-as is clear from the statements made at the meetings of the Council by Mr. Chagla, the Minister of Education of India, and from the letter from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the President of the Council-holds that there are no grounds for the discussion of this question in the Security Council, and points out in particular that nothing has happened recently that even remotely supports "the Pakistan allegations about the existence of a tense situation and an atmosphere of crisis" [S/5522, para. 1].

India's well-known position is that from the legal and constitutional standpoint Jammu and Kashmir is and continues to be Indian Union territory. With regard in particular to the demonstrations in Kashmir expressing grief at the theft of a Muslim religious relic, the Government of India, as is known, has denied the assertion that India had anything to do with it.

We have heard the statements made by the parties to the dispute, setting forth in detail the positions of India and Pakistan with regard to the question now being discussed by the Security Council, and the statements made by the representatives of Morocco, the Ivory Coast, the United Kingdom, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and others. The fact is, it is rather difficult to find anything in the circumstances that makes them appreciably different from those described in the course of previous discussions of the Kashmir question to which, if our recollection is correct, the Security Council has devoted more than 100 meetings since 1948.

The Soviet delegation would first of all emphasise that the religious and communal discord which persists in India and Pakistan is a legacy of the past, when hostility was deliberately kindled by the colonisers, who pursued an infamous policy of "divide and rule" in order to enslave the peoples and keep them in colonial servitude. Recent events both in India, where Muslims have suffered through the exacerbation of religious and communal discord, and in Pakistan, where Hindus have been persecuted, demonstrate once again the need to overcome that discord as quickly as possible and to put an end to that legacy of colonialism. The coloniser's policy of kindling animosity questionably does great harm to the interests of both the Indian and the Pakistan people. Attempts to heighten passions over differences in religious beliefs between some of the peoples of India and Pakistan can serve only those who even today would like to see the peoples of Asia torn asunder, those who seek to gamble on the unsettled state of relations between India and Pakistan, in the pursuit of interests which have nothing in common with the aims of preserving peace and friendship between peoples.

In the context of the Council's discussion of the India Pakistan dispute, attention should be drawn to the appeal made by President Radhakrishnan of India to the President of Pakistan for joint steps to prevent further religious and communal incidents. In his letter of 16 January 1964 addressed to the President of Pakistan, the President of India expressed concern at such incidents, which and I quote-"not only poison the relations between our countries''-that is, between India and Pakistan-"but affect the lives of millions of persons who seek nothing but to live as good citizens in their respective countries" [S/5522, annex I, para. 9]; and as a first step he proposed that an immediate joint appeal should be made to the peoples of India and Pakistan to live harmony. peace and

The fact that the Security Council is again obliged to revert to consideration of the Kashmir question confirms once more, in striking fashion, the correctness of the conclusion that territorial disputes, the problems of frontiers, and unilateral or mutual claims of States to each other's territory most often give rise to dangerous friction between countries in different parts of the world. For this very reason Mr. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government, addressed to the Heads of State of the countries of the world, at the end of 1963, a message proposing the conclusion of an international agreement providing for the renunciation by States of the use of force for the settlement of territorial disputes or boundary questions.

In that message Mr. Khrushchev pointed out that many young sovereign States which recently won national independence have inherited from the colonial regimes a large number of artificially embroiled border problems. Indeed, a glance at the map of the world today will show scores, if not hundreds, of districts, sovereignty over which is disputed by various States on the basis of arguments and considerations relating to history, ethnography, blood affinity, religion, and so forth. Unfortunately, these disputes occur not only between scholars but also between States possessing armed forces, in some cases quite large. Hence in the majority of territorial disputes there is a danger that relations between the parties will become aggravated, a danger of armed conflict which may constitute a threat to peace throughout the world.

It is a highly pertinent fact that the border conflicts and territorial disputes between some Asian countries are having a very adverse effect on the lives of their peoples this at a time when it is most important for the peoples of the Asian countries, including both India and Pakistan, to raise the level of their economy, lay the foundations for a modern industry and attain a higher level of living. Surely it should be clear that this calls for tremendous efforts and, above all, for peace and tranquillity on their borders. In that connexion, Mr. Bhutto, the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan, rightly observed in his statement to the Council [1087th meeting] that the peoples of Pakistan and India had won their freedom in order to fashion their lives with the dignity and self-respect, free from privation and fear, to remove the sufferings that their peoples had endured since human memory could recall.

I am bound to say that, when territorial disputes and border conflicts between Asian States not only exist but sometimes assume aggravated forms, those States are compelled to maintain and even increase their armed forces, thus using their resources in an unproductive manner. This can scarcely be said to benefit the peoples of countries which have recently thrown off the colonial yoke.

As to the substance of the Kashmir problem, the Soviet Union's position in principle has, as we all know, been repeatedly stated by Mr. Khrushchev, the Head of the Soviet Government, and by the representatives of the Soviet Union here in the Security Council chamber. The position of the Soviet Union is that the question of Kashmir's belonging to India has already been decided by the Kashmiri people.

The Soviet delegation is firmly of the opinion that the India-Pakistan dispute should be settled directly by the parties concerned-India and Pakistan-and, of course, exclusively by peaceful means. The parties to this dispute are themselves capable of taking steps to relax the tensions which exist between them. We should like to point out, with special emphasis, that this requires a calm and normal atmosphere.

Mr. Chagla, the Minister of Education of India, in his statement to the Council on 5 February [1088th meeting], stressed in particular that India would continue to work towards amelioration of its relations with Pakistan and that those relations should be based on friendship, equality, co operation and mutual respect, as between two friendly and neighbouring countries. He expressed the conviction that the peoples of India and Pakistan wish to live in peace and friendship.

With reference to the steps which should be taken in the current situation, Mr. Chagla observed that the passing of resolution of the Kashmir question by the Council would aggravate rather than improve matters. He said that the first thing was to restore normal conditions in the disturbed area of India and Pakistan and to bring about inter-communal unity and harmony in both countries; the Government of India, he added, would welcome a meeting of Ministers from India and Pakistan to discuss ways and means. Secondly, Mr. Chagla called upon Pakistan to declare unequivocally along with India that the two countries would never resort to war and would settle all their differences by peaceful means. He stated in that connection that India welcomed Mr. Khrushchev's proposal for the renunciation of the use of force for the settlement of territorial disputes.

The Soviet delegation views these considerations with understanding, and feels that they reflect a healthy and realistic approach in keeping with the interests of both parties and of peace in Asia and throughout the world. We should like to hope that the examination of the India-Pakistan dispute by the Security Council, the United Nations organ responsible for the maintenance of peace and international security, will be so conducted as to make for the establishment of conditions in which the parties directly concerned-India and Pakistan-can settle their dispute themselves by peaceful means. The Soviet delegation also expresses the hope that, in the course of the consultations in progress aiming to an appropriate outcome of the discussion of this question in the Council, all parties will adopt a business like approach and seek a solution with will be in the interests of keeping the peace and reducing tension.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Seydoux (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1091 held on 14 February 1964

I shall naturally not go over the past history of the problem which has again come before the Security Council. The numerous debates in previous years, and very substantial statements made here by the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan and the Minister of Education of India, have given the Council as much information as was possible. However, I will stress the seriousness of a situation which for the past seventeen years has been a source of concern to the many friends of India and Pakistan. France is one of these; it sets great store by this friendship, which is of value to it and indeed to the whole world. For the two countries which are divided by the question of Kashmir are the repositories of a very old civilization, of a great culture and of religions which throughout history have helped to strengthen the spirit of tolerance.

The very structure of these countries, in which very many peoples of very different races and customs live side by side on the same continent, should provide an increasingly interdependent world with a model of true coexistence. India and Pakistan have often set us an example in that respect; they are still doing so in most of their territory. They should both know that our dearest wish is that this action, carried on despite so many trials and difficulties, should be brought to a successful conclusion. Without a final settlement, is there not a danger that action may fail in its results for the whole of the subcontinent? Have the recent disturbances, and the statements we have heard here, not confirmed what a chain reaction of violence might be set off on both sides of the frontier by disturbances at any locality?

Neither country can believe that, if the situation deteriorates, only the other party would suffer from the disorder of a conflict involving not merely two countries so closely linked but the actual communities composing them. Both would be deeply shaken, and the world would witness a disturbance of balance which could have very serious consequences. It is, indeed, the fragility of this balance that worries us. In order to strengthen it, not only the symptoms but the causes of the evil must be treated. Moreover, the treatment must be gradual and must respect the feelings and beliefs of all. Developments in recent years have shown, on another continent, that it was possible to effect a sincere rapprochement between two nations previously divided by an age-old struggle.

In the matter before us, the task of understanding and conciliation in which the Council has again agreed to participate undoubtedly requires an effort to discard prejudices, to revise judgements that are no longer realistic, and to go beyond encouraging but insubstantial utterances-in other words, to lay the foundations for a true settlement of the problem at issue. For it cannot be over-emphasized that, in questions affecting the very existence of States, the passage of time, far from facilitating the search for a solution, often makes it more difficult.

I should like here to pay a tribute to the action taken in this spirit by those of my colleagues, particularly my African colleagues and you yourself, Mr. President, who for the sole benefit of peace and international cooperation took the initiative of trying to find common ground between the two theses which have been put to us.

My delegation has no doubt that it is in this direction that we must advance. We believe that only the restoration of an atmosphere of understanding, and the resumption of the dialogue, can promote a settlement which all desire if, in the search for this settlement, the past action of our Organisation, the wishes of the peoples and the legitimate interests of the two countries are, as important factors, taken into account.

However, it is quite certain that this hope would once again prove unfounded, despite all the authority with which the debates of the Security Council are invested, if the two Governments concerned were not moved by a sincere and resolute determination to give substance to it. I know of no better way to conclude than by expressing the wish that, once this debate is finished, they will re-establish contact in the spirit of the ideas put forward by the Council and that they will not hesitate, if they feel it necessary, to have recourse to the procedure of good offices, in order to facilitate the solutions which we all await.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hajek (Czechoslovakia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1091 held on 14 February 1964

We have carefully studied the documentation submitted to the members of the Security Council in the letters addressed to the President by the representatives of India [S/5522] and Pakistan [S/5517]. We have also heard and then read the statements by these representatives in the Council. In our view, an analysis of these facts and positions reveals nothing that could basically alter the nature of the dispute or that brings to it anything substantially new.

We are considering a dispute and even a conflict between two large States, important Members of the United Nations a dispute and conflict between two country which are closely linked geographically, between peoples who are ethnically very close to if not identical with each other and have over the past centuries been united by a historical process in which they co-operated in the creation of a civilization and culture whose rich artistic forms and depth of thought are still the admiration of the whole world, between peoples who were also united in a more recent past by their resistance and courageous struggle against invasion, foreign occupation and colonial oppression.

In the life of the people of the Indian subcontinent, recently divided between India and Pakistan, there are certainly more elements of unity than of discord, if we consider geography, history, language and race; even in the matter of religion, the disappearance of several minorities-Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan-should in this context be a unifying factor rather than a source of conflict.

Yet the situation today is quite different. It has just been described to us in speeches, and we have noted reports which speak of hundreds and even thousands of victims and myriads of refugees, following bloody incidents during disturbances between communities.

In my delegation's view, the paradox of this dispute can be explained only by the fact that the dispute is a relic of the recent past. The history of the conflict, as described in the documentation before us, shows that it is closely connected by a causal as well as a temporal link-with problem of the partition of the Indian subcontinent. Without wishing to get involved in historical considerations and analyses, we should note the preponderant role played by the former colonial Power in this process, and we shall then see that the so-called question of Jammu and Kashmir is one part or one aspect of the complex problems created by the colonial regime-problems which persisted after the end of that regime and have confronted the peoples that had liberated themselves from its hold.

In this regard, India and Pakistan constitute no isolated case. In several instances, similar problems have arisen problems created and perpetuated by occupying or dominating foreign regimes all over the world. Take, for example, the disputes and conflicts between certain Latin American countries during the nineteenth century, after their liberation. To some extent, even the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe had to struggle, when the empires collapsed after the First World War, with the relics of those empires which hindered their development and often involved them in territorial or ethnic disputes with each other. To a greater and more varied extent, these same problems recur in the life of the peoples of Asia and Africa, with the collapse of the colonial system on these continents. Mostre atibul The peoples then embark on a course of independent development, starting by playing an important role in the formation of the new world, and find themselves up against huge obstacles which often had their origin in the past, at a time when not only their countries' administrative frontiers but important decisions on every aspect of their lives were dictated, not so much by the desires or needs of the indigenous population, or of its natural ethnic units or entities, as by the interests of the colonial regime and of those who benefited from it. In all the past cases in which these problems were the source of conflicts that were often bloody and tragic, and in many cases today, it seems to us that it was and is for the peoples themselves, first and foremost, to liberate themselves from these relics of foreign or colonial domination, instead of remaining its slaves.

We believe that these peoples, which have displayed so much courage in the struggle for their liberation, are also fully capable of displaying wisdom, political foresight, moderation and tolerance in their mutual relations in order to rid themselves of the vestiges of colonialism, to solve the problems peacefully and to establish a relationship of mutual friendship, trust and cooperation. Of course, the path to these solutions is not always easy to find.

Our Government and people draw upon their own historical experience and knowledge to obtain a complete picture of these problems of the world of today, their complexity, their importance and the responsibility of the international community and all its members with regard to their solution. This is why we insist on the principle that such disputes should be settled exclusively by peaceful methods. Replying to the proposal of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev, concerning the peaceful solution of territorial disputes-which has already been recalled here and quoted, together with some other replies the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Mr. Novotny, stated inter alia.

"In the modern world, there are a large number of territorial disputes conditioned by complex factors of a historical, ethnic or geographical nature, the aggravation of which would constitute a threat to peaceful relations among nations. The cases where an evil heritage has been bequeathed by the colonial Powers to the new States form a special group. I agree with you that one cannot simply ignore all territorial problems and act as though they did not exist.

"Today the position is that all frontier disputes between States can be settled exclusively by peaceful means and by negotiations, with proper respect for the facts of the modern world. This is the only practical way in which the needs and the desires of the peoples can be satisfied."

It is also along these same lines that, in our view, the resolution of the current drama of the India-Pakistan dispute must be sought. Since it can basically be regarded as a relic of the problem created for the peoples of the Indian subcontinent by the former colonialist regime, this dispute can be settled only by these peoples themselves. It is true that disputes and conflicts between brothers are often the most bitter, marked as they are by emotion and passion. However, only these brotherly enemies can and must end them without any outside intervention which would merely complicate them and delay, is not prevent, their solution.

Our people has great sympathy for the peoples of the Indian subcontinent, deep admiration for their great culture which is imbued with a humanitarian and pacifist spirit, for their ancient and modern history and for the struggle they have carried on to liberate themselves from colonialism. We do not forget that the leaders of this struggle clearly and unequivocally showed their sympathy and solidarity with our country in the difficult times it went through in 1938, when so many old friends in the West forgot their friendship. We recognize the important role played by these peoples in the efforts made, after the Second World War, to keep the peace among nations.

From the outset we have had excellent relations with India, and we are glad that in recent years we have developed favourable and happy relations with Pakistan. This makes us all the more anxious that disputes between these two States should be settled in a peaceful and amicable way by these two countries themselves.

What should be the position of the Council in the solution of this dispute? It has often been recalled here that it is not the first time the Council has had to consider this question. There are no essentially new elements in this problem. We therefore agree with those of our colleagues who see no reason to make a new examination of the legal and political arguments of the two parties. It is not that our delegation hesitates to take a stand. We have done so in the past; our stand is well known; but we do not want to reiterate it, because we think it would serve no great purpose to engage in a discussion which could not lead us to a solution that, as we have said, only the two parties acting in concert can reach.

The role of the Council should be to help and encourage the two parties to embark on peaceful negotiations. These parties have shown, we feel, that they are capable of embarking on this peaceful course; and although their exchanges of views are somewhat pointed and often impatient, we note with some satisfaction and hope that, at least to a certain extent, they are always receptive and ready to take the path of negotiations. We think that, by helping and encouraging the two parties along these lines, the Council would be respecting Article 33 of the Charter. Since the problem is complex and delicate, we agree with the preceding speakers who said that they did not believe it was appropriate for the Council to pass judgement on the matter by an ex cathedra decision in other words, to adopt a resolution.

In appealing to the goodwill, spirit of understanding, political wisdom and human responsibility of the two parties and trusting their maturity and realism, we think that we should not qualify this appeal by introducing controversial questions which, from the outset, would even at this stage constitute obstacles to holding of negotiations.

This is why our delegation has doubts about the idea of resorting to the mediation or good offices of another State or of a personality. Naturally, such mediation could prove useful, but it should come only as the result of prior agreement which could be reached by the two parties in the course of these negotiations; and even this understanding and an ensuing decision should be a matter for the two parties alone. We therefore believe that our action, which would of course be taken by agreement of all the members of the Council and in a form acceptable to both parties, should consist in an appeal to the parties to take steps to restore an atmosphere of moderation and re-establish harmony between the communities so as to prevent any recurrence of acts of violence. We should invite the two countries to resume their negotiations for a peaceful settlement of their disputes, and we should facilitate the opening of such negotiations. All the rest should be the task of the two parties themselves-a task which my delegation hopes the Council will do its best to facilitate through general agreement.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Nielsen (Norway) in the Security Council Meeting No 1091 held on 14 February 1964.

The Security Council has now been seized of the India Pakistan question for more than a decade and a half. It is a matter of deep regret and concern to the Norwegian Government that relations between these two great neighbouring countries remain strained. The public statements to the Council by the representatives of India and Pakistan have served to remind us of the deep-rooted distrust between the two countries and, as it was described by one of the previous speakers, "the apparently complete incompatibility of the public attitudes taken by the two parties to the Kashmir dispute" [1090th meeting, para. 93].

The seriousness of this conflict between the two neighbouring nations has been underlined by the fact that only recently communal uprisings and violence have occurred, not only in Kashmir itself, but also in India as well as in Pakistan, This has served to remind us of the deep emotions which are engaged on both sides. We in Norway are impressed by the magnitude of the problem as emphasised again by both parties through the fact that the fate and emotions of hundred of millions of people in fact, one sixth of the population of the earth are involved.

My country is reminded of the long and sad story of this item in the records of the Security Council was actively seized of the India-Pakistan question when Norway last served on the Council fourteen years ago. To us the basic features of the Kashmir question have not changed in these years. The core of the problem is still the political future of the former State of Jammu and Kashmir of British India. The resolutions adopted over the years by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan have not been rescinded or abrogated; they therefore remain valid and represent the views expressed by the United Nations on the problem. To us the question of Kashmir clearly has an important international aspect, since two great nations, both Members of the United Nations, are directly involved.

From these basic facts we derive the following general conclusions that a final settlement of the Kashmir question must be satisfactory of the population of Jammu and Kashmir, and that, likewise, the main features of the settlement must be acceptable both to India and to Pakistan.

The statements by the representatives of India and Pakistan to the Council have underlined the differences, and it may seem a hopeless task to try and bridge this gap and strive for a solution on the basis I have just outlined. On closer examination of this situation we believe, however, that we have seen some signs which may encourage the Security Council to try a new approach aimed at reconciling the parties. For one thing, both countries have deplored the renewed outbreaks of communal violence. Further, both parties have stated and emphasised to the Council that they have taken strong action to put an end to the violence and the representatives of both parties have in their statements indicated a willingness in principle to find a common ground,. and thus generally to improve the relations between the two States.

The Norwegian delegation therefore believes that the present time should be propitious for renewed efforts to assist and to encourage the parties. We share the views expressed by a number of the members of the Council that the efforts should be concentrated on the reopening of direct negotiations on the outstanding questions, including the question of Kashmir, which is the question the Government of Pakistan has brought before the Council by the letter dated 16 January 1964 from the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the President of the Security Council [S/5517].

Actually, in the first half of 1963, as has been mentioned here on a number of occasions, the parties did engage in six rounds of such bilateral negotiations on a ministerial level. In order to facilitate the resumed negotiations and increase the chances of singling out the areas in which agreements are most likely, we believe that the two Governments will be well advised in seeking the good offices of a country or an outstanding personality enjoying the confidence of both parties. If assistance should be needed in arranging for effective good offices, the Secretary-General of the United Nations naturally comes to our mind.

I repeat, we are looking toward the resumption of negotiations between the two parties, in recognition of the fact that a solution of the outstanding problems is only conceivable when the parties agree. We do not expect the parties to renounce their claims or their views in advance of future negotiations, but we find it important and encouraging that of none of the parties in principle has rejected the idea of negotiations.

Far be it us to anticipate the results of such negotiations or to prescribe to the parties how to solve their differences. We do believe, however, that both parties will be well advised in recognizing that any settlement of the long standing question of Jammu and Kashmir which is not generally satisfactory to the population of the area can hardly be expected to last. We hope that the parties will pay due attention to the substance of this important consideration; the form of the efforts as well as the means employed to reach this goal peacefully appear to us, however, to be of somewhat lesser importance.

In conclusion, I would express the hope that it will prove possible for the Security Council to encourage the two parties to meet anew at the conference table. And again, the form of such encouragement of the Council does not seem so important as the political value in finding means to give unanimous expression to this desire of the members of this Council to see negotiations resumed at a peaceful settlement of the problems that now divide India and Pakistan.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Liu Chich (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1091 held on 14 February 1964

The Council is dealing with a question which has been on its books since the beginning of 1948. No other issue, I believe, has been the subject of so much debate in the Council with so little result. The passage of time has, if anything, only served to harden the positions of the disputing parties. On the one side, the council has been told that "the With equal Government and people of Pakistan are totally committed to the liberation of their Kashmiri brethren". force and finality, it has been maintained on the other side that "the question raised by Pakistan is purely a domestic matter, with which only India is concerned and in respect of which Pakistan has no right to intervene or interfere and which has been excluded under the Charter from the jurisdiction of the United Nations". The deadlock is thus complete.

It may be recalled that, when the Council was first seized of the Kashmir question sixteen years ago, it did not seek to impose a solution on the disputing parties. On the contrary, it took pains to ascertain the wishes of the parties in an effort to find common ground on which the structure of settlement might be built. It was on the basis of protracted consultations with the parties that the decisions of the Council were finally reached, and both parties solemnly pledged themselves to their implementation. This being so, it cannot be said that the Council's resolutions have now become obsolete and should be thrown overboard.

It is not the intention of my delegation to apportion blame or to determine where the responsibility lies. The fact remains that the dispute over Kashmir has persisted for some sixteen years and has once again manifested itself in communal riots and violence. Certainly, neither India nor Pakistan can allow the dispute to drag on as a festering sore at a time when the common security of the area is under constant threat of the dark forces of aggression which are ever ready to exploit the situation for their own ends.

My delegation refuses to believe that the positions taken by the representatives of India and Pakistan in the present debate are in fact as rigid and uncompromising as they appear. Indeed, they have both expressed their willingness to find a peaceful solution. This is a hopeful note. It is the clear duty of the Council, I submit, to explore the possibilities of bringing about a peaceful settlement.

I fully share the view that the precondition of a settlement is the creation of a climate of understanding between India and Pakistan. I believe that the historical ties existing between them should be strong enough to enable them to move ahead to restore inter-communal harmony and cooperation and to dispel the suspicion and mistrust which have so long poisoned their relations.

I believe that the train of thought embodied in the draft resolution that was considered by the Council in June 1962 is still useful. The Council therefore should once again urge the parties, possibly with the good offices of a third party, to enter into negotiations at the earliest possible date with a view to an ultimate settlement in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations and with due regard to the interests of all concerned. The sooner the question is settled, the better it will be for India and Pakistan, and indeed for Asia and the world.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1090 held on 10 February 1964

The statements which we have heard from the representatives of Pakistan and India have revealed yet again the complexities of the question now before the Council and the apparently complete incompatibility of the public attitudes taken by the two parties to the Kashmir dispute. This, I am afraid, was an outcome which my Government had expected. What we had hoped to avoid here was bitter accusation and counter accusation.

My Government's view on the settlement of the Kashmir problem was stated in the British Parliament in December 1956 by the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations in the following terms:

"Her Majesty's Government has always hoped that this dispute would be settled by agreement between the two countries. That is still their hope. Meanwhile, Her Majesty's Government will continue to support efforts to reach agreement which would give effect to the Resolutions of the United Nations."

This remains my Government's policy.

We are still convinced that a solution can emerge only. from constructive and sincere negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan. We are anxious lest public discussion in the Security Council should prejudice prospects for such sincere negotiation. Nevertheless, the problem of Kashmir has once more been brought before us.

In these circumstances my delegation believes that it is the clear duty of all members of the Council, and if I may say so, the delegations of India and Pakistan, to do our best to use this occasion for discussion and negotiation with a view to moving towards the settlement which has eluded the collective wisdom of the Security Council for fifteen years.

My delegation has therefore welcomed the efforts which we understand are being made behind the scenes to find common ground between India and Pakistan. We should indeed the well pleased if a fresh approach by such members of the Council as have spoken today, which have not previously had direct contact with the consideration of this question in the Security Council, should lead to the break-through that is so earnestly desired by all members of this Council, and should enable the negotiations towards which my Government has been working for many years to be undertaken on a basis that holds promise of a settlement.

What I have now to say, therefore, will be directed to making plain my Government's views on the status of Kashmir, to outlining action taken by my Government since the Security Council last met to discuss Kashmir in 1962, and finally to suggesting steps which in our opinion would help towards progress.

First, I wish to reiterate my Government's position on the status of Kashmir and on the question of self-determination. This was made clear most recently by our sponsorship of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 24 January 1957. According to that resolution, the Council:

"[reminded] the Governments and authorities concerned of the principle embodied in its resolutions of 21 April 1948, 3 June 1948, 14 March 1950 and 30 March 1951, and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations."

My Government stands firmly by the principles enunciated in that resolution today.

We consider it unrealistic to consider the status of Kashmir purely in terms of the legal effect of the Maharajah's instrument of accession. It is in our view impossible to leave out of consideration fifteen years of discussion in this Council and the decisions taken by it. In short, my Government does not accept the contention that no dispute now exists and that there remains in Kashmir nothing to be negotiated. Quite the contrary. A dispute does exist, which should be made subject of negotiation with due regard to previous Security Council resolutions and to the wishes of the people most directly concerned, namely the people of Kashmir.

I now turn to the action taken by my Government towards trying to find a solution of the Kashmir dispute in the period since the Security Council's last discussion of the matter in 1962. I need not explain to members of the Security Council why my Government has felt compelled to be active in this matter. The Council is well aware of our historical association with the problem and the ties of friendship and Commonwealth with both India and Pakistan, which make the continuation of this dispute between the two countries so distressing to my Government.

It will be equally clear to members of this Council and, I trust, to the delegations of India and Pakistan, that satisfactory permanent political defence and economic arrangements for the Indian subcontinent can never be reached until there is an agreed Kashmir settlement. My Government is, therefore, bound to regard this as the ultimate objective and constantly to seek ways and means of moving towards it. It was in this spirit, that my Government warmly welcomed the joint statement issued by Mr. Nehru and President Ayub Khan on 29 November 1962, which reads as follows:

"The President of Pakistan and the Prime Minister of India have agreed that a renewed effort should be made to resolve the outstanding differences between their two countries on Kashmir and other related matters, so as to enable India and Pakistan to live side by side in peace and friendship. In consequence they have decided to start discussions at an early date with the object of reaching an honourable and equitable settlement. These will be conducted initially at the ministerial level. At the appropriate stage direct talks will be held between Mr. Nehru and President Ayub."

We regarded this statement of intention as a major step forward and we followed the course of the ministerial meetings which were subsequently held with keen anticipation. 

There were in all six rounds of ministerial talks. Unfortunately, they came to an end on 16 May 1963 with an announcement that "no agreement could be reached". At this stage my Government reverted to the trend of thought which had been propounded in the Security Council in 1962, namely, that, in the face of the inability of the two countries to agree, some degree of outside assistance might help in the search for a solution.

The possibility of mediation was discussed during the summer of 1963 by the Indian and Pakistani and British Governments and we were encouraged when in answering a question about mediation at a press conference on 15 June, Mr. Nehru confirmed that his Government was prepared "to explore any avenue". Subsequently, however, the Governments of both India and Pakistan indicated that they did not consider the time propitious for further discussion of mediation.

There the matter rested until the autumn of 1963, when developments in Indo-Pakistan relations were once more brought to the attention of the Security Council by the Government of Pakistan. The subsequent course of events is familiar to all in this room.

Apart from the question of Kashmir, the delegations of Pakistan and India have touched in their statements to the Council on other subjects of contention between their two Governments, notably, the communal rioting in East Pakistan and West Bengal, and the problem of population movements between these two areas. My Government shared the profound regret expressed by both delegations at the outbreaks of communal violence, and welcomed the stern action taken by both Governments to put an end to them and to prevent their recurrence. My delegation is not qualified to comment on the genesis of these communal outbreaks. Equally we have not got sufficient facts which would enable a judgement to be made on the merits of the case relating to population movements.

To us, the most immediate and practical way of handling these sources of tension between the two countries is by representatives of the Governments concerned getting together around the conference table. We deplore anything that is allowed to stand in the way of such negotiations, while men and women are exposed to injury and death.

My delegation therefore welcomes the statement made by the representative of India, in the context of these problems, that his Government is prepared to take any and every step i cooperation with Pakistan and that it would welcome a meeting of Ministers from both countries to discuss ways and means. I explained my Government's position on the problem before us and the action which it has taken in the past eighteen months. to try to bring about a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.

I have stressed the fact that, now that meetings are taking place in this Council, we must all make every effort to find a constructive solution. My delegation welcomes the attempts being made by certain delegations to work for such a solution and we have no desire to complicate their efforts by laying down rigid lines of action which in our view should be followed However, I should like to suggest that the Security Council should bear two factors in mind.

The first is that the authority of this Council, which we are all here pledged to preserve, and the principles of the Charter, require that the decisions taken by the Security Council in the course of the last fifteen years should not be lost to view.

The second is that the passage of resolutions which are ignored by one of the parties takes us no further forward and has not in the past led to the constructive solution which all members of the Council, so I presume, desire.

The Security Council's attention should therefore be directed in the first instance to searching for common ground between India and Pakistan. The directions in which this common ground might be found appear to my delegation to be the following. First, both India and Pakistan should restore normal conditions and inter-communal harmony in their two countries and forthwith undertake talks on their communal and related problems with a view to preventing further outbreaks. If the two parties believe that the exercise of good offices in this connection would be helpful, my delegation suggests that the Security Council should stand ready to discuss this aspect. In the second place, India and Pakistan should be prepared to resume negotiations on Kashmir and, as necessary, other related matters.

In this connection I must emphasise that my Government's experience of the negotiations undertaken between the two countries in the course of 1962 and 1963 has convinced it that some degree of outside help will be necessary if satisfactory results are to be achieved. It is for this reason that we have favoured mediation, as both parties are aware from discussions we have had with them from time to time.

We realise that neither Government accepted this contention last August, largely on the grounds, as I said, that the time was not propitious, although our impression was that both agreed that mediation would be helpful at the right time. We now put forward for consideration the view that the extreme tension which characterises Indo-Pakistan relations at the present time, as reflected in the bloodshed of the last few months, renders urgent the need for a bold approach.

This, however, is a matter which we cannot press if it is not acceptable to both India and Pakistan. We shall therefore content ourselves with commending it to the urgent attention of both delegations. We suggest that they consider all possibilities in this regard, including that of engaging the assistance of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. In conclusion, I would say that much clearly bangs on the efforts now being made by certain delegations behind the scenes. Their willingness to accept this responsibility, in spite of the sorry history of the Security Council's past failure to resolve the Kashmir dispute, is admired by my delegation. We have no desire whatsoever to interfere with their efforts, but we wish them to know that they have our full support.

It will be clear, I think, from what I have said, that my delegation would be ready to give general endorsement to the form and content of the method of approach to a solution of this problem advocated at the end of his speech by the representative of the Ivory Coast.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Usher (Ivory Coast) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1090 held on 10 February 1964

The Security Council is meeting to discuss once again the so-called question of Jammu and Kashmir at the request of Pakistan.

In order to establish the facts of the problem as they now stand, we have before us the letter dated 16 January 1964 from the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan [S/5517] and the letter from the Permanent Representative of India dated 24 January 1964 [S/5522] informing us that the charges contained in the letter of 16 January have been dealt with in three previous letters from the Permanent Representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council.

It is clear from those documents and from the events. which have just been recounted to us that Pakistan is accusing the Government of India of violating the Security Council resolutions of 30 March 1951 and 24 January 1957, as well as those of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, by seeking to annex the part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which is held by India. In support of its argument, Pakistan refers to the legislative and constitutional changes [which the Indian Government is seeking to bring about.

Without, apparently, rejecting those charges, India replies that Jammu and Kashmir has been an integral part of India since 27 October 1947 under the British so-called Government of India Act of 1935, as amended in 1947. It is argued, therefore, that the question is a purely internal one.

The Security Council, alas, has had many opportunities to define its position. Its views are stated in well-known resolutions. We are not being asked to invalidate them, any more than we can be asked at this stage to prepare and indictment, to judge and to condemn. That would be futile; moreover, it is my delegation's understanding that our task is to take measures to bring about progress towards a just and honourable solution of the problem.

However, before dealing with the problem itself, my delegation would like to restate certain fundamental principles. First, we accept all the resolutions of the Security Council and we also recognize their dynamic nature; secondly, we reaffirm our devotion to the sacred principle of self-determination; thirdly, we also condemn racial and religious discrimination. That is the spirit in which we approach this debate, seeing for ourselves with great sorrow and regret the distressing results of the violence which has occurred and which cannot be explained away by reason of passion.

In view of the gravity of the question and the possibility of a deadlock in the Council, every possibility of settling the matter which comes to mind should be thoroughly explored and we must say at once that there is a glimmer of hope. This hope, which already existed in 1951 and 1957, has become a little dimmer in 1964 because the situation is so fluid. But it is still something to hold on to since, in the interest of peace, we must cling to some hope rather than give way to despair.

The peoples of Pakistan and India are one and the same people. For centuries they have lived on good terms side by side. There are Muslims in India and Hindus in Pakistan. Surely a Muslim is no different physiologically from a Hindu, a Christian or an atheist? And yet, whole communities rise up against each other and slaughter each other acts of madness which claim tens, hundreds and thousands of lives. The minorities are hostages; they live in constant insecurity which becomes more acute as relations between the two countries deteriorate. Neither the world nor the Security Council should accept this state of affairs. It has made the leaders of the two sister nation's sick at heart.

The President of India has asked the President of Pakistan to join with him in appealing to the people of the two countries to maintain peace and harmony. The President of Pakistan is also asking the Indian authorities to take effective measures to restore peace and order and to give the Muslim minorities a feeling of security once again.

We cannot fail to note the pathetic appeal made by the President of Pakistan to the President of India, which was read to us by the Minister of External Affairs of Pakistan, and I quote :

"By blaming and thus implicitly condoning communal killings and destruction in one country on similar instances in the other, we might unwittingly lend encouragement precisely to these evil forces which it is Government's duty to curb.... Let leaders in each country look into their own hearts and resolve to put their own house in order." [1087th meeting, pära. 70.]

It has been proved that the two countries are so closely bound together that nothing that happens in one can fail to be of concern to the other. It has been proved that each needs moral guarantee from the other in order to maintain peace within its own borders. Lastly, it has been proved if such proof were necessary-that the two countries are suffering morally and materially from this state of latent crisis.

Consequently, the immediate practical action open to us is to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan to establish the conditions for internal peace in their respective countries. For this they must do two things: first, restore climate of understanding between the two countries and peace and harmony between the communities by putting an end to the war being waged in the Press and over the air which can only foster hatred and exacerbate tensions between them with all the risks of open conflict inherent in such a situation; secondly, use the influence of the elected authorities and leaders to ease the minds of the people, particularly the majorities, and thus prevent a recurrence of violence and ensure the security of the communities.

We believe that if each party took those steps within its own territory it would be furnishing the best proof of its desire to seek a peaceful solution to the dispute we are considering. It must, however, be recognized that these are only tentative solutions, applicable only to the immediate present, and that Kashmir must cease to be a constant subject of tension in Indo-Pakistan relation-must cease to be the cause of internal disorder it has been since 1947.

The disinterested, neutral observer cannot but notice that any complication, any instability in Kashmir not only has an immediate effect on the relations between India and Pakistan,

but creates a feeling of insecurity in both countries.

My delegation is among those which believe that enough everything may have been said, tried and done in the matter, it is our duty, out of friendship for the two countries and in the interest of averting the threat to peace and security in that part of the world, not to sidestep the fundamental issue.

To that end, we shall begin with the statements of leaders whose words are to be trusted. In his speech of 26 January, on the eve of the national holiday, President Radhakrishnan, according to France-Presse, asserted his desire to bring about peace in the world and stated that in its relations with China and Pakistan the Indian Government was guided by the desire to reach a peaceful and honourable settlement of questions in dispute. In its letter of 24 January the Indian Government once again appeals to the Government of Pakistan to join with it to devise ways and means of bringing to an end the recurring cycle of such incidents and disturbances which were poisoning relations between the two countries.

The representative of India likewise reiterated before the Security Council that he believed in discussion, in the solution of differences by means of conferences, and he added: "... we will welcome Pakistan to sit with us and resolve our differences" [1088th meeting, para. 87].

All these admissions convince us of the possibility of a rapprochement. And that, in our view, is something we can work with. While it is true that throughout this long Kashmir episode we may sometimes have wondered about the underlying intentions of one party or the other, including these friends, we now feel that the statements quoted are in keeping with the methods laid down by the Heads of African States and Governments at Addis Ababa and proclaimed by them as doctrine in the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity: the ultimate purpose of dialogue is a positive result.

We would hope that Pakistan would react to that attitude with that constant concern for accommodation and that virtue of willingness to make concessions which it has shown ever since the problem of Jammu and Kashmir first arose. For that matter, Pakistan has not eliminated that possibility as a means of bringing the two countries to the inexorable and logical end of their road, namely, the good neighbourliness and friendship to which they have been destined by their long common history. Moreover, the Minister for External Affairs of Pakistan also stated in the Security Council: "It is within our power to find the means to live in peace, provided there is a will to live in peace." [1087th meeting, para. 97].

These statements in which the words "peace", "just", "honourable" are used again and again are in conformity with the Purposes and Principles, and in particular, with Chapter VI, of the United Nations Charter.

In the light of all this, we are tempted to ask India and Pakistan to resume negotiations, leaving it to them to seek the good offices either of a State or of some eminent person if they should feel the seed and the desire to do so. Of course, that solution does not fully satisfy the parties concerned. One of them is merely asking for an appeal to bring their mutual relations into harmony, for a negotiation of differences, and no more. The other considers our proposals too vague and wants us, in a resolution, to reaffirm the Council's previous decisions, the right of self-determination and mediation by the Secretary General.

The proposals of India and Pakistan are so far apart that they seem to be irreconcilable. The bonds of friendship between the Ivory Coast and both of those countries, and its solidarity with them within the framework of the African-Asian group, precluded it from siding with one against the other.

Nevertheless, we wish to discharge our responsibility as a member of the Council. We have been considering as one possible solution the proposals which a number of delegations with which we have been in contact since the beginning of our discussions of the subject have encouraged us to submit to the Council.

These proposals may be embodied in a resolution, or in an appeal by the President of the Council. My delegation would go along with a resolution if the majority of the Council so desired, but it preferred an appeal. We are therefore prepared to give full support to an appeal which would read as follows:

"The Security Council requests the two countries : (1) to re-establish a climate of understanding between them and to restore peace and harmony between the communities; and (2) to prevent the recurrence of acts of violence and to ensure the security of the communities.

"The Council calls upon the two parties to resume their negotiations with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement of all their differences, including the question. of Kashmir, taking into account past action by the United Nations and the wishes of the people concerned.

"The Council suggests to the two countries that they should have recourse, by agreement, to the good offices of a country or a person of their choice, if they consider it desirable to do so."

Those are the proposals which the delegation of the Republic of the Ivory Coast wished to submit to the Security Council.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sidi Baba (Morocco) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1090 held on 10 February 1964

My delegation has listened with particular attention to the statements made to the Council by the distinguished representatives of Pakistan and India.

Relations between these two great countries with respect to the thorny question we are considering have been highly unsatisfactory for a number of years, and this is indisputably one of the problems which causes my country most concern. My Government has very close relations with the Governments of both Pakistan and India, based on strong ties of brotherhood and friendship and on the lofty principles of Afro-Asian solidarity. As His Majesty the King of Morocco has said on various occasions, the principles, largely inspired by the thinking of great men like Gandhi and Prime Minister Pandit Nehru, constitute the guiding idea which underlies our concept of non-alignment and all our activities in the international sphere.

My country will always remember the effective help which these two great sister nations gave to our struggle for national liberation and the major contribution which they were able to make, after becoming independent, to the struggle carried on by the other peoples of Africa and Asia in the name of freedom and independence.

I also take pleasure in recalling here that it was in this same spirit of solidarity that my country, like so many others, fully supported India at the time of its decision to terminate Portuguese colonial rule in the enclave of Goa.

This being so, I need hardly tell you to what extent we, as friends, are affected by the repercussions of this acute crisis and how relieved we would be if the two parties to the dispute should one day reach a solution which was just and equitable and hence capable of giving satisfaction to all concerned, including the population of the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

In that way the two countries could, for the greater good of their peoples, inaugurate a new era in their relations, establishing a policy of good-neighbourliness and friendly and fraternal cooperation-a policy based, moreover, on a community of culture and civilization and on particularly strong bonds of Kinship. We shall not cease to hope and pray for this result.

In the interests of finding a solution to this grave problem and of limiting the scope of the crisis as much as possible, my delegation considers it highly desirable for the two Governments henceforth to refrain from taking any kind of unilateral action that might give rise to new complications or in any way call in question the decisions which the Security Council has already taken in agreement with the parties concerned and in the application of which they agreed, at one time, to cooperate.

We feel that, in the interests of peace and security in this sensitive part of the world, each of the parties to the dispute should do what is necessary to lessen the danger and bring about the "detente" which is essential if the problem is to be resolved by negotiation. That, in my delegation's view, is the minimum which, in the circumstances, the Council should ask for.

The gravity of the problem which the Council is now considering at the request of Pakistan is certainly nothing new. The stakes, on the other hand, seem recently to have assumed larger proportions as a result of intensive military and diplomatic efforts, and this, unfortunately, appears to have made the situation even more complex. Finally, there is the fact that time, instead of helping to decrease the tension, as might have been hoped at the outset, has served only to widen the gap between the two positions.

In these circumstances, we believe that the time has come for one and all to realise the danger which threatens peace and to weigh their full responsibilities. My delegation, for its part, is convinced that the statesmen of Karachi and New Delhi, because of the great moral and spiritual values. which they represent and which are built up of tolerance, justice and patience, will realise the advantages of discussion between them and will undertake the search for a peaceful solution to this problem with all the requisite zeal and energy. In this way they will spare their peoples the serious consequences of a tension which, despite all the efforts made by United Nations, has become permanent. At the same time they will eliminate the threat of a tragedy whose consequences, not only for their own countries but surely for mankind as a whole, be incalculable.

In this matter, involving as it does a conflict between two sister States, it goes without saying that many countries, including my own, would prefer not to take sides-considering it the part of wisdom and good sense for the common friends of Pakistan and India to do everything possible to enable the dispute eventually to be settled through peaceful negotiations in a spirit which is one of mutual concession and of conformity with the earlier resolutions. My Government's determination to leave no stone unturned in its efforts to help overcome the difficulties arising from this conflict is equalled only by our desire that the two parties should agree to sit down together and reach a solution based on respect for rights, including the right of peoples to decide their own future. It is interesting to note, indeed, that the parties to the dispute have on numerous occasions and in various circumstances defined, each as concerns itself, positions favourable to a formula which would permit the people involved to decide its own destiny.

In my delegation's view, it is only on this basis perhaps, that a valid and at the same time lasting solution can be found for this serious dispute which has, unfortunately, developed from a specific situation recognized by all as having given rise to serious controversy. Thus the two parties, assisted by all their friends and with the help of the United Nations, will succeed in terminating the existence of a problem that of the State of Jammu and Kashmir-which is so

prejudicial to all of us. They will thereby remove a source of tension which for more than sixteen years has been an obstacle to rapprochement between their two neighbouring countries.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Secialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

In its statement opposing the draft resolution the Soviet delegation explained in some detail the basic principles which led it to the conclusion that it would have to object to this resolution. Until the very last moment we had hoped that good sense and awareness of the need for objectivity would prevent the submission to this Council of a document which, as is now clear from all that has happened-and, if anyone had any doubts about it, was made quite clear by the statement of the United States representative-was inspired and prepared by the United States of America for purposes which have nothing in common with the tasks of maintaining tranquillity creating friendly relations and strengthening peace in the Kashmir region.

It is also now completely obvious-from the fact that Mr. Stevenson used a text worked out and prepared in such detail and having nothing to do with the subject under discussion that this whole "production" was well rehearsed and took place, so to speak, under the over-all stage-management of the United States of America..

Since I intend to confine myself to an explanation of the reasons why the Soviet delegation voted against this draft resolution, I shall refrain from assessing the political significance of this whole venture. However, the whole world can see that all this, including of course this draft which was presented to us here with pious words-all this is directed towards aggravating to the utmost the relations between the two Asian countries. I have already had the honour to tell the Council who it is who stands to gain by thus setting the two countries against one another-when I pointed out that what had been put to work here and was continuing to work at full speed was the ancient formula "divide and rule"-and drawing the corresponding political advantages from this division. I do not think I need to expound in detail who is doing this and for what purposes.

That is why we were deeply convinced that the adoption of such a decision would merely add fuel to the flames, merely heighten the tension prevailing in the region we are now discussing, merely aggravate the situation which has arisen there and about which both the Indian and the Pakistan Governments have fortunately declared that neither one of them would take the first step towards resolving this problem by force.

That is why we considered that all attempts preceding the submission of the draft, which originated in such peculiar circumstances, circumstances characterised by delays, postponements, and pressures first by the group of five which was working on it then by the group of three, then by two, then finally by one or two delegations (I directly assert that the United States Delegation intended to submit this draft today and removed its name from it at the last moment)-this whole operation, this exceedingly malodorous operation, could not of course lead the Soviet delegation to support such a draft.

This is my first observation, and I would confine myself to it, if I did not have a few words to say about the statement of the United States representative. What is that American magazine called Reader's Digest, in which one can find a ten page synopsis of Anna Karenina in which Leo Tolstoy's style is supposed to be preserved ? It was that kind of compilation, containing the complete works of Mr. Lodge from 1952 until the moment he left his post, that Mr. Stevenson unfortunately presented in this American type of condensed version. Mr. Stevenson had reasons which, of course, had nothing to do with the question under discussion and which cannot help to create a businesslike atmosphere in the Security Council.

I have, in one capacity or another, taken part in, or sat in at, most of the meetings of the Security Council at which the Soviet delegation used this Soviet veto, including fifty-one cases where it was used in connection with the admission of new Members to the Organisation. Let us begin with these fifty one votes, so that we can clear them out of the way.

It is obvious to every impartial observer that these negative votes by the Soviet Union were provoked by the refusal of the United States and its military allies, for reasons of favouritism and without any arguments or grounds whatever which might have found support in the Charter, to admit a number of States which, being responsible and qualified, were also eligible for membership in the United Nations.

Many of these countries are now fortunately represented in the United Nations and some in the Security Council as well. The United States and its allies had sufficient wisdom in the end, after many years (seven, eight, ten and more, and in the case of the Mongolian People's Republic, almost sixteen), and enough courage to vote for the admission of these States to the United Nations, and the impasse which had been created by the United States of America was immediately overcome.

I was a member of the Soviet delegation when these fourteen new Member States were admitted to the United Nations, and I must say that as soon as the United States removed its veto-the veto with which it had barred the admission of a number of new States without any justification -the whole matter was settled literally within the space of half an hour, both in the Security Council and in the General Assembly.

We all witnessed the final repercussions of this affair last year, when the question of the admission of the Mongolian People's Republic was settled and that country at last took its rightful place in the United Nations family after sixteen years of fruitless efforts-efforts which had been constantly frustrated by the political resistance and sabotage of the United States of America.

The right of veto in the Security Council is a sagacious provision, the cornerstone of the United Nations Charter. Without the right of veto it is not difficult to imagine what would have been the shape of many of the Security Council's resolutions, which would have meant success for the United States in its attempts to rule the whole world. But the real balance of power in the world is not such as to allow the United States to rule the world or to impose its will on other at least, on many of the States on this earth the United States tries to compensate for this lack of real power, such as would allow it to impose its dominion on the world, by making violent attacks here in the United Nations against the so-called right of veto.

We are of the occasions on which we use this veto in the interests of universal peace and security-on such occasions, many of which were recalled by Mr. Stevenson, as when we rightly supported India's position in the question of which was also accounted one of our sins by the

United States representative, or when we prevented or tried to prevent the policy of imperialist aggression in the Congo, and on many other occasions enumerated here.

I do not intend to go over this whole keyboard of Mr. Lodge's on which Mr. Stevenson gave us such a fine recital today-nor, indeed, is there any need for me to do so. There is no need to go over it in order to say that we have supported the principle of the Charter and the strengthening of the United Nations, and intend to go on doing so. We intend to vote in the Security Council only for decisions likely to promote the maintenance of international peace and security.

We are prepared neither to participate in nor to be passive witnesses of this completely unambiguous political game which has been played out here, at this meeting and at earlier meetings of the Council, in which the Kashmir question has been used to increase tension in the relations between two Asian countries and thereby to undermine international peace and security. We have never taken part and never will take part in operations of this kind.

I believe that neither Mr. Stevenson nor the United States Government has the right to pass judgement on the policy of the Soviet Union. This policy is well known to the peoples of Asia and Africa. However, we do not expect the approval of those who attempt to impose their own will or their colonial policy in such question as Goa, the Congo, etc., etc.

Permit me to conclude with that, and to say that when this meeting of the Council is over we shall nonetheless go away satisfied despite the strained atmosphere which was created in the closing stages of the debate deliberately and for definite political purposes.

We shall go hence with satisfaction, for we have heard the Indian representative declare that his Government will not be the first to resort to armed force in the Kashmir question; we have also heard, although not quite so clearly worded, a statement to the same effect by the representative of the Pakistan Government. We have heard, moreover, that neither side rejects the possibility of talks on this matter, and if such talks take place without the interference of third parties, in a business-life and harmonious atmosphere, we are confident that the maintenance of international peace and security in this area will be assured.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Stevenson (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

Mr. President, I do not have much more to say. Before I proceed I must say that I was not aware, if I understood the representative of the Soviet Union correctly, that my shoe was on the table. I wonder if he could have confused me with someone else who has still other uses for shoes and tables.

When I was interrupted for the second time, I was saying that the veto has been frequently used to prevent the United Nations from investigating charges brought to the Security Council by the Soviet Union itself. On at least four occasions, with the use of six vetoes, the Soviet Union refused, after using the Security Council to air its charges, to let its own assertions be examined.

I invite your attention to 1950, when the Soviet Union charged the United States Air Force with the bombing of Communist-held areas of China. The Soviet Union vetoed a commission of investigation.

In 1952, the Soviet representative climaxed one of the most shameless falsehoods in history, the long crescendo of accusations that the United States and the United Nations troops were employing germ warfare in Korea, by bringing the issue before the Security Council and then promptly vetoing a proposal for an impartial examination.

In 1958, when the Soviet Union purported to be concerned about United States flights over the Arctic Circle, the United States proposed an Arctic inspection zone. That, too, was vetoed.

In 1960, when Soviet fighter planes destroyed a United States RB aeroplane over international waters, the Soviet Union vetoed two separate proposals for investigations, one of them asking only that the International Red Cross be permitted to assist any surviving crew member of the plane.

In each of these cases, the Security Council tried to exercise its proper peace-keeping function through systematic investigation. In each case, after having brought the charge, the Soviets vetoed the attempt at a remedy..

One of the most disturbing facts also revealed in the history of a hundred vetoes is the consistent effort to prevent the Security Council from developing processes of peaceful settlement. Not only do many of the vetoes I have referred to fall into this category, but most of the remaining ones were also cast against efforts to promote peaceful settlements: four times with respect to Spain in 1946; once again on a resolution on troop withdrawals from Syria and Lebanon in 1946, not because the resolution was wrong but because it was not extreme enough; twice in connexion with problems arising at the time of Indonesian independence; once against Security Council recommendations for a solution of the Berlin blockade in 1948; once on Goa; twice to prevent extension of United Nations peace-keeping functions in Lebanon in 1958; and five times since 1960 in the Security Council consideration of the Congo. The USSR also vetoed four resolutions in the field of disarmament.

Distortion of the veto power has been a fact of life in this Council. It is a fact that led to the "Uniting for Peace '' procedure, adding to the United Nations peace-keeping machinery a flexible means whereby United Nations Members can assure that the United Nations primary function of preserving the peace will be carried out. The veto does exist, within its proper context, as a recognition of political reality. But it is a privilege to be used, not to be abused. And abused it has been, for the Soviet Union has wilfully obstructed the operation of this Council. It has violated that part of the four-Power declaration at San Francisco in which the Powers agreed not to use their veto wilfully to obstruct the operation of this Council.

So much for yesterday and for today. What of the future? The Council is a vital, purposeful organ of the United Nation, in spite of the veto. It provides vital and purposeful direction and leadership, and, in areas of its work where the veto does not apply, we believe the Council might well widen its activities and increasingly provide that direction and that direction and that leadership in our affairs.

As for the veto itself, we hope that, long before the Soviet Union approaches its two hundredth veto, it will realise that its own interests lie not in national obstruction but in international cooperation, not in wilful vetoes for narrow ends but in willing assents for the broad and common good for which the United Nations stands.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

Mr. President, this is, of course, the beginning of a very interesting lecture, reviewing all the occasions on which the Soviet delegation has used the veto.

I should be prepared to hear out such a review if it were in line with the agenda item which we are now considering. However, the agenda item is not entitled "Review of the use by the Soviet Union of the right of veto in the Security Council since the inception of the United Nations''. Only when we have placed such an item on the agenda shall we be able to listen to anything which any member of the Council may say in this connection, including the distinguished representative of the United States.

For the moment. however, since we are not considering such an item, but an item which is entitled "The India-Pakistan question" and which is known to world public opinion as the "Kashmir question", it would be proper for you, Mr. President, to use the discretionary rights vested in you under the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council and to explain to the United States representative which item. We are now engaged in considering, and if, now that the draft resolution has been put to the vote, the United States representative has nothing to say in explanation of his vote, then perhaps he will be kind enough to postpone his very interesting popular lecture to another time. But now we obviously have further explanations of vote to listen to, and I therefore raise this point of order and ask Mr. President, if you wish to carry out your duties impartially, to call the United States representative to order.

As far as the USSR delegation is concerned, we shall exercise our right to explain our vote on the draft resolution when the time comes.

I request you, Mr. President, to settle the point of order which I have just raised.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Stevenson (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

I hope that the members of the Council will not object and will indulge me while I make a few remarks on this historic day in the Security Council. It is a day that should not pass without notice. A permanent member of the Security Council has just cast its one hundredth veto.

From the beginning of the United Nations one of its special characteristics has been the voting procedure in the Security Council. We all recall the serious deliberations which took place at San Francisco concerning the nature and the import for the future of the veto right for permanent members of the Security Council. The veto was given to the permanent members primarily because it would be their military and economic power which would have to be used to sustain and enforce Security Council decisions directly affecting vital world interests. The representatives of small and middle-sized States emphasised their anxiety that the veto might be used to hamstring the Security Council. In order to meet such fears, the four sponsoring members of the Conference set forth their conception at that time of the unanimity rule, with which the delegation of France also associated itself. The big Powers, including the Soviet Union, specifically stated that it is not to be assumed that the permanent members, any more than the non-permanent members, would use their veto wilfully to obstruct the operation of the Council". That was the way we started in San Francisco seventeen years ago this very week, I believe.

What has happened since ? Before the first year was out, the Soviet Union had cast nine vetoes. The Soviet member of the Council has today cast its hundredth veto. For fifteen years, the Soviet Union on occasion after occasion has sought to obstruct the operations of the Council, sometimes where Soviet plans and prestige were directly and clearly involved, and at other times when Soviet interests were not directly involved, save that the continuation of friction might contribute to Soviet objectives.

The Soviet Union has used the veto lavishly to prevent States from assuming their rightful place in the United Nations. In fact, fifty-one of these vetoes were cast on applications for membership of the United Nations. Ireland, a member of this Council, was denied membership for nine years. So were Jordan and Portugal, Austria, Finland and Italy were kept out for eight years. Ceylon was kept out for seven years, Nepal for six years. Mauritania was vetoed in 1960 and Kuwait in 1961. Korea is still not a member. The veto has been used to tie the admission of clearly qualified States, for which there was widespread support, to the admission of States and regimes about whose qualifications for membership there were grave doubts; this, despite the fact that the tying of the admission of one applicant to that of another has been specially held by the International Court of Justice to be contrary to the Charter.

The Soviet representative used the veto thirteen times to assist Soviet bloc activities against the territorial integrity and the political independence of other States. When the Soviets subverted Czechoslovakia in 1948 the Soviet representative vetoed Security Council moves to investigate the case. When communist-supported guerrillas tried to overturn the independence of Greece in 1946 and 1947, the Soviets again vetoed a Security Council investigation. When Thailand asked the Security Council to act again attempted infiltration from India China in 1954, the Soviets again vetoed.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962 .

It is not difficult to see that the draft resolution which the delegation of Ireland has submitted for the consideration of the Security Council (S/5134] basically corresponds to the so-called "summary" made by the United States representative at the meeting held by the Council yesterday.

Immediately after this statement the USSR delegation demonstrated that this so-called summary, being inaccurate and incomplete, did not correctly reflect the course of the discussion and that, in particular, the draft resolution, which is practically a photo-copy of the United States summary and reproduces some of its conclusions, or in fact any resolution on this subject, is absolutely unnecessary in view of the wide exchange of views that has taken place.

Historians may be interested by the report emanating from Press circles at the United Nations that the draft resolution was originally co-sponsor by yet another delegation, not only by the delegation of Ireland, and that at the last moment this second sponsor's name was removed from the document issued under the symbol S/5134. I do not know whether that was really so, but in any case a comparison between the record of yesterday's meeting of the Security Council and the text of this resolution offers abundant proof of the correctness of the Indian representative's remark that the initiator and moving spirit of this resolution is the delegation of the United States of America. Of course, every delegation is entitled to act as it sees fit, and I can see nothing prejudicial in this from the procedural point of view, but on the political plane I cannot fail to stress this circumstance and to associate myself with the conclusion advanced here just now by the representative of India.

I should like to remind you that, as recently as yesterday, not only the USSR delegation, but also the delegations of other countries represented in the Council commented on the United States representative's incorrect interpretation and incomplete and inaccurate description of the positions they took here in the Council.

The USSR delegation considers that the Council should reject all attempts, at this stage of the discussion and after such significant delays and protraction of the debate under various pretexts, to impose on it at all costs a draft resolution which reflects a one-sided and hence incorrect view of the question of Kashmir.

A careful study of the draft shows that its central idea is, as the United States representative asserted more than once, that our earlier resolution on holding a plebiscite in the (territory of Kashmir in order to determine whether this territory belongs to India or to Pakistan is still in force at the present time.) This idea is still the central factor of the draft resolution now before the Security Council, as is perfectly evident from the fact the operative part of the resolution begins with the proposal to remind both parties of the principles contained in earlier Security Council resolutions and, in particular, in its resolution of 17 January 1948 and in the resolutions of the so-called United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

And yet, gentlemen, it is no secret to any of you that these are the very resolutions which contain detailed proposals for holding the plebiscite. Accordingly, the crux of the matter, as was amply proved during these debates, lies in the fact that certain members of the Council still consider it necessary to hold a plebiscite for the above-mentioned purposes.

We have already pointed out in our statement of 4 May 1962 [1010th meeting] that the resolution about this plebiscite was adopted by the Council in quite a different set of practical circumstances and that the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan rested on conditions which were prerequisites for carrying out this whole plan. The most important condition-and I must apologise for having, so to speak, to return from Z to A, but that is not the fault of the USSR delegation was the preliminary withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the entire territory of Kashmir.

Let us not embark now upon a repetition of all that we have heard and said during all the meetings and they were lengthy and protracted enough-that the Security Council has devoted to the examination of this question. Suffice it to say that years have passed since these proposals were submitted and adopted, and life has taken its course. In the territory of Kashmir which is under Indian jurisdiction, three elections have been held, in which the population of that part of the country, representing three-fourths of the whole population of Kashmir, successively and freely expressed its will. During these years, Kashmir has become an inalienable part of India.

That is why in the present circumstances the request for a plebiscite in the territory of Kashmir is, as we have already pointed out, quite unreasonable. It is perfectly obvious that this request casts doubt on the fact that Kashmir belongs to India.

That is why we cannot endorse the proposal that the Council should now reaffirm all the resolutions which it and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan adopted in quite different circumstances. The purpose of this proposal is to ensure that this main difference of opinion concerning the situation between Pakistan and India should be settled in favour of Pakistan, that is to say, settled in favour of one of the parties.

Assertions have been made here-as in the statement of the Irish representative, who defended this draft, to our deep regret that the question is simply one of noting that the relevant resolution was at one time taken by the aforementioned organs of the United Nations. Such references and such assertions only serve to show that some delegations are so anxious to bring about the adoption of the draft now before. the Council that they are ready to contradict the very text of the draft and their own earlier comments on it.

It is obvious to all that the key reason for introducing the draft is the holding of the so-called plebiscite, which in the present circumstances would be nothing but open interference. in the domestic affairs of India, as Mr. Krishna Menon, the Minister of Defence of India, so rightly said here. If that is not the aim of the authors of the draft resolution, why do they include in their text the aforesaid reference to earlier resolutions of United Nations organs which mention the holding of at plebiscite? Surely they have not set themselves the task of writing from their seats. in the Security Council, a kind of historical monograph in which everything that happened in the period they are describing must be stated with equal emphasis ?

It is self-evident that what may be appropriate for historical studies, which must refer to everything that happened during the period under discussion, is naturally inapplicable to the political decisions of the Security Council, which are taken in the light of the practical circumstances and conditions prevailing at the time when the decision is taken. The attempt to create the impression that all this is mentioned, so to speak, for the love of the art of history is doomed to failure; it cannot and should not mislead anyone.

Moreover, it is perfectly obvious from the context of the draft resolution that the negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan, the renewal of which is urged in the draft, are to take place on the basis of the principles set forth in the now outdated resolutions of the Security Council and the United Nations Commission on Kashmir. That, gentle men, is the real purpose of "recalling" the principles contained in those resolutions. Neither references in the draft resolutions to the provisions of Article 33 of the United Nations Charter, which no one has contested, nor any other references to the provisions of the Charter, nor the greatest skill and vigour in argument can conceal this central aim of the draft, which we consider to be basically defective for reasons we have repeatedly stated. No references to the Charter or the most pious quotations from it can conceal the barefaced attempts that some members of the Council are making to adopt positions on the Kashmir question which are contrary to the facts and to the true historical development of the situation. That is why the appeal in the draft resolution that India should enter into negotiations with Pakistan on the substance of the question represents, in light of what I have said, an attempt to impose on India negotiations which would be conducted on a basis pleasing and advantageous to one side only and unacceptable to the other side.

At the same time, although the paragraph of this draft resolution which relates to the negotiations does not refer to mediation by a third party, as did the draft which was not submitted, but was so widely bruited about in the halls of our Organisation that it has long been an open secret-although the new draft does not refer directly to mediation by a third party, paragraph 5 of the draft nevertheless in essence contains this idea of mediation, in a somewhat different form. And yet we have already heard several statements here from the Indian representative to the effect that interference by third parties in the negotiations between India and Pakistan would be unacceptable. Then what grounds are there for believing that the adoption of such a resolution can help to clear the atmosphere and to ensure the normal course of any negotiations which may be conducted between India and Pakistan?

Moreover, it should be noted that, as the Indian representative has pointed out, India has never in principle rejected the idea of bilateral negotiations between itself and Pakistan. However, as it has rightly been pointed out here, these negotiations should take place on an equal footing, without any interference by third parties and without any attempts to impose an obviously unacceptable basis for such negotiations.

Moreover, it should be noted that the proposed draft also fails to reflect the real situation in that it absolutely ignores the historical fact that, as early as 1948, it was India, gentlemen and this cannot be disregarded if we are to see this question in its proper historical perspective-which brought the question before the Security Council, after Pakistan troops had occupied the territory of Kashmir. As we all know, Pakistan troops continue to occupy approximately one-third of the territory of this country, containing about one-fourth of the total population of Kashmir.

Accordingly, when the draft resolution attempts to place on an equal footing both the State which originally brought the question before the Security Council and the State which was called upon to answer for its actions at that time, we cannot regard that view of the situation as objective. And yet that is manner in which the question is presented in operative paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 of the draft resolution. Accordingly, seemingly well-intentioned appeals for negotiation, for the maintenance of a favourable atmosphere, and so on and so forth, assume an obviously hypocritical character in the light of the motive to which I have just referred. These proposals should be viewed not outside the context of the resolution as a whole, not outside the context of the whole course of historical events over the past fourteen years, but in close connection with this course of events. It will then be seen that it is impossible to support even that part of the draft resolution which contains what people who are not familiar with the history of this question and have not studied the relevant documentation might regard as harmless provisions, resembling the provisions of the United Nations Charter. We have never yet allowed the correct provisions of the United Nations Charter to be interpreted in contravention of the factual situation and, in the final analysis in contravention of the spirit and principles of that Character. Accordingly, the wording of these paragraphs cannot mislead anyone and, in my opinion, ultimately will not mislead anyone.

That is why, in the light of all the aforementioned circumstances, the USSR delegation opposes the adoption of this draft A decision such as the one which is being imposed on us here, under the guise of the best and most pious intentions, can only serve to aggravate tension in the relations between India and Pakistan, and that is obviously contrary both to the interests of the peoples of these countries and to the interests of the maintenance of universal peace and security and hence undoubtedly at variance with the functions and role of the Security Council, as the organ of the United Nations bearing the principal responsibility for the maintenance of universal peace and security.

In conclusion, we feel obliged to repeat what we said in our statement on 4 May and in our statement at yester day's meeting of the Security Council, that the Council would do well to note that the Government of India and subsequently the Government of Pakistan declared during our debate that they would not take the initiative in using force to settle the question of Kashmir, and also that neither side rejects the idea of bilateral negotiations.

We believe that such an outcome of the discussion in the Security Council would be the best way of promoting the rapid elimination of differences between Pakistan and India on the Kashmir question, differences which, moreover, are nothing but a consequence of the era of colonial domination. We believe that such an outcome of the discussion would further the establishment of friendly relations between the two countries in the future and that this would be in the interests of the peoples of India and Pakistan and would promote the strengthening of peace in that region and in the whole world.

Text of the Speech made by Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

I made the views of my delegation on the matter under discussion clear in my statement of 15 June [1012th meeting]. I do not wish to repeat anything that 1 said then, but I should like to say a few words about the draft resolution that is not before us and which has been so persuasively commended by the distinguished representative of Ireland.

It will be evident from my statements to the Council that this draft resolution accords with the principles which my delegation thought the Council should bear in mind and with the action which my delegation thought that the Council ought to take. My delegation will, therefore, vote in favour of its adoption.

I must at this stage once again make it clear that in this dispute the United Kingdom Government has no side to take, no axe to grind. My delegation has done its best throughout our discussion here to act with complete impartiality as between the two sides. We are embarrassed distressed by a continuing sharp disagreement between two Commonwealth countries with both of whom the United Kingdom has such close relations. The efforts of my delegation have been directed towards finding a conclusion to the Council's discussion that would be fair to both India and Pakistan and acceptable to both. Perhaps we hope for too much, but this draft resolution, in our considered opinion, comes near to this objective. Above all, it seems to encourage the type of direct bilateral discussion from which alone the Kashmir problem can emerge. eventual solution of the

I conclude, therefore, by commending this draft resolution to the Council and to the parties. I hope that it will be accepted in the spirit in which I am sure that it is offered-as a sincere and constructive attempt, prejudicial to neither party, to take a step towards an eventual solution of the problem before us.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Boland (Ireland) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1016 held on 22 June 1962

The question of Jammu and Kashmir has been the subject of a very full discussion here in the Council and all the members of the Council have expressed their respective points. of view with regard to it. The Council now has the responsibility of coming to a conclusion on the question before it. In our view, that is a responsibility which the Council cannot shun or seek to evade consistently with its own prestige or authority or with the due discharge of its functions under the Charter. The discussion here in the Council has clearly shown that a large measure of agreement exists between members of the Council as to what the Council's conclusion on this matter should be. In our view, it is the duty of the Council to endeavour to give expression to that measure of agreement in a formal resolution. To refrain from doing so would mark a departure from the usual practice of the Council which, in the circumstances, would be difficult to justify or defend.

The draft resolution contained in document S/5134 aims to reflect as accurately and fairly as possible the consensus of the points of view of the majority of the Council as they have been expressed here. Members of the Council will observe that the text contains nothing new or unfamiliar. On the contrary, the ideas which it embodies have been thoroughly discussed both here at the Council table and in informal consultations between members of the Council over the past few weeks. We believe that the draft represents the widest possible measure of common agreement existing at the present time.

In the preamble, three different considerations are taken into account. First, the Council notes that it has received the last report of the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan and it expresses its thanks to Dr. Graham for it. Secondly, the preamble contains a paragraph noting with satisfaction the assurances given by India and Pakistan that they will refrain from the use of force as a means of settling the Kashmir question. Thirdly, the preamble contains a paragraph confirming the awareness of the Security Council that it has a responsibility under the Charter for helping India and Pakistan to reach a peaceful settlement of this question.

These last two preambular paragraphs are, of course, in close accordance with the views expressed by many [members of the Council in the course of the discussion.

The operative paragraph 1 of the draft refers to the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948 and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan's resolution of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, all of which were accepted at the time by both India and Pakistan. References were made during the course of the discussion to the importance and significance of these resolutions in the effort to find a solution of the Kashmir question. References were also made to the changes of circumstances and political and other developments which have intervened within the fourteen years since these resolutions were accepted. It seems to us the appropriate and necessary to include a paragraph in the text reminding the parties of the principles of these resolutions.

The aspect of the question upon which the largest measure of agreement emerged during the course of the debate was the desirability of an effort being made by India and Pakistan to reach a settlement of the Kashmir issue by means. of negotiations and agreement between themselves. The purpose of the draft resolution which we have submitted to the Council is to place the maximum emphasis, at this stage of the question, on this desirability. This is the object of the operative paragraph 2 of the draft. The text of that paragraph is, I think, self-explanatory. It urges India and Pakistan to enter into direct [discussions at the earliest convenient time with a view to the settlement of the Kashmir question in accordance with the principles of the Charter, including Article 33 of the Charter, which itemises the various procedures open to Members of the United Nations seeking a solution of their differences by peaceful means.

The next two operative paragraphs of the draft resolution are also self-explanatory. They urge India and Pakistan to endeavour to establish and maintain an atmosphere favourable to the direct conversations which it is the principal aim of the draft to further and, in this regard, to refrain from statements or courses of action which might aggravate the situation. We are confident, in the light of what the representatives of India and Pakistan have said here at the Council table, that they will endeavour to do so.

I do not think I need to add anything more at this stage. The draft resolution which we have had the honour to submit to the Council speaks for itself. Our purpose in submitting it is to enable the Security Council to reach a conclusion on the issue before it, as we believe it must be the aim of the Council to do. We hope that the draft resolution will commend itself to members of the Council as a worthwhile step towards bringing the question of Kashmir nearer to a peaceful, just and equitable settlement.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1015 held on 21 June 1962

I have asked for leave to speak for the sole purpose of making a correction to the part of my speech which was quoted by the representative of the United States just now [see para. 6]. There is a mistake in the English interpretation of that speech. What I actually said was: "...My delegation considers that on this occasion the action of the Council could be limited to recalling the basic principles contained in its previous resolutions and inviting the two parties..." [1014th meeting, para. 21.] The English interpretation of my speech is mistaken, for it reads "...The Security Council could well limit itself to recalling and reaffirming the basic principles of its previous resolutions...." The representative of the United States quoted the English interpretation, which, as I have just pointed out, is not an accurate translation of the words I used. I should therefore like to put the matter right so that the precise wording of my speech will be duly noted in the records.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Quaison Sackey (Ghana) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1015 held on 21 June 1962

Very briefly I would like to correct a misunderstanding which might easily arise from the quotations which have been made from my speech which I gave before the Council two days ago. I want to emphasise that my speech is an integral and carefully and delicately-balanced whole, and any quotation from it might easily detract from the integral nature of the statement.

I think every representative is at liberty and in fact has a right to quote from speeches, but this is a matter which is a delicate one affecting two sovereign States. My Government's position has been-as was very clearly worded in my statement to strike a balance without taking sides. In fact, reference to the UNCIP resolutions, for example, was qualified by the fact that my delegation and I am quoting from my own speech - "...attaches due weight to all the changes that have occurred in the situation since these two resolutions were adopted" [1013th meeting, para. 17.]

I am intervening only to say that I would not like this impression to circulate that in my statement I was leaning toward one side, against the other. As we made clear in our statement, both Pakistan and India are our good friends; and everything we have said here was to help the Council understand the situation, especially the changed circumstances, and try and find out whether, against that background, some kind of solution could be found. I again insist that any solution which the Council would put forward, in its responsibility, should be such as to help the situation, in a manner acceptable to both sides.

Therefore, quotations such as have been made by my good friend, Mr. Plimpton, might easily cause a misunderstanding, because if he were to have analysed my speech very carefully, I made a number of qualifications and guarded nuances, and all these constitute my speech. Therefore, I want to draw attention to the nuances, the qualifications, and all the subtle points I have made in my speech which should be regarded as an integral whole.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council meeting No. 1015 held on 21 June 1962

When the United States representative was speaking just now, I looked several times at the place where he was sitting in order to assure myself that he was not speaking from the Chair when he summed up the discussion on behalf, as he stated twice, of almost all the members of the Council. I saw with pleasure, however, that the President is still presiding over the Council meeting and that the United States representative is behind the nameplate reading "United States''. This somewhat reassured me, so that I am now able to make a few comments on the summing up attempted by the United States representative.

Before making these comments, I must revert to the idea which I already advanced at the 1013th meeting about the peculiar turn recently taken by this discussion. Although in fact everyone has already spoken on every aspect of the subject, although everyone's opinions and shades of opinion are quite obvious, although no formal proposals have been made and I trust none will be made-since the very course of the discussion and the very facts of the case show that at this stage there is no need for the Council to take any decisions, the meetings nevertheless continue; they are postponed, one or two representatives speak and then there is a further postponement, in the expectation of something unknown, or known only to the small group of people who are keeping our candle burning a candle which the rest of us, who are uninitiated, cannot touch and whose purpose we therefore cannot understand.

There are two possibilities: either there are some specific proposals which are being prepared and which in that case should be submitted to us-although we see no need to take any decisions now after this extremely exhaustive exchange of views or else we should bring this stage of our work to an end. In fact, the arguments just used by the United States representatives merely underline the need for a full stop precisely at this stage, so as not to jeopardise the future situation in the region we are discussing, the authority of the Council or the maintenance of universal peace and security.

I shall now turn to the remarks just made by the United States representative when he attempted-in my view, adequately, inaccurately and perhaps even unsuccessfully to sum up the discussion of this question. I am not saying this because he omitted me from the sages, beginning with the United States representative, whom he cited here as authorities who gave a correct evaluation of the facts and showed us the course we should follow. Having no desire to quote myself, I shall modestly refer the members of the Council to the Council's records, and, in particular, to my statement of 4 May 1962. [1010th meeting]. It will be seen from this document that the conclusions which were drawn as general conclusions on behalf of all the members of the Council are inapplicable, at least where the position of the Soviet delegation is concerned. I said this the day before yesterday and I repeat it now-my delegation abides by its views, which we think were clearly and logically explained at previous meetings of the Council.

It it true that, in his remarks, the United States representative did mention certain points which in fact were made during meetings of the Council. For example, he said that the members of the Council had heard a statement by the representative of India to the effect that India would never initiate military operations in the Kashmir region. Such a statement was in fact made and was welcomed by all the members of the Council, including the USSR delegation. After this statement, the representative of Pakistan also made a statement-perhaps not as precise and clear a statement as we might have wished-but he did make a statement to the effect that Pakistan, for its part, would not do anything which might lead to military operations being undertaken in this region.

Thus, one of the main points which might have given the Security Council cause for concern and called for action on its part has been adequately disposed of in the statements made by both sides. This means that there is now no situation, in which we might expect that, if we merely come to a full stop at this stage in our discussion of the question, the situation in the Kashmir region would suddenly deteriorate, that there might be a danger of a military clash there for any reason. Such a situation does not exist. This is why I say that, when the United States representative based his argument on the statements by India and Pakistan that they would not use force in connection with the Kashmir question, it was not an argument in favour of continuing the debate. This argument is not mine but his, and it is not an argument in favour of continuing the debate but rather-as any objective observer can see in favour of concluding it, in order not to arouse passions and cause the situation to deteriorate by the trend and nature of our discussion. The situation is quite peaceful, as was noted, in particular, in the statement of the representative of India was accepted as axiomatic in the statement just made by the United States representative.

However, Mr. Plimpton, the representative of the United States, adduced two other arguments in his statement First, he tried again and again as was also done, I would say, not by the majority but by comparatively few members of the Council to resurrect and reinforce the importance of the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the Kashmir question fourteen years ago I repeat, fourteen years ago. He rightly said that, if this attitude was justified and one could really speak of applying resolutions adopted fourteen years ago, then it would obviously be impossible to come to a full stop and some proposals would have to be made regarding the application, in entirely new and altered circumstances, of these fourteen-year-old resolutions. However, even the United States representative does not go so far. Like the others who have touched upon this question, he does not suggest that there should now be a plebiscite, say, in Kashmir in order to decide the fate of this part of the territory of India. None of those who referred to these old resolutions and who supported them so strongly has gone far as to propose that they should be implemented because, if anyone had considered the question in detail, it would have been more than obvious how unrealistic and completely unfounded such proposals would be at this time. As I said in my statement on 4 May 1962, these proposals might have had some usefulness fourteen years ago in the circumstances then prevailing and if a number of conditions mentioned at that time had been fulfilled.

It is now quite unrealistic to demand a plebiscite, just as, in the words of the representative of India; obviously no one would now demand a plebiscite in Texas, Ohio or any other state in the United States of America. Hence, when the question of the validity of the old resolutions is raised again and again, another question inevitably arises : do those who raise the matter themselves believe that it is now possible to implement such a resolution as, for example, the resolution on the holding of a plebiscite? Do they believe this or not? Are they seriously making this suggestion to us or are they making it for reasons which have no bearing on the solution. of the question before us ?

I do not wish to answer for them, but I have very serious doubts that those who refer to the implementation of these old resolutions in new circumstances believe that the Council can really propose them as a plan of action now after fourteen. years. This is why there is no longer any question of resurrecting, reaffirming, mentioning or recalling in some other way on behalf of the Council the significance and applicability of resolutions which the Council adopted in a quite different set of circumstances; there can be no question of this now. Such proposals can have no success in the Council. I have said this before and I say it again now.

There remains another argument used by the United States representative-the idea of mediation in the so-called negotiations between India and Pakistan. According to the Charter, negotiations between countries are a normal and natural means of arriving at the peaceful settlement of any dispute. This clear and important provision of the Charter naturally continues to have force and significance. However, negotiations can be useful only when both sides are interested in fruitful negotiations. If one side wants to force the other to negotiate on terms which the other side finds unacceptable, deliberately lying down unacceptable conditions, such negotiations will achieve nothing, no matter how often reference is made to the provisions of the Charter, because what is needed in negotiations is goodwill and agreement between the parties, and not-I repeat-attempts by one party to force the other to agree to a basis for discussion which is unacceptable in principle.

This is why the second argument for continuing discussion of these questions also actually works against the person who uses it. The United States representative's argument that we should continue to seek measures of this kind in the Council here and now is inconsistent, because it inflames passions in the Kashmir question and provokes the discord which we regret to say-is largely a consequence of the colonial epoch and of the ancient policy known as "divide and rule". But all this provocation is not in the interests of the people of Pakistan, the people of India or the United Nations and it naturally cannot be endorsed by the Security Council, as the principal organ responsible under the Charter for the maintenance of universal peace and security.

Thus these two main arguments-the resurrection of former resolutions of the Council and their reinstatement in some form, and the idea of insisting on mediation, which is unacceptable to one side, in the negotiations-are completely invalid. This I maintain. The whole sluggish, reluctant and drawn-out discussion of this question that now only a small group of members of the Council are trying to keep the debate going. I will make no guesses or assumptions why they are doing this; I merely note that only a small group of Council members want artificially to prolong the discussion of this question. All this and the general atmosphere in which the discussion has taken place show that we should merely take note of the statements made here by both the representative of India and the representative of Pakistan to the effect that neither side will take the initiative of using armed force in the Kashmir region and that we can therefore draw the conclusion that the relative peace and calm which have for some time reigned in this region will continue.

Thus, the Council has no cause for alarm in connection with Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Charter, and no need to take any special or additional decisions. I therefore suggest that the wisest course would be to come to a full stop at this point and be satisfied with the exchange of opinions which has already taken place.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Plimpton (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1015 held on 21 June 1962

My purpose in asking to speak today was to see if some measure of agreement could not be found in what has been. said in the Council. We have reviewed the debate carefully and wish to put forward some observations for consideration by the members which, we hope, will be of value.

In the course of this debate, the overwhelming majority of Council members have concentrated their views on five major points. First, most members were gratified by the assurances given by both parties that they will refrain from the use of force in the settlement of this dispute. The second point was the continued applicability of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) and the resolutions of the Council itself on the problem of Kashmir. Third, members have expressed views on the need for India and Pakistan to enter into negotiations which would lead to a peaceful settlement of this dispute. Fourth, a number of members have also commented on the possibility of having the parties avail themselves of the services or good offices of an impartial third party, to assist in such negotiations. Finally, members have not failed to comment on the responsibility of the Security Council in this matter.

But let me be more specific; allow me, as a start, to cite what members have said with regard to the second point, that is, the continued applicability of the UNCIP resolutions. The representative of Ghana, for example, elaborated in substantial detail on his Government's point of view, saying:

"In spite of Mr. Graham's inability to report success, my delegation considers that in default of any other basis for agreement being discovered, the Council must find out whether it can build upon its past efforts, having particular regard to the international obligations by which the parties stood bound under the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949." [1013th meeting, para. 12.]

The representative of Ireland, in discussing that point, said at the same meeting :

"But the UNCIP resolutions of 1948 and 1949 cannot be treated as if they had totally ceased to exist. They remain on the statute book of the Security Council and their provisions must be kept in view in the continuing search for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue." [Ibid., para. 55.]

This position was supported, either directly or by inference, by the representatives of France, Chile, China, the United Kingdom and ourselves, while Mr. Sosa Rodriguez, the representative of Venezuela appeared to attach such importance to these resolutions that he thought that the Security Council could well limit itself to recalling and reaffirming the basic principles of its previous resolutions [1014th meeting].

All members who have spoken have recognized the need for the parties to resume negotiations. This is an important fact which should give us definite guidance. There is some disparity of view, however, with regard to the introduction of a third party. We felt that most of the representatives who spoke appeared to lean to the view that an impartial third party to assist India and Pakistan in their negotiations would be useful.

Sir Patrick Dean, the United Kingdom representative, in discussing the need for the parties to enter into negotiations mentioned the Indus waters analogy, where a third party had been helpful. Ambassador Boland touched upon the possibility of negotiations with a third party to lend a hand, while Mr. Hsuch the representative of China believes that the services of the Secretary-General might well be utilized. Ambassador Quaison-Sackey recalled the informal suggestion of his President, offering his assistance to both parties. Mr. Stevenson referred to the offer by President Kennedy of the services of Mr. Eugene R. Black of the World Bank to explore with each Head of Government the outlines and prospects for negotiations and discussions, adding:

"We are convinced that a high-level conference between India and Pakistan which, we believe, would be facilitated by such an exploration, would enable the parties to ascertain the precise areas of disagreements between them and should, we hope, induce that spirit of compromise and magnanimity on both sides without which no problem can ever be truly solved." [1012th meeting, para. 14.]

Now let me turn to the points of view expressed on the question of Security Council responsibility. Members readily recognized that the Security Council cannot impose a solution to this problem on either party. However, there was recognition that the Security Council could make a contribution. Ambassador Riad of the United Arab Republic thought that the most important objective of the Security Council should be "to help the two parties to resume contacts to reach a peaceful solution". [1013th meeting, para. 26.] Ambassador Boland thought that :

"What the Council can and should do. . . is to appeal earnestly to both Governments to make a determined effort... to re-establish that basic element of mutual agreement which must exist before further progress can be made towards a settlement of the question." [Ibid., para. 57.]

Ambassador Quaison-Sackey pointed out :

"The reasons for making yet another serious attempt to achieve progress are, therefore, overriding, and the Council will certainly require more than ever all the understanding, patience, impartiality and sense of responsibility that it had evinced in the past." [Ibid. 1013th meeting, para. 22.] Sir Patrick Dean remarked :

"Nevertheless, the Security Council cannot wash its hands of the whole affair. The past history of discussion before it and its previous decisions make this impossible. We have a clear duty to formulate a view." [1012th meeting, para. 35.]

Ambassador Schweitzer of Chile said: "We cannot show the world a Security Council powerless before this problem." [1014th meeting, para. 34.] Mr. Stevenson described the Council's responsibility as one in which it would use its best efforts to ensure that a peaceful settlement be attained, while you, Mr. President, as I recall, in your capacity as representative of France, echoed this sentiment when you referred to Article 33 and said: "All that the Security Council can do, within the terms of this Article, is to 'call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means." [1012th meeting, para. 49.]

These views may vary in degree, but there appears to be general agreement as to the continuing responsibility of the Council in this matter.

I hope that I have made a fair summary of the views which have found sympathy among a majority of the members of the Security Council. I have done so in the hope that such a summary will help to focus the attention of the Council on common areas of agreement and that it may lead to further contemplation as to exactly how the Council may be useful.

I would therefore suggest, Mr. President, that following this meeting we should meet again, either tomorrow afternoon or Monday, depending upon the wishes of other members of the Council, with the object of further consultations in the meantime leading to a determination by the Council of the action to be taken.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Schweitzer (Chile) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1014 held on 20 June 1962

Last January, when the Government of Pakistan asked the Security Council to meet again to take up the question of Kashmir, there seemed to be an urgent need to resume our consideration of that complex and long-standing problem, to which so many efforts have been devoted since its first appearance towards the end of 1947.

Five months have gone by and we can say with satisfaction that, although the threats to peace and security have not disappeared, they are not so alarming as they seemed and that the present debate has produced one positive result of great significance we have been able to hear, both from the Minister for Defence of India and from the representative of Pakistan, that their Governments will not resort to force to settle their differences. That is a solemn commitment which reveals the willingness of both Governments to fulfil their obligations as Members of the United Nations and refrain from the threat or use of force. The Council can now face this item on its agenda relieved of the great anxiety with which it reconvened

to consider it. Nevertheless, it would have been desirable to note some progress in so long and difficult a controversy.

The representatives of both Pakistan and India have informed us at great length of their position on the question, which has increased in complexity and difficulty during the long period since the Council first took it up. There is an abundance of documentation, consisting of successive resolutions and reports on the question. The special commission set up to deal with the problem has ceased to exist, but there is still the representatives appointed by the Council and the military observer group; no progress has been made, however, beyond the cease fire, and the truce agreement marking out the definitive military occupation line has not been concluded. Many agreements for the holding of a plebiscite, which the Council has repeatedly held to be the manner in which the question should be settled, have been held up by discrepancies; divergent interpretations and various other difficulties, so much so that today nothing is left but the principles set forth in the resolutions and agreements which both parties have supported. The system which was conceived for putting them into practice is now inoperative.

To catalogue the difficulties which have arisen does not appear to be a suitable approach to a solution of the problem, this Council's basic task, because it might serve to exacerbate feelings and to aggravate the existing tension, and thus defeat its purpose. If this Council were not what it is, an essentially political body rather than a court of law, its task would perhaps be easier, for it would merely have to consider the background and arrive at a verdict. Its function, however, is to prevent problems from getting any worse, and to maintain international peace and security, bringing calm to a region agitated by passions of every sort, where the situation can become even more critical if it is not approached with deliberation, caution and discretion.

My Government, which maintains harmonious and friendly relations with both the countries affected by this question, has therefore striven to adopt an impartial and dis passionate attitude, doing all in its power to help to reduce the difficulties and to find a solution compatible with the interests at stake and the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter,

In my Government's view, that solution would consist in a resumption of direct talks between the two countries with a view to finding a formula upon which they can agree for the settlement of the dispute. We are firmly convinced that in cases such as this, if a solution is to give results, it must not be imposed but must arise from the wishes of the contending parties.

Such talks can be expected to give the desired results if the parties undertake them with a sincere desire to reach a solution. We do not doubt that this will be the case, although we understand that in disputes of this kind, prolonged in time and complicated by various subsequent events, the greatest virtue lies in preserving patience. It seems to us, moreover, that the way to make those talks productive might be by the provision of such impartial aid as those concerned might accept, or that the United Nations could supply, if the need. arose.

Also of fundamental importance in this matter is the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the fruitful development of such negotiations. To that end, it would be necessary for both Governments to strive to adopt such prudent and discreet measures as might calm the atmosphere of the dispute, and to refrain, during the negotiation, from statements that might impede their progress and from actions which might aggravate the existing situation instead of alleviating it.

Our attitude is determined by the conviction that this Council should help the parties to find a peaceful means of settling their dispute, and in view of the lack of progress in the search for an effective solution we feel that such a means can rapidly be found through direct negotiations. The Charter of the United Nations outlines many methods for achieving peaceful solutions.

We cannot show the world a Security Council powerless before this problem. It would be easy for us to show our authority, if that proved necessary. But I would stress that there is no question of that; rather must be demonstrate our ability to prevent a problem that has been lying dormant from once more becoming acute, upsetting the peace that has been achieved and maintained during all the years of the conflict.

We appeal to the consciences of both parties, confident that they will be willing to show by their actions what we have been led to expect from the promises made during the debate. We believe that this Council, as on earlier occasions, will be able to point the way whereby both parties may reach a final solution of the problem, which would relieve and gladden the peoples concerned and the whole world..

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sosa Rodriguez (Venezuela) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1014 held on 20 June 1962

Although the question of Kashmir has been pending for fifteen years and has been the subject of more than a hundred meetings of the Security Council, this is the first time that my country, now a member of the Council, has had occasion to speak about it. My delegation has therefore carefully analysed all the legal and political aspects of the case, and has made a thorough study of the very exhaustive and brilliant statements made by the representatives of Pakistan and India at the most recent meetings of this body, held in May. I shall ask the indulgence of the representatives of the permanent Member States if, in the course of my statement, I am obliged to refer to some facts regarding this problem which are well known, but which I feel I must mention in order to give an adequate explanation of my delegation's position.

My delegation was pleased to note that the representatives of both Pakistan and India have expressly stated that their Governments have no intention of resorting to force for the final settlement of the problem. This shows the respect of both parties for the principles of the United Nations Charter, as also the ties which, despite all their vicissitudes, must of necessity unite two countries which for ethnic, geographical, economic and cultural reasons are called upon to practise close and friendly cooperation. That is what my country, which feels sincere friendship and goodwill towards them both, would like to see, and it is with that in mind that it will view the problem and co-operate in the Security Council in preparing the way for a prompt, peaceful and friendly settlement of the question of Kashmir, which, unfortunately, is still bedevilling the relations between the two sister countries.

The problem before us derives from the events which took place in Kashmir in August 1947, when that State had not yet decided whether to unite with India or Pakistan after those two countries attained independence.

The Indian version and the Pakistan version of those events are very different. According to the Indian account, what occurred was an invasion by miscreants and tribesmen from Pakistan who, with that country's help, attacked the people and local forces of the Maharajah of Kashmir. According to the Pakistan account, the population of Kashmir rebelled against the tyrannical government of the Maharaja Hari Singh and elements of related tribes in Pakistan came to the aid of the rebels.

In any event, whatever may have been the cause of the events, they prompted the Maharajah to ask for the State of Kashmir to accede to India in order to obtain military aid from that country. In a letter dated 26 October 1947 addressed to Lord Mountbatten, than Governor-General of India, Maharaja Hari Singh explained the situation and agreed to sign the instrument of accession of Kashmir to India. The instrument of accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh was accepted by Lord Mountbatten. Nevertheless, in a letter of 27 October 1947, addressed to Maharaja Hari Singh, Lord Mountbatten recognized that "... the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State; it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir, and its soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people".

India then sent military aid to the Maharajah, with which he was able to gain mastery over the situation in most of the State. Nevertheless, since the fighting continued, India brought the case before the Security Council which, in a resolution adopted on 17 January 1948, called upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take immediately all measures to avoid an aggravation of the situation. Later, in its resolution of 20 January 1948, the Security Council set up a Commission to investigate the facts and carry out its instructions. That Commission confirmed the presence of regular Pakistan troops in Kashmir and, in discharge of its mandate from the Security Council, laid the groundwork for a solution of the conflict in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Of the measures recommended by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, only those concerning the cease fire and the line of demarcation of the Indian and Pakistan positions in Kashmir at the time of the cease fire could be implemented. That line has been respected by both parties ever since. They were not, however, able to agree on the interpretation and implementation of the rest of the measures In the resolutions. Later efforts by United Nations representatives who replaced the Commission when it ceased to exist, in conformity with the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950, were not able to reconcile the two parties.

The present situation and the respective positions of the parties in regard to the problem have been explained with a wealth of detail by the representatives of India and Pakistan in their recent statements before the Council. Those statements have stressed the following points:

(a) Both parties accepted the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 of the Commission appointed by the Security Council, but each party ascribes to the other the failure to implement parts II and III of the 13 August resolution.

(b) Pakistan insists that the solution of the problem lies in the progressive implementation of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and has declared that if it is a mistaken interpretation on its part that is impeding the implementation of those resolutions, it is willing to accept an impartial interpretation of the terms of the resolutions by the Security council or a mediator acceptable to both parties;

(c) India maintains that as Pakistan has rendered the implementation of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 impossible and as the situation has completely changed since those resolutions were adopted, they have become imperative and their implementation cannot be enforced. India further maintains that it can no longer accept a plebiscite to decide the question of the accession of the State of Kashmir to India, because that accession has been complete and irrevocable from the time the corresponding instrument was signed, and that as there have been elections for a Constituent Assembly and, subsequently, elections under the Constitution promulgated in the part of Kashmir which was united to India, the people of Kashmir have had an opportunity to express their wishes and India has thus fulfilled its promise to consult the people and will not now accept a plebiscite on the question of accession.

In view of those circumstances and of the background of the case, my delegation has the following remarks to make.

Firstly, the accession of Kashmir to India took place in special circumstances in that the instrument of accession could not be isolated from the letter of 26 October 1947 from Maharaja Hari Singh to Lord Mountbatten and the letter's reply of 27 October 1947. Consequently, from the time the instrument of Accession was signed the accession of Kashmir to India produced all the juridical effects of accession, but the indefinite continuation of those effects, or in other words the final consolidation of the accession, remained subject to a later act, namely, its ratification through a consultation of the people of Kashmir.

The promise of Lord Mountbatten, or rather of the Governor-General of India at that time, was a promise made to the people of Kashmir and not to Pakistan. However, it was a promise made, as Lord Moantbatten's letter says, "in consistence with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State".

Secondly, although it might entertain doubts about the desire of the people of Kashmir to be united with India through the accession of their State, Pakistan could not lawfully aid the rebels if rebels they were-or the invaders-if they were invaders, far less intervene directly in Kashmir with its regular forces.

Thirdly, when the matter was submitted to the Security Council for its consideration, both that United Nations organ and the parties to the conflict agreed to settle the case de facto and de jure in the form laid down in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 of the Commission for India and Pakistan.

Both the question of Pakistan's aggression in Kashmir, as India describes Pakistan's action there, and the question of the accession of Kashmir to India, challenged by Pakistan, were precisely the two questions contemplated in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which laid down the principles and established the procedure for a peaceful settlement of the dispute. As we have seen, those resolutions were accepted by both parties and they therefore constitute an international agreement arrived at with the participation of the United Nations. These resolutions contain various provisions and the implementation of some is dependent on the prior implementation of others. The failure of either party to comply with any provision could therefore justify the other party's refusal to implement the succeeding provisions so long as the non-compliance persisted.

Fourthly, the elections which were held in the part of Kashmir united to India could not take the place of the plebiscite mentioned in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which both parties have accepted. The agreement resulting from their acceptance of those resolutions was of an international character and cannot be amended unilaterally by any law or constitution. That was the principle which the Security Council upheld in its resolutions of 30 March 1951 and 24 January 1957.

In those elections, however complete and democratic they have been, the people of Kashmir were not consulted may about whether they preferred to accede to India or to Pakistan. Those elections cannot therefore be likened to a plebiscite on the question of accession.

Fifthly, it is a fact that the resolution of 13 August 1948. has been implemented only with regard to its part I concerning the cease fire and the cease-fire line, and that, in the absence of agreement between the parties on the interpretation of the terms of the resolution, part II and III of that resolution could not be implemented. Nor was it possible for the resolution of 5 January 1949 to be implemented, since that required the prior application of all the provisions of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Each parties blames the other for the lack of implementation of these resolutions, but in the face of disputed facts and divergent interpretations it is difficult to apportion responsibility. At all events, these resolutions are still in force and having some effect; for one thing, they provide the legal basis for the present provisional status quo Kashmir which has at least prevented the continuation of armed conflict. It must also be remembered that, whatever the true reason for the failure to implement parts II and III of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and hence the resolution of 5 January 1949, nearly fourteen years elapsed since then and the circumstances which then prevailed have been modified by a series of events. It would be therefore advisable, without departing from the basic principles contained in the Council's resolutions on this question, to take these new circumstances into account in future efforts towards a final solution of the problem. My delegation feels that in such circumstances the best course would be for the two parties to discuss the question between themselves in direct negotiations.

In view of the foregoing considerations and the fact that both parties have stated their intention not to resort to force in settling the question of Kashmir, my delegation considers that on this occasion the action of the Council could be limited to recalling the basic principles contained in its previous resolutions and inviting the two parties to undertake direct negotiations as soon as possible, so that in and atmosphere of understanding and harmony they may arrive at a final solution of the problem of Kashmir.

In conclusion, I should like to reaffirm once again the sincere friendship and sympathy which my country feels towards both India and Pakistan, and to express the grave concern with which it views the continuation of a conflict which darkens the relations between these two great countries, diverting their attention from the work of progress and development which they are carrying out in their Asian subcontinent. My delegation trusts that the clearsightedness and ability of the states men of both countries will enable them to overcome the difficulties which have hitherto stood in the way of a solution to this thorny problem and that they will finally reach that agreement for which their friends so eagerly hope, for the good of the people of Kashmir, of India and of Pakistan.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Boland (Ireland) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1013 held on 19 June 1962

We in the Irish delegation listened with the closest interest and attention to the statements which were made here at the Council table by the representatives of India and Pakistan at the end of April and early in May. We are very glad to have had an opportunity, during the interval of time which has elapsed since then, of giving those statements the careful and detailed consideration which their importance so obviously demands.

Before discussing the question presently before the Council, may I say that Ireland, like other members of the Council, has nothing but the warmest feelings of friendship and sympathy for India and Pakistan alike. Not only do we value greatly the good relations which we have with both countries; we sincerely believe that more than ever today, in view of the general situation in southern Asia, the establishment and maintenance of friendly, neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan is a matter of vital concern not only to the subcontinent of India, but to the world community generally. It is in that belief and in the single-minded desire to contribute what we can as a member of the Council towards finding a mutually satisfactory solution of the question of Jammu and Kashmir that my delegation approaches the issue with which the Council is confronted.

The statements of the representatives of Pakistan and India devoted much attention to basic points of difference which have existed between the two Governments ever since the question of Jammu and Kashmir first came before the Council in 1948. These include the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India in 1947, the question of Pakistan's responsibility for the tribal irruptions into Kashmir in the same year, the action of the Government of Pakistan in sending regular Pakistan troops into the State in 1948, and so on.

These, of course, are very basic issues. As we all know. However, these issues had already been clearly defined and were fully in the minds of all concerned when UNCIP formulated its resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which both Pakistan and India accepted at the time. Those resolutions did not purport to resolve the basic legal and other issues of which I have just spoken and, in our submission, to useful purpose would be served by an attempt by the Security Council to go back behind the Commission's resolutions in an effort to resolve those issues now. What the Commission's resolutions did do was to lay down a carefully considered procedure whereby, it was hoped, a peaceful settlement of the question of Jammu and Kashmir might be achieved.

The task of the Security Council now, it seems to us, is not to attempt to adjudicate upon issues on which UNCIP, in its wisdom, refrained from pronouncing itself, but to consider what progress can be made towards achieving a peaceful settlement of the question of Jammu and Kashmir in the circumstances which exist today.

Unfortunately, if there is one thing that emerges more clearly than any other from the statements which we have heard from the representatives of Pakistan and India, it is that the differences of interpretation which prevented the prompt implementation of the Commission's resolutions in the first instance, instead of narrowing, have become wider and wider with the passage of time. Looking back, it is impossible not to deplore the circumstances which prevented the prompt implementation of the resolution of 1948 and 1949 in the favourable atmosphere which had been created by their race acceptance by both India and Pakistan. The delay was most unfortunate in its results because, as the Chairman of UNCIP said at the time-and his statement was recalled here this afternoon by my colleague, the representative of Ghana

"The Security Council's resolutions are static, but the situation is dynamic". The wisdom of that statement has been proved by the march of events, because not only has the lapse of time done nothing to bridge the differences which stood in the way of the implementation of the UNCIP resolution at the time when they were adopted, but changes of circumstances and political and other developments have intervened to make their implementation a matter of even greater difficulty and complexity today than it was when the resolutions were first passed.

While so much may be freely admitted, it seems to my delegation quite a different proposition to argue that because of what has happened in the meantime, the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 should now be regarded as having ceased to have any bearing on the matter at all. The UNCIP resolutions of 1948 and 1949 derive a special importance from the fact that they were accepted and agreed to at the time by both India and Pakistan. They have formed the basis of the Council's consideration of the question of Jammu and Kashmir even since. It would be unrealistic not to recognize that the interpretation and implementation of those resolutions have given rise to conflicts of view between the two countries which this Council has so far found it impossible to reconcile. It may be admitted too that any agreement between the two countries with regard to the question of Kashmir in the circumstances of today would need to take a fair and realistic account of such major political or other changes as may have taken place since those resolutions were adopted. But the UNCIP resolutions of 1948 and 1949 cannot be treated as if they had totally ceased to exist. They remain on the statute book of the Security Council and their provisions must be kept in view in the continuing search for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue.

In their statements to the Council, the representatives of India and Pakistan dealt in detail with the differences of opinion and interpretation which have prevented the resolutions of 1948 and 1949 from resulting in a settlement of the Kashmir question on the lines contemplated in the resolutions themselves. Whatever the individual members of the Council may think of the rights and wrongs of these differences, one thing seems to be only too clear, and that is that the basic reason for the failure to make any progress towards a settlement of the question of Jammu and Kashmir lies in the fact that there is at present a complete lack of any measure of common agreement whatever between the Governments of India and Pakistan. What seems essential to us at this stage is that everything possible should be done to repair that lack; and, in our estimation, judging by the statements which have been made here at the Council able by the representatives of India and Pakistan, the best chances of repairing that lack in the present circumstances lie in direct discussions between the two Governments and in the creation and maintenance between them of a political atmosphere in which such discussions can be carried on with good prospects of success.

As other members of the Council have pointed out before me, it is not for the Security Council to attempt to impose or dictate a settlement of the Kashmir question. Nor can any action which it is open to the Council to take help to bring about a peaceful and stable settlement of the Kashmir question without the agreement and active cooperation of the Governments concerned What the Council can and should do, however, is to appeal earnestly to both Governments to make a determined effort, by means of direct talks between them, with or without the intervention of others as they may decide, to re-establish that basic element of mutual agreement which must exist before further progress can be made towards a settlement of the question.

There are elements, even in the state of deadlock which exists today, which justify the hope that such an effort would not be unproductive of results. Members of the Council will have heard with lively satisfaction, for example, the assurances given by the representatives of India and Pakistan that their Governments will not resort to force for the settlement of the Kashmir question. Another positive aspect of the present situation is that, in spite of the occasional isolated incidents which are always apt to occur on either side of truce or ceasefire lines, the cease-fire line laid down in 1949 continues to be respected.

These are welcome and even hopeful features of the situation as it exists today. They provide a useful starting point for further efforts to widen the areas of mutual agreement. And this, in our opinion, should now be the primary aim, because, when, all is said and done, in matters such as this there is really no satisfactory substitute for mutual agreement. No other settlement, no matter how it is arrived at, can possibly prove as effective, as stable or as enduring as one worked out and agreed to by the Governments concerned.

In that belief, we earnestly hope that the Governments of India and Pakistan will be prepared in the spirit of the phrase in the Preamble to the Charter which you, Mr. President quoted the other day-to sit down and endeavour to resolve the outstanding difficulties in direct talks between themselves, and that in the meantime they will, by mutual understanding, carefully refrain from any statements or courses of action which might have the effect of worsening the state of feeling between the peoples of the two countries. We are convinced that it is only in this way that the question of Kashmir can now be moved forward towards a peaceful settlement.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Haseganu (Romania) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1013 held on 19 June 1962

The Romanian delegation has carefully studied the documents relating to the situation in Kashmir and the statements made before the Council by the representatives of the two parties directly concerned, India and Pakistan. We have, of course, also studied the history of the Kashmir question, the records of the discussions and all the documents which have accumulated over the fourteen years during which the United Nations has been considering the question in one form or another.

In my delegation's opinion, a comparison between the debates which are now taking place and those held in earlier years leads to one preliminary remark: the discussions have remained at the same stage, the same problems are raised, the same arguments are used and reference is made to aspects of the question which are in fact the same and most of which are well known.

Accordingly, we must first of all conclude that there are no new elements to indicate any real aggravation of the dispute between India and Pakistan in Kashmir and to justify a fresh and urgent examination of this question by the Security Council.

There can be no doubt, however, that in order to reach a correct conclusion and an effective solution we must analyze not only the Security Council's debates but also the living realities and the developments of the situation which we are discussing From this point of view, it will be seen that during these fourteen years, while the discussions in the United Nations. marked time, life itself moved forward and provided a reply to the question around which the Security Council's debates have removed to whom does the State of Jammu and Kashmir belong and what is the will of the people of that part of the world?

If the question is considered from the strictly legal point of view, the reply is not difficult. Indeed, the actual legality of the act of association of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India is not and cannot be questioned by anyone, just as the legality of the association to India of over 500 Indian States and principalities cannot be contested. To cast doubt on that legality would be tantamount to questioning the legality of the creation and accession to independence of both India and Pakistan.

In the arguments they advance before the Security Council, the representatives of Pakistan try to contest the validity of this act and assert that this accession to India was not supported by the people and that it does not even now represent the will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. But it has not been possible to produce any conclusive evidence to that effect.

If we analyse developments in the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the years 1948-1962, we shall find that it has become completely integrated in the Republic of India, that the relations between the people of that State and those of India have been consolidated and that there are no noteworthy signs of any clear trends towards separatism. Thus, while the theory of the need to consult the will of the people had some meaning in 1948, to begin to discuss it again today would simply amount to disregarding the real facts, which show that the people of Kashmir expressed their will in local and general elections in 1951, 1957 and 1962. By the votes they cast on those occasions. and by their active participation in the effort that is being made to raise the economic and cultural level of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the people of Kashmir have shown and are still showing that they regard their country as an integral and inalienable part of the Republic of India.

Accordingly, there is now no legal or factual basis for discussing to whom the State of Jammu and Kashmir belongs. From that point of view, we consider that our discussion is pointless.

In the light of those considerations, the Romanian delegation feels that the Security Council can make a useful contribution to smoothing out the differences between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir by accelerating the settlement of this dispute through direct conversations between the two parties and by preventing the problem from being artificially complicated by the introduction of elements foreign to its substance. Unfortunately, we have to admit that such elements do exist and are actively brought to bear.

In this connection, I should like to draw the Security Council's attention to some facts. For example, while the Indian representative has stated categorically and unreservedly that his Government would not take the initiative in resorting to force in the case of Kashmir, the representative of Pakistan. has in effect avoided giving any such guarantee here. He showed us that, although the Pakistan Government does not intend to take the initiative in resorting to force, there might be cases in which it would no longer be able to control events.

We do not think that the representative of Pakistan is contemplating the possibility of a repetition of the events of 1947; on the contrary, we hope that the Government of that country will ultimately give the same guarantee as the Government of India and that it will make every effort to curb any rash actions.

Yet, objectively speaking, whatever may be the intentions of the Government of Pakistan-which do not wish to discuss the attitude hitherto taken by various important figures in that country really encourages such actions. Nor can we ignore the fact that Pakistan belongs to military blocs which are pursuing in that region interests other than those calculated to promote good neighbourly relations between the two peoples. These blocs, which defend the expansionist plans of imperialist circles and colonialist positions, are obviously interested in fostering and exacerbating local rivalries.

It is a coincidence that the question of Kashmir began to be ventilated once again at the time when India liberated Goa and other territories which had belonged to it for centuries from colonial oppression, and at a time when we are witnessing a recrudescence of imperialist pressure against India? We cannot but conclude that the dispute between India and Pakistan about Kashmir is being artificially fostered by those who are anxious to maintain strained relations in South East Asia and to compromise the contribution which India is making to the struggle for the total abolition of colonialism and for the relaxation of international tension.

Being forced to retire from the historical arena, colonialism is endeavouring to hand down to the liberated peoples a most difficult heritage, a large number of time-bombs, which will enable the colonialists to retain or re-establish their privileges in one form or another. The situation which has been created in connection with Kashmir is an illustration of this colonial strategy. While life, in its forward march, is in the process of solving the problem, we are witnessing efforts to maintain artificially the explosive character of this issue.

The Romanian delegation considers that the United Nations should oppose any such action.

We do not think that any proposal which calls for fresh investigations or establishes new arbitration or mediation procedures can serve a useful purpose in the present circumstances.

In so far as the question of Kashmir is still a dispute between India and Pakistan, it primarily concerns those two countries and its constructive solution depends above all on the

cessation of all outside interference.

We are convinced that the peoples of India and Pakistan, which have so much in common in their history and which waged a joint struggle for the overthrow of colonial domination, will be able, especially in the present circumstances, to make what unites them, namely the interests of peace, security and the advancement of all mankind, prevail in their relations.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Riad (United Arab Republic) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1013 held on 19 June 1962

I have listened with great interest to the statements of both the representatives of India and of Pakistan presenting the point of view of their countries regarding the present question. The Government of the United Arab Republic, as you are all aware, has close and friendly relations with both India and Pakistan. Therefore, it is natural for me to confine my statement at this stage to the aspects which we believe are such as should encourage the two parties to find a way out of the present impasse.

In dealing with delicate and complex questions similar to the one which is before us, the Council should adopt a flexible course of action, with a view to helping the two parties to resume further contacts for the purpose of solving the question peacefully under the aegis of the Charter. The Council, in its wisdom, should exert every effort to seek the endorsement of the two parties in any action which it may take. No useful purpose could be served if the Security Council were to act in a way which might complicate an already sensitive situation. I admit that the question under consideration is not of a kind which could be solved easily or in a short time, but the fact that additional time and effort are needed should not discourage us from deploying all possible means of coping peace fully with this situation.

It is true that the Council has tried very hard to help the parties to reach a solution, but it is equally true that any solution which is not acceptable to the parties will not be a workable solution. The Security Council has specific responsibilities under the Charter in dealing with such questions, but the Charter itself does not say that any specific course should or could be imposed on the parties to a question when a settlement is needed.

So the most important objective is to help the two parties. to resume contacts with a view to reaching a peaceful solution. We have every reason to believe that this is the only advisable course for the Council to follow at the present time and we, in the United Arab Republic, are particularly encouraged by the statements which were made by the representatives of Pakistan and India.

I believe, therefore, that it is perfectly in order if we address ourselves once more to both India and Pakistan especially after they have demonstrated such a high standard of statesmanship and set such a good example of self-restraint throughout the history of the question-appealing to them to continue to exercise the same self-restraint and to display a will to solve their differences through peaceful means.

It is reassuring to listen to the solemn and responsible pledges which were made by the representatives of India and Pakistan declaring that their respective Governments will not resort to the use of force. Statements to this effect are indeed significant and we hope will pave the way to the resumption of negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan to reach a final and just solution. This, I take it, could not be done unless the parties endeavoured to create the proper atmosphere necessary for further negotiations. To be able to reach this goal, the parties should refrain from taking any action which might aggravate the situation.

It is clear that the Government of the United Arab Republic does not favour any action which is not acceptable to the two parties and we sincerely hope that the Security Council will not depart from its previous attitude in dealing with this question, namely, that the Council has never tried to impose a solution on the parties, but has always sought to secure the acceptance of the two parties as far as it was feasible. This is the only course which we believe might lead to the resumption of negotiations. Consequently, we could not support any proposal to which a party entertains serious and valid objections.

In concluding, we firmly believe that no course of action should be imposed on one of the parties, and that better results can be achieved if the Council acts with the consent of the parties. This in itself would place greater responsibilities on both India and Pakistan, and the moral obligation entailed in such an action would carry greater weight than any fast and rigid recommendation.

As two great nations with high traditions in Asia, and as faithful Members of the United Nations, both India and Pakistan, I am convinced, will realise the responsibilities which rest on their shoulders. They will not fail, I am sure, to inform the Council at the proper time of the progress which they will have made in seeking an early settlement of this important issue.

 Letter dated 7 February 1968 from the representative of Pakistan A. Shahi to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to the letter dated 10 January 1968 [S/8333] from the Permanent Representative of India to the United Nations and to state that it is regrettable that instead of replying to the point raised in my letters, the Permanent Representative of India has chosen to describe them as "propagandist" and taken cover under the plea of domestic jurisdiction. The facts stated in my letters are based on the unimpeachable evidence of impartial observers and were reported not only in the World Press but also in Indian newspapers. I have only to add that the Indian Permanent Representative reply takes the familiar line of anyone who cannot refute incontrovertible facts.

My Government notes the Government of India's offer to start talks on all outstanding disputes but cannot understand. their refusal to engage in discussions and exchanges on the dispute concerning Jammu and Kashmir. If the Government. of India's offer of negotiations, reiterated in their Permanent. The Representative's letter, is to be treated as genuine, then it is imperative that India abandon the claim jurisdiction in respect of acts which are designed to preclude just and honourable settlement and which have so served to exacerbate tension and prevent negotiations. I should be grateful if this letter were circulated as an official document of the Security Council.

(Signed) A SHAHI Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations

(Source: UN Document No. S/8388).

Speeches of the Representative of Pakistan Mr. Ispaheni in the Security Council Meeting. No. 226th January 6, 1948

The complaint of the Government of India was made known to me by the Secretariat of the United Nations over the telephone on the afternoon of Friday, 2 January. I received a copy of the complaint a day later. I've Since learned from my Government that it was still without knowledge of the case against it, inasmuch as the complaint was telegraphed by the Indian Government to the Government of Pakistan in a cipher which could cot be deciphered, and the Government of Pakistan has had to ask twice for the complaint to be sent again. The Government of India has now promised to send a copy to Karachi by air mail.

The Council will realize that it has not yet been possible for my Government to study the case in order to send me the necessary brief even for this initial bearing.

My Government is sending its Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, to present its case before the Security Council. At the moment, therefore, I can do little more than to say a few words from which the representatives of the countries here assembled may judge for themselves the background of the complaint of the Government of India,

My Government has repeatedly urged the Government of India the necessity of peaceful settlement by negotiation of the dispute in Kashmir. I can do no better than to quote from a speech broadcast from Lahore. I submit that this meeting should be adjourned in order to give the Foreign Minister of Pakistan sufficient time to reach New York. He should be here about the 14th or 15th of this Month. If the Security Council sees its way to granting an adjournment until that date, I shall be grateful.

I can assure the members of the Council that the Foreign Minister will lose no time in arriving in New York, since he is as anxious as everyone else to have the matter placed before the Security Council as expeditiously as possible.

I do not know where the representative of India has obtained his information, I have not received such information from my Government. I have already submitted to the Security Council that my Government is equally anxious to take up this matter and other matters before the Council. As soon as Sir Zafrullah Khan is able to get away from Karachi, he will do so. If he is able to arrive here earlier than Wednesday, 14 January, I shall, if the Security Council directs me, inform the Secretariat; the Security Council can then, if it desires, change the time of the meeting. I do not wish to suggest a date now, only to find that my Foreign Minister has not been able to arrive here on time. I am keeping a day or two margin in hand, taking into consideration the bad flying conditions in Europe and across the Atlantic. I assure the Council that I desire to be as helpful as I can.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Barco (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957

As we feared, the representative of the Soviet Union has again abused the veto power to prevent the Security Council from helping to resolve an international dispute in which the Soviet Union, presumably, has no direct interest. The Soviet representative's implication that the Security Council would be violating the Charter by authorising its President to bear in mind the proposal by one of the parties for a United Nations force to in demilitarization cannot be substantiated by anything that has been said or done here. The action of the Soviet Union can have only one purpose, to perpetuate international conflict and dissension between two of Asia's great countries. The Soviet Union takes a weighty responsibility upon itself. It has blocked measures by the United Nations to help to assure peaceful conditions in the area and friendly relations between the two States. The Security Council has considered the Kashmir problem on many occasions since 1947.

Many Members of the United Nations have served on the Council when this issue was before us. In every instance, and regardless of the membership of the Council, it has overwhelmingly approved measures to bring about a free expression of the will of the Kashmir people through an impartial plebiscite. That opinion, and those resolutions, remain valid and represent the continued sense of the Council. The resolution adopted by the Council on 24 January 1957 [S/3779], and the nine votes which our joint draft resolution has just received make this clear.

In spite of the Soviet veto, the United States hopes for progress in resolving the dispute. We believe that the parties will themselves not wish to end these discussions on the negative note of the Soviet veto. We urge them to refrain from any measures which might have the effect of increasing tension in the area. We believe that the Security Council should consider immediate action to repair the damage caused by the Soviet veto of the four-Power draft resolution. Such action would accord with its continuing responsibility to assist the parties to move towards a solution of this serious problem.

The United States, together with the delegations of Australia and the United Kingdom, therefore submitted a new draft resolution which we believe would provide for helpful action in the present circumstances. This draft resolution has just been handed to the President, and I should like to read it out to the Security Council:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution of 24 January 1957, its previous. resolutions and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on the India-Pakistan question,

"1. Requests the President security Council, the representative of Sweden, to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; to visit the sub-continent for this purpose; and to report to the Security Council not later than 15 April 1957;

"2. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan. to cooperate with him in the performance of these functions;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to render such assistance as he may request [S/3792 and Corr. 1]."

This draft resolution bases itself solidly upon the long and virtually unanimous attitude of the Security Council, as expressed in its resolutions, and upon the obligations accepted by the parties under the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It would authorise the President of the Council to discuss with India and Pakistan any proposals which have been or which may be put forward and which he thinks could help to resolve the dispute, having regard to these resolutions. In his examination of means to solve the dispute, the President would necessarily devote considerable attention to demilitarisation, which is the point at which progress towards a plebiscite has broken down.

The draft resolution vetoed by the Soviet Union offered, in our opinion, the best opportunity for progress. We hope, however, that this new draft resolution will still permit the Council to take constructive action, and we urge the Council to adopt it quickly.

Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): We deeply regret the Soviet Union veto of the four-Power draft resolution, the first veto ever cast in the long history of the Kashmir dispute. We must see what action the Council can now usefully take with a view to making progress toward a settlement. The United Kingdom still ardently desires to see progress made. It is with these considerations in mind that the United Kingdom delegation gladly joins in sponsoring the new draft resolution which has been read out by the representative of the United States.

Under this revised draft resolution, the President of the Security Council would still be enabled to visit India and Pakistan, and he would be enabled to discuss any proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions. He could hardly fail to discuss, amongst others, the problem of demilitarisation preparatory to a free and impartial plebiscite, which has been so much in the centre of our discussion here and on which I explained the attitude of the United Kingdom this morning [772nd meeting, paras, 161 and 152].

It is my hope that this revised draft resolution will commend itself to the Council, because I am sure that the President's mission, even in its present more generalised terms, will make a great contribution to the achievement of a settlement. We have faith not only in his mission, but also in the sincere desire of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan to reach a peaceful settlement.

Text of the speech made by Mr Walker (Australia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 29 February 1957

The Australian delegation deplores the Soviet Union veto of the draft resolution which commanded nine votes in the Council. We do not agree for a moment with the remarks made by the Soviet Union representative when he suggested that the draft resolution which he had defeated was contrary to the terms and spirit of the Charter; nor would I consider it worth spending any time in discussing his suggestion that the purpose of that draft resolution was to bring about another Soviet veto. It was the deep and earnest hope of my delegation-and, I am sure, of the other delegations which supported it-that the draft resolution would be carried and would pave the way for a very useful work by our President in relation to the problem of Kashmir.

We would not wish to see the firm desire of the Council to assist toward a solution of this problem completely frustrated by the Soviet veto, and we have, therefore, joined in sponsoring the new draft resolution which has just now been circulated [S/3792 and Corr. 1].

There is general agreement in the Council regarding the value of a visit by yourself, Mr. President, and your taking up with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals that in your view might lead to some progress in dealing with this difficult problem. The representative of India has assured us that our President will be welcome at any time, even though the terms of his mission may have to be considered within their political context.

As the draft resolution is now drafted, it gives to the President a free hand in selecting proposals for examination with the Governments of India and Pakistan, and the draft resolution, in that way, expresses the full confidence that we have in our distinguished President to handle this particular matter.

The views of the Australian on the method of the plebiscite and on the desirability of concentrating upon reaching agreement on appropriate measures of demilitarisation as a necessary preliminary have already been stated in the Council [768th meeting, paras, 52 and 53], and my delegation would hope that they would be borne in mind by the President when he undertakes this mission.

I very much hope that the Council will be able to adopt the draft resolution that has now been submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States along with Australia.

Text of the speech made by the President Mr. Gunnar Jarring as representative of Sweden in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957

If no other member of the Council wishes to speak, I shall speak in my capacity as representative of Sweden.

Speaking now as the representative of SWEDEN, I wish to explain my vote. Although, obviously, I voted in my capacity as representative of Sweden, the task which would have been entrusted to me under the four Power draft resolutions, as well as under the amendments, had either one of them been adopted, would have put me personally in a special position. Thus, when I abstained in the voting, I did this on the ground that I did not want my vote to be construed in any way to prejudice my mission.

I feel convinced that my colleagues on the Council will agree with me that the new development in the India-Pakistan question will require further study and reflection. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I therefore suggest that this meeting be adjourned until tomorrow afternoon, if there is no objection.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Graham (United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

I wish, Mr. President, to give you my co-operative and loyal good wishes for your most important mission. gratulate you on the opportunity to negotiate with the Governments of two great peoples whom I not only respect, but, if I may say so, have come to love for themselves-their history, their heritage, their heroic struggles with gigantic problems and yet, withal, with a joyous and youthful hope.

I congratulate the Council on your acceptance of this mission, Mr. President, for which you are by ability, experience and disposition so eminently qualified and to which you bring the prestige of the office of President of the Security Council itself. Godspeed to you on your mission, to the efforts of the Security Council, to the cooperation of the two Governments with you and to the untiring work of an ably led and dedicated Secretariat, as they all work together and stand firm on the moral foundations of the life and values of the United Nations in this time of hazard and hope.

The Member States of the United Nations must apply, with equal justice under the Charter, the principles of the United Nations to all nations, large or small, friend or foe, east or west. Problems, situations, disputes, cases on the agenda. of the United Nations have their ups and downs and come and go, but the United Nations goes on, deep in the minds and hearts of the people as they do their day's work and pray and hope, in the great adventure of building a freer and fairer peaceful world for all peoples in all lands.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957

Since the members of the Council indicated their general views on this question, we have had the opportunity of hearing further statements from the representatives of India and Pakistan. It seems timely, therefore, for the Council to consider what further steps might now profitably be taken. As an expression of our concern over this situation and of our desire to assist the Council in its consideration of it, the Australian delegation has joined with the delegations of Colombia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States in co-sponsoring the joint draft resolution contained in document S/3911. which was introduced this afternoon by the representative of the United States and supported by the representative of the United Kingdom. In view of the very clear explanations given by Mr. Wadsworth and Sir Pierson Dixon, I would wish only to offer, on behalf of the Australian delegation, some brief observations on this draft resolution now before us.

The preambular paragraphs of this draft resolution include several points which seem to us of special importance. First, the Council desires to place on record its appreciation of the assignment performed so ably by Mr Jarring, the representative of Sweden, whose report is the occasion for our meetings at this time. Secondly, the Council records its appreciation of the statements of the parties that they are desirous of co-operating with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution to this problem. Thirdly, it notes that the Governments of India and Pakistan recognize and accept the commitments undertaken by them in the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. It is on the basis of these two resolutions that the Council's efforts of the past nine years have been guided.

The concluding parts of the preamble express our common concern over the lack of progress and stress the importance of the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as one of the steps towards a settlement. I think this preamble flows very naturally from the views expressed around. this table.

Now as regards the operative paragraphs, I recognize that neither of the parties will be satisfied. It is natural enough that, after expending such efforts and skill in placing their respective cases before the Council, the parties may feel some disappointment over the operative paragraphs as we have drafted them. But we have to use our own judgement as to what we consider practicable and constructive action by the Council in all the circumstances.

I do not see that either party should object to our operative paragraph 1, though I suppose that each may feel that it has special application to the other. This is, however, solemn. appeal by the Council addressed to both Pakistan and India to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favour to the promotion of further negotiations.

Paragraph 2 touches on the delicate question of the pro gressive implementation of the Commission's resolutions, which both parties have accepted as the framework within which a practical solution of the problem might be found. The Council may recall that on 20 October, I stated that:

" It is a valid concern of the Council to resolve any doubts that may exist whether part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 remains unimplemented in any respect at this time." [798th meeting, para, 10].

This finds expression both in the first and second operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. We believe that the prospects of progress being made along the lines of the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan will undoubtedly be improved, if the Council and the two particles can be assured that part I of the 1948 resolution has been fully implemented. Indeed it seems all too clear that without such an assurance there would not be much hope of proceeding rapidly with the implementation of part II, which is the next logical step. As I said in my previous statement, the Australian delegation shares the view.

".. that within the framework of the Commission's resolutions and of the Security Council's own discussions and resolutions on the subject, a further investigation should now be made on whether some progress can be attempted on the problem of demilitarisation in Kashmir." [Ibid., para, 11].

These are the immediate objects of the draft resolution. To help the parties towards them, the Council requests the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Dr. Frank P. Graham, once more to place himself at the service of the Council and calls upon the parties to cooperate with him. Dr. Graham is asked to report to the Council on his efforts as soon as possible. He has been left discretion and flexibility because we have great confidence in his experience and his intimate knowledge of the issues

I would hope that the parties will accept this draft resolution in the spirit in which it is proposed, that is, in the hope and belief that some forward steps on this matter can and should be taken at this time.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Araujo (Colombia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957

My delegation has listened with particular attention and, of course, with deep respect, to the important statements made in support of their respective views by the spokesmen for India and Pakistan. We have given the same consideration to the statements of the other members of the Security Council, and we support the constructive, the really positive suggestion put forward by the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France and Australia in order to advance this matter and bring it to a successful conclusion. This explains my delegation's support for the joint draft resolution which it has co-sponsored together with the representatives of Australia, the United States of America, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.

The draft resolution before us in no way, not even by a single line, changes the final goal which the Security Council has sought since 1948, with the express consent of the parties concerned, namely, that a solution to this problem should be found by means of a free and impartial plebiscite in which the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir would determine their legal status. The fulfilment of this fundamental premise will constitute what we might call the birth certificate of a new life for these two provinces, and the incidents that have occurred have done nothing to invalidate all the proposals and resolutions adopted by the Security Council, which also reflect the position always held by the Colombian delegation in this matter.

Now we are entrusting to the skill, the intelligence, the authority and the recognized experience of Mr. Graham the task of approaching the two disputing Governments in order to diminish the areas of disagreement and to bring closer the goal I referred to previously. It is necessary, of course and this is a basic prerequisite of the proposal which we are co-sponsoring -that the two parties should cooperate sincerely and in a real spirit of understanding with Mr. Graham. My delegation trusts that the resentment and differences. to which our proposal may at times have given rise will disappear without leaving any trace of bitterness.

So far, we have heard no other proposal which would serve peace and the settlement we have in mind so well. Therefore, until some other proposal within the framework, the limitations, and the approach laid down by the Security Council is presented to us, we must hope that the Council will give this proposal its unanimous support.

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. A Berard as the representative of France in the Security Council Meeting No. 1012 held on 15 June 1962

I thank the representative of the United Kingdom. As no one wishes to speak, in order to advance our work I shall now take the floor as the representative of France. Our Council is again confronted with a question which it has already examined many times in the course of the last fifteen years. Since 15 August 1947, the problem of Kashmir has almost constantly engaged the attention of international opinion and of the United Nations in particular. That there is a problem, and a serious one, cannot be denied. The Security Council, the General Assembly and representatives of the Organization have, in turn, endeavoured to solve it; in this connection, I should like to pay a tribute to the work accomplished by Mr. Graham, to his perseverance and to his devotion to the cause of peace in Kashmir. The fact that we are again. gathered round this table confirms that all those efforts have hitherto been in vain. We are compelled to admit that, in this domain as in many others, nothing can replace the sovereign will of States in settling the disputes which may arise between them.

This problem, it is true, has particularly complex geographical, ethnic and linguistic aspects, to which have been added, in the last fifteen years, elements of a political, economic and social nature which render it even] more thorny. Moreover, the matter has taken on an emotional character, both at Karachi and at Delhi, which is certainly understandable but not conducive to a settlement. I shall not attempt to analyse the various aspects of the question, which the representatives of Pakistan and India have dealt with in detail. I shall refer only to that part of their arguments which concerns the possibilities of solving the problem, for that is the point on which we should concentrate our attention.

On 27 April Mr. Zafrulla Khan declared at this table that his Government's desire "is not to apportion blame, is not to raise prejudice", but that "relationships between India and Pakistan would become closer and the two countries would to co-operate in many fields to the mutual advantage (1007th meeting, para. 93). everyone"

Mr. Jha, for his part, reaffirmed on 1 February last that India would not attack Pakistan or use force against Pakistan. His Government's goal, he continued, was "to create an atmosphere free from any apprehension, and thereby to facilitate the holding of any negotiations or discussion for the settlement of this issue" (990th meeting, para. 87).

Those two statements, further confirmed by the highest authorities at Karachi and Delhi, at least reassure us about the means which the two parties intend to employ in asserting their claims to Kashmir; they are not contemplating recourse to force and are willing to enter into negotiations. Those negotiations must of course be more than a mere facade: they should be undertaken with a sincere desire for success and every condition calculated to contribute to their success should be ensured.

There are of course differences of opinion about the way in which such talks should be held. Nevertheless both India and Pakistan have expressed the desire to settle the dispute peacefully, which, in my view, is an essential element in the cast before us.

In the course of his statements, Mr. Krishna Menon made remarks from time to time of such a harsh nature that they might have seemed to bode no good. Nevertheless, ever since India became a Member of the United Nations it has constantly set itself up to be a champion of international harmony and the independence of peoples. Those are the principles which its representative still defends in the Committees of which he is a member. We do not want to question India's faithfulness to those doctrines, both in matters that affect it personally and in problems of concern to other nations.

What can the Security Council do in these circumstances ? It is not for us to choose a solution, still less to impose one. Besides, in the view of the representatives of both countries, there is no "threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression" in the words of Chapter VII of the Charter. It is therefore the provisions of Chapter VI that apply, particularly those of Article 33, which invites "the parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security", to seek first of all "a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice". All that the Security Council can do, under the terms of this Article, is to "call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means".

This is the framework imposed by the Charter on any action which our Council can take in the present circumstances. I shall express no opinion on the forms and conditions of the negotiations envisaged, because it is the parties concerned which should determine them. That is their right and their responsibility as sovereign States We can only leave it to them and place our trust in them, since through their representatives they have expressed their willingness to arrive at a settlement by peaceful means, but we must also urge them to act in such a way as to bring about and effective relaxation of tension in their relations as soon as possible.

I should like to assure the representatives of India and Pakistan of my Government's sincere wish that a solution acceptable to both parties will be found to the problem of Kashmir. Both of them know that France maintains friendly relations with their countries which it intends to preserve and strengthen.

They may rest assured that my first concern in this debate is to do or say nothing whatever that might impair the atmosphere of Franco-Indian or Franco-Pakistan relations. One of the two representatives has said that the question of Kashmir "keeps apart two countries which are linked by their traditions, their common history and their common language". That is yet another reason why they should settle their dispute rapidly, guided by the Preamble of the United Nations Charter whereby the Member States have undertaken "to practise tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours". Thus will they regain the path of confidence and friendship.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom) in the Security Council. Meeting No. 1012 weld on 15 June 1962

When the Security Council last met in May to discuss the India-Pakistan question, my delegation expected that an interval for reflection on the facts then placed before it would be useful before we met again in order to consider further what this Council might do to discharge its responsibilities and to help towards a solution of the Kashmir dispute. In the six weeks that have passed the whole question has been under active consideration by members of the Council and I trust that at the end of our meetings we shall be able to reach a helpful and constructive conclusion.

The situation in Kashmir has shown no signs of improvement since we last met. On the other hand, both India and Pakistan have held faithfully to their assurances that they do not contemplate the use of force or of measures outside the scope of the Charter of the United Nations to alter or terminate the present state of affairs, To this extent we can say that at least the situation is no worse and that the apprehensions that were expressed before the meeting of this Council in February (990th meeting) have, in the event, happily proved unfounded. This encourages us to believe not only that a solution to the dispute is possible but that the Governments of India and Pakistan will, without recourse to arms, pursue paths which lead to a final solution of this long-standing problem. In December 1956 Her Majesty's Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations gave to the United Kingdom Parliament the following statement of British policy on the Kashmir problem :

"Her Majesty's Government have always hoped that the dispute would be settled by agreement between the two countries. That is still their hope. Meanwhile, Her Majesty's Government will continue to support efforts to reach agreement which would give effect to the resolutions of the United Nations."

This remains Her Majesty's Government's policy: we are still convinced that a solution can emerge only from constructive and sincere negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan.

Until the India-Pakistan question was raised once more at the Security Council this winter, four years had passed since the last substantive discussion of the matter in this Council. It was the hope of the United Kingdom Government throughout that period, as indeed before, that the two parties would take advantage of this break in international discussion in order to hold negotiations privately which might at least have opened the way to a mutually acceptable solution. We were encouraged in this hope by the settlement since October 1958 of many of the other difficult and complicated matters in dispute between India and Pakistan and by the fact that the leaders of both countries had met from time to time in the course of this period and had, we understood, discussed the problem of Kashmir. This process of reconciliation culminated in the signing, in the autumn of 1961, by President Ayub Khan and Mr. Nehru, of an agreement about the use of the waters of the Indus River Basin. This problem, a matter of vital importance to the economies of both India and Pakistan, was felt at one time to be well-nigh insoluble. But with statesmanship, goodwill and the assistance of the President of the World Bank, Mr. Eugene Black, a solution was

found. This development seemed to us proof of the desire of the Governments of Pakistan and of India to remove all those obstacles which had prevented a full understanding between them. We have still no doubt that the desire persists but, much to our regret, it has not so far proved possible to find a basis for the settlement of the Kashmir question which would be agreeable to both parties. This continued disagreement between two member countries of the Commonwealth, for both of whom the United Kingdom has friendship and respect based on long years of the closest association, causes my delegation great concern and distress. There are perhaps no two countries in the world that have so many things in common, so many reasons for continued cooperation and amity, as have India and Pakistan. These stretch long into the past and will continue far into the future despite the present difficulties and differences. Both countries are devoting themselves to the economic advance of their peoples: it is no less than tragic that any part of their energies and resources should be diverted to this sterile and arid political dispute.

Anything which the Security Council can do to avoid the prolongation of this unhappy state of affairs should be welcome to the two parties, to their fellow members of the Commonwealth and to the world community as a whole.

This leads me to the question how the Security Council can help at the present moment. As to this, Mr. President, my delegation finds itself in general sympathy and agreement with the considerations advanced this morning in the persuasive statement of the distinguished representative of the United States.

As I mentioned earlier, our view is that this dispute can only be settled by negotiation between the parties. Neither the Security Council nor any other outside body is in a position to dictate a solution. Nevertheless, the Security Council cannot wash its hands of this affair. The past history of discussion before it and its previous decisions make this impossible. We have the clear duty to formulate a view. Furthermore, I believe that the Security Council can have a positive and helpful role to play.

As I have said, the absence of any progress over the last four years has disappointed our hopes that fruitful negotiations would take place without some form of friendly outside intervention. The Security Council may be able to help by acting as a catalyst and in preparing the ground for negotiation. The Council should consider whether there is not some procedure which it might recommend with a view to clearing the air and removing the obstacles in order to bring about a negotiation in the most hopeful circumstances.

We naturally hope that any such procedure as may be suggested as the upshot of our discussions here would be welcome to the Governments of both India and Pakistan and would be accepted by them in the same friendly spirit as it is offered.

The United Kingdom Government is encouraged by the precedent of the Indus waters to think that a procedure roughly analogous-that is to say by the two parties availing themselves, to the extent that this might be useful, of the good offices of some third party acceptable to both of them-might lead the way to the solution that I am sure is desired by all. We hope, therefore, that further discussion at this current session will not become too embedded in the past history of the case.

My delegation has deliberately not entered into the rights. and wrongs or the merits and demerits of the dispute. We have our views, but we do not feel that it would be helpful to the prospects of solution to utter them at this stage. It is not by the laying of blame but by the good will of those most closely concerned that success in resolving this dispute will come.

We therefore most earnestly ask that the Governments of India and Pakistan and the members of this Council consider the matter in the light of the future prospects of solution rather than of past histories of disagreements and disputes.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hsueh (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1012 held on 15 June 1962

I do not propose to discuss all of the many issues involved in the complex question which is now under our consideration. As we all know, the India-Pakistan question-or the Kashmir question is the oldest of all territorial disputes that have been brought up in the United Nations My delegation happens to be one of those which have participated in all the debates that have taken place on this question at more than one hundred meetings of the Security Council. I believe the position of my Government on the various issues has been made amply clear. In this debate, therefore, I will address myself only to the pertinent basic principles, the importance of which justifies a reaffirmation of our support, and perhaps also to one or two points concerning the latest development which may call for some comment.

It is indeed regrettable that this territorial dispute between India and Pakistan should have remained on the books of the Security Council for more than fourteen years. The latest mission undertaken by Mr. Graham has not, in spite of his diligence and resourcefulness, yielded the hoped-for result. My delegation has carefully studied his last report and wishes to pay tribute to him for his efforts. We have also listened with great attention to the statements made at the earlier meetings of the Council by the representatives of the two parties. To be frank, I must say that we have found few elements in these statements to justify any hope for an early solution of the long dispute. The two parties seem to remain as far apart on this question as they were fourteen years ago.

However, it cannot be said that the present debate has been in vain. It has been quite useful. It will be recalled that, late last year and early this year, numerous statements were These made by persons of considerable influence, both in India and Pakistan, about possible forcible action over Kashmir. statements, while seemingly justifiable in the eyes of the party making them, sounded warlike to the other. No doubt they have contributed to the rise of tension between the two countries. It will be recalled that Pakistan made the request for the present meetings of the Security Council mainly because, in its belief, such statements made in India, particularly those during the national election, constituted a threat to international peace and security.

Against that background, the Council has now heard, during this debate, categorical guarantees given by both parties that they will not seek a settlement of the question through the use of force. I am sure that the Council warmly welcomes these guarantees. For not only do they help relax the tension and thereby create a culmer atmosphere, which is necessary if any new effort toward a settlement is to succeed at all, but, what is more, they also serve to reinforce, in a general sense, respect for the principle of peaceful settlement of international disputes as contained in our Charter. This support of what may be considered the most fundamental principle of our Organisation is all the more welcome, coming as it does at a time when the threat or use of force tends to become again the mode of nations in the settlement of territorial disputes in the name of one high-sounding doctrine or another. My delegation is of the view that, in any resolution that may be adopted on this question, the Council should take due note of these guarantees.

It has been said in connection with the Kashmir question that life has not stood still but hrs moved forward and that much water has passed under the bridge during these fourteen years. I think that is very true. We have heard what the parties have done in these years for the people of Kashmir about economic progress, about industrial development, about the growth of wealth, about the educational achievements and about the improvement of health conditions. I think we all can and should join the people of Kashmir in their rejoicing over the increasingly better conditions in which they live My delegation has nothing but admiration for such good work which benefits the people. But it cannot be said that such internal development, which is so desirable and necessary, has caused any change in the legal status of Kashmir.

Nor could the current initiative which is reported to have been taken by Pakistan, to negotiate with the Chinese Communists in regard to the border of Kashmir, have any effect on the status of Kashmir. What Pakistan hopes to gain from such negotiations, I do not know. India's reaction to such negotiations has already been made known in this Council and elsewhere. On instructions from my Government, I wish to put on record that the result of such negotiations, if any, will not be binding on my Government and on the people of China.

It is only fair to all parties concerned to say that in the eyes of the Security Council, nothing has happened in Kashmir that changes the legal status of that territory. The status of Kashmir remains what it was fourteen years ago. In the absence of an agreement between India and Pakistan, it cannot be determined without regard to the principle of self-determination. This has been the position consistently taken by the Security Council on the Kashmir question. I do not see how it is possible for the Council to take any other position.

The plebiscite elaborately worked out by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, agreed to by the parties and approved by the Security Council, is the means by which the principle of self-determination is to be put into practice in Kashmir. It is the means by which the people of Kashmir are to express freely, under fair and equitable conditions, their will as to the future of the country. It has now been said that such expression has been made through the three elections held in Kashmir. In all sincerity and with due respect, my delegation has yet to be convinced that these elections could have served the same purpose as the plebiscite is designed to serve. I do not think that the people were consulted in these elections about the future status of Kashmir. Furthermore, the UNCIP resolutions contain detailed provisions concerning demilitarisation, withdrawal of troops and other matters, all of which are designed to create fair and equitable conditions so that the plebiscite will be free and impartial and will not be influenced in one way or another. My delegation is constrained to say that the three elections held in Kashmir, however fair and democratic in their own field, are no substitute for the plebiscite and that they have no bearing on the status of Kashmir.

The holding of a plebiscite has been blocked by an impasse which developed at an early stage in the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions. It has become increasingly difficult to remove the impasse as time goes on. After all these years, it might be impractical and futile to determine the responsibility for such an impasse. Even if the Council could today make a definite finding as to who and what have obstructed the full implementation of the UNCIP resolutions, it does not seem likely that such a finding would improve the situation and help settle the dispute. When we find a door closed and even locked, we may of course keep on knocking on it persistently in order to have it opened. At the same time, we may also wish to turn around and see if there is another door which may not be so tightly closed. I think that we must continue to probe all possible approaches to a solution of this long deadlocked dispute.

The Security Council should take advantage of this present debate to urge the two parties to enter into new negotiations. They may wish to do so between themselves or with the help of a third party. As the representative of the United States has just said, the Security Council should be prepared to give them all possible assistance. In the past, the good offices of the Secretary-General have frequently proved helpful in handling delicate and complicated situations. In the present case, the Acting Secretary-General, coming from a country which neighbours both India and Pakistan, can be assumed to have intimate knowledge and appreciation of the intricacies of the problem. My delegation believes that the services may well be utilised. Territorial disputes have afflicted many regions of the world in the course of history. Some of them have proven The leaders of India terribly costly, such as Alsace-Lorraine. and Pakistan of course know this, but the two peoples, moved by passionate nationalism and patriotism, may not know it. Let me express the hope that the people of India and the people of Pakistan will face the problem of Kashmir not only with warm hearts, but also with cool heads.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Stevenson (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1012 held on 15 June 1962

Mr. President, first, let me thank you and the other members of the Council for your kindness and courtesy in re arranging the hour of this meeting to accomodate me. My schedule, unfortunately, makes it necessary for me to be absent this afternoon and I wanted to express even briefly a few views on the subject of Kashmir before leaving.

The United States, as much as any Member of our Organization, regrets that this fourteen-year old dispute between two great countries, with both of whom we enjoy the friendliest of relations, has yet to be resolved and is still on our agenda of unfinished business of great importance. It has commanded the attention and taxed the resourcefulness of the members of the Security Council on many occasions and for long intervals of time during these years. Since 1948 some of the most illustrious statesmen ever associated with this Organization have laboured long and hard to advance a solution. General. McNaughton of Canada, Sir Owen Dixon of Australia, Mr. Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden and, since 1951, the present United Nations representative for India and Pakistan on this question, a distinguished citizen of my country, Mr. Frank P. Graham, have all brought their wisdom and experience to bear on this stubborn problem.

Although their efforts and those of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the Security Council have not yet been rewarded by success, I am sure I express the views of most of the members of the Council that we all have a duty to preserve in our search for a solution to this dispute. a dispute which has poisoned not only the relations between the two countries principally concerned, but which also threatens the peace of the sub-continent.

It has seemed to my delegation that the best approach at this stage of the prolonged debate is to take for a point of departure the area of common ground which exists between the two parties. I refer of course to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were accepted by both parties and which in essence provide for demilitarisation of the territory and a plebiscite whereby the population may freely decide the future status of Jammu and Kashmir. Certainly there can be no misunderstanding of paragraph 1 of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949 which reads as follows:

"The question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite".

Furthermore, this is in full conformity with the principle. of the self-determination of peoples which is enshrined in Article 1 of the Charter as one of the very purposes for which the United Nations exists.

Numerous resolutions have been adopted by the Security Council with a view to furthering the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions. Pursuant to the terms of several of these resolutions, Mr. Graham, with the indefatigable patience of the peace-maker, has made repeated suggestions to the two parties for practical steps for demilitarisation and a plebiscite. His last report, dated 28 March 1958, relates in detail his efforts in accordance with the terms of the most recent resolution of the Council on this subject. Unfortunately, one of the parties to the dispute was unable to agree to the five recommendations made by Mr. Graham during his visit to the sub-continent in January and February 1958.

In spite of the long standing and sometimes discouraging history of this dispute, I repeat that we must not lose heart. In his most recent report, Mr. Graham, after reporting the lack of agreement on his five recommendations, makes a further recommendation which, it seems to my delegation, has great relevance today, four years later. In his report, Mr. Graham

states as follows: ".. I still express to the Council the hope that the two Governments will keep under consideration the proposal for a high level conference. I trust that, in their further consideration, they will find it possible promptly them selve to make, without prejudice to their respective positions on the Kashmir question, preparations for holding, within the framework of the Charter of the United Nations, such a conference at the earliest practicable date, covering questions of time, place, auspices and agenda. The agenda, as the parties might choose, might include the basic differences which the parties find to stand in the way of a settlement and such other matters as the parties might find would contribute to 'progress toward the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 and towards a peaceful settlement'."

We believe that this suggestion deserves the most careful consideration by the members of the Security Council. It was with a view toward facilitating such a high-level conference that President Kennedy offered the services of Mr. Eugene Black, President of the World Bank, to explore with each head of Government the outlines and prospects for negotiations and discussions which hopefully might lead to a final resolution of this troubled and contentious matter.

To our regret, this offer was not accepted by one of the parties. We are convinced that a high-level conference between India and Pakistan which, we believe, would be facilitated by such an exploration, would enable the parties to ascertain the precise areas of disagreements between them and should, we hope, induce that spirit of compromise and magnanimity on both sides without which no problem can ever be truly solved.

In any event, this Council must be prepared in such ways as it can to assist the parties in moving this dispute off dead centre. India and Pakistan-these two neighbours who share the same sub-continent, who spring from the same national soil, who possess so much common history and who together contain such an impressive share of the world's population - have now too long dissipated their energies and their resources in this costly conflict.

By removing this dispute, the parties concerned can set an example for statesmen everywhere and can contribute significantly to the cause of world peace The larger interest of South Asia's peace and security require, it seems to us, the prompt settlement of the Kashmir dispute. We are confident the other members of the Security Council share our conviction that the Council has a definite responsibility to use its best efforts to ensure that such a settlement be attained.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Plimpton (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1011 held on 4 May 1962

Referring to the statement by the representative of Pakistan concerning the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah on the ground that he had been conspiring with a foreign Power and to the mention in that connexion of Governor Stevenson, although the Governor is absent on his way to Illinois, I think I can assure the Council that he is quite innocent of ever having been "a foreign Power".

I suspect that many members of the Security Council will wish to give the most careful attention to the lengthy detailed statements that have been made to the Council and to consult as to what measures can best be taken, looking towards a solution of the situation that has been described to us by two countries, with both of whom the United States has had, has and wishes always to continue to have the friendliest of relations. There is no question but that a serious dispute does exist between these two neighbours and that the Security Council has an obligation to use its best and most serious efforts to contribute to the settlement of that dispute. My delegation will join most earnestly with other delegations in those efforts,

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Patrick Dean (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1011 held on 4 May 1962

I propose to be very brief. This Council has listened for some five meetings to full statements by the representative of Pakistan and the Minister of Defence of India. These statements have covered in considerable detail the historical and political aspects of this highly complex question Both speakers also made comparatively full explanations, from their respective points of view, of the extremely important legal considerations involved. My delegation is grateful to both the representative of Pakistan and the Minister of Defence of India for their full presentations which have certainly been of help in expounding the issues involved, in particular to persons like myself who were not present at earlier meetings of the Security Council on this subject.

My delegation would certainly require more time to study all that has been said here and all the documents, both legal and political, to which reference has been made, before venturing to state any definitive position on the issues involved. Enough, however, has been said in the course of the present debate alone to make it clear that the respective views and attitudes of the two delegations, of India and Pakistan, are in very many respects still far apart. The reasons for this are manifold, and, in the light of the past, for unintelligible. Each side blames the other, and as the years go by the area of common ground between them certainly appears to my delegation to grow no larger. I say this without attempting in the least to assess responsibility or even to assign the causes in detail. I state it as a fact, and, to the mind of my delegation, with its very close and long-enduring ties with both parties, a most regrettable fact.

My delegation does not wish at his time to make any attempt to weigh the actual or potential risks to the maintenance of peace in the area itself or in the greater region. surrounding it, which a continuation of the present deep and long-lasting disputes poses or may pose in the future. Both sides have categorically assured this Council that however dis satisfied they may be with the present situation and at the prospect that it may remain unresolved for some time to come, they do not contemplate the use of force or of measures outside the scope of the Charter of the United Nations in order to alter it or terminate it. My delegation has taken careful note of these assurances and welcomed them without reserve. Other and the Council as well may feel the same, but that in itself cannot discharge the Council from the continuing responsibility placed on it by the Charter to avert any threat to the peace that may be still inherent in the continuation of the present situation and to see to it that the situation does not deteriorate still further, thus endangering to some greater degree the maintenance of peace.

Is there anything more that this Council can or should do in the present state of affairs and at the present moment to discharge its inevitable duty or to begin to help towards a solution ? On this my delegation would wish to reserve judgement while taking time to study the legal and political issues involved. My delegation do, however, feel that the solution in the end must be found by the road of negotiation. There are many forms indeed which such could take. The

modalities, the conditions, the timing, and so on, are all capable of discussion. I do not want to go into this now. As I say, time may be needed to work these out. But at the bottom, this problem is one which for almost every reason-historical, legal and political is the concern of Pakistan and India and it is to these two countries and to their two Governments that in the end all who are, like ourselves, friends of both and this Council must look-and must appeal-to negotiate with each other, using, if so, in whatever form they may deem it helpful, such aid from outside as may lead in the direction which all Members of the United Nations so earnestly desire.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Morozov (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 1010 held on 4 May 1962

Gentlemen, after almost five years, the Security Council is once again obliged, on the initiative of Pakistan, to examine the so-called question of Kashmir. As early as the beginning of this year, as you know, attempts were made to secure urgent consideration of this question in the Security Council. In the Pakistan letter of 29 January 1962 [S/5068] it is stated that: ".. a very grave situation prevails between India and Pakistan which calls for immediate consideration by the Security Council.

It should be pointed out at once that even then it was obvious to anyone who studied this representation carefully that there were no grounds for the assertion that India, by its actions in the Kashmir region, was creating a threat to international peace and security. For this reason, as you will doubtless recall, as early as 1 February 1962 [990th meeting] the representative of the Soviet Union in the Security Council, V.A. Zorin rightly observed that there was no need to call a meeting of the Security Council on the Kashmir question.

Now, after hearing out the six-hour speech made by the representative of Pakistan, those who listened to him and studied the text of his statement objectively will note first of all that in spite of its length, this speech contains no new circumstances to supplement those which representatives of that country have referred to during the discussions which have occupied nearly a hundred meetings of the Security Council devoted in various years, starting in 1948 and continuing until 1957, to the consideration of this question. Now, as then, there are no grounds for accusing India of creating a threat to peace and security in the Kashmir region.

If we cast our minds back over the period separating us from the last discussion of the Kashmir question in the Security Council four and a half years ago, we shall find that the main, the basic fact, is the continuing occupation of one third of the territory of Kashmir by Pakistan forces. On the other hand, not one objective investigator can adduce, in respect of that period, a single fact to indicate that India has used, or proposes to use, force in that region.

If we are to speak of new facts relating to the period mentioned, these new facts consist in the situation's definite normalisation, which is evident in that considerable part of Kashmir which is under the jurisdiction of India.

One cannot avoid noting, in this connection, certain indisputable facts which bear witness to the undoubted progress achieved by the people of Kashmir in that part of the territory since the cessation of military activities. We venture to refer to certain data drawn from the document which the delegation of India yesterday asked should be distributed here as an official document. We shall mention some of the facts which have not yet been referred to here. Here are a few figures characterising, in very spare and unvarnished terms, the real situation now obtaining in that part of the territory which is under the direct administration of India.

Total capital investment in the economy of Kashmir has increased more than twofold: per caput income has increased by 20 per cent; food production has increased from 300,000 to 500,000 tons; the amount of electric power produced has increased almost four times, the number of industrial undertakings has increased almost threefold per caput expenditure on public health services has increased six times; the number of hospitals and other medical establishments has increased almost fourfold; and finally, gentlemen, as a result of this indubitable progress, the population's average life expectancy has risen from thirty-two to forty-seven years. These then are the really new facts, if are going to speak of new facts, relating to what has happened in recent years in this part of Kashmir.

Having said this, I should remark that some of you may think or say that it would be more appropriate to put forward facts of this kind, not in the Security Council Chamber, but in the neighbouring Economic and Social Council Chamber which is a more suitable place for statements showing improvements in the standards of living and economies of individual countries.

These new facts do, of course, merit the attention of the Economic and Social Council. But it is quite deliberately that we mention them on the present occasion; for we wish to show with all the emphasis at our command that, when the ground less assertion is made over and over again that the people of Kashmir has not exercised its right to national self-determination, these data, together with the fact that the population of Kashmir has during the period in question more than once expressed its will through general elections, have not only economic and social but, above all, political significance. Therefore, from our point of view, the document submitted here by the Indian delegation is quite rightly headed: "Jammu and Kashmir Development in Freedom."

We cannot fail to observe that in the light of these real facts a note of definite discord was sounded by the assertion made in the speech of the representative of Pakistan [1007th and 1008th meetings], who, as if purposely, attempted to paint the present situation in the region of Kashmir in sombre colours. An obvious discord, or, as the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, said here [1009th meeting], the shadow of a threat was contained in this assertion by the Pakistan representative. I want to give two quotations from the statement of the representative of Pakistan, because they seem to me important for an explanation of the position now assumed. by the Pakistan delegation on this question in the Security Council:

"If the Security Council does not want the elements in the State who started the liberation battle to start again, if the Security Council does not desire that the tribesmen. should get out of hand and pour into Kashmir again, if the Security Council does not desire that the people of Pakistan should get out of hand and-if I may mix the metaphor-take the bit between their teeth and run away with the whole system of ordered government and if the Security Council does not desire that powerful neighbouring States should plunge into the vortex when it starts again, the Security Council had better take note of the realities of the situation." [1007th meeting, para. 63.]

And further on, we read:

"And if it boils up again, it will not then be confined to where it was confined in those days- a local struggle in the State of Jammu and Kashmir." [Ibid., para. 64.]

Here, gentlemen, every word is a threat to use armed force and not only a threat to use it in the Kashmir region, but in fact a threat to draw practically the whole world into an armed conflict Nobody, of course, can be led astray by the words regarding the so-called "liberation battle", for it is known that these words have served in the past and still serve, merely as a cover for the invasion of Kashmir territory by the Pakistan forces and the presence of these forces on part of that territory at the present time. I shall not go into the history of this invasion now. Hundreds of meetings have been devoted by the Council to the examination of the Kashmir question, and the records of these meetings contain a sufficient wealth of factual material. The representative of India has already recalled here the dark and tragic picture of this invasion, which it then was and still is groundlessly sought to represent as a so-called "liberation battle".

We shall merely recall-and this perhaps might prove useful that the invasion of the territory of Kashmir by Pakistan forces is noted, in objective yet extremely definite terms; in the resolution adopted on 13 August 1948 by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan - a resolution which was later confirmed by the Security Council, a resolution which was not rejected by Pakistan at the time.

References have already been made here to this key document, and further references will be made-and with justification. I ask you to forgive me for not, in my turn, being able to avoid quoting certain vital or material provisions of this document. For example, in part II, Section A, paragraph 1, we read:

"As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material. change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State."

I would draw attention to the last phrase: "..the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State."

And I quote paragraph 2:

"The Government of Pakistan will use its best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting."

Here in some sort-rather lyrically told, and I would have said rather toned down-is the story of the picture which the representative of India drew yesterday in the Council. Here it mentions that they "entered the State for the purpose of fighting". Here are the calm and quite objective lines confirming the fact of armed aggression against Kashmir. It is known, however, that this decision for the withdrawal of the Pakistan troops, this provision of the resolution, has never been implemented. And now, here at a meeting of the Security Council, before the eyes of the whole world, as we became convinced in listening to the statement of the representative of Pakistan, they again openly threaten to repeat the invasion of Kashmir, and moreover, an even larger on scale.

One thinks involuntarily, gentlemen, of the connection between the new and bellicose statements made after a long interval- and these feverish military preparations and the flow of foreign arms into countries which are members of the well known military blocs of CENTO and SEATO.

Will you now kindly turn your thoughts to what happened here yesterday at the meeting of the Security Council? Compare these war like declarations with what was said here yesterday by the distinguished Defence Minister of India, Mr. Krishna Menon. I do not yet possess the text of the provisional verbatim record, so am obliged to speak from the notes when I made during the meeting and from the statements to the press which were published. Nevertheless, I think, that I shall be able to convey the sense of his statement accurately. The sense of the statement is clear. It is as the representative of India said, that the Government of India will not take the initiative in military action and India will not use force if force is not used against India.

It was particularly stressed that, despite India's rights in respect to the one third of Kashmir which the Pakistan troops continue to occupy, India will continue to seek a peaceful settlement and will not begin military operations, as I say, if military operations are not begun against it.

Gentlemen, a comparison of the two statements which we have heard, those of Pakistan and India, needs no comment. On the one hand we hear warlike sabre-rattling and see the continuing occupation by force of part of the territory of Kashmir while the other side displays extreme restraint, patience and a love of peace in keeping with the general line of the neutral and peaceful policy followed by India.

It seems hardly necessary to return in any detail to the discussions which have taken place in previous years in the Security Council on the Kashmir question. It is impossible to analyse in any detail the dozens of different references and quotations contained in the last statement of the representative of Pakistan. Indeed it would be impossible with any regard for seriousness to calculate, as the distinguished Muhammad Zafrulla Khan tried to do, how many of the young people in the territory of Kashmir cried "Long live Pakistan" or "Long ive India" in the public places, and how the local police reacted to these cries; or enter upon a discussion of dozens and dozens of trifling and irrelevant facts out of which an attempt was none the less made here, as with tiny stones for a mosaic, to create an unreal picture of the present situation in Kashmir. In this connection, we can only suggest that there is evidently still some force in the ancient saying: "He who proves too much proves nothing." However, from amongst the matters connected with the history of the Kashmir question and the previous discussion of this question in meetings of the Security Council, I should like to deal with two really important issues which were raised at the earlier discussions and which have already been touched upon in the course of the debate at the Council's present meeting. We will confine ourselves to these two questions, dealing with them very briefly.

These questions are the withdrawal of troops from the territory of Kashmir, and the so-called plebiscite. Not only objective analysis of the wealth of documentation on this subject, but even the representatives of Pakistan cannot deny that the plebiscite, which was unquestionably a compromise measure, was contemplated and could have taken place fourteen years ago only subject to the proviso that the Pakistan troops, who, as is known, had invaded the territory of Kashmir in 1947, were withdrawn.

In the resolution of the United Nations Commission dated 5 January 1949, we read in paragraph 2 the following:

"A plebiscite will be held when it shall be found by the Commission that the cease-fire and truce arrangements set forth in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 have been carried out…’’

And what are the provisions in part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 which are mentioned ? If we turn to part II of section B of that resolution, we read in paragraph 1:

"When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals. referred to in part II, A, 2 hereof have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was represented by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistan. forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from that State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission."

We have already said that the conditions, according to which the Pakistan troops should have been withdrawn from the principality of Jammu and Kashmir, have not been complied with. Therefore we agree that, in accordance with the text of the resolutions mentioned, and also in accordance with the generally accepted principles of international law, to which Mr. Krishna Menon rightly referred here yesterday, the question of holding a plebiscite has lapsed, since the provisions which were a condition for holding it have never been fulfilled.

In order to justify the failure to comply with the obligations regarding the withdrawal of Pakistan troops from the territory of Kashmir, as you know, gentlemen, assertions which were advanced many years ago are not being repeated anew, in the same and also in slightly altered-form, claiming that the resolution of 13 August 1948 provided for the simultaneous withdrawal of both Pakistan and Indian troops.

It must be said that at times this opinion has been put forward in completely undisguised form. Let us take, for example, the Graham report of 31 March 1958. In this document we read:

"They [the Government of Pakistan] informed me further. that they were prepared to withdraw the Pakistan troops from the State of Jammu and Kashmir simultaneously with the withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces from the State

In other cases, the same statement has been made in somewhat different form. They have spoken, and are speaking now, of a so-called synchronised withdrawal of the troops of India and Pakistan, or a so-called demilitarisation of Kashmir. The most recent statement of the representative of Pakistan at a meeting of the Council leaves no doubt that today the so-called synchronisation or demilitarisation of Kashmir implies. the same incorrect interpretation of the resolution of 13 August 1984 in other words, the proposition that the withdrawals of Pakistan and of Indian forces from the territory of Kashmir should begin simultaneously.

It is hardly worth wasting time or effort in proving that references of such a kind contradict the text of the resolution of 13 August 1948, since this resolution provides clearly that Pakistan must first withdraw all its forces from the entire territory of Kashmir.

That is why the present new attempts after the passing of fourteen years, to make India responsible for the collapse: of the plan to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir at that time are groundless.

We have made this small historical excursion in order to demonstrate further that the plebiscite-which in the given conditions of 1948 could have had a definite meaning if the key condition mentioned by us, the withdrawal in the first place of all Pakistan forces from the whole territory of Kashmir, had been observed - has now fourteen years later, in the light of entirely different circumstances, and because life has not stood still but has moved forward, lost any significance whatsoever.

As we shall show presently, and as has already been shown here in the convincing statement of the distinguished representative of India, the people of Kashmir, in the years since that time, has been able to express its will in a sufficiently definite manner. Let us look at some facts. It is known that the Indian Independence Act passed by the British Parliament on 18 June 1947 ended British rule in India on 15 August 1947. This Act provided for the creation, as from that date, of a new State Pakistan-through the detaching of certain regions in the north-west and east of British India.

We may recall that, in accordance with the Act, some 565 Indian States, which up to that time had been directly. governed by Indian princes and rulers, became free to link their future with whichever of the two Dominions they chose. The provisions applying in particular to the procedure for the adherence of Indian States to the Union of India were contained in the Constitution of India, which entered into force on 15 August 1947.

This provision stated that an Indian State should be deemed to be accepted into the Dominion if the Governor General had recognized the agreement on association drawn

up by the ruler.

The Constitution also provided that the Indian States which had associated themselves in this way became an integral part of the Union of India. We would further recall that almost all the States joined either India or Pakistan at different times after 15 August 1947. In each case the agreement on association was signed by the ruler, as required by law.

On 26 October 1947, as has already been mentioned here, the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir drew up an agreement on association with India, in strict accordance with the constitutional form and procedure which we have just recalled. The Governor General of India, Lord Mountbatten, endorsed the agreement on association on 27 October 1947.

It is important to stress that this document is identical with hundreds of other agreements with States which joined either India or Pakistan.

Thus, as has already been noted here, Jammu and Kashmir became, as from 27 October 1947, a State forming part of the Union of India. Strictly speaking, this agreement alone from the standpoint both of national legislation and of international law-was sufficient for Jammu and Kashmir to be considered an integral part of India.

However, the matter did not end there. In 1951, 1957 and 1962, elections were held within the framework of the Constitution of India, including general elections in 1957 and 1962, in which an overwhelming majority of the population of Kashmir very clearly expressed its will.

Statements have been made here-and may be made again-as to the need to effect new studies and investigations of some sort, to adopt arbitration procedure, with a view to establishing the circumstances and reasons which have made it impossible, up to now, to regard the position throughout Kashmir as having been normalised. The Soviet delegation considers that in the light of the analysis of the circumstances which have been adduced here during the meetings of the Council, in the light of the circumstances which we have just stated to the Council, in the light of the real situation which has developed in the course of recent years in the region under discussion, such measures or proposals could only exacerbate the Kashmir question and increase the temperature and tension. The adoption of such decisions could not, in our opinion, serve the cause of the strengthening of international peace and security. Such decisions would be calculated only, as before, to create an atmosphere of uncertainty and anxiety, to call in question the indisputable fact that Kashmir is an integral part of India.

This is why the Soviet delegation, in the light of all the circumstances just described, cannot allow the adoption of such proposals. The position of the Soviet Union on the Kashmir question has been stated on numerous occasions at meetings of the Security Council. It is clear and precise to the highest degree. The question of Kashmir, which is one of the States of the Republic of India and forms an integral part of India, has been decided by the people of Kashmir itself. The people of Kashmir has decided this matter in accordance with the principles of democracy and in the interest of strengthening friendly relations between the peoples of this region.

As Mr. NS. Khrushchev pointed out in 1955, the population of Kashmir does not want Kashmir to become a toy in the hands of imperialist forces. And a policy based on the principle of "divide and rule" undoubtedly conflicts with the vital interests of the peoples of both India and Pakistan. This was well understood at the time, and still is understood, by the people of Kashmir.

That is why attempts to set passions alight about religious differences between certain peoples of India could never be in the interests of those peoples. Such attempts can profit only those whose desire it is to see the peoples of Asia divided those, in particular who would like to exploit the abnormal relations between India and Pakistan, for purposes having nothing in common with the task of strengthening peace in this region and throughout the world.

Therefore, gentlemen, the sooner a peaceful settlement of the so-called Kashmir question is reached on the basis of unconditional respect for the will of the people of Kashmir which has irrevocably decided to link its fate with that of India, the better it will be, and this will be in full accordance with the Principles and Purposes of the United Nations Charter.

In our opinion, the members of the Security Council can note with satisfaction the statement of the Government of India that India will never take the initiative in starting military action in the Kashmir region. This formal statement constitutes a guarantee given by India. In our view, the Government of Pakistan should give a similar guarantee, if it is also really trying to achieve peace.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. T.F. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 808 held on 2 December 1957

The resolution which the Security Council has adopted today is, in my opinion, a moderate and constructive approach to the problem. It is certainly a step in the right direction. My delegation hopes that it will lead to a solution of the problem.

The final word in this whole problem does not belong to any member of the Security Council, or to the Council as a whole, or to the representatives of India or Pakistan who are sitting at this table. The final word as to the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir belongs to the people of Kashmir. When that final word is given to the world through a free and fair plebiscite, the problem will be solved. Until that final word is given, I am afraid that the problem will remain with us. I hope that Mr. Graham's efforts will bring closer that day when the people of Kashmir will be enabled to tell the whole world what their own choice is.

Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 808 held on 2 December 1957

The resolution which has just been adopted by the Security Council will, we hope, be a contribution towards a solution of the problem of Kashmir. If it is read as a whole, I am confident that that will be its effect.

I would like to express my Government's gratitude to the representative of Sweden for his timely and constructive initiative. He has once again placed the Governments concerned and the Security Council in his debt.

I would also like to say a word in reply to the statements. which have been made in this Council by the Soviet Union representative. I was disappointed, if not particularly surprised, by Mr. Sobolev's statement at the Council's meeting on 21 November, that he intended to vote against the draft resolution of which the United Kingdom was one of the sponsors [805th meeting, para, 81]. I do not propose to discuss today, at this late stage, the motives which led the Soviet Union to take that decision. I would only say what I think is evident to all that if the Soviet Union had carried out this statement of intention the situation with which we are dealing would have been greatly complicated; the atmosphere would have become even more embittered; and our hopes of modest progress towards a solution would have been diminished.

I would like to convey our good wishes to Mr. Graham in the task with which he is now entrusted. We know that it is not an easy task, but we are confident that he will discharge it with his habitual integrity and skill. We in the United Kingdom are fully aware of the difficulties in the way of finding a solution to this problem. For a number of reasons, we find ourselves living rather close to it. We do not expect Mr. Graham to produce a final, ready-made solution. We do, however, hope that he may be able to accomplish some step forward in the direction of a settlement.

Finally, I should like to appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to extend to Mr. Graham, as the representative of the United Nations, their full cooperation.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Wadsworth (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 808 held on 2 December 1957

I should like to say just a few words about our support of the Swedish amendments, and now of the amended draft resolution, and also briefly to exercise my right of reply in connection with the comments of the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics about the United State earlier in our discussions and to a lesser extent perhaps, his comments today.

The burden of the complaint of the USSR was that the United States of America gives military aid to Pakistan. Little else need be said about it than that, except that he sought to utilise this fact to convert the Security Council's consideration. of the Kashmir problem from a serious attempt to solve a difficult issue into an exercise in power politics. The United States is glad to cooperate in a collective security arrangement with Pakistan, the reasons for which are found in Soviet policies in action. We are also glad to maintain friendly relations with India, a fact which was referred to by the Indian representative during our discussion in this Council.

We are pleased that the Council has acted soberly and responsibly and has not been drawn into the cold war atmosphere which the representative of the USSR sought to instil. We sincerely hope that the adoption of the resolution which we have just passed will assist in bringing the Kashmir problem to a final solution.

We voted for the amendments submitted by the representative of Sweden because we considered them to be consistent with the purpose of the original draft resolution and because they seemed helpful in enabling the parties to receive the United Nations representative. As was the case with the original draft resolution, the amendments direct the United Nations representative to seek to bring about the implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and we continue to believe that in doing this it is important to make progress on demilitarisation, as the preamble to the resolution continues to reflect. The amendments are also directed towards achieving a peaceful settlement, and this is fully consistent with the reference in the preamble to the statement by both parties that this is what they desire.

As we have stated often, and as we wish to repeat again today,. if a final solution is to be reached it is fundamental that both parties must agree. The only agreed method of reaching

a solution so far is set out in the resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan. The reference to them in the preamble continues to reflect the point. common understanding on this point.

We hope that Dr. Frank P. Graham will have a successful. trip to the sub-continent, and we hope that both India and Pakistan will and we are sure that they will cooperate with him sincerely and earnestly in seeking to achieve the objectives of his mission.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 808 held on 2 December 1957

Before the Security Council votes on the draft resolution submitted by five Powers [S/3911, and amended as proposed by the Swedish representative, the delegation of the Soviet Union feels obliged to recall once again its position in principle on the Kashmir question, namely, that the discussion of the question in the Security Council should not be used as a pretext for outside interference in the affairs of Asian countries or for imposing an alien will upon them in any form.

From this point of view, the Soviet delegation continues to regard as inexpedient, and protests against, any attempts to impose upon the parties any kind of mediatory mission. It considers that the most suitable method of settling the differences between India and Pakistan in connection with the Kashmir question would be by direct negotiation between the parties; this would, in our opinion, best meet the interests of those parties.

The Soviet delegation therefore considers that, in the circumstances, the Security Council should give assistance to the parties along these lines and should refuse to endorse the property draft resolution, the amended version of which stage suffers from a number of serious shortcomings.

As the Soviet delegation has already pointed out, the draft resolution fails to reflect changes in political, economic and strategic factors of the Kashmir question and the changing relationship of forces in that part of Asia.

The draft resolution still by-passes Mr. Jarring's conclusion that an obstacle to the implementation of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan is the deadlock reached in carrying out part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para. 75], proposing that the parties should promote the creation of a favourable atmosphere and should refrain from increasing the military potential in Kashmir. At the same time, the Security Council has heard evidence that United States arms are still being supplied, and bases are being built, to increase Pakistan's military potential in Kashmir and that tension is being aggravated in the area through the intensification of the anti Indian campaign.

In our opinion, these activities are complicating the situation in the Kashmir region and should be considered first in any attempts to find a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem, Instead of this, however, the draft resolution, as we have already pointed out, lays primary emphasis on the question of "demilitarisation", although the meaning of the notion of "demilitarisation is not disclosed. As we know, the notion of "demilitarisation" is not found in the resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan. It is therefore not clear what is meant by that word. Until this is made clear, the word "demilitarisation" can mean either a great deal, or very little. According to statements made by some representatives in the Security Council, the meaning they ascribe to "demilitarisation" is not, for example, the cessation of the rearming of the Pakistan Army and of the building of bases in the region, which, as has frequently been pointed out, are the principal causes of tension. These representatives mainly dwelt on the question of reducing the armed forces on both sides of the line, although this is a secondary problem at the present time. In our opinion. to consider the problem thus is to evade the essential reasons for tension in the region.

If any resolution is to be adopted, the most correct course would be to delete the paragraph on demilitarisation from the resolution. I have in mind the part of the preamble to the five-Power draft resolution which reads:

"Considering the importance which it has attached to the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as one of the steps towards a settlement".

For the above reasons, the Soviet delegation cannot support the draft resolution even in its amended form.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 805 held on 21 November 1957

The Soviet delegation stated its position [799th meeting] on the Kashmir question at the time of the discussion of Mr. Jarring's report [S/3821]. The Security Council is now considering the draft resolution sponsored by the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Colombia and the Philippines [S/3911].

In connection with this draft resolution it should be remembered that the Kashmir question has been on the agenda of the Security Council for almost ten years, and during that period a considerable amount of time and effort has been devoted to its discussion. However, no satisfactory solution has yet been found, chiefly because of the position adopted by the Western

Powers which have been trying to use the Kashmir question to carry through their own political plans and impose on one of the parties a decision unacceptable to it.

Led by the Western Powers, the Security Council adopted resolutions establishing the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and a number of conciliatory missions. All these resolutions, as the experience of many years has shown, diverted the attention of the Security Council from the heart of the problem. This course of action led the Council into protracted and fruitless debate, while the Western Powers and in the first place the United States of America used the time to open the way for penetration into the strategically important area of Kashmir. It should be noted that they have been successful in their schemes. The fact that Pakistan was encouraged to carry out military preparations and that it was given large-scale military assistance has exposed the intentions of the Western Powers which have been helping to the turn the part of Kashmir occupied by Pakistan into a fortified strategic outpost.

It is obvious that the Kashmir question could not remain unaffected by such events as the equipping of the Pakistan armed forces and at the same time af the "Azad'' forces with modern United States weapons, and the construction of military bases and airfields on which jet aircraft were concentrated. These facts which testify to the increased military potential of Pakistan, coupled with the entry of that country into military blocs built up by the United States of America in that area of the world, exacerbate relations between India and Pakistan and impede the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question..

In our view, India, which is pursuing a peaceful foreign policy, has cause for concern. The Pakistan Government has been taking military measures with the support of States which not long ago showed that in order to achieve their aims they would not shrink from resorting to armed force.

The change in the balance of power and the increased tension in that area of Asia give rise to deep anxiety in peace loving countries and throughout the world. This same anxiety was reflected in Mr. Jarring's report.

Mr. Jarring stressed in particular the need for a new constructive approach to the Kashmir question and said:

"The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope tended to change." [S/3821, para 21.]

The Soviet delegation attaches importance to these practical considerations and believes that the Security Council can take no decision on the Kashmir question without taking them into account. We had hoped that the other members of the Security Council would also take account of such cogent arguments. However, the statements made by the representatives of the Western Powers in the Security Council show that they continue as before to disregard the present situation in Kashmir. This becomes even more evident in the five Power draft resolution [S/3911]

The first question which arises is whether the draft resolution takes into account the protracted discussion of the Kashmir question in the Security Council and the position of the parties. as stated by them, and whether it reflects the substantial changes which have taken place in the Kashmir area and in the state of international relations. There can be but one reply. The draft resolution seems to have been produced in a vacuum.

The draft resolution proposes that we should once again seek a solution of the Kashmir question along lines which, as many years of experience have shown, cannot lead to satisfactory results. The sponsors of the draft resolution are again urging the Security Council to adopt the course mapped out by some of its previous resolutions, which, like the recommendations of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, have failed to stand the test of time.

Although everyone knows that Mr. Graham, the United. Nations Representative, admitted five years ago that his proposals were unacceptable to both parties, the authors of the draft resolutions are again proposing that they should be taken as a basis for discussion. The Indian representative has already stated in the Council that those proposals are unacceptable to India. The question arises: what is the use of adopting one more resolution, which instead of offering constructive proposals that would meet present day needs simply repeats proposals which experience has shown to be futile and which do nothing to further a pacific settlement of the Kashmir question ?

The draft resolution lays stress on the implementation of measures which its authors describe as "demilitarisation". In this connection, it is pertinent to ask one of the sponsors, the United States representative, whether the proposal for demilitarisation also includes calling a halt to be shipment of United States arms to Pakistan for re-equipping its army and to the construction of military bases? It cannot be denied that the large-scale military assistance given to Pakistan by the United States aggravates the situation in the Kashmir area, creates new obstacles in the way of a settlement of the Kashmir question, and is incompatible with demilitarisation.

Mr. Jarring's report testifies to the need for a new realistic approach to the settlement of the question. In it he concludes that implementation of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan is impeded by the deadlock reached with regard to carrying out part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, which provides that a favourable atmosphere should be created and military potential should not be increased. As is clear from the facts that have been cited in meetings of the Security Council, this deadlock is the result of Pakistan's failure to carry out its obligations under that resolution. This is a circumstance that must be taken into account in any new decision by the Security Council.

The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom attempted to present their draft resolution in the light of a compromise, calling for mutual concessions by both parties. In actual fact, as the discussion in the Security Council showed, the draft resolution under discussion satisfies only one party, Pakistan; it does not make India's position into account, but rather attempts to impose on it a decision it finds unacceptable. It is obvious that such attempts are contrary to the provisions of the United Nations Charter for the peaceful settlement of disputes between States. These provisions prohibit the imposition of any decisions upon States Members of the United Nations.

In these circumstances, the statement of the United States representative that "no final settlement of the Kashmir problem can be reached except on an amicable basis acceptable to both parties" [803rd meeting, para 26] is purely declaratory for the United States to refrain from imposing on the parties decisions unacceptable to them would be of far greater use.

The Security Council cannot disregard the Indian Government's statement that the draft resolution under consideration is unacceptable to it. We must not forget that we are seeking means of a peaceful settlement of the dispute between India and Pakistan, and that it is therefore the Security Council's duty to look for such methods and measures as would be acceptable to both parties. The USSR delegation wishes to draw the attention of the members of the Security Council to the serious consequences which could result from the adoption by the Council of a decision that would only complicate an already tense situation in that part of Asia.

The USSR delegation expresses the hope that the Security Council will not take the path which the sponsors of the draft resolution are trying to make it take; it is a path that cannot lead to a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question and that it will reject the draft resolution.

The USSR delegation cannot support the draft resolution. submitted by the United States, the United Kingdom and some other countries, and it will vote against it.

Text of the Speech made by President Mr. Hashim Jawad as the representative of Iraq in the Security Council Meeting No. 804 held on 20 November 1957

I have listened most carefully to the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan on Mr. Jarring's

Security Council Meeting report [S 3821] as well as to the opinions expressed thereupon by members of the Council. During the present series of meetings as well as in the previous ones since Iraq was elected to the Security Council, there was occasion to review the whole history of the case with endeavours by both parties to the dispute to throw some light on the nature, origin and development of the problem. My Government, however, remains convinced that its views on the question, which were based on an objective appraisal of the facts connected therewith, are still valid. The ultimate goal has been and still is to decide the future of Kashmir by means of a free and impartial plebiscite, and the fundamental issue impeding the achievement of this goal has been the failure to create satisfactory conditions for carrying out the plebiscite.

A number of the resolutions adopted by the Council reflect the principles according to which a settlement should be sought. The series of endeavours made by the United Nations representatives up to the end of 1952 were directed towards overcoming the obstacles which stood in the way of implementing the principles initiated in the decisions of the Council. Although a number of years have elapsed since the Council had occasion to consider the question, Mr. Jarring has emphasised in his report that the basis for a departure on a new endeavour at settlement is still the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which both Governments consider binding.

Thus the problem in its 1957 setup remains within the context of the Council's resolutions up to 1952 and revolves around the search for means of implementing the two resolutions. In this connection, Mr. Jarring has pointed out that despite the lack of progress made with regard to the implementation of these two resolutions, a state which could be described as a stalemate, both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem. It should, however, be recalled that the explanations given by the representatives of India and Pakistan with regard to the implementation of Part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 shows the existence of differences between the two parties to the dispute.

The main difference as presented by both parties centres around the augmentation of the forces after the cease-fire. This is a very real problem which, if true, runs contrary to part I, paragraph B, of the resolution of 13 August 1948 We have already stated our opinion in respect of the adherence of Pakistan so the recommendations contained in part I, paragraph B, and we do not wish to repeat it now. We know, at the same time, how much importance the Council has attached to the question of demilitarisation and the great bearing this question has on reaching a settlement. In fact, the reports of Dr. Graham which covered his efforts to bring the two parties to agree to his twelve proposals [S/2375, annex 2] centred around solving the question of the quantum of military forces-that is, the specific number of forces which should remain on either side of the cease fire line. His proposals, however, did not bring agreement between the two parties, and therefore the central point of demilitarisation remained unsolved. This stage, it should be recalled, was reached by the end of 1952. The Council's resolution of 23 December 1952 [S/2883] failed to bring about an agreement, and Dr. Graham's fifth report [S/2967] provided a pointer to that effect.

We note that after a period of five years some members of the Council think it appropriate that a new effort for solving this deadlock should be made, starting from the point where it was left off in 1952. This approach is indicated in paragraph 2 of the operative part of the joint draft resolution [S/3911].

Although it is our sincere desire to collaborate in finding some basis for advancing towards a settlement of the dispute, we feel, in the light of the arguments presented on the question of the military situation, that the joint draft resolution deals only partially with the real issue. Furthermore, we fear that the procedure suggested might lead to a prolongation of the existing state of affairs, as we are very much discouraged by the attitude of India, firstly, in respect of its assumed legal position in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, secondly, by its effort at introducing a number of alien elements into the issue of demilitarisation. For these and other reasons, we are inclined to think that the procedures suggested in paragraph 2 and 3 of the operative part of the point draft resolution, though following logically upon the elements which were previously envisaged in the general framework of the settlement, fall short in meeting the requirements of the case as it stands at the present time.

We believe that the representative of Pakistan, who has shown the sincere and keen desire of his Government to assist the Council in reaching a decision which would lead to breaking the deadlock and would provide grounds for a final settlement of the dispute, has made very constructive suggestions. As it is the consensus of opinion in the Council that demilitarisation is a prerequisite to the holding of the plebiscite and that efforts have so far failed to bring about an agreement on this point, it is only logical that we should proceed by another path in order to reach the same objective-the objective being the creation of conditions favourable for the holding of a plebiscite.

The representative of Pakistan suggested very sound and practical methods for the solution of the question of demilitarisation. He stated in his first settlement to the Council:

"In order to facilitate the task of the Security Council in demilitarising Jammu and Kashmir as well as to end the long-drawn-out arguments about the implementation of the Commission's resolutions so far as Pakistan is concerned, I would urge that all troops, whether of India or Pakistan, should be withdrawn from the cease-fire line and a United Nations force be stationed on the cease-fire line to prevent any violation of the line. Alternatively, the Government of Pakistan would be prepared to remove immediately every Pakistan soldier on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line provided a United Nations force, strong enough to defend these areas and ensure their integrity, is stationed beforehand along the cease fire line; and provided that India reduces its own troops to the level prescribed by the Security Council in its resolution of 23 December 1952 [S/2883]. India cannot object to this course being adopted, which safeguards it from any possible attack from the Pakistan side. Nor should India have objection to a United Nations force being posted in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which at present is neither Indian or Pakistan territory, particularly since such a force will be stationed only on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire." [191st meeting, para 79].

These suggestions, in our opinion, are the proper answer to the deadlock of which Mr. Jarring spoke in his report, to the objections raised by the Indian Government on the specific question of the augmentation of military potential on the Pakistan side, and to the doubts expressed by certain quarters as to the possibilities of the Security Council to settle disputes of an acute character. It has, furthermore, come from a party to the dispute-a fact which guarantees 100 per cent cooperation on its part. Last but not least, the implementation of such a plan would uncover the true intentions of the parties concerned in their international relations.

It will have been noted that we do not completely agree with the procedure suggested in the joint draft resolution. But I should make it clear that, because my Government desires that every effort should be made to advance towards a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, and because the present joint draft resolution is the only proposal containing measures which might lead to widening the areas of agreement between the two parties, and in view of the fact that, despite its drawbacks, it provides an approach consistent with the practice followed in settling international disputes, we shall consequently vote for its adoption. We should have preferred, however, to see the Council adopt a procedure similar in essence to that suggested by the representative of Pakistan, as that suggestion seems to be practical and in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

In conclusion, I should like to say that, in his statements, the representative of India referred to certain aspects of my country's foreign policy and tried to interpret certain engagements in a way which is completely alien to our understanding and intentions. I do not, however, desire to reply to his statements, as such a reply would be, as the statements themselves, irrelevant to the question we are discussing and would contribute in no way to its advancement. On the other hand, my country cherishes great respect and friendship for the Indian people, and we prefer therefore to overlook certain personal excesses. Since the desire of my Government is to lessen and remove the existing tension between India and Pakistan through the settlement of the Kashmir dispute, I feel certain that, when normal conditions are established between the two neighbouring countries, the Indian Government will view the efforts of a small country like mine in another perspective Mr. Krishna Menon will find out that we are a people who could, as Shakes peare said, "feel the future in the instant." The future is always stirring beneath the surface of the present, and it is therefore those who live closest to their time that can surely sense the future.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 804 held on 20 November 1957

The Philippine delegation has co-sponsored, with the delegations of Australia, Colombia, the United Kingdom and the United States, the draft resolution which appears in document S/3911. At the present stage which we have reached in the discussion of the India-Pakistan question, we are bound to consider what action the Council can take that would most likely promote a solution to the dispute.

One course of action would be to prolong the debate indefinitely. It would not be difficult to do this. of our current meetings, as well as of our meetings at the beginning of the year, show that the argumentation can proceed in an endless series of statements, replies and rebuttals, large portions of which have little or no relevance to the heart of the controversy. Obviously, the Council cannot follow this course, nor would such a course be in the long-term interest of either of the parties to the dispute.

Perhaps we could decide at a certain point in the lengthening series of rebuttals to bring the debate to an end without adopting any resolution or by approving a resolution. so innocuous that it would amount to the same thing. Unfortunately, this is a question that cannot be dealt with in this manner. The great wound that is Kashmir remains an open wound and there is no sign that it will heal of itself.

Moreover, the Council did try, between the years 1952. and 1957, to submit the dispute to the process of direct negotiations between India and Pakistan. This method brought no satisfactory results.

The original complaint and counter-complaint by which the Council has been seized of this question may, of course, be withdrawn by the parties to the dispute. Or, the question may be removed from the agenda of the Council and brought to the floor of the General Assembly. In either case, action can be taken only on the express desire of the parties themselves. Therefore, unless and until there is a change of venue or there are positive signs that the question is being resolved through direct negotiations between the parties, the Council has a duty under the Charter to take necessary measures to alleviate tension in the disputed area and to promote a just and peaceful solution of the conflict.

Neither India nor Pakistan can possibly desire that this question should fester indefinitely. We are equally certain that neither of them would seek a solution by means of a fait accomplish either through force of arms or through failure of the Council to act. It is in this belief that the Philippine delegation has joined in co-sponsoring the draft resolution before the Council. This proposal seeks, through the intermediary of Mr. Frank P. Graham, the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, to explore the possibilities for further action in connexion with part I of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para, 75], and to enter into negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan in order to implement part II of the resolution.

The spokesmen for India and Pakistan have affirmed that their respective Governments stand engaged by the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para, 15]. It is gratifying to note that, through the long polemics of this debate, nothing has been said to indicate that either India or Pakistan desires to denounce those agreements or that it considers itself absolved of the obligation which it has contracted thereunder. We have heard it argued that one party or the other has failed to abide by certain terms of the agreement, and we have heard it said also that the agreements may become progressively more difficult to implement because of the changed and changing elements of the situation in Kashmir. But neither India nor Pakistan has taken the position that the agreements have lapsed, as it were, by prescription and should, therefore, be regarded as null and void. On the contrary, we have received fresh assurances from both Governments that it is their desire to seek a solution of their dispute on the basis of the agreements set forth in the Commission's resolutions on the sole condition that the measures contemplated therein shall be taken, step by step, in strict logical sequence.

It was on this understanding that the Council decided in February 1957 to entrust Mr. Jarring with a mission to proceed to the sub-continent. It is on this same understanding that it is now proposed to Mr. Graham. entrust a similar mission to

The ultimate objective of both missions remains the same, namely, to explore with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which are likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute. Under this general mandate, and as a result of his initial exploratory talks with the two Governments, Mr. Jarring decided to address himself to the possibility of getting both sides to agree to submit to an arbitrator or arbitrators, with powers of recommendation, the question of whether or not part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 has been fully implemented. This approach failed, in the words of Mr. Jarring, because the Government of India ``did not feel that arbitration, as outlined by me, would be appropriate". [S/3821, para, 19.]

Mr. Graham would doubtless be equally free to examine. with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals whatever that would lead to the implementation of the agreements embodied in the Commission's resolutions. However, in the draft resolution [S/3911] before the Council, he is specifically requested to address himself to the question of the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, in particular to "a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line to a specific number", and to the formulation of an agreement to this end which is to be implemented within a specified period The proposal also calls on both sides to refrain from any statements or actions that might aggravate the situation.

The specific character of the mandate given to Mr. Graham is fully in keeping with the statements made to the Council by the representatives of India and Pakistan. The current argument between the parties has turned mainly on the issue of whether or not the cease-fire agreement has been fully implemented and whether or not it has since been violated. The representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon, has contended that Pakistan is guilty of such repeated violations and is responsible for hostile propaganda and provocative acts against India. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Mr. Firoz Khan Noon, has made similar accusations against India.

The proposal to charge Mr. Graham with the task of promoting an agreement between the parties on reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line and to call on India and Pakistan to cooperate with him on the formulation and Implementation of demilitarisation procedures is a logical and necessary answer to the mutual charges of violation that have been made here. And the request addressed to both countries to refrain from hostile propaganda or provocative acts also flows from the complaints on this score that have been lodged by each side against the other.

This is an objective and impartial proposal. In no way can it reasonably be described as a partisan proposal. It is weighted in favour of nothing and nobody except the agreements embodied in the resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan. And both India and Pakistan have affirmed that they stand committed to those agreements. If there is one word or clause in the draft resolution which can be shown to militate against those agreements or which can be proved to place one side at a disadvantage compared to the other in carrying out its obligations under those agreements, then my delegation for one would welcome any suggestions which would redress such defects. I would like to express the fervent hope that this proposal shall, after careful examination, be accepted in good faith by both India and Pakistan.

I would crave your indulgence, Mr. President, to address through you, to the representative of India, who I regret is absent this afternoon, a few words of gentle remonstrance. I value his friendship highly and I deeply appreciate his many acts of courteous consideration towards me. My Government maintains friendly relations with India and sincerely hopes that those relations shall prosper. It is possible that my Government's notion of where justice lies in this dispute may differ from that held by the Government which my good friend Mr. Krishna Menon so ably represents here. It is also possible that my idea of where the true and lasting interest of India lies in this dispute may differ from his. But it does not follow from this difference that our views are vitiated by motives that are suspect.

Those suspicions appear to rest mainly on our membership in the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO). Those suspicions happen to be justified, but not in the sense intended by Mr. Krishna Menon. In the Pacific Charter, which was adopted as an integral part of the Manila Pact, the Philippines and Pakistan jointly assumed with five other States the solemn undertaking "to uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples". This obligation is shared by the other members of the SEATO alliance that also happen to be members of the Security Council, namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and Australia. But since this principle was lifted word for word from the Charter of the United Nations, it is clear that all the other members of the Council, including India, are equally committed to the principle. of self-determination of peoples.

Finally, I would assure our distinguished friend from India that my Government does not consider this question as mainly or exclusively the concern of the great Powers, Nor do we approach this question as an aspect of great Power relations with political under-tones that might conceivably influence our judgement. All countries, great and small, have a stake in the principles involved in the dispute: considerations of justice and equity, the honouring of international agreements, respect for the principle of self-determination of peoples, the integrity of decisions of the Security Council and its organs, and support of the Council's efforts to comply with its primary responsibility under the Charter to maintain international peace and security.

It is in this spirit that I would beg him to believe that during this discussion I have spoken to him as one Asian to another Asian, on behalf of a small Asian country speaking to a far greater one whose words and actions here, on this embittered question of Kashmir, can do much either to illumine or becloud our common Asian dream of a better world order of peace and freedom based on justice.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957

The consideration of the present item on the agenda of the Security Council, namely, the India-Pakistan question, began on 6 January 1948. As an item of our agenda, the India Pakistan question is unique in two respects. In the first place, it is the only territorial dispute between two Asian States on the books of the United Nations. In the second place, this question has lasted longer than any other territorial dispute before the United Nations.

The consideration of this question has undergone a number of crises. I remember particularly one crisis on 10. February 1948. On that day, the distinguished leader of the Indian delegation, the much respected Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, severely criticised the Security Council for what he considered an over-emphasis on the problem of the plebiscite and neglect of the Indian charge of Pakistani aggression. He told the Council that he would cease to participate in the debates of the Security Council and that he and the members of his delegation would leave New York for New Delhi.

I was by sheer accident asked by the President of the Security Council, General McNaughton, to speak. For very good reasons, I ask the President's permission to quote three paragraphs from my statement on that date..

"It was a pure accident that the President called on me to speak after the representative of India had spoken. I do not think the President had in mind that I desired to make a reply to the very grave and serious speech of the representative of India. However, I should like to take advantage of this present occasion to make one point, mainly to the delegation of India. The representative of India is disappointed with what we have done here. Whatever reasons he may have on that ground, I should like to call his attention to one fact that, I think, the Security Council is right in recommending that the plebiscite should be free and impartial. I think, in emphasising that point, that no member of this Council is guided by any prejudice. I think advocates of this idea are guided by the deepest concern for the welfare of the people there."

"The plebiscite is right in itself. It has been announced. and accepted by the Indian Government. We are not imposing anything on the Indian Government. If you agree to a plebiscite, it must be a free and impartial plebiscite. Furthermore, it seems to me that the announcement and the establishment of a scheme of a free and impartial plebiscite would be the most potent means to pacify the Muslims and the tribesmen. I cannot think of any other way of carrying across to the people in revolt the message that it is unnecessary for them to resort to violence and that, for their own good, they should stop violence as early as possible, because they will have a fair chance to decide their own future."

"Therefore, as to that part of Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar's speech, I must confess I was somewhat disappointed, I hope that he will take advantage of his return to India to explain exactly to his Government the reasons why this Security Council hopes that a really free and impartial plebiscite will be held in Jammu and Kashmir." [243rd meeting, pp. 72 and 73].

Since that time, one material difference in the circumstances has intervened. On the day when I made the speech from which I have quoted, there was bloodshed and the threat of greater bloodshed. Now, fortunately, the cease-fire has been observed, thanks to the wisdom and restraint of the two Governments concerned-and thanks, in part, to the efforts. that the Security Council has made in the last ten years. In spite of this one difference in the circumstances, the sentiments which I expressed on 10 February 1948 are the sentiments that 1 hold today. For that reason, my delegation will support the draft resolution submitted to the Council by five States.

 Text of the speech made by Mr. Nunez-Portuondo (Cuba) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957

At this stage of the debate, my delegation wishes once again to restate its position on the question of Jammu and Kashmir and to clarify some matters raised in recent statements by the Indian representative.

In the first place, I should like to say that it could not reasonably be deduced from my statement of 29 October 1957 [798th meeting] that my delegation had made a proposal. When the Indian representative said in his statement of 11 November 1957, "Supposing the proposition of the representative of Cuba was accepted" [800th meeting para 13], when he spoke of attempts in Balkanize India, and so on, he was taking issue with opinions my delegation had never expressed.

In the case of Jammu and Kashmir, when we speak of the self-determination of these peoples, we are not expressing an abstract concept of political law, we are merely using these words in their literal sense, which is very clear in Spanish. We refer to the right of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, taking into account what was previously accepted by the Governments of India and Pakistan, to decide freely, through an impartially held plebiscite, on their accession to one of the two countries. In political law we would call it a restricted right of self-determination, and that is literally, at least in Spanish, the right to decide freely between accession to India or to Pakistan. This seems very simple to us, and we have by no means forgotten the peculiar manner in which the States of India and Pakistan were established and the regulations which the British Crown and Parliament laid down in order to bring them into being.

When my delegation spoke of a plebiscite, which is something very different from an election, we used the words used by the Prime Minister of India in his telegram of 8 November 1947 to the Prime Minister of Pakistan, in which he said the following:

"It will thus be seen that our proposals, which we have repeatedly stated are (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; (2) that the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as the raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

This telegram was obviously sent after the arrangements made by the British Crown and Parliament. Since the Cuban delegation has always been in agreement with these principles of the distinguished Prime Minister of India, our statements have been confined solely to trying to make this plebiscite possible, for it would be the final step in resolving a serious problem dividing two great peoples, whose Governments are very distinguished Members of the United Nations.

For the foregoing reasons, my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted to the Council by Australia, Colombia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States.

142. Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957

Since the members of the Council indicated their general views on this question, we have had the opportunity of hearing further statements from the representatives of India and Pakistan. It seems timely, therefore, for the Council to consider what further steps might now profitably be taken. As an expression of our concern over this situation and of our desire to assist the Council in its consideration of it, the Australian delegation has joined with the delegations of Colombia, the Philippines, the United Kingdom and the United States in co-sponsoring the joint draft resolution contained in document S/3911. which was introduced this afternoon by the representative of the United States and supported by the representative of the United Kingdom. In view of the very clear explanations given by Mr. Wadsworth and Sir Pierson Dixon, I would wish only to offer, on behalf of the Australian delegation, some brief observations on this draft resolution now before us.

The preambular paragraphs of this draft resolution include several points which seem to us of special importance. First, the Council desires to place on record its appreciation of the assignment performed so ably by Mr Jarring, the representative of Sweden, whose report is the occasion for our meetings at this time. Secondly, the Council records its appreciation of the statements of the parties that they are desirous of co-operating with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution to this problem. Thirdly, it notes that the Governments of India and Pakistan recognize and accept the commitments undertaken by them in the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. It is on the basis of these two resolutions that the Council's efforts of the past nine years have been guided.

The concluding parts of the preamble express our common concern over the lack of progress and stress the importance of the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as one of the steps towards a settlement. I think this preamble flows very naturally from the views expressed around. this table.

Now as regards the operative paragraphs, I recognize that neither of the parties will be satisfied. It is natural enough that, after expending such efforts and skill in placing their respective cases before the Council, the parties may feel some disappointment over the operative paragraphs as we have drafted them. But we have to use our own judgement as to what we consider practicable and constructive action by the Council in all the circumstances.

I do not see that either party should object to our operative paragraph 1, though I suppose that each may feel that it has special application to the other. This is, however, solemn. appeal by the Council addressed to both Pakistan and India to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favour to the promotion of further negotiations.

Paragraph 2 touches on the delicate question of the pro gressive implementation of the Commission's resolutions, which both parties have accepted as the framework within which a practical solution of the problem might be found. The Council may recall that on 20 October, I stated that:

" It is a valid concern of the Council to resolve any doubts that may exist whether part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 remains unimplemented in any respect at this time." [798th meeting, para, 10].

This finds expression both in the first and second operative paragraphs of the draft resolution. We believe that the prospects of progress being made along the lines of the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan will undoubtedly be improved, if the Council and the two particles can be assured that part I of the 1948 resolution has been fully implemented. Indeed it seems all too clear that without such an assurance there would not be much hope of proceeding rapidly with the implementation of part II, which is the next logical step. As I said in my previous statement, the Australian delegation shares the view.

".. that within the framework of the Commission's resolutions and of the Security Council's own discussions and resolutions on the subject, a further investigation should now be made on whether some progress can be attempted on the problem of demilitarisation in Kashmir." [Ibid., para, 11].

These are the immediate objects of the draft resolution. To help the parties towards them, the Council requests the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Dr. Frank P. Graham, once more to place himself at the service of the Council and calls upon the parties to cooperate with him. Dr. Graham is asked to report to the Council on his efforts as soon as possible. He has been left discretion and flexibility because we have great confidence in his experience and his intimate knowledge of the issues

I would hope that the parties will accept this draft resolution in the spirit in which it is proposed, that is, in the hope and belief that some forward steps on this matter can and should be taken at this time.

143. Text of the Speech made by Mr. Araujo (Colombia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957

My delegation has listened with particular attention and, of course, with deep respect, to the important statements made in support of their respective views by the spokesmen for India and Pakistan. We have given the same consideration to the statements of the other members of the Security Council, and we support the constructive, the really positive suggestion put forward by the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Sweden, France and Australia in order to advance this matter and bring it to a successful conclusion. This explains my delegation's support for the joint draft resolution which it has co-sponsored together with the representatives of Australia, the United States of America, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom.

The draft resolution before us in no way, not even by a single line, changes the final goal which the Security Council has sought since 1948, with the express consent of the parties concerned, namely, that a solution to this problem should be found by means of a free and impartial plebiscite in which the peoples of Jammu and Kashmir would determine their legal status. The fulfilment of this fundamental premise will constitute what we might call the birth certificate of a new life for these two provinces, and the incidents that have occurred have done nothing to invalidate all the proposals and resolutions adopted by the Security Council, which also reflect the position always held by the Colombian delegation in this matter.

Now we are entrusting to the skill, the intelligence, the authority and the recognized experience of Mr. Graham the task of approaching the two disputing Governments in order to diminish the areas of disagreement and to bring closer the goal I referred to previously. It is necessary, of course and this is a basic prerequisite of the proposal which we are co-sponsoring -that the two parties should cooperate sincerely and in a real spirit of understanding with Mr. Graham. My delegation trusts that the resentment and differences. to which our proposal may at times have given rise will disappear without leaving any trace of bitterness.

So far, we have heard no other proposal which would serve peace and the settlement we have in mind so well. Therefore, until some other proposal within the framework, the limitations, and the approach laid down by the Security Council is presented to us, we must hope that the Council will give this proposal its unanimous support.

 Text of the speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 803 held on 18 November 1957

In my last statement to the Council on 25 October (797th meeting] I indicated the direction in which Her Majesty's Government considered that the Council should proceed in this matter. We have now had the benefit of a second speech by the representative of India and by the representative of Pakistan. Having considered these speeches, together with Mr. Jarring's report, and bearing in mind the past history and present state at the question, we have joined, with several of our colleagues, in embodying our views in the draft resolution just introduced by the United States representative. My purpose today is to refer briefly to some points in the draft resolution in which additional explanation may be required in order to make our purpose clear.

First of all I should make it plain that we realise that this draft cannot give full satisfaction to either of the parties. It contains elements which we know both parties will consider incompatible with some of their contentions. That is clear, both from the speeches of Mr. Khan Noon and Mr. Krishna Menon and from the long past history of the question. We regret this; but we feel it may be inevitable at this stage. The wideness of the difference which separates the parties is such that obviously the Security Council cannot satisfy both parties in full ; neither can it satisfy either one in full so long as it makes a serious attempt towards progress. But we can at least hope to make proposals which will assist the parties in attaining a solution of this intractable problem. That is our purpose and our hope.

Some of the points I propose now to make in dealing with the draft resolution will bear upon the criticisms of the United Kingdom attitude made by the representative of Pakistan in his speech of 15 November (802nd meeting] and by the representative of India in his speeches delivered on 5, 11, and 13 November [799th, 800th and 801st meetings]. I will not, however, attempt today to deal with these criticisms in full as I believe it is the general with of the Council to make progress as rapidly as possible. In would, however, like to make one general observation.

During his recent statements in this Council on this subject, the representative of India has often complained that the United Kingdom attitude is misguided and that I have been badly advised as to the true facts of the situation. I may be misguided, but I take responsibility, under directions from my Government, for all the statements I make here.

The Kashmir problem has in ten years produced a great weight of documents, a vast complex of statements and reports. I will not pretend that I have read every word of every document that has been printed. I imagine that others occasionally find themselves in a similar position. I have, however, as I am sure have other members of the Council, attempted to acquaint myself fully with the views of the two parties and with the position taken by the Security Council during its many discussions of the problem over the past years.

I have recently refreshed may memory by reading again the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and of Mr. Graham, including some of those from which quotation has been made in our recent discussions. I have been impressed by the careful and balanced drafting of these reports. I am convinced that it is unhelpful for either side to quote individual sentences or paragraphs from these reports in support of some disputed contention, without regard. for qualifications which appear elsewhere or for the context as a whole.

Anyone who reads the documents of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and in particular its third interim report cannot fail to be struck by finding how similar were the stands taken up by the parties at the time of the publication of that report in 1949 to the stands with which we are familiar from the latest speeches on either side. Then, as now, the Council was informed that a deadlock had been reached. That has not deterred the Council in the past from seeking ways of resolving the deadlock consistent with its own approach. I do not think the Council should be deterred from renewing these efforts now.

To come now to the draft resolution which is before the Council [S/3911]. The preamble seeks to put our proposals in their proper setting, that is, the setting of the previous decisions of the Council, the resolutions of the Commission for India and Pakistan and Mr. Jarring's report..

The fourth preambular paragraph observes that the Governments of India and Pakistan recognize and accept the commitments undertaken by them in the Commission's resolutions. This language is carefully drafted; it takes full account of the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan.

I am fully aware of the importance which the Government of India has attached to the assurances given to India by the Commission for India and Pakistan in the exchange of correspondence in August and again in December 1948. I am aware also of the importance which the Government of Pakistan attaches to the assurances received from the Commission. This paragraph is so drafted as to detract in no way from the importance to be attached to those prejudices no position. assurances. This language

The representative of the Soviet Union suggested that because the resolutions were adopted a number of years ago, they had lost their force and meaning [799th meeting, para, 4]. That was a surprising suggestion. One of the most encouraging features of the debate during the renewed consideration of the Kashmir problem this year has been the repeated reiteration by both sides that they stood by their engagements, commitments and obligations-all three words have been used as contained in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

Mr. Jarring's terms of reference were based on those resolutions. His report [S/3821] makes quite clear that his efforts were directed to exploring what impeded their full implementation. There are those who argue-but neither the representative of India nor the representative of Pakistan is among them that the Commission's resolutions should be disregarded, that some other approach should be tried. The simple fact, however, is that the Security Council, in proceeding under Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, is attempting to find a basis for progress towards a settlement acceptable to both sides.

Both sides have repeatedly and categorically asserted during this phase of the discussions of the Kashmir question that they look for the implementation of the Commission's resolutions. The Security Council, in seeking to make progress towards a settlement, must surely proceed from this basis. These is no question of the Security Council attempting to impose a decision on this point; the draft resolution merely reflects publicity announced and reiterated decisions of the parties themselves.

I did not attempt to disguise in my speech at the 797th meeting of the Security Council that the United Kingdom Government was fully aware that there is a long and difficult road to a final settlement of this dispute Mr. Jarring himself was aware of the grave problems that might arise in connexion with and as a result of a plebiscite. The resolution of which we are one of the sponsors does not attempt to deal with these problems. It confines itself to the earlier phases of the question, dealt with in parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of

13 August 1948. I come now to the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution.

In operative paragraph I of the draft, words are reproduced from the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, and this wording has been combined with a reiteration of the words of part 1, paragraph E, of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para, 75]. The effect is to lay emphasis on the need to maintain an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations.

In his statement on 5 November [799th meeting], the representative of India indicated that he regarded the idea of a request of the kind in the first operative paragraph, which I had adumbrated in my speech at the 797th meeting, as superfluous so far as the Government of India was concerned, but he stated that he did not object to it. I also recall the stress which he has laid on the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948.

Mr. Firoz Khan Noon has contended that in my speech adumbrating this part of the resolution, I have placed a far wider interpretation on part I, paragraph E of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948 than its terms suggest. But an appeal to both sides by a United Nations organ such as that in the draft resolution is, of course, a normal and useful practice with which we are all familiar. I believe members of the Council will agree, having listened to what has been said on both sides, that an appeal of this kind is desirable and would be desirable even if both sides were not engaged by the Commission's resolution. A continuing effort is required to create the right atmosphere for negotiation by both sides. I now come to operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution.

In my statement on 25 October [797th meeting]. I dealt at some length with the relationship between parts I and II of the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948. I think I made clear our view that the connection between these two parts of the resolution is such that it would be difficult for the Security Council at this stage to take action on either part without regard to the other. In view of the firmly held conviction of the Government of India that part I has not been implemented, and in spite of the view of the Government of Pakistan to the precise contrary, it would be wrong! to exclude part I from the terms of reference of a United Nations representative. I regret that we and our co-sponsors have felt obliged to record this view in face of the known objections of the Government of Pakistan.

In view of the need to make progress and of the connection which I described in my previous speech [797 meeting], between parts I and II, it has seemed to the sponsors that some step forward on part II is necessary. Conscious of the view of the Government of India that no progress can be made on part II until part I has, in its view, been implemented, we have made an attempt to bridge the opposing views of the two Governments in this matter of demilitarisation. It will be seen, however, that our draft resolution gives considerable discretion to Mr. Frank P. Graham. We do not lay down a rigid sequence for the various tasks entrusted to him. We feed it is desirable that he should be able to use a flexible approach. As regards part I, we hope that he will be able to make recommendations which will be acceptable both to Pakistan and to India. We hope that the necessity for making such recommendations as he considers desirable will in no way militate against progress We also hope that he will be successful in making progress on a plan for a reduction of forces; for this, in our view, is a necessary preliminary to the creation of conditions in which progress towards a final solution will be possible. Surely no single step could do so much to reduce tension and restore confidence between the parties, and until a basis of mutual confidence is established, progress towards a solution obviously is extremely difficult.

As I understand the position of the Government of India, as expressed by Mr. Krishna Menon, it is that it does not consider itself bound by the twelve-point proposals made by Mr. Graham in the course of his discussions with the Governments of India and Pakistan and embodied in his fifth report [S/2967, annex II] This is fully understood. Certainly M Graham must seek an agreement on the basis of the relevant Security Council resolutions; but equally, he cannot ignore. whatever is applicable from his previous discussions. All that our draft resolution says is that Mr Graham should have regard to his own fifth report. This is no restraint on his freedom of action; nor is it an attempt to give some special authority to a previous series of suggestions which proved unacceptable. It is simply a statement of the obvious fact that he will have regard to the previous history of discussions when making his own new approach.

Operative paragraph 3 merely asks for co-operation from the two Governments to work out procedures for putting whatever agreement is reached into effect within three months. Its sole purpose is to say, as has said in the past, that when agreement on demilitarisation is reached, that agreement outright. rapidly to be translated into action.

Such then are the purposes and hopes that lie behind our action in joining in sponsorship of the draft resolution. We recognize that the success of Mr. Graham's mission will depend on the co-operation which he receives from the parties. I am confident that this cooperation will be forthcoming. What we are proposing is a modest step forward towards the settlement which both parties have told us they desire.

In summing up my remarks I would point out that nothing in the draft resolution prejudices, or is intended to prejudice, the stands of the two parties on the various points at issue. On the other hand, it is only out of the exercise of compromises and a willingness to try to find common ground that the solution will be found.

I would like to appeal to the representative of Pakistan not to reject this draft resolution because of its request to Mr. Graham to make any recommendations which he considers desirable in connection with part I of the resolution adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948. I appeal also to the representative of India. Nothing would contribute more to a settlement, which is so much in the interests of both parties, than a reduction of mutual suspicion and hostility. Surely the first and most effective step in this direction would be in the words of the draft resolution-an agreement on a reduction of forces on each side of the cease-fire line.

It is the task of the Security Council to help to bring about an easing of tension and to foster conditions of mutual confidence between the parties in order that a solution may more easily be attained. That is the purpose which animates the United Kingdom in joining the sponsors of the draft resolution now before the Council.

It is the earnest wish of the United Kingdom to see a settlement of a problem which so troubles the relations between India and Pakistan. I therefore appeal to both Governments to accept any recommendations that Mr. Grahom may make in respect of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948. I would also appeal to them to regard the draft resolution as a constructive effort to make progress-progress towards a settlement, by Whatever means it can ultimately be achieved, which is so important to the subcontinent, and which is so earnestly desired by their friends in the United Nations.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 799 held on 5 November 1957

At the request of the representative of Pakistan, the Security Council is again considering the Kashmir question. This time the occasion for the discussion is the report [S/3821] which Mr. Jarring, the Swedish representative, submitted on 29 April 1957 in accordance with the Security Council's resolution of 21 February 1957 [S/3793]. The Council requested Mr. Jarring, who was President of the Security Council at that time, to conduct negotiations with the representatives of India and Pakistan for the purpose of examining any proposals likely to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem.

At the time that draft resolution [S/3792] was under discussion the delegation of the Soviet Union drew attention to its fundamental defects and objected in particular to the mention of the Council's previous resolutions [774th meeting, paras 43 and 44], in other words, to the idea that, in carrying out the Security Council's instructions, Mr. Jarring should to any extent be bound by its earlier decisions, adopted in entirely different circumstances. We pointed out at that time that he should base himself on the present international situation and on circumstances in the Kashmir area as they are today, rather than on resolutions adopted many years ago and embodying recommendations which no longer have any real force and meaning in view of fundamentally altered circumstances. The Soviet delegation did not object to the adoption of the resolution, however, for it believed that the mission entrusted to the President of the Security Council, if carried out in the light of the situation which had developed in that area of the world, could contribute to the peaceful settlement of the problem.

The Soviet delegation has studied the report submitted by Mr. Jarring and feels that some of the observations it contains can assist the members of the Security Council in forming a correct and objective idea of the situation which has arisen in connection with the Kashmir problem.

In particular, the report reflects the fact that during the ten years which have elapsed since the Kashmir problem was first referred to the Security Council, fundamental changes have taken place not only in Kashmir itself, in the life of the people of Kashmir, but also in the political situation in that part of Asia. Considering those circumstances, it would, of course, be unrealistic to be guided by recommendations and proposals put forward in connection with the Kashmir question many years ago.

In the report it is expressly stated that :

"The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change." [S/3841, para 21.]

At the same time the report draws attention to " the concern expressed in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question, together with the changing pattern of power relations in West and South Asia." [Ibid, para 20.]

These conclusions in the report accord with the views expressed by the Soviet delegation when the Kashmir problem. was discussed at the beginning of 1957. The Security Council as not yet shown any sign of taking those conclusions into account. The Soviet delegation for its part shares the concern.

caused in peace-loving circles in Asia and throughout the world by the policy of organising politico-military blocs and establishing military bases on foreign soil, by the armaments race with its disastrous consequences for the economies of the under developed countries, by the Western Powers' intervention in the domestic affairs of States and other action which are leading to increased tension and undermining security in various parts of Asia. The fact that Pakistan has allowed itself to be drawn into the orbit of that policy of the Western Powers has left its mark on the Pakistan Government's policy with regard to the Kashmir problem as well. As a result of Pakistan's policy, which has found support and encouragement among that country's partners in the South-East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO), the situation in the Kashmir area continues to be strained.

For many years the Indian Government has sought a peaceful settlement of the conflict on the basis of the agreements reached in the past and incorporated in the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para, 75] and in its further resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196 para, 15]. Nevertheless, all India's efforts to bring about the successive implementation of those agreements and in particular, the withdrawal from Kashmir of Pakistan troops, tribesmen, and Pakistan nationals, in accordance with the Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, have been baulked by Pakistan's obstructionist policy. The Indian Government, in accordance with the obligations which it has assumed, has sought to promote the national development of Kashmir by granting its people the right of self-determination and by taking the necessary steps to ensure the free expression of their will in the manner most appropriate to the circumstances which have arisen. As is well known, in September 1951 the first general election was held in Kashmir for the purpose of establishing a Constituent Assembly. In February 1954 that Assembly unanimously ratified the accession of Kashmir to India and in November 1956 it adopted a State Constitution formalising the status of Kashmir as a self-governing State within the Republic of India. In March 1957, the population of Kashmir, together with all the peoples of India, participated in elections to the Indian Parliament and also elected a legislative assembly of their own State. The whole development of the State and its successes in the work of national construction show that the close political, economic and cultural ties between Kashmir and the Republic of India are an important condition of its further progress. By now it should be clear to everyone that the people of Kashmir have decided their own destiny once and for all, that they regard Kashmir as an inalienable part of the Republic of India and that they do not want any interference in their affairs by any self-appointed guardians.

Why is the question of the fate of the people of Kashmir again being reopened? Obviously it is not the interest of the people of Kashmir which is determining the policy of the Western Powers, engaged as they are in yet another attempt to use the Kashmir problem once again to exacerbate relations. between India and Pakistan, to undermine the security of that part of South-East Asia and to increase tension in the area.

It would be hard to disagree with the statement made by Mr. Nehru, the Prime Minister of India, on 4 March 1957 in which he said that certain Powers which do not like his country's independent foreign policy are seeking to exert pressure from within and without to induce India to change it.

It would seem to have been no mere coincidence that the resumption of the discussion of the Kashmir problem at the beginning of 1957 occurred at the very time when certain Western Powers were expressing open dissatisfaction with the foreign policy of India, which had taken a stand in favour of the peaceful co-existence of States and the settlement of outstanding international problem by negotiation. Having artificially created the unhealthy atmosphere which surrounds the Kashmir problem, the Western Powers are seeking to use it as a means of applying political pressure to India. The Security Council, however, cannot and must not be a party to, much less an instrument of, such pressure. It is quite obvious that any sort of proposal to send international troops into Kashmir or to refer the question for consideration to various arbiters and mediators, primarily represents a blatant attempt to exert pressure on India. Furthermore, the purpose of such proposals is to cover up and justify foreign intervention in the Kashmir problem and the domestic affairs of India to the detriment of its national sovereignty. For that reason, the objections voiced here by the Indian representative to the proposal to institute a special arbitration procedure for investigating the facts of the Kashmir problem are fully justified. The Council cannot disregard those objections.

The Soviet delegation holds that the Security Council should use its authority not to impose the will of other on the people of Kashmir, but to bring about the cessation of activities, which are increasing tension in the relations between two Asian countries and to create favourable conditions for settlement by peaceful means, without any foreign interference or pressure, those aspects of the Kashmir problem which are still unresolved. If the Security Council follows this course, it will win the support and understanding of the forces of peace everywhere, and will help to restore the situation in the Kashmir area to normal and to strengthen peace and security in South-East Asia, and, consequently, throughout the world,

Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Guillaume Georges-Picot as representative of France in the Security Council Meeting No. 798 held on 29 October 1957

As no other member of the Council wishes to take the floor. I should like now to speak as the representative of France.

The French delegation has studied very attentively the report on the India-Pakistan question [S/3821] submitted in pursuance of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 21 February 1957 [S/3793]. It has listened equally attentively to the statements of the Parties as well as to the interventions of other members of the Council. My delegation would like, in the first place, to pay a warm tribute to the representative of Sweden for the way in which he has carried out a difficult task, and to offer him its thanks. In my capacity as President I note that the members of the Council who have participated in this debate have been unanimous in their congratulations and their praise for the manner in which he has fulfilled his mission.

As to the substance of the problem, it still subsists and, alas, in the same terms. That is an observation we have heard before, and it would be all the more discouraging if we had not heard the two parties clearly reaffirm their desire to find a peaceful solution to the question. It is this intention which, in our opinion, constitutes the most important feature of the case as it stands before us today.

For nearly ten years the Council has spared no effort to find a solution in conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter and acceptable both to India and to Pakistan. Several resolutions have been adopted, some of them, which would have made it possible to settle the question fairly and democratically, have been accepted by the parties but have nevertheless remained up to now a dead letter. The Council cannot stand still, however, it must look forward, not backward.

Mr. Jarring's report has the merit of stressing the complexity of the question. Happily, our Swedish colleague concluded his report on an optimistic note. He said: "Despite the present deadlock, both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem." [S/3821, para 22] This intention is clearly apparent in the statements made by the representatives of the two parties.

The French delegation is pleased to note that the two parties have pledged themselves again to the principle of resorting to peaceful means of settlement, which is embodied in Article 33 of the Charter. There can be no doubt that in the present instance, great difficulties impede the adoption of specific measures for achieving such a settlement. I shall not reiterate These difficulties there are, however, in addition, positive elements, as Sir Pierson Dixon and Mr. Wadsworth have very pertinently pointed out. It remains to find a way of putting them to constructive use.

The Council cannot itself devote its time to so lengthy and detailed a task, and the French delegation is, in this matter as in others, opposed to the setting up of new bodies. The Organisation has for some years, however, enjoyed the distinguished services of Mr. Frank P. Graham as United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, and we believe that the suggestion which was made that Mr. Graham should be asked to seek, with the parties, some means of bringing those positive elements into play, is a constructive proposal and one which should be given consideration.

As no other member of the Council has expressed a desire to speak this afternoon, and as those members of the Council who have not yet spoken have informed me that they do not intend to do so today, I shall, in my capacity as President, ask the representatives of the parties, that is, the representatives of India and Pakistan, if they wish to make any statement to the Council at this stage of the discussion.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Jarring (Sweden) in the Security Council Meeting No. 798 held on 29 October 1957

I have listened very attentively to the statements which have been made during the present debate on my report on the India-Pakistan question. I wish to take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the kind words of appreciation in the report which have been spoken in this Council.

In asking to speak at this stage, I do not intend to make any additions to or comments upon my report. Nor do I feel that having submitted it, I should now offer an interpretation of the report. The report reflects this situation relating to the India-Pakistan question as I saw it, in the light of the mandate I received from the Security Council, at the time of my visit to India and Pakistan. The report must consequently speak for itself.

In my report, I established that a deadlock had been reached between India and Pakistan on Part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948, and in particular on paragraphs B and E of that part. In continuing over efforts to find a way towards a settlement of the India-Pakistan question, I think that should give this problem our special attention. Every proposal for a constructive settlement thereof which might be put forward should, in the opinion of the Swedish Government, be submitted to the most careful examination.

Before I proceed, I should like to recall that the Swedish Government, as other members of the Council well know, has during the current year suggested that certain legal aspects of the question might be referred to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. My Government still maintains that this suggestion should, at an appropriate moment, be carefully considered. Although such a moment can hardly be said to exist today, my Government would nevertheless be interested to learn the attitudes, in principle, of the parties to this suggestion.

During the debate at the Council's 797th meeting, the United Kingdom and United States representatives indicated that it might be advisable to let the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, Mr. Frank P. Graham, who is eminently qualified for this difficult task, resumed his conversations with the two Governments, with a view to putting forward recommendations for a settlement based on the two resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan in 1948 and 1929, by which the two parties have declared themselves bound. Should such a suggestion meet with general support, the Swedish Government will raise no objections, despite what I have already said concerning the desirability of seeking an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice Our hope is that the parties will be able to find their way to a settlement of the question through negotiation. This would be in conformity with the wishes often expressed by the parties for a peaceful settlement within the framework of the United Nations-those wishes to which I have permitted myself to draw the Council's attention in the concluding words of my report.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo (Philip pines) in the Security Council meeting No. 798 held on 29 October 1957

I would like to join the other members of the Council in expressing to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Jarring, my Government's appreciation for the wise and conscientious manner in which he carried out the mission entrusted to him. The tactful and objective terms in which Mr. Jarring's report is couched are such as one would expect from a diplomat of consummate skill indeed, the atmosphere of frankness and cordiality which characterised Mr. Jarring's conversations with the leaders of both India and Pakistan only serves to confirm us in the belief that his inability to report more positive results was in no way due to any lack of resourcefulness, patience or dedication in the pursuit of his mission.

This is why my delegation is constrained to view the report with a feeling of disquiet. The problem of Kashmir has now been before this Council for ten years. The Council has adopted a number of resolutions, and the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13. August 1948 and 5 January 1949, to which both sides stand committed, still await full implementation.

During an interval of five years, between December 1952. and January 1957, the Council even tried the sometimes useful device of allowing the problem to drift, to let the dust of contentious debate settle and thus clear the way for the processes of peaceful negotiation to develop between the parties. But time has brought no healing to this question. Now, as the Council renews its consideration of the Kashmir problem, our feeling of disquiet is heightened not only by the report of Mr. Jarring, but by the burden of the statements recently made to the Council by the spokesmen of Pakistan and India. The problem, needless to say, is an extremely complex one, and the long debates which the Council has held show how many peripheral issues of varying relevancy can be brought into the discussion. But so far as this Council is concerned the basic issues involved are relatively simple, and the actual position is equally uncomplicated. Both India and Pakistan accepted in good faith the

Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Those resolutions provided, first, for a cease-fire, second, for a truce agreement, and third, for a free and impartial plebiscite to determine whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir should accede to Pakistan or to India. The Government of Pakistan should its readiness to comply with the terms of the agreement, and today reaffirmed its oft-expressed desire to proceed to their full implementation. There is no lack of evidence in the records of the Council to support the positive attitude taken by the Government of Pakistan towards. the agreement. Since Pakistan is clearly eager to get on with the plebiscite, it would understandably be equally desirous of observing the terms of the cease-fire and the truce agreement, which are a necessary prerequisite to the plebiscite itself.

The Government of India has contended, and still contends, that Pakistan has failed to implement fully the cease-fire order, and that therefore it cannot agree to the implementation of the truce agreement and the plebiscite. To the proposal of the Council, made through Mr. Jarring, to submit to arbitration the question of whether there has been full compliance with the ceasefire agreement, Pakistan has replied yes, while India holds this is not a matter for arbitration. That is how the question stands at present before the Council.

Our present discussion showed that the disturbing factors come from two sources. One arises from the affirmation in Mr. Jarring's report that:

"The implementation of international agreements of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change." [S/3821, para, 21.]

This is only another way of saying that the agreements of the Commission have reached-if they have not already passed -the point of diminishing returns. The other disturbing factor arises from the statement of the representative of India to the Council on Mr. Menon not only said that the question of the observance of the agreement was not subject to arbitration; he affirmed that:

"There cannot be any question of the violation or any infringement of the issue of sovereignty either in regard to the or the Union as a whole," [795th meeting, para, 18]. and again, that:

"We are not prepared to offer any proposal which in the slightest degree infringes a hair's-breadth of our territory, because that is our national sovereignty, which it is our duty to safeguard and to pass on to succeeding generations." [796th meeting, para, 130].

The objective of the Commission's resolution, which deserves constant repetition, remains that of holding a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations to determine the real wishes of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It is clear that any claim by one party or the other that any portion of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is Indian or Pakistan territory would be highly prejudicial to the implementation of the two resolutions adopted by the Commission and accepted by the two parties.

The failure of the parties to agree to his proposals notwithstanding, Mr. Jarring suggests that the Council may wish to take note of expressions of sincere willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in the finding of a peaceful solution, expressions which he received from both Governments. Such expressions of willingness to co-operate would be meaningless. however, unless they were followed by concrete evidence of willingness to reach agreement. Perhaps this avowed mutual desire could be translated into reality if the Council were to urge once again that the parties negotiate anew between themselves. Surely, the least we ought to expect after such categorical Expressions of willingness to cooperate, made to an official representative of this body, would be the restoration of that amicable and conciliatory atmosphere which in previous years resulted in some sort of agreement between the parties. One can almost tread this thought between the lines of Mr. Jarring's very precise report.

Certainly, if the Council is to move forward, it has to do more than note Mr. Jarring's report and express appreciation for his valuable services. My delegation would therefore urge that the Council should continue to press the parties to come together in order to reach an understanding that will serve the interests of peace in a vital area of the globe with sacrificing the legitimate aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. If the suggestion to call upon the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, Mr. Frank P. Graham, to consult again with the parties for the implementation of the Commission's agreements can help us to reach this objective, the delegation of the Philippines would be happy to support it.

The two governments, I am sure, realise more keenly we do that they cannot permit the situation to deteriorate to such a point as to make conflict inevitable. Yet, each day of stalemate that passes without hope for prospect of solution slowly but surely draws them closer to the abyss. What makes the situation so tragic in the eyes of their neighbours and we are one of them and the rest of the world is that it is so out of character, so foreign to their conception of the virtues that have made the two contending nations great in stature and influence. May not the vision and statesmanship which have given weight to their counsel in the forum of the United Nations be employed to advantage in solving a problem which immediately concerns them and may involve their very survival ?

The Philippines feels a particular concern over this question, which involves two great sister nations of Asia that we admire and respect.

For Pakistan, we are concerned that there shall be increasing respect for the principle of self-determination, which our new countries in Asia and Africa are asking the rest of the world increasingly to respect. For India, we are concerned that her high moral position in world affairs shall not be needlessly compromised by a miscomprehension of her real attitude on the problem of Kashmir.

For both India and Pakistan, we are concerned that these two Asian nations should live together in peace so that, by their words as well as by their example, they can contribute to the building up of a world of peace, order and justice.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Nunez Portuondo (Cuba) in the Security Council Meeting No. 798 held on 29 October 1957

The Cuban Government wishes to congratulate the representative of Sweden, Mr. Gunnar Jarring, on his skilful handling of the difficult mission entrusted to him by the Security Council. His report, which has been very carefully read and studied by us, gives a clear account of the present position of the Governments of India and Pakistan on the question of Jammu and Kashmir.

We have also listened with great interest to all the oral statements of the representatives of Pakistan and India, analysed them and perused, in so far as possible, the innumerable documents contained in the file on this question. There is no need for us to stress again our great esteem for the peoples of India and Pakistan, with whose respective Governments the Government of Cuba maintains very cordial diplomatic relations.

As the Cuban delegation sees it, there was agreement on this problem at one moment; not only between the Governments of Pakistan and India, but also in the United Nations, as represented by the Security Council, which applied the clear and categorical provisions of the Charter. This was when both Governments made public statements agreeing that the people of Kashmir should freely determine their own future and decide by means of a free plebiscite whether they would accede to India or to Pakistan. This happened on 13 January 1949 (399th meeting), when the Council took note of the report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (S/1196), giving notice of the acceptance by the Governments of India and Pakistan of the resolutions adopted by the Commission on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 determining the procedure and establishing the stages for holding the plebiscite, which, we repeat, was accepted by both Governments.

It was after this that the difficulties arose. Nevertheless, up to this very moment we have not heard it stated clearly and categorically nor have we been informed in any official document that the Government of India or the Government of Pakistan refuses to fulfil its offer that the people of Jammu and Kashmir should decide their own final destiny. It appears to us that this point is extremely important, of great legal and particularly moral value. We realise that the passage of time has made fulfilment of the agreement more difficult, but we must also add that it does not make it impossible. Moreover, in our opinion, the Security Council has no alternative but to try, through all possible legal means in its power, to ensure that the people concerned have the last word, expressing their view beyond any doubt by means of a legally and impartially held plebiscite.

Any other course would mean a revision of our agreements or a refusal to carry out obligations, and this the Security Council cannot accept.

We have given consideration and study to all the arguments advanced by the Indian Government; but, in our opinion, none of them is sufficiently weighty to prevent the people of Jammu and Kashmir from deciding their own destiny in the final instance. Besides, we repeat, we have neither heard nor read that the Government of India refuses to fulfil the undertakings it voluntarily accepted.

The Indian Government had adduced one argument which we consider important. We are referring to India's affirmation. that this question of Kashmir was brought before the United Nations by the Government of India itself on 1 January 1948, under Article 35 of the Charter, when it accused Pakistan on committing acts of aggression against it. The Cuban delegation considers that the Council implicitly settled this question by its resolutions subsequent to that date. Moreover, the very fact that India, on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, accepted agreements to resolve the problem through a free plebiscite in which the people of Jammu and Kashmir would decide their own future, logically and legally bars the Security Council from a decision on the original accusation which subsequent events and situations rendered inoperative. The very procedure proposed by the Commission and accepted by Pakistan and India, we repeat, implicitly resolved the question of the alleged aggression, even if the charge had been fully proved.

Another very important argument of the Indian Government relates to the need to guarantee the withdrawal of the armed forces of Pakistan. The offer of the Government of Pakistan to withdraw its forces and replace them by United Nations troops (791s meeting, para, 79) in our opinion constitutes a constructive and encouraging approach. The plebiscite would be made more feasible by simultaneous or subsequent withdrawal of Indian military forces.

In our opinion, the fact that Pakistan belongs to a defensive military alliance such as is constituted by the Baghdad Pact has no relation to the problem under discussion. We have no report of a single act of aggression committed in the name of the Baghdad Pact. Cuba also belongs, and has belonged for many years, to an inter-American defensive; that alliance also has never been accused of committing a single act of aggression against another nation. It is practically impossible for defensive alliances, under the terms of their agreements and in the case of States that are really independent and sovereign, to be used for aggressive purposes, because the other contracting parties would obviously not countenance any act of aggression.

The Cuban delegation considers that, despite all the obstacles, the Security Council must go on working calmly and cautiously to ensure that ultimately the plebiscite is held under the agreed conditions. We are concerned with two States, India and Pakistan, which are kinsmen and neighbours. We should all do our utmost to bring about the solution of a problem which cannot continue without ultimately endangering the peace. These are two Governments worthy of our respect which have always fulfilled their obligations in the United Nations, and which have proclaimed and defended the principle of the self determination of peoples, inasmuch as our goal is self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir, we believe that the task of the Security Council becomes less difficult.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 798 held on 29 October 1957

All members of the Security Council are under a debt of gratitude to Mr. Jarring for his report (S/3821), which provides a cogent and perceptive analysis of the issues as he found them in his discussions in Pakistan and India. The Australian delegation considers that Mr. Jarring's report constitutes a fair clarification of these issues, which have also been fully set out by the distinguished spokesmen of Pakistan and India in the Council. The Australian Government has requested me to convey its thanks to Mr. Jarring for his useful contribution to the Security Council's work.

We listened with great interest to the comments on this report by Mr. Firoz Khan Noon, Foreign Minister of Pakistan and Mr. Krishna Menon, Defence Minister of India. Their speeches made many points of force and persuasion and demonstrated once again the event of situation and the feelings it arouses between two nations which are neighbours. This situation is one that distresses many friends of India and Pakistan and particularly countries like Australia, which are fellow members of the Commonwealth and are bent on policies of friendly cooperation with both India and Pakistan.

I do not think that any good purpose would be served by my attempting an elaborate commentary on the speeches made by the representatives of India and Pakistan. These speeches seemed to the Australian delegation to put forward on many points complementary pictures, and in the main a faithful, if distressing, view of the complexity of the issues outstanding between them. Indeed, if I may say so, the two speeches have illustrated one of the major disturbing features of the present situation; that is, the tendency of controversialists in both India and Pakistan to attribute to the Government of the other country a greater degree of responsibility than either may actually have for the statements and at times the actions of religious and political extremists. In this connection we regret that there is, unfortunately, a tendency on each side to attribute bad faith to the other more readily than might be considered justified by an objective observer. I might mention in passing that the Australian delegation shares the view of the United Kingdom delegation that the references by the representative of Pakistan to "the threat of genocide" are not helpful in a situation which understandably causes considerable anxiety. In the same way, Mr. Krishna Menon's description in his statement of the nature of present conditions along the frontier did not seem to us likely to relieve existing tensions.

As other members of the Council, and particularly the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States, have stressed, we must all, especially in the deliberations of the Security Council, endeavour to improve the general atmosphere and to avoid the aggravation of difficulties.

Looking to the future, my Government does not consider that the problems involved in the Kashmir situation can best be tackled by the Security Council's attempting to determine every disputed question of historical fact, or of mixed fact and law. It is apparent, I suggest, to all who have followed the course of these proceedings that pronouncements on such issues would not be likely to provide a solution of the Kashmir problem. Only the parties to the dispute can, in the last resort, provide the solution. It is for this reason, I believe, that the Security Council has never expressed any conclusion on the legal aspects of the original accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or made any adjudication on the question of aggression.

Mr. Jarring reminds us in paragraph 13 of his report that, in the view of India, one of the impediments to the implementation of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was that "the Government of India felt aggrieved that the Council had so far not expressed itself on the question of what, in the Indian view, was aggression committed by Pakistan on India" (S/3821, para. 13). I think that the representative of India has himself made this view of his Government perfectly clear to the Council; but I hope that he will understand the attitude of the Council. We have also heard the representative of Pakistan's comments on this part of Mr. Garrison's report, and I trust that Mr. Khan Noon also will not misunderstand me if 1 finds it necessary to remark on a portion of his comments..

Australia was not a member of the Security Council at the time when the Kashmir question was first discussed and the basic resolutions taken, and it would not be appropriate for me to interpret or defend the position adopted by those who were members of the Council at that time. During our membership of the Council we have so for considered that our approach to this issue should be to build upon the past decisions of the Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and we have accordingly not felt that it would promote a settlement if the Council were now to go over past history and endeavour to determine whether there has been aggression. However, in case the words used by Mr. Khan Noon, namely, that all representatives on the Council "have regarded the Indian allegation as unworthy of consideration" (791st meeting, para. 24), might be interpreted by some persons as indicating that we had pronounced India's complaint to be insubstantial and hence not worth examining, I must say that we have not made any pronouncement at all on this matter, because we do not believe that it would be helpful to do so.

I doubt whether any of us can do more than try to help the parties towards agreement. The only practical basis that seems to be available is to take the Commission's resolutions as a whole without isolating one claim or another in any particular field of disagreement, in the hope that in this way the Council may be able to assist the parties to make some progress towards a solution. The Australian delegation considers that it is in the implementation of these resolutions, or in some amendment that the parties can work out themselves and believe in themselves, that parties must find the path towards resolving their difficulties I might add that this was the opinion expressed by Sri Owen Dixon in his report to the Security Council in 1950 (S/1791) following his visit to the subcontinent.

The Australian delegation therefore fully supports the emphasis laid by other members of the Council the assurances given to Mr. Jarring during his visit to Pakistan and India, regarding the willingness of both Governments to cooperate with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem within the framework of the agreed resolutions of the Commission. I would stress particularly our support for the interpretation, given in his statement by Sir Pierson Dixon, of part I, paragraph E of the resolution adopted by the Commission on 13 August 1948 (S/1100, para, 75), when he said that in his view this agreement between the parties to promote further negotiations "requires a continuing effort on the part of both Governments, and an effort which should animate them in the whole handling of the situation" (797th meeting, para. 5).

The Australian delegation agrees with the view that, in the light of Mr. Jarring's report and the statements of the Indian and Pakistani representatives, it is a valid concern of the Council to resolve any doubts that may exist whether part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 remains unimplemented in any respect at this time.

We also share the view that within the farme-work of the Commission's resolutions and of the Security Council's own discussions and resolutions on the subject, a further investigation should now be made on whether some progress can be attempted on the problem of demilitarisation in Kashmir. Plainly, demilitarisation is not going to take place if the parties adopt an "all or nothing" attitude. But if even modest progress is to be made towards the goal contemplated in the two resolutions of the Commission-that is a determination of the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by means of a free and impartial plebiscite then a further attempt to reach agreement between the parties on demilitarisation is the obvious way to proceed.

I would suggest in this connection that there are other factors, besides real or imagined anxieties regarding national security, that call for such an approach. In particular, the need for all possible progress to be made in the rapid economic development of India and Pakistan renders the maintenance of armed forces on the present scale in relation to the Kashmir situation an increasing handicap. There is also the view, which has been so widely expressed in the United Nations, that balanced reductions in armed forces can contribute, perhaps more than anything else, to and increase in mutual confidence between countries' suspicions of each other's intentions. I might add that the Australian delegation has been struck in studying the records of this dispute by the tremendous importance which the Security Council has always attached to measures of demilitarisation as the road to progress towards a solution of the Kashmir problem.

It seems to us, therefore, that the Council would be wise to take up the suggestion made by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States at the 797th meeting that it would be appropriate in present circumstances for the Council to call upon the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, Dr. Frank P. Graham, to consult again with the parties in order to bring about progress towards full implementation of the resolutions adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan. The Australian delegation has the greatest respect for Dr. Graham, who, in his long years connected with the United Nations, has become well known to us in our part of the world. We agree with the United States representative that the Council should express its confidence that Dr. Graham can perform another valuable service for the Council and, more importantly, for India and Pakistan themselves, if the two Governments concerned will agree to receive him and to consult with him in good faith in a renewed effort to reach an early agreement on this problem.

Text of the speech made by Mr. Khalaf (Iraq) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

Mr. President, allow me first of all to convey to you the regret of the permanent representative of Iraq, Mr. Jawad, at not being able to be present at this meeting. Other Official duties have kept him in Geneva for a short period. This, of course, has brought on me the honour and duty of presenting my country's point of view before this Council.

It is my privilege and pleasure to congratulate Mr. Jarring on the efficient way in which he has executed the mission entrusted to him by the Security Council. My delegation wishes to express to him its deep appreciation of his sincere and earnest endeavour for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute. Mr. Jarring's report, with its brevity, is an accurate and concise document which leaves no doubt as to the character of the stalemate which if permitted to continue, might lead to further undesirable complications and, to a rift between India and Pakistan. My delegation, on the other hand, notes with satisfaction that Mr Jarring is of the opinion that "both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem" [S/3821, para, 22] These two facts leave no doubt that further efforts are required to narrow the gap between the two parties to the dispute by the removal of the obstacles which stand in the way of a settlement.

The Council has seized this dispute since January 1948. A number of resolutions have been passed to arrest the conflict and to provide ways and means for a settlement.

Mr. Jarring was wise and within his terms of reference in making the point of departure in his efforts to find a settlement for this dispute the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which were accepted by the two parties, and in exploring what was impeding their full implementation. This approach is commendable and is in conformity with the Council's resolution of 21 February 1957 [5/3793], which reaffirms the previous resolutions of the Council. It was not, therefore, necessary for Mr. Jarring to go over the ground already covered by the previous examination the dispute by the Council or to express an opinion as to the adequacy of the resolutions passed by it Mr Jarring has rightly interpreted the resolution of 21 February 1957 and the opinions expressed in the discussions of this Council in January and February of this year.

It is therefore incumbent on the Council in its present deliberations to proceed further in its consideration of a settlement of the dispute. It should, further, keep in mind its resolution of 24 January 1957, which states: that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations" [S/3779]

In other words, any attempt by either party to the dispute to raise issues which have been superseded by the resolutions should be considered by the Council as being irrelevant, at least as far as the problem before us is concerned, and not likely to lead to an easy solution of the problem.

In the light of these circumstances we should like to make a few observations on the stands taken by India and Pakistan with regard to the implementation of the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The two resolutions recommend a process for the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute which could be divided into two stages: first, the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, second, the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide on the question of the future of Kashmir. Since both India and Pakistan agreed and this is the opinion of the Council that the settlement of the dispute lies in the implementation of these two resolutions, the question is, as Mr. Jarring has found out, to examine what was impeding their full implementation.

India claims that the pre-conditions necessary for demilitarisation have not been complied with, while Pakistan takes the opposite view. But both Governments recognize that the steps envisaged by the Commission's resolutions constitute a single and continuous process. The cease-fire order, which is part I, paragraph A, of the resolution of 13 August 1948, has been accomplished. Paragraph B stipulates that both parties should not augment their military potential in Kashmir. In this respect India claims that there has been augmentation on the Pakistan side. Pakistan denies this, and in support of this denial refers to the findings of Mr. Graham, the United Nations representative, who, in April 1952, states in paragraph 32 of his third report [S/2611 and Cerr, 1] that the present number of armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line was estimated to be less than 50 per cent of the number of armed forces existing on 1 January 1949, when the cease-fire became effective If any such violation has taken place, it was the responsibility of the United Nations Military Observers Group to report it to the Council. There has been no such report. Furthermore, in all its previous deliberations the Council has proceeded on the assumption that there has been no augmentation of the military potential in Kashmir.

We submit, therefore, that India's position on this matter does not stand on real grounds

Part I, paragraph E, stipulates that both parties should appeal to their respective peoples to maintain an atmosphere favourable for negotiations. India produces arguments and information to show that Pakistan has not only failed to make such appeals but also has indulged in what they called hostile propaganda. On the other hand, there are statements coming from the Indian side which can be interpreted to show a hostile attitude towards the settlement of the dispute. The dispute has dragged on for such a long time, during which so many events I have happened and so many declarations have been uttered, that it is hardly feasible to make of such statements a legal issue so to block the possibility of proceeding to a settlement.

The contention of India that Pakistan has not implemented part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and in particular paragraphs B and E is not designed to help in reaching a settlement. In all previous negotiations, India has never raised the question of the non-implementation of part I of the 1948 resolution. The main impediment to the full implementation of the Commission's resolutions, as the Council may recall, was the differences of opinion between the two Governments on the question of demilitarisation as a prerequisite to the holding of the plebiscite.

My delegation notes that Mr. Jarring has attempted to break the deadlock concerning part I when he enquired, and I quote, "of the two Governments if they would be prepared to submit the question of whether part I had been implemented or not to arbitration" [S/3821, para, 17]. Nevertheless, in paragraph 19 of his report, he tells us that his efforts in bringing this matter to arbitration failed because of India's refusal. He says in fact:

"While the Government of Pakistan, after a certain hesitation, fell in with my suggestion in principle, the Government of India, however, did not fell that arbitration, as outlined by me, would be appropriate" [ibtd., para, 19].

The Government of India contended that arbitration is not suitable in this case because "such procedure would be inconsistent with sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir and the rights and obligations of the Union of India in respect of this territory" [ibid.]. On this my delegation would like only to say that the question of Jammu and Kashmir has been settled-and this is, indeed, the view of the Council-so as to give India any right or obligations toward this State.

We wonder, therefore, if the new stand of the Government of India regarding the non-implementation of part I of the resolution of 13 August 1948 is not on the one hand an afterthought, and on the other, an attempt to reopen issues which have long been closed. In this respect it should be asked: if Pakistan has not implemented part I, why did India enter into negotiations for the implementation of part II, the truce agreement? It was in January 1949 that India should have raised this matter. In fact the negotiations conducted by the Commission for India and Pakistan and the United Nations representatives were all directed towards finding a basis for the formulation of the truce agreement.

Such arguments on the part of the Government of India should not, however, deter the Council from proceeding with the implementation of parts II and III of the resolution of 13 August 1948. Even if there is a difference of opinion on the question as to whether or not the military potential of the forces in Kashmir has been increased, the proper solution still remains to demilitarise the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The demilitarisation, in accordance with the principles laid down in the 1948 resolution, will certainly remove any augmentation of the military potential that may have taken place. It is the duty of the Council at this stage to find ways and means to objective, and once demilitarisation has been achieved, the procedure laid down in the resolution adopted by the Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949 for the holding of a plebiscite should be set in motion.

The second complaint of India is that although the case had been brought before the Council on 1 January 1948 as an act of aggression committed by Pakistan, the Council had so for not expressed itself on the question and that it was incumbent on Pakistan "to vacate the aggression". Mr. Jarring has rightly declined to entertain this complaint by pointing out that the Council had properly taken cognizance of India's original complaint and that "regardless of the merits of the present position taken by the Government of India, could not be overlooked that it accepted the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan" [S/3821, para 14). The acceptance of the two resolutions no doubt embodies a definitive agreement between the parties with regard to the settlement of the dispute. This position had definitely been accepted by India. stated in the Council: On 9 March 1951, Sir Benegal Rau

"Here again India has already explained its position on more than one occasion namely, that under the guise of arbitration issues which have already been closed by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 and by the assurances given to India by the United Nations Commission cannot be reopened" S/536th meeting, para, 27].

There is reference in paragraph 20 of Mr. Jarring's report to the concern on the part of both sides "in connection with the changing political, economic and strategic factors surrounding the whole of the Kashmir question". This is why my delegation is convinced that a speedy implementation of the Council resolutions is the only alternative left after the continuing deadlock between the two parties. As a matter of fact, paragraph 21 of the report means exactly this when it says:

"The Council will, furthermore, be aware of the fact that the implementation of international agreement of an ad hoc character, which has not been achieved fairly speedily, may become progressively more difficult because the situation with which they were to cope has tended to change." [S/3821, para, 21.1

Of course, this does not in any way refer to the permanent and final solution of the problem, which is the free and impartial plebiscite that should dispose of the dispute once and for all. This is, in our opinion, the solution to the problem, a solution which takes into consideration, and rightly so, the right of the people of Kashmir to self determination.

What India and Pakistan do or abstain from doing in the wide field of international relations has no connection whatsoever. with the Kashmir dispute. Moreover, no purpose Cair oc served in arguing about the implementation of the different parts of the resolutions. The Security Council should proceed to the implementation, the full implementation, of these resolutions by proceeding to a complete demilitarisation on both sides. Once this demilitarisation is achieved, then all the other steps stipulated by the resolutions in question can be taken in an orderly and effective manner.

Before concluding my remarks on this subject, I should like briefly to sum up the main points contained or implied in Mr. Jarring's report, as follows:

1. The two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan are and shall be binding on both Governments.

2 India's charge of aggression against Pakistan and the repetition of that charge during Mr. Jarring's visit were not relevant to his mission.

3. Both countries are desirous of finding a solution. To this, however, we must add that a solution is already prescribed by the Council and the Commission through their resolutions, add all that is to be done is to implement the resolutions.

4 Both parties have expressed their sincere willingness to cooperate with the United Nations in finding a peaceful solution.

We make a special appeal to the Governments of India and Pakistan to facilitate the solution of this dispute by bringing to bear more efforts and more co-operation, so that the right of the people of Kashmir to self-determination may be safeguarded and the Charter of the United Nations upheld.

I should now like to say a word or two on another subject which, although not entirely relevant to the problem now being discussed by the Council, has nevertheless been dwelt upon by the representative of India.

The representative of India saw fit to enter into a discussion of the purposes and objectives of alliances and pacts, and He made a point of mentioning several times during his statement the Baghdad Pact, in which my country is a participant. My delegation categorically denies that the Baghdad Pact has any aggressive aims. Its members have chosen to get together for defensive, economic and social purposes. I am not here to express an opinion on the quotations which the representative of India produced before this Council at the 795th meeting, since, as he said, they were quotations from declarations made by Pakistan statesmen. I should, however, like to assure the Security Council that not a single statement from any responsible Iraqi can be produced to show that the Baghdad Pact is designed for anything other than good neighbourliness and defensive purposes.

We also believe that no country has the right or prerogative to question the right of other countries to enter into a purely defensive alliance or pact which not only is known to everyone and based on Article 51 of the Charter, but also is registered with the United Nations.

To accuse Pakistan of trying to involve other peoples of the Middle East in what the representative of India termed Pakistan's aggressive intentions against India is contrary to the facts of the situation and surely a reflection on the intentions and intelligence of other members of the Pact. That is why we were shocked to here the representative of India say the following at the Council's 795th meeting :

"After all, when there is a contract, there are two parties and there really should be a common intention even if each party goes in for a different reason" 795th, meeting, para, 98].

I should like to say here and now that our common intention is nothing else but common defence and wellbeing. My delegation had not wished to enter into this subject, was it my intention to enter into an argument with the representative of India about what other Governments should and should not do. I did not, however, wish to leave the allegations levelled, although implicit, against my Government without any refutation.

It would not do justice to the case before us or to the people of Kashmir if we or others were to create or entertain the impression that our judgement was in any way related to or based upon considerations other than the merits of the case, the resolutions of the Council and the principles of the United Nations Charter-the most important of which is the principle self-determination.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

The occasion for the present series of meetings on the Kashmir question is the report (S/3921) of Mr. Gunnar Jarring, the representative of Sweden, submitted on 29 April 1957 in pursuance of the Security Council's resolution of 21 February 1957 (S/3793).

I wish first of all to express to Mr. Jarring my delegation's deep appreciation for his excellent performance of a very difficult mission. When, on 21 February 1957, the Security Council decided to send Mr. Jarring to India and Pakistan, 1 stated in the Council that I did not envy him the task that had been entrusted to him. I added that I anticipated-and I was sure that he also anticipated a hard and difficult assignment. (774th meeting, para. 62.) My appreciation of his performance states in spite of the lack of results.

According to the report, Mr. Jarring made the two resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 the starting point-indeed the centre-of all his efforts. His reason was that these two resolutions were the only ones which both India and Pakistan regarded as binding on them. The resolution of 5 January 1949, the Council will recall, had as its central point the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite to decide on the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan. The resolution of 13 August 1948 fixed the procedure preliminary to a plebiscite. Part I of that resolution had to be implemented before action on part II could be taken. Pakistan has always contended that part I has been implemented: India, on the other hand, has contended that part I has not been implemented,

Mr. Jarring, in his mission to India and Pakistan, made a great effort to remove this difference of opinion between India and Pakistan. I consider his efforts on this point to be the heart of his mission. For that reason, and in order to avoid any misunderstanding. I should like to read out verbatim paragraphs 17 and 18 of Mr. Jarring's report:

"17. In order to break the deadlock concerning part I, I inquired of the two Governments if they would be prepared to submit the question of whether part I had been implemented or not to arbitration. In substance, suggestion to the two Governments did not envisage simple arbitration, but the arbitrator or arbitrators would also be empowered, in case they found that the implementation had been incomplete, to indicate to the parties which measures should be taken to arrive at a full implementation. It was also envisaged that in the latter case after a given time-limit the arbitrator or arbitrators would determine whether the given indications had been followed and implementation did obtain.

"18. Being aware of the earlier negative attitude of the Government of India on the question of arbitration with relation to the Kashmir problem as a whole, I made it a point to explain to it that I was not suggesting anything of that nature, and that what I was proposing, while termed arbitration, in all likelihood would be more in the nature of a determination of certain facts which, in the Indian view, were incontrovertible. In addition, the procedure suggested might lead to an improvement in India Pakistan relations in general, a development which I assumed could not be unwelcome to either of the two countries." (S/3821, paras. 17 and 18.)

In the opinion of my delegation, Mr. Jarring's suggestion for removing the difference of opinion between India and Pakistan, in relation to Part I of the resolution of 13 August. 1949, was objective, realistic and constructive. It is in harmony with the ideals and practices of the United Nations. Unfortunately, while Pakistan accepted this suggestion, India rejected it. This is the reason for the failure of the Jarring mission.

During our meetings in January and February, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan put before the Security Council. another suggestion which many members of the Council, including myself, considered to be very constructive (761st meeting, para, 112). It was included in one of the draft resolutions put before the Council. (S/3787). The suggestion was that a United Nations force should be sent to Kashmir. It is obvious that, during the plebiscite, peace and order in Kashmir must be maintained. It is also obvious that any national forces, whether from India or from Pakistan, or from both, stationed in Kashmir during the plebiscite period would be suspected of coercing or intimidating the voters. Our problem is, therefore, to maintain peace and order in Kashmir without any appearance or possibility of coercion or intimidation of the voters. I cannot conceive of a solution better than that of the use of a United Nations force for this purpose. This proposal made by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan was also rejected by India.

In our meetings in February and also in our recent meetings we have been given long and complicated expositions of the Indian Constitution and of the legal position of India in Kashmir. Since I am not versed in these questions of law, I do not presume the judge on the legal claims which India has put forward. I do not dispute or affirm these claims. There is, however, one great consideration which I should like to put before the Council.

All colonial empires have the backing of law. All of them have been fortified with treaties, conventions, protocols, agreements and what not. The British empire in India had ample legal foundation. In the face of India's claim to self-determination, all British legal claims were swept aside. These claims were solidly based on treaties duly signed and ratified, and even sanctified by time and tradition. When the Indian people demanded self-determination, the legal documents in the hands of the United Kingdom seemed to have no moral or political relevance. What the Indian people demanded and won from the United Kingdom should, I hope, be granted to the people of Kashmir.

In one of my previous interventions in this Council I called attention to the fact that, in the post-war period, Asia, for the first time in its history, has had the possibility of building up a community of free and friendly States. We have the possibility even of improving upon the international practices in some other parts of the world. [765th meeting, para 58] Now we face the tragic situation in which India refuses to grant to a fellow Asian people, that is, the people of Kashmir-the same rights which India demanded and won from the British people. I hope that India will yet reconsider.

In regard to the essence of the problem I have only two points to make. One is that the principle of a free and fair plebiscite should be applied. My second point is that all the conditions preliminary to a plebiscite, which India or Pakistan may demand in order to make the plebiscite really free and fair, are legitimate and worthy of our consideration. All other conditions, which are calculated either to strengthen or to weaken claims and pretensions of either side, are simply obstructionist and illegitimate.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Wadsworth (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

Last February the Council gave to one of its members Ambassador Jarring-a delicate and important task. I want to express the appreciation of the United States delegation for the outstanding manner in which he carried it out. We are fortunate to have the benefit of his review of this highly complex question. It cannot fail to help the Council decide how it can best aid in finding a settlement acceptable to both parties. There was a long interval in the Council's consideration of this question between December 1952 and January 1957. Ambassador Jarring's recent discussions with Pakistan and India shed light on the current problems and help us view the situation in perspective. We find one aspect of Ambassador Jarring's report particularly encouraging Both parties have again declared their desire to find a peaceful solution to the problem and have again declared their willingness to cooperate with the United Nations to this end. More recently they have given the Council the same assurances. In this atmosphere the Council should continue, therefore, to assist the parties in finding a just and equitable solution to the problem. This long-standing and difficult I should like to turn now to the specific situation with which the Council is confronted.

It may be useful at the outset to recapitulate the main lines of Ambassador Jarring's report, because it is from that report that our current sessions start. The representatives of India and Pakistan during our discussions early this year indicated that they continue to recognize their international obligations under the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15]. Ambassador Jarring therefore based his mission on these statements of the parties, and he made it his task to explore what was impeding the implementation of the resolutions.

He tells us that the Government of India laid emphasis on two restraining factors, one relating to the "cease-fire order", the other to the "truce agreement". India further stated that it was premature to discuss the implementation of those parts of the 1948 resolution dealing with the truce agreement and the plebiscite until the cease-fire order was fully implemented. The Government of Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained. that the "cease-fire order" had been implemented by it in good faith and in full. It believed that the time had come to proceed to the implementation of the "truce agreement". In order to break this deadlock, Ambassador Jarring asked if the Governments would be prepared to submit to arbitration the question of whether the "cease-fire order" had been implemented. The Government of Pakistan accepted this in principle; the Government of India did not feel that, as explained, arbitration would be appropriate. Ambassador Jarring was unable to break the deadlock and reported back to the Council.

We have now heard statements in the Council by the representatives of India [795th and 796th meetings] and of Pakistan [791st and 796th meetings]. My delegation has given the most careful study to these statements. Insofar as they were related to the Jarring report, they seem to be further elaborations of the positions which are reflected in the report. Other issues and suggestions were also raised in their statements, on a number of which there significant disagreements. So this is where the Council finds itself at the moment, and we are faced with the problem of selecting the most useful basis on which to proceed.

The present case is different from that of many problems which are brought before the Security Council: we are fortunate in having an area of agreement- and a large one between the parties and with the Council. There are, of course, many complexities to the Kashmir question, and I do not in any way wish to minimise the difficulties lying in the way of reaching a final solution. We would delude ourselves if we did so. Nevertheless, there does exist in the resolutions adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan an agreement for resolving this conflict. That agreement calls for the following action: first, for a cease-fire order; second, for a truce agreement; third, for the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan to be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. These are the basic elements of the Commission's resolutions, which both India and Pakistan accepted, and which the Council has repeatedly endorsed. They are obligations which have been recognized by the parties for nine years. Both parties have reaffirmed their recognition of these obligations before the Council this year, as Ambassador Jarring pointed out in his report. And Under these circumstances the Council's most constructive contribution will undoubtedly be to help implement the resolutions.

This, indeed, has been the primary task to which the past efforts of the Council and its agents-the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the various representatives who have been sent to the sub-continent-have been directed for many years. In our view the Council's most useful role at this time continues to be to proceed on the basis of this area of agreement, to seek to enlarge upon it and to make it finally a reality. May I recall that on 15 February 1957 Ambassador Lodge stated in our previous discussion on this issue:

"The Security Council's overriding endeavour in connection with Kashmir has always been to secure an amicable settlement acceptable to both parties. In doing this, it has sought to build the gains which have been made in the past and upon agreements which have been reached by the parties." [768th meeting, para. 26].

My delegation continues to believe that this is the best approach.

On what aspects of the Commission's resolutions do we need to make progress? We need, for one thing, to make progress towards demilitarisation, or the implementation of the truce agreement. This has been the focus of every resolution of the Council since 1950. Most of Mr. Graham's work has also been concentrated on it. Prior to his last report, in fact, he was requested by the Security Council to enter into negotiations with the parties to reach final agreement on the specific number of forces which should remain on either side of the cease-fire line within limits the Council had previously set. Mr. Graham submitted his report on this effort on 27 March 1953 [S/2967]. Although he had put forward precise proposals, he did not succeed in reaching full agreement with the parties at that time, so that this important aspect in implementing the resolutions remains before us.

I suggest that efforts to bring this about, and to achieve agreement on the forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line, should be an important aspect of any further action we take. Surely, a reduction in the number of troops in the area would in itself be a forward step in improving relationships.

Secondly, there are the questions which have been raised. about the status of implementation of the "cease-fire order". Attention has been paid by both the Indian and Pakistani representatives in the Council to previous reports which touch upon this question, especially to Mr. Graham's third and fifth reports. A considerable portion of Ambassador Jarring's report also deals with his arbitration proposal on the question. In the light of this background it would seem desirable that the Council include this as one of the issues on which it might take some action. An appropriate resolution might include an authorization for recommendations to be made on the "cease fire order" if they should seem necessary.

The achievement of these objectives, requiring as it would the positive support and agreement of both India and Pakistan, is not easy. I do not suggest that we can complete the process at this session of the Council. In our opinion we need again to call for assistance.

Fortunately, the United Nations has retained the services, as the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, of Mr. Frank P. Graham. It would seem appropriate to us if the Council were to call upon him to consult again with the parties in order to bring about implementation of the agreements concluded under the Commission's auspices along the lines I have indicated. No one possesses a more intimate knowledge of the background and facts of this problem than Mr. Graham, and I am confident that he can perform another valuable service for the Council and, more importantly, for India and Pakistan. I am hopeful that if the Council decided to take this action, India and Pakistan would agree to receive him and to consult with him in good faith in an effort to reach an early agreement. In closing I would like to say this one of the Council's overriding responsibilities on all questions is to maintain peace and security. Its efforts in this case to help the parties implement their commitments are based on a sincere desire to achieve stability and friendly relations between these two important countries.

In its first resolution, that of 17 January 1948, the Security Council called upon India and Pakistan "to refrain from making statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation". Again in its first resolution, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan also called on the parties ``to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiation" [S/1100, para, 75]. These requests, as well as others that the Council has adopted from time to time, are as pertinent today as when they were adopted. We call them again to the attention of India and Pakistan, both of whom have expressed their intention to conform to these principles.

We believe that a final solution to this problem can only be of benefit to both parties. It is in this spirit that I have spoken. We have concentrated on the favourable aspects of the issue in the hope that we may encourage progress towards its solution and an improvement in relations between these two great Asian countries.

We have made our comments in the hope that they will assist in finding a way to end the frustrations that have hitherto beset every effort to bring about a permanent and peaceful solution of this problem. We do not and should not despair at these difficulties. We should patiently and persistently continue our efforts until mutual agreement can be reached and issues resolved, and we believe that every constructive step towards a solution of this problem contributes to the maintenance of peace and stability

We would appreciate hearing the views of other members of the Council with regard to these important matters.

25101957 Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 797 held on 25 October 1957

I should like first to express the deep appreciation of my Government for the able and conscientious way in which the representative of Sweden, our President for the month of February, has carried out his mission.

It is true that Mr. Jarring felt unable to report to the Council any concrete proposals likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute; nevertheless, I hope that his report will prove to have a special significance in marking the beginning of a new phase of constructive progress under the auspices of the United Nations towards a settlement of the Kashmir problem, which has troubled the sub-continent for the last decade.

Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom attaches the greatest importance to Mr. Jarring's conclusion that, despite the present deadlock, both parties are still desirous of finding a solution to the problem, and to the expressions of sincere willingness which they made to cooperate with the United Nations in the finding of a peaceful solution. Although in both countries popular feeling has been very deeply engaged on this issue, both countries have in fact shown great patience and given proof of their desire to avoid the danger of a military clash.

Since so much depends on the willingness of both parties to seek earnestly for a solution of the problem which faces them. We have always attached particular importance, as I said on 15 February 1957 [768th meeting, paras 17 and 18], to the Security Council resolution of 17 January 1948, which, among other things, called upon both parties to immediately take all measures within their power to improve the situation. I am glad that the representative of India, in his speech at the 195th meeting, accepted this resolution as engaging India, together with the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

For these reasons, too, we attach the greatest importance to both the letter and the spirit of part I, paragraph E, of the resolution of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75]. Mr. Jarring reported the Government of India's emphasis on the failure to implement this section as one of the factors in the way of implementation of the two resolutions. I should like to repeat the wording of this paragraph because of the importance we attach to it: it says that the two Governments ``agree to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations." But in my view paragraph E must be interpreted even more widely than that. To my mind it requires a continuing effort on the part of both Governments, and an effort which should animate them in their whole handling of the situation. For this reason we deplore charges like that of genocide being made in this Council.

We regard with great concern the recent bomb incidents in Srinagar, and we were glad to hear the Foreign Minister of Pakistan deny categorically that the Pakistan Government knew anything of them. My Government strongly holds that terrorist activities can only complicate difficult problems of this kind.

In general, therefore, I would wish to appeal to both India and Pakistan to do their utmost, in the world of part I, paragraph E. of the resolution, "to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations."

What other impediments to progress did Mr. Jarring report? He said that the Government of India felt aggrieved that the Council had so far not expressed itself on the question. of what in its view was aggression committed by Pakistan on India.

The views of the United Kingdom Government on this question are well known to this Council and to the Governments of India and Pakistan. They were set out by Sir Alexander Cadogan at the 467th meeting and by Sir Gladwyn Jebb at the 537th, the 539th, the 606th and the 611th meetings of the Council. The consistent attitude taken on this point in the past by the Security Council is also well known.

I do not feel that it would contribute to progress if we were to go over this ground again. This much, however, I would say since neither Her Majesty's Government nor the Security Council has felt able to pronounce on the Indian case on this aspect of the question, and since this is, so to speak, the major premise in the Indian argument as developed by Mr. Krishna Menon, it follows that we are unable to accept many of the deductions which have been drawn, however logically

they might seem to ensue if the major premise were accepted. It seems to me that the more fruitful way of making progress is to fasten on those points where there is some area of agreement between the parties and to see whether progress can be made from those points. Clearly, we have to admit that there has been little progress over the last nine years towards the goal contemplated in the two resolutions adopted by the Commission, that is, a decision as to the future of the State by means of an impartial plebiscite. Mr. Jarring was aware of the grave problems in connection with and as a result of a plebiscite. The United Kingdom Government, which stood so close to the convulsive events of 1947, cannot fail to be deeply conscious of these problems, which have grown no less with the passage of time. But what is needed above all in order to remove the obstacles to a settlement is a willingness to find a peaceful solution. Both parties, as I have said, have expressed such a willingness to Mr. Jarring. Given this willingness, I do not doubt that the wisdom and statesmanship of the parties is sufficient to enable progress towards a solution of the Kashmir problem to be found.

Mr. Jarring referred also to the emphasis which the Government of India put on their view that part I, paragraph B, of the resolution of 13 August 1948 had not been implemented by the Government of Pakistan. There is a grave difficulty here, too. In this paragraph, both High Commands agree to refrain from taking any measures that might augment their military potential. This is clearly an important preliminary to the next stage-the stage of the withdrawal of the troops of Pakistan and the withdrawal of the bulk of Indian forces, to which both sides stand engaged. Clearly, there is a connection between augmentation and the removal or reduction of forces. Augmentation makes removal or reduction more difficult. Removal or reduction does away with any further problems about augmentation.

It was originally contemplated that the three parts of the resolution of 13 August 1948 should be implemented in quick succession; and, as early as 1949, the Commission for India and Pakistan was pointing out the difficulties arising from delay. Undoubtedly, the passage of time has added to the difficulties about the implementation of paragraph B. In the further eight years since 1949, new difficulties have arisen. Armies have become more efficient; old equipment has been replaced; new roads have been built on both sides.

If I understood Mr. Krishna Menon correctly, he was concerned with what is in the resolution-the principle that forces should not be augmented after the cease-fire-and with something that is not in the resolution; that is, the question of "Azad" Kashmir forces. The Commission did not explicitly deal with this latter point. Now these are very real problems, and the Security Council must be deeply concerned at any augmentation of military potential on either side.

Certainly we regret that Mr. Jarring was unable to suggest a means of dealing with the subject acceptable to both sides. But we must do more than try to ascertain the facts; we must try to find some method of reducing the state of tension, of reducing the burden of armaments and of dealing effectively with a situation which has become crystallised in a form never contemplated when the resolutions were passed. What helpful action, then, can be taken ?

Since 1949 the Security Council has, as I pointed out at the 768th meeting, attached the greatest importance to demilitarisation, and it directed its efforts, until the phase of direct negotiations began, towards achieving progress in that direction. Surely, this is the right approach.

Both the representative of India and the representative of Pakistan have referred to the heavy burden of armaments. The cost of this continuing tension has been made apparent to us all. Mr. Krishna Menon and Mr. Firoz Khan Noon have both made it clear how greatly their countries would prefer to devote as much of their resources as possible to peaceful development. And we all know how much easier and more economical development in the area would be if it could be planned on a basis of cooperation.

After ten years the compelling arguments for making progress towards demilitarisation are stronger than ever before. The Security Council cannot ignore all the patient work and endeavour which has gone into attempting to make progress over the years. Although Mr. Graham's labours five years ago did not get beyond the edge of success; although the direct

talks four years ago were successful; although the Government of India has stated that it does not regard itself as bound by any previous conditional agreements, yet I cannot believe that there are insuperable obstacles to progress on the withdrawal of troops starting from the Pakistani side.

In some ways, time and change make implementation of the agreements, as Mr. Jarring has said, more difficult. But there is a reverse side to the coin; in other ways difficulties may become less acute.

I cannot but think that the compelling reasons for making progress are such that, if a United Nations representative is able to begin conversations with the two parties and they enter upon them with a determination, in both of their interests, to make such advance, progress will in fact be possible. I believe that Mr. Graham could again play a useful role in this

To sum up, I would first wish to appeal to both sides to do their utmost to create an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations. I would also appeal to them to agree to an investigation as regards the facts concerning the augmentation of forces. But I would go beyond that and urge that both sides should again attempt to make some progress towards the implementation of part II of the resolution adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 13 August 1948. There is no question here of interfering with national sovereignty, and no question of arguing for any change of national defence policies. It is a question of carrying out international obligations by which both sides are engaged.

There are those who suggest that the United Kingdom, as a member of the Commonwealth, should avoid being involved in red discussions in the Security Council about the Kashmir questions, since to do so is inevitably to attract criticism from both sides. I need not explain to members of the Council what importance we attach to our relations with India and Pakistan. If we could, we would gladly avoid any action which might give offence to either of them or in any way impair our relations with either country.

Nevertheless, we have a duty as a permanent member of the Security Council and we cannot shrink from playing our part in trying to find a settlement of this dispute which, in the words of the Security Council's second resolution, that of 20 January 1948 "might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of international peace and security". [S/1100, annex 1) So long as this tension continues, not only will it have a profound effect on the lives and fortunes of some 500 million people in the sub continent, but it cannot fail to have its effect on the international policies of both countries. The Kashmir problem affects not only India and Pakistan, it is of concern to the whole world. The reasons for attempting yet once more to make progress towards its settlement are compelling.

I have confidence in the statesmanship and wisdom of both India and Pakistan. I have confidence that this problem will be solved-because it must be solved.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Jarring (Sweden) in the Security Council Meeting No. 791 held on 24 September 1957

Mr. President, first of all I want to thank you for the kind words you have addressed to me. I appreciate them very much.

In its resolution of 21 February 1957 [S/3793] the Security Council requested me, in my capacity as President of the Council for the month of February, to examine with the Governments of India and of Pakistan any proposals which, in my opinion, were likely to contribute towards the settlement of the India-Pakistan dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. I was furthermore requested to visit the sub-continent for this purpose and to report to the Security Council not later than 15 April 1957.

In pursuance of this resolution I visited India and Pakistan during the months of March and April and had conversations. with the two Governments.

My report, which is contained in document S/3821, was submitted on 29 April 1957. I want to express my thanks to my colleagues on the Council for their kindness in granting me an extension of the time originally set for the presentation of my report.

I do not feel that it will be necessary for me to give an oral presentation of the contents of my report or to elaborate upon it. The text has been at the disposal of the members of the Security Council and the parties concerned since 29 April 1957 and it is well known to everybody.

The submission of my report to the Council terminates my duties under the Security Council resolution of 21 February 1957.

I take this opportunity to thank once more the members of the Council for the confidence they have placed in me. I likewise express to the Governments of India and of Pakistan my appreciation for the cooperation I have received in the performance of my task.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Lodge (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

Mr. President, the United States appreciates your willingness to accept the assignment that the Security Council has asked you to undertake. We hope that your understanding of the peoples of India and Pakistan and your experience in the United Nations will enable you to make some real progress towards solving this dispute.

We think that the resolution which has just been adopted will give you enough scope and enough guidance. The consensus of the Council on the major problems involved was expressed in the draft resolution [S/3787] which failed at the 773rd meeting only because of the Soviet veto. It would have been more satisfactory if the specific ideas embodied in the four-Power draft resolution could have been kept, but the resolution that the Council has now adopted does not retreat from those ideas. Nor are the facts changed by the Soviet veto. You are authorised to consider any proposals which might help solve the problem, having regard to the pertinent resolutions. We trust that your mission will be of great help to India and Pakistan as well as to the Council.

The fact that you will be able to draw upon the extensive experience and the ability of Mr. Frank F. Graham - who, may I say, has just made a noteworthy statement-should make it possible for you to function effectively in a short period. Mr. Graham will be able to make a contribution which, it seems to us, no one else could make. The Council is lucky that he is available to help, and we appreciate his offer of cooperation.

Text of the Speech made by Sri Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

As I said at the previous meeting, the United Kingdom ardently desires to see progress made towards a settlement of the Kashmir problem. I am convinced that the resolution we have just adopted will contribute to this end.

We have faith in the mission which you, Sir, are undertaking. We have the fullest confidence in the wisdom and experience which you bring to it. We have confidence in the country from which you come, with its traditions of peace and justice. We have confidence in the authority of this Council which goes with you in this task.

To aid you in your task, you will have the great experience, wisdom and understanding of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Mr. Frank Graham. We have admired his untiring efforts since he was appointed by this Council in 1951, his patience and his skill in negotiation. It is a matter of the deepest regret that all his painstaking toil, which seemed at one time to hold so much promise for a settlement, has not come to full fruition, but it has not been without fruit, and the detailed experience that he has acquired in his dealings with this matter has not been in vain, for this experience is still able to contribute-indeed, I feel sure it will be an invaluable contribution-to the mission which you, Sir, are undertaking under this resolution.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

It now appears that this present draft resolution introduced by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States will be passed by this Council. My delegation will certainly vote for it. Before we pass to the vote, I wish only to say a few words in regard to this draft resolution.

So far we have not heard any criticism of this draft except a mild criticism, if I understand aright, in regard to the recalling of past resolutions and also in regard to that phrase "having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council". So far as my delegation is concerned, if we should omit the creature of the draft resolution I will still vote for it. I do not attach much importance to the reciting of past. resolutions. Even if we should not follow our past resolutions, we certainly will follow the Charter. I think the Charter is a sufficient basis for an appropriate settlement of this dispute.

The particular principle which would be applicable to this dispute would be the principle of self-determination of peoples. If any party should wish the Council to start all over again and wipe off the slate any previous resolutions we have passed, I am agreeable. I would be glad to start all over again and go back to the fundamental principles of the Charter. I believe with the Charter in hand we could find an appropriate solution.

Now, however, we take the draft resolution as it stands. This draft resolution leaves considerable discretion to you, Mr. President. I do not envy you the task that you are assuming. I anticipate, and I am sure you anticipate, a hard and difficult assignment and journey.

A strange feature of this whole dispute from 1948 to the present time is that we started with an agreement, namely, that the question should eventually be decided through a free and fair plebiscite. Our efforts have been hampered, blocked and even baulked by the conditions preliminary to a plebiscite. It is this question of conditions that has prevented any fruitful action. To my mind, there are two kinds of conditions that we can face and in fact we have faced two types of conditions. One category of conditions determined by one State or another relates to the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite. One party or the other is anxious or worried that unless a certain condition is fulfilled the plebiscite will not be free or fair. So far as conditions of that category are concerned, conditions which aim at increasing the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite, I think the Council and I am sure the President will be very sympathetic in considering them. Indeed, it is the duty of the President and the members of the Security Council to consider sympathetically any condition which would make the plebiscite fair and free.

However, in the course of our deliberations during the last nine years, we have had to face another category of conditions, conditions which have nothing to do with the freedom or fairness of the plebiscite but which are aimed at weakening or strengthening the existing claims of one party or the other. It seems to me that that type of condition does not deserve consideration. We cannot afford to write into the conditions of the plebiscite speeches that would strengthen or weaken the claims of one party or the other. We would and we should accept conditions which contribute to the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite.

This draft resolution leaves you, Mr. President, ample discretion. So far as my delegation is concerned, we have every confidence that you will exercise your discretionary powers with wisdom.

126. Text of the Speech made by Mr. Graham (United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

I wish, Mr. President, to give you my co-operative and loyal good wishes for your most important mission. gratulate you on the opportunity to negotiate with the Governments of two great peoples whom I not only respect, but, if I may say so, have come to love for themselves-their history, their heritage, their heroic struggles with gigantic problems and yet, withal, with a joyous and youthful hope.

I congratulate the Council on your acceptance of this mission, Mr. President, for which you are by ability, experience and disposition so eminently qualified and to which you bring the prestige of the office of President of the Security Council itself. Godspeed to you on your mission, to the efforts of the Security Council, to the cooperation of the two Governments with you and to the untiring work of an ably led and dedicated Secretariat, as they all work together and stand firm on the moral foundations of the life and values of the United Nations in this time of hazard and hope.

The Member States of the United Nations must apply, with equal justice under the Charter, the principles of the United Nations to all nations, large or small, friend or foe, east or west. Problems, situations, disputes, cases on the agenda. of the United Nations have their ups and downs and come and go, but the United Nations goes on, deep in the minds and hearts of the people as they do their day's work and pray and hope, in the great adventure of building a freer and fairer peaceful world for all peoples in all lands.

21021957 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

For the purposes of the record, I wish to state that at the previous meeting the representative of India made this statement :

"The representative of the Philippines makes a fundamental error, which he could easily rectify if he read the resolutions of the Commission. He says that the resolution. places both parties on the same basis. That is exactly what it does not do." [773rd meeting, para. 68]

This is what I said :

"Moreover, if the letter addressed to the President of the United Nations Commission on 20 August 1948 by the Prime Minister of India is mentioned by the Colombian amendment in order to incorporate the clarifications of the Commission to the Government of India, it is believed. that a similar reference should be made to the clarifications of the Commission to the Government of Pakistan, so that the two Governments could be placed on an equal footing vis-a-vis the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission" [Ibid., para. 35.]

I emphasize the words: "could be placed on an equal footing". I did not make the statement attributed to me by the representative of India.

Speaking now on the draft resolution before us, my delegation cannot but deplore the fact that at the 773rd meeting the Soviet Union used its veto. That the Soviet delegation might disagree with other members of the Council should be expected, but in a matter where the common position seems to be that agreement between the parties to the dispute should be encouraged. It is believed that a member is under an obligation not to stand in the way of a consensus in the Council as to how agreement between the parties might be promoted. Since the lone vote of the Soviet Union has prevented the carrying out of the majority vote of the Council-and it was not a mechanical vote-it behoves us to make another try. It would seem that members of the Council have first to achieve unanimity. before they can expect to secure agreement between the parties.

My delegation is therefore in full agreement with the initiative shown by Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States in submitting another draft resolution. Understandably, the remaining members of the Council cannot yield to all the demands of the Soviet Union. If there is to be any modus vivendi, the Soviet Union must yield part of its position if the other members are also to yield part of their position. I am happy to note, after listening to the statement just made by the representative of the Soviet Union, that he does not object to the draft resolution now before us. It is in that spirit that my delegation announces its support of the draft resolution which is before us today [S/3792 and Corr. 1].

My delegation sincerely believes that the draft resolution should not give rise to serious controversy. After all, it is founded on previous resolutions of the Council. The least that we can do or should do is to show some respect for the decisions of the Council. It is recalled that the Soviet Union has never before, by its veto or by its vote, opposed those resolutions of the Council. It is plain that the draft resolution does not mention the Pakistan proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. My delegation still believes that the proposal could reasonably be expected to achieve demilitarisation, that it is not only not contrary to the Charter but consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

My delegation will have the honour to vote for the present draft resolution in order to allow this Council to move forward to the liquidation of the Kashmir dispute. We have remained virtually at a standstill on this question and we are bound to suffer a great loss of prestige in world public opinion. The time to act is now. We cannot allow the Kashmir problem to fester like a sore; we must have action, and at a further step we have the duty to adopt this resolution unanimously.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Jawad (Iraq)] in the Security Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

The submission of a new draft resolution by the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States clearly shows the deep desire by the Powers concerned to lay down a basis for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute and the spirit of realism shown with regard to the urgent need for taking positive steps with a view to lessening the tension in the region and to establishing conditions of a durable peace. We highly the spirit which motivated the three Powers in trying to prevent a break in the continuity of the search for a solution of the Kashmir dispute. We believe that the new step which has been taken by the three Powers expresses a desire for progress by those who are anxious to see a rapid settlement of the dispute. It also reflects their conviction that there is an urgent need to bring the two parties together, thus promoting conditions for peace in that general region.

The draft resolution is characterized by its spirit of conciliation and realism. Its general terms offer a great opportunity for taking the different points of view into account, while at the same time it leaves ample latitude for the President of the Council to make an appraisal of the situation as it appears at the present time. This approach will still permit the Council to take appropriate action in accordance with its previous decisions and in the light of the findings of its President,

The central point in this draft resolution which deserves special emphasis is that it will enable the President of the Council to examine, with the Government of India and Pakistan, any proposal which might, in his opinion, contribute to a settlement of the dispute. The assistance and collaboration of the two Governments concerned is therefore extremely important, and it is to be hoped that such assistance will be provided in the spirit of the Charter and without any reservations. We have every reason to hope that the two Governments will avail themselves of this opportunity to demonstrate, in acts as they have done in words, their desire to settle their differences in the interests of their peoples and the people of Kashmir, in conformity with the principles of law and justice. Since this draft resolution has, so to speak, been freed from all elements to which objection has been raised by one side or another, we sincerely hope that it will receive the assent of the Council.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security. Council Meeting No. 774 held on 21 February 1957

I should like to make a few comments on the draft resolution proposed by the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3792 and Corr. 1].

In view of our general position on the Kashmir problem, which we have already explained in the Security Council, we accept the basic idea of this draft resolution, which is that the President of the Security Council should be requested to visit India and Pakistan and to negotiate with the Governments of those countries with a view to finding a solution of the Kashmir problem acceptable to both sides.

The text of the three Power draft resolution is superior to the original four-Power draft [S/3787] Under the terms of the revised draft, the President of the Security Council will, in the exercise of his task, not be hampered by provisions which have proved unacceptable to one of the parties and would doom his mission to failure. We are hound to note that the reference to previous Council resolutions in the three-power draft resolution may render Mr. Jarring's negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan more difficult; our present attitude should not be based on resolutions adopted many years ago but on the realities of the international situation and the existing conditions in the region concerned.

It must not be forgotten that our problem is the pacific settlement of the Kashmir question in keeping with Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter, which provides for the pacific settlement of disputes and excludes any measures of compulsion and any attempt to impose on one of the parties solutions unacceptable to it, The reference to previous Council decisions which, as will be readily understood, are not acceptable to the Government of India, may therefore render the task entrusted to the president more difficult.

We would draw attention to the circumstances in which the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia introduced their new draft resolution. In the course of the previous discussions the delegations of those countries rejected the amendments proposed by the Soviet Union and by Colombia to the four-Power draft resolution. In effect, these delegations thus refused to co-operate in the preparation of an acceptable Security Council resolution capable of promoting a solution of the Kashmir problem. They refused to take into account the legitimate interests of one of the parties. Thus the impression was created that the sponsors of the four-Power draft did not wish to take India's position into consideration and that they are seeking to impose on India a decision unacceptable to any sovereign State.

In their statements, the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia attempted to present the Soviet position in an unfavourable light, to throw doubt on the sincerity of the Soviet delegation's desire to find a just settlement of the Kashmir problem. There is no need to refute such institutions. The Soviet delegation is not unduly concerned at the clamour with which the representatives of the Western Powers usually greet the casting of our vote. In the eyes of all those who sincerely wish for the peaceful settlement of unresolved international problems, talk about the alleged misuse of the veto cannot conceal the fact that our delegation has taken up a position of justice, that it always advocates decisions in keeping with the interests of the peoples concerned. and with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The method of mechanically voting in favour of resolutions which are known to be unacceptable to one of the parties concerned is unsuitable for the work of the Security Council, particularly in cases concerning the peaceful settlement of a problem.

In conclusion, I should like to say that the delegation of the Soviet Union, while discerning serious shortcomings in the three-Power draft resolution, will not oppose its adoption, in the sincere hope that the conversations of the President of the Security Council with the Governments of India and Pakistan may yield a positive result and lead to the resumption of direct negotiations between the two Governments concerned.

The Soviet delegation will abstain in the vote on the draft resolution.

Text of the speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held one 20 February 1957

I should like briefly to explain the Soviet Union delegation's motives in voting against the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The delegation of the Soviet Union introduced three amendments to the draft resolution. As I pointed out in my principal statement [770th meeting, paras. 134 to 147], the purpose of those amendments was to eliminate from the draft resolution those provisions which were at variance

with the United Nations Charter and also a provision which was unacceptable to one of the parties concerned, India. Our contention was that the Security Council, in requesting its President to examine the situation which has arisen in connection with the Kashmir problem, could not at the same time take a stand in its resolution on the side of one of the parties directly. concerned, namely, Pakistan. Such an approach would not be objective, but would make matters extremely awkward for the President of the Security Council in carrying out his mission.

In their draft resolution, the representatives of the Western Powers have in fact attempted to make the mission of the President of the Security Council contingent on a number of provisions which are in conflict with the Charter and which have been rejected by one of the parties, India. First and foremost among these provisions is the matter of sending United Nations troops to Kashmir for the purpose of holding a plebiscite. The Charter of the United Nations, however, provides clearly and unmistakably that United Nations armed forces may be used solely for the purpose of repelling aggression and restoring international peace. The dispatch of a United Nations force to permit the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir would be contrary to the Charter and would be insulting to the national pride of the people of Kashmir.

The Security Council cannot disregard the fact that India, one of the parties directly concerned, is categorically opposed to the idea of sending United Nations troops to Kashmir. The draft resolution of the Western Powers also completely disregarded the statements of the representative of India, Г Krishna Menon, pointing out how the Kashmir situation had changed since the Security Council adopted its resolution in 1948 concerning the holding of a plebiscite. An attempt to impose upon a Member of the United Nations a solution with which it was not in agreement would forsome the mission of the President of the Security Council concerning measures to bring about a peaceful settlement within the terms of Chapter VI of the United Nations Charter. In presenting its amendments to the four-Power draft resolution, the Soviet delegation sincerely hoped that the co sponsors of the draft resolution would carefully examine those amendments and take steps to reach a solution which would be acceptable to the two parties concerned-India and Pakistan and would not tie the hands of the President of the Security Council by giving him instructions which had been rejected by one of the parties directly concerned. To a large extent, the amendments proposed by the delegation of Colombia served the same end. That was the reason why the Soviet delegation, in the interests of reaching an agreed decision, abstained in the vote on the Colombian amendments.

Unfortunately, the Soviet delegation's amendments, like those of the Colombian delegation, were rejected by the sponsors of the draft resolution and the Soviet Union was compelled to vote against the draft resolution submitted for the Council's consideration by the delegations of Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

I can assure the members of the Council that, if it should be necessary, the Soviet delegation will again vote against any draft resolution which is contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter.

I should add that the real aims of the sponsors of the draft resolution just rejected by the Council were revealed by the representative of the United States, Mr. Barco, just now in introducing a new draft resolution. I would say that these aims have nothing in common with co-operation between the Members of the United Nations. There was no need for a vote against or a rejection of this draft resolution, which clearly did not have the support of all the interested parties. And yet the representatives of the Western Powers pressed the matter to a vote. They had to get yet another Soviet "veto" to add to the list which they are keeping. It is quite obvious that such. tactics in the Security Council are wholly at variance with the principles of the Charter, which provides that the permanent members of the Council, who have primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, are, by virtue of their position, under the obligation to reach a form of agreement which will not prevent the Council from discharging its duties but will help it to discharge them to the extent necessary for giving effect to the principles of the United Nations Charter. I wish to repeat that the delegation of the USSR is not at all disturbed by the fact that it was compelled to vote against the draft resolution, since that text is contrary to the principles

of the United Nations Charter.

120. Text of the speech made by Mr Walker (Australia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 29 February 1957

The Australian delegation deplores the Soviet Union veto of the draft resolution which commanded nine votes in the Council. We do not agree for a moment with the remarks made by the Soviet Union representative when he suggested that the draft resolution which he had defeated was contrary to the terms and spirit of the Charter; nor would I consider it worth spending any time in discussing his suggestion that the purpose of that draft resolution was to bring about another Soviet veto. It was the deep and earnest hope of my delegation-and, I am sure, of the other delegations which supported it-that the draft resolution would be carried and would pave the way for a very useful work by our President in relation to the problem of Kashmir.

We would not wish to see the firm desire of the Council to assist toward a solution of this problem completely frustrated by the Soviet veto, and we have, therefore, joined in sponsoring the new draft resolution which has just now been circulated [S/3792 and Corr. 1].

There is general agreement in the Council regarding the value of a visit by yourself, Mr. President, and your taking up with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals that in your view might lead to some progress in dealing with this difficult problem. The representative of India has assured us that our President will be welcome at any time, even though the terms of his mission may have to be considered within their political context.

As the draft resolution is now drafted, it gives to the President a free hand in selecting proposals for examination with the Governments of India and Pakistan, and the draft resolution, in that way, expresses the full confidence that we have in our distinguished President to handle this particular matter.

The views of the Australian on the method of the plebiscite and on the desirability of concentrating upon reaching agreement on appropriate measures of demilitarisation as a necessary preliminary have already been stated in the Council [768th meeting, paras, 52 and 53], and my delegation would hope that they would be borne in mind by the President when he undertakes this mission.

I very much hope that the Council will be able to adopt the draft resolution that has now been submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States along with Australia.

121. Text of the speech made by the President Mr. Gunnar Jarring as representative of Sweden in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957

If no other member of the Council wishes to speak, I shall speak in my capacity as representative of Sweden.

Speaking now as the representative of SWEDEN, I wish to explain my vote. Although, obviously, I voted in my capacity as representative of Sweden, the task which would have been entrusted to me under the four Power draft resolutions, as well as under the amendments, had either one of them been adopted, would have put me personally in a special position. Thus, when I abstained in the voting, I did this on the ground that I did not want my vote to be construed in any way to prejudice my mission.

I feel convinced that my colleagues on the Council will agree with me that the new development in the India-Pakistan question will require further study and reflection. Speaking as PRESIDENT, I therefore suggest that this meeting be adjourned until tomorrow afternoon, if there is no objection.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957

My delegation has examined the amendments submitted by Colombia and the Soviet Union to the draft resolution tabled by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States, and has listened to the statements made by the sponsors in explanation of their respective proposals and also to the statement of the representative of India.

After careful study, my delegation is unable to agree with the first Soviet Union amendment [S/3789, para. 1], which would throw overboard the preamble of the draft resolution. I agree with the representative of Colombia that might be taken as overlooking what the Council has already done in the past. The most that my delegation could accept would be to consider the Soviet proposal as an amendment to the second paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution, but not as a substitute for the whole preamble.

For the same reason, my delegation is unable to support the first amendment, proposed by Colombia (S/3791/Rev. 1, para. 1), which is intended to replace the entire preamble of the draft resolution. Moreover, if the letter addressed to the President of the United Nations Commission on 20 August 1948 by the Prime Minister of India is mentioned by the Colombian amendment in order to incorporate the clarifications of the Commission to the Government of India, it is believed that a similar reference should be made to the clarifications of the Commission to the Government of Pakistan, so that the Governments could be placed on an equal footing vis-a-vis the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission.

As far as the terms of reference of the President of the Council in operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution are concerned, my delegation believes that there is a certain merit in spelling out what kind of proposals the President is expected to take up with the Governments of India and Pakistan. It is obvious that the "achievement of demilitarisation" is necessary in order to create conditions under which a free and impartial plebiscite could be held. In the opinion of my delegation, that should be the prime concern of the President in his mission to the sub-continent.

It should be remembered that some progress had been achieved in the past towards the goal of demilitarisation, so much so that the issues have been concurred particularly as to the quantum of forces that the Governments of India and Pakistan would like to have remain on their respective sides of the cease fire line. Obviously, my delegation cannot support the second amendment proposed by the Soviet Union (S/3789, para. 2) which would delete all reference to the "achievement of demilitarisation".

My delegation does not understand the objection by the Soviet Union to the use of word "demilitarisation" in the draft resolution. It is true that particular word nowhere appears in the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolution of 13 August 1948 (S/1100, para. 75) and of 5 January 1949 (S/1196, para. 15). However, a perusal of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 shows that it is concerned with the withdrawal of armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line from the Pakistan side, of Pakistan troop as well as of tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting; and from the Indian side, of the bulk of Indian forces in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission. Then the resolution of 5 January 1949 speaks of the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces.

The process of withdrawal, reduction or disposal of armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line as provided in the two resolutions of the Commission was described as "demilitarisation" by General McNaughton who was first commissioned by the Council on 17 December 1949 [457th meeting] to meet informally with the parties concerned. So did Sir Owen Dixon and Mr. Frank P. Graham, United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, and the Security Council itself in its resolutions of 14 March 1950 [S/1469] and 30 March 1951 [S/2017/ Rev. 1], use the term "demilitarisation" without objection from anybody.

However, if it will enhance general agreement, my delegation would not object to the use of another term provided it accurately describes the withdrawal or disposal of armed forces as envisaged in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

The formula contained in the second Colombian amendment [S/3791/Rev. 1. para. 2] would seem to be preferable so far as it refers to the achievement of the provisions contemplated in the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. For one thing, it is more comprehensive and more precise than the clause "the achievement of demilitarisation". For another thing, it conserves the principle of a plebiscite which is expressly provided for in the two aforementioned resolutions but which principle is rejected in the second Soviet Union amendment [S/3789, para. 2], according to the explanation of the representative of the Soviet Union. Another alternative would be to use the term "truce agreement" which is the heading of part II of the resolution of 13 August dealing with "demilitarisation". It is meet that the President should be further empowered to examine other proposals likely to contribute to "the establishment of other conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute". That way, substance is given to the pledge of faith made before the Council that the parties may never be found wanting in the methods of exploration and finding agreement. That way also, it is hoped that the President will be given the necessary freedom of action to avoid falling into a rut. The Soviet and the Colombian amendments seem to accept this point of view. However, they both skirt the argument of the representative of India that what the Council is seized of is a situation and not a dispute. Instead the Soviet Union and Colombian amendments adopt the word "problem" which does not appear in Chapter VI of the Charter. It is not seen how the Council can get away from its resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] finding that the continuance of the dispute between the Governments of India and Pakistan is likely to endanger international peace and security.

My delegation has already expressed its views with respect to the proposal to use a United Nations force temporarily [768 the meeting, para. 115] as a means of achieving demilitarisation. It goes without saying that we can only commend it to parties. The parties, jointly or single, are free to accept or rejected it. Nevertheless it is the Council's right and duty to express its opinion. We would be failing in our duty if after deliberation we did not express what in our opinion would be a reasonable proposal to solve the deadlock on the question of demilitarisation.

In this connection, my delegation cannot but reject the statement that there is an attempt to introduce a "war atmosphere" in the way of the United Nations force [769th meeting, para. 176]. I do not think any Member State would be justified in placing a United Nations force engaged in a mission of peace on the same footing as an invading alien force.

I must emphasize that the sovereignty of India or of Pakistan is not involved in the proposal to send a United Nations force into the State of Jammu and Kashmir for a temporary and limited purpose. In the view of both the Council and the Commission, neither India nor Pakistan can bring into question the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This position is crystal clear in the assurance given by the Commission to the Governments of India and Pakistan and which forms the basis of their acceptance of the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 (see documents S/1100, annex 12, p. 105, and S/1430/Add. 1; 1/see also annex V, section A, of the documents submitted as annexes to the statement made by Mr. Krishna Menon (S/PV. 762/Add. 1). Under the circumstances and pending the holding of a plebiscite, neither India nor Pakistan can claim sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Given the purpose of the United Nations force, there can be no stigma attached to its introduction into the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The force is being sent there precisely to assist in securing a free expression of the wishes of the people of the State to determine whether they will accede to India or to Pakistan That salutary objective delimits the tenure and circumscribes the authority of the United Nations force which will function under and derive its powers from the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Purely as a matter of drafting, my delegation would have no objection to the deletion of the words "and the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nation force", at the end of operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution. This clause is redundant because the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force is embodied in the statement of the representative of Pakistan, which the President of the Council is already asked to bear in mind in the same paragraph. I can see no reason for the repetition except for the purpose of emphasis. Moreover, the last paragraph of the preamble of the draft resolution expresses the belief of the Council that the Pakistan proposal deserves consideration in so far as the use of a United Nations force might contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation. Certainly, the President cannot ignore it as one of the proposals he may examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan as likely to contribute to demilitarisation. My delegation considers premature that part of the second amendment proposed by Colombia [S/3791/Rev. 1, para 2] which mentions the possibility of referring the question to the International Court of Justice, which is alleged to have been suggested by the representative of Sweden. If I understood the representative of Sweden correctly, he suggested reference to the Court only as an alternative to negotiations between the parties [769th meeting, paras 39 and 40] My delegation does not believe, therefore, that the proposal to refer the problem to the Court should be among the proposals which the President of the Council should, in the first instance, examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan. The Council will be in a position to examine and study that particular proposal only if the procedure envisaged in the draft resolution should to achieve any result Indeed, the representative of Sweden declared that this Government might deem it advisable to have the legal background of the problem clarified should the question again come before the Council in the future.

As regards operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution, it was suggested the other day that the time limit within which the President should report to the Council might be too close, The Soviet Union amendment [S/3789, para 3] would delete any mention of a time limit. While my delegation holds no particular brief for the date of 15 April 1957, it considers a time limit essential both as a stimulant and as an incentive to achieve progress with the least possible delay. For that reason my delegation is more inclined to accept the third amendment proposed by Colombia [S/3791/Bev. 1, para 3], which would require the President to report to the Council "if possible not later than 15 April 1957."

It has been said here, unfortunately, that some States "Continue to foment an artificial hue and cry on the subject of the so-called 'Kashmir question' in order to force the reconsideration of the decision taken by the people of Kashmir themselves" [770th meeting, para 136]. It was said further that "this hue and cry will in no way help to bring about the re establishment of normal conditions in the area" and that "the object of those who started this hue and cry is not to find a solution to the differences still outstanding between India and Pakistan, but rather to aggravate them" [tbid.]. I said that it was unfortunate that a matter as vital as the India-Pakistan question should be used for the usual propaganda purposes. We all know, in this Council, that no one here is guilty of encouraging any "artificial hue and cry" and that there are no so-called initiators of this "hue and cry" the implication being, as usual, that these must be the Powers habitually accused by their chronic accusers of the vilest imperialistic motives.

I wish to place before the Council my Government's desire. that Kashmir, as part and parcel of the Continent of Asia, should not be involved in the ideological conflict and the propaganda warfare of our time. Kashmir is Asia, and Asia must have no more of the perplexing disputes of ideology with which we have been afflicted recently. The issue before us can not be plainer than it is: we want the people of Jammu and Kashmir to express their own will in a peaceful and perfectly untrammelled way. That is why we have decided on a plebiscite as the best instrument to that end; and if we are discussing this issue again at the present time, it is because that will has not been expressed as desired.

That was the original omission, and it still is. We who are here representing our Governments and the collective will of the United Nations are concerned that there has been no compliance, which, in the interest of world law and order, must come through specific performance by the parties. At the same time, we are bound to take the position that, if anything has happened for the good of the people of Kashmir-as has been alleged that good is in mitigation, but not in condonation, of the original omission.

We have been told here that a plebiscite in Kashmir would be "imposed by force" through the instrumentality of the proposed United Nations contingent, and that the plebiscite would constitute "outside interference" [770th meeting, paras 138 and 139] With all deference to those who think this way, we must say that nothing is more repugnant to the ways of our Organisation than the use of force, and for this reason the mission of the contingent-if the Council decides to create such a contingent will be strictly for peaceful ends. As to the charge of interference from outside, what could result from the good offices of the United Nations but confirmation of the truth-if the truth exists-that all is well in Jammu and Kashmir? If anything, therefore, the plebiscite should establish the facts in this dispute definitely and beyond all doubt.

It is my Government's desire to see this dispute resolved in the United Nations way-that is, with peace as the sole objective, peace based on agreement between the parties, agreement arrived at without interference from this or that ideological camp. It is this kind of interference which we must guard against at all times and, obviously, it cannot come from the United Nations, which has neither imperialistic nor colonial designs. Under United Nations auspices, the goal of peace is beyond muddling, and I submit that it is under such auspices that the principal parties to this dispute can reach a durable goal. settlement and, at the same time, avoid seeing the State of Jammu and Kashmir converted into a battleground for antagonistic ideologies.

118. Text of the Speech made by Mr. Barco (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957

As we feared, the representative of the Soviet Union has again abused the veto power to prevent the Security Council from helping to resolve an international dispute in which the Soviet Union, presumably, has no direct interest. The Soviet representative's implication that the Security Council would be violating the Charter by authorising its President to bear in mind the proposal by one of the parties for a United Nations force to in demilitarization cannot be substantiated by anything that has been said or done here. The action of the Soviet Union can have only one purpose, to perpetuate international conflict and dissension between two of Asia's great countries. The Soviet Union takes a weighty responsibility upon itself. It has blocked measures by the United Nations to help to assure peaceful conditions in the area and friendly relations between the two States. The Security Council has considered the Kashmir problem on many occasions since 1947.

Many Members of the United Nations have served on the Council when this issue was before us. In every instance, and regardless of the membership of the Council, it has overwhelmingly approved measures to bring about a free expression of the will of the Kashmir people through an impartial plebiscite. That opinion, and those resolutions, remain valid and represent the continued sense of the Council. The resolution adopted by the Council on 24 January 1957 [S/3779], and the nine votes which our joint draft resolution has just received make this clear.

In spite of the Soviet veto, the United States hopes for progress in resolving the dispute. We believe that the parties will themselves not wish to end these discussions on the negative note of the Soviet veto. We urge them to refrain from any measures which might have the effect of increasing tension in the area. We believe that the Security Council should consider immediate action to repair the damage caused by the Soviet veto of the four-Power draft resolution. Such action would accord with its continuing responsibility to assist the parties to move towards a solution of this serious problem.

The United States, together with the delegations of Australia and the United Kingdom, therefore submitted a new draft resolution which we believe would provide for helpful action in the present circumstances. This draft resolution has just been handed to the President, and I should like to read it out to the Security Council:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling its resolution of 24 January 1957, its previous. resolutions and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on the India-Pakistan question,

"1. Requests the President security Council, the representative of Sweden, to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan any proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute towards the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; to visit the sub-continent for this purpose; and to report to the Security Council not later than 15 April 1957;

"2. Invites the Governments of India and Pakistan. to cooperate with him in the performance of these functions;

"3. Requests the Secretary-General and the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to render such assistance as he may request [S/3792 and Corr. 1]."

This draft resolution bases itself solidly upon the long and virtually unanimous attitude of the Security Council, as expressed in its resolutions, and upon the obligations accepted by the parties under the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It would authorise the President of the Council to discuss with India and Pakistan any proposals which have been or which may be put forward and which he thinks could help to resolve the dispute, having regard to these resolutions. In his examination of means to solve the dispute, the President would necessarily devote considerable attention to demilitarisation, which is the point at which progress towards a plebiscite has broken down.

The draft resolution vetoed by the Soviet Union offered, in our opinion, the best opportunity for progress. We hope, however, that this new draft resolution will still permit the Council to take constructive action, and we urge the Council to adopt it quickly.

Sir Pierson DIXON (United Kingdom): We deeply regret the Soviet Union veto of the four-Power draft resolution, the first veto ever cast in the long history of the Kashmir dispute. We must see what action the Council can now usefully take with a view to making progress toward a settlement. The United Kingdom still ardently desires to see progress made. It is with these considerations in mind that the United Kingdom delegation gladly joins in sponsoring the new draft resolution which has been read out by the representative of the United States.

Under this revised draft resolution, the President of the Security Council would still be enabled to visit India and Pakistan, and he would be enabled to discuss any proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the settlement of the dispute, having regard to the previous resolutions. He could hardly fail to discuss, amongst others, the problem of demilitarisation preparatory to a free and impartial plebiscite, which has been so much in the centre of our discussion here and on which I explained the attitude of the United Kingdom this morning [772nd meeting, paras, 161 and 152].

It is my hope that this revised draft resolution will commend itself to the Council, because I am sure that the President's mission, even in its present more generalised terms, will make a great contribution to the achievement of a settlement. We have faith not only in his mission, but also in the sincere desire of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan to reach a peaceful settlement.

 Text of Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957

I shall be brief. I wish merely to make a few observations on the statements made at the 772nd meeting by the representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and Australia concerning the amendments proposed by the Soviet delegation [S/3789].

Mr. Walker, the representative of Australia, and Sir Pierson Dixon, the representative of the United Kingdoms have questioned the consistency of the Soviet delegation's attitude on the question of Kashmir since we say that the Kashmir question has already been decided by the Kashmir people and, at the same time, we agree with the proposal that Mr. Jarring, the President of the Security Council, should endeavour to assist in the settlement of the existing dis agreement between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question.

The representative of Australia finds something contradictory in this, that one thing, so to speak, excludes the other. I must inform Mr. Walker that there is nothing contradictory in this position. The Soviet Union does in fact consider that the question of Kashmir has been settled by the Kashmir people, but the situation is complicated by the fact that Kashmir lies on the frontier between India and Pakistan and that part of the territory of Kashmir is administered by the authorities of Pakistan and not of India. This in itself makes differences of opinion between the two States on the Kashmir question a foregone conclusion. It is these differences of opinion that should be discussed and that we are discussing here.

Since these differences between the two States exist, the Soviet Union considers that they should be settled by peaceful means, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter. In our opinion, the most direct approach is that of bilateral negotiations, with regard to which India and Pakistan have not exhausted all possible means and methods. We believe that this is the most promising approach to the peaceful settlement of this question.

In this connexion, the proposal that the Security Council should request its President, Mr. Jarring, to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan the existing situation and proposals which might lead to a peaceful settlement of existing differences, could, in our opinion, be useful if all the other members of the Council concurred. It would appear, in fact, that all the members of the Security Council as well as the two parties concerned agree that such a mission by Mr. Jarring could be useful. The only question, therefore, is how Mr. Jarring's task should be formulated-what he should be asked to do in this matter. It is on this question that we are in fundamental disagreement with the sponsors of the draft resolution.

What is the nature of this disagreement? The representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom are correct in pointing out that the basic difference is on the question the United Nations force. The United States representative considers it desirable-that is the word he used that the Security Council resolution containing the instructions to its President should include a reference to the force of the United Nations [772nd meeting, para. 113]. I should like to ask what "desirable" means in this connection. Does the Security Council endorse the idea of using a United Nations force in Kashmir, and if so, for what purpose? With what object should a United Nations force go there? What would be its mission? The draft resolution we are now considering has nothing to say on the subject.

The United States representative feels that this idea not only deserves to be mentioned but should also be the subject of a recommendation-that it merits further development. If, in the matter of United Nations armed forces, the Security Council wished to act in full conformity with the Charter, it would have to state for what purpose and with what object such forces were being assigned to Kashmir. The United Nations Charter envisages only one task for armed forces of the United Nations that of repelling aggression and restoring international peace in this or that part of the world.

I should like to be shown where in the Charter it is provided that the armed forces of the United Nations may be used. for any other purpose. Article 2 is the only Article of the Charter which refers to the use of armed forces of the United. Nations. The relevant Articles which precede it refer specifically to the repelling of aggression and the restoration of international peace. No other tasks are provided for in the Charter.

Why then should armed forces be sent to Kashmir ? The draft resolution has nothing to say on this subject, but from the statements made here it is evident that they are to go in order to hold what is called a "plebiscite". I contend that the Charter nowhere provides for the use of United Nations armed forces for such a purpose as the holding of a plebiscite in any country Accordingly, the proposal to send armed forces to Kashmir is contrary to the principles of the Charter. The Soviet delegation believes that it is not proper for the Security Council to take decisions which are in conflict with the Charter This is the principal reason for our amendments to the proposals of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Cuba, to delete the provisions concerning the sending of armed forces to Kashmir.

We have been told that by submitting those amendments we are not showing a constructive approach. This is allegedly evidence that we are hindering the peaceful settlement of the disagreement between India and Pakistan on the question of he is mission ? The draft resolution we are now considering has nothing to say on the subject. The United States representative feels that this idea not only deserves to be mentioned but should also be the subject of a recommendation-that it merits further development. If, in the matter of United Nations armed forces, the Security Council wished to act in full conformity with the Charter, it would I have to state for what purpose and with what object such forces were being assigned to Kashmir. The United Nations Charter envisages only one task for armed forces of the United Nations: that of repelling aggression and restoring international peace in this or that part of the world.

I should like to be shown where in the Charter it is provided that the armed forces of the United Nations may be used for any other purpose. Article 2 is the only Article of the Charter which refers to the use of armed forces of the United Nations. The relevant Articles which precede it refer specifically to the repelling of aggression and the restoration of international peace. Charter.

No other tasks are provided for in the Why then should armed forces be sent to Kashmir? The draft resolution has nothing to say on this subject, but from the statements made here it is evident that they are to go in order to hold what is called a "plebiscite". I contend that the Charter nowhere provides for the use of United Nations armed forces for such a purpose as the holding of a plebiscite in any country. Accordingly, the proposal to send armed forces to Kashmir is contrary to the principles of the Charter. The Soviet delegation believes that it is not proper for the Security Council to take decisions which are in conflict with the Charter. This is the principal reason for our amendments to the proposals of the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Cuba, to delete the provisions concerning the sending of armed forces to Kashmir.

We have been told that by submitting those amendments we are not showing a constructive approach. This is allegedly evidence that we are hindering the peaceful settlement of the disagreement between India and Pakistan on the question of Kashmir. But this is not true. Along with other members of the Security Council, we accept the basic idea that the President of the Security Council should, together with the Governments of India and Pakistan, consider possible ways of peaceful solution to this problem. I think there can be hardly anyone who is not convinced that the use of armed forces would not lead to a peaceful solution. On the contrary, their use would be evidence that enforcement measures were being applied. The Security Council has right to apply enforcement measures, but only in certain cases, in the specific cases prescribed by the Charter. In the present instance, the Security Council has embarked on such a course. Hence, there is no justification whatsoever for taking a decision to use a United Nations force in Kashmir.

We may be told that we are not taking a decision on the use of the armed forces and that we merely wish to explore the problem. But that is the whole point of the matter: the effect of this "exploration" will be that the Security Council will in fact be approving the idea, with a view to its implementation. Otherwise, it is impossible to understand the purpose of such a decision.

I understand why the sponsors of the draft resolution reject the amendments of the Soviet Union. It is probably because they believe that anything which comes from the Soviet Union is bad and is not intended to contribute to a constructive settlement of the problem. But, in that case, why do they reject the amendment proposed by Colombia? Is it not because those amendments, too, exclude Security Council approval of the proposal for the use of a United Nations force? Or perhaps because the Colombian amendments refer to the use of a United Nations force with the approval of the two parties? The amendment reads: "if accepted by the parties." Perhaps that is the crux of the matter. Nothing has been said about this here.

I conclude from this that the rejection of the Soviet amendments is not due to the fact that they conflict with the purposes of a peaceful settlement of the differences between. India and Pakistan but rather to other considerations which have nothing to do with our task or with the principles of the United Nations Charter

The Soviet delegation's only consideration in introducing its amendments was the desire to further the adoption by the Security Council of a decision which would be acceptable to both parties concerned and which would make it possible to arrive at a peaceful solution of the existing disagreement which might otherwise develop into a more serious problem, requiring other and more serious measures for its solution.

As long as we keep within the framework of a peaceful solution, the situation is not such that we need by very greatly disturbed. However, we have been informed by both parties that troop concentrations are taking place on both sides. This is a matter to which we must pay attention. If it is really the Security Council's intention to work for a peaceful solution of this dispute, it should not press for the dispatch of a United Nations force to Kashmir as a method of solution. In our opinion, such a proposal can lead to nothing good in the present case.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Jawad (Iraq) in the Security Council Meeting No. 773 held on 20 February 1957

I shall be very brief, as I shall confine my observations to the joint draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3787] and to the two amendments, one submitted by the Soviet Union (S/3789] and the other by Colombia [S/3791/Rev. 1].

Our opinion regarding the amendments submitted by the Soviet Union depends upon three important considerations : first, our understanding and appraisal of the nature of the problem now before the Council; secondly, whether or not the parts of the joint draft resolution submitted by the four Powers which are to be amended do reflect the real situation from the historical and actual standpoints; thirdly, whether the omission of those parts of the joint draft resolution would contribute to the attainment of the objectives the Council has in view in dealing with the problem at present.

We have already stated our opinion on the nature of the dispute [769th meeting, paras. 1 to 27], and there is no need to repeat now what we have already said. We believe that the previous resolutions of the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan form the basis for settling the dispute. These decisions are, we feel, in conformity with the principles of the Charter. Thus, the decisions not only constitute the appropriate approach to a solution of the problem, but also represent the authority of the Council and the consequences which would follow upon the implementation. of and respect for the resolutions.

The first paragraph of the preamble to the joint draft resolution seems to cover this phase of the matter, as we see it. The remaining six paragraphs of the preamble represent, in our view, a statement of fact with regard to the Council's consideration of the problem. They take note of the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan and of the lack of progress achieved in settling the dispute. They also recognize a fact which is, in our opinion, of extreme importance, concerning the steps which should be taken in settling the dispute - that is, the demilitarisation of Kashmir as a prerequisite for the holding of a plebiscite and concerning the operations which constitute a single and continuous process. The proposal regarding the use of a temporary United Nations force is included in the preamble only as a proposal to be examined by the President of the Council in his efforts to promote conditions. leading to the demilitarisation of the State in preparation for a free and impartial plebiscite. No one doubts that the formation and use of such a force should be in conformity with the principles of the Charter.

In the light of those remarks, we believe that the seven paragraphs of the preamble of the joint draft resolution not only reflect the true picture of the situation under consideration, but also provide a clear directive to the President of the Council. Thus, to delete the preamble and replace it by the suggested amendment would seem to ignore certain historical facts of the dispute; to omit the basic process for settling the dispute, as decided upon by the Council; and to present the dispute in a completely new context. For that reason, we find it difficult to agree to the substitution of the text contained in paragraph 1 of document S/3789 for the present preamble of the joint draft resolution.

From our remarks concerning the necessity of including in the preamble statements on the nature of the dispute and the method to be used in settling it, it follows that it is imperative to include in the operative part of the draft resolution a provision concerning what is called the single and continuous process, that is, demilitarisation as a precondition to the plebiscite. We feel, again, that paragraph 2 of the amendments proposed by the USSR in document S/3789 does not meet the requirements of the case and does not refer to the method envisaged for its settlement

With regard to paragraph 3 of the amendments proposed by the USSR [S/3789] we feel, as we have already stated [769th meeting, para. 25], that the time-limit set for the President of the Council to carry out his mission and report to the Council is rather short; we should have liked to see provision made for a longer period of time. Nevertheless, in view of the importance and urgency of the question and past experience in this connection, to omit any reference to a definite date for reporting to the Council might not reflect the concern felt by the Council about settling the dispute. Consequently, we feel that the amendment as presently drafted does not meet the requirements of the situation.

Although the amendment to the preamble of the draft resolution [S/3791/Rev. 1, para 1] submitted by Colombia does recall previous resolutions adopted on the problem, it does not provide a sufficient indication of the importance which the Council attaches to settling the question at the present time. Furthermore, it omits any reference to the way in which the Council views the method of settling the dispute. We do find ourselves in agreement with a number of the points in the proposed Colombian amendment to operative paragraph 1 of the joint draft resolution [S/3791/Rev. 1, para. 2]. Nevertheless, it seems that the adoption of the amendment concerning the possibility of referring the problem to the International Court of Justice would constitute an obvious deviation from the procedure accepted and followed by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India, and Pakistan and from the way in which those two bodies have treated the problem. For these reasons, my delegation is unable to agree to these two amendments.

We do, however, agree with the third amendment [S/3791/Rev. 1, para. 3] concerning the time to be allowed for the President of the Security Council to complete his mission.

The present consideration of the question by the Security Council does not in any way exclude the use of other methods for settling the differences. My delegation remains open-minded about examining and supporting new proposals, provided that such proposals, on the one hand, would constitute positive steps towards decreasing the tension in the area and settling the dispute, and, on the other hand, would not depart from the essence of the problem, as formulated in the decisions of the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and would be in accordance with the spirit of the United Nations Charter.

Before concluding, I should like to refer to the statement made by the representative of India this morning in connection with his reference to a statement which I had made at a previous meeting of the Council [772nd meeting, paras. 87 ff.]. It had not been my intention either to raise this matter or to refer to it here in the Council. I believe that Mr. Krishna Menon is a refined and accomplished lawyer and diplomat and would not wish-even when he differs with others-to express himself in the way in which his words were interpreted both here and outside the Council. Unfortunately, however, this is what has happened, and what has been repeated. It is perhaps due to the fact that the English language is so rich that it is open to various interpretations; that is probably what has caused this misunderstanding Nevertheless, Mr. Krishna Menon has now clarified the matter to the satisfaction of all concerned.

I should like to assure him that we have a great admiration for his wide and profound knowledge of international law tion and international relations. This admiration, however, does not prevent us from differing with him on certain matters. I refer in particular to the position we have taken with regard to the Kashmir dispute. Although Mr. Krishna Menon believes that, in our treatment, we have ignored the circumstances of the case and have not been neutral, I should like to assure him that my Government attaches the greatest importance to settling the dispute by peaceful means. Perhaps more than anyone else, he must realise that the only way for small States to survive and achieve progress and prosperity is through observing the law of nations and standing behind the letter and spirit of the Charter. That is what we have done in supporting the Council's decisions on Kashmir. Despite the differences regarding this problem, we still hope that the genius of India and Pakistan will find a way to settle the problem in accordance with law and justice.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957

The Council has before it a series of amendments to the joint draft resolution (S/3787) proposed by the representative of the Soviet Union (S/3789), and it also has before it amendments proposed by the delegation of Colombia (S/3791/Rev. 1).

As regards the latter, I appreciate the sincere desire of the representative of Colombia, shown in his speeches, to be of assistance in suggesting amendments which he has put forward in the hope that they might prove acceptable to both parties. I would only say that these amendments make certain references and omit certain points, with the result that the balance of the original draft is upset. I therefore hope that he will find it possible not to press his amendments.

The Soviet Union amendments have to be read in the light of the Soviet Union representative's statement at the 770th meeting of the Security Council. The amendments by themselves give the appearance of being an attempt to find a compromise. However, the speech of the Soviet Union suggests either that the Soviet Union delegation is ignorant of the facts about Kashmir or that it is making an attempt to create mistrust and exacerbate existing misunderstanding in the sub-continent.

What does he say? He asserts bluntly that:

"The Soviet Union's view, and its basic premise, is that the Kashmir question has in actual fact already been www settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves." MA [770th meeting, para. 135.]

What does he mean ? And then Mr. Sobolev says:

"We must not forget that the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir now, meets with the objections of one of the parties: that it has in fact been rejected by that party." [Ibid, para. 138.]

But it is clear from the speeches of the representative of India that he has not at any stage rejected on behalf of the Government of India the idea of a plebiscite. He referred to the conditions which have to be met before it is possible to have a plebiscite. He has talked about the difficulties in the way of a plebiscite, but he has not suggested that he rejects the idea of a plebiscite. If, however, it is the Soviet Union view that the question of Kashmir has already been settled by the people of Kashmir itself and that the idea of a plebiscite at the present time has been rejected by one of the parties, what then is the purpose of the representative of the Soviet Union in suggesting that the interested parties could use this time, that is to say, the present time, for making new efforts to settle existing differences by means of direct negotiations? Negotiations about what? If, to accept Mr. Sobolev's contention, the question of Kashmir has already been settled and one party rejects the idea of a plebiscite, how-on what basis-could such discussions take place? With what sincerity does he propose that the President of the Security Council should go out into the field to consider, together with the Government of India and Pakistan, the existing situation in Kashmir as well as possible methods of settling existing differences? Yet, despite the strange illogicality in the speech of the representative of the Soviet Union, he did at least agree to that. It is possible to attribute the words of his speech to innocence or ignorance rather than to anything else. I hope, therefore, that he will not make himself responsible for preventing such a visit by our President from taking place.

I said that the Soviet Union amendments give the appearance of being an attempt to find a compromise; but in my view the effect of those amendments is to emasculate the draft resolution to such an extent that the resulting proposal would not be likely to make a contribution to the settlement of the Kashmir problem. I think I can best explain my reasons-and I shall do it as shortly as can-by pointing out the significance of the points in the four Power draft resolutions which the Soviet proposal seeks to eliminate or amend.

The proposal of the Soviet Union would omit the whole of the preamble except for one paragraph which would be amended, a paragraph to which I shall come later.

Now what does our draft resolution say? In the first preambular paragraph it recalls the Security Council resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779], its previous resolutions and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. In doing this, it is true that it thereby recalls certain parts of the previous which have only a historical interest. But by recalling all the resolutions, the present draft is designed to avoid arguments about the different weight to be given to previous resolutions. This, I should have thought, would be reassuring to both parties.

It is true that the four-Power draft resolution makes a specific reference to the resolution of 24 January. But after all, that resolution is a preliminary resolution which says that the Security Council "decides to continue its consideration of the dispute"; it is a resolution passed at the present series of meetings, and it would be anomalous to omit a reference to it.

I was asked to say why the resolution of 24 January 1957 had greater significance than that of 17 January 1948. My answer is that it has no greater significance. In fact, I drew attention to the resolution of 17 January 1948 in my intervention at the 768th meeting, by reading out the relevant part of it [768th meeting, para. 17].

Then an amendment is proposed to the clause "Having taken into consideration the statements of the representative of the Governments of India and Pakistan". I find it difficult to understand why. My Government is deeply concerned to find a peaceful solution of the Kashmir problem, and I can assure the representative of the Soviet Union that the statements made here have received the closest consideration not only by my delegation, but by my Government too.

Another effect of the Soviet Union amendment is to eliminate the word "dispute" in the draft resolution. I am puzzled that there should be any objection to this word. Not only has it been used in many Security Council resolutions, but it was used in the joint communique issued to the Press in New Delhi on 20 August 1953.

The Soviet Union proposal would eliminate from the draft resolution the clauses referring to "demilitarisation". I am glad of this opportunity important word. to clarify the meeting we attach to this Demilitarisation in this context means simply. the process or procedures for withdrawing troops as laid down in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. I repeat, as laid down in these resolutions. Demilitarisation in our view is an essential process, to which Pakistan and India both agreed, as the way to the settlement of the problem. It is, moreover, an essential step on which both parties have laid the greatest stress.

Next, the Soviet Union proposal would remove the last preambular paragraph. Certain words in it were criticised, but this paragraph must be read as a whole. This paragraph is an expression of belief, and the sole belief expressed is that the use of a temporary United Nations force would deserve consideration in so far as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarisation envisaged in the resolutions-not just demilitarisation, but demilitarisation as envisaged in. the resolutions and towards the peaceful settlement of the dispute. The belief is expressed in the conditional tense. The belief is that the use of such a force would deserve consideration in so far as "it might contribute".

Now, I am aware of the strong feelings about the idea of a United Nations force. Nothing that has been said on this subject, however, appears very relevant to the paragraph in the draft resolution as it is actually drafted, or to provide a reason for the rejection of the draft resolution. It is surely in accord with the letter and the spirit of the Charter that the Security Council should tell the parties that it believes that this idea might, conditionally, deserve consideration. Is not the idea worth examining calmly with the President of the Security Council as progress? a possible way of achieving I assert again that this draft resolution, in our view, in present circumstances, is in the true interest of both parties.

I would here repeat-and I trust my words will go out beyond the confines of this Council that we approach this question in the simple spirit of wishing to see a just and fair solution. We stand ready, as we have throughout the last nine years, to consider our attitude to Kashmir on the merits, and on the merits alone, of the cases put forward by the parties, and in examining the cases put forward we are deeply conscious of the vital necessity of making a positive contribution towards peaceful progress in the subcontinent. My Government's attitude is based on no other considerations whatsoever.

In conclusion, I repeat that the draft resolution before us prejudices no position. In the view of my Government it is a balanced draft. In our eyes it has virtue in that it bridges the Indian election period, without halting all the attempts to find a solution during that period.

The time must come soon when the Security Council. must face its arduous task again. I trust and hope that it will be in a position to do so with further information about the attitudes of the two Governments before it, which will enable it to consider carefully and wisely its next step.

I therefore appeal once more to both Governments to consider the draft resolution before us, not for what is imputed to it, not for what has been read into it, but for what it is.

20021957 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957

The Australian delegation is happy to see that the representative of India is well enough to take his place at the Council table this morning and to make the further statement on behalf of the Government of India that we were promised.

We have listened with great interest to this statement, and I must say that I personally feel more convinced than ever of the desirability of this Council arranging for its President to visit the area and to report back to the Council as provided in the four-Power draft resolution [S/3787] that is before it.

I feel it desirable to comment briefly on the two sets of amendments submitted to the Council by the representatives of the Soviet Union and Colombia.

As to the Soviet Union amendments [S/3789] I am afraid I see nothing in their favour. Is the representative of the Soviet Union really interested in a sound and rational discussion of this problem of Kashmir? His own statements seem to contradict his amendments. At the 770th meeting, Mr. Sobolev had this to say:

The Kashmir question has in actual fact already been settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves, who consider their territory an integral part of the Republic of India". [770th meeting, para, 135].

If this question of Kashmir has been settled, why does the representative of the Soviet Union support a proposal that the President of the Council should go to the sub-continent to investigate the question? Surely there would be no point in our requesting you to make this long and arduous journey to India and Pakistan if the matter were already settled. One may well ask: What are the real objectives of the Soviet Union in this connection ?

If we look further into Mr. Sobolev's statement, we find that he has proclaimed that:

"the Charter does not provide for the use of United Nations forces to impose by force a plebiscite in any country." [770th meeting, para. 139.]

Of course not. But I suggest to my colleagues that this is a gross distortion of the wording and intention of the draft resolution. If Mr. Sobolev had read the preamble carefully, he would have noted the words :

"...in so far as it" - the proposal of the representative of Pakistan concerning the use of a temporary United Nations force-"might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarisation the use of such a force would deserve consideration',. [S/3787.]

Nobody has suggested in this Council that troops should be used to force the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir.

Of course, it does not come as a surprise that the Soviet Union would be opposed to any suggestion of a plebiscite which would enable the people of Kashmir to express their own views. on their future political allegiance. After all, the Soviet Union. has often shown a preference for other methods of determining such questions.

Nor, I suppose, should we be surprised that the Soviet Union is opposed to any proposal for the introduction of a temporary United Nations force into Kashmir. We are all familiar with the position of the Soviet Union on the United Nations Emergency Force at present in the Middle East.

And as for Mr. Sobolev's suggestion that all would be quiet in Kashmir were it not for artificial attempts to create trouble there, these words have so familiar a ring that they can carry little conviction to the Council, particularly in view of the statements we have heard from the parties.

In short, the amendments of the Soviet Union representative seem to me to ignore all that has gone before on this question of Kashmir.

With regard to the amendments proposed by the Colombian delegation [S/3791/Rev. 1], I would only say that while I fully appreciate its motives in putting them forward, I find them difficult to accept since I feel that the draft resolution as it stands would provide a suitable basis for the mission that we wish to entrust to the President of the Council.

Before concluding these remarks, I wish to correct certain references that the representative of India made last Friday [769th meeting] to my own statement in the Council [768th meeting, paras. 48 to 59]. Mr. Menon complained that I had drawn an analogy between the United Nations Emergency Force now in Egypt and the proposal of the representative of Pakistan which is referred to in the draft resolution before us. Moreover, he said that this analogy "comes ill from the representative of Australia, who initially refused to have anything to do with this business of sending a force to Egypt in order to implement the purposes of the Charter" [769th meeting, para. 103.].

I can only say that Mr. Menon's recollection was at fault when he made this remark. There were three votes in the first emergency special session on the subject of the United Nations Emergency Force. On the first of those resolutions Australia abstained because the preamble recalled earlier resolutions relating to the withdrawal of the United Kingdom and French forces which we had not supported. But we made it clear that we supported in principle the establishment of UNEF and we voted for the next two resolutions dealing with arrangements for the Force. So there is no foundation for Mr. Menon's suggestion that Australia's position on UNEF has been such as to make it inappropriate for me to draw an analogy between that Force and the Force proposed for Kashmir, if I had desired to do so. As a matter of fact, my observations on this question were carefully worded to avoid entering into any discussion of that kind.

What I said about the Pakistan proposal for a United Nations force is as follows:

"The idea", I said, "is perhaps not a new one, but it gains in interest and importance from the recent experience of the United Nations in the establishment and operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. Without drawing any parallel between the situation that led to the General Assembly's decision to establish that Force and the problem of securing appropriate measures of demilitarisation of Kashmir as a preliminary step towards holding a free and impartial plebiscite, it would seem to us very difficult for anybody to deny that the use of such a force, insofar as it might contribute towards demilitarisation, would, in the words of the draft resolution para. 53.]. 'deserve consideration'." [768th meeting,Para 53.]

I appreciate that Mr. Menon did not have the text of my statement before him when he spoke and that may explain why his own comments somewhat distorted my remarks. I have gone into this partly in order to set the record straight and also if possible, to reinforce my previous plea to Mr. Menon to recognize our good will in this matter and to accept our draft resolution in the spirit in which it is offered.

I must say that regarding this proposal for the use of a temporary force, the comments of the representative of Pakistan, (770th meeting, para. 120 to 128) towards the conclusion of his speech on Monday, indicating his understanding of the functions that a United Nations force might fulfil in this connexion, struck me as being very reasonable. But these are only observations which, along with the other statements made here, would need to be taken into account by our President in his discussions with India and Pakistan.

It is the hope of the Australian delegation that, along with other matters, our President will explore this proposal with the Governments of India and Pakistan and that they will give this, as indeed the other matters studied by the Council on this occasion, their closest consideration.

20021957 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Barco (United States of America) in the Security 654114 Council Meeting No. 772 held on 20 February 1957

The Security Council began its renewed consideration of the Kashmir problem on 16 January. Since then, we have met eleven times and we have had a very thorough airing of this complicated problem.

The United States has listened with great attention to the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan. The council, as a whole, has shown an enlightened and constructive attitude toward the solution of the problem in the proper spirit of conciliation.

The Soviet Union, however, apparently does not look at this problem in the same way as the other members of the Council. While it has been our hope that the United Nations through the draft resolution tabled by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3787], could assist the parties in taking a forward step, the position of the Soviet representative has been essentially negative.

Let me examine the amendments the representative of the USSR has put forward (S/3789). First, under the Soviet Union amendments, all mention of previous resolutions, either of the Security Council or of United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, is eliminated. The Council would therefore be asked to ignore the obligations to which both India and Pakistan are committed in the United Nations Commission resolutions as well as a large number of Security Council resolutions which are still valid.

Second, under the Soviet Union amendments, all mention of the importance of achieving demilitarisation is eliminated. Now, the cease-fire is in effect. But it is the failure to reach agreement on the terms of a truce that has prevented further progress toward a plebiscite. The elimination of emphasis on demilitarisation would ignore the fact that this is the key point at which progress has been blocked.

Third, under the Soviet Union amendments, all mention of the proposal for a United Nations force is deleted. We continue to believe with the other members of the Council that this idea deserves consideration and that it should be one of the elements borne in mind by the President of the Security Council in his discussions with the parties, in accordance with the terms of the draft resolution. While the President would have sufficient scope to take this proposal into consideration on the basis of the statement of the representative of Pakistan, we believe a clear reference to it in the draft resolution is desirable.

Fourth, the Soviet Union amendments imply that while the Security Council has heard the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, it has not considered them. This is an odd reflection on the work of the Council. The United States and, I believe, other members have considered the statements of the parties, and the draft resolution reflects conclusions based on their consideration.

Fifth, under the Soviet Union amendments, the word. "dispute" is changed into the word "situation". While the security Council used the word "situation" in its earliest resolutions' it has subsequently used the word "dispute" consistently. This was the word used in the resolution of 24 January 1957. [S/3779] and, in our opinion, reflects the facts.

Finally, under the Soviet Union amendments, the terminal date for the mission of the President is deleted. We have no strong views on the exact date, but we do think that we must move forward expeditiously. We would not think that the President should be asked to take on this difficult assignment without a definite terminal date, and we consider 15 April 1957. to be a reasonable date on which to ask him to report.

The draft resolution which has been presented by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States is a carefully balanced whole. The Soviet Union amendments would destroy that balance. The explanation of the amendments made by the representative of the Soviet Union on 18 February (770th meeting, paras. 134 ff.] revealed that his objectives were contrary to those of other members of the Council. The representative of the Soviet Union does not want to have a plebiscite held under United Nations auspices, nor does he want even to consider the possibility of United Nations forces helping the parties to achieve demilitarisation. This is something apparently alien to the instincts of the Soviet Union. He has told us that the serious problem with which the Security Council is faced is, to use his words, an "artificial hue and cry" (Ibid., para. 136), and he premises his willingness to have the President of the Security Council examine the "situation in Kashmir (Ibid., para. 143), as he but it, by characterising that situation as one which has already been settled. In the light of these considerations and his own comments that he wants to interrupt the Council's consideration of the problem for some time, we cannot consider his amendments as a serious attempt to further the work of the Council, and we cannot accept them.

With respect to the amendments introduced by the representative of Colombia (S/3791/Rev! 1), I would like to reiterate simply that we conceive the resolution as an integrated whole. We appreciate the constructive approach which, as always, the representative of Colombia has shown here. However, we have doubts about the desirability of the changes embodied in his amendments, and we think that the terminology in the four Power draft resolutions is more likely to lead to constructive results.

The four-Power draft resolution is designed to assist India and Pakistan to carry out the obligations they have assumed and which they have reaffirmed before this Council.

The United States and I know the Security Council as a whole want to be helpful in resolving this dispute. The United States values its friendship with India and Pakistan. Reference has been made here to our relationship with Pakistan. The United States is glad to be associated with Pakistan in collective security arrangements and to be assisting it in a cooperative effort. We have always attempted to approach the Kashmir problem on its merits, and we do not believe that out collaboration with Pakistan in area defence affects the merits of this case. We seek to assist both India and Pakistan-and I say this with great sincerity-in finding a just and equitable solution of the Kashmir problem. We continue to hope that a settlement can be achieved in a manner satisfactory to both. We again urge them to co-operate to that end. We believe that the four Power draft resolutions will assist them, and we urge its adoption.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 770 held on 18 February 1957

The Security Council has heard statements by the representatives of India and Pakistan, and by members of the Council, on the question of Kashmir. The Soviet Union's general position on this question was outlined in Council's meeting on 81 to 88]. at the Security 24 January [765th meeting, paras.

The Soviet Union's view, and its basic premise, is that the Kashmir question has in actual fact already been settled in essence by the people of Kashmir themselves, who consider their territory an integral part of the Republic of India. Having attained their rights as an autonomous States within the united family of Indian peoples, the people of Kashmir have assumed an active part in the peaceful constructive work in which the whole country is engaged, and have scored considerable successes in the field of economic, social, cultural and political development.

Some States, however, do not want to acknowledge the great changes which have come about in Kashmir in the last few years. They continue to foment an artificial huc and cry on the subject of the so-called "Kashmir question" in order to force the reconsideration of the decision taken by the people of Kashmir themselves. This hue and cry will in no way help to bring about the re-establishment of normal conditions in the area, and it is diametrically opposed to the vital interests both of the people of Kashmir and of the peoples of India and Pakistan The object of those who started this hue and cry is not to find a solution to the differences still outstanding between India and Pakistan, but rather to aggravate them. In fact, they are urging the Security Council along the same path, by calling on it to ignore the changes that have taken place in Kashmir and to try to force the solution of the Kashmir question into the Procrustean bed of the old resolutions.

The Security Council would be committing a serious mistake if it were to recommend any measures whatsoever without taking into account the extent to which they correspond to the true situation and the vital interests of the people of Kashmir.

The Security Council cannot ignore the facts which have been placed before it notably in the statement made by the representative of India. The facts show that in the many years that have passed since the Security Council adopted its resolutions on the holding of a plebiscite, the situation in Kashmir has changed considerably. We must not forget that the idea of a plebiscite in Kashmir now meets with the objections of one of the parties; that it has in fact been rejected by that party. At the present time, the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir, with outside interference in one form or another, as proposed by some members of the Security Council, can serve only to excite local conflicts and to complicate the international situation in the area. The task of the Security Council, however, is to strengthen peace and tranquillity in the area. In these circumstances, what useful purpose will be served by including in the Security Council resolution a clause providing for the holding of a plebiscite in Kashmir ? Clearly, no purpose at all.

Nor, in our opinion, would there be any point in making a reference in the resolution to the Pakistan representative's proposal concerning the use of United Nations forces in the Kashmir region. The United Nations Charter provides clearly and unambiguously that United Nations armed forces can be used only to repel aggression and to restore international peace. The Charter of the United Nations makes. no provision for the use of armed forces for any other purpose. It goes without saying that the Charter does not provide for the use of United Nations forces to impose by force a plebiscite in any country. Thus, the introduction of a United Nations force into Kashmir would be completely at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter and would be an outright insult to the national sentiments of the people of Kashmir.

That being so, the Soviet Union delegation will vote against the inclusion in the draft resolution of any provisions. which do not correspond to the true situation in the Kashmir area, which fail to take into account the vital interests of the people of Kashmir or which are at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The Soviet delegation would however be prepared to support proposals calling for the suspension for a certain time of the Council's consideration of the Kashmir question. During that time the members of the Council could study the documents which have accumulated, and the parties directly concerned could make a further effort to settle their differences by means of direct negotiation.

In the Soviet delegation's opinion, the parties are far from having exhausted all the possibilities for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question by means of bilateral negotiations, without outside intervention of any sort. Such a procedure would be fully in keeping with the principles of the United Nations Charter, as also with the interests of the people of Kashmir and of the people of India and Pakistan.

The sponsors of the draft resolution have told us that the purpose of the resolution is to try a new-and I would stress the word "new" approach to find a peaceful settlement of the differences between India and Pakistan in his new approach consists in requesting Mr Jarring, the President of the Security Council, to go to the area and examine with the Governments. of India and Pakistan the situation in Kashmir and possible means of settling the existing differences, If this is indeed the purpose of the draft resolution, there can be no objection to it. In that case, however, there is no need to tie Mr. Jarring's hands by proposals which, even at the stage of their discussion in the Security Council, have been objected to by one or other of the parties and we have heard such objections in the Security Council.

The representative of Colombia, Mr. Urrutia, had made a very interesting proposal here. If I understood him correctly, he proposes that the preamble to the draft resolution, with the exception of the first paragraph, should be deleted [768th meeting, para, 86]. The delegation of the Soviet Union supports this idea; however, it would be desirable to modify not only the preamble but also operative paragraph 1, by deleting from it. any proposals to which objections have been raised.

The delegation of the Soviet Union therefore presents the following amendments [S/3789] to the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3787]:

"1. Replace the preamble by the following text :

"Having heard the statements of the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan." "2. Amend paragraph 1 of the operative part to read as follows:

"Requests the President of the Security Council, the representative of Sweden, to examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan the situation in respect of Jammu and Kashmir, and to consider the progress that can be made towards the settlement of the problem, bearing in mind the statements of the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan,"

"3. In paragraph 3 of the operative part delete the words: 'but not later than 15 April 1957'.

The last amendment is to delete the reference to a specific date for the presentation of the report. Mr. Jarring should be at liberty to present his report whenever he deems it appropriate.

These amendments are intended to remove from the draft resolution such provisions as have been objected to by one of the parties directly concerned, while retaining the nucleus of the proposal, as we understand it, namely, the request to the President of the Security Council to examine the situation in Kashmir with the Governments of India and Pakistan and to report to the Security Council.

The delegation of the Soviet Union hopes that these amendments will be accepted by the sponsors of the draft resolution and supported by the other members of the Security Council. The delegation of the Soviet Union is of course ready to discuss with the sponsors of the joint draft resolution the best way of including in it the idea underlying the Soviet amendments.

Text of the speech made by the President Mr. Gunnar Jarring as representative of Sweden in the Security Council Meeting No. 769 held on 15 February 1957.

I shall now speak in my capacity as representative. of SWEDEN.

In the course of my intervention at an earlier stage of our debate on the India-Pakistan question, I pointed out that the Swedish Government does not consider itself committed to any particular way of dealing with the problem before us [765th meeting, paras. 78 to 80].

We have studied carefully the various aspects of the question, and it is our sincere wish to try and assist in the endeavours to bring to an end this unhappy situation which has for so long troubled the relations between India and Pakistan-two countries with which we entertain the most friendly relations and both of which we hold in the highest esteem.

As we see it, there are, in principle, two courses open to us along which progress may be made towards the ultimate goal which it seems to us, must be an agreement between the parties on a political basis. Only by such an agreement would lasting peace and security in Kashmir be ensured. course to reach an agreement would be, as has been done in the past, to bring the parties together for negotiation either directly or through some intermediary. The other course is One this if it should be found that the question cannot at the present time be solved through negotiations, might be useful to have certain underlying problems of a legal character progressively clarified in order to create better conditions for an agreement.

Now that nine years have elapsed without any progress being in sight for an agreement between the parties, we would have thought that the time had come to try the alternative. In the opinion of my Government, this could then best be done by referring some of the legal aspects of the matter to the International Court of Justice for an advisory opinion. However, we recognize that there is a general feeling that another effort should now be made to explore the possibilities of finding a solution through negotiations in the light of later developments. We feel that this idea has much to commend itself, particularly in view of the fact that several years have passed since such negotiations last took place. We are therefore fully prepared to accept the idea behind the draft resolution which is before the Council. In the event, however, that it should not prove possible to advance the solution of the problem in such a way and the question consequently will come before the Council once again, my Government might at that time deem it advisable to have the legal background of the question clarified.

Text of the speech made by Mr. Georges Picot (France) in the Security Council Meeting No 769 held on 15 February 1957.

The French delegation has listened with the greatest attention to the statements during the past few weeks of the divergent views of Pakistan and India.

The Kashmir question is a subject of grave concern to all Governments who are anxious to safeguard the maintenance of peace and to bring about a democratic solution of outstanding problems throughout the world. During the past nine years, the question of the future of the Princely State of Jammu. and Kashmir, an outcome of the partition of the Indian Empire, has been a source of more or less permanent discord in the sub-continent.

shall not recall the incidents by which this long dispute has been characterised, shall merely point out that it is the duty of the Security Council, in pursuance of its fundamental task, to do its utmost to prevent any repercussions, however localised, which might rapidly flare up into a conflict. The Council is in duty bound to exert every effort to bring about a peaceful solution based on the principles of the Charter. Such a solution should be accepted with goodwill by the parties, even if it calls for some sacrifices from them both.

The French delegation therefore supports the draft resolution presented by the delegations of Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States of America [S/3787]. It considers reasonable to request our President to examine proposals for a settlement which, although based on previous resolutions of the Security Council, would take into account the arguments advanced by both parties in this room over the past few weeks.

The draft resolution before the Council is not in the nature of a substantive decision. It confines itself to prescribing a fact finding measure and the Council will take no decision on the solution of the Kashmir problem until it has heard the report of its President. I do not therefore think that the final phrase of operative paragraph 1, which reads: "bearing in mind the statements of the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan and the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations forces", should be regarded as anything but an indication.

The President of the Council will undoubtedly examine with the Governments of India and Pakistan all the aspects, both juridical and practical, of the use of such a force. In the circumstances, it seems to me that any objections which the parties, or the members of the Council, might have to any given formula are fully reserved.

The French delegation earnestly hopes that the mission to be entrusted in the President of the Security Council under the draft resolution before us will prove successful. Mr. SOBOLEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) The Soviet delegation reserves the right to speak on the substance of the draft resolution after the Council has heard the statements of the parties concerned in this matter, that is to say, of the representatives of India and Pakistan.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Jawad (Iraq) in the Security Council Meeting No. 769 held on 15 February 1957.

Between my country and the two Dominions which are parties to the Kashmir dispute, there are a number of close ties which require no emphasis. Some of these ties were inherited from the remote past, others were woven during recent decades, still others are projected for the future. The long and arduous struggle of the Indian people as a whole for freedom and independence was a source of inspiration for the people of my country and the Arab people in general. The achievement of these objectives by India and Pakistan was a turning point not only in the history of Asia and the Far East, not only in the history of the Middle East, but also in the history of the nations and peoples which aspired to achieve free, independent and democratic life. Since the day when the peoples of the two great States became sovereign, the people of my country followed with admiration the vast strides made by the Indian and Pakistani people in the political, economic, cultural and social fields. We found in their endeavours-which have been directed toward the promotion of democratic life, the raising of the material and cultural standards of the population as a whole, and the assumption of a decisive role in international relations examples of how liberation movement can contribute to the construction of a healthy national and international life.

Over and above our past relations, we admired India for its democratic institutions, whether they are represented in its political parties, parliamentary practices, trade-union activities or freedom of speech. Furthermore, we like the Indian people for their courage in facing and challenging the material and social realities, for these realities are reflected in their economic and social reforms and in their five-year plans. We draw considerable satisfaction from observing the constructive role India has been playing since its independence in promoting and supporting the liberation of subjected people. There are a number of other reasons for which we Iraqis and Arabs like and admire the Indian people and their leadership.

With Pakistan, we have strong ties of brotherhood, or religious beliefs and of national aspirations. The history of the Arab people and that of the Pakistani people met at certain historical epochs, and, although we lived apart in other periods, both peoples were always inspired, during their long history, by the same sources for their particular civilizations, namely, by Islam as a religion and by the Koran as a guiding book. Both peoples worship one God. Thus, the sense of unity of purpose is deeply planted in the soul of every Arab and every Pakistani.

We have been watching the progress of Pakistan in the political, economic and social fields with profound pleasure. We know how difficult it is to build up society after it has been subjected for a long period to colonial domination, feudal exploitation and internal strife. Therefore, we draw immensely. satisfaction from seeing Pakistan construct its political and economic edifice in the most patient, logical and inspiring way.

If there is a tender spot for Pakistan in the heart of every Arab and every Moslem, this has not deterred us from liking and admiring India and the Indian people. To us, India and Pakistan are partners in their past, present and future. Let no State boundaries mislead those who look at the map of the Indian subcontinent, divided between India and Pakistan: nature has joined them together and subjected them to its various phenomena. Furthermore, history cannot be erased by an act of partition. Indians and Pakistanis have lived together, shared periods of progress and prosperity, and suffered together the cruelties of man and nature.

Here, I must ask the Council's indulgence for this small digression into matters which might not at first sight, appear to be directly related to the question now under discussion. My country's connection with India and Pakistan places it in a very special position, and we intend to clarify in advance that our attachment to India is no less strong than our attachment to Pakistan. That is why we have tried to give certain indications of our relationship both to India and to Pakistan, in the hope that our opinion on the question of Kashmir will not be misconstrued by either of the parties to the dispute.

Our approach to the problem stems from a deep sense of responsibility as a Member of the United Nations which believes in universal peace and justice. No sentiments of any kind, nor worldly goods, nor political gains, can in any way divert us from following the path indicated by the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In my delegation's opinion, it is not possible to appraise the issues involved in the India Pakistan question without direct references to the background of the matter. There are a number of phases, both material and cultural, involved in that background. It is, however, hardly necessary at this stage to refer to the various factors-economic, social, religious and cultural which enter into the formation of the claims presented by Pakistan and India. The record of this question since 1948 contains a considerable amount of material which leaves no doubt as to the nature of the problem and the reasons which have led to the creation of a stalemate. However, any future. action to solve the problem must take into account certain aspects of this background which have a direct bearing on the question; this must be done in order to place the matter in the proper perspective. One of the aspects which, in our opinion, merits some consideration is the relationship between the question of Kashmir and the whole process by which India and Pakistan achieved their sovereign status. Under the scheme of partition, Kashmir became free to accede to India or to Pakistan. The people of the Indian sub-continent were able, after years of struggle, to wring their independence from the United Kingdom. This was an achievement of the people, the result of their struggle and the outcome of the many sacrifices they had made in men and material. Many generations of Moslems and Hindus have suffered from persecution, illiteracy, despotism and all kinds of privations-at the hands not only of foreign rule, but also those Indians and other nationals who were instrumental in the implementation of the colonial rule and policy. Moreover, foreign rule had created its machinery, by means of which it was able to keep 400 million people in subjugation. It had resorted to the creation of a feudal class and the strengthening of the feudal system. It had also helped to create a middle class, which it attached to the machinery of economic exploitation. Economically and politically, the struggle the people of the Indian peninsula was aimed not only at their liberation from foreign rule, but also at their liberation from all the vestiges of foreign domination. In other words, the independence of the Indian subcontinent-which was accompanied by the scheme of partition, as part and parcel of that independence -was an act to restore to the people their natural right to live under a form of government of their own choosing. Only the people of that sub-continent had the right to plan their future. political and economic life. That is why some people chose to go to India, while others went to Pakistan. The religious beliefs of the people were one of the determining factors in the selection of their political allegiances, but the major premise lying at the foundation of the two States was the act of recognition of the people's right to determine the type of State which, in their estimation, would guarantee their rights and liberties.

Consequently, any action which followed the act of independence and the scheme of partition had to stem from one fundamental principle-namely, the freedom of the people to choose the side to which to accede. Thus, any action on part of India or Pakistan to coerce any group of people or any State to join it is fundamentally an act which contradicts and entire historical epoch of struggle, which is in opposition to the principles of freedom and democracy of the people, and which is a hypocritical evaluation of the historical significance of the sovereignty of the people.

It is hardly necessary to say how many of the Indian Princely States were despotically ruled by individuals for their own egoistic ends, how many people enjoyed no political rights or liberties. Religious beliefs played an important role in the maladministration of justice by these rulers It was an epoch of which the less is said, the better. But it is essential to remember that it was the paramount moral duty of the Governments which came into power following the liberation of the Indian sub-continent to avoid the pitfalls and to prepare the foundations for remedying the abuses of that epoch. It follows logically that those who, in 1957, assumed the responsibility for molding the future shape of things in India and Pakistan should restore the people's stolen rights to the people themselves.

We are inclined to believe that the principle of democratic accession of majority of the Princely States to other Dominions, as well as the recommendations of the British Cabinet Mission of 1946, were well observed. It is to be remembered that as from August 1947 the Princely States became free to decides their future political status. That status, it was under-stood, theoretically would have to take one of two forms, either the State had to join one of the two Dominions or it had to remain independent. In practice, accession was influenced by many factors, including economic, geographical and communal factors.

Kashmir was one of three States that had not decided upon accession by 15 August 1947. Pending a decision, the ruler of Kashmir concluded standstill agreements with India and Pakistan; these agreements were to maintain the status quo emanating from the cessation of Kashmir's political relationship with the British Crown. It meant the acceptance by the authorities concerned of the postponement of the decision regarding the accession of the State, but, under the pressure of circumstances, at a moment of turmoil and faced with the tragic events which followed partition, the Ruler of Kashmir decided to accede to India, thus putting an end to the agreements. The Ruler, however, made it clear that the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people, once law and order had been established there.

At this point, the argumentation started. We do not wish here to enter into a discussion of this matter. Whether or not the accession was legal, one thing, however, cannot be denied, namely, that it was a conditional accession which should be confirmed by a referendum or a plebiscite.

When the question was brought to the attention of the Security Council in 1948, the Kashmir situation was no doubt viewed in the framework of the circumstances whole process of the creation of the two Dominions on the one hand and, on the other, in conjunction with the principle of self-determination. It could therefore be said that one of the primary considerations in the settlement of the problem was to ascertain the wishes of the people of Kashmir. The idea of a plebiscite no doubt had been in line, on the one hand, with the traditional struggle for liberation conducted by all the people of the Indian subcontinent and, on the other, with the principle of self-determination. Thus, its acceptance by India and Pakistan showed clearly that the two States were prepared to follow a procedure which conformed both to the wishes of the people of Kashmir and to the underlying principles upon which they had achieved their own sovereign status.

The Security Council, considering its highest duty was to maintain peace in the Indian peninsula and to promote justice for the people of Kashmir, reached decisions which were to serve as bases for the settlement of the question. It is hardly necessary to recall here the resolutions of the Council or those of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan as they have been well known to the world for the last eight or nine years. They indicate, among other things, the way the Council viewed the whole issue and the method for its settlement.

The whole issue centres around one major question, namely, that of the establishment of conditions under which a free and impartial plebiscite could be conducted. It will have been realised that all the resolutions, negotiations and reports were endeavours to promote such conditions. It could therefore be said that this problem, which was from its very beginning a clear one, at times had been obscured by the introduction of a number of elements foreign to it and sometimes quite irrelevant.

We do not wish to enter into a discussion of these elements, since such a procedure would be bound to take us away from the main questions. The statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan were most revealing. They show clearly that the problem which was the subject of lengthy consideration by the Council remains unsolved, in spite of all the efforts that have been expended in that direction. Moreover, despite the passage of time, it seems that today the principal issue which the Council was called upon to settle in 1948 remains basically the same.

Furthermore, the submission of the Kashmir question anew implies, inter alia, that the Security Council is being called upon to assume its responsibilities as an effective organ of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace, to assert its authority and that of the United Nations under the Charter, and to provide directives as to the obligations of Member States.

We have listened most carefully to the points of view presented by the representatives of India and Pakistan, and thus we feel that the arguments put forward by the two parties provide indications that the present conditions surrounding the Kashmir dispute continue to involve elements which constitute a danger to peace in the Asian region and therefore, require new endeavours towards their settlement. These conclusions, reached after carefully examining the case and listening to the two points of view, will serve as bases for formulating our opinion with regard to any proposal put forward in connection with the dispute, It is generally accepted that the past resolutions of the Security Council and of the Commission should constitute the bases for the settlement of the dispute. The passage of time has neither changed the principles upon which the future of Kashmir was to be decided nor has made the method of a plebiscite less applicable now than it was eight years ago. Any development which has taken place on either side of the cease fire line has certainly had some effect on the situation, and for that reason there should be a cooling-down period after the withdrawal of the armed forces of both States.

In view of what has been said here by the two parties with regard to the situation of the armed forces in Kashmir, and because the dispute has continued unsolved as a result of the failure to reach agreement on the nature and method of the demilitarisation of the State, it will be agreed that this matter should receive high priority in any plan envisaged for the settlement of the dispute. Having stated that the holding of a plebiscite is the only way for settling the question, it therefore goes without saying that discussions should start with the problem of demilitarisation.

It requires no emphasis that the negotiation of differences is the only method for reaching an equitable solution. Past experience has shown that the presence of a third party has always been helpful in narrowing differences between the parties. For these and for other reasons, it would seem that, in entrusting the President of the Security Council with the mission of examining the situation, there would be many advantages. In requesting the President to examine, with the Government of India and Pakistan, ways of achieving demilitarisation in the light of the previous resolutions, the Council would show not only that it believes that a rapid solution is highly important, but also that it places its trust in the tradition of neutrality and respect for peace and international law which his country represents.

The recent experience of the United Nations with the role that an international force could play in solving international conflicts and in promoting conditions favouring peace may make the introduction of such a force a factor for achieving a settlement worth consideration. It should, however, be noted that this suggestion is accepted, first, to be examined within framework of the whole question and, second, that its employment should be absolutely in accord with the principles of the Charter.

We feel that the time limit set for the reporting of the President is rather short, and we would prefer that a longer period of time be given to the President.

The only concern of my Government is to see that steps are taken in order to decrease the tension and to prepare the establishment of peaceful relations between India and Pakistan.

We believe that the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States [S/3787] contains all the elements necessary at the moment for taking certain positive steps in the solution of the Kashmir dispute. We hope, with the collaboration of India and Pakistan, that the President will be able to bring this painful episode to a happy ending.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957

I limit my remarks to an appreciation and study of the joint draft resolution that is before the Council.

It reaffirms the resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779] and the previous resolutions of the Security Council and the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Therefore, what this draft resolution tries to do is to further the implementation of the resolutions which the Council or the Commission has already adopted. The co-sponsors have told us and the language of the draft resolution states that all those resolutions stand.

In order to promote the implementation of the existing resolutions and a final peaceful settlement of the problem, this draft resolution suggests two steps to us. It requests the President of the Security Council to undertake a mission to India and Pakistan. I find this suggestion to be a very happy and creative one. The President of the Security Council occupies a position of great importance in the United Nations. The mere fact that this Council requests its President to undertake this mission shows the peoples of India and Pakistan that the Security Council attributes the greatest importance to the solution of the problem. We cannot express our concern and interest in a peaceful solution of this problem in any better way than the suggestion that the President himself should take charge of this question for the time being. Therefore, that feature has the whole-hearted support of my delegation.

I was very happy to learn, in addition, in the course of this morning's meeting, that the President has had practical experience both in India and in Pakistan, so he knows the conditions in those countries of the world. His personal experience is an additional qualification for this task.

The draft resolution suggests consideration of the proposal of Pakistan that the United Nations force should be used temporarily. As I see the situation, this suggestion may cause considerable complication. Therefore, I would like to explain how I feel towards this matter.

If we study the records of the Security Council and of the Commission, we find that this problem of demilitarisation has played a very, very important part in all our thoughts on this subject. Why should the Security Council and the Commission pay so much attention to this problem of demilitarisation of Kashmir ? In the first place, it is realised that an army stationed in that State might coerce or intimidate the people to vote in favour either of India or of Pakistan. When we ask for a plebiscite we naturally want, and mean to want, a fair and free plebiscite. Even if we have pledges and guarantees. that the military forces retained in the State will be instructed to stand aside and not interfere in the voting, nevertheless the suspicion of military interference in the voting would be fatal to the final results. It is for that reason that the Council and the Commission have always attributed great importance to this problem of demilitarisation.

I have explained the necessity for demilitarisation, and I might ask what is the objection to it. The objection is based on the necessity for maintaining peace and order in the State before and during the plebiscite. So we have to devise a scheme to take care of these two requirements: first, the peace and security of the State during the plebiscite; and, second, that the force that maintains peace and security should not coerce or intimidate or give the appearance of intimidating the voters. These are the two requirements that we must always keep in mind in solving this problem of demilitarisation.

I do not know of a better way of meeting those two requirements simultaneously. With the temporary use of a United Nations force in Kashmir, we can contribute to the maintenance of peace and security in that State during the plebiscite. In the second place, the stationing of a temporary United Nations force in Kashmir cannot be suspected by anybody of intimidating or coercing the voters to vote in favour of either of the two parties. Therefore, I find that this idea of a temporary United Nations force really deserves consideration, We are considering this problem now under Chapter VI of the Charter. We have not come to the stage of imposing any solution on either party. Therefore, this draft resolution rightly asks the two parties only to give this proposal their consideration and asks the President to bring this proposal to the parties concerned and ask for their consideration. I cannot see that the feature weakens this draft resolution.

Therefore, my delegation is ready to support the draft resolution.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Romulo lin (Philippines) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957

Before proceeding to the main point of this intervention, I feel bound to take note of a report in which it was made to appear that this Council treated the subject of the last resolution adopted by the Council [S/3779] in a casual manner and that the resolution in question was filed even before the representative of India had finished his presentation of the case for his Government.

I feel it my duty, as President of this Council at that time, to state here and now that there was absolutely nothing casual in the manner in which the Council proceeded in connection with the draft resolution before it. In the afternoon of 23 January 1957, the representative of India announced [163rd meeting, para. 79] that he had decided to change the order of his presentation of his Government's case in order to give, that same afternoon, his Government's views on the action of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. As we recall it, he was obliged to make that change in order to accommodate those members of this Council who were very much concerned about the implications of the reported action of the Constituent Assembly. The draft resolution was submitted only after the representative of India had finished his presentation of his Government's case on that particular subject. On the following day the Council thoroughly debated the issue and forthwith adopted the resolution [765th meeting]. But this was after every member of the Council had expressed the views of his delegation with deliberation, and a perusal of the statements made that morning will show the care and the thorough study which each of them gave to this delicate and difficult problem.

Before leaving this subject I am also bound to dispel the misconception that considerations stemming from certain military groups and alliances had any influence on the decision. taken by the member Governments as reflected in the vote of 10 in favour of the resolution, none against, and 1 abstention.

Although the representative of India has dealt with the question of aggression anew, I do not think that the Council is called upon to make any finding as to whether there has been aggression and by whom it was committed. It should be recalled that the charge and counter-charge of aggression ceased to be relevant the moment both sides agreed to the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949.

The first aide-memoire of the meeting between representatives of the Commission and the Prime Minister of India of 20 December 1948 quoted the Prime Minister of India as saying that his Government had accepted the Commission's resolution of 13 August "in spite of the presence of Pakistani troops in Jammu and Kashmir and the offensive action of Pakistani troops" [S/1196, annex 4, aide-memoire 1, para. 2]. The Commission, therefore, must have taken this into account when it addressed itself to the correction of the situation as reported to it by both parties.

In his last intervention, the representative of India stated that India has not asked for anybody to be branded an aggressor [767th meeting, para 235]. For this reason I see no point in taking up the matter further. Clearly, what each side has the right to insist on is that the situation in Jammu and Kashmir be remedied, that is, according to the terms of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission. But this is precisely the crux of the matter, because both parties have failed to agree on what constitutes a proper implementation of those resolutions.

In the course of his impressive and scholarly argument on the reasons why there has been no progress in the settlement of the India-Pakistan question, the able and worthy representative of India dwelt at length on the changes in the situation which have occurred since the Security Council was first seized of the question nine years ago. The Council heard an ex-position on the doctrine of rebus sic stantibus. Examples were sited of plebiscites that had been decreed by the defunct League of Nations and which were not carried out after a lapse of many years. Then it was recalled that the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan had stated: "The situation. in the State of Jammu and Kashmir has changed; the resolutions remain unchanged." Finally, the Council was admonished that it should not be like Rip Van Winkle and ignore the nine years that have passed. The obvious conclusion which can be drawn from the argument is that it would be realistic if the applicable resolutions were changed in order to meet the changed situation.

If we examine the various resolutions that have been approved by the Security Council on this question, including the resolutions of the United Nations Commission which have been endorsed by the Council, we find one vital principle which underlies the solution recommended and that is that the wishes of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be ascertained. The principle involved is that of self-determination, It is a time-honoured principle which is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. But the Charter did not create it; the Charter merely recognized a principle affirmed and reaffirmed countless times since the American and the French Revolutions. We can go even further back in history to trace the origins of this principle but suffice it for me to say that the principle is as valid today for the United Nations as when the founding fathers first incorporated it into the Charter twelve years ago and it will certainly remain valid for a long, long time to come.

Certainly the principle of self-determination has its limitations. In the particular case before us, I incline to the view that the partition of British India between the Dominions of India and Pakistan did not give independence to the Princely States but merely gave them the option to accede either to India or to Pakistan. As far as the Security Council is concerned, it took the view-reiterated time and again in resolution after resolution that the principle of self-determination properly applied to the situation in Jammu and Kashmir merely meant the right of people to be consulted as to whether they decided to accede to India or to Pakistan.

The will of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, according. The resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which have been accepted by both India and Pakistan, are to be ascertained by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. The other provisions of the resolutions mentioned are clearly. subordinated to that end. The provisions relating to the cease-fire and the truce arrangements are aimed simply at the creation of conditions to enable the free and orderly attainment of the prime objective. Whatever changes may have occurred in the situation since the resolutions of the Security Council were passed, it is submitted that the principle underlying those resolutions cannot be changed because it is unchangeable. If the resolutions have to be modified in the light of changed circumstances, it is submitted that the modification may consist in the alteration of the procedures but not of the principle or objective sought to be realised, namely, the free and untrammelled expression of the will of the people by means of a plebiscite conducted by the United Nations. This was what was meant by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan when it stated that the situation had changed but the resolutions. remained unchanged. The Commission found that the resolutions were no longer adequate to solve the changed situation, not because there was anything wrong with the principle underlying those resolutions but because “Governments were strict in adhering to the letter of those clauses which met their position".

Sir Owen Dixon, the first United Nations Representative, saw that the difficulty that had to be surmounted in bringing about conditions in which preparations for taking a plebiscite might go forward was the inability of India and Pakistan to agree on those conditions. He deplored the fact that the implementation of the resolutions was made dependent on the agreement of the parties but in the end he had to conclude that: "It is perhaps best that the initiative should now pass back to the parties" [S/1791, para. 104].

Mr. Frank P. Graham, the incumbent United Nations Representative who, in our opinion, has done an excellent job, did not succeed in getting the parties to agree on the remaining issue of demilitarisation and, like Sir Owen Dixon, had to fall back on the hope that the leadership of over 400 million people with the goodwill and assistance of the United Nations, may "join in negotiating and reporting an agreement" [S/2967, para. 57].

My Government cannot but reiterate the hope that, given the continued tolerance and goodwill which have not been wanting in the relations between the Governments of India and Pakistan, they may finally agree not only in their own interests but in the interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. Each party contends that if a free and impartial plebiscite is held, it will certainly go in its favour, which is all the more reason why the parties should demonstrate their determination to agree on the antecedent conditions which would make possible the holding of such a plebiscite.

It is undeniable that the longer the present situation is allowed to continue, the greater is the danger of its further deterioration. Certainly it would favour the side which holds under its control the greater portion of the territory and population of the disputed State. It is to be assumed that each party would use all legitimate means to convert to its side the population under its control which must be amenable to its rule. In the circumstances, each party would have a better chance of succeeding in this endeavour the longer it is allowed to exercise its powers of persuasion to the exclusion of the other. The danger, indeed, is that certain conditions may be created on each side of the cease-fire line as to render difficult a charge from the status quo.

The proposal by the representative of Pakistan for the introduction of a United Nations force [761st meeting, para. 112] to exercise police functions in the areas to be vacated by the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line is a proposal that merits consideration. It is not a novel idea, for in another setting the General Assembly has approved the introduction of a United Nations police force into areas vacated by belligerent armies in order to promote conditions which might lead to progress in securing a peaceful settlement of a particularly difficult and complex problem.

I will permit myself now to turn to the draft resolution tabled by the delegations of Australia, Cuba, the United States and the United Kingdom [S/3787]. I can say for my Government that we will find no difficulty in going along with the proponents of the plan envisaged in the draft resolution. And I venture to add that should the Council adopt the plan, as I have reason to believe it will, it would go a long way towards a final settlement of the present dispute.

I wish first of all to commend the idea of sending to the subcontinent of India the President of the Security Council for a first-hand investigation of the conditions there as they relate to the dispute. In our opinion, such a distinguished personality as the President of the Security Council cannot fail in his mission to appreciate the arguments of the disputants in this issue in the light of the facts as they actually exist and as he will actually find them. Mr. Jarring is a diplomat of vast experience. We know for one thing that he is familiar with the Indian sub-continent as a result of his diplomatic assignments there. He should, for this reason, be in a position to meet the principal parties on the spot, weigh their views in the light of the actual circumstances in the State of Jammu and Kashmir and bring us abundant evidence upon which further to proceed in our deliberations.

The draft resolution before us meets all the requirements of the situation and, without departing from the sound and practical course therefore followed by this organ of the United Nations, opens the way realistically to a settlement which, if the parties are minded to coexist in peace, should be final and conclusive.

The proposal does not deviate from the course we have followed. It recognizes the absolute necessity of demilitarising the disputed region as a condition precedent to any genuine plebiscite. None of us here will dispute the proposition that no plebiscite is possible in a setting of warlike appearances. The first and most important condition to a free election is that the people should be able to go to the polls without fear in their hearts. Any sign of coercion would make the true expression of the people's will impossible. Those of us who have been used to the democratic way of life will readily admit that any plebiscite worth its name must be conducted under conditions of absolute peace if it is to be regarded as valid and conclusive.

We can assume that one of the principal concerns of our President when he goes to the sub-continent is that the ground is properly laid for the untrammelled exercise of popular suffrage when the plan of a plebiscite, which is the Security Council's decision, is actually carried out.

Finally, the reference in the draft resolution to the proposal made by the representative of Pakistan that a United Nations Force be assigned to Jammu and Kashmir as a temporary means toward the achievement of demilitarisation is in line with my Government's views that the idea merits full consideration.My delegation, therefore, will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Nunez-Portuondo (Cuba) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957

As far as the Cuban delegation is concerned, the fundamental element of this problem is that the sovereignty of Kashmir rests exclusively with the people of Kashmir. We are dealing with an ancient State, a State, as the representative of India told us, whose history goes back a thousand years, whose people, in our opinion, have the right to decide whether it should be incorporated with Pakistan or whether it should continue to be incorporated with India.

We cannot accept the standard that it is the sovereign power which should decide alone, by its will contrary to the wishes of the people, whether Kashmir should accede to India or Pakistan. This is the fundamental rule that we have established. In our opinion, this has also been the criterion adopted by the Indian Government in other cases. When the Nabob of Junagadh decided by a resolution of his own to accede to Pakistan and did so, the Government of India declared that was illegal because it violated the principle of the people's self-determination. And when the Nizam of Hyderabad also wanted to remain neutral, that is, not accede to either India or Pakistan, the Government of India similarly declared that the Nizam could not do so because he was violating the freely expressed will of the people of Hyderabad. These are recorded facts which in the opinion of the Cuban delegation, have been proven through documents, and we have no doubt whatsoever that the same principle should be applied to the case of Kashmir as a general basis for judging these problems.

We have listened with great attention to the statements made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and the representative of India. They were lengthy, documented statements with quotations from many sources in which different positions were, of course, taken; but from those statements we have been able to deduce the following declarations by the representative of India which, in our opinion, are encouraging. First, India does not have the slightest intention of failing to fulfil an international commitment. Second, the plebiscite can only be held when the first two stages have been carried out : (a) a cease-fire and (b) a truce and the withdrawal of Pakistan troops and later the withdrawal of Indian troops. Then the representative of India also told us that the truce is more essential than the plebiscite. A plebiscite cannot be held unless part II of the agreement has been complied with.

In the opinion of the Cuban delegation, this proves that the position of the delegation of India is that the offer made previously by the Prime Minister, Mr. Nehru, will be carried out, namely that the people of Kashmir will decide upon their own future. That in short, is the same thesis that the representative of India brilliantly expressed on 12 February in the First Committee of the General Assembly when he vigorously and enthusiastically contended that Algeria also has a right to determine its own future. In other words, it would be unjustifiable, in the Cuban delegation's view-and I say this with all due respect to the representative of India-that the Algerian people should have the right to exercise freely the principle of self-determination and that the Kashmiri people should not. This is all the more true since in the case of the people of Kashmir there has been no discussion, as in the case of Algeria, whether it was in effect an integral part of another State, because both parties have recognized that Kashmir has existed as a State for ten centuries, though for many years under the rule of the United Kingdom.

From all the statements that have been made here, the fundamental argument of the representative of India, his most important legal argument, is the following conditions have changed from those existing when the plebiscite was agreed upon. That is to say, the Indian representative and his Government seem to contend that the plebiscite was agreed to when certain conditions existed and that since those conditions have changed, the Government of India in some way does not feel bound to carry out the offer to hold a plebiscite.

This doctrine in civil law is well known to those of us who have practised at the Bar for many years. If judgement is given for the distribution of riverine waters between adjacent meadows, and the river dries up, the judgement of course can not be enforced. Where the right of property an island or barren islet is adjusted, and the court decides that it should be delivered to the party that won the case, and the island or islet owing to a natural phenomenon disappears, then again the judgement cannot be carried out. There are many such examples in civil law. But in legal doctrine the following conditions must be present: first, the situation must not have changed on account of any acts by the defendant; second, as a result of the acts or phenomena which take place, it must be physically impossible to carry out the judgement, that is, the situation must have changed in such a way that the judgement of the court-I am referring to private law-cannot be enforced.

In our opinion this situation does not apply here for the following reasons: the resolutions of the Council exist; Kashmir exists; the people of Kashmir exist; the principle of self-determination exists in the Charter of the United Nations ; but above all, Mr. Nehru's statements exist-most laudable ones, we believe-made a few years ago and also very recently, two weeks ago, in which he reaffirmed the Indian Government's offer to accept the plebiscite as a means of deciding to whom Kashmir should finally belong, Pakistan or India.

Therefore, since all these antecedents exist, the Cuban delegation feels that the wise, proper and timely thing to do is to treat the situation so that the plebiscite may be held. That is the aim of the draft resolution before the Council. But of course, if India had stated categorically: "We do not accept a plebiscite in any form; we declare our previous solemn offer to hold a plebiscite to be null and void", then the Security Council would be faced with a different situation and would have to solve it in a different way. But that is not the case. We are faced by a previous offer, reaffirmed in a public statement two weeks ago by the Prime Minister of India, who said that India accepts the plebiscite, although it lays down certain conditions.

The Cuban delegation therefore believes that this draft resolution would lead to the holding of a plebiscite. In view of the present state of the affair, the consent thereto of the Government of India is naturally required. In our view, however, this can be discounted in so far as the holding of a plebiscite is concerned because, I repeat, the Government of India made the offer several years ago, and it was reaffirmed by the Prime Minister of Ladia in a statement two weeks ago.

According to a United Press telegram, Mr. Nehru publicly stated on 6 February 1957 "that India was prepared to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir if Pakistan withdrew its troops and permitted the Government. of Kashmir, supported by the Government of India, to assume control of the whole State "

But in 1947 the Prime Minister of India sent a telegram. in which he stated:

"We have declared that the fate of Kashmir must definitely be decided by its people. We have promised this. The Maharaja has confirmed this promise not only to the people of Kashmir but to the whole world. We do not want to retract our statement and we cannot do so."

In 1947 Nehru said: "We do not want to retract our statement and we cannot do so." Therefore, for us-in accordance with the statement by the Prime Minister of India, whom we very much respect, in which he said regarding the Kashmir plebiscite: "We do not want to retract our statement and we cannot do so"-the problem of the plebiscite is something that has been definitively settled and agreed upon by the parties. All that has to be done is to bring about conditions in which the plebiscite can be held.

From the Indian representative's statement here, and also from the statements I have quoted, it seems clear that India has at no time tried to retract its promise to hold the plebiscite, since it laid down conditions under which parts I and II must be complied with before part III can be carried out; and there would be no reason to speak of the fulfilment of conditions for a plebiscite if no plebiscite were to be held. opinion, is crystal clear. This, in our We therefore believe that the draft resolution we have submitted is an attempt, by entrusting the President of the Council with this task, to bring about the conditions which will allow the holding of a plebiscite.

The Cuban delegation hopes that the parties will contribute to this end, because there can be no doubt about the following the immense quantity of documents and statements which we have studied with great care, to the best of our ability, shows that the Security Council, Pakistan and India have been in agreement on one principle that the people of Kashmir should determine their own future. And since this in our view is the very essence of the matter, we must all do everything in our power to permit the people of Kashmir to determine their own future.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957.

The Australian delegation has joined the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Cuba in sponsoring the draft resolution contained in document S/3787 because we believe it presents the right decision for the Security Council to take at the present stage of our consideration of the situation in Kashmir.

We have heard important statements by the representatives of Pakistan and India, and I should like to express the appreciation of the Australian delegation to Mr. Firoz Khan Noon and Mr. Krishna Menon for the pains they have taken to present their respective cases so fully and clearly to the Council. I feel sure that from these statements, together with the earlier important reports of Sir Owen Dixon and Mr. Frank Graham, we have all gained a better understanding of the difficulties and the opposing points of view and interpretations of events that have stood in the way of a mutually acceptable settlement of this problem.

It might be possible for the Council to proceed here and now to a detailed examination of and an exchange of views upon the positions adopted by the parties in this discussion before the Council and to endeavour to pronounce some sort of judgement upon the many points of controversy. But I would not consider such a procedure to be wise at the present time, for I doubt whether it would bring us closer to a solution of the problem. On the other hand, the devoted and painstaking efforts of Mr. Graham did reduce the divergences between the positions of the parties, even if they did not produce a final agreement.

Surely after this lapse of three years, the path wisdom is to continue to explore the possibilities of ref ching agreement on practical steps forward. The recognized goal of the Council has been to be guided by the wishes of the people of Kashmir. Without attempting at this stage to pronounce itself any further on the constitutional procedures that have been followed or challenged in the past, the Council may well continue to put its faith in the method of popular consultation by plebiscite, which, provided the necessary conditions are established to facilitate a free expression of the people's will, is of all methods, the most democratic one.

The Council has all along attached great importance to the adoption of appropriate measures of demilitarisation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a necessary step towards the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is well known that negotiations on detailed practical measures to bring about such demilitarisation have not in the past been successful. This is the most immediate problem to which, in our view, the Security Council should bend its present efforts.

The draft resolution refers to the proposal of the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force (761st meeting, para. 112) to facilitate agreement on effective arrangements for demilitarisation. The idea is perhaps not a new one, but it gains in interest and importance from the recent experience of the United Nations in the establishment and operations of the United Nations Emergency Force in Egypt. Without drawing any parallel between the situation that led to the General Assembly's decision to establish Force and the problem of securing appropriate measures of demilitarisation of Kashmir as a preliminary step towards holding a free and impartial plebiscite, it would seem to us very difficult for anybody to deny that the use of such a force, in so far as it might contrib towards demilitarisation, would, in the words. of the draft resolution "deserve consideration". It is the hope of the Australian delegation that this proposal will receive full and sympathetic consideration by the Council and the parties.

We recognize, however, that precipitating action by the Council at this moment might not produce the results that the Council desires. The Australian delegation appreciates the difficulty that could confront the Indian Government if it were requested to a plebiscite, including possible arrangements for an international force, on the eve or in the midst of the forthcoming national elections, which will naturally make great calls upon the time and attention of ministers and officials. Moreover, we have heard from both parties something of the changes and developments that have taken place on both sides of the cease-fire line since the suspension of hostilities, and there can be little doubt that the Council would wish for more. information regarding actual present-day conditions and the prospects of working out some agreed measures.

In these circumstances, it seems to us that the Council could be greatly assisted if its President, who has long experience and a profound knowledge of both India and Pakistan, were to undertake the mission proposed in the draft resolution.

The Council will note that it would be the task of our President under this draft resolution to examine, with the two Governments concerned, "proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation or to the establishment of other conditions for progress towards [a] settlement"-having regard, of course, of course, to the past resolutions of the Council, to the statements that we have heard from the parties, and to the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force in this connexion.

We would hope that, when the President has completed his investigations and discussions with the Governments concerned, the Council will find it possible to proceed, in an atmosphere of harmony and cooperation, with the elaboration of concrete measures that will win acceptance from all parties concerned and pave the way to a just and peaceful settlement of this painful problem.

I trust that the Council will adopt the draft resolution now before the Council, and I feel sure that the Governments of India and Pakistan will afford our respected President every possible assistance in this supremely important mission.

When I spoke in the Council earlier on this subject (765th meeting, para. 24], I referred to the close and cordial ties that Australia enjoys with both India and Pakistan, and I expressed the deep anxiety of the Australian people in regard to the continued friction between our friends over the Kashmir question, which we have always hoped could be resolved by peaceful negotiations between the Governments of India and Pakistan. It is not necessary, I know, for me to repeat this. Our neighbours and friends in India and Pakistan will, I hope, recognize that, in putting forward this draft resolution in association with the other sponsors, we in Australia are moved solely by a spirit of the warmest goodwill toward them and by our deep concern for the interests of the people of Kashmir.

Mr. URRUTIA (Colombia) First of all, I would like to say that I thoroughly approve of the idea of having only simultaneous interpretation today. I realise, of course, that today's step is only being adopted as an exceptional measure, for otherwise the Council would have been faced with the prospect of having two statements in Spanish which, with the two consecutive interpretations to follow, would have tripled the time the Council would have had to spend in listening to them. It is because of that problem, in fact, that I have occasionally taken the liberty in the past of speaking in one of the two working languages so as to save the Council a threefold loss of time in hearing what I have to say. Unfortunately, the press in the Spanish speaking countries- possibly in ignorance of the Council's rules of procedure - has been highly offended at my not speaking in Spanish: in ignorance of the rules of procedure, I repeat, for it should really have been offended at my failure to speak in Basque. As Mr. de Lequerica explained so convincingly in the General Assembly Basque is one of the most ancient of languages - for Basque is a language, not a dialect and it happens to be the one spoken by Mr. de Lequerica's forebears and my own.

[Mr. Urrutia then spoke a few words in Basque]

The translation of what I have just said -I am afraid I must give it myself-is that I am sorry I am not able to address the Council in Basque. Today, in any case, we shall only have simultaneous interpretation; however, I reserve my right in the future to abstain from Spanish and to speak in French or English in order to save the Council's time, and also to speak Basque on occasion so as to ensure that language is not denied the rights admittedly accorded under rule 44 of the rules of procedure.

It is an excellent idea to ask the President of the Security Council to undertake in concert with the Governments of India and Pakistan to study proposals that might help to solve the problem of Kashmir, and my delegation wholeheartedly sup. ports it; but I would like to refer briefly to the difficulties we encountered in the past so as to avoid their recurrence in the future.

When the Security Council appointed the Commission which went to India and Kashmir in 1948, it committed without design the same error we are about to commit with the present draft resolution: the Commission's sole terms of reference being to negotiate within the framework of the resolution of 21 April 1948 [S/726] which one of the parties-India, in this case had denounced before the Commission left New York. Thus on its arrival in India the Commission found itself in the following rather absurd position: it was acting in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter, in other words, it was engaged. in the conciliation procedure, and was required, in doing so, to keep strictly to a resolution that had already been denounced by one of the parties. Despite this completely illogical situation, the Commission scored an unexpected success by getting the Indian Government to agree, subject to certain conditions, that the question of Kashmir's future should be submitted to decision by its inhabitants by means of a plebiscite. This agreement was not reached through the 1948 resolution, however, but through direct negotiations which were not provided for in the resolution and which I think ought to be stressed, since I consider the debate of the past few days to have revealed a rather grave misunderstanding of the question.

I would like to point out, in the first place, that the situation which the Commission found on its arrival in Pakistan was this: Pakistan had rejected any solution that did not involve explicit provisions concerning the plebiscite. India, for its part, refused even to consider the idea of a plebiscite until hostilities ceased and the Pakistani forces were withdrawn. The Commission managed to bring about agreement on the cease fire and the truce as a bridge between those two positions. What was arrived at, therefore, was a compromise solution whereby it was possible to elicit an offer from India to submit the final disposition of Kashmir to a plebiscite. Two points have to be made clear, however: first, the Commission accepted the sovereignty of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a fact and avoided entering into a discussion of the legality or illegality of the act of accession, which meant that it recognized the de facto sovereignty of India. Secondly, the Commission never recognized the legality of the presence of Pakistani troops in Kashmir. These points must be stressed in order to appreciate why the Commission ordered the complete withdrawal of the Pakistani forces but only requested India to withdraw part of its forces, while permitting it-and even giving it special rights to maintain internal order and take charge of external defence. For the same reasons the Commission, when the idea of a plebiscite was discussed, was the first, to recognize that Pakistan had no right to take part in drawing up the rules and regulations for the plebiscite, except. in an advisory capacity, whereas India was recognized as having the right to be consulted. It was also agreed in principle that the Pakistani forces would be withdrawn, completely and definitively, whereas the withdrawal of the Indian forces was subject to consultations with the Commission.

Once this legal position had been made clear, and solely because the Commission had been able to clear it up and had recognized India's de facto sovereignty over Jammu and Kashmir, it was able to obtain India's agreement to a further point that India would agree-even if it were proved or disproved that Kashmir belonged legally to India that a plebiscite would be held provided certain conditions had been met, and that if the plebiscite showed that the people of Kashmir wished to leave India and enter and form part of Pakistan, India would bow to that decision.

But then as we see, there is a complete difference between what was said and what Was agreed upon. The Chairman of the Commission, during these discussions, was the representative of Colombia, and therefore I felt it was my duty to examine the records. And of course I found, first of all, that when the Commission, was asked whether it wanted to enter into a discussion on the legality of India's sovereignty over Kashmir, the Commission said it would prefer not to do so; second, that when Mr. Nehru asked Mr. Lozano whether the offer to hold a plebiscite would, in the Commission's view, entail an unconditional commitment if the first and second parts of the resolution of 13 August 1948 were not carried out, Mr. Lozana replied very definitely, "No". It is very clear that there would be no commitment on India's part until after the first and second parts of the August revolution have been complied with.

Thus what really took place was a negotiation. On 13 August 1948 the Commission adopted a resolution that resolution was then a foundation, a declaration of principles, to which the agreement of both parties was then sought. India accepted the resolution in a letter dated 20 December 1948 which the Prime Minister of India sent to Mr. Korbel [S/1100, para, 78], and later in a communication dated 23 December 1948 addressed to Mr. Lozano [S/1196, annex 4], which made it very clear that the Commission's August resolution was being accepted, but on condition that the first and second parts would have to be complied with before the plebiscite could be held.

From statements made in the past few days by the Prime Minister of India, I have the impression that he misinterpreted the Security Council's resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779]. In India that resolution was interpreted as one that changed the terms of the agreement reached by that Commission in 1948. That is not my interpretation. What we said on 24 January was that we had to reaffirm the general principle that Kashmir's fate must be settled by means of a plebiscite, but naturally within the conditions stipulated in 1948, which meant that the first and second parts of the resolution had to be complied with first. At no time have we said that we wished to change those bases: they still stand. What the Security Council discussed on 24 January was something different, namely, whether as a result of the incorporation of the State of Kashmir by India those bases would be changed; and we decided that it would not. Why? Because the Commission never discussed the question of sovereignty; we in the Security Council never discussed the legal problem. We are not asking India to tell us that it is prepared to submit the legal problem of sovereignty to the Council for decision or to a plebiscite; what we are asking India is that, in accordance with the offer it made to us in 1948-even if Kashmir is legally a part of India it should agree to a plebiscite, and that if the majority of the people of Kashmir wish to cease being Indian and become. part of Pakistan, India should agree. This is apparent from the letters of 20 August and 23 December 1948, which were confirmed by the Commission's January 1969 resolution.

In my opinion, the success of the Commission's work lay in the fact that it obtained an explicit offer from India in this direction. I think it is a very serious matter to make step backwards, because the Commission's success was precisely due to the fact that it decided to avoid the legal aspect of the right of sovereignty and instead, I repeat, to obtain India's offer to renounce any future right of sovereignty over Kashmir if the people should request this in the plebiscite.

Now let us see what steps the Commission took to obtain this offer so as not to obscure what we have achieved. In the first place, in order to obtain this offer, the Commission had to enter into negotiations that lasted over half a year. The resolution was approved by the Commission in August, but it was not until December that India's acceptance was obtained and then it was a conditional acceptance. The acceptance is very clear. It says: first there has to be a ceasefire, then a truce, and when those two stages have been completed, the plebiscite will be held. There was more: the Commission had succeeded in obtaining agreement that once the truce agreement had been signed, and during that truce, a new agreement should be reached in order to synchronise-I use that word because there was a great deal of discussion about it and it was finally adopted-the withdrawal of forces and enable the plebiscite to be held. Unfortunately, the atmosphere of confidence that had been achieved was lost owing to a series of errors and incidents which it is advisable to recall so that they will not recur.

The first was the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator. As it is now nine years ago, I think it is worth-while to explain what happened. In the Commission the Colombian delegation urged that the Plebiscite Administrator should be a neutral, that being the only way to induce India to abide by the offer which had been obtained with such difficulty. Unfortunately, other delegations had explicit instructions to urge that the Plebiscite Administrator should be a United States citizen. My delegation suggested, in private conversations also, that we should accept the Indian Government's suggestion that the President of the International Red Cross should be appointed Plebiscite Administrator. If at that time, we had accepted the Plebiscite Administrator proposed by India, the President of the International Red Cross, the plebiscite would already have been held. Instead of that, Admiral Nimitz waited nine years in new York for an opportunity to organise the plebiscite. But these errors are delicate matters, because an apparent diplomatic victory, obtained at a certain time, served propaganda purposes, but in reality undid all the work the Commission had accomplished.

In view of that situation, the members of the Commission and particularly the representative of my country, realised that their mission had been completed, for as the Chairman of the Commission summed it up in a statement that I consider excellent :

"The Security Council's resolutions are static, but the situation is dynamic." The Commission had provided. for an arrangement, system or procedure that was to be carried out in six weeks or three months at the most. Advantage should have been taken of the favourable atmosphere of the climate that had been brought about in Indía: Mr. Nehru's acceptance, and the confidence with which the Commission had inspired him to accomplish all this in three months. But instead, we began to be asked for clarifications, which bogged us down for a year and a half. Then, of course, the Commission had nothing further to do.

The dissolution of the Commission was requested, and its functions were temporarily assumed by the President of the Council, General Mc Naughton (Canada). In the meantime, Admiral Nimitz. of course, was still in New York. General Mc did not find any solution, and then the first mediator was appointed, Sir Owen Dixon (Australia). After a four-week visit, he gave up his mission, and then Mr. Graham was appointed; as you know, he has travelled to India more than twelve times and has submitted a number of reports with which all of us in the Security Council are familiar.

In deciding to ask our President to make a new effort at mediation, I think I should point out that the essence of Mr. Graham's final effort was to try to reach an agreement on demilitarisation in one stage only: a truce with some of the provisions of the resolution of 5 January 1949. That might be the solution, but in any case it is different from that agreed upon in 1948 by the Commission and Mr. Nehru. There was even a moment when Mr. Graham obtained agreement. You will remember that at one time he proposed that the forces of India should be limited to 18,000 men and those of Pakistan to 6,000. India insisted on 21,000, and because Pakistan would not agree to the additional 3,000 men at that time, Mr. Graham's effort came to naught and, once again, we took a step backwards.

In the light of these observations, I feel that we should not tie the hands of the President of the Council, because if we do so, we shall encounter all the difficulties that the Commission encountered in 1948 and those that later caused the failure of the efforts of General Me Naughton and Mr. Graham.

The operative part of the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States is excellent. But on the other hand, I would object to the preamble. Strictly speaking, there is also a point in the operative part that I think should be changed, namely: should we set a time limit for the President of the Council. General Me Naughton's visit lasted four weeks and nothing was accomplished. I believe it would be very difficult for the President of the Council to achieve anything in four or five weeks. Let us give him latitude, because we must bear this in mind : later it will be practically impossible for us in the Council to achieve in New York what the President cannot effect on his visit. Thus let us give him all the necessary time and latitude. Whatever he may accomplish, it will be the only concrete step we can depend on in the forthcoming discussions.

Now, with respect to the preamble, I find that there is one. part that is somewhere illogical. We cannot recall resolutions and introduce new elements. Either we should adhere to previous resolutions or we should introduce new elements. But to recall resolutions and to introduce new elements is to weaken our position, because the only concrete thing we have, the only international instrument or commitment we have, is India's offer to agree to a plebiscite if the first and second parts of the 1948 resolution are fulfilled, subject to the conditions laid down. If we depart from that, we should have to re-examine the whole situation. These new elements may be excellent, they may be the formula, just as the formula suggested by Mr. Graham might very well have been an excellent one. But while we are within the framework of Chapter VI, we must not forget that we are acting as mediators and that the parties must agree to the suggestions.

This is only human and obviously everyone knows that if a person is to act as mediator, the worst thing he can do is to say, before beginning the mediation : "This is my solution." No, if one is acting as a mediator, one should simply come with the foundations that have already been laid, which in my opinion are the agreements contained in the letters of 20 August and 23 December 1948. From then on we should study whatever solutions or suggestions are put forward by either Government.

The idea of United Nations troops seems to be an excellent one, but only if and when India accepts it first.

As is well known, we cannot impose the presence of such troops. There are other cases in which this problem has arisen. We must first obtain the consent of the parties concerned to the presence of the troops.

Here again, as in discussions previously, we find ourselves. in a difficult situation, at all events in so far as my country is concerned; for example, we have not wanted to accept the idea that the mere fact that it is desired to hold a plebiscite in a country necessarily obliges that country to hold the plebiscite and to discuss sovereignty. The Greeks wanted a plebiscite to be held in Cyprus, but we refused. Some Arab countries wanted to apply in the same way the principle of self determination in North Africa, but we did not agree. I believe the Australian representative will also agree with me that in New Guinea the principle was upheld in a different way. Thus it is rather difficult for delegations, like mine, that are attending all the debates to advocate one argument in the Security Council, and then go to the First Committee of the General Assembly and support a different argument, and to support another, even more delicate, in a further debate. Our way of thinking must be consistent. Just as we asked the representative of India, if he accepts the idea of self-determination as he has done in many debates apart from those on Kashmir, to reaffirm the offer made by the Prime Minister of India to submit the sovereignty of Kashmir to a plebiscite and also, if Kashmir belongs to India today, to agree to transfer that sovereignty if the people should so decide, so therefore, it seems to me, that we also must be logical, and that we cannot put down at once in a resolution a series of new elements on the presence of United. Nations troops without the countries having requested them, because tomorrow the same request will be made in connection with Cyprus, New Guinea and all the other problems that lie before us.

Thus the idea is excellent, but only if and when the President of the Council obtains the consent of the parties in advance, because according to Chapter VI, nothing can be done unless the parties agree beforehand. It is obvious that the President of the Council has listened to the statements by the representatives of Pakistan and India, and that he is well aware of the proposals that have been made and the suggestions that have been put forward here. Thus he can go to India, Kashmir and Pakistan to investigate and then return and report to us. But I do not think there is any reason to weight down the President of the Council with a series of new elements that were not in the 1948 proposal.

We voted for the resolution of 24 January 1957 [S/3779] precisely because we felt that India had to fulfil the commitments it undertook on 20 August and 23 December 1948. But for that very reason we could in no circumstances introduce new elements and say to India: "You must carry out your promise not under the conditions agreed upon, but under new conditions." That we could not ask.

Having made these remarks, I should like to ask the sponsors of the draft resolution whether it would not be preferable to leave the first paragraph as the entire preamble, to delete all the other paragraphs of the preamble and then continue with the operative part, which is excellent. If the sponsors do not wish to do this, I shall not submit an amendment, nor shall I cast a negative vote; I merely wish to make these remarks because I greatly fear that if we adopt the draft resolution in its present form, when the President of the Security Council returns on 15 April, we shall find ourselves in exactly the same position that we are in today.

15021957 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Lodge (United the States of America) in the Security Council meeting No. 768 held on 15 February 1957.

In its resolution of 25 January 1957 [S/3779] the Security Council reminded the Governments and authorities concerned of the principle contained in previous resolutions of the Security Council:

" that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations."

The Security Council also reaffirmed that action by the Kashmir Constituent Assembly to determine the affiliation of the State would not constitute a disposition of it in accordance

with this principle. At that time the Council did not consider what further action might be desirable from the point of view of facilitating a settlement of this dispute between India and Pakistan.

In closing my remarks to the Council on 24 January, I observed that the United States considered that:

"In the absence of a direct mutually acceptable agreement between the parties, the Council has an obligation to continue its efforts, as it has in the past, to seek and to support any fruitful suggestion in this difficult case.' [765th meeting, para. 51].

At the suggestion of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, Mr. Frank Graham, who, let me say, has served the United Nations with distinction and skill in more than one difficult problem in addition to having a record of distinguished service in his own country, the parties to the dispute undertook direct negotiations in 1953. These negotiations were not successful.

Thus the Council again has a positive duty to assist the parties in finding a just and equitable solution. The Security Council's overriding endeavour in connection with Kashmir has always been to secure an amicable settlement acceptable to both parties. In doing this, it has sought to build upon the gains which have been made in the past and upon agreements which have been reached by the parties. As the Secretary of State of State of the United States said on 5 February 1957 at a press conference:

"We continue to believe that unless the parties are able to agree upon some other solution, the solution which was recommended by the Security Council should prevail, which is that there should be a plebiscite."

We listened attentively to the forthright presentations of the representatives of India and Pakistan with this in mind. We were pleased to find that a common basis for agreement still exists upon which the Security Council can build in its efforts to assist the parties in finding a pacific solution. One basis for agreement is the continued recognition by the parties of their international obligations under the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Affirmations of this adherence were made by the representative of Pakistan at the 766th meeting and by the representative of India at the 767th meeting.

The representative of Pakistan stated:

"The only international obligations which the Governments of India and Pakistan have undertaken in regard to the Kashmir dispute are embodied in the two resolutions. of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 's [766 meeting, para. 4,]

The representative of India stated:

"These are the engagements. If they were of a formal character, they might be treaties, but, at any rate, they are the engagements we have entered into the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949." [767th meeting, para. 97.] What do these resolutions call for? The resolution of 13 August 1948 sets out in successive stages a cease-fire, a truce agreement and the determination of the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people. The resolution of January 1949 states that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. It also specifies methods through which this plebiscite should be organised. This, then, is the first solid basis of agreement from which the Security Council can proceed.

Another important fact on which the Council can build is the realisation by both parties that one of the chief barriers to the full carrying out of these resolutions is the failure to achieve demilitarisation. This is the central problem involved in the truce section of the resolution of 13 August 1948 and has been recognized in the statements of both parties as a crucial problem in carrying out the resolutions. In this sense the question appears before the Council fundamentally in the same light as it did when we were previously called upon to discuss the matter.

The long and energetic efforts of Mr. Frank Graham, the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, removed many obstacles to the achievement of demilitarisation. However, it has not been possible for him so far to achieve a final agreement; nor did it prove possible for the parties, the last time they undertook negotiations, to come to final conclusions. It is, therefore, on demilitarisation that the discussions of the representatives of India and Pakistan have largely turned and it is to this that the Council needs largely to address itself.

We welcome the assurances of both representatives of their continued respect for and adherence to these international engagements. We hope both parties will do their utmost to consult in good faith to implement the obligations they have assumed, and in which the Security Council has played such an important role. We recognize that the opinions of the representatives of India and Pakistan differ considerably on many of the details of these obligations, on the reasons for the failure to achieve demilitarisation and on the elements that would bring it about in an equitable fashion. However, the Security Council has previously expressed its view on many of these points.

The draft resolution which has been introduced by the Governments of Australia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States(S/3787) builds upon these points of agreement. It thus lays considerable stress on the importance of achieving demilitarisation. Four of the preambular paragraphs refer to this problem.

The task which we are suggesting that the Security Council assign to its President also emphasises the efforts to achieve demilitarisation. In this connection, a proposal has already been put forward as a suggestion by which the present deadlock might be broken. This was the proposal of the representative of Pakistan at the 761st meeting, reiterated at the 766th meeting, to the following effect :

"The functions of protecting the State and ensuring internal security should be entrusted by the Council to a United Nations Force which should be introduced into the area at once." [761st meeting, para. 112.]

We have thought it desirable to note this proposal by the representative of Pakistan for the use of a temporary United Nations force in connection with demilitarisation. We have not, however, attempted to express a final judgement on this proposal but have stated the belief that the use of such a force would deserve consideration that is all, would deserve consideration in so far as it might contribute to the achievement of demilitarisation as envisaged in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and toward the pacific settlement of the dispute. We would hope that the President of the Security Council could explore this proposal further with the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to examining its utility and determining the extent to which it might be employed. If the United Nations force would be of

value in assisting in the demilitarisation or a basic settlement of the dispute, I am sure all of us would agree that it would deserve consideration. We have, therefore, listed a temporary United Nations force as one of the elements which need to be borne in mind in making a new. attempt to achieve a settlement.

Considering the complexity of the Kashmir issue and the length of time since the Council last dealt with it, however, we have suggested that the primary action of the Security Council at this time to request the President of the Security Council to examine with the two Governments proposals which he thinks are likely to contribute to demilitarisation or to establishing other conditions for settling the dispute. This gives the President sufficient flexibility to produce positive results in bringing the parties together.

As I indicated earlier, the United States believes that we must build upon the gains which have been made before. The President, in undertaking this mission, is accordingly to do so having regard to the resolutions which have been adopted on Kashmir by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. He is also to bear in mind the statements of the parties and specifically the proposal for a United Nations force. As the President of the Council, he will also no doubt bear in mind the statements of the members of the Council.

The resolution authorised his travel to the sub-continent and requested him to report back as soon as possible but not later than 15 April 1957. By sending one of its highest ranking representatives, the United Nations will show its serious concern over the continued deadlock in the achievement of demilitarisation and a plebiscite and provide an opportunity for full and detailed consideration of means through which progress might be made. The word "achievement" and the word "progress" are important elements of the operative paragraph inasmuch as they express the hope of the sponsors that the President will be able to report new progress when he has completed his assignment. We are particularly fortunate to have as President of the Security Council the eminent representative of Sweden, Mr. Gunnar Jarring. We urge him to accept this great responsibility. Mr. Jarring is unusually well qualified for this assignment, having been his country's representative both to India and to Pakistan. He thus will carry with him not only his experience as President of the Security Council and representative of Sweden in the United Nations but also a first-hand knowledge of India and Pakistan and a friendship with the leaders of both countries. We appeal to the Governments of both India and Pakistan to receive him cordially and in accordance with their traditions of international cooperation. We believe that both parties, by virtue of their expressed attitude towards the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions, should discuss with the President of the Security Council detailed proposals and plans for achieving demilitarisation and the establishment of conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute.

Finally, the draft resolution requests the Secretary General and the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to render the President of the Security Council such assistance as he may request in connection with this special assignment. The United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan has played a significant role in narrowing the differences between the two Governments on practical measures for bringing about the truce and demilitarisation stages preparatory to a plebiscite. I am sure the President of the Security Council would want to draw heavily upon the reports which he has made to the Council, to obtain his advice and counsel before undertaking explorations with the parties. We hope that Mr. Graham, who has served the United Nations self-effacingly and effectively for many years in seeking a pacific settlement of this dispute, will be able to put himself at the disposal of the President of the Security Council for such assistance as he may need in the coming weeks.

To conclude, the United States believes that the present draft resolution offers the most promising and judicious course for the Security Council to follow at this time. We hope that the other members of the Council will support it.

Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 768 held on 15th February 1957

In my previous statement to the Security Council [765th meeting, paras. 2 to 19], I confined myself very largely to one aspect of the Kashmir problem, the question of the action taken by the Constituent Assembly in Srinagar. I did, however, emphasise with what deep concern and anxiety the United Kingdom views any differences between countries in the Commonwealth with which we have such a long and friendly. connections.

Before I turn to the matters of substance raised by the representatives of India and Pakistan in their statements before the Council, I should like to emphasise once more that the only concern of my Government, as I am sure it is of all of us, and it has been so throughout the long and interactable history. of this case, is to achieve a peaceful and just solution acceptable to both sides. It has been encouraging, therefore, to find that in spite of acute disagreement on many important points, a considerable area of agreement is apparent from the statements we have heard from the representatives of India and Pakistan. Neither denies that a solution of the problem is urgent. Both emphasise the fundamental role of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 [S/1100, para 75] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15] in any solution, and in particular stressed the point that the next step must be demilitarisation in Kashmir, for until this is achieved, no subsequent step is possible.

When the Security Council first considered this question in 1948, it preferred to look to the future rather than to the past; it looked forward to a settlement of the problem. With this aim before us, the Security Council set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and the Commission examined the facts. Then, having taken all the causes of the conflict into account, it produced these two resolutions which, as both parties agree, are basic. The Commission concluded that after a cease-fire had been achieved, the main obstacle to a settlement, which it believed could be reached, was the problem of demilitarisation.

The representative of India has stressed the fact that a long time has gone by without any effective progress being made towards solving the Kashmir problem, but many efforts have been made. General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon made notable contributions. Since March 1951, with great skill and persistence, Mr. Graham has persisted in his endeavours. During a period of two years, he produced five reports, each narrowing the field of difference between the two parties. Mr. Graham sought agreement on twelve proposals to achieve demilitarisation, and by his labours he reached agreement on all but two of them. He then was reluctantly obliged to conclude there was no room left to continue his efforts.

Direct discussions between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan began in June 1953, and these, together with the progress made on demilitarisation by the efforts of Mr. Graham, gives grounds for hope that a solution might well be reached in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. These direct negotiations came to an end because of the difference of view between the two Prime Ministers on the effect on the situation of certain extraneous events. In these circumstances, since there seems no further prospect of progress by direct negotiations, the Government of Pakistan has felt obliged to come back to the Security Council and, in all the circumstances, my Government recognizes that it was the only course open to them.

It is now for the Security Council to attempt to find ways of making progress towards a settlement. As the Under Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations said in the House of Commons on 20 December 1956: "Her Majesty's Government has always hoped that this dispute would be settled by agreement between the two countries. That is still their hope." I am, of course, not overlooking the dangers inherent in the situation, dangers which Mr. Firoz Khan Noon and Mr. Krishna Menon have so vividly described. That is indeed one of the factors the Security Council cannot overlook. But it is not an argument for doing nothing-rather the reverse.

We are fully aware of the dangers of a false step and we must and shall, in considering our action, have clearly before us the imperative necessity of averting bloodshed and strife in the sub-continent. It is with a sense of our deep responsibility that my delegation and those delegations which are associated. with us have forward the draft resolution which was tabled yesterday, and which is before the Council [S/3787].

We feel justified in requesting Mr. Jarring, our President, to undertake the task proposed in the draft resolution, onerous and difficult though it undeniably must be, because of the considerable area of agreement apparent in the statements of the parties. We think for this reason that there is hope of progress towards a settlement of this dispute in accordance with United Nations resolutions.

The representative of India contended at length that the next step is simply for Pakistan to withdraw its troops. This is, of course, the case which India has argued before the Security Council fully in the past. Pakistan for its part has set out a different case, There is, I think, no need for me to refer to it in detail, for it is fully set out in Sir Mohammed Zafrullah. Khan's statement of 8 February 1950 at the 464th meeting of the Security Council and also in the reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan themselves.

It was to find common ground between the two cases. put forward that Mr. Graham proposed, and both sides agreed, that the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the two resolutions of the Commission should be effected as a single continuous process.

What then has held up progress towards demilitarisation over the years? It has been, on the one hand, the contention of the Government of India that the "Azad" Kashmir forces constitute a link with the Pakistan Army and would be a threat to the security of the State. On the other hand, it has been because the Government of Pakistan was convinced that if 21,000 Indian and State armed forces are allowed to remain on the Indian side of the cease-fire line as against only 6,000 "Azad" Kashmir forces, the security of the "Azad" Kashmir area would be put in serious jeopardy. In fact, as it seems to us, the root cause of the breakdown on both sides has been fear of the dangers which might arise from the forces of the other side.

This is precisely why, in the view of the United Kingdom delegation, the idea of a small temporary United Nations force is worth further examination with the two Governments. There would be no intention of setting aside any of the processes or procedures for demilitarisation set out in the resolutions of the Commission. Indeed the intention is to enable the demilitarisation procedure set out in those resolutions to be put into effect. We therefore see the proposal for such a force as a method of easing the way towards carrying out demilitarisation in accordance with the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions.

The draft resolution now before the Council takes nothing away from the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It recalls all the resolutions. It also takes into consideration the statements of both parties. Obviously, after the long and detailed speeches made in the Security Council, the President of the Council must, in undertaking such a mission, have them very much in mind. That again, however, does not in any way detract from the force of the resolutions. Indeed, if I have understood the representatives of India and Pakistan correctly, both claim that their positions are based on the two United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions to which I have referred Nothing which has been said has detracted or can detract, from the force of those resolutions or those of the Security Council itself.

I need not, I am sure, emphasise the importance of making some positive step forward. The draft resolution before the Security Council is designed to help towards such a result. This, of course, requires the cooperation of both parties. I have noted the statement of the representative of India that India would never be found wanting in the methods of exploitation of the problem [767th meeting, para. 239]. For his part, the representative of Pakistan has put forward an idea which, in its present form, is new: the proposal that a United Nations force might be temporarily introduced into Kashmir to break the long jam over demilitarisation [761st meeting, para. 112]. The Council is entitled to take note of this proposal. But the Council is, of course, most anxious to do nothing that might in any way appear to detract from its previous resolutions and those of the Commission, and the draft resolution, therefore, in taking note of the proposal of Pakistan, makes it quite clear that the use of the temporary force could only be considered within the framework of resolutions in so far as it might contribute towards the achievement of demilitarisation as envisaged in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission and towards the pacific settlement of the dispute.

I now pass for a moment to the request which, under the draft resolution, we are making to the President. We ask him to examine, with the Governments of India and Pakistan, proposals which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute towards the achievement of demilitarisation or to the establishment of other conditions for progress towards the settlement of the dispute. The President is asked to examine them having regard to all the resolutions and, in his examination, to bear in mind the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan and the proposal for the use of a temporary United Nations force.

As regards other conditions for progress towards the settlement, perhaps I should indicate what we have in mind in including this in the draft.

First and foremost, we were deeply aware of the imperative need for a decrease in tension in the subcontinent. The first resolution which the Security Council adopted on this problem on 17 January 1948 contains the following provision :

"Calls upon both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan to take immediately all measures within their power (including public appeals to their people) calculated to improve the situation, and to refrain from making any statements and from doing or causing to be done or permitting any acts which might aggravate the situation."

On many occasions since then the need for peaceful cooperation between the two countries has been stressed as essential for progress towards the settlement of the Kashmir problem. This, them, is one condition for progress which indeed should be examined-the need for a decrease in tension -and there are doubtless other matters. I think, for instance, of clarification of the position of the Plebiscite Administrator, which the President may think would repay examination with the two Governments. But all this examination is governed by the phrase "having regard to the previous resolutions of the Security Council and of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan". That point is fundamental.

The Council, if it should decide to adopt this draft resolution, would not be ignoring the very real difficulties which would face the Indian Government during the coming elections in India and the period during the coming elections in India and the period of the electoral campaign which is now beginning - the real difficulties which might arise if Kashmir were the subject of debate here during the next two or three weeks. We in the United Kingdom watched with admiration and respect the conduct of the first general elections held in India in 1952. We realised the immense toil and effort involved and we know that, although this time the experience gained will make the task casies, it is still, as Mr. Menon has pointed out to this Council, a truly gigantic task. We have no desire to add to the complexities and complications of this task. The draft resolution, therefore, provides for a procedure which, we trust, will enable progress to be made, but not through the medium of public debate, during the next few weeks. Yet, the need to make progress is pressing, and for that reason the draft resolution proposes a definite time limit within which the President should report to the Security Council; for the Council cannot fail to take up its task again at the earliest possible moment.

Finally, I should like to point out that the President would go to undertake this task, as I am sure he will agree, not as the representative of any country and not reflecting the views of any country; he would go with all the authority of the Council, making available to the parties his wisdom, his impartial judgement and his high-minded endeavour, as a contribution towards the solution of this problem which has so long troubled the world. We look not to a settlement of the Kashmir dispute alone, we look to a settlement of all the outstanding problems between India and Pakistan.

We in the United Kingdom, because of our close ties of history and sentiment with the two countries and our association with them within the Common-wealth, fervently desire to see progress towards a better understanding between the two countries. This desire is shared by the peoples of all our three countries. The division of the sub-continent into two fully independent States inevitably created a host of problems, many of them of the most difficult kind. It is surely proof of great statesmanship and understanding, both in India and in Pakistan, that so many of these problems were settled amicably at the time or have been settled amicably since. We in my country like to think that we made a contribution to that end, without partiality of any kind or anything but a desire to be of the greatest possible assistance. But, inevitably, some problems remain. The difficulty over Kashmir is one of the greatest of them and it does arouse very deep feelings on either side. Both sides recognize that it has to be solved in the interests of full friendship and co-operation between the two sister nations. The task of the Security Council is, therefore, onerous and responsible. The accomplishment of that task demands all its patience, all its impartial effort, all its tolerance and understanding.

24011957 Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. Carlos P. Romulo as the Representative of the Philippines in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

I shall now speak as the representative of the PHILIPPINES.

My Government has approached the question now before the Security council with the utmost sympathy towards the two nations, for which we entertain the friendliest of feelings. The Philippines is not deciding this matter in favour of one nation against another. We are not taking sides. We are not, in fact, sitting as if in judgement of a case. We have not the least desire to see the matter aggravated by an exacerbation of misgivings which can but lead to a possible breach of the peace, We have noted at the outset of the negotiations between India and Pakistan a commendable disposition on the part of both to make things easier for them to come to terms. We have hoped sincerely, and will continue to hope, that the original spirit of mutual concession would prevail throughout the negotiations in the interests of the peace and welfare of both nations, towards which, I reiterate, the Philippines has nothing but the utmost good will. My Government believes with the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan that direct negotiations may pave the way towards the definitive solution of the nine-year-old dispute between the two countries.

This is not to belittle the achievement of Mr. Frank Graham and his predecessors, whose efforts at mediation have considerably narrowed down the area of disagreement between the parties on the question of demilitarisation. As a matter of fact, the last resolution adopted by the Security Council on 23 December 1952 [S/2883] urged the parties to enter into immediate negotiations in order to agree on the remaining issue, namely the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line. The fifth report of Mr. Graham, dated 27 March 1953 [S/2967], would seem to imply that perhaps agreement would be forthcoming if one or the other of the parties were willing to make greater concessions than he would be entitled to ask objectively in his capacity as mediator.

Be that as it may, the representative of Pakistan reports that the attempts of his country to secure agreement through direct parleys had proved abortive. On his part, the representative of India seems to imply that a true agreement is no longer possible because of a breach of the conditions which could have put it in operation.

My Government is at a loss to accept either conclusion in the face of the claim put forward by each party that it has done, is doing, or will do, its best to achieve agreement. Incidentally, may I say at this juncture that the distinguished representatives of India and Pakistan who addressed the council have given a good account of themselves in the presentation of their respective sides. The Foreign Minister of Pakistan, with his sobriety and moderation, has shown himself to be an able spokesman of his country. Mr. V.K. Krishna Menon, whom I have known for many years, has once more demonstrated his keen mind, his dialectic skill and his unsurpassed argumentative power.

The joint communique issued by the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan at the end of their meeting in Delhi on 20 August 1953 was a distinct step forward, not merely in its reiteration of the principle of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through a fair and impartial plebiscite and in the decision to have the Plebiscite Administrator appointed by the end of April 1954, but in the common determination to resolve before that date the preliminary issues that had hitherto blocked progress towards the holding of a plebiscite. That the promise of this auspicious agreement between the two Prime Ministers was not fulfilled is to be regretted. It is not for me to say which party is to blame, as I have already stated that the Philippines is not deciding this issue in favour of one nation against another. Rather it is for me to express the hope that the good will and the spirit of conciliation that brought about the agreement and indeed that brought about previous agreements could again be invoked.

It is worthwhile to recall that the basic resolution of the United Nations Commission of 5 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 15] merely incorporated the proposals governing the cessation of hostilities which were explored in conversations between the representatives of India and Pakistan, and later accepted by their respective Governments. Perhaps another attempt at direct conversations on the ministerial level between the two parties is in order. Or perhaps the expert committees brought into being by the joint communique of 20 August 1953, which had covered considerable ground in studying the thorny problem of demilitarisation, could be reactivated.

It is gratifying to note from the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan that their countries had not withdrawn their acceptance of the basic resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The representative of Pakistan affirms that his Government accepts the basic resolutions of the United Nations Commission as an international obligation. The representative of India affirms that his Government stands by its international standards commitments.

Under the circumstances, my Government entertains the hope that continued and persistent attempts at negotiation between India and Pakistan on the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot but be crowned with eventual success. The recent trade agreement signed by the two countries, so aptly underscored here by the representative of India, is an encouraging sign that they could come together and agree on a satisfactory solution of common problems.

It may have been the original intention of India to seize the Security Council not of a dispute but of a situation which might, by its continuance, endanger the maintenance of peace and security. However, the subsequent filing of a counter complaint by Pakistan has converted the situation into a dispute within the meaning of the Charter. This is affirmed in the resolution of the Council of 21 April 1948 [S/726], in which it is stated that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security".

There is, however, a disturbing element that has been drawn into the picture which may wreck all prospects of peaceful negotiation or peaceful settlement of the dispute. I refer to the allegation of Pakistan that on Saturday, 26 January, the constitutional step will be taken to integrate the State of Jammu and Kashmir formally into India. The representative of India, on the other hand, states that nothing of the sort is going to happen on 26 January, and that the critical date, if there was one, was 17 November 1956 when certain provisions of the State Constitution took effect, among them, section 3, which states that "The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be integral part of the Union of India''. In view of these two conflicting statements, we have the draft resolution sponsored by five Powers before the Council [S/3778].

Ever since the Security Council was seized of the dispute, it has repeatedly called upon the parties to refrain from any action which might aggravate the situation or which would likely prejudice a just and peaceful settlement of the dispute. On the particular question of the covering of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, which was the subject of a previous complaint by Pakistan, the representative of India gave his solemn assurance that the constituent Assembly was not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in its way, and that while the Constituent Assembly might, if it so desired, express an opinion on the question of accession, it could take no decision on it.

The Security Council was explicit in its disapproval of the avowed purpose of the Constituent Assembly to determine the "future shape and affiliations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir". The Council's resolution of 30 March 1951 affirmed that any action that the Constituent Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State, or any part thereof, would violate the agreement principle that :

the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations." [S/2017/Rev. 1.]

Again, on 29 May 1951, at its 548th meeting, the Council approved a message to India and Pakistan which noted with satisfaction the assurances given by the representative of India and stated that it was the sense of the Council that the reports contained in the communications from Pakistan, if correct, would involve procedures in conflict with the commitments of the parties to determine the future accession of Jammu and Kashmir by a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations [548th meeting, para. 89].

I am sure that it would be well to reiterate the considered view of the Security Council on the matter so that there may be no misunderstanding as to its position. That view remains valid even if it is found that the Constituent Assembly had its origins much earlier than the request for its convocation by the General Council of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. It is for this reason that the Philippines supports and will vote in favour of the five Power draft resolution.

I do not consider a vote in favour of the draft resolution. as a vote against India for the simple reason that it is merely a reiteration of previous resolutions of the Security Council. And I have the highest respect for this august body so that I would not accuse it of bias whenever it approved any resolution which a party might consider adverse to its interests.

In all earnestness I would urge the parties to respect the standing resolutions of the Council, which have not been repealed or modified and are, therefore,/as valid today as when they

were adopted many years ago. Those are the views of the Philippines on this question which has been before this body for quite a time. They have been, I submit, delivered here in the hope that they will help clarify the doubts over the facts of the issue and help this Council arrive at a clear appraisal of the dispute for the sake of a permanent settlement.

We are of Asia, and Pakistan and India are close to us, not only geographically but also by long historic association which has endured through the years. We know that both. India and Pakistan want peace. Our desire is to see the two Governments come to an amicable settlement of their misunderstandings, and I hope to have contributed the efforts of my Government towards that end. With mutual tolerance on the part of the principal parties in this dispute they cannot, my Government trusts, fail to achieve a solution of their problem to their mutual satisfaction and in the best interest of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Jawad (Iraq) in the Security Council Meeting No 765 held on 24 January, 1957

For several reasons my delegation would have liked to make on this occasion a statement on the substance of the matter, to express our position arding the Kashmir dispute, We believe that such a statement is necessary because of the special position of Iraq in relation to India and Pakistan, two countries with whom we have close and friendly ties, past and present, ties of a historical, economic and religious character. Furthermore, Iraq is taking part for the first time in a discussion on the Kashmir question, which has been pending for the last nine years, and for this reason we thought it would be appropriate to make our opinion known to the two countries. concerned and to others who have special interests in the future of Kashmir.

In view of the recent developments in connexion with the step taken by the Srinagar Constituent Assembly regarding the integration of Kashmir into India on 26 January 1957, however, we have decided to postpone our statement to a future meeting, as we feel that it is extremely essential for certain preliminary decisions to be arrived at today to reaffirm the Council's previous decisions regarding the basis and methods for deciding the future of the people of Kashmir.

We consider that the previous decisions of the Council were in conformity with the principles of the Charter. After hearing the statements of the representatives of India and Pakistan, we are inclined to believe that the issue remains basically the same as it was when it was dealt with for the last time in 1952. We find that the draft resolution submitted by the five Powers meets the immediate requirements of the present situation, as the last paragraph of that resolution keeps the question under consideration by the Council and we feel sure that this will assist the Council to find a peaceful and lasting solution of the dispute.

My delegation therefore supports the draft resolution in question and reserves its right to speak on the substance of the problem at a later meeting.

Mr. GEORGES-PICOT (France) (translated from French) In view of the resolutions which have already been adopted and of what has been said both by the parties concerned and by the members of the Council, the French delegation was in the beginning doubtful whether the draft resolution that had been submitted was really essential to dispel certain apprehensions. which have been expressed. After further thought, it has come to the conclusion that the draft resolution will be a useful interim measure if it gives us the time we need for careful and unhurried consideration of the serious and delicate questions that have been submitted to us.

In that spirit the French delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted by Australia, Colombia, Cuba, the United Kingdom and the United States, while reserving the right to speak again later on the substance of the question.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr, Sobolev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

The Security Council is once again discussing what is called the Kashmir question. As we know, this question first came before the Security Council more than nine years ago, when it was raised in connection with the defence of the people of Kashmir against the hostile activities of certain tribesmen from the territory of Pakistan and later against the activities of regular Pakistan troops.

Subsequently, during the discussion of the Kashmir question in the Security Council the original intention had ceased to be stressed. The attention of the Security Council was, unfortunately, later focused, not on finding a solution of the Kashmir question through a direct agreement between the parties, but on the organisation of a plebiscite, the supervision and interference from outside.

The Soviet Union has always maintained and still maintains an impartial and objective attitude to the Kashmir question, bearing in mind the principles of democracy and the need to strengthen friendly relations between the peoples of that area. The Kashmir question did not arise among the Kashmir people themselves. It was created nearly nine years ago, by certain Powers which are using every means in their endeavour to foment discord between countries striving for their national freedom and independence. The position of these Powers on the Kashmir issue was determined, not by any desire to settle that question in a manner corresponding to the interests of the Kashmir people themselves and of the peoples of India and Pakistan. These Powers were guided primarily by their own interests which were aimed at penetration into this region as one of great strategic importance. Such a policy is, of course in complete contradiction to the real interests of the Kashmir people who are striving towards a peaceful and constructive existence and have no desire to be the plaything of imperialist States.

It was natural that, in an effort to put an end to the uncertainty of their position and to stabilise the political situation, the Kashmir people should, in 1951, have elected a Constituent Assembly which adopted a series of important laws including that of February 1954 confirming the union of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with India. On 17 November 1956, the Kashmir Constituent Assembly adopted the State Constitution according to which the State would enjoy the right of self-government within the Republic of India. The Kashmir question was thus settled by the Kashmir people themselves to be an inalienable part of the Republic of India. The Security Council cannot disregard these facts.

The delegation of the Soviet Union feels compelled to observe that the draft resolution submitted by the delegations of the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia, Colombia and Cuba actually fails to take account of the real situation in Kashmir and to some extent casts doubt on the fact that the Kashmir question has already been settled in accordance with the expressed wishes of the Kashmir people themselves.

The draft resolution before us is based on the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951. You may remember that, even then, the Soviet Union opposed the resolution on the grounds that it was from the start unacceptable to one of the parties to the dispute and could not therefore, serve as a basis for the settlement of the questions at issue between India and Pakistan, Now again an attempt is being made to reaffirm the provisions of that Council resolution, in complete disregard of the radical changes which have taken place in Kashmir since that time.

The delegation of the Soviet Union sees no particular use in adopting a further resolution to which one of the parties to the dispute is opposed. It is this consideration which is determining the Soviet Union delegation's attitude to the draft resolution before the Council.

With regard to the disagreements still existing between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir question, they should, in our view, finally be settled by peaceful negotiation between the two sides, without outside interference. The Security Council, for its part, should facilitate the conclusion of a peaceful settlement of this question and should urge the two sides to settle outstanding disagreements through bilateral negotiations.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Jarring (Sweden) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765, held on 24 January 1957

As a newly elected member of the Security Council, Sweden is now called upon for the first time to pronounce itself on the India-Pakistan question, whereas other members have taken part in previous deliberations on the subject. Hence, now that the question has once again been submitted io the Council, my Government does not consider itself committed to any particular way of dealing with this matter.

In accordance with our obvious duty, we have studied the various aspects of the problem with a view to forming an opinion of what solution should be sought and what procedure should be followed. A primary requirement must be that both parties should refrain from unilateral measures which would alter the status quo. Thus, for the time being the present demarcation line must be respected. This implies that the use of force aimed at changing the status quo must be excluded. It also implies that the parties should desist from taking internal legislative measures by which the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be considered definitely incorporated in the territory of one of the two parties and which would prejudice the Security Council's continued deliberations on this matter.

It follows from what I have said that my delegation is prepared to vote in favour of the draft resolution now before the Council. Our affirmative vote, however, should not be construed to mean that we have taken a definite stand on the previous Council resolutions enumerated in the present draft resolution. In my Government's opinion, the legal issues involved in his matter require further and thorough study, particularly in the light of the statements made by the representatives of India and Pakistan. I therefore reserve my right to revert to this matter at a later stage of the Council's discussions.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

The Kashmir question is in a way unique among the questions which have come before the Security Council. Usually, questions of this kind concern, on the one side, a country in Asia or Africa and, on the other side, some European country. Here is a dispute between two Asian countries.

When India asked that the Kashmir question be put on the agenda of the Security Council at the beginning of 1948, I was in my own country. My Government instructed me to return to the Headquarters of the United Nations immediately and to do my utmost to promote a peaceful settlement of this question. My Government did that not because it made any difference to China whether Kashmir acceded to India or to Pakistan. My Government had a special reason for its active interest in this question.

We in China felt that, at the end of the Second World War, there emerged in fact a new Asia-in other words, for the first time in our history, the possibility of a community of Asian nations. Of course, in the old centuries, there were many Asian nations but, because of the lack of means of communication, there was little of a community. In the nineteenth century the sense of a community grew, but it was not a community of independent nations. It was only at the end of the Second World War that we in Asia faced the reality of the possibility of a community of nations. My Government fondly hoped that we in Asia might even do better than the European nations had done in the past. In China we did not know too much about European history, but even school children knew something about Alsace-Lorraine The Chinese newspapers, at the beginning of 948, frequently expressed the hope that Kashmir might not become an Asian Alsace-Lorraine to poison. this new hopeful community of Asian nations. It was from that angle that my Government instructed me to return to my post as soon as possible and to do active duty in the settlement. of this problem.

When I joined the debate I found that the interest in promoting a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir problem was general. I have never seen the members of the Security Council sharing the burdens of discussion and proposal so equally as on this Kashmir question. Every delegation was working actively. towards a peaceful solution. During the month of January 1948, the Council was presided over by Mr. van Langenhove, the representative of Belgium. In addition to presiding over this body, he was in daily consultation with the delegations of Pakistan and India and tried, through private conversations, to bring before the Council some solution that would be agreed upon. In February General MeNaughton of Canada did the same thing. In March it was my turn to preside and I tried to do something. Then, of course, there was the representative of Colombia, whom I remember very well, Mr. Lopez, who, I was told, had once been the President of his country. He did his level best to contribute towards a peaceful solution. Then, as I recall, there was Mr. Philip Noel-Baker. Everybody worked hard on this,

Now I should like to recall another feature of the Security Council of that time. I think I can honestly say that no question has ever been considered by members of this Council in such an objective, unprejudiced, unbiased way as this Kashmir question. Ordinarily, in the United Nations, we know that delegation A might be pro-X and anti-Y. In the Kashmir debate, in spite of many private and public discussions, we were all puzzled as to who was for A and against B and who was against A and for B. Especially do I remember Mr. Noel Baker. I have never seen a man watch his words in public and in private so carefully as Mr. Noel-Baker watched his in this matter. This objective of the Council of that time would, I think, be manifest to anybody who would read the records of the Council of 1948, 1949, 1950 and 1951.

I should like to call the attention of this Council to another feature: At that time there was no SEATO; there was no Baghdad Pact; and Pakistan, I think, did not have a single military ally. Whether, at the present time, the military alliances and friendships of Pakistan could influence the members of the Council or not, I could not presume to judge, but that kind of prejudice certainly did not exist in the Council in 1948, 1949 or 1950.

Since this debate is in fact the renewal of the debate of that period, I thought that this brief report of the atmosphere of that time might be useful to my colleagues today.

The representative of India repeated both yesterday and today that the question before the Council is not a territorial dispute. He says it is the aggression of Pakistan against India. The letter in which India asked the Security Council to put this question on the agenda contains this word "aggression", and I quote the particular phrase in which it is used:

"The Government of India requested the Security Council to call upon Pakistan to put an end immediately to the giving of such assistance, which is an act of aggression against India." [S/1100, annex 28, para, 1.]

Assistance in that phrase meant, of course, a complaint of military assistance to "Azad" Kashmir and to tribesmen, and, in the course of the presentation of the Indian case by Mr. Ayyangar, that charge was repeated a number of times, Sir Mohammed Zafrullah Khan, representative of Pakistan at that time, made a counter-charge of acts of aggression by India against Pakistan. So we faced these rival charges : aggression by Pakistan against India; aggression by India against Pakistan.

I hope that members of this Council today will take the time to read the records of those years. No member of the Council ever gave serious consideration to either charge, the charge of India or the charge of Pakistan. There never was a proposal made dealing specifically with aggression. In fact, there was no systematic or serious consideration of that charge and of the counter-charge of aggression. The members of the Council, without consultation, all came to the same conclusion, that the charge of aggression should be by-passed. That charge was never taken up, never sifted, never even given serious consideration; I believe it was very wise of the Council to by-pass that charge.

Now it is said that this is not a dispute with regard to territory. However, I cannot understand why anybody should say that this is not a dispute with regard to territory. The basic question is whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir should become a part of India or a part of Pakistan. That is what is in dispute. Is that not a dispute with regard to territory ?

This dispute has another peculiar feature. From the very beginning, the Council began with an agreement between two parties. In fact, before the two parties directly concerned ever appeared before the Council, the two parties agreed that the plebiscite should be the answer. What did the Council do ? The Council tried to build a solution on this prior agreement that the two parties had before they came to this Council. So the idea of a plebiscite was not imposed by the Council on the two parties.

In their public statements the statesmen of both countries, India and Pakistan, have stated that they would be willing to let the wishes of the people of Kashmir decide the future of that State. In this Council, in his very first statement in January 1948, the representative of India, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, had this to say:

"The question of the future status of Kashmir vis-a-vis her neighbours and the world at large, and a further question, namely, whether she should withdraw from her accession to India, and either accede to Pakistan or remain independent, with a right to claim admission as a Member of the United Nations-all this we have recognized to be a matter for unfettered decision by the people of Kashmir, after normal life is restored to them." [227th meeting, p. 29.]

This feature of the discussions is rather rare. We here have known cases when weeks and months of debate have failed to find any element of agreement, but in connection with the Kashmir dispute we began with a major agreement that the final decision as to the future of Kashmir should be left to the people of Kashmir.

In spite of that good start, we have not had much success. The problem of a plebiscite was bogged down under the conditions for a plebiscite. The Council has spent many hours trying to solve that problem. Our Commission and our representatives sent to India and Pakistan have spent many weeks trying to solve that problem.

What the Council and the Commission and the representatives tried to do was this. If we could secure agreement between the two parties with regard to some particular condition, we were happy, and we put that down on paper immediately as a condition to which both parties agreed. But when we met with some point on which the two parties fell apart we were all patient to listen to the viewpoints of both and in all fairness we tried to draw a middle line and reach a compromise which we knew that neither party would entirely like but which we thought might be fair enough so that both parties would, after all, accept it.

That has not occurred. It is not necessary-and I would not presume to try-to assign blame and responsibility in regard to these conditions. However, I should like to say that a plebiscite was not only agreed on before the two parties came to this Council; it was the unanimous belief of the members of the Council that a plebiscite was the solution.

Furthermore, what is a plebiscite? A plebiscite, in terms of the Charter, would mean the self-determination of a people. Self determination is expressed through a plebiscite. I would say that all Members of the United Nations, by becoming Members, by subscribing to the Charter, would have to accept the principle of plebiscite. If we accept a plebiscite we mcan, of course, a fair and impartial plebiscite. In regard to this point, that a plebiscite must be fair and impartial, I remember very well a sentence that Mr. Noel-Baker said to the Council during that period. He told us that the plebiscite not only must be fair and impartial in reality but it must be fair and impartial even in appearance. This fairness and impartiality could sway the passions of peoples. It could decide the question. of peace or war.

If we honestly and seriously believe that the future of Kashmir should be decided by a plebiscite, I believe both parties should not be too meticulous about conditions. The setting of conditions should not be allowed to obstruct the main purpose, that is, to allow the people of Kashmir to have the right of self-determination.

We were told this morning that much has changed. Indeed, some things have changed, but as I listened to the two opening speeches in this debate, I confess, I did not see much change. I was afraid that the representatives from other parts of the world might say that, after all, the old European belief about the unchanging East was accurate. Certain things have changed, but the basic features of the problem have not changed. I believe the principle of a solution should not change and can not change.

The draft resolution before the Council is a simple and modest one. It really re-affirms the stand that the Council has taken in regard to this dispute, and therefore my delegation will support it.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Vesga Duarte (Colombia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

co-sponsoring the draft resolution before the Council, may delegation is maintaining the stand it has taken on earlier occasions in the Security Council. By a happy coincidence Colombia was a member of the Council in 1948 when this question was first brought before us. We then took the position we are taking today; it was and is our intention to cooperate to the best of our ability with the majority of the Council members with a view to securing a peaceful solution of this dispute between those two great nations, Pakistan and India.

I might perhaps add that our interest in the India-Pakistan question to some extent reflects Latin America's understanding of this type of problem; we remember that when we gained our independence from our respective mother countries, we also had similar problems among ourselves. Experience has taught us that lasting solutions can only be obtained by peaceful means.

As the majority of representatives who have spoken have explained, this proposal is primarily concerned with procedure. We know that in international affairs procedure almost everything and it is therefore most important that should be understood that in reaffirming earlier Council resolutions, as the co- sponsors of the draft resolution ask the Council to do, we are not taking a position on the substance of the problem, but simply indicating the means whereby a future solution may be sought through peace and understanding between those two great Asian countries, India and Pakistan. Like the representative of Cuba, I wish to express my admiration for the remarkable statement by the representative of India, who, for over eight hours, was able to hold the Council's attention, thanks to his amazing dialectic ability, and I was happy to note that at the end of his statement he expressed a desire which I believe to be a sincere one that a peaceful, permanent and lasting solution may be found to this problem.

In co-sponsoring this draft resolution, Colombia hopes that wish, which is shared by all, may be fulfilled as rapidly as possible.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Lodge (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

In considering the India Pakistan item the Security Council faces an unfortunate difference of opinion between two nations, whose friendship and esteem is highly valued by the United States. We desire to help them to find a solution to this problem and we approach the question in that spirit. It is regrettable that this dispute has lasted more than nine years, despite the earnest efforts of the Security Council and of its representatives, the individual efforts of certain members of the Council, and the attempts of the parties concerned.

It is a tribute to the Council and to the parties that a cease-fire was achieved on 1 January 1949 [S/1196, para. 14] as part of an agreement by India and Pakistan for demilitarisation and for a United Nations sponsored plebiscite. Unfortunately, however, and despite the best efforts of the Council and its representatives, the parties have failed to agree on carrying out the next two steps. It is understandable that strong emotion should be involved on both sides of this problem.

One of the first concerns of the Council has always been that nothing should be done which might aggravate the situation. This was made clear and explicit in the Council's first resolution on the case adopted on 17 January 1948. We Finally, the United States lays stress on the final paragraph of the draft resolution before us. In the absence of a direct mutually acceptable agreement between the parties, the Council has an obligation to continue its efforts, as it has in the past, to seek and to support any fruitful suggestion in this difficult case.

 Text of the Speech made by M. Nunez Portuondo (Cuba) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

The delegation of Cuba wishes to pay a tribute to the magnificent oratorical efforts of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan and the Ambassador of India, whose statements will undoubtedly be of great value when we come to discuss and consider the substance of this problem.

The proposal which we have presented in our draft resolution and which is now before you in what might be called a preventive measure, that is to say, a measure which is to a certain extent provisional. In passing, I might say that the delegation of Cuba would have preferred this draft resolution to be presented after the representative of India had finished his statement. However, we do not believe that the representative of India can have any reason to oppose this draft. The first part of it refers to the views of the Prime Minister of India, Mr. Nehru, for whom I have the greatest respect and admiration, who stated in a telegram of 8 November 1947 to the Prime Minister of Pakistan :

"It will thus be seen that our proposals which we have repeatedly stated are (1) that the Government of Pakistan should publicly undertake to do its utmost to compel the raiders to withdraw from Kashmir; (2) that the Government of India should repeat its declaration that it will withdraw its troops from Kashmir soil as soon as raiders have withdrawn and law and order are restored; (3) that the Governments of India and Pakistan should make a joint request to the United Nations to undertake a plebiscite in Kashmir at the earliest possible date."

This statement by the Prime Minister of India, which does him very great honour and is fully in accordance with the principles of the Charter and with the right of peoples to self determination, is exactly what we propose in the first part of our draft resolution when we say that "the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations".

Our draft resolution therefore introduces nothing new but simply reaffirms the earlier resolutions of the Council and accepts that which, at one time, was also accepted by the representatives of both Pakistan and India.

I likewise see no reason why the second part of the resolution cannot be accepted by the Indian delegation, because the representative of India has repeatedly stated that the recent decisions of the Constituent Assembly in regard to Kashmir could not affect the final disposition of Kashmir since in his view Kashmir formed part of India as a result of actions prior to the establishment of that Assembly. If, therefore, he really believes that is the situation in regard to Kashmir is a view which is not shared by many members of the Security Council - then the second part of the draft resolution should likewise not affect that situation in any way.

The delegation of Cuba therefore considers that the draft resolution is a reaffirmation of the Council's position, of the clear and binding provisions of the Charter, and of the right of peoples to self-determination. At a later stage, of course, the Council shall have to consider the time and circumstances. of this plebiscite, which must be held-and here I agree, of course, with the representative of India - once the proper conditions have been met, that is to say when it can be held in such a way that the people will be freely able to express their choice and their will and decide whether to join Pakistan or India.

Because this is a provisional measure and a rea-ffirmation of our earlier decisions, which at one time were acceptable to India and Pakistan, the delegation of Cuba has co-sponsored this draft resolution and will vote in favour of it.

As regards the substance of the problem, the delegation of Cuba will naturally require more time to study all the facts and all that has been said by the representatives of Pakistan and of India. These representatives have made long statements with many references to authorities, documents, rules of international law and so on, which will have to be weighed and analysed before any final conclusion can be reached.

The delegation of Cuba will express its views in the course of the general discussion.

Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

It is a matter of very deep regret to my Government that the Security Council should have to be dealing once more with the Kashmir dispute. There is the closest relationship between my country and all the peoples of the sub-continent-if I may use a term which, I agree with the representative of India, is not a very elegant one. Ties of history, of sentiment and, as we firmly believe, of interest also, link our small island kingdom with every part of that vast section of Asia. We are proud of our part in the constitutional development of the Commonwealth. We like to think that, in a period which is past, we contributed not a little of our own to the inheritance of the age-long civilizations of that part of the world. There is much that we have learnt in return.

In the past, as the present, our constitutional relations with the various parts of this area have differed, but our good will to every part of it remains the same.

I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my gratification at the generous remarks that have been made in the course of this debate about the attitude of my Government and of the role played by many of my countrymen during the difficult and anxious period of travail that gave birth to the India and Pakistan of today. Only the voice of envy would, I think, deny that the Englishmen, the Scots, the Welsh and the Irish-for, on a small scale, we too have our diversity all those who served the Crown in the old imperial India and in the transitional period came to feel a deep devotion to the peoples among whom they passed their lives and gave of their best.

In the altered circumstances of today those feelings persist. From the bottom of our hearts we wish well to the peoples of India and Pakistan. They are partners with us, and with many others, in a community which rises above differences of race or creed and which is, I think, unique not only in the present world, but in world history. Everything that unites these two countries gives us deep satisfaction, anything that divides them causes us deep concern.

Unhappily, today the Security Council is dealing with a problem that does deeply divides these two countries. That the difference is a deep one and that it has caused the strongest emotional reactions on both sides, it would be useless to deny. It is, therefore, the desire of my Government, as it is certainly the duty of the Security Council, to proceed in this matter with the greatest prudence and foresight Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on behalf of the Members of the United Nations as a whole. I am sure that the Council will do its best to act in the spirit of the great responsibilities which it bears.

I shall have more to say at a later stage of the proceedings about many of the matters of substance touched upon in the statements of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and the representative of India. At this stage, however, I propose to limit myself to the subject matter covered by the draft resolution which my delegation has joined in sponsoring [S/3778]. This

particular matter has, of course, been considered by the Council before.

The Constituent Assembly was established in Srinagar in 1951. As Mr. Krishna Menon pointed out yesterday, its primary task was to promote the processes of self-government in Kashmir territory. That is not a matter which in itself comes within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, and my Government, for one, of course, welcomes any step towards the development of democratic processes in Kashmir as elsewhere; but when its attention was called to the matter in 1951, the Security Council could not fail to take note of the reports that one of the functions of this Constituent Assembly would be a decision on the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir.

The Council was naturally concerned that nothing done in Kashmir should prejudice a settlement of the whole issue in accordance with the principle that had been the basis of its consideration of the matter since 1948, that is to say, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be made in accordance with the wish of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

What action did the Council then take ? It did not seek to interference with the processes of democratic development in Kashmir, but it affirmed a quite simple proposition that the convening of the Constituent Assembly and any action that it might take would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the principle to which I have just referred.

The Council was assisted in its task at that time by the explicit assurances at various stages of the proceedings by the representatives of the Government of India. In particular, on 9 March 1951, Sir Benegal Rau had this to say:

"Will that assembly decide the question of accession ? My Government's view is that, while the constituent assembly may, if it so desires, express an opinion on this question, it can take no decision on it." [536th meeting, para. 23.)

Then, after the resolutions had been passed, Mr. Dayal on 29 may 1951 reiterated this assurance and said something else, which I should also like to quote: "...I reaffirm that so far as the Government of India is concerned, the constituent assembly for Kashmir is not intended to prejudice the issue before the Security Council or to come in its way." [548th meeting, para. 40.]

The position thus was quite clear, and I now turn very briefly to what has happened since. If I understood Mr. Menon correctly when he spoke yesterday, [763rd meeting, paras. 135 ff.], he said that the Constituent Assembly for Kashmir had passed a Constitution, some of the clauses of which came into effect automatically on 17 November 1956, and others will come into effect on 26 January next. In particular, Mr. Menon referred to section 3 of the Constitution as already being in effect, and that section, I believe, states that the "State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India". In these circumstances it is surely quite natural that the Government of Pakistan should seek some reassurance as to the views of the Security Council.

If I understood Mr. Menon correctly yesterday, he said that the constitution for Kashmir which we are considering is that of "a sub-sovereign body" [Ibid., para. 136]. This is, I take it, another way of making the point made by Sir Benegal Rau in 1951 when he told the Security Council that as regards the question of accession the Constituent Assembly can take no decision on the matter.

This, then, appears to be the position today, as it was in 1951. The Security Council, in dealing with this limited question, has before it therefore the same considerations as it had in 1951. In these circumstances there appears to be no reason at all to modify the simple proposition set out in certain parts of the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/ Rev. 1] to which I have previously referred.

In view of the expressed anxiety of the Pakistan representative on this score, it seems to me reasonable for the Security Council to consider a short draft resolution which re-affirms the clear stand it took in 1941. It is for that reason that the United Kingdom joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Security Council.

My colleague from India complained this morning that the draft resolution had been circulated before he had completed his speech. Perhaps I should say, as one of the sponsors, that I had taken the statement we listened to yesterday afternoon as a clear exposition of the Indian position on the particular aspect of the Kashmir problem with which the draft resolution deals, that is, the point relating to this constitutional issue. There is, of course, a special reason for expedition in connection with this particular point, since the other party to the dispute, the Government of Pakistan, has expressed concern lest some step might be taken in the very near future, that is, on 26 January. For the practical purpose of our discussions here in New York, this date may in fact partially be considered as 25 January, since New York is eleven to twelve hours behind. Delhi and Karachi in time. It is evident, therefore, that time. is very short if some reassurance is to be given.

There are, of course, other matters of the greatest importance referred to in the speeches of the representatives of Pakistan and India. These matters are before the Security. Council, and they are matters which require full and most careful consideration. It is for this reason that it seems wise to include operative paragraph 2 in the draft resolution, and I would wish to return to these questions at that later stage.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Walker (Australia) in the Security Council meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

It is not my intention today to enter at any length at all into the substance of the difficult and long-standing problem of Kashmir, but I thought I should say a few words immediately regarding the draft resolution which, together with several other representatives here, we are submitting to the Council. We think that it is necessary to present this draft resolution now and to comment briefly on it just because of the march of the calendar and the references which have been made to the date of 26 January, which, together with India, we share as a national festival.

I should like to say that, so far as I am concerned, I took the representative of India's remarks yesterday as being a full statement on the particular matter to which this draft resolution is addressed, and for that reason I was prepared to join in sponsoring the draft resolution this morning.

The Kashmir problem is one that has occupied the attention of the Security Council for a number of years, and I think it will be recognized that if a solution satisfactory to both India and Pakistan has not been put into effect, it is not through any lack of effort on the part of the Council or through any failure by the members of the Council to study the complexities of the problem in a spirit of good will towards both parties. Indeed, the Council has, in its past resolutions, laid down certain basic steps that should be taken towards a solution, steps which were firmly founded upon the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The first step was to establish and police a ceasefire, which happily is still in force. In an attempt to move ahead towards a constructive solution, the Council has declared the rights of the people of Kashmir to determine their own political future and has placed faith in the recognized democratic method of a plebiscite to be conducted in conditions that would ensure a free vote without any concern. However, the Council's efforts, through its Commission and its successive Representatives, to bring this about have not yet been successful, and we are again requested, this time by Pakistan, to take up the matter.

The Australian delegation enters upon this discussion with a deep sense of responsibility, for the people of Australia have followed this problem of Kashmir with great anxiety and concern. One of the most remarkable results of the United Kingdom's policy in terminating imperial rule in India was that it paved the way for a new relationship between Australia, on the one hand, and India and Pakistan, on the other. The growing sense of our partnership with India and Pakistan in the Commonwealth has been a prominent factor in the minds of Australians in recent years, and today the Australian people are widely conscious of their close ties with India and Pakistan, ties that have been strengthened by personal contact, especially with the many young men and women who have come to study in our universities and colleges.

This conflict over Kashmir has grieved us, and, as is usual when one's close friends quarrel, we have not been eager to take sides. But we have endeavoured to understand sympathetically the issues at stake and to encourage an amicable settlement. The efforts of the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Menzies, in this direction are well known, as is the work of Sir Owen Dixon, the United Nations Representative in 1950, and of General Nimmo, the present United Nations Chief Military Observer in Kashmir.

We Australians believe most sincerely that the continuing existence of this conflict can only bring with it evil effects for peace in the sub-continent, for the evolution of democratic government in the two countries, and for the economic development of Kashmir and the welfare of its people. The sole interest of the Australian Government in this matter is to do what we can, in the circumstances prevailing, to assist the parties to find a just and mutually acceptable solution of this problem.

We have listened most carefully to the statement made before the Council last week by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Mr. Khan Noon [761st meeting], and to the detailed reply we heard yesterday and today from the representative of India, Mr. Krishna Menon [762nd to 764th meetings.] Both statements are extremely important and require the most painstaking consideration in the Council, and I can assure Mr. Noon and Mr. Menon that their observations and arguments will close and serious examination by my delegation and by the Australian Government.

Those statements exposed very clearly the complexity of the problems that had to be faced by the United Kingdom and by the political leaders of India and Pakistan in connection with the transfer of sovereignty, the establishments of practicable systems of government, and the settlement of the delicate issues relating to the former Princely States. That there are limits to human wisdom and the capacity to solve such problems is unfortunately all too true, and is tragically illustrated by the situation in Kashmir. Nevertheless, one cannot but note that the achievements of both India and Pakistan in building their State are in part a reflection of the great measure of wisdom displayed by those who had to resolve the difficult constitutional and related problems that have been explained to us in these statements.

I am not at all convinced that it would be desirable for the Council to take up in detail many of the particular questions of past history that have been ventilated by the representatives of Pakistan and India. The charges and counter-charges of conspiracy and aggression have been considered at great length by the Council in the past. It seems to me most important at the present stage to concentrate our attention upon the fundamental principles already recognized by the Council.

There is no doubt in my mind that whatever varying interpretations may have been placed by India or Pakistan at various times on the conditions to be fulfilled before a plebiscite should be undertaken, and whatever the course of action of these parties at various stages of the dispute, the Security Council has committed itself to the principle that the wishes of the Kashmiri people regarding their future should be established through a plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. As I see it, this is the view of the Security Council, as expressed in several resolutions, and it is my impression that the Council has in the past considered India and Pakistan as having accepted this principle.

grin Perhaps I should say in passing that Mr Menon's statement, interesting and powerfully argued though it was, still leaves me in some doubt as to just where the Indian Government stands today in relation to this principle, and it may be necessary for us to go into this question at a later stage. But it has no bearing on the fact that the Council has been, and is of this moment, committed to the principle of a plebiscite.

The Security Council also considered it necessary almost five years ago to record its view that any action taken in a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir to determine the political future of the people of Kashmir would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with this principle. What view is to be taken, therefore, by the Security Council as to the significance of the deliberations of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly? I confess that it is not altogether clear to me just what is expected to happen in Kashmir from a constitutional viewpoint on 26 January. I understand that the Constituent Assembly has adopted a Constitution for Kashmir, some of whose provisions were operative from 17 November 1956, and the remainder were to come into effect on 26 January. What is not completely clear is to what extent this represents any new step purporting to determine the future affiliations of the State of Kashmir and whether it is regarded by the Government of India as raising a new barrier in the way of a plebiscite in accordance with the Security Council's past resolutions.

I do not know whether the Government of India itself proposes to take any formal step to accept such changes as are purported to be made through this Constitution drawn up by the Constituent Assembly. It would seem to us that any such formal action would be in conflict with the past resolutions of the Council. If, on the other hand, the Constituent Assembly is merely going to dissolve itself on 26 January and celebrate the completion of its activities, the question remains as to whether those activities are regarded by the Government of India as having any bearing on the disposition of Kashmir and the question of taking a future plebiscite. If so, they would seem to us to be equally inimical to the Council's past resolutions on this subject.

In these circumstances, it does seem desirable to us that the Council, before going any further with its examination of this difficult and important problem, should draw the attention of all concerned to the Council's earlier decisions. For this and it expresses reason, the Australian delegation has joined in sponsoring the draft resolution which is before us, the hope that the Council will adopt it without undue delay.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Pierson Dixon (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 765 held on 24 January 1957

It is a matter of very deep regret to my Government that the Security Council should have to be dealing once more with the Kashmir dispute. There is the closest relationship between my country and all the peoples of the sub-continent-if I may use a term which, I agree with the representative of India, is not a very elegant one. Ties of history, of sentiment and, as we firmly believe, of interest also, link our small island kingdom with every part of that vast section of Asia. We are proud of our part in the constitutional development of the Commonwealth. We like to think that, in a period which is past, we contributed not a little of our own to the inheritance of the age-long civilizations of that part of the world. There is much that we have learnt in return.

In the past, as the present, our constitutional relations with the various parts of this area have differed, but our good will to every part of it remains the same.

I should like to take this opportunity of expressing my gratification at the generous remarks that have been made in the course of this debate about the attitude of my Government and of the role played by many of my countrymen during the difficult and anxious period of travail that gave birth to the India and Pakistan of today. Only the voice of envy would, I think, deny that the Englishmen, the Scots, the Welsh and the Irish-for, on a small scale, we too have our diversity all those who served the Crown in the old imperial India and in the transitional period came to feel a deep devotion to the peoples among whom they passed their lives and gave of their best.

In the altered circumstances of today those feelings persist. From the bottom of our hearts we wish well to the peoples of India and Pakistan. They are partners with us, and with many others, in a community which rises above differences of race or creed and which is, I think, unique not only in the present world, but in world history. Everything that unites these two countries gives us deep satisfaction, anything that divides them causes us deep concern.

Unhappily, today the Security Council is dealing with a problem that does deeply divides these two countries. That the difference is a deep one and that it has caused the strongest emotional reactions on both sides, it would be useless to deny. It is, therefore, the desire of my Government, as it is certainly the duty of the Security Council, to proceed in this matter with the greatest prudence and foresight Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is charged with primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on behalf of the Members of the United Nations as a whole. I am sure that the Council will do its best to act in the spirit of the great responsibilities which it bears.

I shall have more to say at a later stage of the proceedings about many of the matters of substance touched upon in the statements of the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and the representative of India. At this stage, however, I propose to limit myself to the subject matter covered by the draft resolution which my delegation has joined in sponsoring [S/3778]. This particular matter has, of course, been considered by the Council before.

The Constituent Assembly was established in Srinagar in 1951. As Mr. Krishna Menon pointed out yesterday, its primary task was to promote the processes of self-government in Kashmir territory. That is not a matter which in itself comes within the jurisdiction of the Security Council, and my Government, for one, of course, welcomes any step towards the development of democratic processes in Kashmir as elsewhere; but when its attention was called to the matter in 1951, the Security Council could not fail to take note of the reports that one of the functions of this Constituent Assembly would be a decision on the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir.

The Council was naturally concerned that nothing done in Kashmir should prejudice a settlement of the whole issue in accordance with the principle that had been the basis of its consideration of the matter since 1948, that is to say, that the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be made in accordance with the wish of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

What action did the Council then take ? It did not seek to interference with the processes of democratic development in Kashmir, but it affirmed a quite simple proposition that the convening of the Constituent Assembly and any action that it might take would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the principle to which I have just referred.

The Council was assisted in its task at that time by the explicit assurances at various stages of the proceedings by the representatives of the Government of India. In particular, on 9 March 1951, Sir Benegal Rau had this to say:

"Will that assembly decide the question of accession ? My Government's view is that, while the constituent assembly may, if it so desires, express an opinion on this question, it can take no decision on it." [536th meeting, para. 23.)

Then, after the resolutions had been passed, Mr. Dayal on 29 may 1951 reiterated this assurance and said something else, which I should also like to quote: "...I reaffirm that so far as the Government of India is concerned, the constituent assembly for Kashmir is not intended to prejudice the issue before the Security Council or to come in its way." [548th meeting, para. 40.]

The position thus was quite clear, and I now turn very briefly to what has happened since. If I understood Mr. Menon correctly when he spoke yesterday, [763rd meeting, paras. 135 ff.], he said that the Constituent Assembly for Kashmir had passed a Constitution, some of the clauses of which came into effect automatically on 17 November 1956, and others will come into effect on 26 January next. In particular, Mr. Menon referred to section 3 of the Constitution as already being in effect, and that section, I believe, states that the "State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India". In these circumstances it is surely quite natural that the Government of Pakistan should seek some reassurance as to the views of the Security Council.

If I understood Mr. Menon correctly yesterday, he said that the constitution for Kashmir which we are considering is that of "a sub-sovereign body" [Ibid., para. 136]. This is, I take it, another way of making the point made by Sir Benegal Rau in 1951 when he told the Security Council that as regards the question of accession the Constituent Assembly can take no decision on the matter.

This, then, appears to be the position today, as it was in 1951. The Security Council, in dealing with this limited question, has before it therefore the same considerations as it had in 1951. In these circumstances there appears to be no reason at all to modify the simple proposition set out in certain parts of the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/ Rev. 1] to which I have previously referred.

In view of the expressed anxiety of the Pakistan representative on this score, it seems to me reasonable for the Security Council to consider a short draft resolution which re-affirms the clear stand it took in 1941. It is for that reason that the United Kingdom joined in sponsoring the draft resolution before the Security Council.

My colleague from India complained this morning that the draft resolution had been circulated before he had completed his speech. Perhaps I should say, as one of the sponsors, that I had taken the statement we listened to yesterday afternoon as a clear exposition of the Indian position on the particular aspect of the Kashmir problem with which the draft resolution deals, that is, the point relating to this constitutional issue. There is, of course, a special reason for expedition in connection with this particular point, since the other party to the dispute, the Government of Pakistan, has expressed concern lest some step might be taken in the very near future, that is, on 26 January. For the practical purpose of our discussions here in New York, this date may in fact partially be considered as 25 January, since New York is eleven to twelve hours behind. Delhi and Karachi in time. It is evident, therefore, that time. is very short if some reassurance is to be given.

There are, of course, other matters of the greatest importance referred to in the speeches of the representatives of Pakistan and India. These matters are before the Security. Council, and they are matters which require full and most careful consideration. It is for this reason that it seems wise to include operative paragraph 2 in the draft resolution, and I would wish to return to these questions at that later stage.

 Text of the speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council meeting No. 607 held on 5 December 1952.

This controversy is now quite familiar to us all but no less a problem for that reason. As members of the United States have attempted in their draft resolution [S/2839] to put forward the elements for a settlement. I should like briefly to review the role of the Security Council and of the parties, as my Government sees it, in attempting to resolve this controversy When one considers that it has been before the Security Council for nearly five years, we can conclude, unless past efforts of the Security Council are largely discounted, that the solution will not come simply.

It seems to me that the principles on which we are trying to proceed to assist the parties to carry out their Charter obligations are these.

In the first place, a lasting political settlement must be an agreed settlement. Secondly, the Security Council will, we feel, always welcome any agreement which the parties themselves can reach on any basis which will settle the dispute, provided of course that basis is consistent with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

Thirdly, we feel that it is the role of the Security Council to assist the parties in seeking to reach agreement. In this case the Security Council has made available the services of Mr. Frank Graham as the United Nations Representative.

Fourthly, we believe that agreement most frequently is reached step by step through negotiation and that negotiation involves an element of compromise.

Finally, we believe that the Security Council should consider with care the views and the recommendations of its representative and indicate to him and to the parties its views on the positions he has taken. With the permission of the President, I should like now to examine the draft resolution [S/2839] before the Council in the light of these principles.

The draft resolution recalls the basic agreements which the parties have reached thus far, the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1942. These resolutions provided that the question of the accession of Kashmir would be decided through a free. and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. We shall be concerned here with the principles those resolutions set out, which would form the basis for a truce agreement. The United Nations Representative has demonstrated that he is well aware of them He has set them out in his first report (S/2375), circulated on 15 October 1951.

The draft resolution before the Council goes on to recall the three resolutions of the Security Council during the period when Mr. Graham has been acting. Then it endorses the general principles which he has formulated and on all but two of which an agreement has not been reached between the parties. The draft resolution goes on to note that a plan of demilitarisation is not now in existence because agreement has not been reached on one issue. As the United Nations Representative has narrowed the difference down to this one issue, we feel that it is quite appropriate for the Security Council to examine the ways in which the United Nations Representative and the parties have approached this issue. As a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions. my Government's examination of this process and our reflection on Mr. Graham's views have led us to arrive at and agree with the United Kingdom Government on the document now before you.

After sixteen months of effort, of wise effort, Mr. Graham is reporting that he has narrowed the problem down to the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line. He has put before the Security Council methods, either of which might, in his view, help the parties to settle this issue: either the establishment of the number and character of forces to remain on either side of the cease-fire line; or the determination of these numbers as a result of studying criteria or principles. This means that the parties would consider why any troops are involved, what they are needed for, and in view of their mission, how many are needed The draft resolution, in its operative paragraph, encourages the parties to negotiate for the purpose of reaching agreement on a specific number of forces within certain bracketed ranges suggested to them by the United Nations Representative. The draft resolution also urges the parties to negotiate, bearing in mind the principles or criteria which would lead to a decision on what the precise numbers should be. Presumably, we venture to think the United Nations Representative suggested some bracketed ranges of figures as a result of his own study of these principles or criteria which he later put before the parties.

The United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, reported to the Security Council, on 10 October 1952 [605 meeting). that the parties had been able to agree some points of his twelve point programme and that the differences between them on the twelve-point programme had been narrowed down to one main point on which the whole plan depended.

Mr. Graham describes this-and I use his own words as "the issue of the number and character of forces to remain on either side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation. In his third report to the Security Council [S/2611 and Cor. 11, on 22 April 1952. Mr. Graham recommended that his own negotiations with the parties be continued with a view to "resolving the remaining differences on the twelve proposals with special reference to the quantum of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation".

Mr. Graham has, from time to time, put before the Security Council various proposals which he has suggested to the parties during his sixteen months of devoted efforts. Mr. Graham left open, in the form of blank spaces to be inserted by the parties, the number of forces on which they would agree. On another occasion Mr. Graham suggested that the numbers be arrived at by relating them to the proportion of force as they existed at the time of the cease-fire and the cessation of hostilities. Again, more recently, he suggested on 16 July of this [S/2783, annex 3], certain bracketed numbers within which he recommended that the parties seek a specific figure. After that he arrived at the point of suggesting, on 2 September of this year [S/2783, annex 7], that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there should be an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan troops having been withdrawn, and large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces having taken place, while on the Indian side of the cease-fire line there should be an Indian army of 18,000, including the State armed forces. Mr. Graham also came forward with the suggestion that it might be helpful to the parties to consider the principles or criteria for arriving at figures, and this he suggested on 4 September 1952 [S/2783, annex 8].

I think it is fair to conclude that in coming forward with these proposals, Mr. Graham had taken the advice of his military adviser, and that the numbers he has suggested are not guesses arising from some sense of political expediency. Rather, it is fair to view them as carefully considered. suggestions of the United Nations Representative, bearing in mind the basic agreement of the parties heretofore reached in the form of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Mr. Graham has emphasised over and over again the importance of these agreements, the way in which they present problems which will exist for both parties at the end of the period of demilitarisation. In his most recent statement Mr. Graham tells us that there is an agreement between the parties that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein. who have entered the state for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn, and that the Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the state. There is also an agreement that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn. He has suggested the various methods. I have outlined for assisting the parties what forces shall remain.

Having considered the United Nations Representatives carefully formulated suggestions on this question, and recognizing the considerable thought and effort that must have gone into arriving at them, the United Kingdom and the United States Governments, together, have put forward the draft resolution urging the parties to negotiate. We have urged them to negotiate to arrive not at a number which we suggest but the number within the range which Mr. Graham himself Suggested on 16 July of this year. It was on the basis of these ranges of figures, the Security Council would recall that Mr. Graham reported the willingness of the parties to go to Geneva during the year and to negotiate. We therefore have arrived at these suggestions of the United Nations Representative as a considered judgement of his, which we support and urge the parties to use in seeking agreement between themselves.

As the United Kingdom representative has pointed out [606th meeting], the Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit Scouts, occupying as they do a special position, could not be computed in arriving at figures within the range on which the parties urged in our draft resolution to negotiate.

The ranges of numbers contained in the draft resolution were taken from the 16 July 1952 proposals of the United Nations Representative, on to go to Geneva and negotiate, which the parties had agreed.

Thus, the co-sponsors, the United States and the United Kingdom are relying upon a suggestion of the mediator, and for that reason the draft resolution, document S/2839, reads in part as follows:

"...this number to be between 3,000 and 6,000 armed forces remaining on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and between 12,000 and 18,000 and 18,000 armed forces remaining on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, as suggested by the United Nations Representative in his proposals of 16 July 1952 (annex 3 of S/2783)..

The Security Council will notice that the draft resolution urges the parties to negotiate "bearing in mind" the principles or criteria which the United Nations Representative suggested on 4 September of this year. The co-sponsors feel they are worthy of careful attention.

These principles, as they relate to the point we are discussing, are contained in annex 8 to the United Nations Representative's fourth report (S/2783). Paragraph 7 reads as follows:

"Agree that the demilitarisation shall be carried out in such a way that at the end of the period referred to in paragraph 6 above the situation will be. "(a) On the Pakistan side of the case-fire line:

"(t) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn; "(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;

"(ili) Large-scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite;

"(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

"(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and state armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph (b) (i) above will have been carried out; so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum number of Indian forces and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite."

It will be recalled that the parties had agreed that ; 44 the demilitarisation shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above" (S/2783, annex 8, para. 8).

The parties had agreed to a revised version of the ninth principle, which is firmly based on the two United Nations Commission resolutions, that:

"pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations (S/2783, annex 8, para. 9).

I have taken the liberty of reading these principles or criteria because, in the nature of things, they must be the considerations which have led the United Nations Representative to arrive at the concrete figures he has suggested to the parties, including the range of figures concerning we are urging the parties to negotiate. It will be noted that Mr. Graham has suggested as one principles here, as on previous occasions, that the large scale disbanding and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum forces required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease fire agreement with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. We have accepted what we conclude to be the United Nations Representative that the forces and that is what he calls them which remain on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be those Azad Kashmir forces which remain after large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces. We have also accepted the view of Mr. Graham that on the Indian side of these cease-fire lines the forces should be Indian army forces and State armed forces.

The resolution of 13 August 1948 of the United Nations. The Commission for India and Pakistan provides in part :

"Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission" (Part II, para, A. 3)" For the word "Commission" we may read "the United Nations" because that Commission, the United commission for India and Pakistan, is no longer in existence.

Thus it was one of the United Nations Representive's first problems, and one which is still before us, to reduce this principle to the factual situation which would exist at the end of the period of demilitarisation. Originally he proposed - but lacking agreement of the parties did not pursue this proposal after December 1951-that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the force should consist of civil armed forces. He has since consistently suggested, if we read his language correctly, that these forces should be Azad Kashmir forces. After dropping his original proposal in December 1951, he suggested that the United Nations surveillance be affected by removing the Azad Kashmir forces from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command, and by having them offered by neutral and local officers as I have stated, under the surveillance of the United Nations.

He finally suggested that the remaining Azad Kashmir force should be the minimum number necessary for the maintenance of law and order, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite. Thus, it is fair to say that the United Nations Representative considers that some Azad Kashmir forces would remain. The co-sponsors agree with this position.

The United Nations Representative has specified what the function of these remaining Azad Kashmir forces would be. He has described it as "the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite".

As the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan states in the part which I have just read, these forces would be in territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops and administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Considering then what the functions of these remaining Azad Kashmir forces would be as Mr. Graham has stated them - operating in an area evacuated by Pakistan troops, I think it is clear that they would be separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command. This position was apparently acceptable to the Government of Pakistan when it indicated to Mr. Graham that it was prepared to accept, subject to certain observations not here relevant, his proposals of 16 July 1952. The draft resolution takes into account the conclusion which United Nations Representative had previously reached.

He also indicates that the role of the Indian army forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line would call for a minimum number of Indian forces remaining to ensure the maintenance of law and order and the observance of the cease fire agreement and with due regard for the security of the State. This is entirely consistent with the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948. Paragraph B (3).

It may well be that the United Nations Representatives. assistance will help the parties in approaching these problems. Therefore, the operative paragraph of this resolution attempts to organise and put before the Security Council and the parties. Some of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative on the one issue which all are agreed is at the root of the problem. From what I have said I hope it is clear that the co-sponsors, like the United Nations Representative, have attempted to build on the United Nations Commission resolutions and at each stage to narrow rather than to broaden the areas in which agreement is thus far lacking. As the representative of the United Kingdom has observed, we hope that there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two Governments to reopen questions already agreed on under these resolutions.

We have attempted to put before the parties some of the wisdom and some of the suggestions of the United Nations Representative and to urge them to negotiate to attempt to reach a solution. We have asked them to provide the Security Council with their own account, in their own words, of where these negotiations lead them. We have done this because we see in this case an element of urgency. It is a case which, as Mr. Graham stated to the Security Council on 10 October [605th meeting], should not be allowed to drift lest the parties and the organised society of nations should find themselves in a position of greater danger.

In the areas of agreement thus far reached, the United Nations Representative, by formulating his proposals and by his negotiations, has, in the view of my Government, assisted the parties. The draft resolution does not in any way impair or limit Mr. Graham's authority under the previous Security Council resolutions, and we expect and hope that he will continue to exercise his functions under them. Therefore, the draft resolution not only expresses the gratitude of the Security Council to him but requests him to continue to make his services available to the Governments of India and Pakistan. It also endorses the principles on which he has sought to bring about agreement.

In conclusion, I return to the general principles with which I began my statement. This draft resolution offers to the parties an opportunity to arrive, by their negotiations, at a statement of the final issue now standing in the way of the demilitarisation of the State and the planning for a plebiscite, including the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator.

The settlement itself, when it comes, will be the result of free agreement by the parties themselves. The Security Council and the United Nations Representative can simply assist the parties in reaching agreement.

The United States Government would welcome the agreement of the parties on any just basis which would settle this dispute. The road we have suggested reflects much thought and much negotiation. The United Nations Representative recognizes that there may be more than one road to settlement. He has told the Security Council in his fourth report that when he invited the parties to negotiate at Geneva he made it clear to them that he would at all times welcome suggestions from either Government directed towards the settlement of the main differences on the twelve proposals, the general implementation of the United Nations Commission resolutions and the solution of the dispute. The representative of the United Kingdom stated to the Council on 6 November [606th meeting] that his Government had in no sense closed its mind to the possibility of a settlement of the problem on lines different from those which we have considered in the Security Council up to now.

Of course, the numbers of troops which we have urged the parties to negotiate on, and the criteria which we have urged them to bear in mind, are not now agreed on by them. If such an agreement had, happily, been reached, there would be no occasion for this or any other draft resolution except, perhaps, an expression of gratification for a solution reached. Negotiation must, in the nature of things, involve the element of give and-take and the possibility of compromise. We have attempted to restate in the draft resolution an appreciation of the views of the United Nations Representative about how such compromise might be brought about.

The United States takes seriously the view of Mr. Graham that there is danger to us all in allowing this case to drift. As the representative of the United Kingdom put it, we cannot leave it to settle itself.

All Members of the United Nations have an interest in seeing this dispute settled peacefully. The United States, for its part, feels that it has more than an interest in the matter : it has the most earnest desire to see the two great States of the subcontinent join together to assure their mutual peace and security as well as their mutual prosperity.

These two nations have much more in common than the fact that they are neighbours. Whole areas of understanding between them should and, we believe, will exist once this dispute has been settled. Leadership and statesmanship by the Governments of India and Pakistan can bring about that result which we devoutly seek.

I have no words to match the eloquence of Mr. Graham, and I take the liberty of concluding with a quotation from the statement he made in the Security Council a year ago [570th meeting, paras, 66 and 70]:

"The opportunity in time and place is for the leadership on the subcontinent, tested in the struggles and sufferings for the human liberty of 400 million human beings, to help prevent the destruction of human freedom and the self-destruction of civilization by setting challenging examples of demilitarisation, self-determination, reconciliation and reconstruction in a fearful and broken world.

"The subcontinent is the place for a timely example of demilitarisation and of self-determination. Now is the time for the dedicated leadership of two great people to rise to the call of their spiritual heritage, the responsibility of their power and the opportunity for their greatness to give in a dark world challenging examples and fresh hopes the peoples in the unresting adventure of the human spirit, through the United Nations, in the long pilgrimage towards a freer and fairer world, in answer to the prayers of the people for peace and freedom on God's good earth."

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 606 held on 6 November 1952

The object of my intervention this afternoon will be to explain as best I can the draft resolution which has now been. distributed to all members of the Council in document S/2839, dated 5 November 1952. In what I say I shall not, of course, be speaking on behalf of my United States colleague, who has associated himself with this draft resolution, but I hope that what I say will be agreeable to him.

Now that we are about to resume our deliberations on the India-Pakistan question, I am sure of one thing that I shall be giving expression to the views of most of the governments represented round this table when I say how deeply we regret that no solution has yet been found to the differences between the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan with regard to the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

For its part, Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has always recognized the great delicacy of the issues involved in this question. At the same time, however, it has always been encouraged by the fine agreement of the two governments concerned on the principles to be followed in order to achieve a settlement. It has therefore always hoped, and it continues most strongly to hope, that agreement can be reached on how these principles can be put into effect-in other words, on how the inhabitants of the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be enabled most fairly and effectively to express their wishes on the question whether their State should accede to the Indian Union or to Pakistan. In a world beset by so many intractable and seemingly insoluble problems, this particular one has always seemed to be eminently susceptible of settlement be seasoned negotiation and compromise. I am sure that my colleagues on the Security Council will agree with me on one thing that it is the plain duty of the Council to use its best endeavours to promote such a settlement.

We last discussed the various issues involved in the India Pakistan question in detail in February and March 1951. As the result of our debates at that time, Dr. Graham was appointed as the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, with a mandate to resolve, negotiation with the parties, the differences between them which were preventing the fulfilment of the demilitarisation provisions of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.' The four reports which we have received from Dr. Graham [S 2375, S/2445, S/2661 and S/2783] are a monument, if I may say so, to his thoroughness, patience and perseverance in carrying out this mandate, and I am sure we are all agreed on this one thing, the tribute that I have paid to Dr. Graham. As representatives will have observed, the fourth report of Dr. Graham, which deals with the latest negotiations, contains certain detailed suggestions for the determination of the number of armed forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation. I believe that Dr. Graham has made a valuable contribution to the long negotiations on this point by putting forward these specific suggestions. It will be seen that in the draft resolution which United States and United Kingdom delegations have now placed before the Council, and to which I have referred, we have based the action which we think the Security Council might urge the parties to take on certain of these detailed suggestions by Dr. Graham, to which I have just referred. I will come back to this point, however, a little later when I discuss the draft resolution in detail.

Before I do this I should like, if I may, to explain to the members of the Council! the general considerations which have guided the United Kingdom as co-sponsor of this draft resolution.

In the first place, we do not believe that this dispute over the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be left simply to settle itself, or that the efforts of the United Nations to achieve a settlement can in any way be relaxed. It may be that there are some problems which can with advantage be placed on one side and just allowed to develop and, perhaps, come to a head in their own way. I do not know, but that may be so. But I do not believe, personally, that representatives will consider that such a proceeding would be wise or proper in dealing with this question of India and Pakistan.

As I have already said, the dispute over the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is of a kind in which the Security Council ought to be able to be of great assistance. The parties have agreed - and they have many times reaffirmed their agreement to decide the future accession of the State by means of a free and impartial plebiscite to be held under the auspices of the United Nations. And I repeat that: "under the auspices of United Nations' '. Can the United Nations, therefore, do other than continue to strive to create the conditions in which this plebiscite may be held ? Indeed, the danger, which we all have reason to fear might arise, to the peaceful relations of the peoples of India and Pakistan if this question were to be shelved by the United Nations is enough to persuade us that there can be-or there should be no relaxation of effort on our part to bring about a settlement.

Of course, the United Kingdom Government has in no sense closed its mind to the possibility of a settlement of the problem on lines different from those which we have considered in the Security Council up to now. We have always insisted that the solution to this problem can come only as a result of an agreement by the two governments concerned, and it would follow from this, we should have thought, that if these governments choose to reach a settlement in accordance with principles different from those contained in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, on which all our recent action in the Security Council has been based, that settlement would be non the less welcome. I am sure that I speak for other representatives in the Security Council in saying that we do not regard ourselves as having any monopoly of wisdom in regard to this problem and that any agreement between the parties to settle the dispute in any way whatever would be most welcome to all of us. Nevertheless, the only agreement which has been placed on record so far between the Governments of India and Pakistan on this question is that contained in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. It is because the original agreement between the governments has, therefore, been to decide the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations that the United Kingdom Government has always lent its support for the settlement on such lines. This we shall continue to do unless there is, and until there is some indication from both governments that they prefer to work for a settlement in some other form. In drawing up a draft resolution to place before the Security Council, therefore, the Government I represent has, for this very reason, concerned attention on resolving the main differences standing in the way of agreement between the two parties on the demilitarisation of the State and the holding of a plebiscite.

I should how like to examine for a moment, if I may, the extent to which Dr. Graham has been able to obtain acceptance by the two governments of the points contained in his twelve proposals which, of course, are all familiar to us. He originally put these proposals forward on 7 September 1951, and he has presented them in various slightly modified forms since then, ending with his proposals of 4 September 1952. In the first place, as we understand it, it has been agreed by the two governments that demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single continuous process. We for our part, have always felt that this would be more logical and, indeed, more suitable than for the demilitarisation to be done in two separate operations, as provided for in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. We therefore welcome the acceptance by the parties of Dr. Graham's proposal on this point.

It has also been agreed that on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line the tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State will have been withdrawn by the end of period of demilitarisation. In fact, we understand that this has long been the case. Nevertheless, we welcome also this restatement of agreement by the two parties.

We understand that they are further agreed that the Pakistan regular army units should be withdrawn from the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line and that on the Indian side of the cease-fire line the bulk of the Indian and State armed forces should likewise be withdrawn. These are the steps which the two governments concerned have agreed on as the method of reducing the military forces in the State to whatever final figures they may determine between them.

Dr. Graham has also reported that they have accepted a proposal that demilitarisation should be conducted in such a way as to involve to threaten the cease-fire agreement either during or after the demilitarisation period. This seems to us at any rate to be of great significance. If it is taken as a criterion in deciding the stages by which, and the extent to which, the military forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be reduced, it should provide a way of resolving at least the major differences of view that may exist between the two governments. We believe that Dr. Graham, in suggesting the limits within which the final number of armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line should be fixed, was guided by this principle.

If the two governments could decide on a final figure for the strength of their armed forces within the limits suggested by Dr, Graham and, indeed, within the limits which we have incorporated into our draft resolution, they can, we think, assure themselves that, in spite of the considerable reduction in the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line, this reduction will, at any rate, involve no threat to the integrity or to the security of the territory on either side.

Therefore, it is our view that, within these limits, final figures for the strength of the armed forces on each side of the cease-fire line can and should be determined; that within these limits figures could be agreed upon which would enable a free and impartial plebiscite to be arranged-and this must, in our view. be the first and principal consideration-and which would at the same time take into account the need to safeguard law and order, the integrity of the cease-fire line and the security of the territory on each side of that line.

The Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit Scouts, which occupy a special position, need not, in the view of the sponsors of this draft resolution -I think I am speaking for the representative of the United States to-be included in the total of the forces to be determined in accordance with the draft resolution which we have now jointly put before the Council.

I am sure that representatives have noticed with deep satisfaction the agreement recorded in the first of Dr. Graham's twelve proposals, namely, that neither government will resort to the use of armed force to settle this dispute. I believe that once some evident progress towards the organisation of a plebiscite is achieved, the efforts of the people of Kashmir on both sides of the cease-fire line and, indeed, of the peoples of India and Pakistan also, would be concentrated on the task of organising the methods and procedures to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to express freely their wishes on the question of the accession, and that, once this stage was reached, the talk of war and threats of war, which we have all so much regretted in the past, would, as it were, become a thing of the past. Of course, should there still be doubts on this score, I should hope that the parties would remember the proposal which my Government and the Government of the United States put forward in the draft resolution of 21 February 1951 [S/2017]. It may be remembered that at that we suggested that a neutral force might be used to facilitate demilitarisation. If demilitarisation on the lines suggested by Dr. Graham and by our own draft resolution can be brought about. I do not believe that the device of a natural force would in any sense be necessary. Of course not. But, should the fear that demilitarisation may lead to a renewal of conflict in Kashmir still exists perhaps we might, with respect, urge whichever of the parties feels this fear to reconsider the proposal that a natural force might then be made available.

In this way, therefore, we would hope that an agreement might at last be reached by the two governments on the extent of demilitarisation; on the number of armed forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the time when the plebiscite is to take place. Dr. Graham, in paragraph 38 of his last report [S/2783], observes that not only the number of armed forces but also their character remains to be settled, which of course is true. On this question of the character of the forces, I would simply say that we would hope that agreement could quickly be reached, based on the principle I have mentioned earlier that at no stage should demilitarisation involve a threat to the cease-fire agreement. This would mean that that the forces of each side of the cease fire line should make it clear that the United Kingdom Government has never thought that the proposal to limit the forces on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line to an armed civil police force while leaving a military force on the other side of the cease-fire line was consistent with a really free plebiscite. I hope that representatives will join me in urging that the parties should resolve any differences they may still have on this point in the way which I have suggested.

In the draft resolution [S/2839] which the United Kingdom and the United States have placed before the Council, it is sought to concentrate attention. on this one question, namely, of determining finally the figures to which the armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line are to be reduced. It will be seen that the suggestion contained in the draft resolution is that the two governments should negotiate directly with each other to this end. We would hope that Dr. Graham will be ready to assist the two parties in any way they may indicate, and we have framed the draft resolution so as to provide for this possibility. We would hope, however, that the Council will agree that at this moment the primary responsibility for working out an agreement should lie with the two governments themselves. The United Kingdom Government, therefore, would earnestly hope that the Governments of India and Pakistan would each appoint representatives with adequate powers to enable them to negotiate a final agreement on demilitarisation. In the draft resolution we have suggested that these negotiations should take place in New York. This seems likely to be the most convenient agreement since, after all, while the General Assembly is in session the ministers and representatives of the two governments, who will be concerned with the negotiations are in addition likely to be engaged with the work of the General Assembly.

It will also be seen that the draft resolution requests the two governments to inform the Security Council of the results of their negotiations within a period of thirty days. In view of the urgency of a solution and the narrow gap, as we think, to which the differences between the two parties seem to have been brought, the sponsors of the draft resolution believe that members of the Council will think it desirable that a further report should be placed before them within the period which we have indicated in the draft resolution.

Once agreement is reached on the level of the armed forces at the end of the demilitarisation, surely a will be but a short step for representatives of the two governments, sitting in joint session with military experts of course, to draw up a detailed programme of disbandment and withdrawal.

The two governments have already agreed that such a programme should be carried through within ninety days from the date of its signature by them. Within a matter of months, therefore, we might hope to see the forces in Kashmir reduced to the level at which a fair and impartial plebiscite could take place. Within a matter of months we might hope to see the Plebiscite Administrator formally appointed and established inside Kashmir to begin the final task of preparing for the voting to take place.

So near are we to a solution--or so it seems to us-of this difficult and dangerous problem which has so long exercised our minds and unsettled and weakened an extensive and vitally important region of the world; so near are we to a solution if only the spirit of compromise and the determination of both parties to achieve a settlement can be brought to grapple with the outstanding differences between them The sponsors of this draft resolution hope that there will be no tendency on the part of either of the two governments to go behind the agreements enshrined in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which have been agreed on. These resolutions, as we think, contain all the elements of a settlement. Reinforced and amplified as they are by the agreements of the two governments to all but two of Dr. Graham's twelve proposals, they provide the Security Council and the parties with a framework on which to build, and they also provide certain agreed principles according to which that building should be done.

The ultimate objective of a fair and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations has after all been written into solemn agreements by the two governments and endorsed by this Security Council. These agreements have been affirmed and reaffirmed by the two governments many times during the last three and a half years. The transformation of this agreement into the reality of the actual voting ought not to present insuperable difficulties. We have recently. seen the tremendous achievement-if I may say so with respect of the Government of India in organising and carrying through a fully democratic election throughout its vast territory. From this great example it is clear that the will of the people of Kashmir and Jammu in this question of accession could be ascertained without any insuperable difficulty.

It is therefore too much to hope that the two governments can now resolve their differences and show by example how the precepts which the United Nations frequently affirms can be put into practical effect and made the instrument of a political settlement which would not only satisfy the aspirations of the people of Jammu and Kashmir but would also add greatly, as we all know, to the happiness, prosperity and security of peoples throughout the free world.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Frank P. Graham (United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan in the Security Council Meeting No. 605 held on 10 October 1952

As a supplement to the report to the Security Council dated 16 September 1952 [S/2783 and Corr. 1], the United Nations Representative makes this personal summary statement, This statement should be considered in connection with all other previous reports to the Council and debates in the Security Council on the Kashmir question. This statement will set forth:

(1) The obstacles we have found in the way of the Governments of India and Pakistan hindering an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation:

(2) The twelve proposals made to overcome these obstacles;

(3) The progress made by the parties in the acceptance of these proposals;

(4) The revival of the difference over the meaning of "local forces";

(5) The several proposals made regarding the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office;

(6) The several proposals made by the United Nations Representative regarding the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation;

(7) An agreement on ten and part of another of the twelve proposals; and

(8) Suggested alternative approaches to the one main remaining difference regarding the issue of number and character of forces.

Obstacles Found in the way of an Agreement on Demilitarization When we arrived on the sub-continent on 30 June 1951 we found the atmosphere heavily charged with the following factors:

(1) Allegations about the violations of the cease-fire line;

(2) Headlines about troop movements and counter troop movements close to the border of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

(3) Discussions and fears concerning the role of the Constituent Assembly to be convened at Srinagar; and

(4) Threats of war and rumours of war.

In the course of many consultations with the two Governments, the United Nations Representative found additional differences regarding :

(5) The timing and amount of the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces in relation to the withdrawals of the Indian forces;

(6) The time required for a programme of demilitarisation;

(7) The number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation;

(8) A possible danger to the cease-fire line incident to possible fears which might arise out of a heavy preponderance of armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line in the process of demilitarisation;

(9) The timing and coordination of appropriate with endrawals, reductions, disarming and disbanding of forces, as the case may be, on the two sides of the cease-fire line;

(10) The timing of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator into office;

(11) The meaning of the phrase "final disposal' in the 5 January 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in relation to location or reduction of forces, and more lately;

(12) The meaning of the phrase "local authorities" in the 5 January 1949 resolution. The twelve proposals made by the United Nations Representative for overcoming the obstacles in the way of demilitarisation.

To overcome the first four of the twelve obstacles enumerated above, the United Nations Representative directed his first four proposals to decreasing the high tension between the two countries. Representatives of the Government of India indicated that no agreement in demilitarisation was possible because of the threats of war. The representatives of the Government of Pakistan said that the delays in demilitarisation as a condition for a free and impartial plebiscite caused unrest and talk of war among the people of Pakistan. Thus we found that delays in demilitarisation caused talk of war and at the same time talk of war caused delays in an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation.

The United Nations Representative therefore asked the two Governments for the following commitments :The Governments of India and Pakistan

Proposal 1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir,

Proposal 2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, organisations, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;

Proposal 3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949; Proposal 4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

The fifth obstacle was the question of the Azad Kashmir forces in relation to part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 and principles 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution. The resolution of 13 August 1948 made no reference to the Azad Kashmir forces". Part II of this resolution had the following provisions :

"A

"1. As the presence of troops of Pakistan in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir constitutes a material change in the situation since it was represented by the Government of Pakistan before the Security Council, the Government of Pakistan agrees to withdraw its troops from that State.

"2. The Government of Pakistan will use in best endeavour to secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of lighting.

"3. Pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistani troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission.

"B

"1. When the Commission shall have notified the Government of India that the tribesmen and Pakistani nationals referred to in part II, A, 2 here of have withdrawn, thereby terminating the situation which was reported by the Government of India to the Security Council as having occasioned the presence of Indian forces in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and further, that the Pakistani forces are being withdrawn from the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India agrees to begin to withdraw the bulk of its forces from the State in stages to be agreed upon with the Commission.

"2. Pending the acceptance of the conditions for a final settlement of the situation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indian Government will maintain within the lines existing at the moment of the cease fire the minimum strength of its forces which in agreement with the Commission are considered necessary to assist local authorities in the observance of law and order. The Commission will have observers stationed where it deems necessary.

"3. The Government of India will undertake to ensure that the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will take all measures within its power to make it publicly known that peace, law and order will be safeguarded and that all human and political rights will be guaranteed."

The 5 January 1949 resolution provided, regarding the Azad Kashmir forces and the Indian and State armed forces, principles 4 (a) and (b) as follows: "4 (a) After implementation of parts I and II of the

Commission's resolution of 13 August 1948, and when the Commission is satisfied that peaceful

conditions have been restored in the State, the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator will determine, in consultation with the Government of India, the final disposal of Indian and State armed forces, such disposal to be with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

"(b) As regards the territory referred to in A, 2 of part II of the resolution of the 13 August, final disposal of the armed forces in that territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities."

The Government of India maintained that, in accepting the 13 August 1948 resolution on 20 August 1948, they were unaware of the large number and fighting efficiency of the Azad Kashmir forces. They maintain that if they had been so aware they would have insisted on the disarming and disbanding of these forces provided for in part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution.

In this matter the Government of Pakistan maintained that they stood on the resolution as written and accepted.

The United Nations Commission, as the author of these two resolutions, held that the disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces was not contemplated that under the 13 August 1948 resolution. However, the Commission assured the Government of India that it was contemplated that "large scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces" would be undertaken promptly in the implementation of the 5 January 1949 resolution.

The dead-lock over this issue was an obstacle to an agreement on demilitarisation during the mediation of the Commission in 1949, of General Me Naughton later in 1949, of Sir Owen Dixon in 1950, and confronted us early in our negotiations in the summer of 1951.

Regarding this problem the Commission itself, in its third interim report [S/1430], had observed (paragraph 250). "The conclusion to be drawn from the experience of The Governments of India and Pakistan Agree that the demilitarisation shall be carried out on such a way that at the end of the period referred to a paragraph 6 above the situation will be:

(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line

(i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State; and

(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place.

(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line:

(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been carried out,

(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in (b) (i) above will have been carried out.

so that at the end of the period referred to in proposal 6 above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the ceasefire line to be filled in by the two Governments as a precise basis for resolving the difference on the crucial issue.

Proposal 8

The Governments of India and Pakistan

Agree that the demilitarisation shall be carried out in such a way as to involve no threat to the cease-fire agreement either during or after the period referred to in paragraph 6 above.

Proposal 9

The Governments of India and Pakistan

Agree that representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments, assisted by their military advisers, will meet under the auspices of the United Nations, to draw up a programme of demilitarisation in accordance with the provisions of paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above.

Next to proposal 7, proposal 10 was the most crucial of the twelve proposals. Proposal 10 provided for the fixing of a definite time and manner for the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator as follows:

Proposal 10

The Governments of India and Pakistan

Agree that the Government of India shall cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be formally appointed to office not later than the final day of the demilitarisation period referred to in paragraph 6 above.

To make clear that, in connecting part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution and "the large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces" and "the further reduction of the Indian forces" to constitute part of a continuous process of demilitarisation, the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator remained with regard "to final disposal" of the remaining forces, proposal provided as follows:

Proposal 11

The Governments of India and Pakistan

Agree that the completion of the programme of demilitarisation referred to in paragraph 9 above will be without prejudice to the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator with regard to the final disposal of forces as set forth in sub paragraphs 4(a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution.

The Government of India contends that both under the two United Nations resolutions read together and according to the understandings with the Commission, the term 'final disposal' in sub-paragraph 4 (a) means only disposition. This is evident from the fact that the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 speaks of minimum forces required to assist the local authorities in the maintenance of law and order, which the Commission itself has interpreted to include adequate defence. The Government of India considers that it can never be contemplated that as a result of any subsequent reduction, forces should be reduced to below the minimum. The Commission has never used the term 'reduction' or 'withdrawal' of Indian forces with reference to sub-paragraph 4 (a); it has, on the other hand, always insisted that sub-paragraph 4 (b) contemplated disbandment and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces and other armed forces on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line. This distinction was made by the Commission with reference to a difficulty of its own creation by giving an assurance to the Pakistan Government, without the knowledge of the Government of India, that it did not contemplate the disbandment and disarming of Azad Kashmir forces at the stages of part II of the 13 August 1948 and resolution. Moreover, once it is accepted in principle that demilitarisation contemplated under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single continuous process, no interference with the strength of forces in the State is possible at the plebiscite stage. Furthermore, if the element of reduction or withdrawal of forces at the plebiscite stage, according to the Pakistan Government's interpretation of sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the resolution of 5 January 1949 is, brought on to the demilitarisation must be deemed to have exhausted itself and the United Nations Representative and the plebiscite Administrator can at that stage deal only with the question of disposition".

The Government of Pakistan contends "that the term 'final disposal of forces' was used by the UNCIP both in sub paragraph 4 (a) of its resolution of 5 January 1949 with respect to Indian and State armed forces, and in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the same resolution in respect of the Azad Kashmir forces. It could only mean the same thing in both cases. The Vice Chairman of the Commission informed the Foreign Minister of Pakistan on 25 December 1948 that the object of paragraph 4 of the Commission's draft proposals on 11 December 1948 (which subsequently become the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949) as "to ensure a large-scale reduction and disarmament, the exact scope of which will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the authorities concerned". (See memorandum appended to annex 5 to the second report UNCIP [S/1196].

The term 'final disposal' therefore covers reduction by withdrawal or disbandment as well as location or stationing of the armed forces concerned. If it is contended that 'final disposal' means only the location or stationing of forces, then there is by same token, no provision in the UNCIP resolutions for the reduction or disbandment of the Azad Kashmir forces either".

To prevent a later dead-lock over differences regarding an agreed programme of demilitarisation proposal 12 provided as follows:

Proposal 12

The Governments of India and Pakistan

Agree that any differences regarding the programme of demilitarisation contemplated in paragraph above will be referred to the Military Adviser of the United Nations Representative, and, if disagreement continues, the United Nations Representative, whose decision to be final.

It is the view of the Government of Pakistan that paragraph 12 of the truce proposals enables the United Nations Representative to determine final points of experience relating to technical details concerning the real implementation of the agreed demilitarisation programme. This is not enough. Sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the Security Council's resolution of 14 March 1950 [S/1461] authorised the United Nations Representative to interpret the agreements reached by the parties' demilitarisation. There should be a similar provision in the truce agreement. The experience of the last four years underlines the necessity for such a provision. Without it, there would be no means of resolving dead-locks that might arise".

It is the view of the Government of India that "the reference in paragraph 12 of Mr. Graham's letter is not to differences arising in the process of drawing up a programme of demilitarisation but only to differences upon technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. On this understanding the answer to the question is in the affirmative".

In line with his policy maintained from the outset of his mission that any assurance given to the parties could only be given by the United Nations Representative on the written record with the equal knowledge of both Governments, the United Nations Representative gave the assurance that he was not seeking to arbitrate matters of substance and would confine his decisions to those matters of technical details concerning the actual implementation of the agreed programme. III. Progress in the Acceptance of the Twelve Proposals.

At the conclusion of our consultations with the two Governments on the sub-continent we were able, in our report to the Security Council of 15 October 1951 [S/2375], to report agreement on the first four of the twelve proposals.

At the conclusion in December of the negotiations in Paris, we reported to the Security Council on 18 December 1951 [S/2448] additional agreements on proposals 8, 9, 11 and

12.

The suggestion made by the United Nations Representative that the Plebiscite Administrator designate be now associated with him not for negotiations but for consultation regarding the prospective joint responsibilities of the Representative and the Administrator and to make studies, was not considered advisable by the two Governments. This suggestion was therefore not carried out.

The United Nations Representative considered that it would facilitate the preparation for the plebiscite to have the Plebiscite Administrator designate make studies as soon as possible regarding the conditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure plebiscite. Your representative has the view that these studies by the Plebiscite Administrator are basic to the consideration of the whole complex problem of the plebiscite. Since such studies as are necessary could best be made on the ground and since both Governments consider it inadvisable for him to be consulted in an official capacity before his induction, it is my view that is important that he be induced as soon as possible and therefore it is important. that an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation be agreed upon as soon as possible so that he can get on with his studies on the ground.

In the negotiations at the United Nations Headquarters early in the summer of 1952 the military advisers of the two Governments, under the chairmanship of the United Nations military advisers, made precise their differing definitions of the word "bulk" and the words "State armed forces" as used in the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and the estimated number of their own armed forces as they existed at the time of the cease-fire on 1 January 1949.

There remained outstanding four of the twelve proposals upon which agreement had not been reached including the two most basic of all the twelve proposals: first, the time of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator; and secondly, the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation.

In view of the continuing dead-lock of the United Nations. Representatives made definite suggestions regarding the two most basic differences in revised proposals presented on 16 July, 2 September and 4 September 1952. On 2 September and 4 September 1952 he transferred the substance of the original proposal 9 to provisional clause at the end of the twelve proposals, that clause to read as follows:

Provisional clause. This agreement shall enter into effect when the two Governments of India and Pakistan have approved a programme of demilitarisation in conformity with paragraphs 5, 6, 7 and 8 above, the draft of such programme to be drawn up in meetings between the representatives of the Governments of India and of Pakistan assisted by their military advisers under the auspices of the United Nations. The first meeting shall take place within two weeks after the signature of the above agreement.

In the revised versions of 2 September and 4 September 1952 the new proposal 9 was made as follows: 2 September

Revised proposal 9

The Governments of India and of Pakistan

Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. The local authorities shall undertake the fulfilment of such duties as are necessary for the observance within that territory of the provisions of the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949. (That is, the cease-fire agreement).

4 September

Further revised proposal 9

The Governments of India and of Pakistan

Agree that, pending a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the suited Nations. Revival of the difference over the meaning of "Local Authorities"

The difference over the means of local authorities" confronted the first United Nations Commission in the summer of 1948 and persisted during the mediation of General McNaughton and during the mediation of Sir Owen Dixon.

The Government of India contends that the State of Jammu is a legal entity, that the sovereignty of India is based on the Instrument of Accession constitutionally executed, and that there can be no de jure or de facto recognition of the Azad Kashmir Government.

The Government of India holds "that the administration of this area would, under paragraph 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities under the same resolution only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature. of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation of the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with civil armed forces' '.

The Government of Pakistan holds that

"Paragraph 3 of section A of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 provided that 'pending' a final solution, the territory evacuated by the Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the Commission". "In its letter dated 3 September 1948, the Commission defined the 'evacuated territory' to mean, 'those territories in the State of Jammu and Kashmir which are at present under the effective control of the Pakistan High Command (first report of UNCIP, paragraph 90). As a result of the demarcation of the cease-fire line all territories situated on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line should be regarded as 'evacuated territory."

"The United Nations Commission told the Foreign Minister of Pakistan that by the term 'local authorities' it meant the Azad Kashmir Government, though the Commission could not accord de jure recognition to a revolutionary authority such as the Azad Kashmir Government. The Commission also gave the assurance that no official of the Government of India, or of the Maharaja's Government, would be permitted to enter the evacuated territory. (See summary record of the meeting held by UNCIP on 31 August 1948)."

"As regards the term 'surveillance', the UNCIP said that it meant neither supervision nor control. The Chairman of the Commission explained that all the commission had wanted was to find a definition for something which would release the Commission from taking too heavy responsibilities on its shoulders. The word "surveillance" was chosen as the mildest expression for something which would not imply spontaneous control or interference with the local authorities unless the truce is violated'. (See summary record of the meeting held by UNCIP on 2 September 1948). The Commission also agreed that its surveillance would not extend to Gilgit.

"The Pakistan delegation took note of the United Nations Representative's statement on 2 September 1952 that he understood the term local authorities' to mean the person there who exercise effective authority' and that as regards surveillance' over the local authorities the United Nations Representative would seek to exercise it through the appointment of civil and military observes". In Geneva the representatives of the two Governments agreed on a revised proposal 9 to read as follows:

Revised proposal 9

The Governments of India and of Pakistan

Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shall be given to this by the time the process of demilitarisation mentioned in paragraph 6 has been completed on both sides of the cease-fire line. The several alternative proposals made by the United Nations

Representative for negotiations regarding the induction of the plebiscite Administrator into office In the original twelve proposals of 11 September 1950 the United Nations representative proposed on sub-continent. that the Plebiscite Administrator be inducted into office not later than the last day of the ninety day period of demilitarisation.

The Government of Pakistan agreed.

The Government of India then "doubted whether during the period of ninety days the firm will to settle the Kashmir question peacefully would have replaced in Pakistan the spirit and temper of war prevailing at the present time" (that is, at that time). The Government of India considered "that the proposal concerning the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator should be committed from the twelve proposals and be included in proposals having to do specifically with the holding of the plebiscite".

The United Nations Representative proposed in Paris in December 1951 that the Plebiscite Administrator be inducted into office on 15 July 1952.

The Government of Pakistan agreed. The Government of India held that if agreement could

be reached on the number and character of forces to be left on each side at the end of the period of demilitarisation; the other remaining differences (which included the timing of the induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator) could be settled without difficulty. In New York, the United Nations Representative suggested on 16 July 1952, for consideration in the conference proposed to be held in Geneva, that the Plebiscite Administrator be inducted into office not later than the final day of the demilitarisation period (ninety days) referred to in proposal 6.

The view of the Government of India is "that the Plebiscite Administrator can properly function only after (1) the process of demilitarisation is completed and the United Nations representative is satisfied that peaceful conditions have been resorted and (ii) the local authorities are recognized and are functioning on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line under the surveillance of the United Nations Representative. In the interests of agreement, however, the Government of India would be prepared to agree to his induction on the last day of the period of demilitarisation provided that it is completed according to plan and is exhaustive so that the Plebiscite Administrator would, as regards the forces remaining in the State after demilitarisation is fully implemented, be concerned only with their disposition".

It is the view of the Government of Pakistan "that second in importance only to the question of demilitarisation is the date by which the Plebiscite Administrator will be inducted into office. Under the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the Plebiscite Administrator has to be inducted into office as soon as the tribesmen, Pakistan volunteers and the Pakistan Army and bulk of the Indian Army have been withdrawn. The United Nations Representative's proposal that the Plebiscite Administrator should be appointed not later than the last day of the demilitarisation programme represents a big concession to the Indian point of view. Nevertheless, Pakistan is prepared to accept it as a part of the twelve truce proposals suggested by the United Nations Representative." The several alternative proposals made by the United Nations Representative regarding the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation.

In the original twelve proposals of 11 September 1951 the United Nations representative suggested in proposal 7 "that at the end of the period (90 days) referred to in paragraph 6

above there will remain on the present Pakistan side of the cease-fire line a force of civil armed forces, and on the Indian side of the cease-fire line a force of...".

The position of India was as follows: "As regards the civil armed forces to be maintained on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period agreed upon in the terms of paragraphs 6 and 9, the Government of India would agree to a force of 4,000, organised, equipped and composed as recommended to UNCIP in term C of the memorandum transmitted to the UNCIP under cover of a letter dated 13 April 1949 by the Secretary-General in the Ministry of External Affairs of India; that is, the forces (of 4,000) should consist of persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force should be commanded by United Nations officers or 'locals' and not by Pakistan officers."

The Government of Pakistan felt that a force of not more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should remain on each side of the cease fire line at the end of the demilitarisation programme envisaged in paragraph 7". The Pakistan Government however, expressed the view that some slight difference in the strength of description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached, so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line were of the order indicated above" In effect, proposal 7, as it stood, did not provide the basis for an agreement.

In the Paris sessions of December 1951, the Government of India emphasised that the Indian troops remaining in the State of Jammu and Kashmir at the end of the period of demilitarisation under this plan were over 7,000 less than the minimum stated in paragraph 8 of the Prime Minister's letter of 11 September.

This proposed remainder of 21,000 was estimated by India to be a reduction of over 30 per cent of the Indian and State armed forces present in the State at the time of the ceasefire on 1 January 1949.

The Government of Pakistan maintained its position that a force of no more than four infantry battalions (with the necessary administrative units) should be left on each side of the cease-fire line. The Pakistan Government was, however, prepared to agree that "so long as the forces on each side of the cease-fire line are of the order indicated above, some slight difference in the strength of description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached".

The disparity between the number and character of forces proposed by the parties continued to be wide. The United Nations Representative revised the relevant part of proposal 7 to read as follows: "so that on the date referred to in paragraph 6 above there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion of the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949."

This revised proposal also did not provide the basis for an agreement.

In New York the United Nations Representative, in his revised proposals of 16 July 1952 (S/2783, annex 3], suggested for the consideration of the two Governments, in a conference proposed to be held in Geneva, brackets of numbers in proposal 7 as follows:

(a) On the Pakistan side of the cease-fine line : (i) The tribesmen and Pakistan nationals not

normally resident therein who had entered the State for the purpose of fighting will have been withdrawn;

(ii) The Pakistan troops will have been withdrawn from the State;

(iii) Large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces will have taken place; so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be an armed force of. [the the United Nations representative suggests, as a basis for discussion, figures ranging from 3,000 to 6,000];

(iv) The remaining Azad Kashmir forces will have been separated from the administrative and operational control of the Pakistan High Command and will be offered by neutral and local officers under the surveillance of the United Nations.

(b) On the Indian side of the cease-fire line :

(i) The bulk of the Indian forces in the State will have been withdrawn;

(ii) Further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the Indian and State armed forces remaining in the State after the completion of the operation referred to in sub-paragraph

(b) (i) above will have been carried out: so that at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be an Indian Army force of [the United Nations Representative suggests, as a basis for discussion, figures ranging from 12,000 to 18,000].

These numbers did not include the Jammu and Kashmir Militia and the Gilgit and Northern Scouts.

The proposed brackets of numbers (12,000 to 18,000 on the Indian side and 3,000 to 6,000 on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line) not having provided the basis for an agreement, the United Nations Representative, in the further revised proposals on 2 September 1952 suggested for consideration by the representative of the two Governments an armed force of 6,000 on the Pakistan side and an Indian and State Army of 18,000 on the Indian side of the cease-fire line.

Since these two definite figures did not provide the basis for an agreement, the United Nations Representative then proposed on 4 September 1952 principles or criteria by which the number and character of forces could be determined, so that:

On the Pakistan side at the end of the period of demilitarisation there shall be the minimum number of forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite; and On the Indian side there shall be the minimum number of Indian and State armed forces that are required for the maintenance of law and order and of the cease-fire agreement, with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

Since this suggestion did not provide the basis for an agreement, the above principles or criteria were revised in other draft proposals on which agreement was not reached. The position of the Government of India regarding the character and number of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line was summarised in Geneva as follows [S/2783, annex 5]:

"1. Character and quantum of forces to remain on each side of the cease-fire line: "(I) The position of the Government of India as regards its own forces is as follows:

"(a) According to paragraph 4 of part II of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948, the Government of India must have the minimum forces required to assist the local authorities, i.e.. the Jammu and and Kashmir Government, on the India side of the cease-fire line in the maintenance of law and order; this term, according to the Commission, includes adequate defence.

"(b) Under subparagraph 4 (a) of the UNCIP resolution of 5 January 1949, the disposal of India and State armed forces on our side has to be with due regard to security, which in its connotation has a wider significance than law and order.

"(c) The Government of India is constitutionally responsible for the defence of the Jammu and Kashmir State, which includes aid to the civil power.

"(d) Having regard to these commitments of internal and external security, the responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement and the fact that Pakistan would be free to locate its forces as it likes within its own borders, which for some length are common with the borders of the Jammu and Kashmir State and for a still greater length within practically striking distance of the cease-fire line and important areas of the Jammu and Kashmir State, the Government of India considers that a minimum force of 28,000 is required.

"(e) However, on complete disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces and as a further gesture towards a settlement, it is prepared to effect a further reduction of 7,000, but it is impossible to reduce this absolute minimum figure of 21,000.

"(f) The Government of India will in no circumstances be prepared to include the Militia in these calculations. The Militia is a special armed police force which is under the administration of the Jammu and Kashmir Government for its normal law and order responsibilities and is only temporarily, for the period of emergency, under the operational control of the Indian Army.

"(II) The position of the Government of India as regards. forces on the Pakistan side of the case-fire line is as follows:

"(a) The Azad Kashmir Forces and the Gilgit and Northern Scouts have been newly raised or greatly augmented during the period of Pakistan's aggression. This has been done in violation of the Commission's assurance that Pakistan would not be allowed to consolidate its position to the disadvantage of the State. They are administratively and/or operationally under the control and direction of the Pakistan High Command. For these reasons they are indistinguishable from the Pakistan regular troops and must be disbanded and disarmed. This is necessary not only to honour the assurances given but also to restore peaceful and normal conditions in, and to facilitate the return of the refugees to, this area.

"(b) The administration of this area would, under paragraph 3 of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948, vest in local authorities to be established or recognized for the purpose; to these local authorities, under the same resolution, only local administrative functions have been assigned. In the very nature. of things such authorities can be in charge only of local law and order whether in the area or with reference to the cease-fire line. To give them any armed force equivalent to troops would not be consistent either with their status or with their functions and would be a violation to the sovereignty of the Union of India and the Jammu and Kashmir State. In the very nature of things, therefore, these local authorities can be entrusted only with a civil armed force.

"(c) The Government of India considers that having regard to all the circumstances of the case, a civil armed force of 4,000 would be on the liberal side considering the pre aggression strength of similar forces policing this area. However, they are prepared to consider an appropriate increase to provide for the needs of the northern areas or should the United Nations Representative, under whose surveillance these forces would be operating, make out a case that this strength is inadequate.

"(d) Having regard to the functions these forces are to discharge and the conditions of a fair and impartial plebiscite, these forces should consist of an equal proportion of Azad Kashmir and other elements. The Government of India would be prepared to agree to a suitable readjustment of the armed and unarmed portion of this force.

"(e) The civil armed force should be under neutral and local officers.

"2. Principles for the determination of forces to be left on either side of the cease-fire line :

"The Government of India considers that the principles enumerated in sub-paragraph 7 (a) (iii) and 7 (b) (ii) of Mr. Graham's proposal of 4 September 1952, were conceived in the right spirit having regard to the two UNCIP resolutions. As a basis for the evolutions of a suitable definition of functions. of forces on both sides of the cease-fire line they contained the germs of a settlement but despite several efforts to evolve a suitable draft in terms of the language used in the Commission's resolutions no understanding could be reached with the Pakistan Government. Since the evolution of such principles is basic to the question of the character and quantum of forces, the Government of India would point out that while the Commission's resolutions acknowledge its responsibilities in this respect in specific broad terms, the use of the term 'local authorities', the provision for the surveillance of the United Nations Commission, and the fact that these local authorities I have to carry on the mere administration of this area leave no doubt whatsoever that their law and order responsibilities are of a purely local character. The Government of India cannot accept any equation of its responsibilities with the local authorities on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line or agree to anything more than a local character to the maintenance of public order in that area by the local authorities. It would observe that constitutionally the defence of the entire State of Jammu and Kashmir is the concern of the Government of India and it alone is entitled to maintain a military armed force for the purpose. This is the only position consistent with the assurance given and the practice observed hitherto by the United Nations authorities of giving recognition to the sovereignty of the Indian Union and the State which derived originally from the Instrument of Accession and has since been embodied in the Constitution of India.

The position of the Government of Pakistan regarding the number and character of forces to remain on each side of the case of the case-fire line has been summarised as follows [S/2783, aenex 6]:

(1) Proposals of 16 July 1952 "Pakistan considers that after the processes outlined in

Paragraph 7 of the United Nations Representative's truce proposals of 19 July 1952 have been carried out; there should remain on each side of the case-fire line only the minimum forces necessary for the maintenance of law and order and the preservation of the case-fire line. "

UNCIP resolutions contemplated the retention of some forces on both sides of the ceasefire line for the purposes specified above. The character of the forces must, obviously, be the same on both sides of the case-fire line.

"There is no warrant in the UNCIP resolutions for the appointment of 'neutral' officers in command of the reduced Azad Kashmir forces. This proposal is also inherently unworkable. There is no shortage of suitable local officers to command the reduced Azad Kashmir forces."

(2) Proposals of September 1952 "Pakistan considers that the United Nations Representatives proposal that at the end of the demilitarisation programme contemplated in paragraph 7 of the proposals there should remain an armed force of 18,000 (exclusive of 6,000 Militia) on the Indian side, and an armed force of 6,000 (exclusive of 3,500 Scouts) on the Pakistan side leaves too many soldiers in the State. Before partition, the Maharaja's Government managed with less than a quarter of the forces suggested by the United Nations Representative (8,000 as against 33,500).

"The ratio on the date of the cease-fire was 5 to 4 in India's favour according to the Government of Pakistan, and 7 to 5 according to General Jacob Devers, the Military Adviser to the United Nations Representative." (3) Proposals of September 1952

"Pakistan fully agreed with the United Nations Representative that every effort should be made at the Conference itself to agree on the number and character of forces which should remain on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarisation programme. Failing this, the Conference should at least agree on the guiding principles for determining the number and character of forces.

"The Pakistan delegation felt that the words 'with due regard to the freedom of the plebiscite' used in sub-para graph 7 (a) (iii) and the phrase 'with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite' used in sub-paragraph 7 (b) (ii) of the draft proposals should be deleted. The object of this amendment was to avoid the recurrence in the Military Sub Committee of the political controversies which had held up progress in the main conference itself. If this amendment had been accepted, Pakistan would not have insisted on further reduction of forces under subparagraph 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution, and would have been satisfied with the disposition of all remaining forces by United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the respective authorities, and with due regard to the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite.

"Subject to the above observations, and some drafting changes, the Pakistan delegation was prepared to accept the United Nations Representative's draft proposals of 4 September 1952."

VII. Agreement on ten of the twelve revised proposals and partial agreement on another To quote from our report of 16 September 1952 [S/2783] submitted to the Security Council:

"The revised proposals of 4 September were agreed upon by the representatives of India and Pakistan to the following extent:

"(i) Proposals 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 (a) (i) and (ii), 7 (b) (i), 8, 9, 10, 12 and the provisional clause; with the redrafting of paragraphs 5, 6 and 9 as follows "5. Agree that the demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the United Nations resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 shall be effected in a single continuous process;

"6. Agree that this process of demilitarisation shall be completed during a period of ninety days, starting from the date on which the programme of demilitarisation referred to in paragraph 7 below is approved by the Governments of India and Pakistan, unless another period is decided upon by the two Governments; "9. Agree that pending a final solution the territory evacuated by Pakistan troops will be administered by the local authorities under the surveillance of the United Nations. Effect shall be given to this by the time the process of demilitarisation mentioned in paragraph 6 has been completed on both sides of the cease-fire line.

(ii) Concerning paragraph 12, the representative of India accepted it with the understanding that the differences referred to by the United Nations Representative should be only on technical details referring to the actual implementation of the agreed programme.

"(iii) In regard to sub-paragraphs 7 (a) (iii) 7 (b) (i)" on which an agreement has not been reached "the remaining difference in position of the Representatives has been stated in paragraph 25.

"(iv) Paragraph 11 of the proposals was deleted, to be substituted with another one to be agreed upon by the two Representatives, connected with the definite wording of paragraph 7 and with the functions and responsibilities of the United Nations Representative and the Plebiscite Administrator in accordance with sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the UNCIP

resolution of 5 January 1949."

viii. Suggested alternative approaches to the remaining differences on the demilitarisation proposals

In seeking to carry out the responsibilities entrusted to him by the Security Council, namely, to aid the parties in reaching an agreement on a plan of demilitarisation, the United Nations Representative proposed a twelve-point programme of demilitarisation as one step in the solution of a complex problem. He wishes to make clear to the members of the Council that the narrowing of the differences on the twelve point programme to one main point, upon which the whole plan depends, emphasises the depth of the difference on this point. As we have sought to remove many obstacles, surmount boulders and to narrow and more precisely to define the differences, the remaining difference on the issue of the number and character of forces is still deep. It is related to the differing conceptions of the two Governments, often set forth-and I cite the interim report of UNCIP (Official Records of the Security Council, Fourth Year, Special Supplement No. 7, document S/1430/Rev.1, paras. 200-202) and the report of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan to the Security Council (document S/2375 and Corr. 1, 15 October 1951, para. 35)-relating to first status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir secondly, the nature of the responsibilities of the appropriate authorities on each side of the cease-fire line after demilitarisation, and thirdly, the obligations of the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and of 5 January 1949 with the provision for a plebiscite.. Upon the acceptance of definite provisions for a plebiscite came the cessation of fighting. Under the two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 the consideration of the conditions and requirements for a free, fair and secure plebiscite would proceed in part from the studies of the Plebiscite Administrator.

Towards reaching an agreement on the remaining difference on proposal 7, the United Nations Representative made his suggestion for alternative approaches either through the establishment of the number and character of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation or through the declared policy that the number and character of such forces should be determined in accordance with the requirements of each area and, accordingly, that principles or criteria should be established which would serve as guidance for the civil and military representative of the government of India and Pakistan in the meeting contemplated in the provisional clause of the revised proposals.

The settlement of the Kashmir dispute involves the preservation of the existing cease-fire line, a proposed agreement on plebiscite demilitarisation, and certainly not less important, the requirements and conditions for holding the plebiscite. The peaceful settlement of the whole complex Kashmir problem is important for the State, for both nations, and for all nations.

To fail to solve the Kashmir problem rather than to bridge present differences is inconceivable as a practical policy in the face of a situation heavily charged with long accumulated high potentials. The peoples of the sub-continent have the opportunity to challenge the peoples of the world with their own adventurous programmes for both individual freedom and the general welfare, for both national security and world peace. For the peoples of the sub-continent to fail to solve peacefully the Kashmir problem and to drift or stumble into greatly increased danger rather than bridge the chasm which divides them would be a tragedy for the two nations and for the people of the world who look with hope to the humane leadership of two great peoples. Programmes now provide sustenance, freedom and hope for hundreds of millions of people might give way to violence. At this important and critical time in the history of the sub-continent, an agreement on Kashmir could be a great demonstration for peace by peace-minded leaders, whose position for peace would be reinforced by an agreement. In case of conflict and destruction, fear and hunger might stalk the villages, where most of the people live in the hopeful lands between the mountains and the seas. Violences and then tyranny might seek to feed on hunger and hatred while humane programmes were engulfed in the deep catastrophe.

The values of an early settlement of this dispute would, in my view, be tremendous for the 4 million people of the State, the 400 million people of the two nations involved, and the people of the world.

A settlement of this dispute would mean that status of the people of the State would be finally determined not by the sovereignty of princes but by the sovereignty of the people not by the might of arms but by the will of the people, not by bullets but by ballots, through the self determination of peoples by the democratic method of an impartial plebiscite conducted with due regard for the security of the State and the freedom of the plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

A settlement of this dispute might help to settle the dispute over evacuee property. It might thus help bring adjustment of the claim of the hosts of refugees who, in their tragic trek and counter-trek from one country to the other, left behind their homes and their property and yet carried in their minds and hearts the horrors of mass slaughter. These adjustments in belated justice would assuage some of the pain of their losses and memories and contribute much to raising the morale and increasing the productive energies of millions of people in both nations.

Moreover, the settlement of the Kashmir dispute would contribute much to the relief of the fears and tensions over canals and rivers from which come the waters for the fields, and the hopes of food and opportunity for millions of people. A settled basis for the co-operative development of the natural resources of the rivers and their wide valleys would make more promptly and broadly possible the connecting of the engines of production, transportation and communication with nature's ceaseless cycle of mighty but unharnessed power between the sun and seas, between the mountains, the snows, the rains. and the rivers, between the clouds and the lands of the vast sub-continent.

Food and freedom, goods and equal opportunity, health and education, dynamic hope and the liberation of the human spirit for the good life of these great, free societies can thus become the way of life of the peoples of India and Pakistan with all the meaning to the peoples of the world herein involved.

The cooperation of India and Pakistan in the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the self-determination of the people of the State, and in the allocation of larger budgets for constructive programmes, might become one of the turning-points in the history of our times towards the cooperation of all nations for the larger self-determination of all peoples; towards universal disarmament and the harnessing of atomic power for the moral equivalent of war in the campaigns against poverty, illiteracy and disease; and towards the more effective coordination of the national programmes, the "Point Four" programme, the Colombo Plan and the United Nations technical assistance programme for advances in agriculture and industry, health and education, freedom and peace, for all people.

On the subcontinent of Asia there is juncture of the forces of strategic geography, historic peoples, high traditions, ancient religions, human leadership, fresh national freedom and democratic power of high potential currents of for peace or conflict, weal or woe, in the present world. May the prompt, fair and peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute by the Governments of India and of Pakistan set the example, provide the leadership and point the way from fear and conflict to peace and hope for the peoples of the earth.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Kyrou (Greece) in the Security Council Meeting No. 572 held on 31 January 1952

Greece's interest in the dispute between India and Pakistan does not, of course, date only from its election to the Security Council. The Greek Government has followed the successive stages in the development of the question of Jammu and Kashmir, now with anxiety, now with hope, but always with keen and friendly sympathy. It has never lost its confidence in the wisdom of the two parties directly concerned. That is why I have read the two reports [S/2375, S/2448] submitted by the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan with great care, and why I listened with interest to his brilliant statement [570th meeting).

As was so eloquently said at yesterday's meeting, Pakistan and India are two highly important factors in the progress and civilization, not only of the continent of Asia, but of the whole world. May I add in this connection that it is only through fraternal collaboration that these two nations, descended from an ancient and noble common civilization, will be able to discharge fully the great responsibility which has been placed upon them. The fact that not only the outstanding leaders but also enlightened public opinion in the two States which comprise the sub-continent are fully aware of that supreme necessity, gives us confidence that the question before us will find a solution, and reason for hope in the future of Asian affairs. As the Netherlands representative so rightly said yesterday, the leaders of Pakistan and of India fully realise that the key question in the differences between them is the question of security. It is, I believe, the problem of security which dominates the scene, over and above all questions relating to the withdrawal of troops, the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator or the setting of the date for the plebiscite, Both the Karachi Government and the New Delhi Government know well that there can be no security without their fraternal agreement, and consequently they are resolved to reach such agreement.

That is why the anxiety felt by the friends of those two nations, indeed by the entire civilised world, during the first stages of the dispute is more and more giving way to feelings of hope. Only yesterday the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan told us with his customary calm confidence that his Government is convinced there can be no real solution of the question of Kashmir and Jammu save through friendly negotiations. I am sure that the Indian representative's speech will show the same spirit, and that he too will assure us of his Government's firm resolve to follow the same road.

May I pay sincere tribute to Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan for the constructive spirit, the sense of responsibility and the extreme moderation which he has once again shown. I am confident, I repeat, that the representative of India will follow. in his footsteps.

It is only right that I should associate in this tribute the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, who has achieved such practical results in his brief mission. Mr. Graham has succeeded, thanks to his patience, tact and understanding for everything human, in removing several points of difference he therefore well merits the Security Council's confidence. It is therefore our duty to uphold Mr. Graham's mission, strengthened by the fact of the support which the two parties directly concerned will continue to give him.

The Greek delegation unreservedly subscribes to the proposal made by the United Kingdom representative to permit Mr. Graham to continue his efforts for some weeks further, perhaps without fixing any date, as our Chinese colleague has just suggested.

I will even go further. I believe that we have no right to suspend an undertaking which started under such favourable auspices and which has already borne fruit. The possibility of terminating Mr. Graham's mission could only have been contemplated if the two parties directly concerned had expressed that desire or if Mr. Graham himself had told us that it could no longer produce any useful results. Fortunately, precisely the reverse happened. India and Pakistan recognize the advantages resulting from Mr. Graham's intervention. The result is that the United Nations Representative was in a position to state, in his second report, that agreement had been reached upon four further points of his demilitarisation proposals. Consequently, we have no right to terminate a mission which made a good start and continues to have every chance of reaching settlement on the four points still pending.

I even consider such a prolongation perfectly natural and I believe it should not be hampered by a too rigidly delimited mandate. I think it would be enough for us to outline the mandate and to leave its fulfilment to the parties concerned, the course of events and Mr. Graham's wisdom. So long as the final aim is the organisation of a popular plebiscite, there can be no misunderstanding. Let us leave it to the main protagonists, with Mr. Graham's help, to arrange the conditions for the demilitarisation that will make it possible to fix the date which we hope and believe will not be far distant-of the induction of the Plebiscite Administrator and the date of the plebiscite itself Although in the last resort the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir question is a matter for the people of that State, India and Pakistan have a supremely important part to play therein and the United Nations a useful mission to perform.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Kural (Turkey) in the Security Council Meeting No. 572 held on 31 January 1952

May I briefly explain my delegation's attitude with regard to the proposal made yesterday by the United Kingdom representative, which we fully support? Faced with a dispute which has already lasted so long-too long-we should of course have preferred to learn of its termination, or to be in a position ourselves to find a more positive and final solution to it. However, we fully realise all the difficulties and complications which are likely to arise in a task of this kind. We see grounds for encouragement and hope in the progress made up to now by Mr. Graham, who has succeeded in reducing the differences between the two parties to a small number of points-points which it is true are of some importance. But we believe that since Mr. Graham has been able to do such work hitherto, and since his efforts have met with success, he will, undoubtedly, if he is allowed to continue, succeed in the near future in reducing still further, and perhaps entirely removing, the differences which remain between the two parties.

It is in this spirit that we support this suggestion made yesterday by the United Kingdom representative. Since Mr. Graham is on the right path we believe that his work should not be suspended. That, I repeat, is the spirit in which my delegation supports the suggestion made yesterday by the representative of the United Kingdom.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Ross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1952

When the Security Council considered the report of the United Nations Representative during the 570th meeting, the United States representative observed that the practice of mediation is one of the greatest of arts and in our country Mr. Graham is one of its most distinguished practitioners, This fact is more apparent today than ever. The United Nations Representative has been continues to be as it has been, to build agreement brick by brick to form the structure of a settlement between two sovereign States. This is a purpose as simple to two sovereign States. This is a purpose as simple to state as it is difficult to accomplish in the tensions of the world in which we live and of which we are all a part.

Mr. Graham's second report and his oral presentation of it to the Security Council on 17 January 1952 are monuments, if one requires them, to this art of mediation which Mr. Graham so skillfully practices. His report is outstanding for one thing alone: It carefully states the issue. The issue is to find an agreed and I emphasise the word "agreed" and not an imposed solution for three questions "first, a definite period for demilitarisation: secondly, the scope of demilitarisation and quantum of forces that will remain at the end of the period of demilitarisation: thirdly the day for the formal induction into office of the Plebiscite Administrator".

Mr. Graham goes beyond stating the issue. He has put before the Security Council the principles in which it can be resolved. First there must be agreement of the parties if the settlement it is to be lasting and, naturally, agreement must involve compromise. One can search in vain in Mr. Graham's report for any suggestion or any implication of imposing a settlement that would force upon the parties or the people of Kashmir a political future not of their own choosing. He is attempting to bring about a free and impartial plebiscite. To use his own words when he addressed this Council two weeks ago [570th meeting]: "The plebiscite would keep the promise made to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, who are worthy of the right of their own self-determination through a free, secure and impartial plebiscite."

The second principle implicit in Mr. Graham's work is that this dispute must not be deadlocked but must show movement along the road to settlement. Time in our opinion is running against both parties. One side or the other might feel that delay will somehow favour its cause. But delay and frustration are not allies of either side; they are the moral enemies of both. The forces of chaos work internally and also from the outside. Time is not a luxury to any of us whose objectives and principles are fundamentally similar. Whoever would suggest in seriousness that all of the structure built so patiently brick by brick should now be abandoned ? Again I would let the United Nations Representative speak for himself. He told us two weeks ago that "the time is past when society can safely take slow decades and centuries to muddle through ..... adjustments''. He said: "Social drift and unsettled disputes' ' and he mentioned specifically the Kashmir dispute can "now involve mankind", if allowed to go unchecked, "in the swift and total tragedy of global war"

The United Nations Representative has put before the parties a twelve-point programme. It provides a logical and well-balanced framework in which to carry out the demilitarisation upon which the parties themselves have agreed and which they have also agreed is a necessary prelude to the holding of a plebiscite. Through that plebiscite, the parties have also agreed that the people of the State can exercise their right of self-determination.

My Government feels today, as it did when the United States representative addressed the Council on 10 November 1951, that these twelve points form a solid basis on which the parties can reach agreement. The last November, Mr. Graham has made progress. It has been slow, but progress there has been. He has translated the outstanding issues which I stated a sometime ago and which are now all that stand between the parties and a completely operative agreement. In some way or another, he tells us, solutions can be found for these problems.

We were struck by what he said on the fixing of a time for the induction into office of the Plebiscite administrator. He has called this a linchpin that would integrate his programme. My Government agrees. As we looks around the Council table and see the two parties to this dispute sitting here with the United Nations Representative, one sees in this fact alone tangible evidence of a desire to settle this case by the peaceful means which Members of the United Nations have obliged themselves to use in the settlement of disputes.

If we look back to Mr. Graham's report of 15 October 1951, there was agreement on four of these twelve principles. Then, in his report of 19 November 1951 [566th meeting], there was agreement on four more, thus reducing the issues to their bare bones. This is the progress which has been made up to now towards the settlement of the Kashmir question.

My Government feels that this progress has not been and should not be halted. In the coming weeks we shall look for clear evidence of movement towards settlement of the basic issues. The United States feels that none of the remaining issues is an insurmountable barrier between the parties and a peaceful solution, a Charter solution, an agreed solution. Not lightly should the parties, or any of us, cast away the fabric of agreement as it now exists.

The Security Council gave its representative a heavy task.

by its resolution of 30 March 1951 [S 2017/Rev. 1], which in paragraphs 3 and 5 instructed him to effect demilitarisation and analyse the points of difference between the parties. The Security Council has further instructed him, on 10 November 1951, in paragraph 2 of its resolution [S/2392] of that date: "...to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties on a plan for effecting the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir". This is precisely the task upon which Mr. Graham is now engaged.

Mr. Graham has narrowed the issues to two critical ones, and the emphasis, we feel, must now be put on resolving these two issues. The efforts of the next weeks will either see these issues resolved, or we shall know that patience, persistence and wisdom have once again been unrewarded, except perhaps by frustrations and dilatory manoeuvres. In this sense, Mr. Graham's continued effort might justly be described as a final one.

We agree that Mr. Graham needs no further directive from the Security Council, and we feel that his continued effort will necessarily involve his return to the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, and it will also involve a final report, which I should expect by the end of March, as various representatives have indicated this afternoon.

On 17 January Mr. Graham told us that negotiation is still the way to a solution of the unresolved issues. He also expressed the view that the time has met with the place and the opportunity to settle this dispute. We agree with this view.

We would also venture to express the hope that leadership by the parties-indeed, real statesmanship on their part will open the way to a successful negotiation and a speedy solution of this dispute which, in our view, has too long remained unsolved.

 Text of the Speech Made by Mr. Santa Cruz (Chile) in the Security Council Meeting No 571 held on 30 January 1952

This is the first opportunity the Chilean delegation has had in the United Nations to intervene in the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. I should therefore like to indicate briefly the spirit in which my country and its Government propose to participate in the efforts to settle this dispute.

In our opinion the entry of Pakistan and India into contemporary international life as fully independent and sovereign nations is one of the outstanding historical events of recent times. It marks a particularly significant stage in the renaissance which the Far and middle eastern countries are accomplishing with ever-increasing speed. India and Pakistan have needed but little time to take a decisive part in international affairs. We have all been witnesses of the growing influence exercised by their ideas and views in the various organs and activities of the United Nation.

By reason of their size, their large populations, their great natural resources, their geographical situation, their links and relationships of all kinds with the East and their relations with and experience of the peoples of the West, India and Pakistan are called upon to play an ever more important and decisive part in international life. One of them closely linked with the Middle East and the other with the various countries of the Far East, they can and are bound to become major factors in directing the stormy and irresistible movement for national independence and freedom of these vast area along lines which are consistent with the principles of international peace and friendship and the peaceful settlement of disputes, lines which do not run counter to but rather promote that growth of internationalism which is essential in a world that has now become so highly interdependent. With their experience, India and Pakistan will be able to guide this head long upsurge of hundreds of millions of human beings towards peaceful cooperation, and at the same time help to persuade those who, from a distant geographical political and ideological standpoint, have hitherto refused to comprehend the power, justice, and inevitability of the quickened process of evolution, and even revolution, of these historic times.

India and Pakistan are also needed to guide by their example and assistance the inescapable task of economic and social development in the East, and to assist in the difficult process of adapting to the inevitable technical revolution of the West a society based principally on great spiritual values and fettered by an age old backward economy.

We also believe that India and Pakistan, in the interests. of their 400 million inhabitants and of the international community as a whole, must devote all their material and moral resources to the consolidation of their promising but young political institutions and to the strengthening and modernization of their economic and social structure in order to raise their inadequate standards of living. The gigantic national and international task I have outlined calls imperiously for a state of peace. These countries cannot, as I see it, afford the luxury of diverting the economic resources which are urgently required to increase agricultural production and to build factories and industries to the maintenance of armies which may one day wage a war that will have all the characteristics of a fratricidal conflict. They cannot and they must not waste the spiritual energy needed for domestic progress and the great part which together they might play in strengthening world peace.

In short, we believe that apart from the obligation of every government to its own people and to the community of nations to do all that can be done to maintain peace, that obligation is one which these countries cannot possibility evade. It follows that in our view the chief responsibility, and above all the chief possibility of a solution of Kashmir, still rests with the Governments of India and Pakistan.

The Security Council, in successive resolutions accepted by the parties concerned, has laid the foundation, in accordance with the principles of the Charter, on which such a settlement should be based, namely, the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite carried out under the auspices of the United Nations. It rests with the Governments of India and Pakistan to see that the necessary atmosphere is created for the success of that process. For this, it is essential that there should be mutual good faith and above all, the determination to make certain sacrifices which will entail in particular the running of what they believe to be certain risks, since most unfortunately they are still parted by fears and suspicions that can be easily understood. I repeat that in my delegation's opinion it is the imperative duty of Governments of India and Pakistan to proceed along those lines.

We also believe that the United Nations should continue to do everything possible to assist in the conclusion of a settlement. We have read with great interest and attention the reports of Mr. Graham. First, we should like to make it clear that in spite of the accusation made against him by the representative of the Soviet Union at the last meeting, we agree with other delegations in believing that Mr. Graham deserves the full confidence of the United Nations. The stage already traversed towards agreement, the progress in clarifying the points of disagreement mentioned, and the spirit of true understanding of the problem which Mr. Graham has shown in his reports and in his statements to the Council, give firm ground for hoping that the United Nations will make an important contribution to the final settlement of these disputes.

The last part of Mr. Graham's speech at our 570th meeting gave, I think, a clear picture of the very correct attitude he has taken in the difficult task entrusted to him by the Security Council.

Therefore, unless the parties concerned express disagreement with the action taken by the United Nations Representative, our delegation is ready to support the continuation of his work for a reasonable period. Mr. Graham has succeeded in isolating and limiting the points of dispute. Like other speakers who have preceded me, I believe that the new conciliation efforts can concentrate on seeking a settlement of these points of difference.

For our part, we offer India and Pakistan our social cooperation in the Security Council in any action which they feel is likely to help in composing their differences. The countries of Latin America, by reason of their political and spiritual tradition, their racial composition, the similarity of their racial composition, the similarity of their economic and social problems, their identical conception of human dignity, all of which have so often found common expression in the United Nations, are well qualified to understand the special characteristics of the Asian peoples and their problems.

As a country, we are entirely disinterested in this matter and our attitude towards it is based solely on our preoccupation for the future of peoples whose progress we fervently desire, and on our concern for the maintenance of international peace.

Lastly, we should like to express our appreciation-and we believe the Indian representative will share our sentiments for the wisdom and sense of responsibility shown by the representative of Pakistan in resisting the attempts which we have witnessed here recently to transfer this quite specific and local Kashmir dispute to the controversial and almost impassable ground of the great international political dispute to which the USSR is one of the parties.

This is one more demonstration of the fact that nowadays. there are no local disputes. Every dispute, past or future, will be made use of in the cold war and the struggle for strategic positions. Any one of these disputes may be the starting point of the great conflagration which we all desire to avoid. Therein lies another, and a decisive, reason why the Governments of India and Pakistan should spare no effort or sacrifice to their reach a solution satisfactory to all and conducive to peace.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Muniz (Brazil) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 Jan, 1952

In the first place, I wish to thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan, for his very able and impartial expose of the question of demilitarisation from its origin until its present stage after the intervention of Mr. Graham.

The Brazilian delegation wishes also to pay a warm tribute to Mr. Graham for his earnest and painstaking efforts to bring about a solution of the dispute on the demilitarisation Not only of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a precondition of a plebiscite to decide the future of the disputed area. During his stay in the sub-continent, but also in New York and afterwards in Paris, Mr. Graham exerted himself through long negotiations with the interested parties, in order to bridge the difference on the question of demilitarisation.

Although the diligence and great wisdom with which he endeavoured to fulfil his difficult mission were not crowned with immediate success, we cannot say that his efforts were in vain or that they met with failure. In a matter such as this, involving old antagonism and exacerbated nationalism, the task of conciliation is a hard and long-protracted one. It requires patience, forbearance, constant application and the intervention of time with its healing qualities in order to bring the parties to see, above the passions of the hour, their real and permanent interest, and to produce the necessary adjustments leading to final settlement.

For the reasons which I have stated, the Brazilian delegation does not believe that the Security Council ought to consider Mr. Graham's mission as terminated. Nor does it consider that his past endeavours were fruitless. On the contrary, his twelve point proposal has greatly clarified the issue. We agree, therefore, with the suggestion of the United Kingdom representative that Mr. Graham, in fulfilment of the mission entrusted to him, should proceed again to the sub-continent and report to the Security Council at the end of March 1952 in order to seek to expand the area of agreement which has been enlarged through his intervention.

Another important consideration prompts my delegation to accept that suggestion. Within a few days the complete results of the Indian general elections will be known, and this fact is likely to exercise some influence on the issue and establish a favourable climate for the task of conciliation.

The Brazilian delegation is, therefore, of the opinion that a renewed effort to achieve conciliation at this juncture may greatly facilitate the settlement of the issue of demilitarisation.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Von Balluseck (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1952

On 17 January 1952 we listened to the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan present to us his second report, set forth in document S/2448. It will be remembered that the Security Council, in the resolution [S/2392] it adopted on 10 November 1951 by 9 votes in favour and 2 abstentions of demilitarisation which the one of which was the Soviet Union-noted with approval the basis for a United Nations Representative put forward to the Prime programme Ministers of India and Pakistan on 7 September 1951 [S/2375) annex 21. The Council further noted with gratification the declared agreement of the two parties to four points contained in Mr. Graham's proposals, and it instructed the United Nations Representative to continue his efforts to obtain further agreement of this parties and, not later than six weeks after the resolution came into effect, to give the Council a report and statement of his views concerning the problem confided to him.

We have now been able to acquaint ourselves with Mr. Graham's second report and with his own views concerning the problem confided to him. From this report I note with satisfaction that Mr. Graham has reached agreement on four more points of the proposals submitted by him to the parties, so that we may now take it that the parties have no objections to proposals 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8, 9, 11 and 12 of that plan.

In my intervention during the Council's meeting of 10 November 1951 [566th meeting], I stated that, notwithstanding the fact that the then remaining points of difference were of major importance, inasmuch as they were concerned with the actual implementation of the principles for demilitarisation, it nevertheless looked as though Mr. Graham had been able to narrow down the conflict to a reduced number of points at issue. I considered that in itself a matter of considerable merit and of definite improvement compared to what the situation had been before Mr. Graham went to work on his mission.

I also said that I trusted the parties would realise that, under the circumstances, they bore an increased responsibility for overcoming the final of obstacles that were still obstructing the way towards a solution, now that the gap seemed to have become less wide.

Mr. Graham himself came to the conclusion that, although he did not underestimate the remaining difficulties, "the possibility of arriving at a basis of agreement between the two Governments is not excluded". On the basis of that confidence My Government was able to agree to the recommendation of Mr. Graham to allow him to continue the negotiations with the two parties in order to obtain a further meeting of minds. Since in his second report, as I recalled just now, Mr. Graham was able to point to agreement on four more of his original proposals, the points at issue, which remain for the moment, are those contained in proposals 5, 6, and 10. I realise that these last four proposals are the most basic ones, and we also agree with Mr. Graham that agreement on those four proposals is most essential for carrying out the plan of demilitarisation he rightly wants to envisage as an integrated whole.

The Security Council would perhaps now be entitled to consider whether, in the face of these continuing disagreements on certain basic points which must be resolved to enable demilitarisation to be carried out, paragraph 6 of the resolution of 30 March 1951 [S/2017/Rev. 1] should not at this time be implemented. It seems to me that as long as there is a reasonable chance of further agreement through negotiation-and I am not yet prepared to give up all hope of this-we should give priority to the method of negotiation over the method of arbitration. On the other hand, the patience shown so far by the Security Council should not be misconstrued as lightning in any way the moral and political responsibilities of the parties themselves for the fulfilment of their definite commitments regarding the creation of fair conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.

These four remaining points are concerned with the implementation of the demilitarisation plan as a single continuous process which is to be completed, in the view of Mr. Graham, on 15 July 1952, unless the parties can agree and decide upon another date. They also concern the moment for formal appointment to office of the Plebiscite Administrator, and we now know that, in Mr. Graham's opinion, this appointment should not occur later than the final day of the demilitarisation period, that is to say, 15 July 1952.

The final point at issue concerns the armed forces which will remain on each side of the cease-fire line on 15 July 1952

Mr. Graham has suggested a scheme for withdrawal, reduction, disbandment and disarmament of the various groups of armed forces on both sides, as a result of which on 15 July 1952 "there will remain on each side of the cease-fire line the lowest possible number of armed forces based in proportion on the number of armed forces existing on each side of the cease-fire line on 1 January 1949"-that is to say, the moment when the cease-fire agreement came into force Since then we have been acquainted with the tentative plan for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir based on the original proposals of Mr. Graham and worked out in more detail by General Jacob L. Devers, Military Adviser to Mr. Graham. This tentative plan was, I believe, turned over as a suggestion to both parties, or at least released so that both parties could take cognizance of it. It follows the lines of Mr. Graham's original proposal but it has made an effort to fill in certain figures in proposal 7 of the Graham plan where the United Nations Representative refers to the lowest From the figures possible number of troops on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the demilitarisation period suggested by General Devers I gather that the total numbers of armed forces remaining on each side of the cease-fire line would then present a ratio of about 5 on the Pakistan side to 7 on the Indian side. At the same time General Devers has suggested a more detailed scheme for a reduction in stages of armed forces on both sides of the cease-fire line on the basis of the general ideas outlined by Mr. Graham and for which he has endeavoured to calculate exact figures and periods.

It is not my intention to pass a judgement on each suggestion. I believe that the members of this Council are hardly in a position to be able to judge the military situation and the military possibilities which prevail on the spot. However, these suggestions are from an authoritative source and are well worth our earnest consideration, as well as that of the parties concerned, and I submit that the material produced by Mr. Graham and his advisers might well form useful ground-work for further negotiations, this time perhaps on the very highest level.

I know that the parties hold divergent views on the security needs in and around the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Notwithstanding the acceptance by both parties of point 1 of Mr. Graham's original proposals in which the Governments of India and Pakistan reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures, and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir" notwithstanding those mutual assurances, there seem to linger uncomfortable feelings that such assurances are not sufficient in themselves. Two great States are facing each other across the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, and in their considerations the needs of their own security seem to play a considerable part. But I submit that the issue before us should in the first place be determined by the need of self-determination of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir themselves.

I may recall in this connection that both parties stand committed to the implementation of the UNCIP resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. Those resolutions constitute a framework which must now be definitely filled in. Both parties have repeatedly accepted the principle that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, either to India or to Pakistan, shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations after the cease-fire and truce arrangements will have been carried out. Therefore the freely expressed wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir must in the end prevail over the wishes and claims of the two bordering States.

It seems to me that it would be difficult to admit the right of either party for reasons of their own security to curtail the full freedom of choice by the people of Jammu and Kashmir. On the other hand we must not for a moment underestimate the responsibility which the United Nations has undertaken in connection with the peaceful solution of this matter. Through the efforts of the United Nations both parties have accepted a basis for a solution. Through the efforts of the United Nations Representative, Mr. Graham, both parties have reaffirmed their determination not to resort to force. For that reason a party which would break the solemn pledges would load upon itself a terrible guilt. There seems to be no reason to envisage such an eventuality for the moment. Therefore we should continue to place before every other consideration the conditions which must enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir to express themselves, free from any kind of intimidation or pressure.

My country has no direct interest in this matter except that it wants to see a conflict, which might in the long run jeopardise peace in the sub-continent, solved in a just and equitable basis. We have no particular reason to be for or against an accession of Jammu and Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan. Our only interest in this matter is one of principle, namely, that the right of self-determination for the people of Jammu and Kashmir must be respected and implemented. We are therefore willing and eager to explore every avenue that may lead to full agreement between the two parties to make that self-determination possible. Mr. Graham thus far has been able to secure agreement on eight points out of twelve. We would therefore consider it wise if he went on with his work for a further period of time to endeavour to bring the parties together on the remaining four points and we associate ourselves with what was said just now by the representative of the United Kingdom in this respect.

At the same time I think the United Nations, which has done so much to pave the way for a just and peaceful settlement of this question, is entitled to the greatest measure of constructive cooperation on the part of both India and Pakistan. It sometimes looks as though the balance in this essential cooperative spirit has not always been maintained. We sincerely hope that the parties will be ready to remove all obstacles in the path which must lead to a free plebiscite.

In conclusion, I wish to make a brief observation in connection with what was said during our meeting of 17 January 1952 by the representative of the Soviet Union. The USSR representative, in his statement, interpreted the intentions of the efforts which the Security Council has so far made to promote a solution of the Kashmir question in a manner which I fail to understand. I may recall that up to a few weeks ago the representative of the Soviet Union had taken very little part in the debates in the Security Council on this question. On the resolutions appointing Mr. Graham and approving his proposals, the representative of the Soviet Union abstained when the vote was taken. When Mr. Graham was appointed last year and when the USSR representative questioned the wisdom of filling this post by an American citizen, it was explained to him that every member of the Council had complete liberty to propose other candidates. The Soviet Union representative refrained from proposing any candidate and did not vote against the appointment. It is therefore a little surprising, to say the least of it, to find the USSR representative now accusing Mr. Graham and his assistants of being something like agents of the Pentagon. I do not propose to go further into this matter now, but merely wish to recall the conclusion the USSR representative in his speech on 17 January 1952 when he said that "the USSR Government considers that the Kashmir question can be resolved successfully only by giving the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide the question of Kashmir's constitutional status by themselves without outside interference" But I submit that this is exactly what we are trying to do and what we have been trying to do for years. The demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir is exactly meant to prevent partial and biassed outside interference with the free choice of the people of that territory. It is to that end precisely that my Government would like to see Mr. Graham continue his efforts

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 571 held on 30 January 1951

I have listened with great attention to the speech made by my friend, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan. We are all, I am sure, very grateful to him for the resume which he has given us of the negotiations conducted by Mr. Graham since the Security Council resolution of 30 March 1951, and we shall all doubtless wish to study the conclusions which he has drawn.

Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan has also, if I may say so, dealt most effectively with the allegations made by the representative of the Soviet Union in his intervention on 17 January with which, as the Council will recollect, I also dealt at the time. I do most sincerely hope that these extraordinary red herrings will not continue to be drawn across the trail and that the Council will return to the atmosphere of objectivity which, until the USSR representative made his last intervention, had always, I think I am right in saying, characterised its consideration of the Kashmir problem.

The representative of India will presumably, at some stage in our discussion, wish to comment on the views expressed by the Foreign Minister of Pakistan and to put forward the views of the Government of India on the points immediately at issue. In the belief that both parties will seek, so far as possible, to avoid controversy-which I know is the intention 1 have asked the President's permission to speak before the representative of India, in the hope that by putting before the Council certain proposals-constructive as we believe-we may be able to confine our discussion to a quite brief examination of the steps likely to carry this problem further forward towards a solution. In our long and painful consideration of the Kashmir question, we have as it were inched our way slowly forward, one step at a time. Now, however, seems to be the time to take one final step.

We have now had time to give proper study to Mr. Graham's second report and to the text of the important and helpful oral statement which he made to the Council on 17 January 1952. The United Kingdom Government had hoped, of course, that Mr. Graham, during the further period of six weeks in which he continued his negotiations with the two parties here in Paris, would succeed in resolving the outstanding points of difference between them. We had hoped that with the points of difference so clearly defined, the way would be found to reach agreement on them. I shall not, therefore, conceal the fact that the United Kingdom Government was deeply disappointed when Mr. Graham's second report showed that on the two basic points-the points which go to the very root of this problem of arranging a plebiscite în Kashmir-the differences between the Governments of India and Pakistan seem to be almost as wide as ever. As we know, Mr. Graham defined these two points in his oral statement as follows: first, the minimum number of forces to be left on each side of the cease-fire line at the end of the period of demilitarisation; and secondly, the fixing of the definite time when the Government of India would cause the Plebiscite Administrator to be inducted into office.

Agreement between the parties must clearly be reached under these two heads before we can hope to go forward to the plebiscite and to the final goal to which both the parties have pledged themselves: namely, a decision by the people of Kashmir whether the accession of their State should be to India or to Pakistan. How such agreement can best be brought about is, I submit, the matter which requires our immediate attention.

I do not wish to suggest to the Council that because these basic differences continue no progress has been made during Mr. Graham's tenure of office as United Nations Representative. On the contrary, I believe that there has been significant progress and that we are all greatly indebted to Mr. Graham for clearing a good deal of the ground towards a final settlement of the dispute In the first place, it has been a considerable gain, in our, view for Mr. Grahanı to formulate the main points on which agreement between the two Governments is required, in the form of his twelve-point proposal. This has introduced clarity into the consideration of the dispute and has disposed of a number of uncertainties and ambiguities which tended to cloud the earlier negotiations. Also, we must by no means overlook the importance of the eight points in Mr. Graham's proposals to which the two Governments have expressed their agreement.

It is because of the success which Mr. Graham has had in carrying his negotiations forward that the Government of the United Kingdom now believes that they should pay a further visit to the sub-continent to make one final attempt to bring about a solution of the two outstanding points of difference which I mentioned earlier. After all, we must admit that the circumstances for Mr. Graham's last round of negotiations were perhaps not entirely propitious. The Government of India was already preoccupied with the arrangements for its general election, which as we all know, on account of both the size of the country and the great extension of the franchise, has presented many difficult problems. The United Kingdom Government therefore hopes that, now that the Indian elections are, as I believe, virtually over, and now that both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan are ready-and we believe indeed anxious-to give their full attention to the task of working out an agreement on outstanding points continued negotiations by Mr. Graham will be fully justified.

Another reason which has moved us to suggest continued negotiation by the United Nations Representative is that, by going to the sub-continent, he might be able to arrange for representatives from both sides, able to speak for their Governments, to meet together under his chairmanship to discuss how best to resolve the differences at present preventing demilitarisation, the plebiscite and the final settlement of the dispute, Indeed, he might find the situation such that it would be possible for the two Prime Ministers themselves to met under his chairmanship. That might happen. I express this hope, because we think that such joint discussion offers the best hope of speedy progress. Of course, Mr. Graham would have to decide himself when the moment was appropriate for them, and we would not wish in any way to limit his discretion. But, should he decide that joint discussions were desirable, we trust that he would find the two parties ready to fall in with his proposals for bringing them about.

It is scarcely necessary, I suppose, for me to say that the United Kingdom Government is fully aware of the urgent need for a settlement of this dispute and for some early and tangible proof that the Security Council and its representative, Mr. Graham, are carrying matters forward towards a settlement. I would therefore suggest that if the procedure which I have just put before the Council is adopted, Mr. Graham should report back to the Council on the results of his further negotiations by the end of March. I think it is most important and I am sure that Mr. Graham himself would agree-to set some limit

in this way for any further round of negotiations. There is no need to speak of terms of reference, I think, for the negotiations which I have suggested. In a long series of resolutions, the Council has already clearly defined the path along which a settlement has to be approached. The two parties, by their acceptance of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, are themselves pledged to a programme for achieving a settlement. Mr. Graham himself, by the twelve-point proposals which he has submitted to the parties in furtherance of the principles contained in the resolution of 30 March 1951, has already set the course which he will follow.

Throughout his negotiations, Mr. Graham has clearly been guided by two main principles, with which the United Kingdom Government-and, I have no doubt, the government of most other members of the Security Council-is in complete agreement. The first is that, in order that the plebiscite shall be demonstrably fair and free from any external pressure, the number of troops on both sides of the cease fire line should be reduced to the absolute minimum compatible with the need to preserve law and order and internal security, and that both parties should cooperate to this end in a spirit of mutual trust and good will. The second is that once the process of demilitarisation and preparation for a plebiscite has started, the momentum should be maintained until the whole operation is completed.

The twelve proposals which Mr. Graham put to the two parties last September, and has since been discussing with them, are firmly based on these two principles and we feel satisfied that they are on the right lines. As I have already said, agreement has been progress in defining more closely the other four. In our view the object of the new discussions between the parties should be to build on these proposals of Mr. Graham's to consolidate the progress already made, and to tackle the outstanding points of difference on the basis of the two principles to which I have referred in a resolute effort to reach agreement on them.

In paragraph 32 of his second report, Mr. Graham has expressed views on the four outstanding points of difference. We have no doubt that these views, coming from such a source, will be taken fully into account by the two parties. We also greatly hope that, with the object of setting themselves a target, the parties will, as suggested by Mr. Graham, aim at 15 July 1952 as the date by which the process of demilitarisation should be completed and the Plebiscite Administrator inducted.

As I see the position, Mr. Graham can now return to the sub-continent in pursuance of the existing mandate, no new resolution being necessary. May I refresh the memory of the Council by reading paragraph 2 of the Council's resolution of 14 March 1950. [S/1461]. That part reads as follows;

"The Security Council...

"2. Decides to appoint a United Nations Representative for the following purposes who shall have authority to perform his functions in such place or places as he may deem appropriate : "(a) To assist in the preparation and to supervise the implementation of the programme of demilitarisation referred to above and to interpret the agreements reached by the parties for demilitarisation;

"(b) To place himself at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan and to place before those Governments or the Security Council any suggestions which, in his opinion, are likely to contribute to the expeditious and enduring solution of the dispute which has arisen between the two Governments in regard to the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

"(c) To exercise all of the power and responsibilities devolving upon the United Nations Commission by reason of existing resolutions of the Security Council and by reason of the agreement of the parties embodied in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 ;

"(d) To arrange at the appropriate state of demilitarisation for the assumption by the Plebiscite Administrator of the functions assigned to the later under agreements made between the parties;

"(e) To report to the Security Council as he may consider necessary, submitting has conclusions and any recommendations which he may desire to make."

Mr. Graham, of course, in succeeding Sir Owen Dixon to this appointment under the resolution of 30 March 1951, has inherited all the powers and responsibilities of the office of United Nations Representative and, as we see it, he is therefore fully entitled to return to the sub-continent if he believes it desirable and if the Council does not disagree. To sum up, I earnestly hope that my colleagues in the Council will feel able to concur in our view that Mr. Graham should, as part of his continuing function as United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, make a further visit to the sub-continent to continue his negotiations with the two Governments and that he should report the result of these negotiations to the Council by the end of March 1952.

If this is the general sense of the Council, I hope that the representatives of India and Pakistan will agree that these further negotiations should be undertaken and that they will be able to offer the full cooperation of their Governments to Mr. Graham in bringing them to a successful conclusion. Clearly less controversy between the parties in the Council at this. stage, the greater will be Mr. Graham's chances of finding a readiness in the sub-continent to conclude the settlement which we have all so long and earnestly awaited. May I therefore appeal to our colleagues from India and Pakistan to hammer out their differences round the conference table with Mr. Graham rather than at the Security Council table.

This time we must all hope that the hammering out process will produce agreement rather than new lacerations. We must all try to show the world that the United Nations' way, long and arduous though it be, is the right way to solve our mutual conflicts. We must all, by our help and our encouragement, do our best to preserve faith in our democratic institutions. I think that it is the privilege of India and Pakistan to be able to point the way to the happier world community of the future.

 Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. T.F. Isiang as representative of China in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November 1951

As the representative of China, I should like to state that my delegation will vote in favour of the joint draft resolution [S/2390] which points out the way in which the Security Council, for the time being at least, can be of best service to India and to Pakistan. Mr. Graham is eminently qualified to undertake this difficult task.

Reading his written report and hearing his oral report before the Council have convinced me of Mr. Graham's insight into the problem, his impartiality and his deep friendliness to both India and Pakistan. I hope that both parties will give him hearty co-operation.

A number of delegates have called our attention to the matter of the Constituent Assembly in Kashmir. When the world Press first reported the possibility of such a Constituent Assembly in Kashmir my delegation went on record in the Security Council as believing that such a Constituent Assembly I could not be allowed to prejudice, far less foreclose, the question of the accession, of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. We still hold to that view. I hope that Mr. Graham's renewed effort will result in a final solution of this important question.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sarper (Turkey) in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November 1951

We have already explained the connection with this dispute in the statement which I made to this Council on 29 March of the year [538th meeting]. If you will permit me, I shall read a sentence from the statement which I made:

"First of all, we are deeply disturbed and concerned because of the existence of such a dispute between two sister nations, to both of which we have the greatest admiration."

I now want to explain very briefly the vote we are about to cast on the draft resolution which is before the Council now, that is, document S/2390.

My delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution tabled jointly by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom. However, in doing that it is the intention of this delegation to reaffirm the provisions of the fifth paragraph of the resolution adopted by this Council on 30 March 1951. I shall read this, if you will permit me, because we attach some importance to the provisions of this paragraph.

The fifth paragraph reads as follows:

"Affirming that the convening of a Constituent Assembly as recommended by the General Council of the 'All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, and any action that Assembly might attempt to take to determine the future shape and affiliation of the entire State or any part thereof would not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with the above principle". that is to say, the principle of the resolution adopted on 30 March.

At the same time, I should like to express the hope that the parties to the dispute will abide by the dispositions of this paragraph in particular and of the resolution in general.

10111951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Albornoz (Ecuador) in the Security Council Meeting No 566 held on 10 November 1951

The delegation of Ecuador for the same reasons which induced it to support the resolution on the problem at the 539th meeting of the Security Council in New York will vote in favour of the draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom and the United States.

At the same time it expresses the hope that, within the period indicated in paragraph 4 of the operative part of the draft resolution, progress will be made towards a greater degree of understanding between the parties so as to bring closer the achievement of the Security Council's intention that the problem finally be solved on the basis of a peaceful, democratic, free and impartial expression of views by the peoples concerned, as is expressly restated in the first paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolution.

10111951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Chauvel (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November 1951

The French delegation will be happy to vote for the draft resolution before the Council. The importance of the question of Kashmir cannot be overestimated. Obviously very considerable interest is moved, but surely it is of overriding importance that the difficulties connected with that question should be solved.

The French Government has steadfastly supported past efforts for disposing of this heavey which not only places a strain on the relation between two countries that for many reasons to be drawn closely together but which, as a consequence, also impairs the political stability of a vast area of the world.

My Government congratulates the United Nations representative on the manner in which he has discharged his functions so far. It has most felicitously noted the spirit of moderation which the parties involved display and which is described in certain chapters of the report (these are the chapters referred to a short while ago by the representative of the United States). It regards as a good omen that Mr. Frank Graham himself should be suggesting the renewal of his mission. My Government makes a special point of encouraging Mr. Graham in his further efforts and is confident that both the governments concerned are sincerely anxious to facilitate his task.

00111951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Muniz (Brazil) in the Security Council Meeting No 566 held on November 1951.

I had occasion in New York, when presiding over the Security Council, to express the appreciation of the Council, and of the Brazilian delegation, for the excellent work done by Mr. Graham in his mission of bringing the parties to agreement on the question of demilitarisation. The report of Mr. Graham, as presented to the Security Council, is the best evidence of the sincerity and earnestness of his efforts and of his fitness for the mission entrusted to him.

The Brazilian delegation will support the joint United State United Kingdom draft resolution [S/2300], which in our opinion is in keeping with previous decisions of the Security Council on the matter and represents a continuation of the efforts made by the United Nations towards the peaceful settlement of the India-Pakistan question and of the problems arising out of the demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir. The comprehensive report submitted by Mr Graham

[S/2375] gives us a very clear picture of the differences outstanding between the two governments and shows the necessity of promoting and furthering the negotiations between the Governments of Pakistan and India. This is why the Brazilian favours the joint draft resolution before the Council, which allows for a further exploration of all possible approaches to the matter.

In voting for the draft resolution, the Brazilian delegation makes its earnest appeal to the Governments of India and of Pakistan to do their very best to make the new effort at conciliation succeed. I am sure that this appeal expresses the aspirations and the concern of as peoples, who see in the continuation of this conflict a source of grave danger to world peace.

10111951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Von Balluseck (Netherlands) in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November 1951

The very serious issue before us, which has endangered the relations between two great nations of the Asiatic sub continent for almost four years, has not yet found a just and reasonable solution acceptable to the parties. As a result of this absence of agreement it has remained impossible for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a whole to exercise their fundamental right of self-determination, although this right is not contested by the parties. On the contrary, the right of self-determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir has been clearly and formally recognized and accepted by all concerned. The lack of agreement therefore does not concern this right of self-determination. It concerns the ways and means and procedures to establish the conditions for a fair expression of the will of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir who want to make their choice free from any kind of fear or intimidation.

When I spoke about this problem before the Council on 29 March 1951, I contended that the issue should, in the last analysis, be decided by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir themselves, and not the rulers heretofore placed over them, and that no prearranged political organisation in any part of the State concerned, and set up under the auspices of authorities which had already made their, choice should interfere with their complete freedom of choice.

For that reason my Government welcomed the paragraphs in the preamble of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 30 March 1951 to the effect that the convening of a Construction Assembly for the purpose of determining "the future shape and affiliation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir" could not constitute a disposition of the State in accordance with principle of determination through the democratic methods of a free and impartial plebiscite set up under the auspices of the United Nations. In this respect I associate myself entirely with what was said just now on this aspect of the matter by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States.

We have now before us a draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States of America based on the recommendations of the report of Mr. Frank P. Graham. It should be recalled that Mr. Graham and his very capable assistants arrived on the sub-continent on 30 June 1951. We know that he and his staff have done their utmost to conform to the terms of reference which required him to report to the Security Council within three months of the date of his arrival on the sub-continent.

It was our firm hope that the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan would, at the end of this term, be able to announce complete agreement between the parties, and it is a matter of deep regret to us that this has not been possible and that a further extension of time for negotiations seems to be inevitable. We know full well that the matter. under consideration is not an easy one. We know that although the parties have agreed on the necessity for a fair plebiscite, and even on the principles for demilitarisation, which must establish just conditions for such a plebiscite, there has been and still is disagreement as regards the interpretation of these principles. This difference of interpretation has made it impossible so far to formulate a truce agreement, and in the absence of such a truce agreement, implementation of the demilitarisation remains impossible.

It is in our opinion, one of the great merits of Mr. Graham's report, that he has analysed the question of demilitarisation in a very clear and concise manner. He has put before us a number of proposals which he placed before the parties, and he has told us on what points of these proposals these parties have agreed and also where they continue to differ. Fortunately these are numerous points where agreement was found possible. do not for a moment underestimate the importance of the fact that the parties were willing to reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and not to make warlike statements. It is also of great moral value that both parties reaffirmed their will to continue to observe the ceasefire agreement and to continue to accept the principles that the question of the accession of the state of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a true and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

In all these matters we found a reaffirmation of good intentions, and we earnestly hope that this is a step towards producing an atmosphere where the grave tensions between the two nations may gradually be lessened and ultimately disappear. But good intentions are not enough. The solution of the problem before us must be based on deeds-peace through deeds. In order to enable the people of Jammu and Kashmir freely to exercise their right of self determination, we must solve the problem of demilitarisation and pave the way for the plebiscite administrator supervise the final choice.

Mr. Graham, in his report, has placed before us four points of difference on the proposals which he has submitted to the parties. These points are of major importance. They concern the actual implementation of the demilitarisation as an introduction to the plebiscite itself. principles for Nevertheless it looks as though the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan has been able to narrow down the conflict to those four points. That in itself is a matter of considerable merit. We hope that we shall be justified in saying that this constitutes an improvement compared with what the situation was before Mr. Graham went to work on his mission. We trust that the parties will realise that under the circumstances they bear an increased responsibility for overcoming the obstacles that are still obstructing the way towards solution, now that the gap seems to have become less wide.

Mr. Graham himself, according to his report, has come to the conclusion that "although he does not underestimate the difficulties, the possibility of arriving at a basis of agreement between the two governments is not excluded,"

We fervently hope that the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan will prove to be right in his estimate On the basis of his confidence, my Government is willing to agree to the recommendation of Mr. Graham, where he suggests to the Security Council that he should be instructed to continue negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan in order to obtain an agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Such negotiations, continues Mr. Graham in his report, should be carried out at the seat of the Security Council and instructions should be given to the United Nations representative to report to the Security Council within six weeks. I realise that in meeting the wishes of Mr. Graham, the Council would for the moment deviate from paragraph 6 of its own resolution of 30 March 1951.

In this draft resolution the parties to the conflict, in the event that their discussions with the United Nations representative fail to result in full agreement, are called upon to accept arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference reported by the United Nations representative. However, as long as there is a reasonable chance that further negotiations may result in agreement, my Government is willing to keep this opportunity open during the period of six weeks suggested by Mr. Graham.

In the light of my foregoing remarks, my Government recognizes in a general way the draft resolution now before us. The adoption of the draft resolution would mean that the Council noted with approval the basis for a programme of demilitarisation such as Mr. Graham put forward to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. It would also mean that the United Nations representative would have an opportunity to continue his efforts to obtain agreement of the parties and, finally, that the United Nations representative would be instructed to report to the Council on his efforts not later than six weeks after this resolution came into effect. This, in our opinion need not mean that the solution might not be reached within a shorter time. We would welcome a shorter time because every delay can only increase the risk of growing and explosive tension between the parties. As Mr. Graham has himself said before the Council [564th meeting), delays in demilitarisation cause talk of war. Talk of war causes delays in demilitarisation. We must break this vicious circle and the sooner we can do it, the better it will be.

Mr. Graham's own suggestion regarding further negotiations within a period of six weeks was that they should be carried out at the seat of the Security Council. I do not find the reflection of this suggestion in the draft resolution [S/2390] now before us. I sincerely hope that this does not mean that the period of six weeks will have to be spent in part in activities involving a great deal of travelling which would mean loss of valuable time, for once again my Government believes that we must indeed be conscious of the necessity to save time. By saving time, we avoid dangerous risks which, if not deterred,

might compromise the work of peaceful settlement that we are trying to achieve. In the sense of what I have already stated, my Government will support the joint draft resolution.

10111951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November, 1951

Looking back at the last meeting of the Security Council on this subject of the India-Pakistan question [564th meeting]. I think of it as a memorable one. It was memorable for the eloquence and wisdom with which the United Nations representative put his report before us. I too, regret that he is not able to be here today with us; I understand he is confined to a hospital room and I am sure that we all wish him a speedy recovery.

Our last meeting on this subject was memorable also, I think, because the presence of Mr. Graham in this case is, in our view, in itself a fact of positive importance. The statement which Mr. Graham made to the Council at that meeting demonstrates that he approached his task with an open mind and only one desire-to be of the utmost service to the Security Council, whose insistent wish it is to see this question settled promptly and with justice. Mr. Graham has stated his belief that both parties now realise the vital importance of a peaceful settlement of this issue. However, both his report [S/2375] and his statement to the Security Council show his awareness of the difficulties to be surmounted before he will have succeeded in assisting the parties to affect the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with their undertakings. Such a result would, as he put it, give a lift to the spirits of people who are struggling to be free, and although he feels it is a possibility which is not to be excluded, at the same time he does not under-estimate the difficulties. of arriving at t. So much is clear from Dr. Graham's report and statement.

It is impossible to believe that either the Government of India or of Pakistan underestimates the apprehensions with which all friends of the people of the Asian subcontinent view the protracted continuance of the dispute with which we are dealing. There is but one thought in the minds of those who have at heart the interests of these two great peoples : the removal of this inflammatory and dangerous source of friction on a basis which has been agreed to by the parties. Another positive fact in this case is that the leaders of India and Pakistan have made judicious and restrained statements in discussing with the United Nations representative the issues on which agreement has not yet been reached. As a result of Mr. Graham's work during the past three and a half months he has suggested that a new effort should be made to proceed with the plan of demilitarisation and that a United Nations representative-he modestly does not mention himself-should continue these efforts and report to the Security Council within six weeks In short he asks for a little more time.

My Government is hopeful that the other members of the Security Council and the parties will agree that we are fortunate to have the skill and the faith of Mr. Graham and that we should pave the way for him to continue his efforts along the lines which he suggests in his report, and this is what the joint draft resolution [S/2390] is designed to do to give him the support, the encouragement and the time. My Government feels that the proposals for demilitarisation as set out by Mr. Graham form a solid basis upon which the parties can reach an agreement. The draft resolution itself does not, of course, deal with the details of the proposals themselves. It does endorse the principles underlying the proposals and the basis for a programme or, as Sir Gladwyn Jebb put it a few moments ago, the broad lines of the programme of demilitarisation which Mr. Graham laid before the parties in their negotiations.

It is a hopeful fact that the parties, during the course of the discussions with Mr. Graham, have reaffirmed their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures. They have also reaffirmed their determination to observe the cease-fire agreement and their acceptance of the principle of an accession of the state by a free and partial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. I think that these facts are dealt with property and with approval in the first paragraph of the operative part of the draft resolution. The apprehensions of the world concerning the present situation on the subcontinent of Asia, to which I have referred, underline the decisive importance of effecting demilitarisation. Truly the gap between agreement to demilitarise and the actual accomplishment of demilitarisation is the long gap between promise and performance, between success and failure.

The Security Council has repeatedly expressed concern also at the convening of a Constituent Assembly which might purport to decide the question of accession by some means other than a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. I confess that my Government is troubled at the press reports, if they are correct, of Sheikh Abdullah's address to the recently convened Constituent Assembly, in which he is reported to have made the point that this Assembly has sovereign status, and that the decision and I quote the statement attributed to him-"has the irrevocable force of law." We will all recall that the representative of India stated to the Security Council on 1 March, 1951 [533rd meeting] that, so far as the Government of India is concerned, the Constituent Assembly is not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in its way. He went on to say on 29 March [538th meeting] that any opinion which the Constituent Assembly expresses will not bind the Government of India, nor prejudice the position of the Council. The members of the Security Council were gratified to hear these assurances repeated at our 548th meeting on 29 May, 1951, and I recall that it was during that same meeting that I had the occasion to express the concern of the United States Government regarding an earlier statement attributed to Sheikh Abdullah that the Constituent Assembly would purport to make a definitive decision on the question of accession.

These facts, therefore, lead me to restate what I have on behalf of my Government twice before observed to the Security Council, and most recently on 29 May, 1951, that so far as we view the matter any attempt to decide the issue without the consent of both parties would leave only a constant and explosive irritant in the relations between two governments, an irritant which might well prevent the bringing about of peace and security in South Asia.

On the other hand, it is reassuring that Prime Minister Nehru has recently been quoted as saying that India stands by its commitments to the Security Council, and as feeling that the United Nations representative has gone a long way towards success. The joint draft resolution [S/2390] correctly restates what has always been the view of the Security Council, that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations. It is goes without saying that, in our view, the Security Council would have no choice but to regard any attempts by the Constituent Assembly to settle this matter itself as null and ineffectual. Since our last meeting, the peoples in India and Pakistan have, together with the peoples of the rest of the world, suffered a tragic event which deprived the world of a great leader and a wise statesman. Often in history the martyrdom of an individual sharpens the realisation of the gravity of problems and thus draws people closer together. The President of the United States, in a message to the Government of Pakistan, said that the memory of the Liaquat Ali Khan will long remain a guide and inspiration to the Government and people of Pakistan.

We are all fortunate that the policies and principles for which the Liaquat stood are now in the distinguished custody of the new Prime Minister, Khwaja Nazimuddin. Prime Minister of India stated on 17 October, As the

"All of us should now approach the large question of Indo-Pakistan relations in a new way and try to hush the voices of controversy and dispute and also try to find some way or path consistent with our self-respect and honour to establish real peace between India and Pakistan."

In concluding, I should like to say that my Government accepts the sober optimism of the United Nations representative. We entirely agree with his view that the settlement of this issue could have the most far-reaching results for the people of India and Pakistan as well as for the peoples of the world. In co-sponsoring with the United Kingdom the draft resolution before us, we suggest to the Security Council a simple and direct means of giving the United Nations representative a further opportunity to continue the practice of his art, because mediation is one of the greatest of the arts, and in my own country Mr. Graham is known as one of its most distinguished practitioners. The Government of the United States therefore recommends the draft resolution to the parties and to the Security Council.

10111951  Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 566 held on 10 November, 1951

In his report [S/2375] presented to the Security Council on 18 October, a copy of which we have in front of us, Mr. Graham, the United Nations representative for India and Pakistan, recommended that if the Security Council decided in favour of a renewed effort to obtain the agreement of the Governments of India and of Pakistan to the proposals for demilitarisation which he made to them, he might be instructed to continue his negotiations with the parties.

Members of the Council will, I am sure, share our own admiration for the ability and devotion brought by Mr. Graham to this difficult task. They will equally, I am sure, support my view that, if in Mr. Graham's view there is any chance that, by a further comparatively brief period of negotiation, agreement between the parties can be reached or substantial progress towards agreement made, that chance should be taken. That Mr. Graham does consider a prospect of further progress exists is evident. It is therefore the opinion of my Government and, I believe, of the Government of the United States who are the co-sponsors of the draft resolution [S/2390] which is now in front of you, that this recommendation of Mr. Graham's should be accepted.

This forms the central feature of the draft resolution which instructs the United Nations representative to continue his endeavours to obtain the agreement of the parties to a plan for demilitarisation and to make his report to the Security Council within six-weeks from the coming into force. of the resolution.

The draft before the Council is a brief and simple one and one that I hope both parties will be able to accept without reservation. We are, I am sure, all agreed that Mr. Graham's prospects in this further mission, in which we fervently wish him all success and I am only sorry that, being indisposed, he is not here this morning, so that I am not in a position to wish him success personally-will best be served by the avoidance now of any lengthy debate. We have not felt that any detailed restatement of the United Nations representative's terms of reference was needed. He will still be operating within the framework of the Security Council's resolution of 30 March last [539th meeting]. He will in fact be trying to complete, in the additional six-weeks now proposed, the task assigned to him under that resolution. I do not think that I need go into any lengthy exposition of this draft resolution, but I should like to draw the attention of members of the Council to the second paragraph of the preamble.

My Government has felt it important that Mr. Graham and the parties should be left in no doubt of the Council's approval of the manner in which he performed his task and of the broad lines of the programme for demilitarisation which he laid before the parties.

There is one further question not directly touched upon in the draft resolution to which I must refer. Members will recall that the Council's resolution of 30 March reminded the governments and authorities concerned of the principle embodied in the various Security Council and United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions on Kashmir, that the final disposition of the State should be made in accordance with the will of the people expressed through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations.

The resolution went on to point out that the convening of a Constituent Assembly by Sheikh Abdullah's Government in Kashmir and any action taken by that Assembly to determine the future shape of the State would not constitute a disposition of the state in accordance with the above principles.

Finally, the operative part of the resolution called on both parties to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement.

Now, since that resolution was adopted, a Constituent Assembly has been convened by Sheikh Abdullah's Government. Its inaugural session in Srinagar has just ended, and speakers, including Sheikh Abdullah, have referred to the question of the future of the State. As far as I can judge, the Constituent Assembly itself has not sought to pronounce on this issue of accession.

I should like, if I may, to make it clear that His Majesty's Government attaches great importance to those portions of the 30 March resolution dealing with this subject, and I think it is pertinent to recall the assurances given to this Council from time to time by the representatives of India that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly is not competent to take any decision on the question of accession; and that, though it cannot be prevented from expressing its opinion on this subject, this opinion will not bind the Government of India or prejudice the position of this Council

Those solemn assurances have been strengthened by a recent statement made by Mr. Nehru which I am sure my colleagues from Pakistan and members of the Council will welcome. I should like to quote the relevant portion of this statement if it has reached me. In answer to a question about the effect which the convening of the Kashmir Constituent Assembly would have on the current United Nations proceedings in Paris, Mr. Nehru said:

"We have made it perfectly clear in our statement in the Security Council that the Kashmir Constituent Assembly, so far as we are concerned, does not come in the way of a decision by the Security Council; that stands completely."

That is a quotation from what Mr. Nehru said. Mr. Nehru went on to emphasise India's wish for the earliest possible plebiscite, and to state that India stood completely by her commitments to the Security Council. These are very welcome statements, and I am sure they augur well for Mr. Graham's further mission.

It is, therefore, with real confidence in the chances of Mr. Graham's success, that I recommend the adoption by the Security Council of the draft resolution which is now before it.

18101951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Graham (United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 564 held on 18 October, 1951

In this hour of the bereavement of the people of Pakistan and grief in India and the world in the death of the Prime Minister of Pakistan, Liaqat Ali Khan, I wish again to express my sympathy to Begum Liaqat Ali, who served him through the years with intelligent devotion, and to the people of Pakistan whom he served with high dedication. For many years he was the right arm of the founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinah, militant shephered of the Muslim people. In these last years, as the first Prime Minister, Liaqat Ali Khan was the eloquent voice of the mind and heart of the hopeful young nation. As the chief bearer of the burdens and hopes of eighty million people, he led them in troubled times to a high position among the nations of the world.

He is another witness to the fact that some of the noblest spirits of our time are born of the spiritual heritage and democratic hopes of the peoples of the South Asian subcontinent. He bravely laid his life as a sacrifice on the altar of peace. May his faith in peaceful procedures still prevail among the people. In his sacrificial death, he lives and carries on for his people. His immortal spirit, in cooperation with other noble spirits of the living and the dead of both countries, will work mightly for an early settlement of the Kashmir dispute in the advancement of the co-operative progress of two great peoples and the peace of the world.

I wish to express our grateful appreciation to the Governments of India and Pakistan for their generous hospitality, courtesies and co-operation.

To the Secretary-General and his associates, I am thankful for their cooperation in the selection of the able and experienced members of the advisory and administrative staff. The competence, industry and loyalty of the staff are the stuff out of which is woven the fabric of teamwork and the devotion of a mission to the principles and procedures of the United Nations. I list them again here in gratitude: Mr. Petrus Schmidt, a veteran of the Korean and Eritrean United Nations Missions, principal secretary, and his assistant, Mr. David Blickenstaff, political and liaison officer; General Jacob Devers, former Commander of the Sixth Army during the Allied offensive into Germany and former Commander-in Chief of the United States Ground Forces, Military Adviser, and his aide, Colonel Joy, Dow, also pro tempore acting information officer; Mr. Miguel Marin, experienced political and legal adviser, whose services with the united Nati Commission for India and Pakistan have given him first-hand knowledge of the documents, proceedings and reports of UNCIP; Lieutenant-Colonel and Professor William B. Aycock, a veteran of Patton's Third Army, personal assistant to the United Nations Representative and pro tempore liaison officer; Mr. Philippe d'Esterno, formerly of the United Nations staff of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Plebiscite Administrator designate since 1949, political officer and acting information officer; Mr. Edward Lawson, leader in the movement for civil rights, United Nations social affairs officer and adviser on minority problems; Miss Audrey Awen, administrative assistant; Miss Mary Robertson, Secretary to the United Nations Representative; Miss Louise Crawford, secretary pro tempore; and Sergent Richard Hainey, secretariat aide to General Jacob Devers.

It would be remiss not to recall the able and devoted work of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in 1948 and 1949, through whose good offices were achieved the cease-fire and the acceptance by both Governments of its resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, both of which, together with the three reports of UNCIP [S/1100, S/1196, S/1430 and Adds. 1, 2 and 3], constitute the reference frame of our Mission; of General A. G. L. Mc Naughton, former war Commander of the Canadian Armies, as the mediating President of the Security Council in December, 1949; and of Sir Owen Dixon, the internationally distinguished Justice of the Australian High Court, as the first United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, whose. summary report [S/1761 and Add. 1) is a basic document in the Kashmir dispute.

We should in these troublous times be mindful of the competent vigilance, during many arduous months in a rugged terrain along the cease-fire line, of General R. H. Nimmo and his United Nations military observers from many lands, and of his predecessor, Brigadier Harry Angle, who, together with some of his observers and air crew, lost his life in the crash of the United Nations plane, and of General Delvoie, the first military adviser to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of the air services of Major H. W. Robertson and his crew, and the administrative services of Mr. Mark Short and his staff, who remain stationed on the sub-continent with General Nimmo General Jacob Devers, our Military Adviser, has expressed a high tribute to the leadership, discipline, morale and co-operative spirit of both armies.

To the Security Council we are grateful for the opportunity and rich experience of coming to know something of the background, lives and struggles and hopes of two great peoples. Upon the settlement of their differences may largely depend on the peace, freedom, welfare and progress not only of the two nations on the sub-continent but also of all the nations on the earth.

These differences have resulted from conflicting interpretations of the obligations of the two Governments regarding demilitarisation under the provisions of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which both Governments had accepted.

It is of decisive importance that these differences be resolved. The longer they remain unresolved, the more difficult it is to reach a settlement, because of the vicious circle which delay itself creates. For example, during the summer the Government of India expressed grave concern over talk in Pakistan of a holy war against India. During the summer also, the Government of Pakistan expressed grave concern over the lack of an effective demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and over Indian troop movements near the border of Pakistan.

The lack of an effective agreement on demilitarisation causes impatience and indignation among the people of Pakistan, and, among some elements, talk of a holy war against India. Delays in demilitarisation cause talk of war. Talk of war causes delays in demilitarisation. One of the problems. close to the heart of the matter is to find a way to bring to an end this circle apparently without an end. It is my hopeful faith that the high capacity for social, political and military inventiveness of the leaders of the two countries, with continued mediation of the United Nations, will soon find a formula to end the talk of war and bring about demilitarisation.

To resolve these differences and break the vicious circle, twelve proposals were submitted to the parties as a basis for a draft agreement.

I shall not here recapitulate the whole report, which is already in your hands. I shall now simply give the main substance of the twelve proposals, submitted to the two Governments on 7 September 1951 for consideration as the basis for an agreement, and the positions of the two Governments regarding these twelve proposals. In doing this, I shall, since the report is a composite work with my staff, include mainly by direct quotation from the report the main differences between the parties, the conclusions and the recommendations, and then make some-purely personal observations. First I quote from the central body of the report as follows:

In order to assist in the creation of an atmosphere conducive to the adoption of a plan of demilitarisation, and to narrow the differences between the parties with regard to such a plan, the United Nations Representative presented the proposals contained in the draft agreement as specified below. The official replies of the two Prime Ministers expressed not only the desire of their respective Governments to settle peacefully their differences regarding the State of Jammu and Kashmir, but also their willingness to take definite steps to relieve the cumulative tensions between the two peoples".

First, let us consider proposals 1 to 4: "49. Paragraphs 1 to 4 of the proposed agreement deal with general principles. Their objectives were as follows:

"A. To meet a threat of recourse to war, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan

"1. Reaffirm their determination not to resort to force and to adhere to peaceful procedures and specifically pledge themselves that they will not commit aggression or make war, the one against the other, with regard to the question of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;"

"B. To meet the problem of detrimental propagandhi, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan

"2. Agree that each Government, on its part, will instruct its official spokesmen and will urge all its citizens, organisations, publications and radio stations not to make warlike statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of jammu and Kashmir;"

"C. To meet alleged violations of the cease-fire, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan"

"3. Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire effective from 1 January 1949 and the Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949;' "D. To meet the situation created by the convocation

of a Constituent Assembly in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the United Nations Representative proposed that the Governments of India and Pakistan "4. Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that

the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations :'

"50. The replies of both Governments indicated that they were favourable to these first four clauses of the proposed agreement........."

"55. Paragraph 5 of the proposed agreement was drawn up as follows:

"The Government of India and Pakistan.........

"Agree that subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 below, demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir contemplated in the UNCIP's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 should be effected in a single, continuous process."

"56. Agreement that the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be effected in a single, continuous process implied, in the opinion of the United Nations Representative, the implementation of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution, together with sub-paragraphs 4 (a) and (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution as a whole..."

"57. The position of the two Governments on this proposal may be expressed as follows:

"India

"The Government of India agreed that demilitarisation should be effected in a single continuous process in so far as it combined the demilitarisation envisaged in sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the 5 January 1949 resolution with part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution but not to the extent of including the substantial part of sub-paragraph 4 (a) of the 5 January 1949 resolution. India was therefore willing to withdraw the bulk of the Indian forces plus some of the remainder. so as to leave on the Indian side of the cease-fire line one line of communication area head-quarters and one infantry division... but of four brigades of four battalions each, provided such a plan calls for complete demilitarisation on the Pakistan side of the cease-fire line, except for a civil armed force of 4,000 persons normally resident in Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be followers of Azad Kashmir and the other half persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force, according to the Government of India, should be commanded by United Nations officers or 'locals' and not by Pakistan officers.

"Pakistan

"The Government of Pakistan agreed that demilitarisation should be effected in a single continuous process subject to the provisions of paragraph 11 of the proposal of the United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan. The demilitarisation", according to Pakistan, "envisaged in 4 (a) and (b) of 5 January 1949 resolution should be combined with the provisions of part II of 13 August 1948 resolution. Pakistan was therefore willing to accept large-scale disarming and disbanding of the Azad Kashmir forces in a plan for the implementation of part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution, provided such a plan calls for withdrawals of the balance of the Indian forces (after the bulk) and a reduction of the State armed forces and State Militia "

So much for proposals 1 to 4 and 5. Now with regard to proposals 6 to 12:

"58. The principles for a plan of demilitarisation were set forth in paragraphs 6 to 12..."

Their main substance is implicit in the replies of the two Governments to these proposals, which also indicate the main differences regarding proposals 6 to 12. The replies of the Governments of India and Pakistan to paragraph 6 to 12 of the proposed draft agreement, as they have been summarised in the report, indicate, in the opinion of the United Nations Representative, that the points of difference between the two parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of demilitarisation on the basis of the draft agreement can be established as follows:

With regard to the period of demilitarisation the Government of India greatly doubts whether, during the period of ninety days, the firm will to settle the Kashmir question peacefully would have replaced in Pakistan the spirit and temper of war prevailing at the time. The Government of Pakistan agrees that the phase of demilitarisation should be completed as suggested during a period of ninety days, unless another period is decided upon by representatives of the Indian and Pakistan Governments.

Concerning the withdrawal of troops, the Indian Government is readly to withdraw the bulk of the army when the tribesmen, Pakistan nationals not normally resident in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and the Pakistani troops have been withdrawn from the State and large-scale disbandment and disarmament of the Azad Kashmir forces have taken place.

The Government of India maintains that further withdrawals or reductions, as the case may be, of the India and State armed forces remaining in the State after the complete withdrawal of the bulk of the Indian forces, cannot be related to the period of ninety days. Both the period during which these further withdrawals or reductions are to be made, and their phasing and quantum, cannot, in the opinion of the Government of India, be determined at present.

The Government of Pakistan agrees to the withdrawals as proposed in the draft agreement, emphasising that the term "further withdrawals or reduction" mentioned in sub-paragraph 7 B (ii) refers to large-scale reductions and disarmament.

The Government of India agrees that on the Pakistan side of the cease fire line at the end of the period agreed upon, there should be a force of 4,000 men, consisting of persons normally resident in the Azad Kashmir territory, half of whom should be persons who are not followers of Azad Kashmir. This force. should be commanded by United Nations officers or "locals" not Pakistan officers.

India states that there will remain on its side of the cease-fire line in Jammu and Kashmir one line of communication area headquarters and one infantry division of four brigades of four battalions each.

The Government of Pakistan maintains that the same standards should apply to the status of the forces to be left on side of the

The Government of Pakistan considers that a force of no more than four infantry battalions, with the necessary administrative units, should remain on each side of the cease fire line at the end of the demilitarisation programme. Pakistan, however, agreed that some slight difference in the strength or description of the two forces should not stand in the way of an agreement being reached. With regard to the Plebiscite Administrator, the report states in paragraph 60, point 4:

"(a) The Government of India considers that the proposals concerning the appointment of the Plebiscite Administrator should be omitted from the agreement. According to the Indian Government, they would be more appropriately included in proposals that deal specifically and in detail with the holding of the plebiscite and connected matters.

"(b) The Government of the Pakistan emphasises the importance of appointing the Plebiscite Administrator formally to office as much in advance of the final day of demilitarisation as possible."

From this analysis, the following conclusions are drawn in the report: "62. Due to the situation prevailing on the subcontinent, as explained in chapters II and III, it was not possible to effect demilitarisation during the time available as the United Nations Representative under his terms of reference.

"63. The United Nations Representative has set forth in chapter III the main differences between the two Governments, not only in regard to their interpretation and execution of the UNCIP's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 concerning demilitarisation, but also in regard to points of difference between the parties concerning the proposals made by him for an agreement on a plan for demilitarisation. The United Nations Representative considers that, by doing so, he has carried out the instructions contained in paragraph 5 of the resolution of 30 March 1951 of the Security Council.

"64. It is with satisfaction and hope that the United Nations Representative emphasises the fact that the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan, in their replies to his proposals for an agreement, expressed their willingness to :

"(a) Reaffirm their determination. force; not to resort to

"(b) Agree that each Government, on its part, will...... ...urge all its citizens...... not to make warlike statements........

"(c) Reaffirm their will to observe the cease-fire...... ;

"(d) Reaffirm their acceptance of the principle that the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under the auspices of the United Nations.

"Considering the results of the informal consultant jobs held by the United Nations Representative with the Governments of India and Pakistan, and the written replies received from the two Governments to his letter of 7 September 1951, and considering further the points of difference formulated at the end of chapter III of this report, the United Nations Representative has come to the conclusion that, although he does not underestimate the difficulties, the possibility of arriving at a basis of agreement between the two Governments is not excluded."

With regard to recommendations, the report in chapter V states the following: "Accordingly, the United Nations Representative recommends to the Security Council:

"1. That the Security Council call upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to take immediately all measures to improve the relations between the two countries by avoiding any increase of their military potential in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and by instructing their official spokesmen and urging all their citizens, organisations, publications and radio stations not to make war-like statements or statements calculated to incite the people of either nation to make war against the other with regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir;

"2. That the Security Council consider the possibility of a renewed effort being made to obtain an agreement"-may I emphasise oral agreement-"of the parties to a plan for effecting the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir;

"3. If the Security Council decides that a renewed effort to obtain an agreement should be made, it might consider instructing the United Nations Representative to implement its decision by continuing the negotiations with the Governments of India and Pakistan in order to obtain an agreement of the parties to a plan for effecting the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Such negotiations should be carried out at the seat of the Security Council, and the Council should instruct the United Nations Representative to report to the Council within six weeks." The United Nations Representative in making these three recommendations, because of his faith in the two Governments. wishes now to make an additional purely personal statement to emphasise the possible far reaching results of an early agreement on the implementation of the provisions for demilitarisation to the people of Jammu and Kashmir, to the people of India and Pakistan, and to the people of the world.

With respect to the value of a settlement to the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the first significant result which would proceed from an agreement would be the exercise by the people of Jammu and Kashmir of the promised right of self-determination for which they have been anxiously waiting for three years. It would recognize the enduring idea that, in the long run, the sovereignty which proceeds from princes is subject to the sovereignty of the people who, after all, under God, are the highest sovereignty. Any status based on the compulsion of force by either nation or on the attrition of long delays in settlement would not be permanently accepted by the people of the State or of either nation, would not be in accordance with the principles and spirit of the United Nations, would not have the support of the moral opinion of mankind, and therefore could not long endure.

As a practical matter, without fulfilment of the promised right of self-determination through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, the continuing dispute, as has been well said, would become a running sore, which would tend to drain away resources and energies to the damage of the State and the peoples of both nations.

Furthermore, an agreement on the provisions for actual demilitarisation as a fair condition for holding a free plebiscite would obviously be welcomed by many peoples of Asia who, out of their long and recently victorious struggles for self-determination, have a most sympathetic concern. Such an agreement would give a lift to the spirit of peoples anywhere struggling to be free.

As to the value of a settlement to the peoples of both nations, the chief road-block in the way of the cooperation of India and Pakistan is the Kashmir dispute. The prior settlement of the Kashmir dispute. The prior settlement of the Kashmir dispute would help clear the way for the settlement of other disputes of importance to the life of millions of people in India and Pakistan. Without knowledge of and without any thought on my part of going into the merits of any other disputes, it is appropriate to point out that the importance of the other disputes adds even more to the high importance of settling the Kashmir dispute. The settlement of the dispute about which there is the most bitterness would remove the main barrier to the spirit of co operation between India and Pakistan necessary for the settlement of the disputes over evacuee property and waterways. In pointing out the importance of the disputes over evacuee property and waterways. I mean only to emphasise the higher importance of first settling the Kashmir dispute

The lack of settlement of the evacuee property issue gives millions of people, including their families and friends, a deep sense of grievance and injustice which is damaging to the creative energies and hopes of both peoples. These refugees from communal slaughter, uprooted from the land, who passed or counter-passed each other on the trek from one country into the other, have called forth the heroic efforts of both nations for their rehabilitation. To assuage some of the sorrow in their hearts and the horror in their memories, an agreement to adjust for them in their new country the values. of their lands, homes, shops and other property left behind in the old country would relieve some of the tension between the two peoples and add to the productive energies and morale of both nations.

The co-operative spirit, enhanced by a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, would also likely facilitate the settlement of the dispute over rivers and canals. This dispute is another obstacle in the way of the cooperation of India and Pakistan in the development of a programme for the maximum use of the water resources to the advantage of both. Too much the waters from the hills and mountains wash away the precious topsoils, pile up the slit in the rivers, and go their wasteful way to the sea. The river valley systems can be cooperatively developed for the storing of vast water resources, conservation of the soils, irrigation and reclamation of the lands for the production of foods and fibres and for the generation of power to meet the urgent needs of the peoples of the whole sub-continent. Out into the waste places and up the hillsides would move the mills and factories with their creative power, and down from the hills would come tumbling the rivers for the electrification of civilization, cleanly charged with the potentials for the production of foods ,fibres, goods, books, leisure, culture and something more of the good life for the further self-development of the high natural and spiritual capacities. of the people of India and Pakistan.

During the past several months, along with my task of finding out the present differences between the two nations. over Kashmir. I have been trying to find out their historic differences in fundamental ideas and ways of life. I have read through scores of books and piles of related material, talked with many people in my line of duty and observed the life and scenes about me. I have, within the narrow limits of my time, my ability and opportunity, tried to dig deep into the centuries to find the origin and depth of these differences.

Though I am still in the midst of explorations, even the fragments of my findings move me to say that it is important for the peoples of the sub-continent and the world that every efforts should be made promptly by the two Governments and by the United Nations to settle this crucial dispute between the two pep'es. Despite all the history, experience and hopes which the two peoples have long had in common, a present crucial dispute too long unsettled might become too heavy. charged as to connect the currents of present differences with high potentials of profound historic differences. An unsettled dispute over Kashmir must not be allowed to overspread and engulf two nations in the horrors of fratricidal strife. Disputes dragging along over demilitarisation in one State must not be allowed to overspread and engulf two nations in the horrors of fratricidal strife. Disputes dragging along over demilitarisation in one State must not be allowed to drift into an unintended catastrophe for a whole sub-continent. A local spark must not become a global conflagration. It would be tragic for all peoples for the conditions on the sub-continent either to drift or to explode into war, which be ruinous for both nations and disastrous for the world.

The damaging results of unsettled disputes and the vast human needs of hundreds of millions of the people of the two nations emphasise the need in the mind and hearts of men and women of goodwill in both India and Pakistan for a settlement of this most crucial dispute. Furthermore, the mutually destructive fears, bitter memories and profound differences make imperative the finding of moral substitutes through the development of projects for creative international co-operation between the two peoples. International conferences between leaders and representatives of the two peoples can promote the co-operative development of water resources, hydro-electric power, economic programmes, scientific research, health projects, university exchange, intercollegiate sports, youth conferences, women's associations, civic clubs and every other fundamental field of international co-operation for a freer and fairer life. With full and final acceptance of each other's national independence and with full loyalty to their own high spiritual heritage and indigenous ways of life, the two peoples have opportunities for the needed positive programmes of cooperation as various as the life of the people on the long peninsula between the seas, as wide in scope as the vast sub-continent, as annual as the monsoons and as high as the mountains from which come the waters of life for the people.

An agreement on the provisions for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir may provide the example of international cooperation for peace for which the peoples of the world hope in their day's work and pray in the sanctuary of their hearts. The leaders and the peoples of India and Pakistan want peace. Yet these two great peoples are turned from a larger realisation of their far-visioned programmes by fears of possible war on the sub-continent. The great masses of the people of the British Commonwealth, the Soviet Union, the United States and all the other nations of the world want peace. Nevertheless, a billion and a half people in two opposing worlds are turned from a larger fulfilment of their humane programmes by the fear of a third world war.

The intellectual, political and spiritual leaders of India and Pakistan have the most strategic opportunity, through the settlement of a complex and stubborn dispute, to give to the United Nations and to the peoples of the world a desperately needed example of international co-operation for freedom, self-determination and peace.

The United Nations, with all its growing pains and frustrations, is the only international body for the settlement. of the most difficult international disputes. The failure of peaceful settlement of such deep disputes has involved the world in tragedies too terrible to risk again. The United Nations, with all its defects, is nevertheless, with its multilateral procedures for the peaceful settlement of complex disputes, still the best hope of the peoples for peace.

The call comes to the peoples and the leaders of India and Pakistan not only from the United Nations but also from the homes and the common life and hopes of hundreds of millions of human beings all over the earth who toil in the fields and factories, people in the villages, towns and cities, mothers and fathers in homes, refugees without homes, sons and daughters dreaming of homes of their own, children in schools and without schools and the un-numbered millions of human beings disinherited by war and hate. The call comes from the people of our common human family around the earth who hope for homes and work in freedom and peace for themselves and their children.

On the vast Asian peninsula between the seas guarded by the highest mountains on this earth, developed one of the most advanced ancient civilizations of prehistoric times. Out of the basic Dravidian-Indo-Aryan stocks with Greco, Scythian, Arab, Persian, Turco-Afghan, Mughal and British elements and influences, have developed the peoples of India and Pakistan. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the French and more especially the British made the sub-continent an inter-dependent part of the great commercial revolution by which the new lands of America and the old lands of India and the East became the mighty pivots upon which the mediaeval turned to the modern world. The Hindu epics, traditions and folk dramas, the Koran, the Islamic traditions, the assimilations of great religions; the values and treasures of great languages and literatures the principles of the common law and the fundamental rights of the common man, the struggles of the peoples on that sub-continent, on the foundations of their own ancient spiritual heritage, for the principles of civil liberties, federalism and parliamentary government, of the basically humane people against whose imperial rule the peoples of the sub-continent struggled-all are now combined together in the ancient heritage and fresh hopes of the great peoples of India and Pakistan.

From the heritage and hopes, life and struggles of these peoples, great leadership has developed from the times of Ashoka to Gandhi and Nehru and from the days of Akbar to Jinnah and Liaqat Ali Khan. Out of the crossing of ancient faiths and modern science, old customs and modern. democracy, frustrations and hopes, patient sufferings and victorious struggles in great causes, have developed some of the noblest spirits of our time, always overburdened, sometimes baffled but never daunted on that sub-continent as they grapple with the problems of poverty, hunger, disease, illiteracy, religious intolerance, caste, class and exploitation of untold millions of people struggling toward a higher freedom.

On the southern sub-continent of Asia and in many lands east and west, men and women of goodwill are working and hoping through the long days and nights, against the desperate hours of a darkening age, to redirect the possibilities of the self-destruction of civilization to the potentialities of creative co-operation of nations in a great adventure of the human spirit through the United Nations, pioneering along the far frontiers of the vast wilderness of our yet unmastered civilization.

As a key part of this forward movement of freedom, an agreement on the provisions for the actual demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, by preparing the way for a free and impartial plebiscite and the self-determination of the people, would prepare the way for the settlement of other disputes and the larger co-operation of the Governments and peoples of India and Pakistan: it would strengthen the democratic and moral ties of the Indonesian, Southern Asian, North African, South-eastern European and Mediterranean world, not as a bloc but as a spiritual force for freedom and peace, and might bring about a reorientation of the relations of East and West for a decisively human turn in the tragic history of our times.

The great leadership of the peoples of India and Pakistan, by the settlement of this crucial dispute, might set in motion a spiritual chain reaction which, we pray, would encompass the earth with the moral power or mankind in behalf of human freedom, the self-determination of people and the cooperation of nations for the peace of the world.

Through the statement of the Kashmir dispute, through the mutual respect for the national independence and high values of both peoples and through the cooperation of both nations in their far-visioned educational, agricultural, industrial, social. scientific, medical and humane programmes for the equal opportunity, the more abundant and spiritual life of all their people, may I readapt, in a spirit of brotherhood with both great peoples, a hope which I once expressed for my own beloved country.

May India and Pakistan be nations in which, in the larger fulfilment of their own ancient heritage and youthful hopes, in response to their own great leaders, the people more and more become brothers in the sight of God and in the human heart; where the lowest and the highest and all the people equally together have the freedom to struggle for a higher freedom; where life is made richer by the vigour and variety of the differences of the people; where the answer to error is not terror, and the response to a difference in religion, race, colour, economic condition or social status is not discrimination, exploitation or intimidation. Where and when men are free, the way of progress is not subversion, the respect for the past is not reaction, and the hope of the future is not revolution; where the majority is without tyranny and the minority without fear, all people have hope for freedom, peace and brotherhood in the long human pilgrimage, under God, toward one world neighbourhood of human brotherhood.

An agreement regarding the provisions for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be one decisive step toward the fulfilment of this long hope, to which India and Pakistan and the nations of the world are committed by the noble principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

29051951 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Quevedo (Ecuador) in the Security Council Meeting No. 548 held on 29 May, 1951

The determination of the future political affiliation or allegiance of Jammu and Kashmir by the constituent assembly which is to be convened would be a violation or an attempted violation of the international agreement between India and Pakistan whereby the question is to be settled by means of a plebiscite. It would also be a failure to recognize the authority of the Security Council, and finally, it might prevent a peaceful settlement of the question.

At the meeting of the Security Council on 30 March, fearing that such an assembly might be convened and might take the decision referred to today, I said when the draft resolution approved at the meeting was being discussed [539th meeting]:

"If there is any criticism to be made of the draft resolution, I think it is that its operative part, seeking not to depart from the area of agreement already reached by the parties so that implementation may be achieved, is not explicit enough in its statement of the requirements which seem in the present situation to be just, necessary and indispensable to the holding of a truly free and impartial plebiscite to express the desire of the people of Jammu and Kashmir.".

I then added :

"Inasmuch as India and Pakistan have agreed that the final status of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite, that must be our point of departure and the legal and political basis for the Council's action.

"Upon this basis, in our opinion," I said, "it can only be inferred that:...the constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be considered as representing the people as a whole or as a free manifestation of the people's will, and the decisions of such an assembly can neither change nor deprive of their effect the international undertakings entered into by India and Pakistan in respect of the plebiscite."

I added that a free and impartial plebiscite presupposes that the electors shall be free from pressure, threats, intimidation or compulsion in any form by the local authorities, or by military or police forces (whichever they are called) in the territory during the preparation and holding of the plebiscite.

If therefore, the constituent assembly of Jammu and Kashmir were to do what is suggested in the speech of Sheikh Abdulla quoted by the delegation of Pakistan and made on 4 May, that is, convene the assembly in order to decide the future allegiance of this State, on the assumption that no one can veto its decision, it seems to me that the Security Council, which has today taken note of the statement made by the representative of India, should state beforehand categorically that any such decision by the constituent assembly could not be regarded as valid and would not therefore be recognized as a settlement of the problem, and should call upon the two Governments to abstain from taking or permitting any action which would prevent the holding of the plebiscite and the peaceful settlement of the problem.

30041951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 543 held on 30 April, 1951

In explaining my vote I should in the first place, like to remark on behalf of my government the decision which this Council has just taken and, in particular, to express my Government's appreciation of Mr. Graham's readiness. to undertake the great and admittedly arduous responsibilities of his appointment as United Nations representative for India and Pakistan. Mr Graham surely we know, carry with him to the sub-continent our good wishes and the firm support of the Council as a whole. His task is clear: it is to work for a settlement of those differences which have so far prevented the Governments of India and Pakistan from effecting the demilitarisation of Kashmir. If he succeeds in this the way will be open for Admiral Nimitz, as Plebiscite Administrator, to organise the plebiscite to decide the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

None of us, I think, has any illusions about the difficulty of the task which Mr. Graham has, fortunately, accepted, but we all trust that he will find the two governments ready to reach some agreement on a question which, if it only could be considered dispassionately, is by no means insoluble. Mr. Graham, in undertaking this mission on behalf of the United Nations, will, I hope, feel strengthened by the clear and unequivocal views expressed by members of the Council in the discussions leading up to the adoption of the resolution of 30 March.

If the wise statesmanship which led the two governments to agree on the cease-fire in Kashmir and to acceptance of the two resolutions for the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, can be applied to the immediate problem of demilitarisation, there should indeed, we think, be real hope of progress towards a settlement. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has, however, noticed with regret what appears to be a misapprehension in the Indian subcontinent on certain aspects of the resolution of 30 March, and notably in regard to arbitration. We have seen it suggested that under that resolution the United Nations Representative is instructed to go to the subcontinent and to decide, as an arbitrator, whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir should accede to India or to Pakistan. But of course that is not in the least what the resolution says. As my Government understands the resolution, in fact it instructs the United Nations Representative, after consultation with the Governments of India and Pakistan, to use his best endeavours to obtain their agreement to a plan for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the principles contained in the two United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions. Further, it instructs him, after obtaining this agreement, to put the plan into effect. In other words, his instructions are to bring about the demilitarisation of the State in agreement, if possible, with the Governments of India and Pakistan. So far, his task is to be entirely one of negotiation. In this capacity he will have, of course, the full authority of the Security Council and the United Nations behind him, and he will be able to point to the views expressed by the majority of the members of this Council in regard to the fundamental principle that demilitarisation should be such that the plebiscite can be held free from any influence by the armed forces of any interested party to the dispute. But nevertheless his task will be that of negotiation and not a task of arbitration.

If, however, he is unable to obtain the agreement of the Governments of India and Pakistan to a plan for demilitarisation, or for putting such a plan into effect, the United Nations Representative is instructed to report back to the Council and to define those points of difference, arising out of the interpretation and execution of the two agreed United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions, which are preventing demilitarisation. Only then, if the United Nations Representative reports such points of difference, will the question of arbitration arise, and arbitration would deal only with the points of difference concerning demilitarisation.

So it should be clear, we think, that the resolution of 30 March calls upon the parties to accept arbitration only on matters which might be described as procedural rather than substantive, only on matters concerning the demilitarisation of the State, which is a part of the procedure for holding a plebiscite, and not on the substantive question of accession itself.

The accession itself, far from being decided by the United Nations Representative, or by the arbitral panel for that matter, is to be decided by a free vote of the inhabitants. of the State. The whole purpose of the resolution, as my Government sees it at any rate, and the purpose which I am sure will guide Mr. Graham in his mission as United Nations Representative, is to facilitate holding of a plebiscite to decide the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in circumstances which will ensure for the inhabitants of the State the right to express their preference in full knowledge of all the facts and without fear that they will suffer by expressing such preference.

It is because the co-sponsors were convinced-and here I think I speak also for my United States colleague-that the inhabitants of Kashmir should not the prevented any longer by disagreement on matters of procedure from deciding the accession of their State to either India or Pakistan, that they included in the resolution which they presented to the Council provision for the determination of this disagreement by arbitration in case one final attempt to resolve it by negotiation should fail.

Finally, in wishing Mr. Graham success in his mission. I should like to repeat what I said when I introduced the draft resolution on 21 February last [553rd meeting]. I spoke then as follows:

"I do not feel, indeed, that I can emphasise too. much the fact that both Governments agreed on

the essential elements of a settlement and that all that is now required is goodwill on both sides to solve outstanding points of detail. Given the far reaching benefits which a settlement would bring and in all too obvious dangers of the continuance of the dispute, not only to the two countries themselves, but to all those countries elsewhere in the world which value human liberty and the demo erratic way of life, I trust I am not being too sanguine in expressing the hope that a final settlement of the dispute can now readily be achieved."

30041951  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 543 held on 30 April, 1951

When my Government undertook to explore the possibility of presenting the name of someone to this Council for the post of United Nations Representative for India and Pakistan, it turned to the Panel for Inquiry and Conciliation created by General Assembly resolution 268 D (III) of 28 April 1949 on the recommendation of the Interim Committee. Mr. Graham, as you know, is among the five distinguished United States citizens designated by my Government for inclusion in the panel. His fine qualities are well appreciated in the United States, where he is known as a distinguished educator, statesman, government official and negotiator of great ability. I know that he will bring to this new task in full measure the qualities needed for the accomplishment of his mission.

In expressing the good wishes of the United States for the success of the mission of the new United Nations Representative, I should like to add a word or two regarding the character of that mission. This is or may be two-fold, as the Council knows. His first effort will be to affect demilitarisation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the international agreement embodied in the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [S/1100, S/1196). While previous efforts to bring about agreement between the parties on the demilitarisation provisions of these resolutions made by the United Nations Commission, by General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon have not been successful, they have undeniably made progress toward the desired end. The area of disagreement has been narrowed and we have, thanks to them, a fairly clear picture of what these disagreements are. I am sure that the debate on the Kashmir question recently concluded in the Council, in which the representatives of Pakistan and India have presented their governments' views, has been most helpful to the members of this Council. Council members' intervention exhibited a large measure of agreement in their understanding of the issues and in their ideas of what should be done to resolve them.

The disagreements on the demilitarisation process still existing are basically differences of interpretation of how the framework provided by the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission should be filled in. These resolutions, in attempting to devise procedures which would furnish adequate security and equitable treatment for all, went as far as was possible at the stage then reached The procedural details necessarily had to be left to be worked out by the parties. This they have not yet fully succeeded in doing. It is our earnest hope that both parties will work out with Mr. Graham and implement the details of demilitarisation preparatory to the plebiscite, which will permit the people of Kashmir freely to express their will regarding the question of accession.

If, however, these efforts should fail of their purpose, the United Nations Representative would embark in the second phase of his mission. He would return to this Council and report to it those points of difference between the parties, in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, which he considers must be resolved to enable demilitarisation to be effected. The arbitration clause of the present resolution would then become operative, and the United States most earnestly urges that the parties accept the arbitration procedure as a final step to concluding a peaceful settlement of this problem, which holds such danger for the peace, prosperity and stability of the great sub-continent. I fully concur with our President who said at the 538th meeting of this Council.

"In a case like the one with which we are dealing, this would seem to be the logical procedure, since it concerns questions which, as the representative of Brazil has so ably explained, might well be considered as coming within the widely acknowledged participle sphere where arbitration would fully satisfied.``

Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 539 held on 30 March, 1951

I think that I should follow the United States representative in dealing, very briefly, with one or two points which have arisen during the course of the debate on the revised draft resolution submitted on 21 March by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom. I certainly hope that that draft resolution will very soon come to the vote.

In the first place, I must say how glad the sponsors of the draft resolution have been-how glad I think we have all been to note the general agreement among members of the Security Council that in our approach to this problem we should concentrate on one all-important principle, namely, that the future accession of the State of the Jammu and Kashmir should be settled by a United Nations plebiscite, held in conditions which will enable the inhabitants of the State to express their preference, free from improper influence by any of the authorities interested in the result. I am sure that members of the Security Council have been encouraged by one thing, at any rate the reaffirmation by the representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan of their own adherence to this principle.

As I believe the representative of the United States has already said, the President himself expressed this principle very clearly in the statement which he made in the Council yesterday. I should like, if I may, actually quote his words, since they impressed me so much. He said [538th meeting]:

"But once the right to self-determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is-as it has been recognized, once it is clearly accepted by the parties in dispute-as it has been that they have no right to impose anything upon these people against their wishes, and that therefore these wishes must prevail over the wishes and claims of the bordering States, it must be possible to find a procedure which will create the most favourable. conditions for a fair expression of the will of the people, who want to make their choice free from any kind of fear or intimidation.". The President's eloquent words do, I think, contain the whole key to the problem, and our conviction of this fact has guided the representative of the United States and me in formulating our proposals.

In his statement to the Council yesterday, Sir Benegal Rau mentioned two aspects of these proposals which, in the view of his government, were not in accord either with the facts or with the agreements which the Commission embodied in its two resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. If I may, I would like to comment briefly on these two aspects.

The first concerns the validity of the accession of the Maharaja of Kashmir. On this point I must say at once that I do not purpose to indulge in a sort of logomachy in which there is some risk that my learned friend with his great forensic ability might appear to emerge triumphant on points. I would hesitate to do that. But I doubt in any case that it will help to bring a solution of this dispute nearer if the Council were to retrace its steps behind the agreed principles and to take up legal issues concerning the validity of the Maharaja's accession. The Council has heard the arguments of both parties on this particular point. I think it is only too clear that any detailed consideration of the issues involved in this would only lead the Council into an examination of all the events leading up to the Maharaja's letter requesting accession. If this took charge, how could the Council escape from going on to consider parallel cases in which the question of accession may will at first sight appear to have been decided in accordance with entirely different principles ? My argument, from the outset of the Council's deliberation on this question, thought that we would do well to concentrate our attention on the plebiscite and on means whereby it should be fairly conducted.

Remarks which I made in my statement of 21 March [537th meeting] on the question of the legality of the accession of the Maharaja of Kashmir, though it is not in any way go back on them, where therefore, in that view, subsidiary to the main argument. If they will not deal detail with the merits of the claims of merits of the two parties in this question, I can assure the representative of India that it was not due to any ignorance of or inattention to these claims on my part, or rather because of my impression that a consideration of their merits would not advance the Council any way to a solution of the dispute.

The second aspect of our proposals to which Sir Benegal Rau took exception in his statement yesterday was connected with arbitration. He quoted an exchange of letters between his government and the Commission in the endeavour to show that certain questions were regarded as settled. He suggested that arbitration would reopen these questions to the prejudice of India and, furthermore, would give the Pakistan Government a right to be consulted in matters which the Commission had already agreed were outside the competence of the Government of Pakistan to discuss.

I would only remind members of the Council that the whole of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948 is prefaced by the statement that:" both governments accept the following principles as the basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in consultation between their representatives and the Commission".

Since the truce agreement has still to be formulated, I would suggest that in no sense is consultation with both parties excluded by that resolution. But my government would not wish to prejudge the findings of any arbitrators on this point The extent to which the matters dealt with in the two agreed resolutions are already decided and the extent to which Pakistan has a right to be consulted are, we believe, in themselves two points eminently suitable for determination by arbitration. Indeed, since there is disagreement by the parties. on them, arbitration provides the only suitable and perhaps the only possible means of determination. Of course, it is not my government's intention that any matter which has been clearly decided in favour of the Government of India should Now be decided otherwise Of course not. The exchange of letters quoted by Sir Benegal Rau will be taken into account by the arbitrators and, in so far as they decided certain points in India's favour, arbitration could only, of course, confirm these decisions.

There remains one further point arising out of the statement by the representative of India yesterday which I think I ought to mention. He suggested I was inconsistent in appealing to his government to ensure that the proposed Kashmir constituent assembly did not in any way prejudice the work of the Council while, at the same time, emphasising the view of my government that the accession could not be regarded as a matter which has already been settled. I do not really think that there is any incompatibility between these two views. This dispute is one between India and Pakistan. It is obvious that, if there is one of these two parties to whom the Council must appeal in order to prevent prejudicial action by the Kashmir constituent assembly, it is to the Government of India. Though I hesitate to cross swords with such an authority on constitutional law, I believe this is a matter which the Council must regard solely from the standpoint of how the two governments can help to give effect to the agreement embodied in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

The proposl is really very simple. All we ask is that both parties to the dispute should give their full assistance to the Council so that-and here I quote the paragraph 1 of the United Nations Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949 : "The question of the accesston of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India and Pakistan will be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite."

It is in the conviction that the revised draft resolution that the representative of the United States and myself have placed before the Council provided the best method of achieving this that I express the hope that the Council will adopt it.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 599 held on 30 March, 1951

The statements made yesterday and earlier this morning by my distinguished colleagues on the Security Council have been clear and extensive. I believe there is little I can add which might aid the Council in reaching a conclusion on the revised draft resolution submitted jointly by the United Kingdom and the United States. However, may I be permitted to address myself to one point raised by Sir Benegal Rau in the statement he made yesterday?

The distinguished representative of India objects to the operative part of the draft resolution, because, as I understand it, he interprets paragraphs 3 and 6 of the draft resolution as giving to Pakistan rights of consultation which had not existed under the August 1948 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. Sir Benegal, I believe, said that the draft resolution now before the Security Council reopened issues which had been settled by the August 1948 resolution; that it sought to give Pakistan a voice in matters in which it had been denied any voice previously; and that it sought to transfer to arbitrators the right to make decisions which previously had required the agreement of India. The Government of India, as I understand it, objects therefore to paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, calling for acceptance of arbitration on unresolved issues, as a violation of the agreed resolution August can only say that the revised draft resolution submitted to the Security Council on 21 March would instruct the United Nations representative, after consulting the Governments of India and Pakistan, to effect demilitarisation. on the basis of the two agreed United Nations Commission resolutions. For this purpose, obviously, he must consult the Government of Pakistan as well as the Government of India in order to obtain their views. The very preamble to part II of the 13 August 1948 resolution says:

"Simultaneously with the acceptance of the proposal for the immediate cessation of hostilities as outlined in part I, both governments accept the following principles as the basis for the formulation of a truce agreement, the details of which shall be worked out in discussion between their representatives and the Commission."

The United Nations representative must be free to consult with the Government of Pakistan as well as India in working out the necessary details.

As we see it, the two United Nations Commission resolutions provide a framework which remains to be added in. These resolutions do not set forth a complete plan for accomplishing demilitarisation and a plebiscite. The parties will have to develop and consider with the United Nations representative the details which fill out this framework, in order to honour their commitment to settle the issue of accession to India or Pakistan by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. If the parties do not agree upon these details in filling out the framework established by the two United Nations Commission resolutions, it will be because the parties gave differing interpretations. In such a case there will be some way of resolving the dilemma, and we have suggested arbitration as that way..

It seems to us that the commitment of the parties. and the legitimate interests of the Security Council in seeing and this dispute settled do not stop with these two resolutions. They are not the end of the road. The sentiment of the Governments of both India and Pakistan is to settle the question of accession by a free and impartial plebiscite.

The representative of the Netherlands, Mr. Von Balluseck, pointed out very clearly yesterday that once the right of self-determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is recognized, as it has been by both parties, then it must be possible to find a procedure which will enable the people of Kashmir to make their choice as to whether they will accede to India or to Pakistan. It seems to us that we are face to face with the necessity of finding a procedure which will enable the parties to carry out this basic and ultimate commitment. It is, as I have said before, to create the conditions whereby the people of Kashmir can vote without fear of intimidation upon the question of accession. If resort to arbitration of any matters which stand in the way of this result is objected to, how can the dangerous deadlock be broken?

All members of the Security Council who have spoken have illuminated the spirit in which the resolution has been. offered. That spirit springs from the sincere belief that the Security Council must aid the parties to advance toward a solution of the dispute by providing reasonable means through which issues which the parties cannot themselves resolve may. be brought to a speedy and mutually acceptable solution.

The PRESIDENT: Before calling upon the last speaker, I wish to remind the Security Council that it is my intention to put the revised joint draft resolution now before us to the vote immediately after we have heard that speaker.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Bebler (Yugoslavia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 539 held on 30 March, 1951

I should like to explain briefly my delegation's general attitude regarding the revised draft resolution of the United Kingdom and United States delegations on the question of Kashmir.

My country is, of course, graphically speaking, denoted from the actual scene of the dispute, which has resolved into one of the most complex problems confronting the Security Council. We are nonetheless only aware of the extent to which the continuance of this problem not only affects the relations between the Member States and trammels the normal economic and cultural development of four million Kashmiris, but make places the peace and security of a sensitive area of the world in serious jeopardy. We therefore share wholeheartedly the desire repeatedly expressed here but some further advance should now be made towards the solution of the problem.

We have listened with the greatest attention to all the views expressed both by the parties themselves and the other representatives seated round this table. We have also endeavoured to study the factual background of the case and, in particular, the various efforts made so far to reach a settlement, and this has brought us to certain general conclusions,

The problem as we see it presents three salient features. The first is the existence of an agreement between the parties on the general principle of a settlement. The second is the persistent differences on a number of points connected with the implementation of that general principle. The third feature-and one that is frequently overlooked-is the fact that agreement has proved possible on such important points as, suspension of arms, the establishment of a formal cease-fire and the demarcation of a cease-fire line, which are after expressed pre requisites of any peaceful settlement, and this agreement has been achieved by means of direct negotiations between th: parties, with a varying measure of United Nations assistance.

This appears to us to point to the course the Council should follow in its endeavour to do away with the differences now dividing the parties. What we should try to do, in the view of my delegation, is to assist the parties gradually to narrow, in direct contact and by their own efforts, the areas of disagreement between them and thus move towards a settlement which obviously is in the interest of them both. Such a course a course, incidentally, to which Sir Owen Dixon's preferences went at the close of his painstaking efforts to reach a settlement appears to us to be not only, generally speaking, the soundest way of resolving matters of this nature but also, in view of present circumstances, the only really useful contribution we can make towards the solution of this vexed problem.

There is an alternative course, naturally. Such a course would consist in attempting to reach a solution for the parties rather than in helping them to achieve it themselves, of imposing upon the parties-or upon one of them the actual mode of implementation of a settlement the principle of which they have already accepted. I feel that such a course would not merely in all probability prove futile, but might even impair what chances still remain of reaching an understanding on the yet unresolved issues and diminish rather than increase the prospects of an overall settlement.

It is in the light of these considerations that my delegation has examined with the utmost care the draft resolution now before the Security Council, and more specially the latter half of its operative part. We regret that we have not been able altogether to escape the impression that the draft resolution inclines towards the second of the two courses described, without having fully explored the possibilities of the first course. I shall therefore have to abstain on the resolution.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hsia (China) in the Security Council Meeting No 539 held on 30 March, 1951

My delegation has listened with care to the statements. made by the representatives of India and Pakistan at the meetings of the Security Council on 1, 6, 7 and 9 March [533rd, 534th, 535th, 536th meetings, and to the statement of Sir Benegal Rau yesterday afternoon [538th meeting]. I note that both Sir Benegal Rau and Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan devoted consi portions of their statements to the history of the case, particularly to the events that occurred in October 1947. It is certainly not the desire of my delegation to pronounce judgement on any phase of the historical background of the question. My only desire is to help to find a peaceful and satisfactory solution of the dispute between the two States, which ought to be good neighbours and the best of friends.

The revised joint draft resolution introduced on 21 March by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States is, in the opinion of my delegation, in perfect harmony with the spirit and temper in which the Security Council has endeavoured to settle this dispute. The draft resolution at its outset reminds the parties that they have accepted the provisions of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, and have reaffirmed their desire that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations" that is the central feature of the draft resolution, and all other features are subordinate or supplementary and are designed to bring about that free and impartial plebiscite.

The remarkable thing about the whole dispute is the undoubted fact that the two parties and the Security Council are all agreed on the principle of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is true that certain differences that arose have prevented up to the present time a solution of the Kashmir question, but these differences relate not to the principle but to the procedure for conducting a free and impartial plebiscite..

As I have said, differences that have arisen between the two parties relate not to the principle but in the procedure to be adopted. I would humbly submit that if such differences cannot be resolved by direct negotiation, they should be settled by third parties. Fortunately, in this case, the vast majority of the Members of the United Nations and of the Security Council are friendly to both India and Pakistan, and have no direct interest in the eventual disposal of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. No matter how the two parties object to the various proposals more to them by this Council, by the Commission, and more recently for our representative, neither India nor Pakistan has accused us of bias or partiality. In fact, I think the Council, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and the United Nations representative have not been extraordinarily fair and patient.

The draft resolution before us contemplates arbitration upon all outstanding points of difference by an arbitrator or a panel of arbitrators to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice in consultation with the parties. This is the proposed machinery in case differences in regard to procedure cannot be settled in the consultations between the United Nations representative and the representatives of India. and Pakistan. The scheme of arbitration so provided has every guarantee of fairness and impartiality.

The representative of India has raised objections to the provisions of paragraph 6 of the draft resolution which refers to arbitration [538th meeting. With all due respect to Sir Benegal Rau and to what he said yesterday afternoon, I still maintain the view, which is also held by the representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States, Brazil, the Netherlands, Ecuador, France and others, that this proposal is a key provision in the draft resolution in the present circumstances

My delegation supports the main features of the draft resolution. I hope that the two parties, after further consideration, will accept the proposed resolution and will cooperate heartily with the United Nations representative in. effecting the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The problem of demilitarisation has always bulked large in the discussion of the procedure of the plebiscite. Sir Owen Dixon's recommendation [S/1791] differs somewhat. from the recommendation of the Council and of the Commission. Sir Benegal Rau took pains to point out the differences. I concede that these differences are real. It may well be that a free and fair plebiscite does not require a total demilitarisation and that armed forces could be so placed as to exercise no effect or very little effect upon the results of the plebiscite. For those reasons, my delegation will not insist upon total demilitarisation and is prepared to support the United States United Kingdom draft resolution.

There is one new development in the question of Kashmir, and that is the constituent assembly referred to in the third and fifth paragraphs of the preamble of the draft resolution. My delegation is very apprehensive in this regard. Such a constituent assembly may adopt a resolution declaring the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India, or the assembly may incorporate in the constitution an article. to that effect. In either form, such an act would not be in harmony with the resolution adopted by this Coun or with the resolutions of the Commission Sir Benegal Rau's statements on this point, while moderate, are unfortunately not quite definite. Nevertheless. I deduce from his statement the conclusion that no such resolution or constitutional article is contemplated, and I hope that my deduction is correct. However, such a constituent assembly might prejudice the issue. in other ways. In the first place, a constitution adopted before the plebiscite would have the tendency, or at least the appearance of having the tendency, of making a formal definitive relationship of Kashmir to India, In the second place, the constitutional provisions which the constituent assembly might have. adopt might dovetail the State political structure of Kashmir so closely with the State political structure of Kashmir so closely with the State political structure of India as to signify definitive accession. Such tendencies or appearances may arouses suspicions and passions which may make the solution of the problem more difficult than it is now.

Pending the solution of the problem, this Council has a right to expect both parties not to take measures which would further complicate the question. The amended draft resolution is certainly in harmony with the Charter and with the principles of peace and friendly international relations which I sincerely hope will be acceptable to the leaders of India and Pakistan. The question is so grave and so complicated that nobody should favour undue haste. On the other hand, the very gravity of the situation would also make it unwise to indulge in any unnecessary delay. The main features of the draft resolution are so obviously right that the Council must at least make a serious effort to implement them.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr Lacoste (France) in the Security Council Meeting No. 539 held on 30 March, 1951

The French delegation has listened with the utmost attention to the discussion which has once again taken place in the Council on the Kashmir question. It did not think it had much to learn about the basic facts of a situation with which the Council has been only too familiar in the three years during which the item has been on its agenda. In such a serious matter, however, the distressing and dangerously critical nature of which is shown by the fact that it persists in spite of so many efforts to settle it, care must be taken to avoid the risk of over-confidence, and untiring efforts must be made to hear the parties to the dispute and carefully to analyse their statements so long as they think they have some fresh light to throw on the points at issue. In this respect, however, it would appear that ample justice has been done to the two eloquent spokesmen for the opposing sides, and that both of them have had full opportunity to develop their cases and make their replies

My delegation has sought in vain to find, in the facts the parties have adduced or the arguments they have repeated, any such new factor that would convince it of the need to reconsider the positions it has taken before.

Year by year the eloquence and skill of the representatives of India and Pakistan seem to raise new aspects of the subject. However, a calm study of their speeches and of the practical results they have each year achieved, leads to the dual conclusion that, in the realm of ideas the Council has had no occasion to change its position since the decisions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 were taken, and that, so far as the facts are concerned, there has unfortunately been no real progress towards a settlement of the dispute.

Under the resolutions I have just mentioned-resolutions which marked development of paramount importance in this case because they won the support of both parties-the Council proclaimed the need to settle by a just and impartial plebiscite the problem of the accession of Kashmir to one or other of the two States successors to the Indian Empire.

The unanimous agreement reached on that principle should have made it possible harmoniously and quickly to settle a problem which is a serious threat to peace in an important region of the world. No such action has been taken, however. That is not the Council's fault, nor the fault of the United Nations representative, nor even, perhaps, the fault of either or both of the two parties. It is rather due to the all too usual combination of things which so frequently causes such a long interval in space and time between the proclamation of a principle unanimously admitted and its effective application to the world of facts.

Everyone here is aware of the difficulties which Sir Owen Dixon encountered, and we can only regret that the efforts he so generously made should finally have proved vain. The fact remains that the holding of a really just and impartial plebiscite-such as the two parties expressly wanted it to be and have undertaken to see that it should be, so far as it is in their power to do so-requires the previous fulfilment of one condition That is that the territory, the inhabitants of which are called upon to vote, should be freed from any improper influence, such as that inevitably involved in the presence of occupation troops from outside belonging to one or other of the parties concerned. The plebiscite must therefore be preceded by the demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir. It is surely not an impossible task-it should not even be a very difficult task-to draw up an equitable plan of demilitarisation in accordance with the principles already accepted by the parties concerned. And two parties of good faith and we do not doubt the good faith of the parties in this case-should be able to agree on such a plan of demilitarisation.

After two years, the failure of Sir Owen Dixon's mission and of all attempts to facilitate a direct arrangement, between India and Pakistan have confronted the Council, much against its will, with responsibilities which it thought it had finally. fulfilled, and brought it back to the point where it was on 5 January 1949.

We should be grateful to the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States for their painstaking efforts during the past few weeks to reconcile the points of view and devise a solution acceptable to everyone. In its revised form, the joint draft resolution they have submitted to us is simplicity itself. Starting from the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949-to which we must always return because they won the express agreement of both India and Pakistan it restates the need for a plebiscite, endeavours to make a plebiscite possible by trying to solve the previous problem of demilitarisation, and provides that to that end a representative of the United Nations shall proceed to effect demilitarisation after consultation with the parties. If the parties are unable to reach agreement on the plan submitted to them, provision is made for arbitration, and, to make assurance doubly sure, arbitration is to be carried out by an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators appointed, not by a political body, but by the President of the International Court of Justice.

That is the core of the draft resolution. For sometime there has been no question of anything but setting to motion the implementation of resolutions already accepted by everyone. The methods the draft resolution proposes for that purpose should raise no objections from any Member of the United Nations as it consists of its duty and is sincerely anxious to discharge it. As a recent meeting, Sir Gladwyn Jebb recalled [537th meeting that when we signed the San Francisco Charter, we all subscribed to certain fundamental principles and that the principle of most importance, the one most vital in the world today both for the international community and for each of its Members, was that which made it incumbent upon us to find a peaceful solution for all our disputes. It is enough to recall Article 33, paragraph 1 of the Charter, which reads:

"The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilition, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements or other peaceful means of their own choice".

That text is undoubtedly relevant to our task. No one here can doubt that the two parties concerned are fully aware of their responsibilities to the United Nations. They have already given proof of their readiness to discharge them. They have accepted the cease-fire the Council ordered in Kashmir, and they have accepted the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite for the final settlement of their dispute.

That is the heart of the matter. The rest, it must be said, is only incidental. If each party clings to details of implementation, reasoning will be carried away by sentiment and national pride, and the irritation caused by the fact that the controversy has gone on too long will lead the party to discover, persuade itself and demonstrate that every detail me jeopardizes the essential principle. Such a discussion might be prolonged, so to speak, to infinity. But that is just where the parties to a dispute which has already dragged on for so long and which, as Sir Gladwyn Jebb has so rightly observed, is not of a kind to be cured or alleviated by time, must show an international spirit, loftiness of views, and wisdom.

The governments of States like India and Pakistan owe it to the international community, and to themselves, to demonstrate their political maturity on this occasion. The draft resolution which the United Kingdom and the United States submitted to us does not ask the parties to sacrifice principles, ideas or even interests. It does no more than ask them to apply to the settlement of their dispute, in stages of which they have already recognized the need, classical methods, approved by the founders of our law, tried by experience, incorporated in the Charter and recommended for three years by the Council as the best means-if not, in the absence of direct agreement, the only means-of escaping from what seems to us to be assuming more and more the appearance of a dangerous impasse.

The governments of these two States, both of which for various reasons are of very great physical and moral importance in contemporary international society, cannot fail to understand what serious responsibilities they are incurring, in the present circumstances, towards their respective peoples and towards that international society.

In supporting the Anglo-American revised draft resolution, my delegation has the feeling, born of mature reflection. that it is violating no one's rights, and that it is acting both in the spirit and within the limits of justice. It wishes to convey an assurance in this sense to the representatives of those two great States, and it ardently desires that by a happy solution of this painful case they may find the peace they need to enable them to continue their progressive work.

29031951  Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. D. Von Balluseck as representative of the Netherland in the Security Council Meeting No. 538 held on 29 March, 1951

There are no more speakers on my list. If none of the other representatives wishes to speak for the moment, I should like to make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of the NETHERLANDS.

Some of the things I am going to say have been mentioned before by other speakers. That is hardly surprising, taking into consideration that we have been debating this problem for more than three years. Most of what could be said has been said. Yet, some things, I think, should be repeated since they contain components of what may become agreement.

The draft resolution in its revised form, jointly presented. by the United Kingdom and the United States, needs and deserves the most careful study, since it represents a new and, we think, fair effort to Ind in equitable and peaceful solution for a problem which, if left unsolved, might seriously further endanger peace and stability in a vital part of our already badly harassed world. The Security Council, having due regard to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security must endeavour to prevent that danger. Too much time has already passed since the question which still awaits its conclusive solution was placed before the Council. We must therefore earnestly hope that this time a speedy settlement will be reached and we must, in our opinion, exams the new suggested ways and means in the light of that need and, of course, of fairness and justice to the parties, but above all to the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves.

I need not dwell extensively on the history of the case nor on the various stages through which this intricate problem has passed since 1948. There has been disagreement between the parties directly concerned on many of the points at issue. But as the draft resolution is before us points out, there has also been substantial agreement on some very fundamental principles We know that these principles are; that the accession of the State Jammu and Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, after the cease-fire and truce arrangements have been carried out. That, in our opinion, is and must remain the basis for a just and equitable solution of the problem now under consideration.

With the assistance of the United Nations, certain very important achievements have already been factually attained. 1 refers to the effective cease-fire arrangement which has withstood all tensions during more than two years. The Governments of the two countries deserve great credit for having been able, often under great stress, to achieve the continuance of this agreement without which any further development of a just and peaceful solution would be fatally jeopardized.

Furthermore there has been acceptance by both parties of the principles to which I have just referred. The revised draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States rightly, in our opinion, starts out by again laying stress on that point. We are then, we may earnestly hope, in the presence of a common and uncontested desire that the future of the territory and the population which are involved in the dispute should be decided through the free exercise of the right of self-determination by the people most directly concerned. The Netherlands Government has always considered the principle of self-determination as being of primary importance for human happiness and the peace of the world. It continues to believe in that principle, now that the Council is a again confronted with the Jammu and Kashmir case.

My country has in the recent past based its own policy in matters vital to our fundamental national interests upon this same important principle, even though it required from us far-reaching sacrifices, and it is this basic conception of freedom and self-determination of peoples which will continue to guide my Government also in matters where we have no other interest than the sincere wish to contribute to the well being of the world, and in this particular case, to the well being of friendly States with which we maintain cordial and mutually beneficial relations.

If the joint draft resolution points to an essential aspect of the right of self-determination, it reaffirms, in doing so, the fundamental freedoms of which the Charter of the United Nations constantly reminds us, and for which we have all assumed a great moral responsibility.

The basic agreement between the parties and the organs of the United Nations, that is to say the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, constitute a very definite framework which, however, must now be definitely filled in. The resolutions contain principles which have been accepted by both parties. In accepting them, both parties stand committed to their implementation and application. The cease-fire was applied and implemented. The next step should be the formulation of a truce agreement. For this also the principles have been laid down and accepted. They indicate ways and means for a process of demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in successive stages by the two contesting parties. They leave the final disposal of remaining armed forces, that is to say, after the truce agreement is implemented to the representative of the United Nation in consultation with the Indian Government on the one side of the cease fire line and the local authorities on the other side.

On the basis of the foregoing principles the truce agreement should be formulated. Once that is done, accepted and implemented, the plebiscite can then be organised and held. The demilitarisation contained in the truce agreement will in itself constitute one of the most important prerequisites for the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite itself. But we cannot proceed without the truce agreement. That must be brought about and formulated first of all. So far this has failed to materialise, and this failure constitutes one of the major stumbling blocks in the path towards a solution. The draft resolution now before us, rightly we think, has placed the task of removing this stumbling block in the hands of a new United Nations representative to be appointed. If he should fail on account of disagreement between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the principles to which India and Pakistan stand committed then, according to the draft resolution, the points at issue should be submitted to arbitration, which the parties are now called upon to accept in operative paragraph 6. In that way the truce agreement could and should finally be effected, that is to say, the demilitarisation, which is indispensable to the free exercise of the right of self-determination of and by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

From all this it is clear that the truce agreement, in other words, the implementation and application of the principles which have already been accepted, is an essential element of the problem with which we are dealing.

The draft resolution now before us endeavours once again to break the deadlock, first by giving wider powers to the United Nations representative, and second by formally introducing the element of arbitration, now that it has become evident that other peaceful means have been unable to produce adequate results.

Surely it would have been far preferable for the two. parties to have reached an agreement between themselves. However, we cannot but recognize the lesson which three years of experience have taught us. This lesson is that a basic difference of approach prevents the parties, if left to themselves, from composing their views

Indeed, there have been serious difficulties which offered to be almost impossible to overcome. There are conflicting conceptions in regard to the justification of the presence of the armed forces of the parties in dispute on the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. There are objections to suggested ways and means for the synchronisation of the various stages in the process of demilitarisation. There are fears on both sides regarding the security of the bordering States and for the freedom of expression of the population of Jammu and Kashmir itself. These solicitudes may perhaps wholly or in part be explained in the light of the history and the evolution of the case But once the right to self determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is as it has been-recognized, once it is clearly accepted by the parties in dispute-as it has been that they have no right to impose anything upon these people against their wishes and that therefore these wishes must prevail over the wishes and claims of the bordering States, it must be possible to find a procedure which will create the most favourable conditions for a fair expression of the will of the people, who want to make their choice free from any kind of fear or intimidation.

The issue should, in the last analysis, be decided by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and not by the rulers heretofore placed over them. The choice of affiliation to one nation or another is so fundamental in its nature and consequences that only the people themselves can and ought to make that choice. It stands to reason that such a choice should be freely made, untrammeled by biased pressure from interested outside parties. No prearranged political organisation in part of the State concerned, set up under the auspices of authorities which have already made their choice, should interfere with this complete freedom of choice. For that reason my Government is inclined to agree with what was said in substance by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States on the subject of the Kashmir National Conference. For the same reason we approve the relevant paragraphs in the preamble of the draft resolution now before us, as well as operative paragraph 8.

I should like to add a few words on the matter of arbitration. In a case like the one with which we are dealing, this would seem to be the logical procedure, since it concerns questions which, as the representative of Brazil has so ably explained, might well be considered as coming within the widely acknowledged justiciable sphere where arbitration would be fully justified. Two parties have agreed on certain principles for the solution of a problem. They stand committed to these principles, but they disagree on interpretation and implementation. Also they are both Members of the United Nations. They have subscribed to the Charter which stipulates in Article 2, paragraph 3 that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and which in Article 33 commits them first of all to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, etc. A number of these means have now been tried during the last three years without success. Arbitration seems therefore to be in order, the more so since it would not determine the final solution, but only the interpretation of such already agreed principles dealing with a preliminary stage of the solution as would give rise to differences of opinion and thereby block any further action. We therefore would most earnestly urge the parties, notwithstanding what has been said this afternoon by the representative of India, to accept arbitration as a means to pave the way towards an ultimate settlement.

For too long has action towards an equitable solution of the problem of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to one or the other of its great neighbouring States of the subcontinent has been blocked. This delay has given rise to dangerous tensions and sometimes to irresponsible, emotional campaigns. Yet in part 1, section E of the resolution of 13 August 1948 the Governments of India and Pakistan agreed "to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations." Tension prolonged too far may, however, frustrate the most serious efforts of this nature.

The Security Council therefore must now live up to its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security In devising the means which are to be conducive to a just settlement, the rights and wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir deserve first consideration My Government believes that the interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the peace between the great nations of India and Pakistan, will be well served by a procedure such as that proposed in the revised draft resolution now presented to us by the United Kingdom and the United States. For those reasons the Netherlands Government has instructed me to support this draft resolution, with the fervent hope that it may succeed in giving the people of Jammu and Kashmir what they want, and that it may bridge the gap which now separates two countries, whose constructive cooperation and good neighbour policy could contribute so much to the peace of the world.

 Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. D. Von Balluseck as representative of the Netherland in the Security Council Meeting No. 538 held on 29 March, 1951

There are no more speakers on my list. If none of the other representatives wishes to speak for the moment, I should like to make a few remarks in my capacity as representative of the NETHERLANDS.

Some of the things I am going to say have been mentioned before by other speakers. That is hardly surprising, taking into consideration that we have been debating this problem for more than three years. Most of what could be said has been said. Yet, some things, I think, should be repeated since they contain components of what may become agreement.

The draft resolution in its revised form, jointly presented. by the United Kingdom and the United States, needs and deserves the most careful study, since it represents a new and, we think, fair effort to Ind in equitable and peaceful solution for a problem which, if left unsolved, might seriously further endanger peace and stability in a vital part of our already badly harassed world. The Security Council, having due regard to its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security must endeavour to prevent that danger. Too much time has already passed since the question which still awaits its conclusive solution was placed before the Council. We must therefore earnestly hope that this time a speedy settlement will be reached and we must, in our opinion, exams the new suggested ways and means in the light of that need and, of course, of fairness and justice to the parties, but above all to the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves.

I need not dwell extensively on the history of the case nor on the various stages through which this intricate problem has passed since 1948. There has been disagreement between the parties directly concerned on many of the points at issue. But as the draft resolution is before us points out, there has also been substantial agreement on some very fundamental principles We know that these principles are; that the accession of the State Jammu and Kashmir either to India or to Pakistan shall be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, conducted under the auspices of the United Nations, after the cease-fire and truce arrangements have been carried out. That, in our opinion, is and must remain the basis for a just and equitable solution of the problem now under consideration.

With the assistance of the United Nations, certain very important achievements have already been factually attained. 1 refers to the effective cease-fire arrangement which has withstood all tensions during more than two years. The Governments of the two countries deserve great credit for having been able, often under great stress, to achieve the continuance of this agreement without which any further development of a just and peaceful solution would be fatally jeopardized.

Furthermore there has been acceptance by both parties of the principles to which I have just referred. The revised draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States rightly, in our opinion, starts out by again laying stress on that point. We are then, we may earnestly hope, in the presence of a common and uncontested desire that the future of the territory and the population which are involved in the dispute should be decided through the free exercise of the right of self-determination by the people most directly concerned. The Netherlands Government has always considered the principle of self-determination as being of primary importance for human happiness and the peace of the world. It continues to believe in that principle, now that the Council is a again confronted with the Jammu and Kashmir case.

My country has in the recent past based its own policy in matters vital to our fundamental national interests upon this same important principle, even though it required from us far-reaching sacrifices, and it is this basic conception of freedom and self-determination of peoples which will continue to guide my Government also in matters where we have no other interest than the sincere wish to contribute to the well being of the world, and in this particular case, to the well being of friendly States with which we maintain cordial and mutually beneficial relations.

If the joint draft resolution points to an essential aspect of the right of self-determination, it reaffirms, in doing so, the fundamental freedoms of which the Charter of the United Nations constantly reminds us, and for which we have all assumed a great moral responsibility.

The basic agreement between the parties and the organs of the United Nations, that is to say the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, constitute a very definite framework which, however, must now be definitely filled in. The resolutions contain principles which have been accepted by both parties. In accepting them, both parties stand committed to their implementation and application. The cease-fire was applied and implemented. The next step should be the formulation of a truce agreement. For this also the principles have been laid down and accepted. They indicate ways and means for a process of demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in successive stages by the two contesting parties. They leave the final disposal of remaining armed forces, that is to say, after the truce agreement is implemented to the representative of the United Nation in consultation with the Indian Government on the one side of the cease fire line and the local authorities on the other side.

On the basis of the foregoing principles the truce agreement should be formulated. Once that is done, accepted and implemented, the plebiscite can then be organised and held. The demilitarisation contained in the truce agreement will in itself constitute one of the most important prerequisites for the freedom and fairness of the plebiscite itself. But we cannot proceed without the truce agreement. That must be brought about and formulated first of all. So far this has failed to materialise, and this failure constitutes one of the major stumbling blocks in the path towards a solution. The draft resolution now before us, rightly we think, has placed the task of removing this stumbling block in the hands of a new United Nations representative to be appointed. If he should fail on account of disagreement between the parties in regard to the interpretation and execution of the principles to which India and Pakistan stand committed then, according to the draft resolution, the points at issue should be submitted to arbitration, which the parties are now called upon to accept in operative paragraph 6. In that way the truce agreement could and should finally be effected, that is to say, the demilitarisation, which is indispensable to the free exercise of the right of self-determination of and by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

From all this it is clear that the truce agreement, in other words, the implementation and application of the principles which have already been accepted, is an essential element of the problem with which we are dealing.

The draft resolution now before us endeavours once again to break the deadlock, first by giving wider powers to the United Nations representative, and second by formally introducing the element of arbitration, now that it has become evident that other peaceful means have been unable to produce adequate results.

Surely it would have been far preferable for the two. parties to have reached an agreement between themselves. However, we cannot but recognize the lesson which three years of experience have taught us. This lesson is that a basic difference of approach prevents the parties, if left to themselves, from composing their views Indeed, there have been serious difficulties which offered to be almost impossible to overcome. There are conflicting conceptions in regard to the justification of the presence of the armed forces of the parties in dispute on the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. There are objections to suggested ways and means for the synchronisation of the various stages in the process of demilitarisation. There are fears on both sides regarding the security of the bordering States and for the freedom of expression of the population of Jammu and Kashmir itself. These solicitudes may perhaps wholly or in part be explained in the light of the history and the evolution of the case But once the right to self determination for the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is as it has been-recognized, once it is clearly accepted by the parties in dispute-as it has been that they have no right to impose anything upon these people against their wishes and that therefore these wishes must prevail over the wishes and claims of the bordering States, it must be possible to find a procedure which will create the most favourable conditions for a fair expression of the will of the people, who want to make their choice free from any kind of fear or intimidation.

The issue should, in the last analysis, be decided by the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and not by the rulers heretofore placed over them. The choice of affiliation to one nation or another is so fundamental in its nature and consequences that only the people themselves can and ought to make that choice. It stands to reason that such a choice should be freely made, untrammeled by biased pressure from interested outside parties. No prearranged political organisation in part of the State concerned, set up under the auspices of authorities which have already made their choice, should interfere with this complete freedom of choice. For that reason my Government is inclined to agree with what was said in substance by the representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States on the subject of the Kashmir National Conference. For the same reason we approve the relevant paragraphs in the preamble of the draft resolution now before us, as well as operative paragraph 8.

I should like to add a few words on the matter of arbitration. In a case like the one with which we are dealing, this would seem to be the logical procedure, since it concerns questions which, as the representative of Brazil has so ably explained, might well be considered as coming within the widely acknowledged justiciable sphere where arbitration would be fully justified. Two parties have agreed on certain principles for the solution of a problem. They stand committed to these principles, but they disagree on interpretation and implementation. Also they are both Members of the United Nations. They have subscribed to the Charter which stipulates in Article 2, paragraph 3 that "all Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means" and which in Article 33 commits them first of all to seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, etc. A number of these means have now been tried during the last three years without success. Arbitration seems therefore to be in order, the more so since it would not determine the final solution, but only the interpretation of such already agreed principles dealing with a preliminary stage of the solution as would give rise to differences of opinion and thereby block any further action. We therefore would most earnestly urge the parties, notwithstanding what has been said this afternoon by the representative of India, to accept arbitration as a means to pave the way towards an ultimate settlement.

For too long has action towards an equitable solution of the problem of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to one or the other of its great neighbouring States of the subcontinent has been blocked. This delay has given rise to dangerous tensions and sometimes to irresponsible, emotional campaigns. Yet in part 1, section E of the resolution of 13 August 1948 the Governments of India and Pakistan agreed "to appeal to their respective peoples to assist in creating and maintaining an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations." Tension prolonged too far may, however, frustrate the most serious efforts of this nature.

The Security Council therefore must now live up to its responsibilities for the maintenance of peace and security In devising the means which are to be conducive to a just settlement, the rights and wishes of the people of Jammu and Kashmir deserve first consideration My Government believes that the interests of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, as well as the peace between the great nations of India and Pakistan, will be well served by a procedure such as that proposed in the revised draft resolution now presented to us by the United Kingdom and the United States. For those reasons the Netherlands Government has instructed me to support this draft resolution, with the fervent hope that it may succeed in giving the people of Jammu and Kashmir what they want, and that it may bridge the gap which now separates two countries, whose constructive cooperation and good neighbour policy could contribute so much to the peace of the world.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sarper (Turkey) in the Security Council Meeting No. 538 held on 29 March, 1951

The history of the India-Pakistan question, which has been on the agenda of the Security Council for over three years, is well known to all of us. In the light of its development through several phases and of the actions taken by the Security Council in each phase, we have given careful thought to the question. We have also listened with great care to the views and explanations submitted to the Council by both parties. In our study of the question and in determining our attitude towards it, we have been guided by certain basic considerations. First of all, we are deeply disturbed and concerned because of the existence of such a dispute between two sister nations, to both of which we are bound by sincere ties of friendship and for both of which we have the greatest admiration. We are further concerned by the fact that such a situation should exist at this particular juncture in world affairs. The gravity of general world conditions is obvious, and it is unnecessary for us to comment upon it at this time.

Amidst these unsettled world conditions it appears to us and we are certain that both parties to the dispute themselves will agree that the primary interest of the two great nations is common, namely, maintenance of peace, security and stability in the sub-continent and in the world as a whole. It is, therefore, essential that every effort should be made in order to find an amicable solution to this problem. The main responsibility here, of course falls upon the parties themselves, and we are sure that they will continue their endeavours until a satisfactory and final solution to this question can be found, bearing in mind the extreme gravity of the general situation.

The present dispute between India and Pakistan over the State of Jammu and Kashmir is a factor of instability in the sub-continent and, as Sir Owen Dixon said in his remarkable report, "Except by agreement between them there is no means of settling it". On the other hand, it is gratifying to note that, as far as principle is concerned, no difference exists between the two parties. Both of them agree that the question of the future of Jammu and Kashmir should be settled in accordance with the will of the people expressed through a fair and impartial plebiscite.

Moreover, in accepting the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949, they have further agreed upon the main lines of a course of action to bring about the plebiscite.

Thus, in our view, the scope of the dispute seems to have narrowed down to points on methods and procedures, such as the withdrawal or disbanding of the armed forces at present in the area prior to the holding of the plebiscite, and the control over the administration of the disputed territory during the plebiscite. Since agreement has been reached on principle, we believe that the differing views of the parties on these matters of procedure cannot be irreconcilable. If efforts are continued and redoubled both by the parties themselves and by this Council, which bears the primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security, we believe that a solution can be found to this question which will be just and satisfactory to both sides. Such, I am certain, is our common objective.

With these considerations constantly in our mind, we have made a thorough study of the joint draft resolution now before us.

The draft, in its preamble, contains certain observations and certain statements of principle. The first of these is that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided through a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. I have already commented upon this briefly. We are, I think, all agreed that such a plebiscite is the only way to bring about a just solution to the question of Jammu and Kashmir. Once we have accepted this principle, we must also admit that such measures as convening a constituent assembly which will not be representative of the whole territory, in order to decide the future of the State, would not be in harmony with this principle.

The draft also mentions in the preamble that the difference between the two parties has been narrowed down to two main points. Since the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan resolutions of 1 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 have already been agreed to by both parties, this is the next step in our efforts to find a peaceful solution to this. The problem should obviously be to move along lines set forth in those resolutions and try to obtain the agreement of the parties upon details and procedures as well. Thus, the operative part of the draft resolution concentrates on this point. Naturally the most important task would be to arrange and to effect the demilitarisation of the area, as already agreed to the two parties in principle. This would be a preliminary condition for ensuring both the stability of the area and the realisation of the final objective that the plebiscite is held under fair and Impartial conditions and without undue pressure or influence-deliberate or unintentional-on behalf of anybody.

Therefore, the main function of the United Nations representative who is to be appointed under this resolution would be to effect the demilitarisation of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the general lines already agreed to.

An important paragraph of the draft resolution, in our view, is paragraph 6, making it possible to resort to arbitration on points of disagreement. It should be mentioned that the arbitration foreseen in this paragraph is not an overall arbitration for the whole of the question of Kashmir, since, as we have repeatedly pointed out, both parties have agreed on the general principle. Consequently, paragraph 6 covers only minor points of disagreement which may arise during the negotiations. It must be admitted that the only way for deciding such minor issues on which the parties may not agree, would be to submit them to impartial arbitration.

As I have tried to indicate briefly, we are substantially in agreement with the general lines of the joint draft resolution. The action taken by the Security Council during the last three years in regard to the question of Jammu and Kashmir has been by no means fruitless. May I recall that when the question came to the Council at the beginning of 1948, actual fighting was going on between the parties It was through the intervention of the Security Council that a cease-fire was obtained and the hostilities were stopped. It was due to the action of the Council and the efforts of its Commission for India and Pakistan that the parties agreed to the principle of deciding the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by means of a free and impartial plebiscite. Finally, the mission of Sir Owen Dixon made a beginning towards a lasting solution to the dispute. The present joint draft resolution is a further attempt in the same direction, and we sincerely believe it can and will produce the desired results. Particularly after revision, we think it goes a long way toward meeting the points made in this Council by the two parties at the beginning of our present debate.

It is with these considerations and convictions in mind. that we support the draft resolution, while reserving our attitude towards any point which may be raised or any suggestions or amendments which may be put forward during the further deliberations of the Security Council on this question. Our sole objective is to bring about a just and amicable solution to this dispute. We are also aware that such a solution can be brought about only if the parties themselves adopt a just, reasonable and realistic attitude towards this resolution.. We have no doubt they will.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 537 held on 22 March, 1951

When I last spoke in the Security Council concerning the India-Pakistan question, on 21 February [532nd meeting]. I said that the United States Government believes the Council should exercise its responsibility to narrow further the area of disagreement between the parties. We think this responsibility can best be performed by affecting the demilitarisation of Kashmir in order that a plebiscite can be held under United Nations auspices. The joint draft resolution, introduced by the United Kingdom and the United States, proposed to deal with the principal issues arising in this area of disagreement by establishing machinery which we believed would capitalize on the experience of the past two years of repeated attempts to carry out the 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan.

The United States, in acting with the Government of the United Kingdom to offer this draft resolution last month, did not believe that the machinery provided by the resolution which we put forward then was the only means of helping the parties advance towards a settlement of this dispute. However, we thought it was a reasonable proposal and, like any suggested device for helping solve a complex issue, it was always open to revision designed to improve the suggestion we made while retaining the essential minimum necessary, in our view, to help advance the dispute toward a reasonable solution. acceptable to both parties. That was the basis upon which we, along with the United Kingdom, submitted our draft resolution.

Since then the Governments of both Pakistan and India have voiced objections to the draft resolution as submitted. The Government of Pakistan indicated, through its distinguished spokesman, that it would prefer a resolution by which the Security Council would order the United Nations representative to carry out the provisions of the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which I have mentioned; which would give the Council's representative the power to remove or disband all the military forces, and to exercise effective supervision over State authorities in assuring a fair and free plebiscite; and which would also give to the representative the power to arbitrate all points of difference between the parties arising from implementation of these two resolutions.

On its part, the Government of India, through Sir Benegal Rau, declared that it was wholly unable to accept the draft resolution, because it conceived the resolution, in many respects, to go beyond the terms of the 13 August 1948 and. 5 January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission. The representative of India particularly mentioned the reference in the draft resolution to Sir Owen Dixon's demilitarisation proposals, and the possibility that United Nations troops might be used to facilitate demilitarisation and the holding of a plebiscite.

In accordance with our concept that the joint draft resolution submitted on 21 February last might be improved by revision as long as the objective remained of providing machinery to help the parties advance toward a reasonable and mutually acceptable solution of the dispute-we have joined with the United Kingdom in sponsoring revisions of that draft resolution of 21 February. These revisions, as has been so ably pointed out by Sir Gladwyn Jebb, take into account objections made by both parties, the most important of these being the insistence by the Governments of both India and Pakistan on holding firm to the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The revised text is, in my opinion, the irreducible minimum in this case if the Council is to provide machinery which will in fact aid the parties to carry out their commitments, as Members of the United Nations, to settle their disputes by peaceful means.

These amendments have four principal effects, which I should like now briefly to outline. In the first place, the United Nations representative would now be charged with the duty of effecting demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of the two United Nations Commission resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. This does not mean that we believe the United Nations representative should disregard the efforts of more than two years by General Mc Naughton and by Sir Owen Dixon in attempting to carry out these two resolutions. This experience surely forms a part of the record of the Security Council and neither can nor should be ignored.

In this connection, we believe that both parties should be led, by virtue of their attitude as expressed here toward the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission, to give the United Nations representative their detailed plans for carrying out these resolutions. We are most pleased to note the reaffirmation by the representative of India of his Government's firm adherence to these two resolutions, and his statement that they contain adequate provisions for a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. We cannot, however, agree with Sir Benegal Rau's emphasis that the Government of India cannot make what he described as further "concessions''. That is not a matter of making concessions, but of giving effect to a commitment. The responsibility of the Government of India and of the Government of Pakistan, under their international commitment in accepting these two resolutions, is to co-operate in settling the question of accession to India or Pakistan by a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices. The United Nations Commission's resolutions provide merely a framework which remains to be filled in; these resolutions do not set forth a complete plan for accomplishing demilitarisation and a plebiscite. The parties will have to develop and consider with the United Nations representative the details which fill out the framework in implementing their commitment-details over which the Governments of India and Pakistan have unhappily disagreed for more than two years. We feel that neither party can stop short, merely reaffirm the two resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949, and say that it cannot make further "concessions'', thereby blocking further progress.

The partie, moreover, are committed to permit the people of Kashmir to decide the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or to Pakistan. That commitment is not, as the distinguished representative of India has said, and I quote the words he used in the Security Council, "to give the people the right to decide whether they would remain in India or not''. To phrase the plebiscite question in this form would be to disregard the binding agreement accepted by both parties. The Security Council has from the beginning held that the issue of accession is one which is to be settled by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices, and both parties, in the language of their own commitments, have accepted this view. I am confident, therefore, that Sir Benegal Rau did not have and did not intend to suggest a contrary interpretation.

I emphasise this, now, to make clear the position of the United States Government in this vital matter. It is a position which rests upon the belief that the most fruitful approach which the Security Council can take this stage is to provide. the parties with machinery for the solution of this dispute.

The second of the four principal effects of the amendments is the complete elimination of paragraph 4 of the original draft. This change results from the thesis that the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions should be set forth clearly as the basis upon which the United Nations representative is to effect demilitarisation. The suggestions offered in paragraph 4 of the original draft were intended merely to provide helpful guide-posts to the United Nations representative in his efforts to work out a reasonable and mutually satisfactory solution of the Kashmir dispute. However, in view of the objections of both parties to these provisions, they have been deleted from the text.

Thirdly, if the United Nations representative has not affected demilitarisation or, at least, at least, obtained agreement of the parties to a plan for effective demilitarisation, he is to report to the Council, within three months from the date of his arrival on the subcontinent, those points of difference between the parties, in regard to both interpretation and execution of the August 1948 and January 1949 resolutions, which he considers must be resolved in order to enable demilitarisation to be carried out. This formulation by the Council's representative of these essential points of difference is important, not only in focusing the attention the Security Council on the principal issues between the parties, but also because of the revised paragraph 6 and its arbitration proposal.

Paragraph 6, to which I now, turn, embodies the fourth principal change proposed in our revisions presented today. Although, as previously, the new draft calls upon both parties to accept arbitration upon such outstanding points of difference as may remain after concluding discussions with the United Nations representative, it is now altered to declare that arbitration should be accepted upon those points which may be reported to the Council by the United Nations representative. Furthermore, the arbitration proposal now provides: that the arbitrator or panel of arbitrators is to be appointed by the President of the International Court of Justice after consultation with the parties, instead of by the Court as a whole. This latter change, we think, is more in accordance with the international practice, and should serve also to expedite the arbitration process if resort to arbitration should become necessary.

The Government of the United States regards this arbitration proposal as one of the key elements of this draft resolution. The representative of India has not, as we understand it, rejected the concept of arbitration, but has said that under the guise of arbitration issues cannot be reopened which have already been closed by the resolutions of August 1948 and January 1949 and by the assurances given to India by the United Nations Commission.

I trust that, if it becomes necessary to give effect to this arbitration provision, the Government of India will find itself able to accept the arbitration provisions of this resolution. The commitment of both parties in this dispute is to settle the question of accession by a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations supervision. It is also the parties commitment, under the Charter of the United Nations, to seek a solution by all manner of peaceful means of their own choice. When other peaceful means have been exhausted and interpretation must be made of the commitments entered into by both parties under the earlier resolutions of the Commission, then arbitration is logical in order to settle the issues preliminary to holding the actual plebiscite.

The members of the Security Council will note that the original draft resolution submitted by the United Kingdom and the United States remains the same in one important respect: the language in the preamble concerning the Kashmir National Conference has not been changed. In my statement on 21 February in support of the draft resolution [532nd meeting). I expressed my Government's concern about the action which the authorities in the Indian controlled area of Kashmir are undertaking to determine the future shape and affiliation of the State of Kashmir. I wondered whether it might interfere with a fair and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices in the entire state. I associated myself with the anxiety expressed by Sir Gladwyn Jebb in this regard, and hoped that, if the Security Council received an explanation, we would find ourselves reassured that the action of the Kashmir National Conference would not prejudice the prior commitments of the parties.

The representative of India, in advertising this problem in his statements, declared that, so far as the Government of India is concerned, the constituent assembly is not intended to prejudice the issues before the Security Council or to come in the Council's way. He subsequently stated that, while the constituent assembly might, if it so desires, express an opinion on the question of accession, it could make no decision on the question. However, the representative of India also said that the Kashmir State Government is a unit of the Indian Federation, subject to federal jurisdiction in regard to defence, external affairs and communications, but completely autonomous in all other matters. Sir Benegal Rau emphasised the autonomous nature of the Kashmir Government, affirming that the State is entitled to frame its own constitution and to convene a constituent assembly for this purpose. In discussing the question of supervising the activities of the Kashmir State Government for purposes of a plebiscite, the representative of India emphasised that the authority of the Government of India over the Government of Kashmir is limited to certain subjects; outside that sphere it could only advise and could not impose any decision.

In addition to this careful statement of the Government of India's limited control over the Government of the State of Kashmir, a number of statements bearing directly on the problem before the Security Council have been made recently by ranking leaders of the Governments of India and Kashmir concerning the constituent assembly and its purpose. One such statement was made by Sheikh Abdullab as recently as 25 February, when he said that the constituent assembly would decide the question of accession of the State, as well as its form of government. The Government of the United States, therefore, believes the situation requires that the Security Council place on the record its attitude toward the constituent assembly and toward any attempts that the constituent assembly might make to determine the future shape and affiliation of Kashmir.

The United States believes that the Security Council can and should affirm what the parties have agreed upon-that final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be made by the will of the people of Kashmir as expressed through a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices. We believe that it is important that the Security Council hold firm to the language in the preamble regarding this matter as a minimum statement of its attitude toward the proposed constituent assembly and toward the obligations of the Government of India in respect to this constituent assembly. The matter of the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is an international question, a matter which this Council has had within its purview for more than three years. It clearly falls within the field of external affairs, and Sir Benegal Rau has told the Council that the external affairs of the Government of Kashmir are within the control of the Indian Government. The Security Council, therefore, should be entitled to assume that the Government of India will prevent the Government of Kashmir from taking action which would interfere with the responsibilities of this Council.

Members of the Security Council will note that paragraph 8 of the revised draft resolution calls upon the parties to take all possible measures to ensure the creation and maintenance of an atmosphere favourable to the promotion of further negotiations, and to refrain from any action likely to prejudice a just and peaceful settlement. This language is similar to that used in previous Security Council resolutions in the course of this dispute. The Government of Pakistan and the Government of India have both condemned appeals to force to settle the Kashmir dispute, appeals which have been made by irresponsible and intemperate elements. Continued efforts by the parties to discourage such appeals to force will help ensure and maintain an atmosphere which is favourable to promoting further negotiations toward a peaceful settlement.

Let me close my remarks by repeating the hope of my Government that the Security Council will give serious and prompt consideration to the revised draft resolution. The proceedings before the Security Council since 21 February have indicated clearly the degree to which the Kashmir dispute continues to be an irritant, prejudicing friendly relations between the Governments of these two great Powers. and Pakistan. This dispute blocks the restoration of the India friendship and mutual esteem which is necessary for the peace and security of South Asia. I believe that the Security Council must assist the parties to reach a peaceful and mutually acceptable solution of this protracted dispute. The draft resolution, as we have revised it, offers a reasonable device to help the parties solve a complex issue. It is offered in the sincere belief that the present frame of mind of both parties requires that the Security Council aid them in attempting to advance toward a solution, rather than leave them their own devices. As I said last February, the time and the situation demand that the Council give the parties practical aid, and give this aid with the earnest hope that it may, in those old and meaningful words, "speak to their condition".

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 537 held on 21 March, 1951

Members of the Council have heard in the statements which my two Commonwealth colleagues have made at our recent meetings a detailed and lucid exposition of the points of view of the Governments of India and Pakistan on the matter before us. We are indebted to the two representatives for the thoroughness with which they have analysed this complex problem. One thing at least can be said about the Kashmir case, and that is that no other case which has come before the Security Council has ever been presented by both sides with such commanding ability.

I do not now intend, however, to ask the Council to weigh the relative merits of the many arguments which have been advanced by the two representatives. It will be remembered that, in the statement which I made [532nd meeting] when my United States colleague and I introduced our joint draft resolution [S/2017], I expressed my belief that, in spite of the many points of detail which have emerged during the long negotiations, the broad issues which the Council must consider, and on which we should endeavour to persuade the parties to concentrate their attention, are relatively simple. The broad issues, I repeat, are relatively simple. Nothing which my two colleagues from India and Pakistan have said during their statements has changed this belief. Indeed as I listened to the views which they put forward, it was brought home. to me even more forcibly that, in spite of their many differences on this question, their agreement to decide the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices, and their agreement to the specific proposals for holding the plebiscite contained in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 [S/1100, S/1196] completely overshadow the significance of their disagreements on points of detail. The picture which their statements built in my mind was one of the clearly defined objectives which both parties are equally anxious to reach and of certain obstacles in the path leading to this objective, the best way of surmounting which is still in dispute between them. I am sure the Council will agree with me that we must do our utmost to concentrate the attention of the parties on the objective and to persuade them, if, we can, of the futility of allowing these obstacles to prevent them from attaining it. This must be the plain duty of all those not themselves involved in the dispute and, in particular, I suggest, of all members of the Security Council.

I shall not deal in detail, therefore, with the many arguments which have been advanced and I shall ask the Council to consider only those arguments which have a direct bearing on how the two agreed resolutions of the Commission can be put into effect. I shall return to these in a moment.

But first, I should like to remind the Council that, in the statement which I made when introducing the resolution which my United States colleague and I jointly co-sponsored, I said:

"I wish to emphasise from the outset that the sub mission of this draft resolution is not intended in any way to pre-judge the Council is deliberations or the views which the Indian and Pakistan representative will no doubt put forward. It seemed to my Government, however, that it might be helpful for the Council to have a draft resolution before it is a basis for discussion...".

As a result of the views expressed by my two colleagues from India and Pakistan, and also as a result of private consultations which have been held with them, a modified joint draft resolution has now been drawn up by the United States and United Kingdom Governments. This has been circulated as document S/2017/Rev. 1, and copies of it are now before members of the Council.

The Council will be aware that the representative of Brazil has recently made determined and, indeed, most welcome efforts to bridge the difference between the two parties. I hope that he himself will give the Council an account of the proposals which he put forward and the responses which he received I think he will forgive me if I say now that the point which emerged from his negotiations was that the Government of India was unable to accept arbitration in any form as a way of resolving the disagreements regarding the interpretation and application of the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. I believe that, on the other hand, the Government of Pakistan, as was emphasised by my colleague Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan in his statement to the Council [534th, 535th meetings], was completely ready to accept any arbitration which the Council thought desirable to resolve these disagreements. That, I think, is the crux of this matter.

Members will see that in the modified draft resolution which my United States colleague and I have tabled we have retained provision for arbitration. We have not done this without a great deal of anxious thought, or without weighing carefully all the arguments which were advanced on behalf of the Government of India: we have considered whether arbitration would, as my colleague suggested, threaten the security of India; we have considered whether there is any way in which arbitration on the interpretation and application of the agreements, of which both the Government of India and Pakistan have repeatedly affirmed their acceptance, would in any way prejudice the rights or interfere with the proper responsibilities of the Government of India, and I must say to members of the Council that we-for I believe I can associate the representative of the United States in this-have been unable to see how arbitration in the form which we have proposed could in any way act to the detriment of the Government of India's rights and responsibilities. Indeed, in a matter such as this, where an international agreement,

It seems to us to be the only right course to accept arbitration in differences concerning its interpretation and application. My Government was aware, of course, that the Government of India had been unwilling to submit these matters to arbitration by a single individual, and we have, therefore, tried to meet any anxieties which it may have on this score by providing for a panel of arbitrators nominated by the President of the International Court of Justice. We can be satisfied, I am sure, that arbitration in this form would guarantee both parties a completely fair and objective determination of their disagreements arising out of the two resolutions of the Commission. I hope that members of the Council in the statements which they will no doubt be making will feel able to affirm their Governments, support for the use of arbitration in matters like this, and that they will, by voting for the draft resolution, support the co-sponsors in their view that agreement on arbitration is now the obvious and essential step for the Governments of India and Pakistan to take.

If members of the Council will now compare the modified draft resolution with the original draft resolution I shall try to explain the considerations which the co-sponsors had in mind in making the various changes. First of all, in the second paragraph of the preamble it will be seen that we have omitted reference to the Security Council resolution of 14 March 1950 [S/1461]. It will be remembered that both parties in their statements insisted that the Council should follow as closely as possible the two agreed Commission resolutions and that, in particular, the representative of India objected to the provision contained in the original joint draft resolution for demilitarisation to carried out on the basis of Sir Owen Dixon's proposals which, in certain respects, went beyond the demilitarisation plan contained in the two agreed resolutions. We have, therefore, tried to meet the views of the two parties by concentrating in our amended draft resolution on ways of giving effect to those two earlier agreed resolutions. That is the only reason for the omission that I have just mentioned.

The next amendment is in operative paragraph 3. There again our object has been to meet the objections raised by both parties to the inclusion of provisions which go beyond the two Commission resolutions. We have been glad to meet Sir Benegal Rau's point that demilitarisation must be in accordance with the agreed plan and not in accordance with subsequent modifications of it. I think, however, that it is only right for me to explain to the Council that our amendment here in no way implies that my Government, at any rate, disagrees with the demilitarisation proposals put forward by Sir Owen Dixon and, indeed, I think that my colleague from India was, if I may say so, a little less than fair to Sir Owen in his analysis of these proposals [533rd meeting). But that is a side issue which I need not explore here. The point I wish to emphasise is that the form of demilitarisation referred to in the amended paragraph 3 is precisely that which we understand the Government of India desires to see put into effect.

It will also be noticed that we have omitted the sub paragraph 3 (ii) of the original draft resolution. This again has been done because, in a sense, it might be thought to have gone beyond the two agreed Commission resolutions. Since the task of preparing detailed plans for carrying out the plebiscite is the responsibility of the Plebiscite Administrator, we have, therefore, thought it better to omit this provision from the present draft resolution.

We have also omitted the whole of paragraph 4. Members of the Council will remember that in presenting the original draft resolution the representative of the United States and I explained how we thought the three possibilities mentioned in this paragraph might help to remove difficulties preventing the settlement of the Kashmir problem. I should not wish to withdraw anything that I said in support, for instance, of a neutral force, the possibility of certain limited boundary adjustments and the idea that the degree of supervision over the plebiscite might suitably be varied from area to area in the State, and although these ideas, as we see, have been left out of the revised draft resolution, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom hopes that the Council and the two parties will continue to have them in mind in case, at some later stage in the negotiations, they should feel that they would, after all, provide the solution to some of the difficulties which we have to resolve. In particular the proposal for a neutral force which certain Member States were prepared to provide still seems to my Government to be a valuable one. I make my Government's view on this point quite clear. I made it quite clear in my initial statement, and I will not say anything further now except to express the hope that the Government of India, should disagreement on the question of demilitarisation continue, will feel able to waive its objections and agree to the replacement of the military forces of all interested parties by some suitable neutral force.

The new paragraph 4 of the revised draft resolution is the same as the original paragraph 5, with an omission at the end made necessary by the change in paragraph 3. Paragraph 5 of the revised draft resolution is the same as the original paragraph 6. It will be seen, however, that we have defined more closely the matters which would be submitted to arbitration.

As I have said earlier, we regard points of difference in regard to the interpretation and execution of the agreed Commission resolutions to be eminently suitable for determination by this method. Paragraph 6 of the revised draft resolution, again is substantially the same as the corresponding paragraph in the original draft resolution; it has been expanded a little to tie it in more closely with the report which the United Nations representative is required, under paragraph 5, to submit, and the President of the International Court of Justice has been made the authority for appointing the arbitrators instead of the International Court as a whole. It was felt that this was more in accordance with international practice and also a more convenient arrangement. It will also be noticed that the wording at the end has been slightly changed to emphasise that these appointments are to be made after consultation with the parties and that, while the views of the parties will of course be taken into full account, objections by either of them to the arbitrators nominated by the President would not be a bar to their appointment. Those are the differences which we have made in the

revised draft resolution. I do not think I need give the Council any further explanation of the reasons which the co-sponsors had in mind in making them. They are all quite straightforward and, I would hope, with make the draft resolution more acceptable to the Governments of India and Pakistan. I should like, however, to say a few words about changes which we have not felt it possible, for instance, to omit provisions for arbitration. I am sure the Council will agree with us on this point. Arbitration is, after all, one of the methods mentioned by the Charter for resolving international disputes and it is, therefore, a method which all Members of the United Nations have in principle already accepted in signing the Charter. All of us know that great efforts have been made both by the United Nations Commission, and subsequently by General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon, to find some way of resolving the disagreements between the two parties.

All those various representatives of the Security Council have acted as mediators and have had no power to do other than to endeavour by persuasion to negotiate an agreement between the parties. The Government of the United Kingdom feels very strongly that the time is now past when these disagreements can be dealt with in this way. The dispute over the future of Kashmir is not one which time will help to solve. I am afraid that is an all too obvious statement. I need not labour this point, and I hope that the Council will accept the retention of arbitration in the new draft resolution as the most effective way of moving forward towards a settlement. We must hope that if the Council expresses its conviction on this point, the Government of India will find itself able to waive the objections which the representative of India has recently expressed.

There remains the question of the Kashmir constituent assembly. It will be seen that the paragraphs in the preamble which deal with this particular point have been retained in the

amended draft resolution. I wish I could say to the Council that we feel satisfied from what the representative of India has said that the Government of Pakistan has no cause for disquiet in respect of the proposed constituent assembly. Indeed, if it had not been for a series of disturbing pronouncements by Sheikh Abdullah and by Ministers of the Government of India and of the Kashmir State Government, the Council would probably have felt that what the representative of India has told the Council was a sufficient guarantee that nothing would be done by the constituent assembly which would in any way prejudice the settlement of the future accession of Kashmir in the manner to which the two Governments and this Council are committed.

But when the Council is confronted with a statement by the Prime Minister of the Kashmir State Government that "without caring for the opposition of Pakistan, Britain and America, the proposed constituent assembly for the State will be set up on the due date to decide all big issues, including accession", the view of the Government of India, as stated by its representative, that "while the constituent assembly may, if it so desires, express an opinion on this question, it can take no decision on it", does not hold out any real promise that the Government of India will take all steps possible to prevent the Kashmir State Government from action which must inevitably prejudice the work of the United Nations in settling this dispute. I therefore wish to make a further earnest appeal to the representative of India to make it clear beyond all doubt that his Government will do everything in its power to prevent action which will damage the work of the Council, of which he himself is so distinguished a member.

Finally, I wish to deal with one general point which arises out of the statement of the representative of India, and that is the assumption which I detected behind a number of his remarks that the accession of Kashmir has already been settled and that all that remains is for the people of Kashmir to confirm that the State shall remain a part of the Indian Union. I have already referred to the letter to the Maharaja of Kashmir from the Governor-General of India, dated 27 October 19.7, in which he said, "the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State''. I do not think I need draw the attention of members of the Council to the various resolutions which both the Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan have from time to time adopted in which the decision that the accession of the State should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite has been constantly re-affirmed. The assumption made by the representative of India that the accession has been settled and that no more remains except to give the inhabitants of the State an opportunity to decide whether they should remain in India or not, in the view of my Government cuts right across the very principles on which the Council and, we have always understood, the two parties also, have been striving to effect a settlement. Of course members of the Council will all share my desire not to read anything into the statement of the representative of India which was not intended, and I am sure we shall all be most reluctant to interpret his statement in a sense which would suggest that the Government of India is in any way abandoning the pledges which it has always so. categorically affirmed.

But the combination of the proposal for establishing a constituent assembly with the suggestion that all that is now required is to give the people of Kashmir an opportunity to decide whether they should remain in India or not, will inevitably raise apprehensions in the minds of members of the Council that the Government of India does contemplate a method of ascertaining the wishes of the people on this question of accession which would be wholly inconsistent with the principles to which it, the Government of Pakistan and the Council have all along subscribed. I should therefore like in conclusion to appeal to the representative of India to set at rest any doubts which members of the Council may have on this point, by re-affirming quite explicit and categorically that the Government of India does intend to adhere to its undertaking to settle the future accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. A statement to this effect would, I am sure, be most welcome to the Council; if it could be combined with a more encouraging response to the efforts which the Council has been making for so long to resolve the disagreements between the two Governments, then we should all, I am certain, be greatly heartened.

From what I have said it will be observed that in the opinion of my delegation at any rate, we have now come to a turning point. The Security Council, we suggest, must very shortly face the issue, and by passing the revised draft resolution without hesitation, make known its definite attitude as regards this long drawn out dispute. By doing so it would at least make it clear that the United Nations, as well as the two parties, is concerned with one thing and one thing only, which is that wild talk of war on one side or the other must stop and that the solution of this admittedly difficult problem must now be achieved by peaceful means, and indeed essentially by the means laid down in the Charter to which we have all subscribed. This is what we shall be doing if we now adopt the revised draft resolution.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 532 held on 21 February, 1951

In speaking of the draft resolution submitted to the Security Council today by the United Kingdom and the United States, I wish, at the outset, to call the attention of the Council to the statement made by Sir Owen Dixon in his report submitted to the President of the Council on 151 September last. I think that this statement, which so well indicates Sir Owen's attitude in his negotiations, should be borne in mind by the Council today. He said :

"It was obvious to me that in my attempt to settle the dispute it must be governed by the course that had been taken by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and agreed upon by the parties. It might be true that the chances of such a course proving successful were much reduced by the failure of the parties over so long a period of time, notwithstanding the assistance of the Commission, to agree upon any practical measures in pursuance of that course for the solution of the problem. But the terms of the agreed resolution of 5 January 1949 were specific in appointing a free and impartial plebiscite as the means by which the question of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan would be decided. What was wanting was agreement upon the matters, including demilitarisation, which were preliminary to even the commencement of the necessary arrangements for the taking of a poll of the inhabitants."

Sir Owen's statement, in my opinion, sets the tone for our deliberations on the Kashmir question. It is the foundation for the resolution submitted today for the Council's consideration.

The item before us opens up for the Security Council the continuance of its function of bringing about, by peaceful means and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, the adjustment or settlement of an international dispute. I believe it is clear that the Council can effectively do this and that, in this case, it has proceeded on the basis that it is the agreement of the parties on which a lasting political settlement must be built.

A very important affirmative element in this case, which has been singularly lacking in others immediately concerning us, is the fact that the Prime Ministers of Pakistan and India have indicated in the clearest terms that there exists on the part of both governments the will to settle the Kashmir case peacefully and to examine solutions carefully. Also, the area of disagreement has been narrowed. Thus the Security Council comes to this case with this affirmative attitude of the parties, and I think all would agree that the Council can best exercise its function by narrowing further the area of disagreement. That is the premise on which the draft resolution before the Council is based. There are two main questions which my government believes are the primary business of the Council in its continued consideration of the Kashmir problem. The first is an action, which has been described by the representative of the United Kingdom, which the authorities in the Indian-controlled The second is the area of Kashmir are undertaking in order to determine the future shape and affiliation of the State. The first issue is the matter of bringing about a final solution of the case in accordance with principle of peaceful settlement. is presented in the preamble of the draft resolution and the second is dealt with in the operative paragraphs.

The members of the Security Council were advised, through a letter addressed to the President of the Council by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Government of Pakistan, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan on 14 December 1950, of a resolution of the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference. Sir Gladwyn Jebb has also made reference to this: This Conference met in the area of the State under the general control of the Indian Government. This resolution was proposed on 27 October 1950; it was adopted on 28 October, the following day; and it was reportedly fully . endorsed by the Prime Minister of India.

The resolution proposed the convening of a constituent assembly to determine the future form of government of the government of the entire State, including the areas under Pakistan control, and to determine the question of the State's affiliation. More recent Press reports from Kashmir and India have described how the implementation of this revolution has begun According to these report, electoral rolls in Indian-occupied areas of Kashmir are expected to be completed by March of this year, and elections may be held in June or July Although the Pakistan-held parts of Kashmir would not participate in the vote, the decisions of the Constituent Assembly will be held applicable to all parts of the State including the Pakistan-controlled areas. It is our impression that the proclamation which ordered the carrying into effect of these steps implementing the 28 October Kashmir National Conference resolution was approved by the Government of India. When the Governments of India and Pakistan accepted in writing the principles formulated in the 5 January 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, both governments agreed that the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite under United Nations auspices I emphasise "free and impartial" as well as "United Nations auspices" because it seems clear that these phrases support each other in a guarantee to the world and to each party that the plebiscite would be so fair that objective and dispassionate observers could not criticise it in any way. Equally important to the idea of a free and impartial plebiscite is the guarantee to the Government of India and Pakistan that each will have its interest protected by a plebiscite under United Nations auspices, so that the outcome will not be held unfair and the result of coercion or intimidation.

The United States Government firmly believes that there can be no real and lasting settlement of the Kashmir dispute which is not acceptable to both parties. Any attempt to decide the issue without the consent of both parties would only leave a constant and explosive irritant in the relations between. these two governments, an irritant which would effectively prevent the bringing about of peace and security in South Asia. Our friendship for the Governments and peoples of Pakistan and India has led us always to stand ready to extend whatever aid and service we can in contributing to their friendly and peaceful relationship The Prime Minister of India on 2 November 1947, in a radio broadcast, stated that the future. of Kashmir should be settled by a referendum held under international auspices, such as the United Nations. peated this pledge in Press statements as late as 0 September 1950 and 16 January 1951.

Moreover, in the light of the commitment of the Government of India, as expressed in its acceptance of the 5 January. 1949 resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, it is clear that such plebiscite can be held only under United Nations auspices, if it is to provide the guarantees of fairness and impartiality expressed in the Commission's resolution. My government is in full agreement with the view expressed by the United Kingdom representative that the action proposal by the Kashmir National Conference would not bring about such a fair and impartial plebiscite. The draft resolution presented by the United Kingdom

and the United States at this meeting proposes that a declaration to this effect be adopted by the Security Council We also share the view of the representative of the United Kingdom that the Council cannot accept or approve of a plebiscite conducted without the approval or supervision of the Council or its representatives. Our friendship for the Governments. and peoples of India and Pakistan should not deter us from expressing ourselves on this point. I was impressed by the sober anxiety which Sir Gladwyn Jebb voiced on this matter, and with him I believe that if the Security Council hears an explanation we shall find ourselves reassured that what is intended does not prejudice the parties' prior commitments. I should like in particular to associate myself with the statement of the representative of the United Kingdom, from which I quote: "no reference to the wishes of the people of Kashmir regarding the future accession of the State made otherwise than under the auspices and with the full consent of the United Nations can be regarded as constituting a settlement acceptable to this Council".

Turning to the operative part of the draft resolution which we have introduced with the United Kingdom, it proposes the appointment of a United Nations representative to effect the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir on the basis of demilitarisation proposals made previously by Sir Owen Dixon, with such modifications as the United Nations representative deems advisable; and to present to the parties and obtain their agreement on detailed principles for carrying out the plebiscite. In order to explain the reasons for this proposal, I think it advisable to review briefly the history of negotiations in this case.

The Kashmir dispute was brought before the Security Council on 1 January 1948, more than three years ago. Since then the Security Council has made three separate attempts to aid the parties in reaching a reasonable solution of the dispute. There have been a number of diplomatic approaches by the United Kingdom, and by the United States as well, supplementing these United Nations efforts. On 20 January 1948, the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan was established by the Security Council [S/654), and was able after extended negotiations to obtain agreement to a cease-fire and other principles under which a truce and plebiscite could be brought about.

Both parties agreed that the question of accession of the State to India or Pakistan should be decided by a State-wide plebiscite under United Nations auspices. This agreement between the parties was formalised in a resolution of 5 January 1949 of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The Commission was unable, however, to bring about demilitarisation and the holding of a plebiscite. In December 1949, the Security Council requested its President of that month, General McNaughton of Canada, to consult with the parties in order to help them find a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir dispute. General McNaughton reported on 3 February 1950 [S/1453] that he had not been successful; that while the Pakistan Government had accepted his proposals in substance, the Government of India did not agree on the same important issues concerning which the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan had previously reported its inability to obtain Indian acceptance of the Commission's various proposals.

In view of General McNaughton's failure, the Council then decided on 14 March 1950 [470th meeting] to appoint a United Nations representative to take the place of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and to aid the parties to work out a demilitarisation programme, as well as to offer any suggestions which might contribute to the solution of the Kashmir dispute. Sir Owen Dixon was appointed United Nations representative on 12 April 1950 [471st weeting]. He spent from May until the end of August in investigation and negotiations on the sub-continent. Sir Owen presented various proposals to the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan regarding the measures necessary to make I possible to hold a State-wide plebiscite to determine the future of Kashmir.

Having been unsuccessful in obtaining the agreement of the Government of India to his demilitarisation proposals and his suggestions for conditions which, in his opinion, would assure a fair and impartial Statewide plebiscite, the United Nations representative then ascertained the reactions of the two Prime Ministers to various plans alternative to that of an overall plebiscite. While the Government of India appeared interested in certain of these suggestions, the Government of Pakistan contended that they contravened India's commitment to determine the future of the State as a whole by a Statewide plebiscite. Despite this apparent impasse, Sir Owen. continued his negotiations in August, and persuaded the Government of Pakistan to agree to discuss possible alternative settlements without abandoning their adherence to the principle of a State-wide plebiscite, provided that the Government of India would agree to accept a plan to be drafted by Sir Owen containing conditions for a fair and impartial plebiscite in the general area of the Vale of Kashmir. Sir Owen drew up such a plan, but it proved unacceptable to the Government of India. Consequently, Sir Owen left the sub-continent on 23 August, both Prime Ministers having agreed that there was nothing further he could do under his terms of reference.

Since Sir Owen filed the report with the Security Council in September, the Council has not met to consider the Kashmir dispute, However, in London in January of this year, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers, as has already been mentioned by the United Kingdom representative, attempted, I understand, to make some progress toward a solution of this issue.

This recital of carnets but unavailing efforts to bring about a final solution of the Kashmir dispute may seem at first hearing to present a picture which offers little hope of eventual solution for this perplexing issue, so disruptive to the peace and security of the world. On the contrary, upon reflection, I think we may draw renewed faith that we can advance toward a final and lasting peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question. When the dispute was first laid before the Security Council in January 1948, an undeclared war was raging in Kashmir and threatening to spread beyond its borders. Thanks to the efforts of the Security Council and its representatives, the fighting was stopped. The parties exhibited a most cooperative attitude in agreeing to the cessation of hostilities, and themselves worked out the cease-fire line. Moreover, throughout the continuing negotiations, the Prime Ministers of both countries have steadily reiterated their earnest desire to settle by peaceful means this dispute as well as all other existing disagreements between them. In a statement on 30 September 1950, the Prime Minister of India affirmed that "India has always been prepared to agree for the duration of the plebiscite, and for a suitable period preceding it, to the appointment of United Nations representatives enjoying powers which would be sufficient to ensure that every national of Jammu and Kashmir casts his vote freely and without fear". On 16 January 1951, the Indian Premier declared that "India has repeatedly offered to work out with the United Nations reasonable safeguards to enable the people of Kashmir to express their will, and is always ready to do so".

Likewise, Prime Minister Liaqut Ali Khan of Pakistan, in a statement to the Pakistan Parliament on 5 October 1950, said, "We want to live on the friendliest terms possible with India. We want to settle all our disputes peacefully". In the published correspondence between the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan regarding the peaceful settlement of disputes between the two countries the Prime Minister of Pakistan is quoted in a letter dated 27 November 1950, as saying to Mr. Nehru, "I have also declared over and over again that Pakistan wants peaceful settlement of the Kashmir question." He added, "I agree with you that it is our common misfortune that this correspondence seems to have produced no positive result. Despite my deep disappointment, I assure you that I still believe that it is in the highest degree essential that our two governments should settle all disputes by peaceful methods. I am convinced, and I am never tired of saying so, that a war between India and Pakistan would be an unmet gated disaster for both countries and I assure you that I shall continue to work for peace".

The United States Government believes that the quoted utterances of the Prime Ministers of these two great countries indicate most clearly not only that there exists on the part of both governments the will to settle the Kashmir dispute peaceably and to examine solutions carefully, but also that the area of disagreement has been narrowed. The Security Council can best exercise its functions to narrow further this area of disagreement by effecting demilitarisation of Kashmir as a prerequisite to conducting a plebiscite. The previous negotiations in this dispute have pointed up the area of disagreement as involving, primarily first, the procedure for and the extent of demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir preparatory to holding a plebiscite; and secondly, the degree of control it would be necessary to exercise over the functions of government in the State in order to ensure a fair and impartial plebiscite. The draft resolution sponsored by the United Kingdom and the United States proposes to deal with these two principal issues.

It provides for the appointment of a United Nations representative to succeed to the post resigned by Sir Owen Dixon, but with amplified and strengthened terms of reference. The United Nations representative would have two principal tasks. He would affect the demilitarisation of the State on the basis of the demilitarisation proposals which had previously been presented by Sir Owen Dixon, with such modifications as he himself deems advisable. He would present to the parties, and obtain their agreement on, a detailed plan for carrying out a plebiscite in the State in order to give effect to their solemn commitment that the future of the State is to be decided by a free and impartial plebiscite conducted under United Nations auspices. The resolution of 14 March 1950 placed the burden of preparing and executing the demilitarisation programme upon the parties themselves, assisted by the United Nations representative. There was no reference in that resolution to the working out of a detailed plebiscite plan. The present draft resolution proposes that the United Nations representative, after consultation with the two governments in regard to their differences, himself affected the demilitarisation of the State and assumed the initiative in presenting to the two governments and obtaining their agreement to a detailed plan for the plebiscite.

The United Nations representative is authorised to take into account four considerations which, although they are definitely not exclusive of any others, we regard as important suggestions by the Security Council of possibilities which might well be considered when the United Nations representative frames his proposals to the Governments of India and Pakistan. My United Kingdom colleague has described these possibilities in some detail, and I shall merely cite them without extensive analysis of their content.

First is the report of Sir Owen which describes his most careful and objective attempt to present proposals which would meet the principal objections of the parties to both demilitarisation and the general form of a plebiscite. As the most recent attempt by a Security Council representative to help the parties in settling this dispute, it contains valuable information which undoubtedly will aid the new United Nations representative.

Secondly, there is the possibility that, for purposes of maintaining order and guaranteeing the State from external aggression during the period of demilitarisation and the holding of the plebiscite, forces might be provided from States Members of the United Nations or raised locally.

Thirdly, there is the possibility that, although a Statewide plebiscite would decide the accession of Kashmir on the basis of majority vote, the losing party might, subsequent to the plebiscite, be assigned those local areas in which such party had obtained the overwhelming majority local vote. The qualification to this suggestion is, of course, that due account must be taken of geographic and economic considerations which would vitally affect both sides.

Fourthly, there is the possibility that, while affirming the principle that there must be United Nations supervision over the functions of government in the State during the demilitarisation and plebiscite periods, it may be appropriate to have different degrees of such supervision for different areas of the State.

The draft resolution has one more major provision designed to strengthen the hand of the United Nations representative in his negotiations, and to aid the parties to reach a full and lasting settlement of this complex problem. This provision calls upon the parties to accept arbitration upon the points of difference remaining unresolved despite the efforts of the United Nations representative. The United Kingdom, as was made clear by Sir Gladwyn Jebbs's statement this afternoon, and the United States believe it necessary that still another Charter device for peaceful settlement should be provided whereby unresolved issues can be settled objectively. In this way the parties and the United Nations representative may be assured that the Security Council is firmly resolved that all possible means for peaceful settlement to bring about a full solution of the Kashmir dispute should be offered to the parties. I believe that it is the duty of the Council to call to the attention of both governments their obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to seek a solution by all manner of peaceful means, including arbitration.

These are the essential elements of the draft resolution which the United Kingdom and the United States have placed before the Security Council today for discussion. I know that the members of the Council and the parties will want to study the terms of the draft resolution with great care.

In concluding my remarks, I wish to emphasize my deep concern that the Security Council should give prompt consideration to this draft resolution. The situation on the sub-continent, in which the Kashmir dispute provides a constant irritant, prejudicing friendly relations between the parties and injuring their economic well-being, demands that the Security Council press forward suggestions which it believes may help the parties towards a reasonable and acceptable determination of this dispute. I sincerely believe that this draft resolution offers good possibilities for successfully channeling the Council's activities in the direction of practical aid to the parties. The time and the situation demand this aid, and require that it be given without thought of criticizing either of the parties or attempting to sit in judgement upon them.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Gladwyn Jebb (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 532 held on 21 February, 1951

The India-Pakistan question has now been before the Council for more than three years, and I am sure that I shall be expressing the feelings of the two governments and of members of the Council when I say how deeply we all regret that it has not yet been possible to settle it. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom has from the outest attached the greatest importance to a solution of the differences between two fellow members of the Commonwealth, not only because of the special ties which the United Kingdom has with each of the them, but also because of the supreme importance of securing the peaceful evolution of those Asian nations whose emergence to full statehood was one of the principal and, indeed, one of the most encouraging results of the Second World War. Further, developments in Asia during the ten months since this question was last debated by the Council have clearly demonstrated the urgent need for removing the obstacle to co-operation and mutual assistance. between the Government of India and Pakistan. Never was it more necessary, indeed, than it now is for two great peace loving States to give practical evidence that the issues which divide them, great and troubling though they are, are still capable of adjustment in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organisation to which both belong. Never was it more important, too, for all members of the Security Council, and, indeed, for all Members of the United Nations, to give every possible help and assistance to both sides in reaching such an adjustment. We know only too well how intractable this kind of question is: none of us, I am sure, wishes to assume any superior moral position in regard to it. We are all of us fallible and mortal. None of us wishes, unless absolutely forced to do so, to take sides. But as members of the Council, we cannot simply sit back and admit failure. However bleak the outlook, we must go on trying to secure a settlement, and try we will.

The aspect of the dispute between India and Pakistan. with which we are at present particularly concerned is, of course, that which relates to the final disposition of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It will be recalled that, on 14 March 1950, the Council adopted a resolution [S/1469] which called on the two governments to prepare a programme for the demilitarisation of the State based on proposals formulated by General McNaughton as President of the Council some months previously [S/1453). The resolution also appointed a United Nations representative for India and Pakistan to assist them in this task and to place before them any suggestions which, in his opinion, were likely to contribute to a solution of the dispute. Members will have read with great interest the report subsequently submitted by Sir Owen Dinxo who, in his capacity as United Nations representative, spent a number of months in the sub-continent in negotiation with the two governments and in examination of the problem in the State itself.

I think I shall be speaking for the Council as a whole in expressing my warm admiration for the great ability and energy with which Sir Owen discharged his mission, and for the lucid and comprehensive report which he has submitted to us. Sir Owen has made the fullest use of the terms of reference which the Council gave him and has, by formulating and discussing with the parties a whole range of proposals for settling the dispute, thrown a great deal of new light on the problem, and provided the Council with much valuable material for its consideration of what the next step towards a solution should be. The document is indeed a most masterful analysis, and I should like to draw the Council's attention to the remarks which I made as President at our 503rd meeting. and to repeat my government's appreciation for Sir Owen's most valuable services and its regret that his duties as a Judge of the High Court of Australia should make it necessary for him to relinquish his appointment as United Nations Representative. I am sure that members of the Council will wish to associate themselves with this.

On only one major recommendation did my government differ from Sir Owen Dixon. Sir Owen in fact concluded that in all the circumstances it would be best henceforward to leave the problem of the disposal of Jammu and Kashmir to the parties themselves to settle, the Security Council holding itself aloof, unless indeed hostilities should unfortunately recur. Sir Owen Dixon is a wise man and there will undoubtedly be some who would accept this advice. Certainly, if adopted, it would place my country in a less immediately embarrassing and invidious position But after full reflection His Majesty's Government could not agree that it should now, as it were, wash its hands of the problem. The reasons for

this conclusion I shall now shortly state. The history of the negotiations for a settlement of the Kashmir dispute is a long one, and I do not intend to take up time in recapitulating it. The three reports of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and Sir Owen Dixon's report, which I have just mentioned, contain a full and clear exposition of it. It is important, however, that we should keep constant in mind certain fundamental considerations. Complex as are the detailed issues raised during the course of the negotiations with the two governments, these fundamental considerations are really quite simple. The first of course is that both governments are agreed that the future disposition of the State, which is the question of accession and here I quote from the letter dated 27 October 1947 from the Governor-General of India to the Maharaja of Kashmir "should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State". In his opening statement to the Council on 15 January 1948, Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a Minister of the Government of India and its representative, in presenting its original complaint to the Council, elaborate the statement of the Governor-General's letter in the following terms [227th meeting]:

"I would invite the attention of the members of the Security Council to the high-principled statement characteristic of the Government of India under its present leadership. In accepting the accession they refused to take advantage of the immediate peril in which the State found itself and informed the Ruler that the accession should finally be settled by a plebiscite as soon as peace had been restored. They have subsequently made it quite clear that they are agreeable to the plebiscite being conducted if necessary under international auspices. It was clear to my government-as indeed it was clear to everybody else-that peace in Kashmir could never be restored or maintained without the support of the people. On the question of accession, the Government of India has always enunciated the policy that in the cases of dispute the people of the State concerned should make the decision."

He went on to say: "We desire only to see peace restored in Kashmir and to ensure that the people of Kashmir are left free to decide in an orderly and peaceful manner the future of their State." This fundamental principle, then, has been accepted by both governments and endorsed by the Security Council from the earliest stages of the dispute. The difficulties which we have encountered have all concerned the translation of that principle into a detailed scheme to give effect to it. However, even on matters of detail there has been a substantial measure of agreement between the two parties. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which was constituted by the Council in January 1948 [S/6541, prepared two resolutions which the two governments both accepted. These resolutions dated 13 August 1948 [S/1100] and 5 January 1949 [S/1196], have since been regarded by the Council as providing the basis on which the settlement of the dispute should be sought and it is, therefore, worthwhile to consider for a moment what their main provisions are.

The Commission, when it arrived in the sub-continent in July 1948, was faced with new and serious developments in the situation by the entry of Pakistan military forces into the western part of Kashmir and the existence of hostilities. between the Indian and Pakistan armies. Its first concern, therefore, was to bring about a cease-fire and to provide for the orderly withdrawal of military forces on both sides of the cease-fire line to enable preparations for a United Nations plebiscite to begin. The resolution of 13 August 1948 concentrates on these two objectives. As a result of the Commission's skill and perseverance and of the wise statesmanship shown by the leaders of the two governments, a cease-fire was proclaimed to have effect from 1 January 1949, and agreement was shortly afterwards reached for the appointment of a United Nations observer force to democrats the cease-fire line and prevent incidents between the forces on both sides. That serious incidents have been avoided is a tribute to the two governments and their military commanders, and also to the United Nations observers who are still performing their duties with admirable judgement and efficiency. I should like at this point to pay tribute to Brigadier Angle, Canadian head of the observer forces in Kashmir, who was killed in an Aeroplan accident in the sub-continent on 17 July last year, and to his two United States colleagues who died with him. All who came into contact with his work in this capacity had the highest regard for him.

Unfortunately, the Commission for India and Pakistan was not able to follow up its success in obtaining a cease-fire with a solution of the next problem, namely, that of demilitarisation. It did, however, produce its second resolution, that of 5 January 1949, which provided for the appointment of a United Nations Plebiscite Administrator and defined in some detail the form which United Nations supervision over the plebiscite should take. The acceptance by the parties of these resolutions therefore has provided a wide area of agreement, and in spite of the difficulty which General McNaughton and Sir Owen Dixon subsequently met in settling the matters of detail that have so far prevented these two resolutions from being put into full effect, my government is not without hope that a further determined effort by the Council, with the assistance of the two governments, will discover a way of resolving them and of effecting a settlement of the whole Kashmir problem.

I do not feel, indeed, that I can emphasise too much the fact that both governments have agreed on the essential elements of a settlement and that all that is now required is goodwill on both sides to resolve outstanding points of detail. Given the far-reaching benefits which a settlement would bring and the all too obvious dangers of the continuance of the dispute, not only to the two countries themselves, but to all those other countries elsewhere in the world which value human liberty and the democratic way of life, I trust I am not being too sanguine in expressing the hope that a final settlement of the dispute can now quickly be achieved,

This at any rate is the spirit in which my government has approached this problem. Since Sir Owen Dixon's report was received by the Council, my government has devoted much thought and effort in consultation with the two parties towards overcoming the deadlock and opening the way to its solution. During the recent meeting of Commonwealth Prime Ministers in London there were, as the Council knows, a number of informal and private discussions between various the Prime Ministers about Kashmir, and certain new proposals for facilitating a settlement were brought forward and examined. In addition my government has been in constant touch with the United States Government, which has, as the Council knows, played a leading part in seeking a settlement of the question since it was first referred to the Council three years ago.

As a result of their careful examination of Sir Owen Dixon's report and of the discussions which they have held with the parties and with other governments, my government and the Government of the United States have prepared a draft resolution for the consideration of the Council. This has been circulated as document S/2017. I wish to emphasise from the outset that the submission of this draft resolution is not intended in any way to prejudge the Council's deliberations or the views which the Indian and Pakistan representatives will no doubt put forward. It seemed to my government, however, that it might be helpful for the Council to have a draft before it as a basis for discussion, and that the most convenient way in which the United Kingdom and the United States Governments could put before the Council the results of their deliberations on this problem would be in the form of such a draft resolution.

I now turn to the actual terms of this draft resolution. I should perhaps first emphasise that although it takes into full account many discussions which my delegation has had with both parties, it has not in any sense been prepared in consultation with them, still less agreed with them. Indeed I fear that it will be found to contain certain provisions with which one side or the other may not find itself entirely in sympathy. I would only urge them to give the most careful consideration to it and to accept it as constitution what we believe to be the only approach likely to resolve the differences which have been preventing the holding of the plebiscite that we are all so anxious to secure. Before I draw my colleagues' attention to the detailed provisions of the resolution, I must first refer to the letter of 14 December 1950 to the President of the Security Council from the Pakistan Foreign Minister, Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan [S/1942). Members will no doubt themselves have seen reports of what is called the "All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference'' resolution to which this letter refers, and will have wondered how far it could be reconciled with the agreement already enshrined in the two Kashmir Commission resolutions which, as I have already mentioned, provide of course for settlement of the future accession of the State by a fair and impartial plebiscite conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. I feel bound to say on behalf of my delegation that for our part we find it difficult to reconcile the Kashmir National Conference resolution with this agreed form of settlement and my government has felt some anxiety lest the Kashmir State authorities should embark on some kind of independent action which would be a challenge as we felt to the authority of the Security Council and of the United Nations. However, I feel sure that when we hear, as we shortly. shall, the explanation which my colleague, the representative from India, will no doubt give us, we shall be reassured that there is no intention on the part either of his government or of the Kashmir State Government to adopt measures which would in any way prejudice the agreements already reached and the commitments already entered into by the Governments of India and Pakistan, or which would conflict with the measures already adopted by the Security Council.

Therefore, I shall not dwell on the third and fifth paragraphs of the preamble of the draft resolution submitted by my United States colleague and myself. These paragraphs, read with the statement which I hope Sir Benegal Rau will eventually make, will, I am sure, be a reassurance to the Pakistan Foreign Minister and will place on record quite categorically that no reference to the people of Kashmir regarding the future accession of the State made otherwise than under the auspices and with the full consent of the United Nations can be regarded as constituting a settlement acceptable to this Council.

The final paragraph of the preamble points to the two immediate and major differences requiring solution, namely, as we all know, demilitarisation of the State and the degree of United Nations supervision over the conduct of the plebiscite. Study of Sir Owen Dixon's report will show in detail the reasons why he was unable to resolve the differences between the parties on these two points. Our draft resolution does not itself seek to define a solution for them.

In paragraph 4, however, it sets out four elements which we hope may contribute towards a solution. We sincerely believe that the possibility that a neutral force might be made available to safeguard the security of the State during the plebiscite period should, if there is a minimum of goodwill of both sides, overcome many of the difficulties which have so far stood in the way of demilitarisation. I hope that the representatives of the two parties will be able to give the Council assurances that such a neutral force would not be rejected by their governments if the United Nations representative should decide that it offers the only solution to the problem of demilitarisation. Whatever difficulties may have been felt by either of the parties in the past, I hope that there will now be a ready acceptance of the principle that the best guarantee of a fair expression of the wishes of the people of Kashmir is the removal or disbandment of the military forces of all interested parties and their replacement by United Nations forces which can have no interest to sway the vote either way. As a principle this seems to us at least to be so axiomatic that we can hardly believe that it will not be accepted by the Council and by those immediately concerned. For if it is not accepted, it can only mean that the contestant denies the whole concept of settlement by plebiscite, which after all has already been accepted without reservation. Can anyone in fact maintain that the two classic examples of successful plebiscites in recent years the Saar and Upper Silesia-could have been successfully conducted without the presence of a neutral force, neutral, that is to say, as between the two contending parties? I suggest that it cannot.

As I have said the resolution does not itself set out a detailed solution, but instructs the United Nations representative in consultation with the parties to effect the demilitarisation of the State and to present detailed plans for carrying out the plebiscite. The Council will, I hope, agree that the United Nations representative should be given some assurance that on outstanding points of difficulty a means of obtaining an authoritative decision will be available to him. It is for this reason that provision has been made in paragraph 7 for reference of any such points to an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators appointed by the International Court of Justice.

The Council will, of course, be aware of a previous occasion when the Government of India was unable to accept the Kashmir Commission's proposal for arbitration on such points. My government has, of course, given anxious thought to the considerations which prompted the Government of India to reject this previous proposal. But the hope is that, in view of the repeated failure to resolve these differences on points of detail and of the fact that the general principle of settlement by plebiscite has already been fully accepted by both governments, they will now feel able to accept arbitration on any points of difference which the United Nations representative, after further consultation with them, is unable to resolve.

I do not wish to weary the Council with too much detail at this stage. My colleagues will no doubt wish for time to examine the draft resolution I-and I am sure my United States colleague also will be very ready to elucidate any points in our proposals which may be put forward in later meetings of the Council. I should, however, draw the Council's attention to the provisions of sub-paragraph (iii) of paragraph 4 of the draft resolution since this deals with a principle which has not hitherto been incorporated in any formal resolution. It is one, however, which members of the Council have, I am sure, long had in mind. Whichever party the majority vote in the plebiscite may favour, there seem certain to be some areas with an overwhelming proportion of inhabitants in favour of the party with a minority of votes throughout the State. Where, after careful consideration of geographical and economic factors, it seems that any of those areas should be separated from the State as a whole and included in the territory of whichever of the two parties loses the plebiscite, the intention of this sub-paragraph is that such adjustment should be made. There are several points which need emphasis. The first is that no adjustment should be made which would result in the formation of an enclave. Then it is our intention that no area should be taken out of the State if by so doing the economic interest of the State as a whole or of the territory to which it acceded under the plebiscite would be materially damaged or threatened. It will be seen of course that this proposal does not in any way affect the principle that the future of the State as a whole will be decided by the majority of all the inhabitants of the State eligible to vote. Any adjustments that may be made in accordance with this sub-paragraph would be subsequent to the determination of the accession of the State as a whole and would be designed purely to avoid the incorporation in the territory of whichever of the two parties won the plebiscite of areas which contained an overwhelming number of inhabitants opposed to such incorporation. We have not attempted to work out the details of this new provision. This in our view could suitably be left until agreement has been reached on the immediate problems which are still preventing the plebiscite from being held. We should hope that the Plebiscite Administrator, in consultation with the two parties, would be able to prepare a detailed plan acceptable to both governments to give effect to the principles expressed in the sub-paragraph.

Such are the main features of the draft resolution now. before the Security Council. It is, I can assure the members. of the Council, the fruit of the most mature consideration not only by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government but by certain other governments as well. It is submitted in all earnestness and good faith and, I should add, in a spirit of hope and not of despair. When one considers. that any attempt to settle this vexed question by force would be so immeasurably more disastrous to both sides than any possible solution in accordance with the means now suggested; when one further reflects that even a continuance of the present tension, with all its economic and political effects, would also be far more damaging to both sides than any possible disadvantages which the decision of the people of Jammu and Kashmir could produce; and when finally one contemplates the condition of the world in which this at one time fratricidal struggle is now being conducted, then one can scarcely believe that an agreed solution is impossible of achievement by reasonable human beings. It is in this mood that we present our resolution to the Security Council and to the representatives of the two great nations concerned, not seeking to impose, but only anxious to serve.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Bebler (Yugoslavia) in the Security Council Meeting No. 471 held on 12 April, 1950

At the beginning of this meeting the President, referring to the present world tension, addressed a general appeal to the permanent and non-permanent members of the Security Council. My delegatton feels that, in so doing, he was perfectly justified in emphasising that in the eyes of public opinion we-and I am speaking of the Council as a whole are very far from playing the part which we are called upon to play in international life that of a great artisan of peace and of international understanding. Our agenda contains a long list of questions. We do not mention them. I of course share the opinion of those who hold that failure to discuss these questions is perhaps a good omen, since it can be taken to mean that they are not "burning" questions. However, as the President pointed out, there are problems to which that optimistic view obviously cannot apply. Some of them are not taken up despite the fact that they are immediate and pressing.

The President was right in mentioning the question of the admission of new Members. Some States applied for admission to membership in the United Nations in 1946 and 1947. They have been waiting for the past three or four years. It is to be deplored that these States have not been admitted as a result of the lack of agreement on the question as to how many of them should be included in the first group of new Members to be admitted. The prestige and success of the United Nations call for an immediate solution to that problem.

Moreover, I feel that I must refer to the problems of armaments. These are particularly grave problems since the armaments race adds to international tension which in turn speeds up that race. Who, other than the Security Council, can rescue the world from this vicious circle ?

The Security Council must, of course, be in a moral position to do so. It is therefore essential that the Council itself should be able to function. Its composition should be such as to permit it to take, with authority, whatever initiative may be required.

Unfortunately, we cannot say that all is well within the Security Council. We are divided on a vital question, that of the representation of a permanent member, China. As I told the Press the other day, I consider that the time has definitely come for that question to be solved. There is, in our opinion only one possible solution, that of admitting to our table the representative of the Government of the People's Republic of China, the only Chinese Government worthy of that name. Our failure to take that decision has resulted in the absence from the Council, through no fault of its own, of one of its permanent members, a situation for which the majority of its members is to blame.

Moreover, is there still that majority of seven votes which the Charter requires for accepting the validity of the credentials of the Chinese delegate who is here at this time? I doubt that very much and I believe that the President should examine the situation and lead us to a speedy solution of that question which has remained in suspense for too long a period of time.

To avoid any misunderstanding, I wish to point out that such a decision should be taken immediately, not because of the intentional absence of another permanent member, but despite that absence. It should be taken in the interests of the United Nations; it should be taken because the Charter requires the presence of China in the Security Council; that is clearly stipulated in Article 23. It should be taken because China's absence constitutes the most flagrant violation of the principle of universality of the United Nations, since it concerns a country the population of which is larger than that of the whole of Europe or even of the two American continents combined.

In our opinion, we should deal with this question first and should devote one of our forthcoming meetings to it. This is the first task awaiting not only the permanent members of the Council but also and especially the non-permanent members, since the latter seem less divided on this point which, incidentally, is no more than a reflection of the general state of affairs in our troubled world.

This last factor is an additional reason for our attitude with regard to the part be played by large and small countries. This attitude was clearly stated by my country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Kardely, during a general debate at the last session of the General Assembly, when he said :

"We are far from under-estimating the part which the great Powers are at present playing in international life and, particularly, in the defence of peace We believe, however, that the co-operation on an equal basis of the small Powers in all efforts towards strengthening the peace is essential if the peace is to be not merely a peace for the great Powers but also one between the great's Power and the small, i.e., a peace between equal nations, a peace for all and not only a peace for the strong. and the Mighty."

For that real, just and indivisible, peace, we are prepared to do everything which is necessary. As a member of the Council, my country is prepared to cooperate in any plan and to give its support to any step directed towards that end, any step aimed at raising the prestige of the United Nations, by showing that the United Nations as an organisation, is equal to its task and that its work, its enterprises and its successes an expression of that are which is deepest and most common to all peoples: the desire for a lasting peace.

12041950 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 471 held on 12 April, 1950

I appreciate and praise the noble motives which motivated the President to make the statement which he did at the beginning of today's meeting. It is obvious that the peoples It is of the world look to the United Nations and, in particular, to the Security Council, to keep the peace of the world. It is also obvious that problems have increased faster than we have been able to find solutions for them. The President's concern is therefore very legitimate. I wish to take a few minutes of the Council's time to set forth the views of my delegation in regard to the problem which the President took up in his opening statement.

In the first part of the President's statement he stressed. the problem of disarmament and the organisation of a United Nations force. Although he did not specifically mention the problem of atomic energy. I am sure he had it in his mind, as indeed all of us must have it always in our minds. My delegation regrets and laments that we have not succeeded in prohibiting and controlling the atomic weapon. We regret that the matter of the limitation of conventional armaments has not made much progress. We also regret that the organisation of an international force is as far off today as it was when the United Nations was first started. This state of affairs is undoubtedly a disappointment to all of us here and to all the peoples of the world. Indeed, we can say that such a state of affairs has come about against the deep wishes of all the peoples of the world. Nevertheless, it is a fact, and we can ponder over the reasons for the present situation.

The world, in spite of its shortcomings, has progressed. beyond the stage of cannibalism or war for the sake of just killing people. War for the sake of war is definitely a museum piece. If, then, we still see on all sides preparations for war it is because we are divided on policy. It is my sincere conviction that the cause of disarmament can be served only by seeking a settlement in the political sphere. Any effort to work on the problem of disarmament, including the control and prohibition of atomic energy, would not bear fruit unless we succeed in the first instance in achieving a substantial measure of political agreement.

Turning now to the political field, it appears to me that it is well for the Security Council to keep in mind its limitations. To realise our limitations is not to abdicate or to remain passive in the face of the world crisis. If we realised our limitations we could then more profitably build up our strength and apply that strength along lines that would be really useful.

One of the great political problems facing the world today is the problem of peace treaties with Germany, Japan and Austria. Now, it was decided by the Powers that the question of peace treaties should be placed beyond the sphere of activities of the United Nations. No matter what we here might think today, this problem is not within our jurisdiction. I can see nothing that the Security Council can do usefully in this field.

The second great limitation which we must face is the rise of Soviet Union imperialism. This rise is unexpected. In the years before the organisation of the United Nations. and during the Conference at San Francisco, all the Governments and peoples of the world expected the Soviet Union to cooperate with the other countries of the world on the basis of live and let live. Actual events have gone against our expectations. We face today a new kind of imperialism more deadly than anything we have ever seen before in all of mankind's history. It works with weapons against which the Charter made no specific provision just because the framers of the Charter did not visualise such a possibility. It is only when aggression assumes the classical form of armed invasion that the specific Articles of the Charter can be brought into action. Aggression through propaganda, through the "fifth column", through exploitation of economic backwardness in some countries, waging a war of aggression in the form of a civil war all these and other devices were not foreseen and safe guarded against by the framers of the Charter. This limitation of the United Nations is one of the fundamental causes of its weakness today. It is also the fundamental cause of the world's worries.

What, then, can the United Nations contribute towards the maintenance of peace? It has no force of its own. It has no financial resources of its own. Some of the important problems of the world are not within its scope of activities. Our Charter was designed more to meet the problems of the past than to meet the one problem of today.

In the face of all these limitations and difficulties there is -one sphere where we can be useful and strong. That is the sphere of world public opinion. It is by the mobilisation of the moral forces of the world that the United Nations today. can make a real contribution. I am firmly convinced that if we should be courageous enough to deploy all the moral forces. of the world, we could yet maintain the peace of the world.

During the fourth session of the General Assembly, my delegation asked the United Nations to consider the aggression of the Soviet Union against my country. The General Assembly contented itself with a resolution of abstract and remote principles. Even today, when the question is before the Interim Committee, some delegations are only too prone to be passive, to say that what is past is past. I cannot conceive of any way of raising the prestige of the United Nations if we continue to hush matters. Proposals have been made to patch up things. Such proposals are calculated to preserve the United Nations as a piece of bureaucratic machinery. I am not interested in the United Nations as a piece of bureaucratic machinery; I am interested in the United Nations as a force for international justice and peace. As soon as it ceases to be such a force, a mere gigantic bureaucracy will serve purpose whatever. no

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 471 held on 12 April, 1950

The United States wishes to encourage its fellow Members of the United Nations, India and Pakistan to continue to make these substantial gains in the direction of the settlement of an extremely complicated situation. It has never been necessary for the Security Council to consider the question of blame, guilt, or anything of that kind. It has had enough to do in considering the facts, the complexity of which was the natural outgrowth of a situation having many ramifications and a long and ancient history.

I think that, as representative of the United States, I could do no better at this moment of progress than briefly to refer to what these great Members of the United Nations have already accomplished and to the promise which this holds for the future. I should like to bring out the high points in the comparatively brief consideration which the Security Council has given to this matter. I should also like to touch upon the matters which remain to be considered and acted upon by the two representatives of the Security Council: first, by the person whom we have appointed today and whose distinguished character gives us every cause for expressing gratitude at his willingness to assume the burdens of this great task; and, then after he has carried cut that task and reported to the Security Council, by Admiral Nimitz, who will have to go forward with his part in the programme as supervisor of the plebiscite in which fair opportunity is to be given to the people of Kashmir and Jammu to make their own decision as to accession.

This, briefly, is the story as we see it, and we think it represents a notable achievement by two great countries. which were suddenly confronted with the necessity of solving these problems that grew out of the great change from a colonial status to one of independence.

It was in January 1948 that this matter was brought before the Security Council. On the 17th of that month, the Security Council adopted a resolution [S/651] submitted by the representative of Belgium which called upon the parties ``to take all measures...to improve the situation...." The United Kingdom delegation suggested that the President of the Security Council meet with the representatives of the parties to explore the grounds for settlement; and, still in that same month, on 20 January 1948, a three-member Commission was created by the Security Council [S/654] to proceed to the spot, investigate and report.

On 13 August 1948, by virtue of a resolution [S/1100, paragraph 75] adopted by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [UNCIP] the Security Council Commission to which I have just referred, a cease-fire was ordered and a truce agreement proposed, reaffirming the wish of both parties that the future status of the State be determined in accordance with the will of the people.

On 23 December 1948-I am skipping many of the details of this history, because it is necessary on this occasion to bring only the high points into the record-India accepted, by letter [S/1196 annex 4], the proposals made by UNCIP; and, on 25 December, Pakistan did likewise [S/1196 annex 5]. India and Pakistan agreed, then, to order a cease-fire, which became effective, at midnight, one minute before 1 January 1949.

On 5 January 1949, UNCIP adopted another resolution [S/1196, paragraph 15] supplementing part III of the resolution of 13 August 1948, providing for a plebiscite to be carried out by a plebiscite administrator to be nominated by the Secretary-General and to be formally appointed to office by the Government of Jammu and Kashmir.

Very shortly thereafter, on 24 March, to be exact, Chester W. Nimitz, Fleet Admiral of the United States Navy, was designated Plebiscite Administrator, and the Commission of the Security Council was notified by the Secretary-General of this designation.

These were important and logical steps toward a peaceful solution of a situation. had become so dangerous that both parties told the Security Council that its continuance threatened to bring about an international conflagration.

On 15 April, UNCIP presented to both parties truce terms which were deemed to represent a fair compromise. Those terms included, first, the drawing of a cease-fire line, secondly, the withdrawal of troops, and, thirdly, general provisions.

On 26 August, the parties not having been able to agree to all the particulars of UNCIP's proposals, another idea was tried out a proposal [S/1430 Add.1, annex 35] providing for arbitration on the differences existing between the parties concerning all questions raised by them regarding the implementation of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

I have referred to two resolutions: one 13 August 1948 and the other of 5 January 1949. They are basic resolutions, and I have called attention to them because they are concerned. with what we are doing today and constitute the basis of our action, as I shall point out.

The proposal for arbitration was rejected. The net gain up to this point, then, before the resolution which was adopted on 14 March 1950 and to which the representative of Ecuador has referred, was the cessation hostilities, the adoption of a line of truce, an agreement for a plebiscite, and recognition by both India and Pakistan that Admiral Nimitz was satisfactory as a supervisor and overseer of the plebiscite. That is where we stood on 14 March 1950, when

the Security Council adopted the joint resolution introduced by Cuba, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, which replaced UNCIP by a single representative and called upon the parties "to prepare and execute within a period of five months from the date of this resolution"-that would bring it to next August-"a programme of demilitarisation on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal [S/1453] or of such modifications of those principles as may be mutually agreed."

I shall not take the time of the Security Council to review the McNaughton proposal, but I refer to it in order to have this record connected up logically.

There is one paragraph in the resolution of 14 March 1950 that I ask leave to read; it is not long and I regard it as important enough to be made a part of any remarks. It reads:

"Commending the Governments of India and Pakistan for their statesman-like action in reaching the agreements embodied in the United Nations. Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 for a cease-fire, for the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and for the determination of its final disposition in accordance with the will of the people through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite and commending the parties in particular for their action in partially implementing these resolutions by" and this is the record of achievement:

"1. The cessation lities effected 1 January 1949, "2. The establishment of a cease-fire line on 27 July 1949 and "3. The agreement that Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz shall be Plebiscite Administrator."

What is there left immediately before us? We find that the greatest difficulty, and one which provoked the idea of arbitration, was the demilitarisation of the country, which is deemed to be necessary, and which is considered by the Security Council to be necessary, in order that the plebiscite may be held in an orderly way and uninfluenced by the presence of the armed forces of either party to this controversy. Consequently, the immediate question still to be decided, and the question with regard to which this very distinguished representative will participate, assist, afford guidance and report to the Security Council from time to time is that of demilitarisation.

I should like to say, in conclusion, that the United States wishes to strengthen the arm of the representative of the Security Council as far as it is proper and appropriate for a member of the Security Council and a Member of the United Nations to do so. It is our judgement that this great representative should have the strong support of the Security Council at all times in his very difficult task. In saying this we cast no aspersions whatsoever upon the parties. Their problem is exceedingly difficult, as we know. We are not trying to enforce something by punishment, coercion or anything of that kind. What we are trying to do is to use that finest of instrumentalities in all disputes, pacific settlement, and the offer of a very distinguished and able person to aid in bringing the parties together.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Terence Shone (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 469 held on 8 March 1950

I have been deputed by my three follow-sponsors of the joint draft resolution now before the Council to make a short statement on behalf of all four of us with a view to clarifying certain points on which we have been given to understand there may be some doubt.

We have been asked to explain in greater detail the intentions which we had in mind in including in paragraph 1 of the operative part of our joint resolution the words "on the basis of the principles of paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal".

The sponsors believe that the general approach adopted by General McNaughton was right and they consider that, in the existing situation and in the light of the information which has been made available to them, the suggestions contained in paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposals [S/1453] are not only entirely fair and reasonable, but also best calculated to facilitate the early settlement of the dispute. It would seem to be unsuitable for the Council to do more than to recommend these suggestions in general terms to the parties. and to the United Nations representative. In working out a programme of demilitarisation, it would be expected that due consideration would be taken of the opinion of the Council and that the programme would follow broadly the lines indicated. by General McNaughton. The United Nations representative would, no doubt, be guided also by the statements made at Lake Success by members of the Security Council. Subject to this, the United Nations representative would, of course, have a certain amount of discretion to adjust this course in the light of any fresh considerations which might arise.

The sponsors of the joint draft resolution believe that it provides a practical procedure for moving forward toward the final settlement of the Kashmir dispute by building on the essentials of agreement already reached between India and Pakistan. In putting forward the draft resolution they did not intend that the Council itself should engage in a mediatory effort or negotiation with the parties on the details of the application of the underlying principles. In the view of the sponsors, that is a task which can best be performed by the United Nations representative in direct negotiation with the parties. The sponsors believe that a reasonable programme of demilitarisation can best proceed on the basis of the principles set forth in paragraph 2 of General McNaughton's proposal. One of these principles is that the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line should be reduced by withdrawal, disbandment and disarmament in such stages as not to cause fear at any point of time to the people on either side of the cease-fire line. A second is that the armed forces should be reduced in this manner to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order. They should be reduced to a level sufficiently low, and should be so placed, as not to inhibit the free expression of public opinion in a plebiscite. It follows that the programme of demilitarisation should be dealt with as a whole and accomplished within a single period, leaving only the minimum of forces for final disposal under the resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196 paragraph 15] of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan; that it should embrace all the areas of the State, including the northern area, and that it should be so designed as to reduce to the minimum the possibility of any recrudescence of fighting or disturbances.

As to the question of the temporary administration of the northern area, the co sponsors believe it to be a corollary of the maintenance of the cease-fire line that the military and civilian authorities on their respective sides of the cease-fire line must be able to cooperate with each other. The sponsors have therefore assumed, as General McNaughton appeared to assume in paragraph 2 of his proposals, that there could be no question of making any change in the civil administration in the northern area. The sponsors are fortified in this view by the apparent belief of the Commission that any such change would involve the risk of an extension of military activity. If the United Nations representative should find the assumption I have mentioned unwarranted, this draft resolution would not preclude him from suggesting other appropriate and equitable arrangements.

It has been asked whether the provision in sub-paragraph 2 (a) of the joint draft resolution that the United Nations representatives should interpret demilitarisation agreements, is intended to refer only to future agreements. We confirm that this is the intention.

In regard to sub-paragraph 2 (b) of the joint draft resolution, we have been asked to define more exactly the extent of the United Nations representative's authority to may suggestions under this sub-paragraph. It will be observed that the wording of the sub-paragraph gives the representative a very wide discretion or regard to the kind of suggestions he is empowered to make to the Governments of India and Pakistan or to the Security Council. It should be borne in mind, however, that the sub-paragraph must be read in its context. Through this joint draft resolution the Security Council would, among other matters, commend the parties for reaching agreement on the goal of a free and impartial plebiscite and express its opinion that the resolution of the outstanding difficulties should be based on the agreement on fundamental principles already reached..

When subparagraph 2 (b) is read in this context, it should be clear enough that the Council would expect any suggestions which the representative might make to be compatible with the agreed objective. Only if he should find, after investigation on the spot, that the agreed objective was impracticable, would he be expected to make suggestions at variance with this objective. The mandate is made as extensive as it is in order to ensure that the representative will be duly empowered to make appropriate suggestions in all contingencies, even such as would today be considered highly improbable.

It has also been asked whether the power of the Plebiscite Administrator in regard to the final disposal of armed forces after the demilitarisation period would be affected by the present joint draft resolution. The sponsors wish to say that, under subparagraph 2 (d), it is anticipated that the Plebiscite Administrator would assume the functions assigned to him "under agreements made between the parties". Therefore, the powers which it was agreed, under the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949, that the Plebiscite Administrator should assume, would not be prejudiced by the present joint draft resolution.

We have also been invited to clarify our intentions in regard to paragraph 5 of the joint draft resolution. It is our intention that the United Nations representative should be in a position to exercise his powers immediately upon his appointment by the Security Council, and that the Commission should remain in existence for a short period in order to ensure continuity. During this period the United Nations representative and the Commission would be equipped with identical powers, but it is not anticipated that circumstances would arise in within the Commission would need to exercise its powers.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Terence Shone (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 468 held on 28 February, 1950

I imagine that some of us may perhaps have hoped that the four days which have elapsed since the joint draft resolution now before the Council was presented might have sufficed to enable the representatives of the two parties mainly concerned to give the Council the views of their Governments today. On the other hand, I am sure we can all appreciate that a further brief period of delay may be required in a matter of such importance. At the same time I feel bound to recall to the Council the emphasis which many of its members, including the representative of the United Kingdom, who then occupied this chair, have placed on the importance of avoiding any undue delay in this matter. Some of us cannot but feel concerned at reports which we read in the Press almost every day regarding various questions at issue between India and Pakistan, apart from the question of Kashmir.

The Security Council has, as we all know, a grave responsibility in this question of Kashmir, and we are surely. entitled to hope that anything we may be able to do to lead to a rapid settlement of it will help in other ways as well. I trust, therefore, that I shall not be regarded as pressing matters unduly if I express the hope that within a few more. days we shall be fully apprised of the views of both parties on the joint draft resolution, and that we may then be enabled to take things a stage further in the Council,

28021950  Text of the Speech made by the President Mr. C Blanco as the representative of Cuba in the Security Council Meeting No. 468 held on 28 February, 1950

Speaking as the representative of Cuba, I wish to make a few observations and to explain the reasons which have led my delegation to reach certain conclusions, after a detailed and impartial study of the India-Pakistan question, with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. For the sake of brevity I shall not refer to the historical background of the problem. I shall deal surely with the measures adopted by the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan as a basis for a peaceful solution of the problem.

Leaving aside the Security Council resolutions of 17 [S/651] and 20 [S/654] January and 21 April [S/726] 1948, let us consider the resolutions of 13 August 1948 [S/1400 paragraph 75] and 5 January 1948, [S/1196 paragraph 15] of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, which form the basis of the agreements reached by the two parties concerned as a result of the good offices and the mediation of the Commission in seeking a settlement of the dispute.

The resolution of 13 August 1948 provided for three stages in the process of effecting a peaceful solution: the cease-fire in Kashmir, the truce leading to the demilitarisation of that territory, and the future legal status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, to be determined by the free will of the inhabitants. The resolution of 5 January 1949 supplements that of 13 August with regard to the last point, in that it describes the conditions required in preparing and organising a plebiscite in that State. The Governments of both India and Pakistan agreed to the two resolutions and as a result of their acceptance the provisions of the resolutions apply equally to both. It was possible, by means of the Commission's negotiations with the parties, to bring about a ceasefire in the territory. Despite the Commission's efforts, however, it was not possible to implement the second part of the resolution of 13 August with respect to a truce and demilitarisation, essential steps for guaranteeing the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite.

That provision gave rise to the greatest difficulties. The parties concerned were unable to agree on the application of a plan of demilitarisation. The result was that what might have been considered a mere question of detail, had there been agreement in principle, has become a fundamental question for which no solution has as yet been found.

In view of the situation, the Security Council decided. in December 1949 [457th meeting] to request General Mc Naughton, who was its President at the time, to enter into informal conversations with the representatives of both parties. for the purpose of determining whether it is mutually satisfactory. basis might be found for the solution of the difficulties which had arisen. It is a matter of the utmost regret to the delegation of Cuba that the proposals submitted by General Mc Naughton set forth in document S/1453, have not been accepted by either of the two parties in so far as the demilitarisation plan is concerned.

Fully aware of its duties and responsibilities as a member of the Security Council, the delegation of Cuba considers that in its broad lines the proposals submitted by General McNaughton constitute an ample, reasonable and practical basis for the solution of the difficulties to which I have referred. It further believes that the proposal should commend themselves to the members of the Security Council and to world public opinion, in view of their equitable and just character. The delegation of Cuba wishes once again to express its admiration and gratitude to the author of those proposals, General McNaughton, for the valuable contribution he has made to the solution of the problem. In the opinion of my delegation, the proposals have also a practical aspect which should be borne in mind, in that they take into account the substantive part of the agreement reached between the parties concerned, which is essential if any settlement is to be achieved. Other representatives have referred to it, and I do not intend to dwell on that point.

The delegation of Cuba wishes, therefore, to state that it adheres to the principles contained in paragraph 1 of the proposals submitted by General McNaughton and is pleased that the representatives of the two parties have, in their recent statements, confirmed their acceptance of those principles, which are :

"(a) To determine the future of Jammu and Kashmir by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite, to take place as early as possible;

"(b) Thus to settle this issue between the Governments of India and Pakistan in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants, as is desired by: both Governments;

"(c) To preserve the substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles which has already been reached between the two Governments under the auspices of the United Nations ;

"(d) To avoid unprofitable discussion of disputed issues of the past, and to look forward into the future towards the good-neighbourly and constructive cooperation of the two great nations."

With respect to the problem of demilitarisation, the Cuban delegation believes that the principles set forth in paragraph 2 of the proposals submitted by General Me Naughton could serve as a basis for the establishment of a plan to bring about demilitarisation as soon as possible.

Associating itself with those proposals, the Cuban delegation has offered its modest collaboration in the draft resolution now before the Council, which is based on the principles referred to. Generally speaking, our position in the matter is the same as that of the United Nations. It is our earnest desire that a solution should be reached in accordance. with the provisions of the Charter. We do not espouse the cause of either of the two States which are parties to the dispute; we have equal respect, consideration and sympathy for both. Our attitude could not be more objective or impartial. We support the cause of the United Nations, in other words the cause of peace and justice; we also support the cause of the people of Kashmir, whose right freely to express their will with regard to their future is unassailable.

We must bear in mind, however, that so long as this dispute remains unsolved and the present situation between. India and Pakistan continues, international peace to en dangered, the progress of both peoples is retarded, and their fate is perhaps in danger. We wonder, therefore, whether the reasons, valid as they may be, which order of the two States may have, or the rights which they may claim to any specific disputed territory, should although the advantage, or rather the necessity, for both States to establish good neighbourly relations, to enlarge their commercial relations, and above all to walk hand in hand, thus contributing to the progress and improvement of their respective peoples and of those other peoples in that area who have but recently achieved their freedom and independence.

We do not doubt, therefore, that both India and Pakistan. will reconsider the problems in the light of whatever new action the Security Council may take, and that they will succeed in closing a past of struggle and anxiety, and settling a present fraught with danger, so as to open the way to a future of peace and prosperity for their peoples.

The delegation of Cuba considers that the draft resolution submitted jointly by Norway, the United Kingdom the United States and Cuba offers to both parties new opportunities to achieve a just, equitable and final solution of their difficulties and gives ground for hope that a free and impartial plebiscite may soon be held in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, through which its people may determine their future by democratic methods.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Viteri Laforne (Ecuador) in the Security Council Meeting No. 468 held on 28 May, 1950

The S. C. is now carrying out one of the great functions in the development of the United Nations entrusted to it by the San Francisco Charter. That high function, that noble aim, is to contribute to the search for solutions to international disputes which may arise between Member States of the United Nations. By its very nature and essence an international dispute generally requires considerable time before any solution can be reached. It involves work which does not always proceed as rapidly as might be desired by the parties directly concerned and by others interested in the maintenance of peace and security. Yet by the very nature and essence of disputes, there are cases which appear simple at first, yet become more and more complicated as time goes on. International disputes have been known to last for over a century.

The aim of international organisations such as ours is to bring about solutions within a reasonably short period of time. To the difficulty of finding a solution to such grave and complex problems is added the fact that the parties concerned. are not always prepared to do their utmost to solve their disputes. I believe that in the present case fortunately, the two parties, sister States which have only recently joined the international community of nations firmly intend and earnestly desire to arrive at a speedy solution of their dispute.

Although this dispute originated in 1948 more than two years ago, it is now the end of February 1950 and no solution has yet been found. In the past two years however, as a result of direct action by the Security Council and by the special commissions set up by that organ to bring about a solution of the dispute between India and Pakistan, some very positive steps have been taken towards a solution. It would be most unfair, in speaking of the achievements of organs of the United Nations, among them the Security Council, to say that absolutely nothing has been reached. There are many problems which, without the existence and intervention of the United Nations or its organs, would have become much more. serious; in cases where it has not yet been possible to reach a solution, it is because the inherent gravity and complexity of the problem has made it impossible for a solution to be reached as speedly as might have been desired.

In the organisation of the Security Council it was felt that there should be continuity of action which would enable the Council to solve international disputes despite the passing of time and the changes in the Council's membership. That is one of the reasons for there being both permanent and non permanent members in the Council. The non-permanent members are not all changed simultaneously, and continuity is thus ensured even for problems which might last months or years. The Security Council can continue to examine problems in full knowledge of what has gone before, and new members elected by the General Assembly are able to take those problems up at the latest point of their development.

That is why, in dealing with the problem of India and Pakistan, we do not need to concern ourselves unduly with what has happened over the past two years. During that period there has been a development of the discussion and of the various stages in the endeavour to find a direct solution of the problem. Ecuador, for example, which has just joined the Security Council, must take things as it finds them; it must take up the problem at the point it has now reached.

We have studied the problem ourselves and we have also listened carefully to the statements made by both parties. That valuable background material has made it possible for us to obtain a clear picture of the situation, but we cannot retrace our steps and we must face things as they are at present

What have we at present? We have now before us a very interesting draft resolution [S/1461] submitted by four members of the Security Council, the representatives of Cuba, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States. That draft resolution is a natural consequence of the most recent developments, those which we should now consider. The United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan set up by the Security Council to study the question has made an investigation on the issue, has visited the capitals of the two countries concerned, and has acted efficiently, patiently and intelligently. It has now submitted to us its third interim report [>/1430, S/1430 Add. 1, S/1430 Add and S/1430 Add. 3), containing practical information, conclusions and suggestions which warrant the serious attention of members of the Security Council. We have also carefully studied the importance and realism of General McNaughton [S/1453],

President of the Security Council for the month of December 1949. No attempt was made in that report to enter into the third historical aspect of the dispute. It is completely realistic and contains a number of recommendations, to the parties to the dispute, together with the Moments of both parties with respect to General McNaughton's proposal. We are not only informed of their comments, which were made directly to General McNaughton, but we have also heard and carefully studied the statements made by the representatives of India and of Pakistan.

The delegation of Ecuador has maintained close and continuous contact with the other delegations of the Security Council and has followed every step in the discussion which has led four members of the Council to submit the draft resolution which is now before us. That draft resolution, I believe, shows much understanding of the problem, shows a desire to make conciliation possible between the parties and to develop matters in such a way as to lead to a speedy solution of the dispute involving two Member States of the United Nations.

The draft resolution embraces all the points on which the two parties have already agreed; it gives, so to speak, a secondary place to the points on which no agreement could be reached and takes as its basis the fundamental points upon which both parties have agreed. With regard to those matters upon which there has been disagreement, it seeks to set up a procedure, to create a body representing the Security Council to the parties which possesses sufficient authority to enable it to mediate in an intelligent, flexible and efficient manner to bring about the solution which we all desire.

The draft resolution mentions the three basic stages on which the parties have agreed the cessation of hostilities as from 1 January 1949, the establishment of a cease-fire line on 27 July 1949, and the appointment of Admiral Nimitz as Administrator of the plebiscite which is to decide definitely, by the free will of the inhabitants, whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir is to become part of India or of Pakistan.

The fact that both parties have agreed to an impartial plebiscite through which the inhabitants may express freely their real wishes constitutes an valuable basis which it behooves us to use, so that the action of the mediator and of the two parties concerned may lead to a final solution of the dispute. The draft resolution gives a general outline of the terms of reference of the person who is to represent the Security Council in endeavouring to bring the parties together, so that the desired settlement might be achieved, a just and fair settlement which could be of a permanent character.

I shall not attempt at the present stage to analyse the proposal. I merely wish to state that in the view of the delegation of Ecuador the proposal is comprehensive and effective, offering the parties concerned a sensible basis upon which to settle their dispute.

In deciding to accept the draft resolution, we have taken into consideration a recommendation which we feel to be of the utmost importance in the Commission's report. When a commission which has worked with the determination, patience and energy of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan states that it is unable to do anything more in bringing about a solution, that it would be best to discontinue. its function and that its responsibilities should be transferred to one person, that decision is obviously the result of experience, and we should treat that recommendation with the respect which it has received in the draft resolution.

The Security Council should appoint a person who would strive towards conciliation and mediation and who would take advantage of every opportunity and of all suggestions which might lead the two parties to a solution of their dispute. I believe that a person who would enjoy the confidence of both parties would do much to bring about the solution which we all desire.

I do not wish, I repeat, to enter into a detailed analysis of the proposal. It may prove necessary to make some slight changes for the purpose of clarification, but they would be of minor importance.

The delegation of Ecuador supports the proposal submitted by the four States and feels certain that, with the firm desire and the good will of both parties to accept it and to implement it, it should be relatively easy to find a solution which would bring peace to millions of people and prove to the world that it is possible to arrive at solutions, provided in the Charter are used.

  Text of the Speech made by Mr. Hsia (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

As I listened carefully to the most able and skilful. statements presented by the representatives of India and Pakistan, I became increasingly convinced of the complexity and seriousness of the dispute and with therefore to endorse the thoughtful conclusion of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan in which it is stated [S/1430, paragraph 278] :

"The roots of the Kashmir dispute are deep; strong under-currents political, economic, religious-in both Dominions, have acted, and do act, against an easy and prompt solution of this outstanding. dispute between India and Pakistan.

My delegation is persuaded, as was the Commission, that both Governments are "keenly conscious of their duties and responsibilities as Members of the United Nations, and that both desire a final and peaceful solution of the Kashmir question."

It is therefore our earnest belief that both Governments will allow reason and moderation to prevail in their deliberations so that some peaceful solution of the existing difficulties may be found. Meantime the situation calls for patience, perseverance and statesmanship on the part of us all. For this season I do not propose to offer any comment on the broad and complex background of the relations between the two sister Dominions, and like the Commission, I shall confine my brief remarks to the specific problems arising out of the implementation of the agreement entered into by India and Pakistan under the resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. It is of course a matter of regret that these specific problems have become veritable stumbling blocks to the implementation of the truce agreement. General Mc Naughton's proposals were not acceptable because of the same difficulties. I refer to the issues of the disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces, the withdrawal of troops, and the defence and administration of the northern area. In this connection I wish to make a general observation by under-scoring the conclusion of the Commission when it says that the difficulty in disposing of these issues to the satisfaction of both Governments has been out of proportion to their real importance. It has been agreed by all parties concerned that a free and impartial plebiscite alone will give a final and peaceful solution to the Kashmir question, and that such a plebiscite should be held as soon as possible. If the method and objective are sincerely desired by both India and Pakistan, then none of these so called issues should have any real or permanent significance, for they are only important as preliminaries to a successful plebiscite.

Let me first take the issue of the Azad Kashmir forces. I think the Commission has rightly pointed out that the Azad forces have a strength which changes the military situation and, to that extent, makes the withdrawal of forces, particularly those of India, a far more difficult matter to arrange. The Commission admits with some regret that if it "had been able to foresee that the cease-fire period would be prolonged throughout the greater part of 1949 and the Pakistan would use that period to consolidate its position in the Azad territory, the Commission would have dealt with the question in Part II of the resolution of 13 August'' [S/1430, paragraph 225].

It is also significant to note the concluding paragraph of the Commission's analysis of the problem [S/1430, paragraph 226]:

"It cannot be said that either side has complied with the letter of part I, section B of the resolution, which prohibits any increase of military potential by either country in the territory of Jammu and Kashmir".

It is true that the 13 August resolution made no mention of the Azad forces or of how and when they should be disposed of. But what is the actual difference in point of view between India and Pakistan in this matter? On the one hand, we have 1949 [S/1430 Add. 1 annex 49] that the disposal of the armed the declaration by the Government of Pakistan of 30 May forces in the territory will be determined by the Commission and the Plebiscite Administrator in consultation with the local authorities, in accordance with sub-paragraph 4 (b) of the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949. My delegation accepts this as an assurance that the Azad forces will be withdrawn, or otherwise disposed of, before the holding of the plebiscite. On the other hand, we have the memorandum of 18 May 1949 [S/1430/Add. 1, annex 48] in which the Government of India declares it to be "of the utmost importance........ [that] the discussions regarding the procedure and phasing of the disbandment and disarming should commence immediately after the truce is signed".

There seems, therefore, to be considerable agreement that the Azad forces should be disposed of and that this should be done before the holding of the plebiscite. If so, the issue. can be readily resolved if the two Governments are able to agree upon the precise moment when the withdrawal of the Azad forces should begin and how long a period of time should elapse between the withdrawal of the Azad forces and the holding of the plebiscite. Surely, this is not such a difficult task. matter to arrange, if there is present the necessary good will on both sides.

The withdrawal of forces is the second issue that has blocked agreement between the parties. It is indeed unfortunate that disagreement or misunderstanding would have arisen in connection with the withdrawal of forces from Kashmir. Pakistan holds that the withdrawal of its regular troops depends upon plans acceptable to the Pakistan Government for the synchronisation of this with that of the bulk of the Indian troops; while India maintains that the timing and staging of the Indian withdrawals and the strength of Indian forces to be retained in the State are matters for settlement between the Commission and the Government of India.

The importance of this disagreement has been magnified because each side puts upon the manner of troop withdrawals a political interpretation, as if the settlement of the question of accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan depended upon the method and timing of the withdrawal of their respective forces. Surely, both Governments are perfectly aware of the fact that proposals with regard to the withdrawal of forces are motivated primarily by considerations of ensuring peace and order to the regions concerned, and are entirely without prejudice to the ultimate question of accession. The Commission seems to have made the right approach to the problem when, on 15 April 1949. [S/1430) Add. 1, annex 17] in making proposals to the Governments of India and Pakistan on the implementation of part II of its resolution of 13 August 1948, the Commission suggested a schedule, a time table of withdrawal. In the view of my delegation, this is still the right approach to the problem. There should be agreed upon between the two Governments a comprehensive schedule of withdrawal for both the Indian and Pakistan troops. Here, it is not a question of precedence, but of practicability.

Lastly, we have the issue of the defence and administration of the northern area. In this particular controversy the Commission has been placed in a very embarrassing position by the conflicting claims of India and Pakistan. The Commission has stated very clearly in paragraph 273 of its third interim report [S/1430] its reasons for refusing to accede to India's claim. The relevant passage reads

"The authority of the State Government had not only been challenged: by 1 January 1949, the authority of the Jammu and Kashmir Government had been eliminated from the area. The entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities. In consequence the Commission could expect that the Government of India, taking into. considering the wholly temporary nature of the truce, would be willing to waive a claim which was to be decided shortly thereafter in the preparation of conditions for the holding of the plebiscite."

My delegation would make the same appeal to the Government of India. As in the question of troop withdrawal we are not prejudging the eventual ownership of the northern area. Let us hope the plebiscite will settle that. But at the present moment the Council's task is to prevent any renewal of hostilities and to prepare conditions for the holding of a free and impartial plebiscite.

It has been said that the Security Council is asking India to make concessions to Pakistan or asking Pakistan to make concessions to India. The Security Council is not doing that. The Security Council is not playing the part of a broker or trying to bring about a compromise or a deal between the two parties. If the Council asks either India or Pakistan to make a concession, it is not a concession to Pakistan or India, but rather a concession in the interest of the plebiscite. This is the consideration that has dominated all our thinking. My delegation has advocated from the beginning that a free and impartial plebiscite alone will give a final and peaceful solution of a dispute that has unfortunately stood in the way of friendly co-operation between two great peoples in the continent of Asia.

As regards the draft resolution submitted today by the representatives of Cuba, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States, I wish to say that I had prepared my statement. before I saw the draft resolution. Representatives will notice that I have covered in my statement a number of points contained in the draft resolution and in General McNaughton's proposals I shall make further comments on the draft resolution if I consider it necessary or useful.

24021950  Text of the Speech made by the Mr. Gross (United States of America) in the Security Council No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

I wish at the outset to associate my delegation unreservedly with the statements which have been made this afternoon by the representatives of Norway, the United Kingdom and

The dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir is but one of many problems which have strained relations and these new nations were created by the partition of former British India. The Council will recall that, when India placed the Kashmir case before this body in January 1948 [S/628], Pakistan on its part. submitted three other problems [S1646 and 646 Corr. 1] namely, the developments in the State of Junagadh, the recent massacres of migrating peoples in the Punjab, and the difficulties which had arisen with respect to certain partition agreements between India and Pakistan. The Council then decided, and my Government believes it was a wise decision, that all of these problems were interrelated and that a settlement of the Kashmir dispute would open the way to a satisfactory disposition of the other issues.

What has happened since ? Unfortunately, the differences between India and Pakistan have multiplied and spread. Today, the two countries are engaged in economic warfare which has resulted in almost complete cessation of trade between them. Such other issues as the Punjab rivers question and the 'evacuse' property problem remain unresolved. In short, relations between India and Pakistan have markedly deteriorated.

This is no light thing. The fate of more 400 million people is involved. people who, only two and one half years ago, took into their own hands the governance of their new countries, with high hopes for economic and social betterment. These hopes are being thwarted by the continued tension between India and Pakistan, which retards the concentration of their talents and energies on constructive efforts.

This picture has a brighter side. The leaders of India and Pakistan know that the differences between their countries are thwarting the legitimate aspirations of their people. They have repeatedly declared that these differences must be removed, and removed peacefully. This Council can, therefore, be confident that both Governments will direct their best talents and their unremitting efforts towards the settlement of their own disputes. The Security Council stands ready now, as in the past, to assist them. If the parties, with the help of this Council, can find a solution to the Kashmir problem, my Government has faith that the goodwill of India and Pakistan will speedly find the means of removing their remaining differences.

The Security Council has dealt with several matters of great importance to the international community, and the body of experience which it has gained has perhaps to some extent been generalised. When confronted with a dispute involving armed conflict, the first task for the Security Council has been to obtain a cessation of hostilities. The disputants must stop fighting. This means a cease-fire, and a cease-fire line. If necessary, this Council must, as it did in the Palestine case, act expressly under Chapter VII of the Charter in insisting upon an end to hostilities.

A cease-fire, however, is merely a temporary restraining measure. It is the first essential action in removing excess heat from controversies which have passed the boiling point. The Council's experience has shown that the heat is quick to develop again when other steps looking towards a lasting settlement are not quickly taken.

The next step, after the fighting is stopped, is to draw the opposing forces away from each other and to reduce them, by degrees if necessary. As this process continues, the strain on the cease-fire line eases; its importance diminishes; a more permanent arrangement takes place, such as the armistice agreements in Palestine and the truce provisions of the Renville Agreement (S/649, Appendix XI] in the Indonesian case.

The wisdom gained from these and other experiences was recognized by the New Delhi Conference on Indonesia, held some thirteen months ago.

Two important lessons can be drawn from previous Security Council experience. First, the elimination of Military pressure between the parties to a dispute is partly a stop-gap measure, which must be quickly followed by a lasting political settlement. Secondly, while effectuation of a cease-fire and a demilitarised programme is a process in which this Council can, if necessary, assume the initiative, the enduring political solution is essentially the responsibility of the parties to a dispute. Their agreement and their cooperation are indispensable ingredients.

In the case now before us, India and Pakistan have agreed to the application of this general pattern. As a result of the praiseworthy and painstaking efforts of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and the corporation of India and Pakistan, both Governments have agreed upon certain bases of settlement which are set forth in the resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan dated 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The principles underlying these resolutions are that hostilities should cease; that the State should be demilitarised in order to establish more normal conditions of life for its inhabitants ; and that the final disposition of Kashmir should be in accord with the will of its people, to be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite. The first principle was affected by the cease-fire, worked out by the parties themselves, on India's initiative, on 1 January 1949, and by the agreement in July 1949 on a definitive cease-fire line.

Unhappily, the parties, despite the efforts of the United Nations Commission for India and

on the implementation of the demilitarisation phase of the Commission's resolutions. The impediments to agreement have derived, at least in part, from conflicting claims with respect to legal and technical aspects of the dispute. For example, India's position has been based in some part on its legal claim that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was acceded to India. On the other hand, Pakistan, in addition to opposing this claim, has pointed to certain geographic factors, economic ties and communal affiliation as offsetting the claim on India.

From the outset of this case it has been evident that agreement between the two nations for an enduring settlement of the dispute must be reached on broad political grounds. The two nations at an early stage accepted the principle that the question of accession of the State should be determined by the will of the people freely and impartially ascertained under the auspices of the Security Council. For these reasons, therefore, while the Security Council and the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan have from the beginning listened with the greatest respect to the contentions of the two parties on the legal and technical issues, they have consistently taken the position that a determination by them of these issues was neither essential nor conducive to a just settlement of the question. Thus, in seeking to advance this settlement within the existing area of agreement, we should avoid unprofitable discussion of these disputed issues and focus our attention on the pressing problems of the present and the future.

In approaching the problem of demilitarisation it is important to keep these considerations in mind as a guide to our thinking. Demilitarisation does not prejudge the rights or claims of the parties. It need not, therefore, rest upon those rights or claims. It is, however, an essential prerequisite for a solution of the dispute. Fortunately, the task of the Security Council in its efforts to help the parties in this problem has been made easier by the fact that both sides have agreed to the demilitarisation of Kashmir and the problem is not whether there should be demilitarisation, but how it shall be carried out. Thus, the Security Council, in the draft resolution which has been placed upon the table, and which my delegation joins Cuba, Norway and the United Kingdom in sponsoring, directs itself towards this immediate and essential objective. In the circumstances of this case it seems necessary for the Security Council to call upon the parties, as this draft resolution does, to agree on a workable plan of demilitarisation and to carry out that plan as a necessary preliminary to the final stage of determining the wishes of the people of the State. The Security Council would also fulfil a duty by providing the means for helping the parties reach agreement. This would be done by appointing a representative to carry forward the work started by the Security Council and the Commission, and to supervise such arrangements for demilitarisation as will be agreed upon.

The demilitarisation proposals placed before the two parties by General McNaughton unfortunately did not prove acceptable to the Government of India. The basic principles governing these proposals are, in our judgement, fair and sound. The draft resolution proposed by the United Kingdom, Norway, Cuba and the United States would call upon the Governments of India and Pakistan to prepare and to execute a plan of demilitarisation on the basis of these principles.

A basic principle of General McNaughton's proposals is that the armed forces on either side of the cease-fire line. The armed forces should be reduced in this manner to the minimum compatible with the maintenance of security and of local law and order. They should be reduced to a level sufficiently low, and should be so disposed, as not to inhibit the free expression of public opinion in a plebiscite. This principle has not been objected to by either party.

Another basic concept is that the problem of demilitarisation should be dealt with as a whole. It will be recalled that the resolutions of the Commission contemplated that the local forces west of the cease-fire line, as well as local forces on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, should be disposed of during the next plebiscite period, rather than at the time of the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistan regular troops during the earlier truce period. This distinction in timing developed later into one of the major obstacles encountered by the Commission in reaching an agreement on demilitarisation India had, in the course of the Commission's mediation, indicated its view that the disposal of the local forces on the other side of the cease-fire line should be linked with the withdrawal of Indian regular forces.

The concept of accomplishing demilitarisation within a single period, rather than the two successive periods envisaged by the Commission's resolutions, is consistent with what should be the controlling consideration in the demilitarisation of Kashmir, that is, the need to minimise at all stages the possibility of a resumption of fighting across the cease-fire line. The process should therefore be so timed that at the conclusion of the demilitarisation period there should be no armed force in the State with any aggressive potential.

The proposals also rest on the principle of embracing all areas of the State, including those to the north of the cease-fire line, in a coordinated programme of demilitarisation. This is likewise, in the opinion of my Government, an appropriate principle, consonant with the essential objective of any demilitarisation. The Commission's conclusions in respect of the demilitarisation of the northern area are clear and, in our view, sound and practical. The Commission concluded that "the entry of Indian forces into the area north of the case-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities'' (S/1430, paragraph 273].

The Commission's report continued [S/1430, paragraph 275]: "The situation in the northern area today is such that the posting of garrisons by the Indian Army at any point beyond those which are now held by it would result in an extension of military activities the Government of India although it need not necessarily imply an increase in the military potential which both Governments have agreed is not to take place on either side." Phim 1 continues to quote from the next paragraph of the report of the Commission; "The Karachi Military Conference of July has settled the question of the cease-fire line. The line is now demarcated and agreed to by India and Pakistan. Until such time the conditions as envisaged in the resolution of 5 January have been created and normal life begins to return to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the line which is today a guarantee against a resumption of hostilities should be scrupulously observed by the Government of India and Pakistan, and the opposing forces should remain behind it.

In our view it is eminently fair and sound, and in fulfilment of our duty as members of this Council dedicated to peaceful settlements, to recommend to the parties that they accept a principle which strengthens the concept and value of the cease-fire line and avoids the risk of an extension of military activity.

No inference should be drawn from the fact that the Commission did not, in its resort, address itself specifically to the question of the temporary administration of the area during the period of demilitarisation. It is altogether reason able to assume that since the Commission concluded that it would not be in the interest of the plebiscite to sanction an extension of military activity beyond the established cease fire line, the Commission believed it unnecessary to refer to a change in the administration of the area, since such a change would clearly depend upon, or involve the risk of, an extension of military activity.

I should like now to turn to that part of the draft resolution which envisages the appointment of a United Nations representative to assist in the preparation, and to supervise the implementation, of such programmes of demilitarisation as may emerge from future negotiations. This feature of the draft resolution also has the full support of my Government. It is considered a judgement of the Commission that a single person can now (most effectively conduct the negotiations and consultations with and between the parties.

General McNaughton endorsed and acted upon this recommendation of the Commission. In the discharge of the duties which the Security Council would entrust to such a representative, the closest and the most continuous relations with the two Governments will be necessary. The mutual understanding and confidence which should form the background of these relations can best be built up and maintained. by a single individual. In saying this, of course, I do not with to disparage the relationship which existed between the Commission and the two Governments. I merely wish to stress that continuity and the resulting accumulation of understanding so necessary to subtle negotiation, are likely to be achieved more readily by one person than by a body of diverse personalities with the ever-present risk to continuity through changes in personnel. In negotiations of the present nature, shades of meaning play their part and these are less likely to be lost when stored in the memory of one individual than when dispersed, and perhaps differently evaluated, in the minds of several.

I am privileged to join several of my distinguished colleagues on the Council in sponsoring the draft resolution which has been presented to the Council this afternoon. We have attempted as loyal members of the Security Council and as friends of both India and Pakistan, to bring to bear upon the Kashmir problem the lessons that this Council has learned in other disputes and the knowledge that we have gained of the special factors involved in the present dispute. We believe that this draft resolution derives from the principles already accepted by the parties We are confident that it will contribute to the improvement of relations between India and Pakistan by enabling them to move expeditiously toward the demilitarisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and a final settlement of the dispute in accord with the will of the people of the State as to their permanent affiliation with India or Pakistan.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Chauvel (France). in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950.

My delegation had followed with the keenest sympathy the efforts at conciliation General McNaughton made having his presidency of the Council in accordance with the Council's action of 17 December 1949 [457th meeting]. The French delegation had encouraged him to continue his efforts even after the expiry of his term of office as President and as a representative to the Council, and has therefore studied the report of his activities with particular attention.

I cannot conceal my delegation's disappointment at the fact that, once again, the conscientious efforts of a man whose impartiality and moral authority cannot be challenged, came up against the all too familiar obstacles.

The Jammu-Kashmir case was placed before the Security Council by a communication from the representative of India [S/628] on 1 January 1948, that is, almost twenty-six months ago today. Since then, United Nations action in the matter has consisted of four principal acts the Council's resolutions of 20 January 1948 [S/654] and 21 April 1948 [S/726] creating the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan and setting forth its membership and powers, and the Commission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949. The Commission itself laid down three stages in the settlement of the dispute: cessation of hostilities, organisation of the trace by demilitarisation of all the territories concerned, and organisation of this plebiscite.

What is the situation today, twenty-six months after the question was brought before the Council and almost fourteen months after the Commission's second resolution ? The parties have agreed to the resolution of 13 August 1945 January 1949. On 1 January 1949, they affected the cessation of hostilities, and on 27 July 1949 they agreed to the establishment of the cease-fire line 1S/1430/ Add. 1, Annex 26]. They have accepted the principle of a plebiscite and consented to the appointment of Admiral Nimitz as Plebiscite Administrator. That is all. In other words, only the first of the three stages laid down in the resolution of 5 January 1949, the cessation of hostilities, has been completed. On the other hand, there has been no progress towards the conclusion of a truce agreement which, in practice, can be based only on demilitarisation, nor, despite the appointment of Admiral Nimitz, towards organisation of the plebiscite. In fact, some time past, demilitarisation has been the main obstacle to all efforts: not the principle of demilitarisation, but the way to carry it out.

If we consider the different interests involved, we see that the main issue is the political allegiance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. That issue concerns, first and foremost, the populations of those two States, and I may add, in passing, that whatever the solution of the problem, the question of refugees cannot be left out of account, as regards both their participation in the plebiscite and their ultimate settlement. It also concerns, obviously and for various reasons the two States which claim a right to those territories, that is, India and Pakistan.

I must stress, however, that whatever importance India and Pakistan may attach to the defence of their respective claims, they have a still greater interest to consider; the cessation of the conflict which divides them and sets them against each other. In view of the present state of Asia and the world, it is unthinkable that two great countries which have recently acquired full sovereignty and have to face all the problems of organisation and all the political, economic and financial adjustments following on that new status, should exhaust their strength in a struggle which has destroyed their past solidarity and compromises the solidarity which geography imposes upon them for the future. Is it possible that these two States, belonging as they do to the same great group of sovereign States, and being besides, both Members of the United Nations, should be unaware not only of their own

higher interest, but also of that of the community of nations ? That community, the world community which we represent in this Council, can have no other wish than to put an end to a burdensome and dangerous situation and to eliminate from the map of the world and from such an important point on that map a troubled area from which tempests might blow. As against considerations of such weight, I see no principle that could properly be invoked.

The Government of India claims that it stands on a kind of legality. It consents to a plebiscite, but repudiates as illegal the authorities now in control of the northern and eastern zones. In its opinion the plebiscite must be held in a unified State under the sole authority of Sheikh Abdullah. Apart from the fact that no principle of legality can stand against the will of people, it would appear that Kashmir is now divided not only by two occupations, but also by the fact that it has two Governments, each the product of uprisings against the authority of the Maharaja. While, on the Indian side, Sheikh Abdullah has seized power in the name of the principles of democracy after many years of struggle and the test of imprisonment, another rebel, Mohammed Ibrahim Khan, invoking the same principles, confronts him, backed by thirty-two battalions levied from the inhabitants of the areas under his control.

In the face of such a situation, our position is clear. It is prescribed to us by the United Nations Charter. It is for the populations themselves, and for them alone, to decide their fate. They must do so in conditions of security against all forms of pressure. It would have been desirable for the two neighbouring States to agree on those conditions. In the absence of such agreement, there is no other way but to place the matter again in the hands of the Organisation, which assumes responsibility for it. I do not see what objection there can be to this. Whatever their feelings on the substance of the issue, I do not doubt that the parties are both profoundly anxious that the wishes of the populations should be respected. It is clear enough that the United Nations does not want any particular solution, but a solution. Its objectivity and impartiality offer the best possible guarantee to the populations of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and, consequently, to the Governments of India and Pakistan.

That is the course to which the French delegation has faithfully adhered in this matter. In its opinion, that course must be followed in order to complete the two remaining stages of organisation of the truce by the demilitarisation of the territories as a whole and organisation of the plebiscite.

The way in which the United Nations should take charge of the situation when the question of organising the plebiscite actually arises will be a matter for other debates. The issue before us today is only the organisation of the truce by means of demilitarisation, and that was the purpose of General McNaughton's efforts and of the proposals he put before the parties. Those proposals appear eminently reasonable to my delegation. For the phase of operations with which they are concerned, they take into account the three conditions listed here by the French representative on 24 January 1948 [235th meeting] as follows:

"1. The withdrawal of foreign troops from the State of Kashmir".

"2. The return of the inhabitants, irrespective of their race-Hindu or Moslem-to their places of

origin in that State"

"3. The establishment of a free administration which would not exert pressure on the population and would give absolute guarantees of a free vote."

That, I repeat, is why the French delegation has been deeply disappointed by the reservations made with regard to those proposals; those reservations have so far prevented their implementation.

My delegation can do nothing today but recommend them for renewed and earnest consideration by the Council and the parties. It entreats the latter to spare no effort of conciliation which might at long last ensure, in this important matter, the triumph of the principles which the Members of the United Nations have pledged themselves to defend and which they themselves, in the case in point, have expressly

Text of the Speech made by Sir Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

Members of the Security Council may recollect that in the course of the brief debate on this subject which took place on 29 December [458th meeting] I made a statement concerning the attitude of the United Kingdom Government and indicated its general support for the proposals made to the parties by General McNaughton. I do not propose to repeat again today the considerations which I put forward then, and which have been fully endorsed by my Government, which has now introduced me to add certain observations in the light of the statements which have been made to the Council by the representatives of India and Pakistan.

All of us here must agree that this issue is one of importance to us all, and one which demands that we should proceed unflinchingly to do what we conceive to be right. All of us must wish to maintain and extend the power and prestige of the United Nations and the Security Council. We must do all that we can to make effective the code of good conduct that is contained in our Charter. Men and Women throughout the world yet place their hopes in us and we must not fail in our duty to those people.

The Kashmir dispute has been before the Security Council now for over two years. Much work has been done, work in the Council itself and by the Commission, and although a solution is not yet at hand, that work has been by no means fruitless. Here is an area of agreement, not so large as we should wish or might have expected, and we must think twice before we discard any solid element of agreement on which a settlement might be built.

I do not mean that we must be rigid or inflexible. We are here to deal justly and impartially with matters which come before us, and we must, of course, take due account of all developments which may be relevant. But if this Council. is to function effectively now, and in the days to come, we must insist that its authority be respected and its recommendations be not made simply to be discarded or ignored.

I say this at once because I have felt there is a tendency to reopen the earlier history of this matter in a way which cannot contribute to the peaceful settlement which it is our duty to devise. General McNaughton in his statement on 29 December expressed the view that any legalistic or historical approach to the matter would entail the examination of a complex mass of detail. I have no wish to enter into such past history.

The representative of Pakistan submitted that the history of the Kashmir dispute did not begin with the influx of tribesmen in October 1947. Any attempt to fix the initial responsibility for the present state of affairs would involve investigation of the claim made by Pakistan that the fighting began when the Maharaja made unprovoked attacks on his Muslim subjects. I do not express any view on that claim, but I refer to this point as an instance of the dangers that lie in harking back to the detailed history of this matter. It seems to me that we may risk losing sight of our real purpose through becoming involved in the discussion of numbers of points which are not directly relevant to a practical solution of the problem. I know that it has been argued that proposals must be examined against the background of past events. In many negotiations that is the case, but we remember that, in this case, if we can achieve what we desire, that is, to enable the people of Kashmir freely to express their wishes, by which the fate of the State will be decided, all this past history will then have become irrelevant, and I hope the slate could then be sponged clean.

What we are discussing is really a question of mechanics, of preparing for that free expression of the will of the people. Both India and Pakistan have given their agreement to a procedure which will enable the people of Kashmir to make known their views. I am indeed glad to note that in their statements to the Council the representatives of India and Pakistan seemed to be in full agreement with the objectives set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of paragraph 1 of General McNaughton's proposals [S/1453].

Let us refresh our memory of paragraph 1. Sub-paragraph (a) refers to the intention that the future of the State shall be determined by a free and impartial plebiscite. But, more than this, the clause provides that the plebiscite should take place as early as possible. I repeat as early as possible. Sub paragraph (b) underlines the desire of both Governments to settle the dispute in accordance with the freely expressed will of the inhabitants. Surely we have in these two clauses, to which both the Indian and Pakistan Governments subscribe, a most important principle. Both Governments acknowledge that the will of the people is to be decisive, and they agree that the people should be given an opportunity freely to express their desires as quickly as is found practicable.

Far be it from me to brush aside legal considerations when they are relevant, but can it be argued that the hopes and aspirations of the people of the State are in any way dependent upon the question of who exercises sovereignty over Kashmir at this time? Then, again, there are the questions of the disbanding and stationing of troops. Can it be the wish of either side to lay itself open to charges that it is preventing the expression of the will of the people in a free and unfettered manner? Can either side afford to prolong the present deadlock by insisting that this or that force should be disbanded at this or that time ? One merely has to pose these questions to know the answers.

How, then can either side feel justified in pursuing points such as these which can do no good and which, unintentionally. I know, does it merely serve to frustrate the early expression of the will of the people? Delay is dangerous. In this case, it is no healer. Unless positive action is taken without delay, the present malady, which besets not only the unfortunate State of Jammu and Kashmir but also the whole sub-continent, may become incurable. Can it be anyone's wish to allow legal points of doubtful relevance to stand in the way of progress? Here, again, one merely has to pose the question to know what the answer will be. If safeguards or guarantees are required, it is up to the United Nations to provide those safeguards or guarantees, and I see no reason why we should not be able to do anything which is likely to be needed.

I would like to remind the Council of some words uttered by the Prime Minister of India, a great statesman whose wisdom we all admire. He said, in November 1947: "We have declared that the fate of Kashmir is ultimately to be decided by the people. That pledge we have given, and the Maharaja has supported it, not only to the people of Kashmir but to the world. We will not and cannot back out of it". In the same statement, the Prime Minister used these words also: "As soon as Kashmir is free from the invader, our troops will have no further necessity to remain there, and the fate of Kashmir will be left in the hands of the people". These are the words of a noble and wise statesman. Let us not allow ourselves to become so blindly by lesser matters that we lose sight of these principles altogether.

Considerable progress has been made towards the fulfilment of the undertakings given by the Prime Minister of India. With the agreement of both parties, a man of world-wide renown has been nominated by our Organisation to administer the plebiscite. Moreover, both parties have agreed to the performance by our nominee of certain functions, including the final disposal of armed forces remaining in the State, as a preliminary to the plebiscite. These seem to me to be very substantial steps towards the eventual settlement of this matter, and I can see no valid reason why we should not be able to complete our task along the lines on which we have so far proceeded. It seems to me that the time has come for the Council to give a lead in the matter, and for the members to indicate frankly what, in their view, might break the present deadlock and contribute to the achievement of a solution. which would be just and equitable and which they would expect both parties to accept.

I cannot attempt to conceal the disappointment of my Government that the proposals put forward by General Mc Naughton to the two parties were not accepted. My Government feels that these proposals indicate broadly a basis upon which this matter could be disposed of quickly and fairly. I must confess that we are very sorry to learn that the replies of the two Governments showed that the high hopes which we had entertained in regard to the outcome of General Mc Naughton's discussions could not be realised.

It is now the duty of the Council to devise other means of carrying forward their plans. I think there can be no doubt in anyone's mind about the attitude of the United Kingdom after the remarks I have made this afternoon. My delegation has had the advantage in these last few days of consultation with a number of other delegations, and we have been able to put our name to a joint draft resolution which is being submitted this afternoon for consideration [S/1461] I should wish it to be quite clear that, in acting as one of the sponsors of this draft resolution, my delegation does so in the belief and on the understanding that the procedure indicated therein is directed towards the earliest possible implementation of the agreement existing between the parties in regard to the ascertainment of the will of the people. In my view, both the Government of India and the Government of Pakistan have accepted an obligation to extend their full and unreserved co-operation in the preparation of arrangements which will enable the people to express their views through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. It is, therefore, incumbent upon both Governments to make every effort towards putting into effect the arrangements set out in the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949.

To turn to the question of demilitarisation, members of the Council will observe that the draft resolution submitted to them does not follow General Mc Naughton in his suggestion that agreement should be reached in New York in regard to the matters listed in paragraph 1 of General McNaughton's proposals. If the Council decides to appoint a representative of the kind suggested in the draft resolution, I should consider it appropriate to leave it to him to decide upon the procedure he intends to adopt. I should hope that he might find it possible to begin negotiations here in New York.

I would conclude by commending the draft resolution to the Council and to the parties. No doubt one or other of these, or even both, will find in it things that they would have changed that must always be the case in any attempt to bridge differences of opinion, but I trust both parties will recognize in this draft resolution a sincere attempt on the part of members of the Security Council to formulate proposals that will be fair and effective. We are, I hope, on the way to a solution of a difficulty that has been embittering for too long the relations between the two countries concerned. It is not, unfortunately, the only question at issue between them, but if it could be satisfactorily settled much else might follow. The ultimate method for settlement is agreed ; we are only hampered and obstructed by differences of opinion as to how we can come to achieve that settlement, and I most devoutly hope that the deliberations of this Council, at this time, may make a useful contribution to the removal of these differences.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sunde (Norway) in the Security Council Meeting No. 467 held on 24 February, 1950

It with considerable uneasiness that have followed the developments in the Kashmir case since the Security Council resumed consideration of it in December last. The valiant efforts of General McNaughton have failed to bridge the gap between the positions of India and Pakistan, and the poison from this festering wound in the relations between the two great nations is almost daily breaking out in new and exacerbated disagreements.

At the Council's [458th meeting] on 29 December 1949, I addressed myself particularly to General McNaughton's proposal. His suggested basis of agreement seemed to me, said eminently fair and just, and added that I failed to perceive what objections the parties could muster against the proposal that would be reconcilable with their avowed common goal of free and impartial plebiscite. purposely couched my statement in cautious terms because I realised that it would be unwise to attempt a final and categorical evaluation as long as the parties themselves had not expressed their opinions.

Since that meeting we have heard long and carefully argued submissions from both parties. These submissions have covered practically all aspects of the Kashmir conflict. Their important burden, however, has been the agreements for and against the McNaughton proposal. Today we have an adequate basis for judging that proposal and the parties' reactions to it. feel, therefore, that as members of the Security Council we have a duty, at this stage, to express our opinions clearly and forthrightly. Only in this way will it be possible for the Council to help the parties towards the elaboration of a just and workable solution.

have listened to the statements of the parties with keen attention and have studied the verbatim records [463rd, 464th, 465th and 466th meetings] with scrupulous care. I have also endeavoured conscientiously to keep an open mind to all the arguments in order not to allow myself to be prematurely persuaded by any particular line of reasoning, however convenient it might seem. But now the time has come for a final appraisal, and there is no longer any doubt in my mind as to whose reasoning has the best foundation of fairness and justice. It is General McNaughton's.

I do not mean to say that General Mc Naughton's proposal ought to be accepted by the parties without the slightest change. Both parties have proposed amendments to it, and it is possible that some of its provisions might be improved upon. But as for the essential features and the approach to the problem, I am firmly convinced that General Mc Naughton is right..

His proposal proceeds from the obviously correct point of departure: India's and Pakistan's agreement that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people. This agreement, first briefly stated in part III of the 13 August 1948 resolution [S/1100 paragraph 75] and subsequently elaborated in greater detail in the 5 January 1949 resolution [S/1196 paragraph 15], is not merely an important part of the edifice which has been laboriously built up by the Commission in the two resolutions; it is the keystone which carries the whole structure and to which all the other parts are intimately related

This does not mean that the other parts of the structure of agreement should be discarded or disregarded on the contrary. On this point also I agree with General Mc Naughton. The substantial measure of agreement on fundamental principles which has already been reached between the two Governments under the auspices of the United Nations must be preserved.

We must bear in mind that it was under the terms of this agreement, incorporated in the two resolutions of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan which I have just mentioned, that cease-fire orders were issued by the opposing parties on 27 January 1949 [S/1196 paragraph 14). The cease-fire agreement of 1 July 1949 [S/1430, Add. 1, annex 26], completely democrats on the ground, is also based upon and integrated into the same structure. Any attempt to bypass or whittle away its basic principles would jeopardise the cease-fire which has so painstakingly been established by the Commission.

We know from the Commission's own admission but a certain part of this structure has been rendered unsound and inadequate by subsequent changes in the economic situation. This, after all, is not very surprising. It would have been a miracle if an agreement desired to cover a short transition period had retained a full validity after its implementation had been delayed for more than two years. The problem is not a mathematical equation but one which concerns human beings who grow and change and whose power constellations are in a state of constant flux.

It seems to me, however, that the main structure of the agreement, its sustaining principles, remain undamaged, and this applies specifically to the keystone, the plebiscite provisions. With goodwill on both sides it should be possible to localise the damage and to replace the outmoded parts by new provisions which take full account. of the changed situation.

There is one important condition, however. The new provisions must be so designed as to fit into the existing edifice. The whole agreement as it stands will be put in jeopardy if the parties, or one of them, press for new provisions which run counter to the structural principles. And the essential principle is of course-I think it bears repeating-that the future status of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people.

Every argument which bypasses or disregards this agreed objective is not only irrelevant at this stage but potentially destructive of the solid body of agreement which has been achieved. And this is undoubtedly what General Me Naughton. had in mind when, in his proposal, he deprecated the unprofitable discussion of past issues. I agree that it is not always easy to determine which agreements are, and which are not, relevant to the issue which remain unresolved. It does not seem difficult, however, to prune away a number of arguments as entirely unrelated to the remaining issues.

The unresolved issues, as we all know, relate to part II of the 5 August 1949 resolution dealing with the demilitarisation prior to the plebiscite period. Certain principles are set forth in this part of the resolution which form the accepted basis for an agreement, the details of which remain to be worked out. Some of these principles have become defective and inadequate as a result of subsequent development, when those principles have been replaced by new ones which take account of the new situation, the structural skeleton will have to be filled out with the masonry of necessary details in order to become an organic whole.

This remaining task should be comparatively simple if the parties keep firmly in mind its nature and limitations. The problems will become insoluble, however, if the parties go beyond the immediate issues and press arguments which tend to negate the structural principles of the existing agreement.

In this important respect it seems to me that both the parties have erred. Arguments for and against the conclusive legal effect of the Maharaja's letter of accession to India seem to be irrelevant at this stage. The same applies to arguments tending to show that economic and strategic factors, or factors relating to the population's dominant religious allegiance, favour accession to one of the parties rather than to the other. Such arguments are not only irrelevant; they are harmful because they undermine the main principle of the agreement which has been achieved. It is for the plebiscite to deter mine the ultimate fate of the State.

I would like to add that this principle, this keystone of the whole structure, has an importance which transcends the obligatory force it derives from the consent of the parties. The principle has its intrinsic value because it embodies the only criterion for determining Kashmir's fate which is compatible with modern democratic ideals. It should be borne in mind that the unsolved problems concern only the practical procedures through which demilitarisation can be carried out on both sides of the cease-fire line in order to bring about conditions which will enable the Plebiscite Administrator to take over. The parties should therefore faithfully abstain from advancing, let alone pressing, arguments which are incompatible with or unrelated to this objective. Within this rather narrow compass of legitimate disagreement I see only two important considerations against which the opposing arguments should be weighed and measured. One is that the demilitarisation must be carried through as quickly as possible. The other is that the demilitarisation should be so staged as to eliminate fear at any time on the part of the people on either side of the cease-fire line. On this point again I find myself in full agreement with the main principles of the McNaughton proposal.

In conclusion, I beg the parties again to consider their positions and to take full account of their solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to settle their international dispute by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered. It would be a tragedy with unforeseeable consequences if they should give up their attempt to reach an amicable solution; it would be doubly tragic because a clear path towards an equitable and honourable settlement is so clearly indicated in the Mc Naughton proposal.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Malik (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) in the Security Council Meeting No. 458 held on 29 December 1949

Without touching upon the substance of the dispute between India and Pakistan or upon the nature of the Presi dent's proposals, which, quite obviously, can best be judged by the parties concerned, I should like to speak on some points of procedure. I would emphasise that the best course would be for the parties themselves to judge the nature of the President's proposals, since the position of those who assiduously praise those proposals, regardless of their nature and without taking the trouble to hear first, in the Security Council, the view of the parties interested in those proposals, is somewhat anomalous. The impression might be created that certain parties are trying to force those proposals upon certain others. The views of the parties to the dispute are not merely of secondary importance to the Security Council.

As regards the procedural aspect of the issue, the USSR delegation wishes to draw attention to points 4 and 5 of General McNaughton's proposals, which provide that the mediator shall be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, while the plebiscite administrator in Kashmir shall be appointed and shall take up his duties in accordance with the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 5 January 1949.

The USSR delegation considers such a procedure to be inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations, the rules. of procedure and established practice. The question of Kashmir is before the Security Council; therefore, the letter and the Security Council, as the organ mainly responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, should itself appoint the appropriate subsidiary organs for mediation, arbitration, or the carrying out of any other measures for the settlement of a given dispute. The Security Council should not transfer or relegate those functions to any other organ of the United Nations, including the Secretary General.

Similarly, it is of course impossible to endorse the decision adopted in this matter by the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan on 5 January 1949. The Commission obviously exceeded its powers by deciding that the Secretary General should appoint a plebiscite administrator. Such action is within the competence of the Security Council. The Commission's powers are limited to the submission of recommendations to the Security Council; it cannot take the Council's place or assume the functions of an organ having powers of decision.

To sum up, I wish to say that the USSR delegation believes that, should the appointment of a mediator or arbitrator be found expedient in the interests of the peaceful settlement of the dispute, it should be effected directly by the Security Council. As regards the functions and powers of such a mediator or arbitrator they, too, should be determined by the Security Council. It goes without saying that the candidates for the part of mediator or arbitrator and of plebiscite administrator, must be acceptable to both parties, that is to say, they should be nominated with the consent of both parties.

As regards the proposal made by the representative of Norway today, here, too, considerable difficulties of a procedural nature are involved. We know that, up to the present, the following procedure was observed in the consideration of the question before us, i.e. the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir and Jammu: the Security Council heard the views of the parties, and the President of the Council then proceeded acquaint himself with and to study the question in greater detail with the object of submitting any possible concrete proposals to the Council for examination. At the preceding meeting of the Security Council, there was a definite departure from this generally accepted and established procedure. The President was entrusted with the holding of discussions with the parties, without so much as hearing their views. Experience shows that one faulty step often leads to another; the wrong course, once chosen, will be pursued.

The meaning of the suggestion made today by the representative of Norway is that the present President of the Security Council, the Canadian representative, will be charged with carrying out the function of the President when he no longer will be President, in obvious disregard of the fact that after 1 January 1950 Canada will no longer be a member of the Security Council. The Norwegian representative has therefore suggested something for which there is no precedent that the Security Council should empower the representative of a country which in a few days will retire from the Security Council to continue to exercise functions which no longer pertain to him, that is to say, functions which in this matter have heretofore been performed by the President of the Security Council. This would surely be an unprecedented situation. Indeed, the Council would be placing the Canadian representative in an embarrassing, not position. to say, delicate,

Such a state of affairs would be an innovation, not provided for either in the Charter or in the rules of procedure, and inconsistent with the methods of work of the Security Council.

Until now the Charter has recognized two categories of members of the Security Council, permanent and non permanent. The Norwegian representative is in fact asking the Council to establish a new and third kind of membership: an extended membership, as it were. He is actually suggesting that the powers of the Canadian representative should be extended beyond 1 January 1950, so as to permit him to handle the affairs of the Security Council not only after the expiration of the term of his powers as President of the Security Council, but also after the country he represents will have ceased to be a member of the Council. This would naturally be putting the Canadian representative in an extremely delicate position, to say nothing of the fact that it would be acting in contravention of the Charter, the rules of

procedure, and the accepted practice.

Consequently, the USSR delegation can see no grounds for supporting the suggestion of the Norwegian representative. I would remark that lately there have been too many violations of the Charter and of the rules of procedure both in the sessions of the General Assembly and in other organs of the United Nations. The USSR delegation does not wish to be a party to yet another violation. Those who have the interest of the United Nations at heart and who respect the Charter and the rules of procedure will certainly be unable to support such a suggestion. The decision, of course, rests with the majority, which is free to decide one way or the other. Nevertheless, no matter what decision the majority takes,

the Security Council cannot consider it as forming a precedent. Such are the brief remarks on procedure which the delegation of the Soviet Union wished to make at the present stage of the discussion.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Chauvel (Frauce) in the Security Council Meeting No. 458 held on 29 December, 1949

Although France was not one of the authors of the draft. resolution which set up the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [S/654], it participated, by its vote, in the establishment of that body and has never ceased to hope for the success of its mission.

Ever since the Security Council began to consider the matter, we have felt that two fundamental reasons make it expedient for a peaceful settlement of the problem to be reached as quickly as possible. The successful mediation of a complex question which is causing conflict between two States which have only recently attained their independence could not be a matter of indifference to the United Nations. The success of that mediation would constitute a promise for humanity and an example for the other Members of the United Nations.

Finally, the geographical position of the two States concerned, the size of their populations, and the splendid future which seems to lie before them, make the consequences of a prolonged dispute particularly serious.

We must not shut our eyes to the fact that because of the period of history through which we are passing and because of the great responsibility their Governments assumed when the two nations acquired independence, these States are faced with many problems. It would be regrettable if the question of Kashmir, which is one of those problems, were to be prolonged to the point of appearing practically insoluble, for we would then see India and Pakistan devoting a large part of their resources to preparing and carrying on a struggle which, because of their common history, would actually be fratricide. We would see the future of these States endangered, perhaps beyond recovery, and a magnificent promise disappearing in chaotic upheavals.

The French delegation gladly associates itself with the tribute the representatives of Norway and of the United Kingdom have paid to the President for the devotion to duty he has shown in his conduct of this matter. He has been very favourably impressed by the practical and concrete nature of the proposals he has presented. It thinks that it is indeed by adhering to the facts of the case and by facing the practical objective to be reached, disregarding as far as possible the sentimental respects of the problem, that progress can be achieved.

Text of the Speech made by Sir Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 458 held on 29 December 1949

The discussion of this matter in the Security Council today, particularly in the absence of the replies from the two parties to the proposals which the President has made to them, is necessarily in a preliminary stage. However, in the hope that it may be useful to the Security Council, I am already in the position to indicate broadly the reaction of my Government to those proposals which the President has put to the parties and which are now before the Security Council.

As the members of the Council will be aware, the United Kingdom stands in a very special relationship to India and to Pakistan. We value very greatly the friendship which we enjoy with both countries, and we are anxious to do all in our power to assist the Governments of India and Pakistan to reach agreement in regard to Kashmir. It has been a matter for particular regret on our part that the dispute has for so long hindered the development of peaceful and fruitful cooperation between the two Governments. The immense problems which face both of them call for the exertion of every ounce of their joint strength.

We all know how great a part these mighty nations can play in leading the people of Asia and of the world to a realisation of those great hopes of a fuller and better life which all of us cherish. These facts seem to me to place a special responsibility upon the Security Council in its consideration of the question of Kashmir. The work which the Security Council has done on this question during the last two years possesses a significance out of all proportion to the simple issue of Kashmir alone. It is the duty of the Security Council to strive to safeguard the peace and well-being of the peoples of the world, and we must take the account of all relative considerations, and do our utmost to display the breadth of vision which alone can enable us to fulfil our duty to the peoples of the world.

India and Pakistan brought their dispute to the United Nations in this spirit, and it is in this spirit that we must apply ourselves to the task of arriving at a settlement which will be accepted by the peoples of India and of Pakistan, and of the whole world, as just and right.

It is perhaps appropriate that the leader of a delegation of another Commonwealth country should have been entrusted by the Security Council with the task of endeavouring, by private negotiation, to arrive at the basis of settlement upon which the parties might agree. Our President has, I know, laboured night and day since the last meeting of the Security Council and has spared neither himself nor his staff. We all owe a very great debt of gratitude to him and his delegation. Such knowledge as I have had of the progress of his consultations with the parties has led me to admire his fair-mindedness and his anxiety to take due account of all points of view and of the special difficulties which beset the parties to the dispute.

I know sufficient of his work to be able to say that his whole attitude has been completely objective, and I feel confident that the representatives of India and Pakistan will agree with me that this is unquestionably the case.

The third interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan [S/1430, S/1430/ Add. ), S/ 14301 Add. 2, S/1430/Add. 3) drew particular attention to three matters which have hindered the Commission in its work. Two of these matters, namely, the disposal of the Azad forces and the withdrawal of troops from Jammu and Kashmir, can, in the view of my delegation, be linked together when we reflect upon ways and means of overcoming the impasse which has been reached. It seems to us that, viewed against the proper background, these matters are not of such a major character that a solution is impossible. Both Governments are, after all, pledged to determine the final accession of Kashmir in accordance with the will of the people expressed through a free and impartial plebiscite. The principles which are to govern the arrangements for the plebiscite have, moreover, been agreed by both parties and are set out in the United Nations Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949. Clearly, however, conditions for the plebiscite cannot be established so long as there is any reasonable ground for fear on the part of any of the inhabitants of Jammu and Kashmir. It is, therefore, fundamental that the armed forces in the State, no matter what their description may be, should be so reduced in number and so disposed as to afford a guarantee to the people that they will be left free to exercise their votes without any form of anxiety or pressure. I do not think that either India or Pakistan would attempt to dispute this view, and we, for our part, would certainly support any arrangements which they might agree upon for the effective reduction of the armed forces which are now established within the borders of the State.

In regard to the question of the Northern Area, my Government is impressed by the statement in paragraph 273 of the Commission's report that "the entry of Indian forces into the area north of the cease-fire line would almost inevitably lead to a renewal of hostilities." It is, of course, the duty of the Security Council to eliminate such a contingency. It will be remembered that all members of the Commission except one felt that the Government of India ought, in the circumstance, to be willing to waive a claim which has, in any event, to be considered afresh in connection with the preparation of conditions for the holding of a plebiscite.

According to my information, the proposals which the President submitted to the two parties were prepared only after the closest consultation with them. They were designed to pay the utmost possible regard to the legitimate interests of the two parties to this dispute.

I do not think anyone would wish to question the general considerations which are set out in paragraph 1 of the proposals.

In paragraph 2 I note that it is laid down that the programme of progressive demilitarisation shall be agreed between the parties. Having regard to the objectives which have been accepted publicly by both Governments, it seems to me impossible to quarrel with this paragraph. No doubt special considerations and interests might need to be taken into account in preparing the program, but given good will on the part of all concerned, I believe that it would be possible to achieve a result which would be equitable and acceptable.

The remaining paragraphs of the proposal seem to my delegation to be equally appropriate, having regard to the circumstances in which we find ourselves, and the history of this matter.

I would, therefore, as to the parties that these proposals seem to me to correspond broadly to the views of well-disposed and impartial observers of the Kashmir scene.. I know that both the Indian and Pakistan delegations have been reflecting upon them with all seriousness, and that this matter calls for the display of great statesmanship on the part of the leaders of both countries. Let us, however, be under no illusion about the purport of these proposals. What is under consideration is not a final solution of the Kashmir problem, but rather the next step in a process leading towards the plebiscite which, as both side, are agreed, shall take place to decide the ultimate fate of Kashmir. The two Governments have had submitted to them well-intentioned and objective suggestions designed to achieve the end which both of them desire. It will, of course, be understood that there is no desire to exclude consideration of any modifications or amendments that would help to achieve the object in view.

In conclusion, I would extend to the President and to the delegations of India and Pakistan our good wishes in the anxious negotiations which are now proceeding. I have every confidence that it will be found possible to reach an understanding along the lines suggested by the President, which will enable progress to be made in this matter fairly and satisfactorily to all concerned.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sunde (Norway) in the Security Council Meeting No. 458 held on 29 December 1949

Since it was my suggestion which led the Security Council. to impose upon the President the arduous and delicate task of conciliation, I think it is also incumbent upon me to thank him for the untiring and selfless devotion with which he has proceeded with the discharge of his mandate. What I called the "short-cut" in terms of the history of the Kashmir dispute has turned out to be long indeed in terms of the sacrifices which it has entailed for the President. At the time when most people were enjoying a he went about his important task with complete disregard for his personal convenience and in a spirit of whole-hearted devotion to the interests of the community of nations.

His statement today makes it clear to all of us that he has made every effort which was humanly possible in order to clarify the issues involved in the Kashmir dispute and that he has succeeded in defining clearly the areas of disagreement. His proposal for a basis of agreement, in my opinion, cuts. across those remaining areas in a fair and equitable manner. I shall not presume to embark upon a detailed evaluation of that proposal. It can, of course, not be judged entirely on its intrinsic value; the controlling consideration must be its effect upon the life and happiness of the population of the disputed area itself and upon the vital interests of the two great nations. of India and Pakistan. I do not have the knowledge of Jammu and Kashmir or of their tangled history which would make it possible for me to judge the merits of the opposing claims. to the territory. However, the very remoteness of my country from the area in question and the fact that my Government entertains equally friendly relations with both the parties to the dispute, make it possible for me to view the problems with no other interests in mind than those of justice and peace.

Besides the establishment of the cease-fire line, the important fact which stands out greatly to the credit of the Commission and of the parties themselves is that the two Governments have clearly and unequivocally agreed that the future of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined by the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite. The only disagreements which remain concern the methods through which the necessary conditions for such a plebiscite could best be assured. To me it would seem tragic if disagreements in regard to these essentially procedural problems should block

the settlement for which we are all hoping. This brings me naturally to the basis of the agreement. which has been suggested by the President and which he has so eloquently and so convincingly presented to us today.

His proposal has the merit of brevity. Even a cursory perusal makes it clear, however, that every word has been carefully weighed and inspired by an earnest and well-advised desire to strike a just and equitable balance between the conflicting interests.

His proposal involves no retreat from the important positions which have so painstakingly been reached by the Commission in agreement with the parties. The resolutions of 13 August 1948 and 5 January 1949 remain in force and are modified only on those points that have become outmoded and outpaced by subsequent events. On those parties-I refer especially to the new principles of demilitarisation his suggestions seem eminently fair and just, and the Azad forces in the Northern Area are dealt with clearly and equitably. In all frankness, I must say that I fail to perceive what objections the parties could have to this proposal, which could be reconciled with their common goal of a free and impartial plebiscite.

I should like to beseech the parties with all the urgency at my command to take full account of the fact that this dispute between the two countries is the vital concern of the world at large, and that they have undertaken the solemn obligation under the Charter of the United Nations to settle international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace, security and justice are endangered. not

In conclusion, I should like to suggest that the negotiations between the parties should be continued under the auspices of the President, General McNaughton. Who has already done so much to reconcile their points of view, and of whose insight into and knowledge of the matter full cognizance should be taken. It is my suggestion that the President's mediation should, if necessary, and if he is willing, continue after the expiration of his term as President.

 Text of the Speech made by the President General Me Naughton (Canada) in the Security Council Meeting No. 458 held on 29 December, 1949

The Council will recall that at our last two meetings it was agreed to employ simultaneous interpretation for all statements made by members of the Council and by other representatives and to use consecutive interpretation only for procedural matters and when we came to a vote on any draft resolution which might be submitted to the Council. I think that normally this is a very useful procedure which we have come to adopt. But the situation with which the Council is faced today is unfortunately not normal, and I think that in consequence some modification would be advisable. The difficulty is that, over the last few days, telegraph and telephone communication with the capitals of India and Pakistan have proved difficult and there have been delays in the transmission and receipt of important messages. The result is that, despite every endeavour by all concerned, I have not been able to place myself in a position to distribute a report on these negotiations in advance of this meeting. Moreover, I should like to emphasise both the importance and the delicacy of the negotiations which have been. undertaken during the past fortnight on behalf of the Council. My statement and the discussion which follows it in the Council should therefore, in any opinion, be given the facility of consecutive interpretation, in order that all members may have the best opportunity we can provide for consideration of the matter. I therefore suggest that, during this meeting of the Council, we should adopt the system of consecutive interpretation for all statements made by members of the Council.

As there is no objection to that procedure, I shall consider it adopted.

I should like now to make a brief statement as President, reporting on my consultations with the representatives of India and of Pakistan. The Security Council will recall that at our 457th meeting, held on 17 December 1949, the representative of

Norway introduced a proposal that "the President should meet informally with the two parties and examine with them the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem". This proposal was adopted by the Council by a vote of 9 in favour with 2 abstentions. I therefore undertook to accept the responsibility assigned to me, and thereafter to call the Council together as soon as I had anything to report which might merit consideration.

Pursuant to this decision of the Security Council, I have, since 17 December, held frequent meetings with the representatives of India and of Pakistan individually, in a very serious endeavour to find a basis for a solution of the difficult question with which we are faced. I have also had the benefit of a meeting held on 20 December with the members of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan; with Mr. Colban, who has been with the Commission as the personal representative of the Secretary-General; with General Delvoie, Military Adviser to the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan, and with Mr. Marin, the Commission's legal advisor.

During the course of my meetings with the representatives of India and of Pakistan, and at their request, I undertook to formulate a proposal for submission in writing to the parties for consideration by their respective Governments. The various clauses of this proposal were put through a process of prolonged and detailed preliminary discussion with the parties in the draft stage. I submitted the proposal to the two parties on Thursday, 22 December, and a copy of it has been distributed to members of this Council.

I have naturally had to study many aspects of the problem, and, in my proposal, I have sought to take as basic the practical task of bringing about conditions in which the plebiscite could be held. The proposal is based firmly on the principle originally offered unilaterally by the Government of India in a far-seeing and statesmanlike declaration and, since then, accepted and re-affirmed repeatedly by both parties : that the future of the State of Jammu and Kashmir will be determined by the freely expressed will of its people. I have therefore endeavoured, in so far as possible, to concentrate on developing, through the application of common sense and agreement, a basis for a practical and expeditious solution of this question by a plebiscite. I have intentionally avoided attempting to analyse or pronounce judgement on the rights and wrongs in the disputed issues of the past few years, except in so far as these matters need to be taken into considerations for the specific purpose of bringing about a settlement. In my judgement, a legalistic and historical approach to the matter would require the examination of a complex mass of detail, the relevance of which to arranging an early plebiscite seems at the least to be doubtful. It is my hope that the general method of approach by seeking to concentrate on the development of acceptable arrangements for the future, rather than pronouncing upon issues raised in the past, will commend itself to the members of the Security Council. Certainly, it seems to me the most hopeful course to follow, because, to a large and important extent, this method of approach does not require us to choose between conflicting interpretations of what has happened.

In my meetings with the representatives of the two parties, it was confirmed that, in so far as the establishment of conditions under which, in the language of part III of the resolution of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan of 13 August 1948 [S/1100 paragraph 75], "...the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be determined in accordance with the will of the people" was concerned, the three main points of disagreement put forward by the respective parties concerned: first, the Azad forces; secondly, the question of demilitarisation; and thirdly, the Northern Area.

In the meetings which followed, after traversing the whole field of the problem I came to the view that the general plans advanced by our Commission in accordance with the Security Council's directions were appropriate to the situation. The difficulty, however, was that in one very essential part or stage of these plans the necessary agreement by the Government of India and Pakistan had not been secured, and there was therefore a block in carrying these plans into effect. The problem, therefore, was not one of formulating and putting forward a wholly new proposal, but rather of taking that part of the existing plan in connexion with which difficulties had arisen and finding ways and means, here and now, of resolving these difficulties so that the matter might go forward with the minimum change in organisation or in procedure.

In thus attempting to isolate the area where agreement was lacking. I reached the conclusion that it concerned essentially the various stages of demilitarisation which should take place during the period prior to the plebiscite. In my meetings with the parties, I came increasingly to believe that, if the question of demilitarisation prior to the plebiscite could be treated as a unified whole, a basis for agreement might well be developed. Accordingly, the proposal I have advanced is designed to remove the block by providing the basis for an agreed programme of demilitarisation, to take place before the plebiscite is held. I should like again to emphasize that the proposals I have submitted relate specifically to this period prior to the plebiscite, and that they do not purport in any way to supersede the functions of the Plebiscite Administrator, as set forth in our Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949 [S/1196). The powers therein assigned to the Plebiscite Administrator would of course remain in full force and effect. Indeed, the object of my proposal is to advance the time when the Plebiscite Administrator will take up his duties in Kashmir and carry them through to a conclusion.

During the course of my discussions, the most detailed examination has been given to the questions of the Azad forces, the Northern Area, the security of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the maintenance of law and order, the necessity for safeguarding the free expression of public opinion in the State, and to other similar important points which have been the subject of long previous debate between the two parties. The detailed examination of these points reinforced my view that the question of demilitarisation prior to the plebiscite must be considered as a whole and that, if the parties could agree on a programme of progressive demilitarisation, the essential requirement leading to conditions requisite to a free and impartial plebiscite would have been established and the way would be open for the Plebiscite. Administrator to discharge the functions which have already been entrusted to him. The provisions contained in my proposal do, in my judgement, provide the basis for a fair and equitable programme of demilitarisation which would legitimate the interests of both parties.

I should like to emphasise that in this proposal, as in many similar cases, it is not to be expected that all its provisions would be agreeable to both parties. Yet the solution of the Kashmir dispute depends, in my opinion, essentially on a spirit of adjustment, and it was in this view that my proposal was put forward.

The task of drafting a proposal of this nature has not been an easy one, and I have had to call on the close and continued attention of the parties as well as of the staff which has helped me in this work. Every word of this proposal has been examined with great care and discussed during the drafting stage with the respective parties. Its provisions were repeatedly re-drafted in an effort to obtain the maximum degree of equity and acceptability to both sides. I am sure that the necessity for this procedure, time-consuming as it has been, will be apparent to members of the Security Council and I hope, therefore, that my colleagues will not think that I have imposed unduly on their patience.

I had intended, with the full assent of the representatives of India and of Pakistan, that the procedure to be followed thereafter would be that, once definite comments or suggestions for amendment to my proposal had reached me from both India and from Pakistan, I would arrange for the simultaneous interchange of their comments. Each party would thus be in possession of the explicit views of the other side. I had then intended to see their representatives separately with a view to endeavouring to narrow the differences, in so far as might be possible, in discussions with them. It would be, I thought, by this process that agreements on matters of substance would be incorporated into the proposal. The text would also be subject to drafting changes which might be required to ensure that the intent had been correctly reflected in its terms.

Unfortunately, the difficulties of communication with the Sub-Continent, to which I have previously referred, have resulted in delay in the receipt of the texts of the two replies. One I received yesterday and the other only today. The process of interchange will therefore not be completed until later on today, after this meeting. Moreover, I believe that in. this present stage of negotiation it is certainly advantageous to give the parties adequate time for consideration of all aspects of each other's suggested amendments before requiring them to take up public positions from which it might be difficult to recede.

What is now required, I think, is that the parties should proceed with their negotiations under whatever auspices they or the Council may desire. For this purpose the proposal which have been put forward, and the amendments which have been submitted, will serve as an appropriate basis from which, I hope, in due course, agreement may be reached.

I believe that my statement reflects accurately the principles which have guided me in the preparation of the proposals which I have submitted to the parties. I should like to conclude by expressing my very deep sense of appreciation to the representatives of India and Pakistan for the courteous attention which they have, one and all, given to me in the conduct of these discussions, and for the great care they have taken in providing me, as promptly as was possible, with all the information which I felt I required.

 Text of the Speech made by Sir Alexander Cadogan (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 457 held on 17 December, 1949

In the first place I should like to warmly endorse what has been said by the speaker who preceded me in tribute to the Commission and to its report. It seems to me that the members of the Commission have done a very excellent, conscientious and useful work, of which we may take advantage.

In the second place, on the matter of procedure which has been raised, I should like to support very strongly the suggestion made by the representative of Norway; namely, that the President should forthwith endeavour, in consultation with the parties, to find a way of achieving the agreement which we all seek. It seems to me that that is a practical and efficient way of working. Both the parties and everyone seated at the Council table have complete confidence in the ability and integrity of the President, and I should hope that, if he agrees to take that course, and if the parties, as I am confident they will, also agree to it, it might lead to excellent results.

As the representative of Norway has pointed out, that does not derogate in any way from the powers of the Security Council. It does not remove the matter in any way from its purview; it merely prepares the work for it in the most efficient manner possible. Naturally, every proposal will come back to the Council for submission and find decision. The Council remains the master of the proceedings. But I do think that the procedure that has been proposed by the representative of Norway would conduct best to a satisfactory and, I should hope, a rapid agreement, and if it is agreed that that procedure should be tried it will have, I am. sure, our very best wishes for its success.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Sunde (Norway) in the Security Council Meeting No. 457 held on 17 December, 1949

First of all, I should like to compliment. Mr. Samper on his lucid exposition of the work of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. His statement well supplements the Commission's excellent report of 5 December. I believe that I represent the general feeling of the Security Council when I praise the Commission for its report. It is succinct, yet complete and comprehensive, and testifies clearly to the unwavering effort of the Commission to carry out its difficult and pressing task in a spirit of fairness and impartiality which does credit not only to the Commission itself but also to the United Nations.

Nevertheless, the most important part of the Kashmir problem still remains unsolved. Let us not, however, forget the very real progress that has been achieved by the Commission. There is no more fighting A cease-fire line has been drawn and agreed to by the opposing parties. This is no small achievement in itself, and it is all the more encouraging because it strengthens our confidence that the parties which are facing each other across this precarious line want peace, as do all the rest of us, and that they are ready to explore together all avenues by which that peace can be attained.

It serves no purpose, however, to close our eyes to the fact that an impasse has been reached on the main avenue along which the mediation effort of the United Nations has so far progressed. It seems to me that the time has come to stop and take new bearings, and I am wondering whether some new technique or approach might not be found by which the need and earnest desire of the parties for a solution could be translated into the final agreement for which we are all hoping. I frankly doubt the utility of threshing out again in the Security Council the manifold and complex issues which are at stake in this case. Tentative suggestions swiftly become unalterable opinions when they are expressed in this Council, and arguments advanced in the heat of discussion have a tendency to become vested with the habiliments of national prestige. Such a discussion might yet become necessary. But would it not be better first to explore another approach, another avenue, or-let me say frankly-a short cut ?

We have this month as our President the representative of a country which is closely related to both the parties by the ties of friendship and common interest which prevail in the Commonwealth of Nations. Our President possesses also. to an eminent degree the authority, as well as the broad minded impartiality is necessary for the reconciliation of opposing points of view. It is my suggestion, therefore, that the President should meet informally with the two parties and examine with them the possibility of finding a mutually satisfactory basis for dealing with the Kashmir problem.

This procedure was adopted at various times during the first four months of 1948 and led to the Council's resolution of 21 April of the same year [S/726] By adopting this suggestion we should also, in my opinion. take full advantage of the fact that Pakistan and India are represented at the headquarters of the United Nations by such eminent statesmen and diplomats as Sir Mohammad Zafrulla Khan and Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai, who have no superiors and few equals in the art of negotiation and conciliation.

In conclusion, may I say that if my suggestion is adopted we should request the President to report back to the Security Council for its consideration any proposal which might develop during his meetings with the parties.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Samper (Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 457 held on 17 December, 1949

I am honoured to represent the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan before the Security Council and, on behalf of the Commission, I wish to express our appreciation for the Council's reception.

The members of the Security Council will recall that, when the Council received the Commission. in Paris in November 1948 [382nd meeting], conversations were underway looking towards an agreement between the Governments of India and Pakistan on the principles relating to a free and impartial plebiscite in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and that the result of these conversations was subsequently embodied in the Commission's resolution of 5 January 1949. [S/1196, paragraph 151.

The Security Council is aware that the Governments of India and Pakistan, on their own initiative and before the Commission had reached the SubContinent again, made the cease fire order effective as of 1 January 1949. The Commission is pleased to report that the high commands of the Indian and Pakistan Armies made every effort to avoid incidents and violations of the cease-fire during the very difficult time when no line as such existed, and that it was due largely to their attitude of conciliation and understanding that the military conference in Karachi in July of this year led to the agreement on a line. The task of demarcating the line was achieved through the assistance of United Nations military observers under the Commission's military adviser. The immediate and vital objective of the Security Council-namely, the cessation of hostilities in the State of Jammu and Kashmir-has thus not only been achieved, but ensured, through the co-operation and the good will of the two Governments.

The Commission, unfortunately, cannot inform the Security Council that substantial progress has been made in the implementation of the succeeding parts of the Com mission's resolutions of 13 August 1948 [S/1100 paragraph 75] and 5 January 1949. After eight months of negotiations, the Commission has deemed it advisable, having in mind the importance of continuing an active movement towards a solution of the problem, to refer the matter back to the Security Council. We believe that the parent body will more easily find means for making the adjustments and modifications which today have become necessary for the execution of the commitments and agreements entered into by the two. Governments.

The Commission's third interim report [S/1430 and S/1430/Add. 1 and Add. 2] has been before members of the Security Council for several days now, and I do not believe it will be necessary to take up the time of the Council by going into a lengthy expose of the contents. Members of the Council are aware that, throughout eight months, the Commission endeavoured to mediate the differences which existed in the way of implementing part II of the first resolution dealing with the truce and principally concerned with the withdrawal of troops [S/1100, paragraph 75]. The Commission maintained direct contact with the two (Governments individually in New Delhi and in Karachi. It instituted sub committees. It drafted truce terms of its own, which were presented to the two Governments and which, in the light of the response of the two Governments, were modified in so far as this was possible, keeping in mind the framework and the principles which were our guides. The Commission also suggested a joint political meeting with the two Governments for the purpose of reaching agreement on the truce; this meeting was subsequently cancelled by the Commission. Finally, in a last endeavour, the Commission asked the two Governments if they would be willing to submit to arbitration the differences arising between them as regards the implementation of part II of the resolution of 13 August 1948.

The third interim report endeavours to set forth objectively, impartially and comprehensively the reasons for the unsuccessful outcome of the negotiations, which cover the period from February to September 1949. It has been the Commission's intention to show how the strict letter of previous commitments has become more and more rigid in a changing and dynamic situation, and how questions which, in the light of the overall problem and of the objective pursued by the two Governments and by the United Nations in the dispute, might be considered as of lesser importance have, in fact, impeded positive action on the part of the two Governments, in spite of their desire to proceed to a settlement.

The facts of the case are clear. The main issues stand well defined. The Commission believes that three of these issues are the most important: first, the withdrawal of troops. from the State, which is essential for the creation of conditions for a free and impartial plebiscite: secondly, and closely linked, the disposal of the Azad Kashmir forces in the western part of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and thirdly, the administration and defence of the northern area of the State.

When this information at hand gathered from the past experience of the Commission, it is our hope that future action under the auspices of the United Nations and with the co-operations of India and Pakistan may be facilitated. Should this prove to be the case, the Commission will then have served an important and useful purpose in furthering the solution of this dispute.

In the conclusions of the report, the Commission has described the spirit which animated not in drafting that report. It also has expressed the belief that the present pattern, as it stands, is outmoded and unsuited in respect of questions of timing and method, and that this pattern should be made freer and more ample for mediation to be effective. The Commission is of the opinion that a single individual can now more expeditiously undertake what might be termed the third phase of the Kashmir dispute. It has so recommended to the Security Council and hopes that consultations with the representatives of India and Pakistan will take place to this end.

I have the privilege formally to present for the consideration of members of the Security Council the third interim report of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. The report was prepared in Geneva and was signed there by four of the five members: the representatives of Argentina, Belgium, Colombia and the United States of America. The representative of Czechoslovakia reserved his position at the time of discussion of the report until a later date. At a meeting of the Commission held yesterday after noon at Lake Success, the representative of Czechoslovakia presented his delegation's minority view [S/1430 Add. 3].

Before concluding these brief remarks, may I express the Commission's gratitude to the Governments of India and Pakistan for the courtesy, consideration and warm hospitality which they have extended to the Commission during its stay on the Sub-Continent. We are convinced that both Governments wish to find a peaceful and a final solution of this dispute and that it is the intention of the Governments of India and Pakistan to continue to cooperate with the United Nations for this purpose.

The Commission and its Rapporteur, the Belgian representative, of course remain at the disposal of the Security Council and its President.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Korbel. (Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan) in the Security Council Meeting No. 399 held on 13 January, 1949

May I be allowed to say on behalf of the Commission that it feels highly honoured to appear today before the Security Council to present its second interim report. The first interim report [/1100] was presented to the Council on 25 November 1948 and covered the period of the Commission's activities in the sub continent. The second interim report covers the Commission's work in Geneva, in Paris, and at Lake Success to the present date.

Members of the Security Council will remember that on 13 August last year, when in Karachi, the Commission passed a resolution consisting of three parts, which appears in its first interim report [S/1100] In part one it asked the Governments of India and Pakistan to stop fighting; in part two it proposed certain principles for a truce; and in part three it expressed in general terms its conviction that the future status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be decided by the free will of the people of that State.

The Government of India signified its acceptance of the Commission's resolution, and the Government of Pakistan attached to its acceptance certain conditions regarding mainly the question of conditions under which the plebiscite should be held in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

On the basis of this, the Commission, when in Paris, suggested that two representatives of the Governments of India and Pakistan should take part in conversations regarding the conditions and the basic principles which should govern the holding of the plebiscite. Both Governments responded to this suggestion affirmatively. Thus, the Commission held several informal conversations with the representatives of India and Pakistan, these conversations being held partly by the Commission as a body, and partly by individual members of the Commission.

These conversations led the Commission to formulate its final proposals, which were communicated to both Governments on 11 December. In the Commission's communication. It was stated that the Commission hoped that those proposals would be accepted by both Governments in their entirety.

The main points of those proposals were: that the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be decided by way of a free and impartial plebiscite that the Secretary-General of the United Nation, would nominate, in agreement with the Commission, a plebiscite administrator who would be a person of high international standing and who would derive from the Government of Jammu and Kashmir the powers which he considered necessary to organise and conduct a free and impartial plebiscite. The Commission. further proposed that all human and political rights should be re-established and guaranteed; that the return of refugees should be organised by two commissions to be nominated by the Governments of India and Pakistan respectively; that the question of the final disposal of the armed forces which are in the State of Jammu and Kashmir should be solved by the plebiscite administrator and the Commission in consultation with both Governments and the competent authorities; finally that the plebiscite administrator should report the result of the plebiscite to the Commissions and to the Government of Jammu and Kashmir, and that the Commission should inform the Security Council whether the plebiscite had been free and impartial.

The Commission put these proposals before the two Governments and decided to send one of its members to the sub-continent so that he might place his services at the disposal of both Governments, if any clarification or interpretation of the Commission's proposals were needed.

The representative of Colombia, Minister Lozano Agudelo, accompanied by his alternate, Mr. Samper Gomez, and the personal representative of the Secretary-General, paid a short visit to both capitals and held several conversations with officials of the Governments of Pakistan and India. In view of the clarifications which Minister Lozano offered to both Governments, I am highly privileged to announce that both Governments have accepted the Commission's proposals and, on the basis of these, have declared the cessation of hostilities in the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as from 1 January 1949.

The Commission reconvened on 5 January at Lake Success, where the report of Minister Lozano Agudelo was considered and approved, where the second interim report to the Security Council was elaborated and approved, and where a resolution was adopted embodying the proposals accepted by both Governments. The Commission then resolved to return to the sub-continent in the immediate future.

If the Commission has succeeded in the first stage of its work, it is only thanks to the Governments of India and Pakistan. The Commission has been working on these proposals in Paris in close contact with the representatives of both Governments, who have offered the Commission all possible help and assistance; and thus they have given proof of their desire to solve the problem of Kashmir in a peaceful way.

The Commission will return in a few days to the sub continent in order to work in close co-operation with the two Governments on the implementation of part I and part II of its resolution of 13 August, and, at a later stage, it will elaborate the details of the Commission's proposals. The Commission sincerely believes that on returning to Lake Success it will be able to report to the Security Council that it has carried to a happy conclusion the honourable mission. which has been bestowed upon it.

The President: The Security Council has just heard the statement of the Chairman of the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan. As President of the Council, I should like to take this opportunity to express on behalf of the Council our sincere satisfaction with the report which we have now received. All members of this Council, and, indeed, all Members of the United Nations, were heartened to learn from the joint communique issued by the Governments of India and Pakistan on 1 January that they had accepted the proposals which had been advanced to them. by our Commission, and that arrangements for a cease-fire had been made to come into effect at one minute before midnight on 1 January. This action on the part of India and Pakistan. represents a most important and encouraging event in the history of the United Nations.

The situation in Kashmir, which has been before this Council for over a year and which has been a source of grave anxiety, now seems to be on the way towards an acceptable solution. The ending of this controversy will have a profound result, not only for the good relations between India and Pakistan, but its effect will extend to peoples far beyond those territories, who will be inspired by the good example which has been set and encouraged by the fact that this very difficult and grave controversy has yielded to patience and persistent effort by the parties through the medium of an agency created by the United Nations.

In expressing, therefore, our appreciation and gratification to the two Governments whose earnest efforts for an agreement have now reached the satisfactory stage which has been reported to us today, I should also like to express the appreciation of the Council to the Commission for India and Pakistan, whose members we are privileged to have at our table today. They are discharging with every credit the exacting task with which they have been entrusted. I believe that the members of this Council would like to take advantage of this opportunity to hear from the representatives of India and Pakistan.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 304 held on 26 May, 1948

The delegation of the United States supports the proposal made by the President of the Security Council at the opening of this meeting. This proposal, if we understand it correctly, is that the Commission should act according to paragraph D of the resolution of 20 January 1948 [document S/654, which reads as follows:

"D. The Commission shall perform the functions described in clause C: (1) in regard to the situation in the Jammu and Kashmir State set out in the letter, dated 1 January 1948, from the representative of India addressed to the President of the Security Council, and in the letter, dated 15 January 1948 from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General; and (2) in regard to other situations set out in the letter, dated 15 January 1948, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs. of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, when the Security Council so directs."

This would be with the understanding that the Security Council Commission would concentrate its efforts initially on the Kashmir issue, taking up the Junagadh question at its discretion.

I listened with great interest to the remarks of the representative of Argentina. I must say that, for the time being, we feel persuaded that some investigation should be made by the Security Council's Committee of Experts with reference to the general situation which has been disclosed by the experience of the Security Council in this India Pakistan case, and in other cases as well. We have noticed that there is apparently no sense of obligation on the part of the parties to the case. The parties come to this great United Nations under the very generous spiritual terms of the Charter. The Charter invites all the world to bring its difficulties and disputes to this international Organization.. The parties come here and engage the very expensive machinery of the United Nations and the time of distinguished men from all over the world, and there does not seem to be much sense of obligation to give respect and due regard to the judgement arrived at.

I notice that the Charter in Article 35, paragraph 2, mentions an obligation. It is related to the privilege that is granted to a State not a Member of the United Nations "...bring to the attention of the Security Council or of the General Assembly any dispute to which it is a party if it accepts in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter."

It might be very helpful if this Committee of experts would examine what was meant by that. What was the obligation of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter? Neither party that has come before the Security Council seems ready to admit that there is any obligation whatsoever. In fact, the recommendations of the Security Council in this case were made because the parties came to the Security Council and represented that if this dispute were allowed to continue without the intervention of the United Nations, it might lead to a threat to the peace and a breach of the peace. That is the foundation on which the Security Council acted.

For four months following that, we heard the parties on both sides and diligently tried to get them to arrive at a solution by negotiation but they could not do it. They barely yielded from the original trading position that they took at the beginning of these negotiations. Finally, they called upon the Security Council to make recommendations; both parties asked the Security Council to do that. And the Security Council passed a resolution, to many of the most important articles which we are now told they will not assent, but which they will resist. That is an absurd position for the United Nations to be in.

Are there no obligations under Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" ? If there are not, to what does this. refer? In Article 35, paragraph 2, it says "...if it accepts in advance, for the purpose of the dispute, the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter".

I am very interested in what the representative of Argentina has proposed here, and I shall examine the specific terms of his proposal with great attention because I think that we have learned from our three years' experience here that there are certain matters relating to the interpretation of Chapter VI that need to be clarified and explained to the world, so that in this benevolent work of ours, in which the whole world is free to air its disputes and grievances, we may have some method of effective collaboration under the pacific methods of dispute Parties sit at this table with almost unlimited privileges, having all the privileges of any Member save that of voting; they engage in prolonged representations; they engage in vis-a-vis debate against each other here in the Security Council; they have the opportunity to debate particular specific provisions of a resolution when we are at work upon an undertaking that is peculiarly up to the Security Council then when it comes to the performance or execution of the terms of a resolution, they say they will not consider it.

There is something exceedingly wrong about that. It is not only morally wrong, but I think that it is not in conformity with the spirit of the Charter and that the time has come when the Security Council should get out an interpretation of what are the obligations of pacific settlement provided in the present Charter and when it should lay them down, so that in some such manner, in recognition of some of the cost, the parties will assume an obligation in advance to abide by the decision that is arrived at through this Chapter of the Charter. If parties come here and both of them call upon the Security Council to make recommendations for the solution of their dispute, ought they not in advance agree to abide by it ? They are not bound to ask the Security Council to make such recommendations, but if they do, I ask the Committee of Experts if they have not thereby implied that they will conform or try to conform to them.

This situation is a serious one affecting the foundations of the world and of this great United Nations, and I shall consequently examine with great interest the proposal, when it comes, of the representative of Argentina But, for the time being, the United States delegation favours the proposal made by the President for reference of all these matters to the Commission with the understanding that the Kashmir matter has priority and that the other matters shall be taken up at its discretion.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 304 held on 26 May, 1948

During an early part of the Security Council's discussion with regard to this question-back in the month of February -my delegation suggested that it might be better for the Security Council to adopt a number of general principles, leaving the details to be worked out on the spot by the Security Council Commission. That suggestion was made because of the consideration that the members of the Security Council did not have all the local knowledge which the solution of the problem required. In the second place, we had one other consideration, namely, that if the members of the Commission were on the spot, they might achieve more through personal relationships than the Security Council could achieve here, at such a distance.

The suggestion of the delegation of China was not adopted by the Security Council, mainly, I think, because we all deferred on that point to the judgement of the delegation of the United Kingdom. Since the delegation of China adopted that standpoint early in the debate, it cannot, of course, object to the Commission going out at this moment.

As I listened to the objections put before the Security Council by the representative of India, I had the feeling that some of them were not of so serious a nature as to prevent our commission from doing good work. I have in mind particularly the objection he raised on the ground of peace and order. It is evident that it is as much in the interest of the Security Council that peace and order should be restored in Kashmir as it is in the interest of India and Pakistan. As I stated before, it certainly would not be the intention of our Commission to make it impossible for peace and order to be restored in Kashmir. The plebiscite itself could not take place unless peace and order were completely attained in that region. Therefore, the objections of the representative of India on that score seem to me to be susceptible to adjustment on the spot.

However, the representative of India raised another objection, namely, that referring to the coalition Cabinet in Kashmir. I felt that this objection was more serious and that it might hamper the activities of our Commission. It is on that ground that I hesitate to urge that the Commission. should proceed at once to India. Without some adjustment on that particular point, I feel that our Commission may not find it possible to do useful work. Again on that point, so far as I am concerned, I am ready to defer to the judgement of the representative of the United Kingdom.

However, if we should agree that the Commission should proceed to India, I feel it would be wise not to refer all of the disputes to that Commission at once. We might allow the Commission to work for some time on the Kashmir question. If due progress is made on that question, then further matters might be referred to the Commission. If the Commission is overloaded at the very beginning, its chance of success even with regard to Kashmir may be diminished.

Without passing judgement on these various questions or their relative importance, we must agree that, once we make some headway with the question of Kashmir, we shall find other questions much easier of solution. In case we meet with a deadlock on Kashmir, then I am afraid success on the other questions will not be easy.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Lawford (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 304 held on 26 May, 1948

While appreciating the force of the arguments which have just been used by the representative of Argentina, my delegation feels that if we wait as long as he suggests, we may be waiting forever and the Commission may never go out to Kashmir at all. We are strongly in favour of the Commission's now proceeding to India at the earliest opportunity though. We also agree with what I think was the President's suggestion that a preliminary meeting should be held here for convenience. We also agree with what I understand was the President's proposal that the Commission should deal with these additional questions, as well as the question of Kashmir, when it is in India.

We consider that the utmost care should be taken not to prejudice any further the chances of successful action by the Commission with regard to the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. In the circumstances, we consider it important that the Commission should not take action on these issues until it judges this to be appropriate, having in mind that its first objective should be to arrange, in cooperation with both parties, for measures to bring about a settlement in Kashmir. This does not mean that we should in any way minimise the importance with which these additional questions are regarded. by the delegation of Pakistan. On the contrary, we wish the Commission to deal with them as the President would suggest.

Above all, we want to ensure, by avoiding further delay, lengthy discussion, recrimination and counter-recrimination, that the time we have already spent here on these questions in our view, in the interests of India and Pakistan-should not prove, through the passage of still further time, to have been completely wasted.

The Commission may have a very difficult task, but if the representative of Argentina will allow me to say so, its members are eminent, distinguished and efficient men, and we are hopeful, in the United Kingdom, that once the Commission arrives in India, whatever the appearances may be now, it may finally be able to accomplish the just and lasting settlement which we all-and above all, I think-India and Pakistan have at heart.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. EL-Khouri (Syria) in the Security Council Meeting No. 286 held on 21 April, 1948

We all agreed from the beginning of this discussion that an effort should be made to get the agreement of both parties on one kind of resolution, with the belief that it would be advantageous for the Security Council and for the implementation of its programme if the programme coincided with the wishes and had the consent of both parties. Unfortunately, until now, this agreement has not been achieved. Each side persists in its position. From the speeches which we heard yesterday [285th meeting), we understood that neither of the parties is in agreement with this joint draft resolution.

This matter has certain aspects. There is the political aspect, and there is the judicial and legal aspect of the question. I have noticed that this joint draft resolution, which has been proposed by six and supported by seven members of the Security Council, deals in a very good manner with the political aspect, the finding of a solution which would cope with the political phases of the question in the best possible way.

But at the same time, there is also the legal aspect which has not even been discussed, nor considered at all, in the Security Council. The legal aspect to which I refer is the matter of accession, which is now considered by the Indian delegation as an accomplished fact. The Security Council did not refer to this matter in any way, but I believe that, while dealing with such a situation and considering a final resolution on it, this aspect should not be neglected altogether. This is obviously the case if we bear in mind what the accession is and to what extent it can be considered, in such a way that it would be helpful for both parties and for the Commission which is to be established to assist in the implementation of the resolution.

I understood from the statements presented by both parties that the accession of one of the States to either India or Pakistan will, in the first place, be made by the ruler, by the Maharajah of that State, when he is in full agreement with his subjects. If there is no agreement between the Maharajah and his subjects, then the plebiscite is the only way to decide the question of accession, whether it be to one side or the other.

I do not know how many of the 585 States in the subcontinent of India have acceded to Dominion or the other in this way, but there were only two cases brought before us : Kashmir and Junagadh. Both of them are in similar, antagonistic positions. In Jammu and Kashmir there is a great majority of Muslims, about eighty per cent. In Junagadh it is the contrary. The population is Hindu, and the Maharajah is Muslim, while in Kashmir the population is Muslim and the Maharajah is Hindu. It seems that in both States the accession was declared by the Maharajah, according to his own wish, sentiment and intentions. The Muslim Maharajah of Junagadh submitted his decision of accession to Pakistan, being himself Muslim and the majority of his subjects Hindus. In Kashmir it was just the contrary. The Maharajah is Hindu, and the majority of the people are Muslims, so the Maharajah of Kashmir expressed his desire to make the accession to India. In both cases the wishes of the Maharajah were opposed to the desire and wishes of his subjects. According to the agreement reached between the two parties when the Dominions of India and Pakistan were created, in cases where there is conflict between a Maharajah and his subjects, only a plebiscite would determine to which Dominion accession would be made.

We have seen what happened in the case of Junagadh. When the Maharajah announced the accession to Pakistan, the Indian Government did not accept it, and they occupied it. Junagadh with military forces deposed the Maharajah and established a government. Afterwards, they had a new plebiscite, and the result of the plebiscite were in favour of India, so that the desire of the Maharajah for accession to Pakistan was nullified

In the State of Kashmir it was altogether different. The Maharajah announced his desire for accession to India against the wishes of a good number of the people. I do not now, whether that number was in the majority or in the minority but there was revolution and bloodshed in Kashmir for some time. The Muslim people there, as we understood it were demanding that the Maharajah declare accession to Pakistan, which he did not wish to do. He declared accession to India and called for help from India. India at once sent forces to occupy the country and became the de facto authority there, complying with the wish of the Maharajah, while the population is still fighting and receiving help from raiders and intruders from other neighbouring countries and from the Muslim tribes who came to help their people

There is another government, the Azad government. Kashmir, which was established to defend their case. In this matter, as far as I understand it, it would not be legally and judicially correct if we considered the accession as already having taken place, and that it cannot be modified except by a plebiscite 1 consider that, up to the present time, there is no accession of Kashmir to either Dominion, because that accession which was proposed was not in conformity with the arrangements and arrangement made between the two parties, and it is not an arrangement with the people of Kashmir themselves whereby they have been given a chance for self-determination, an opportunity to decide their own fate. The wishes of one person should not dominate, as in the case of Junagadh. It is correct to say that the Maharajah of Junagadh, in declaring his accession to Pakistan, was not acting within the rules of our Charter, and that the people of Junagadh were not given the opportunity for self-determination, the chance to determine the fate of their future government. It was the same case in Kashmir.

Let us leave this point and pass on to the second point, which is that there are now two candidates for election in this plebiscite India and Pakistan.

I consider it to be fair and just that, in drafting a resolution, the Security Council should give to both parties equal advantage and privileges in controlling the plebiscite which is to be held. I believe that it is obligatory that both parties should have the same advantages, just as, in all elections held throughout the world, when there are two candidates, they are given the same opportunities to exercise their right of control and of seeing what is going on. One party should not be given the advantage over the other.

The draft resolution before the Security Council envisages, as a first point, the establishment of peace. Toward that end, it calls upon the people of Kashmir and the tribe men who are there to stop fighting. I am sure that such an appeal will not be effective.

Sub-paragraph 1 (b) of the draft resolution calls upon the Government of Pakistan to use its best endeavours to persuade the people of Kashmir and the tribesmen who came there from outside the State that this resolution guarantees for them full freedom to express their views in a just and free plebiscite.

The representative of Pakistan indicated on 19 April [285th meeting] that he is not convinced that this resolution will guarantee the fulfilment of the aims indicated in it. How can we ask the Government of Pakistan to persuade others of something about which that Government is not itself convinced? The representative of Pakistan stated clearly that he is not convinced that this resolution will guarantee a free plebiscite and equal rights to all the people. If he is not convinced, certainly we cannot expect him to convince others. Therefore, the first point as to the establishment of peace fails from the beginning. If the Government of Pakistan will not undertake to

carry out the provisions of sub-paragraph 1 (b), who will do it? It will have to be done by force. The Indian forces which are in Kashmir will continue to fight with the tribesmen and with the opposing party, in order to try to establish peace. In that case, our resolution would not be effective in leading towards a peaceful solution of the matter.

As to the next point, the plebiscite, under the terms of the joint resolution Pakistan would have no opportunity to participate in controlling or inspecting or supervising it. The Government of India has been given a certain amount of supervisory authority; Pakistan has been given nothing. I think that for reasons of fairness and practicability, the Security Council must give equal opportunities to both parties in any resolution. Only in that way could the resolution be worthy of being described as a recommendation not of either of the parties, but of the Security Council. If we fail to meet the desires of the parties, then we have to draft our resolution in fair terms, giving equal advantages to both.

If the authors of the joint resolution would agree to certain amendments in it, I should perhaps find it acceptable. However, I understand from reliable sources that the seven members who have supported the resolution are not ready to vote for any amendments. Furthermore, the paper circulated today by the Indian delegation indicates that it does not accept this joint draft resolution and will not agree to any amendments unless the Pakistan delegation is willing to accept the first draft resolution submitted by the President of the Security Council, the representative of China [document S/699].

For these reasons, I do not see much hope in supporting this draft resolution, or in trying to put it into effect. The fighting will continue in the present circumstances, and no results will be attained. Therefore, as long as the draft resolution does not have the support of both parties, I prefer to abstain from voting. The President: As no other member of the Security Council wishes to speak. I take it that it is the wish of the Council to proceed as has been suggested, namely, to discuss and vote upon this draft resolution paragraph by paragraph. We shall do so accordingly.

Before I ask the Assistant Secretary-General to read the draft resolution paragraph by paragraph, I wish to make clear once more that it has never been the understanding of the authors of this draft resolution, nor their wish, intention, or right, to restrict the views of any member of the Security Council in any way, or to prevent their submission of whatever amendments they may see fit to any of its paragraphs.

Mr. Sobolev (Assistant Secretary-General in charge of Security Council Affairs): The preamble of the revised draft resolution at present under discussion reads as follows: "The Security Council,

Having considered the complaint of the Government of India concerning the dispute over the State of Jammu and Kashmir,

"Being strongly of the opinion that the early restoration of peace and order in Jammu and Kashmir is essential and that India and Pakistan should do their utmost to bring about a cessation of all fighting.

"Noting with satisfaction that both India and Pakistan desire that the question of the accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India or Pakistan should be decided through the democratic method of a free and impartial plebiscite,

"Considering that the continuation of the dispute is likely to endanger international peace and security,"

The President: The complaint has been voiced that the authors of this proposal failed, in the preamble, to give their opinion as to the steps that should be taken by Pakistan to secure the removal of the invaders.

I would like to explain that the matter of the complaint is very clearly and fully covered in the substantive part of the draft resolution, in the paragraph relating to the things that Pakistan should do on the recommendation of the Security Council. In this connection we did not think that the Security Council had been invited, or could be invited, to give an opinion on the legal merits of the case as to the rights of the parties to this dispute. The Security Council was requested by them to take appropriate measures for the peaceful settlement of the dispute and to restore friendly relations between them. That is what we have been seeking to achieve with these. recommendations.

I might add that, at the very beginning of these deliberations, the position seemed to be more hopeful than it is at present. As a matter of fact, both parties agreed to the appointment of a Commission that would act on behalf of the Security Council [230 meeting], but the members of which would be appointed by the parties to the dispute. At the beginning we did not think it would be necessary in any way to have direct representation of the Security Council on the Commission.

The Security Council has had an opportunity to hear the extreme points of view so ably stated by the representatives of India and Pakistan and also to appreciate the task with which it was confronted in trying to bring about some sort of conciliation between those two extreme points of view in order to make what would be considered a just, fair and acceptable recommendation.

It is a matter of great disappointment to the Security Council to find that, on the contrary, both parties seem to think very definitely that the Council has not learned enough to either side in trying to meet their wishes, but we still hope that the Council has not learned enough to either side in trying to meet their wishes, but we still hope that the spirit of the friendly approach that brought the parties before the Security Council will be continued, and that the overriding interests of the sub-continent will very decisively influence the parties to consider these recommendations as favourably as possible before doing anything that will in any way I will not say endanger international peace and security because I don't even like to think of that-but which might in any way widen the breach between the two Dominions. The Security Council believes that it is clearly in their interest to make every possible effort to reach an understanding, and confidently expects that after this discussion has come to an end, the Governments of India and Pakistan will see their way to remedying whatever shortcomings this draft resolution may have, with a view to finding a way to work in agreement towards this proposed goal of a free and impartial plebiscite by means of which the people of Jammu and Kashmir would be given an opportunity to decide the question of accession either to India or to Pakistan.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Austin (United States of America) in the Security Council Meeting No. 284 held on 17 April, 1948

The India Pakistan question, which is item 2 of the agenda, is before the Security Council on the basis of allegations by both India and Pakistan that a dispute exists between them, the continuance of which is likely to endanger international peace and security. That is the reason they have come here to the Security Council. Indeed, they pictured a scene of fearsome threat to international peace and security in the several representations which they made to the Council. The facts which they submitted, facts in which we believe and on which we rely, justify their allegations.

The Security Council does not have to pass judgement upon any issue of fact in this dispute beyond the one on which both parties were agreed, and which they pressed earnestly. The Security Council has never undertaken to decide the particular issues of fact or of law existing between the parties. It was sufficient to charge the Security Council with the duty to have before it a dispute, the continuance of which was likely to endanger international peace and security.

Our responsibility was challenged at once, and it remains challenged now. We are acting under a general mandate which is beyond the specific provisions of the Charter. It is contained in paragraph 1 of Article 24, which reads as follows:

"In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Member confers on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international relations. peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."

We have acted on behalf on these two Members for whom we have very great respect. We recognize the contribution which they have made to peace and we recognize the devotion of both of them to the principles and policies of the Security Council and their earnest desire to arrive at a solution of this dispute which will be peaceful and just Their conduct has been according to that principle.

India appeared before the Security Council with the request that the Council assist in restoring peace and order in Kashmir by calling upon Pakistan to desist from certain actions which the Government of India considered to be unfriendly

The members of the Security Council will note that in this revised draft resolution, an attempt has been made to deal with this particular allegation. In paragraph 1, under the title, "Restoration of peace and order' we find this recommendation:

"1. The Government of Pakistan should undertake to use its best endeavours: "(a) To secure the withdrawal from the State of Jammu and Kashmir of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals not normally resident therein who have entered the State for the purpose of fighting and prevent any intrusion into the State of such elements and any furnishing of material aid to those fighting in the State.

"(b) To make known to all concerned that the measures. indicated in this and the following paragraphs provide full freedom to all subjects of the State, regardless of creed, caste, or party, to express their views and to vote on the question of the accession of the State, as that therefore they should cooperate in the maintenance of peace and order."

On the other hand, in the counter-complaint of Pakistan, it was maintained that the people of Kashmir had strong economic and cultural ties with their Pakistan neighbours but were not able, under circumstances prevailing in the State, to express their wishes on the ultimate affiliation of the State to one or other of the two dominions. Fortunately, the Government of India had, at the time of Kashmir's accession, committed itself to the statesman like principle that this question must ultimately be decided by the freely-expressed will of the people of the State. Responsible Indian leaders announced. their willingness to see the issue resolved by a plebiscite, under international auspices.

Therefore, the problem which confronted the sponsors in working out this revised draft resolution was a simple one in some ways. It was principally a problem of pacification and of establishing a plebiscite, about which both parties had begged the Security Council to do something. However, the difficulty remains of devising procedures whereby the plebiscite would be administered fairly and impartially. We soon ascertained that the method which we have always tried in every one of these issues, the continuance of which might endanger the security and peace of the world, and which was the same method which we tried here-of solution by negotiation, with the Security Council standing on the sideline and exhorting the parties did not accomplish its objective. It was apparently impossible for the parties to agree on a solution.

Thereupon normally, under the Charter, it would become the duty of the Security Council to make recommendations. But in addition to that, in this case, the Security Council was requested by both parties to make specific recommendations. Of course, both sides reserved the right to challenge those recommendations and state their objections to them. I anticipate that they will do that now.

In passing, let me say that the record of this case has been admirable from the point of view of the attitude of the parties and their representatives present here. Their conduct, in a parliamentary way, has been superior to any I have ever witnessed They have treated each other with consideration, and considerate courtesy, and they have made our task far more pleasant than it can be, as we well know, when parties hurl invectives at each other and when they fail to observe the rules of good conduct in parliamentary debate. Here we have a notable example of what a cultured person has accomplished and can do. The example is a very good one.

This plan is not a final solution. It does not pretend to be more than a recommendation, accepting the creation of a subordinate organ representing the Security Council to help these parties in accordance with their request.

The first part of the revised draft resolution is a resolution, not a recommendation, and amends the previous resolution by increasing the number of members of the Commission to five. It instructs the Commission in a manner which relates to the future and shows that the theory which the Security Council has about a solution here is one work; that this is only a plan; only a recommendation; a suggestion to these parties, and calls for work on their part and a continuation of their efforts, but with the aid of good offices of the Security Council. This Commission is vested with authority not merely of a good offices commission, but with the authority of a good offices commission, but with the authority of a mediator. to settle controversies, questions and interpretations, and to enable these parties to accomplish the business of a final settlement on the spot.

Thus, it says in the first part of the draft resolution, which is both effective and binding

"Instructs the Commission to proceed at once to the Indian sub continent and there place its good offices and mediation at the disposal of the Governments of India and Pakistan with a view to facilitating the taking of the necessary measures, both with respect to the restoration of peace and order and to the holding of a plebiscite, by the two Governments, acting in cooperation with one another and with the Commission, and further instructs the Commission to keep the Council informed of the action taken under the resolution..."

All that which follows this is a recommendation. Even the part which relates to the Commission is a recommendation that the Commission should, at the end of the plebiscite, certify to the Security Council whether the plebiscite has or has not been really free and impartial. The Security Council is undertaking here and now to fulfil for these parties the requests they have made and lay before them these recommendations. The Security Council. has no authority to apply sanctions to these recommendations. The Security Council has been called upon for its good offices under the pacific settlement provision of the Charter. It is just responding now to this request, and what it is offering to these Members of the United Nations, on whose behalf the Security Council is acting, is something which represents three months of effort on the part of the Security Council to arrive, not at a decision and final solution, not at a determination of the issues between the parties, but at a method to be recommended to them to apply to their dispute, and for them to arrive at a solution by agreement in contrast to a solution by military decision.

In passing, permit me to thank Mr. Noel Baker for what he had to say about this subject of the achievement of the United Nations. Of course, I recognize that what he refers to in this instance is that, had there not been a United Nations to come to with this case three months ago, there might have been a devastating war of great magnitude already in progress. We recognize that because the United Nations was in being and because the parties came here with their dispute, that which existed and threatened so much, calmed a little and certainly did not increase, and that the situation today is better in India and Pakistan, because the United Nations was here to consider carefully the appeals of both these parties.

We have now considered these appeals and have given the best that our judgement affords. It took something to do this. I am sure the parties realise that, when they appeal to a body like this, one made up of eleven different nations, they are appealing to individuals and to countries that will have different points of view and envisage these problems differently, and that, therefore, it takes a spirit of conciliation in order to reach that measure of agreement which has already been indicated here by the fact that there are several sponsors to this draft resolution. It is not because of the dignity or worth of these sponsors, but because of the fact that so many of them in studying this case came to this measure of agreement, that there seems to me to be cause for considering carefully these recommendations.

I had intended to go into the development of the character of future action under these resolutions, but I think I have said enough. Now if the parties desire to study this draft resolution with that point of view, aiming at the realisation. that the character of this resolution is one of help, that it is not one imposing anything on them, and that it takes one other factor in order to make it a binding obligation agreement or assent to it, or action under it-then I have a feeling, and I certainly have a hope, that what the Security Council has done for them at their request may be found by them to be worthy of trying out, and, if tried out, may be found feasible and effective.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Noel Baker (United Kingdom) in the Security Council Meeting No. 284 held on 17 April, 1948

I wish to join with the President and the representatives of China, Canada and Belgium in recommending this draft resolution to the favourable consideration of our esteemed and patient colleagues from India and Pakistan. I want to ask the representatives of those two States-as I also want to ask the Security Council-to consider the alternative before them, before their Governments and their peoples, if this effort fails.

This resolution, as the President has said, is the result of long debates and of much patient labour by the Security. Council over many weeks. Its paragraphs, or many of them, have their roots in our discussions in those dark January days when our work began. I believed then, as I believe now, that the Kashmir dispute is the greatest and the gravest single issue in international affairs.

The Security Council, and, with respect, the parties, can only judge this resolution against the background of what has happened in the last three months When the Government of India brought its complaint before the Security Council both parties told us told us with an urgency and conviction which we could not disregard-that their differences about Kashmir might lead them into war. Scores of witnesses of many nationalities told me that war at that time was very near.

Those men who best knew India and Pakistan believed that if war had happened, it might have been as dangerous and destructive a conflict as any in the history of mankind. Only two months before, the Governments, by superb personal heroism, by statesmanlike co-operation of no ordinary kind, had brought the communal troubles in the Punjab to an end. But if war had happened, if the armies had been locked in battle at the front, who could have stopped the communal strife from breaking out again? There are nearly forty million Muslims in India, and many non-Muslims on the other side. If war had happened, tribesmen might have come down not in tens, but in hundreds of thousands. They might have been a mortal danger to both the Governments of India and Pakistan. A sub-continental war involving four hundred million people, a fifth of all mankind, would have been an immeasurable. disaster to India, to Pakistan and to the world. And it might. have happened. Indeed, in the view of men whom I judge much wiser and more experienced than myself, it would have happened but for the wisdom and the statesmanship which brought the matter before the Security Council. It was certain that when the first phase of our labour was ended, when the Indian delegation returned to Delhi to consult its Government, the risk of war, by general consent, had grown much less. Who can doubt that the discussions in the Security Council had played their part in that result ?

Mr. Austin, in a penetrating review of the work of the United Nations in this month's issue of United Nations World has shown that the Security Council, and the other institutions to which it is linked, have had a record of achievement much greater than the defeatists think. But if the Security Council had done nothing else but help India and Pakistan to avoid a conflict, that alone would have earned it the gratitude of all mankind. That fact that great improvement in the situation which resulted, at least in part, from the first phase. of our labours of which we were barely conscious then-should be present in our minds as we near the conclusion of the second phase of our labours here today. It should be present in our minds because plainly it may bear on the value of the draft resolution, for which I hope we shall obtain the unanimous endorsement of the Security Council.

May I now, like the representative of China, speak briefly of the draft resolution and explain how my Government understands it. To my Government it is in no sense an award, a verdict, a judgement between the parties; it is a plan, a body of measures-which the Security Council, I hope, will propose to India and Pakistan this afternoon-designed to stop the present fighting in Kashmir and to provide machinery for the fair and impartial plebiscite on Kashmir's future, which both India and Pakistan desire.

The draft resolution was proposed by the six delegations whom the President, in his discretion, thought it useful to consult. That means that the draft resolution is a collective effort. That means that none of us, if he could have done it for himself, would have drawn it exactly as it stands. But we take individual and collective responsibility for the result because we think that these measures, if they are adopted, will give the best hope for a peaceful settlement of the dispute, and a settlement honourable to both India and Pakistan. We believe, moreover, that something along those lines would, in the light of the history of the dispute, have been proposed by almost anybody of impartial men.

Of course, the whole plan depends upon co-operation between the Governments of the two parties, co-operation between those Governments and the Commission which the Security Council will send out. The draft resolution is a directive to that Commission. It can be altered, amplified and improved if the two Governments should so agree. I hope, therefore, that the representatives of India and Pakistan will not hastily reject this draft resolution.

May I draw attention, as the representative of China has done, to some of the main features which I hope the representatives of Pakistan and India will bear in mind.

First and foremost, the draft resolution declares that while the threat to peace, though it has been diminished, has not yet disappeared, there is still costly and disastrous fighting in Kashmir; there is still the risk that a wider conflict might occur. Something, some plans must, in the general interest, be adopted with a minimum of delay.

Secondly, as I have said, these measures depend on the co-operation of the parties to the dispute, and I add that without cooperation freely and generously accorded, not only this plan, but no plan can work.

Thirdly, the draft resolution imposes a heavy duty on Pakistan in helping to stop the fighting and to prevent it breaking out again. I believe this draft resolution should point the way to the Government of Pakistan towards fulfilment of this duty and, indeed, its fulfilment is surely, in the long run, in the highest and enduring interests of Pakistan itself. It must be Pakistan's overwhelming interest that the fighting shall cease; that the tribesmen shall go home; that the volunteers shall return from Kashmir to Pakistan and that, at last, argument and reason shall supersede disorder.

Fourthly, the Commission will be stronger, thanks to the President, than we first intended. Its link with the Security Council will be closer, and I hope it will be quickly at its work, for the part to be played by the Commission is essential to the plan.

Fifthly, and most important, the draft resolution boldly faces the main problems which our discussions have revealed.

We all know what they are; we have debated them for months the plebiscite, the occupation, the administration of the country until the plebiscite has been held.

In my Government's belief, the proposals for the plebiscite are bold and fair.

The Secretary-General, as the representative of China has explained, will nominate a plebiscite administrator who, in the name of the Government of Kashmir

-but with direct access to the Commission, and through the Commission to the Security Council-will organise and carry out this consultation with the people, which India and Pakistan desire. In the name of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and with the assistance of the Secretary-General, he will build up his own administration; he will draft the regulations under which the plebiscite will be conducted, and the Government of India will ensure that the State will give to his regulations the force of law, and that the State will delegate to him such powers as he in his discretion he may require to make the plebiscite as fair and as impartial as it ought to be. And at any moment, if he thinks things are going wrong, he can report directly to the Commission, and through the Commission to the Security Council and to the Governments of Kashmir, of India and Pakistan, and it will be his duty to report on any circumstance which, in his opinion, may interfere with the freedom of the vote.

It has been said that these arrangements, though admirable, in themselves, may be frustrated by the troops which occupy the country or by the Government of the State which is in power. Let me speak of occupation. I ask anyone who takes that view to consider fairly the measures proposed regarding the occupation in par. graphs 2, 3, 4, 5 and 8. I find it difficult to believe that, taken together and supervised by the Commission and its observers, for which paragraph 17 provides, these measures will not remove the dangers of intimidation by armed forces in the State. Indeed, I believe that at one time we were near agreement between the parties on this question, and I hope that agreement may yet be obtained.

By far the hardest problem has been, and still remains, that of governing the country while the plebiscite is being prepared and carried through. Some people feet that whatever power the plebiscite administrator may possess, the people who must vote might be influenced by the determined but hidden power of the Government then in office. Paragraph 6 contains the solution which we propose. I have no doubt that both India and Pakistan will raise objections to it. I have no doubt that if, in the end, they should adopt it, this most intractable of all our problems would be solved. Indeed, I go so far as to say this: that unless it can be solved on the basis of the formula which this paragraph contains, I doubt if any peaceful settlement can be obtained at all.

I know that some people think that these measures fall short of what the Security Council should require, that there are loopholes still for improper pressure, for under influence on the people of Kashmir.

I ask these people to consider the guarantees that lie behind these measures which we have proposed. There is the fundamental guarantee that protects the liberty of voting in every country where men are free. I mean the right of every political party to hold its meetings, to canvass, to move about, to conduct its electoral campaign at its desires. It is the right of every individual leader or follower of any party to take complaints to the plebiscite administrator or to the Commission. There are the members of the plebiscite administration, the observers whom the Commission will appoint-observers who will have the right to go wherever they will and to report to the Commission on any matter dealt with in this plan. There are the general guarantees for the rights of minorities which our paragraphs set up.

Lastly, it is the duty of the Commission to report on the plebiscite, to pronounce in judgement whether, in its opinion, it has been just and fair. Who will face an adverse verdict of the Commission ? I find it hard to think that, with these guarantees, the measures we have proposed will not succeed in guaranteeing full freedom and safety to all concerned.

I know that the Governments of India and Pakistan I will have to study this plan as a whole, together with the practical details of its application. I hope they will not decide their action on too meticulous a survey of the paper details of what we here propose. In government, it is the spirit behind the paper, the will to make it work, that really counts. The Weimar Republic had the most perfect paper constitution in the world, built on the pure word of John Stuart Mill. Our House of Commons has no paper constitution at all. The Reichstag perished in Hitler's fire. Hitler's bombs destroyed our chamber but our House lives on.

I have explained how my Government views this draft resolution. May I now say why I hope its measures may find favour with both parties to the dispute, and may find it without prolonged delay? To begin with, the sands of time, in literal truth, are running out. Kashmir is a land of mountains. In October the snow begins to fall. If the plebiscite which both sides desire is to be held this year, the Commission and the administrator must be at work within a month. The alternative is a summer, perhaps another winter, of uncertainty, maybe of fighting, with all that that would mean.

I think this draft resolution deserves success because the Security Council, if I may say so, has done an honest, a patient and a careful piece of work. It has been accused by: reckless outsiders of favouring one side or the other, of playing politics, of yielding to threats and blackmail. I am not always here among the representatives on the Security Council. I can look at the Security Council with a detached and impartial eye. I venture to say that all such suggestions as I have quoted are arrant nonsense. The Security Council has sought only to do right and justice, with equal friendship for the peoples and equal affection for the representatives of India and Pakistan, and I am encouraged to hope that this draft resolution will succeed by the very attitude which the parties have adopted from the start.

I said almost in the first words I used in January last [229th meeting] that I believed that in their heart of hearts both Governments desired to settle. I believe it even more today. Both Governments want a plebiscite in Kashmir; both want it to be fair.

Sir Zafrullah told us on 10 March 1948 [266th meeting] that if there were any condition in his proposals to which even a suspicion might attach that that condition would put pressure on an elector to vote in favour of Pakistan, he would gladly give it up. On that same day the leader of the Indian delegation told us that his Government was as anxious as anyone could be that the plebiscite should be conducted in a perfectly free and unfettered manner. He told us that it wanted the conduct of the plebiscite to be fully independent; that it wanted the Kashmir voters to be free from every pressure, whether by the Government, by the army or by the police.

The Security Council accepts these assurances in the full good faith in which they are made. I say to Sir Zafrullah that unless I was honestly and wholeheartedly convinced that the measures in this resolution would result in an honest plebiscite and a fair and just result, I would never have spoken on it and I would never have commended it to his favourable consideration, as I have done today. I any to the leader of the Indian delegation that I am certain there is nothing in this draft resolution which the Indian Government could not safely and honourably accept.

What is the alternative to something like this resolution ? Let us suppose that both sides reject it; no commission goes to India ; no plebiscite is held. Is it not clear that the situation will not stay as it is today; that it will inevitably, perhaps immediately, grow worse that forces may be unleashed which it may be very difficult or even impossible to control?

And what are the real interests involved in this dispute ? The people of Kashmir are one per cent of the population of India and Pakistan. Their economic wealth may be 0.1 per cent. What both Governments want is that the people of Kashmir shall live in peace and freedom under the Government which they themselves choose. That is a common interest which surely far outweighs any conflicting interests which there may be.

On 10 March [266th meeting, the Indian representative told us in his brave and generous speech that he would come back fully equipped to participate in our debate with greater chances of achieving a result which would be satisfactory to both India and Pakistan. His words recall to me that noble declaration made by his Government on its Independence Day:

"We have proclaimed that we as a nation and a people stand for world peace and co-operation among nations... We stand for democracy. The method of democracy is to find peaceful solutions for all problems... By violence and hatred no problem is solved." The proclamation ended as follows:

For though Pakistan may be separated from India by political boundaries, yet the essential spiritual unity of the country, like its geographic unity, cannot and should not be broken up. Any injury to one part of the country. hurts the other parts."

India and Pakistan have an overriding common interest in settling this question and in settling it now. Kashmir has become the very pivot of their relations, on which all else turns. It is the crossroads at which the course of future. history will be decided. The decision means everything to them. It means little less to Asia and the world.

The representative of India speaks for three hundred million people, people with vast resources and an ancient culture. The representative of Pakistan speaks for seventy million people, more than Hitler had when he launched his war. The influence of India and Pakistan as great nations in Asia, as great nations in the world, must be, is, and will be inevitably great. We know that both believe in peace, that both place their hopes in the United Nations. Their action now will have a worldwide and permanent effect. A settlement would bring hope to every nation, would strengthen faith in international peace and friendship, would enhance the glory. of both peoples as no victory of arms could ever do.

On Independence Day, the Prime Minister of India told his people that they were writing history anew. I came across a letter which he wrote to his little daughter on her thirteenth birthday. He said:

"Ordinary people are not usually heroic, but a time comes when a whole people are filled with faith for a great cause and then even simple ordinary men and women become heroes, and history becomes stirring and epoch-making. Great leaders have something in them which inspires a whole people and makes them do great deeds."

That is supremely true of the world in which we live today.

On Monday last, speaking to my countrymen, Mrs. Rossevelt told us how we could win the great historic struggle for peace, happiness and freedom in which all nations are now. engaged. Mrs. Rossvelt said:

"It must be done by strong men and women, strong in their convictions and the love which casts out fear and makes men free. It must be done by strong nations whose ways are rooted in individual freedom and belief in justice and laws...... ...The great are humble and cannot be humiliated.........Pray God, we join together and invite all others to join us in

creating a world there justice, truth and good faith rule."

That is the very spirit of the United Nations. May it, in this great matter, now prevail.

 Text of the Speech made by Mr. Nisot (Belgium) in the Security Council Meeting No. 284 held on 28 January, 1948

The resolution before us recommends to both parties certain procedures or methods of adjustment which in the opinion of the Council, should help to solve their differences. It places at the disposal of the two parties the services of the Commission, already set up by the Council, which will offer its good offices and ensure a means for mediation. Hence, what is proposed now is to obtain the agreement of both parties, which is a necessary condition for the peaceful solution. of their difficulties. The purpose of the recommendations formulated in the resolution is to guide and support their efforts.

The Belgian delegation hopes that the Governments concerned in the dispute will take full advantage of these recommendations and will support, to the greatest possible degree, any action that the Commission may take to bring about the desired results.

Text of the Speech made by Mr. Tsiang (China) in the Security Council Meeting No. 289. held on 17 April, 1948

Exactly one month has passed since the Security Council last considered the dispute concerning the State of Jammu and Kashmir. We have devoted an entire month to the study of the problem.

At the end of the last meeting of the Security Council. On this question, the 269th meeting of 18 March 1948, I stated that I would rely on the experience of the two previous presidents of the Security Council, the representatives of Belgium and Canada. I also stated that I would welcome suggestions, oral or written, from other delegations with regard to the solution of this problem. Since the adjournment of the meeting of the Security Council of 18 March, I received detailed suggestions from the delegation of the United Kingdom and the delegation of the United States of America. Because of the fact that I anticipated that the solution of the problem would be delayed until this month of April, I also invited the delegation of Colombia to join in

the discussion. Thus, a total of six delegations participated in the revised draft resolution.

The President of the Security Council called attention. to the fact that when he assumed office, he had before him a revised draft resolution, dated 30 March. That revised draft resolution was, in fact, the third since the one I submitted on 18 March [document S/699]. Since the submission of the revised draft resolution on of 30 March, many additional revisions have been submitted.

The present revised draft resolution is the considered judgement of six delegations, arrived at after weeks of hard work. As the representative of Canada said, the conferences on this question were animated by only one purpose, that of helping the parties to come to an agreement, and failing that agreement between the parties, to find the fairest and most effective means of achieving a peaceful settlement.

The problem has two aspects; first, the restoration of peace and order, and secondly, a plebiscite to decide whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall become a part of the Dominion of India or a part of the Dominion of Pakistan.

The problem is indeed complicated, having its roots in the long political, cultural and religious history of the sub continent, together with the very complicated geographical aspect. If we had only considered the complications contained in the problem, we might well have despaired of ever finding a solution. Fortunately, the Government of India, together with the two delegations present, furnished the Security Council with a key to the solution.

Long before the problem was brought to the attention of the Security Council, the Prime Minister of India said that he would leave the question of the eventual accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the decision of the people of that State. Since the question came before the Security Council, the delegation of India and the delegation of Pakistan have both insisted that that is their wish. That gave us the key. Therefore, the plebiscite is the arch of this draft resolution. The question should and must be solved by a fair and imperial plebiscite. The greater part of the draft resolution is aimed at making that plebiscite as fair and as impartial as possible.

I should like to explain to the Security Council the various safeguards for the freedom and impartiality of the plebiscite which this draft resolution provides.

The plebiscite cannot be singled out alone. It is related to the entire military and political situation in the State, and therefore, we have included provisions which cover the general situation. However, I should like first of all to deal with the plebiscite itself.

The following provisions are contained in the draft resolution:

First, we provide that an administrator of international repute, nominated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, shall be appointed to be the head of the plebiscite

administration.

Secondly, this internationally nominated administrator shall have the right to choose his own assistants and subordinates. In other words, this international personage will