Anwar Alam  

The Trump Administration’s decision to withdraw from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the Iran nuclear deal, on May 9, has raised serious concerns in the international community on the stability of West Asia. Emboldened by the US action, the Israeli Government launched a series of missile attacks on the Iranian missile sites in Syria. It further shot 59 and wounded over 200 Palestinians protesting against the US decision to move its Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Arab governments, while welcoming the American withdrawal from the JCPOA, condemned the Israeli actions.

The JCPOA, a 2015 Obama signature deal, had signified international consensus on peaceful means to prevent Iran from making nuclear bombs. It subjected Iran to the rigorous international inspection regime headed by International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) and linked the gradual lifting of international sanctions on Iran in lieu of the latter’s cooperation in adhering to the JCPOA. The deal, in part also, intended to re-integrate Iran in the regional order of West Asia. From all accounts, including from IAEA, Iran have been dutifully implementing the provisions of the JCPOA since 2015. In return, Iran benefitted economically from lifting of international sanctions, and gained international recognition as a normal political actor after its political isolation was ended.

Now after the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, it is interesting to note the regional and international reactions. It has raised some questions: Whether the US withdrawal will contribute towards the stability or will further de-stabilise the region? What are the implications for India?

The international community primarily looked at the US move as emanating from unstable, erratic, incoherent personality of Trump and his understanding of politics as “commercial activity” without any long-term vision of international order. While the force of personality does play some role in shaping the political outcomes; Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from a series of international agreements ranging from the Paris Climate Deal in 2017 to the JCPOA in 2018 is not without hard rational political calculation and America’s national interests. These are all deft political moves to secure the American interests under the “doctrine of America First”. This is not for the first time that signatories to international agreements have left the international agreements; the history of international politics is littered with such examples.

The Trump Administration believes that Iran has grown taller and increased its influence in the region due to Obama’s West Asian policy, including the JCPOA. While Iran directly benefited from US’ military action in Afghanistan and Iraq, Obama’s doctrine of preference of multilateralism over unilateralism and its politics of gradual withdrawal of American militarily troops in the region provided “conducive political space” for Iran to increase its influence tremendously in the region; in addition to weakening the American security umbrella to the Gulf region. Moreover, the JCPOA only temporarily halted the Iranian dream of acquiring nuclear bombs; it did not eliminate the future possibility of the Iranian nuclear bomb, which greatly concerns America’s Gulf allies, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE. With region being de-stabilised in post-Arab Spring period both from within (terrorism, ISIS, economic hardship, rapid decline in international oil prices) and outside (weakening of American security structure), a future possibility of “nuclear” Iran with already existing discourse of politicised Shiism does pose a direct threat to the existence of Sunni Gulf states (particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE). Moreover it has potential to plunge the region into the nuclear arms race. It is for this reason that the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have welcomed the US withdrawal from the JCPOA.

The Trump’s decision is intended to achieve two crucial goals: (a) To regain America’s presence, prestige, domination and influence in the region. Since mid-1950s, the US has not allowed any other global entity to share its influence in the region. The reluctance on the part of the Obama Administration to ensure America’s traditional commitment to security of the regimes in the region, particularly the Gulf regimes, began to be perceived as its relative decline in the influential quarters of the region. If the Trump Administration considers the American military intervention in Iraq as the “biggest blunder” of American foreign policy, it is also critical of “soft policy” of the Obama Administration in the region which allowed other external forces, particularly Iran and Russia, to assert, expand and carve out their zone of influence in the region. (B) To bring back the regime of international sanctions on Iran, which are being considered as the toughest ever sanctions both in their scope (number of items) and jurisdiction (subjecting companies and governments to punitive actions for doing business with Iran)? The US is said to be also working on mechanisms to target the Iranian presence in Syria, Iraq and Yemen.

The combined measures are intended either to cause “regime change” in Iran or to weaken the Iranian regime to an extent that it would cease to be a major force in the region. Thus the Trump Administration’s policy is to re-establish the old American paradigm in the region: maintain balance of power in the region and not allow any nation to develop capacity to threaten its interest or disturb the balance of power in the region. It may be noted that Iran gained its influence in the region not on account of its internal strength (economy, technical manpower, etc) but due to external situations (collapse of the Iraqi and Taliban regimes; chaos due to Arab Spring, development of ISIS and military weakness of the Gulf regimes, etc). The Trump Administration, therefore, believes that Iran took the advantage of fragile external conditions to boost its influence in the region by sponsoring terrorism.

In the current situation, a clear cut alliance pattern is emerging in West Asia. On one side is Iran-Syria-Turkey-Qatar alliance with localised Islamist terrorist forces backed by Russia; on the other side is the coalition of Saudi Arabia-UAE-other GCC members and Egypt, minus Qatar, that is aided by Israel and the US in the field of counter-terrorism.

How is India going to respond to the emerging contradictions in the region considering the fact that both Iran and Qatar are vital for India? India needs Iran as gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia besides supply of oil and gas. India is the third largest importer of oil and gas from Iran and it has heavily invested in Chabahar Port, which did help in transporting millions of tonnes of Indian wheat to Afghanistan. Chabahar is further important for constructing International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connecting India to Russia via Iran, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Similarly, India imports large amounts of gas from Qatar. India has faced such situations earlier and has pursued the policy of diplomatic balance though the weight of diplomatic balance has been titled in favour of the US-led international order against Iran.

Realistically speaking, India does not have much option but to toe the line of emerging informal alliance among US-Israel-Saudi Arabia-UAE without becoming an alliance partner for multiple considerations. First, India’s greatest concern is the maintenance of political stability in Gulf (particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE), which is the major source of remittance, bilateral trade, investment, supply of crude oil and gas. Besides, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have successfully collaborated with India in the field of counter-terrorism. Only the US, in collaboration with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, has capability and resources to maintain stability in the region. Second, the Saudis and the UAE together can easily compensate the loss of supply of oil to India. India will be within its right to negotiate with these two Arab countries on the term and conditions of trade favourable to India including the possibility of trading in Indian currency, a lucrative proposition that Iran has offered to India.

Politically, it is far more prudent for India to strengthen its relationship with countries championing pluralism and religious moderation such as the UAE. It is also crucial in our fight against Islamic radicalism in South Asia. In the emerging scenario, it is in India’s national interest to take a clear stand and reduce levels of engagement with Iran. The perception that the US is internationally isolated because of its withdrawal from the deal is erroneous. The US, with its enormous power and influence over international institutions, continues to set the global agenda and drive the international order. Some mega companies within Europe, including TOTAL, the oil giant, have announced the cancellation of projects with Iran in view of the likelihood of imposition of sanctions against Iran. This is an indication of what is to come. Pragmatism demands that India stands by the forces of stability in West Asia rather than pursuing an ambivalent policy that lacks both clarity and integrity.

(Anwar Alam   is Senior Fellow, Policy Perspectives Foundation, and former professor of international studies at Jawaharlal Nehru University and Jamia Millia Islamia, all in Delhi)

Courtesy: Pioneer: Saturday, 26 May 2018